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INTRODUCTION AND PLAN OF THE WORK.
The annual labour of every nation is the fund which originally supplies it
with all the necessaries and conveniencies of life which it annually
consumes, and which consist always either in the immediate produce of that
labour, or in what is purchased with that produce from other nations.
According, therefore, as this produce, or what is purchased with it, bears
a greater or smaller proportion to the number of those who are to consume
it, the nation will be better or worse supplied with all the necessaries and
conveniencies for which it has occasion.
But this proportion must in every nation be regulated by two different
circumstances: first, by the skill, dexterity, and judgment with which its
labour is generally applied; and, secondly, by the proportion between the
number of those who are employed in useful labour, and that of those who
are not so employed. Whatever be the soil, climate, or extent of territory of
any particular nation, the abundance or scantiness of its annual supply must,
in that particular situation, depend upon those two circumstances.
The abundance or scantiness of this supply, too, seems to depend more
upon the former of those two circumstances than upon the latter. Among the
savage nations of hunters and fishers, every individual who is able to work
is more or less employed in useful labour, and endeavours to provide, as
well as he can, the necessaries and conveniencies of life, for himself, and
such of his family or tribe as are either too old, or too young, or too infirm,
to go a-hunting and fishing. Such nations, however, are so miserably poor,
that, from mere want, they are frequently reduced, or at least think
themselves reduced, to the necessity sometimes of directly destroying, and
sometimes of abandoning their infants, their old people, and those afflicted
with lingering diseases, to perish with hunger, or to be devoured by wild
beasts. Among civilized and thriving nations, on the contrary, though a
great number of people do not labour at all, many of whom consume the
produce of ten times, frequently of a hundred times, more labour than the
greater part of those who work; yet the produce of the whole labour of the
society is so great, that all are often abundantly supplied; and a workman,
even of the lowest and poorest order, if he is frugal and industrious, may
enjoy a greater share of the necessaries and conveniencies of life than it is
possible for any savage to acquire.
The causes of this improvement in the productive powers of labour, and
the order according to which its produce is naturally distributed among the
different ranks and conditions of men in the society, make the subject of the
first book of this Inquiry.
Whatever be the actual state of the skill, dexterity, and judgment, with
which labour is applied in any nation, the abundance or scantiness of its
annual supply must depend, during the continuance of that state, upon the
proportion between the number of those who are annually employed in
useful labour, and that of those who are not so employed. The number of
useful and productive labourers, it will hereafter appear, is everywhere in
proportion to the quantity of capital stock which is employed in setting
them to work, and to the particular way in which it is so employed. The
second book, therefore, treats of the nature of capital stock, of the manner
in which it is gradually accumulated, and of the different quantities of
labour which it puts into motion, according to the different ways in which it
is employed.
Nations tolerably well advanced as to skill, dexterity, and judgment, in
the application of labour, have followed very different plans in the general
conduct or direction of it; and those plans have not all been equally
favourable to the greatness of its produce. The policy of some nations has
given extraordinary encouragement to the industry of the country; that of
others to the industry of towns. Scarce any nation has dealt equally and
impartially with every sort of industry. Since the down-fall of the Roman
empire, the policy of Europe has been more favourable to arts,
manufactures, and commerce, the industry of towns, than to agriculture, the
Industry of the country. The circumstances which seem to have introduced
and established this policy are explained in the third book.
Though those different plans were, perhaps, first introduced by the
private interests and prejudices of particular orders of men, without any
regard to, or foresight of, their consequences upon the general welfare of
the society; yet they have given occasion to very different theories of
political economy; of which some magnify the importance of that industry
which is carried on in towns, others of that which is carried on in the
country. Those theories have had a considerable influence, not only upon
the opinions of men of learning, but upon the public conduct of princes and
sovereign states. I have endeavoured, in the fourth book, to explain as fully
and distinctly as I can those different theories, and the principal effects
which they have produced in different ages and nations.
To explain in what has consisted the revenue of the great body of the
people, or what has been the nature of those funds, which, in different ages
and nations, have supplied their annual consumption, is the object of these
four first books. The fifth and last book treats of the revenue of the
sovereign, or commonwealth. In this book I have endeavoured to shew,
first, what are the necessary expenses of the sovereign, or commonwealth;
which of those expenses ought to be defrayed by the general contribution of
the whole society, and which of them, by that of some particular part only,
or of some particular members of it: secondly, what are the different
methods in which the whole society may be made to contribute towards
defraying the expenses incumbent on the whole society, and what are the
principal advantages and inconveniencies of each of those methods; and,
thirdly and lastly, what are the reasons and causes which have induced
almost all modern governments to mortgage some part of this revenue, or to
contract debts; and what have been the effects of those debts upon the real
wealth, the annual produce of the land and labour of the society.
BOOK I.
OF THE CAUSES OF IMPROVEMENT IN THE
PRODUCTIVE POWERS OF LABOUR, AND OF
THE ORDER ACCORDING TO WHICH ITS
PRODUCE IS NATURALLY DISTRIBUTED
AMONG THE DIFFERENT RANKS OF THE
PEOPLE.
CHAPTER I.
OF THE DIVISION OF LABOUR.
The greatest improvements in the productive powers of labour, and the
greater part of the skill, dexterity, and judgment, with which it is anywhere
directed, or applied, seem to have been the effects of the division of labour.
The effects of the division of labour, in the general business of society, will
be more easily understood, by considering in what manner it operates in
some particular manufactures. It is commonly supposed to be carried
furthest in some very trifling ones; not perhaps that it really is carried
further in them than in others of more importance: but in those trifling
manufactures which are destined to supply the small wants of but a small
number of people, the whole number of workmen must necessarily be
small; and those employed in every different branch of the work can often
be collected into the same workhouse, and placed at once under the view of
the spectator.
In those great manufactures, on the contrary, which are destined to supply
the great wants of the great body of the people, every different branch of the
work employs so great a number of workmen, that it is impossible to collect
them all into the same workhouse. We can seldom see more, at one time,
than those employed in one single branch. Though in such manufactures,
therefore, the work may really be divided into a much greater number of
parts, than in those of a more trifling nature, the division is not near so
obvious, and has accordingly been much less observed.
To take an example, therefore, from a very trifling manufacture, but one
in which the division of labour has been very often taken notice of, the trade
of a pin-maker: a workman not educated to this business (which the
division of labour has rendered a distinct trade), nor acquainted with the use
of the machinery employed in it (to the invention of which the same
division of labour has probably given occasion), could scarce, perhaps, with
his utmost industry, make one pin in a day, and certainly could not make
twenty. But in the way in which this business is now carried on, not only the
whole work is a peculiar trade, but it is divided into a number of branches,
of which the greater part are likewise peculiar trades. One man draws out
the wire; another straights it; a third cuts it; a fourth points it; a fifth grinds
it at the top for receiving the head; to make the head requires two or three
distinct operations; to put it on is a peculiar business; to whiten the pins is
another; it is even a trade by itself to put them into the paper; and the
important business of making a pin is, in this manner, divided into about
eighteen distinct operations, which, in some manufactories, are all
performed by distinct hands, though in others the same man will sometimes
perform two or three of them. I have seen a small manufactory of this kind,
where ten men only were employed, and where some of them consequently
performed two or three distinct operations. But though they were very poor,
and therefore but indifferently accommodated with the necessary
machinery, they could, when they exerted themselves, make among them
about twelve pounds of pins in a day. There are in a pound upwards of four
thousand pins of a middling size. Those ten persons, therefore, could make
among them upwards of forty-eight thousand pins in a day. Each person,
therefore, making a tenth part of forty-eight thousand pins, might be
considered as making four thousand eight hundred pins in a day. But if they
had all wrought separately and independently, and without any of them
having been educated to this peculiar business, they certainly could not
each of them have made twenty, perhaps not one pin in a day; that is,
certainly, not the two hundred and fortieth, perhaps not the four thousand
eight hundredth, part of what they are at present capable of performing, in
consequence of a proper division and combination of their different
operations.
In every other art and manufacture, the effects of the division of labour
are similar to what they are in this very trifling one, though, in many of
them, the labour can neither be so much subdivided, nor reduced to so great
a simplicity of operation. The division of labour, however, so far as it can
be introduced, occasions, in every art, a proportionable increase of the
productive powers of labour. The separation of different trades and
employments from one another, seems to have taken place in consequence
of this advantage. This separation, too, is generally carried furthest in those
countries which enjoy the highest degree of industry and improvement;
what is the work of one man, in a rude state of society, being generally that
of several in an improved one. In every improved society, the farmer is
generally nothing but a farmer; the manufacturer, nothing but a
manufacturer. The labour, too, which is necessary to produce any one
complete manufacture, is almost always divided among a great number of
hands. How many different trades are employed in each branch of the linen
and woollen manufactures, from the growers of the flax and the wool, to the
bleachers and smoothers of the linen, or to the dyers and dressers of the
cloth! The nature of agriculture, indeed, does not admit of so many
subdivisions of labour, nor of so complete a separation of one business from
another, as manufactures. It is impossible to separate so entirely the
business of the grazier from that of the corn-farmer, as the trade of the
carpenter is commonly separated from that of the smith. The spinner is
almost always a distinct person from the weaver; but the ploughman, the
harrower, the sower of the seed, and the reaper of the corn, are often the
same. The occasions for those different sorts of labour returning with the
different seasons of the year, it is impossible that one man should be
constantly employed in any one of them. This impossibility of making so
complete and entire a separation of all the different branches of labour
employed in agriculture, is perhaps the reason why the improvement of the
productive powers of labour, in this art, does not always keep pace with
their improvement in manufactures. The most opulent nations, indeed,
generally excel all their neighbours in agriculture as well as in
manufactures; but they are commonly more distinguished by their
superiority in the latter than in the former. Their lands are in general better
cultivated, and having more labour and expense bestowed upon them,
produce more in proportion to the extent and natural fertility of the ground.
But this superiority of produce is seldom much more than in proportion to
the superiority of labour and expense. In agriculture, the labour of the rich
country is not always much more productive than that of the poor; or, at
least, it is never so much more productive, as it commonly is in
manufactures. The corn of the rich country, therefore, will not always, in the
same degree of goodness, come cheaper to market than that of the poor. The
corn of Poland, in the same degree of goodness, is as cheap as that of
France, notwithstanding the superior opulence and improvement of the
latter country. The corn of France is, in the corn-provinces, fully as good,
and in most years nearly about the same price with the corn of England,
though, in opulence and improvement, France is perhaps inferior to
England. The corn-lands of England, however, are better cultivated than
those of France, and the corn-lands of France are said to be much better
cultivated than those of Poland. But though the poor country,
notwithstanding the inferiority of its cultivation, can, in some measure, rival
the rich in the cheapness and goodness of its corn, it can pretend to no such
competition in its manufactures, at least if those manufactures suit the soil,
climate, and situation, of the rich country. The silks of France are better and
cheaper than those of England, because the silk manufacture, at least under
the present high duties upon the importation of raw silk, does not so well
suit the climate of England as that of France. But the hardware and the
coarse woollens of England are beyond all comparison superior to those of
France, and much cheaper, too, in the same degree of goodness. In Poland
there are said to be scarce any manufactures of any kind, a few of those
coarser household manufactures excepted, without which no country can
well subsist.
This great increase in the quantity of work, which, in consequence of the
division of labour, the same number of people are capable of performing, is
owing to three different circumstances; first, to the increase of dexterity in
every particular workman; secondly, to the saving of the time which is
commonly lost in passing from one species of work to another; and, lastly,
to the invention of a great number of machines which facilitate and abridge
labour, and enable one man to do the work of many.
First, the improvement of the dexterity of the workmen, necessarily
increases the quantity of the work he can perform; and the division of
labour, by reducing every man’s business to some one simple operation, and
by making this operation the sole employment of his life, necessarily
increases very much the dexterity of the workman. A common smith, who,
though accustomed to handle the hammer, has never been used to make
nails, if, upon some particular occasion, he is obliged to attempt it, will
scarce, I am assured, be able to make above two or three hundred nails in a
day, and those, too, very bad ones. A smith who has been accustomed to
make nails, but whose sole or principal business has not been that of a
nailer, can seldom, with his utmost diligence, make more than eight
hundred or a thousand nails in a day. I have seen several boys, under twenty
years of age, who had never exercised any other trade but that of making
nails, and who, when they exerted themselves, could make, each of them,
upwards of two thousand three hundred nails in a day. The making of a nail,
however, is by no means one of the simplest operations. The same person
blows the bellows, stirs or mends the fire as there is occasion, heats the
iron, and forges every part of the nail: in forging the head, too, he is obliged
to change his tools. The different operations into which the making of a pin,
or of a metal button, is subdivided, are all of them much more simple, and
the dexterity of the person, of whose life it has been the sole business to
perform them, is usually much greater. The rapidity with which some of the
operations of those manufactures are performed, exceeds what the human
hand could, by those who had never seen them, be supposed capable of
acquiring.
Secondly, the advantage which is gained by saving the time commonly
lost in passing from one sort of work to another, is much greater than we
should at first view be apt to imagine it. It is impossible to pass very
quickly from one kind of work to another, that is carried on in a different
place, and with quite different tools. A country weaver, who cultivates a
small farm, must lose a good deal of time in passing from his loom to the
field, and from the field to his loom. When the two trades can be carried on
in the same workhouse, the loss of time is, no doubt, much less. It is, even
in this case, however, very considerable. A man commonly saunters a little
in turning his hand from one sort of employment to another. When he first
begins the new work, he is seldom very keen and hearty; his mind, as they
say, does not go to it, and for some time he rather trifles than applies to
good purpose. The habit of sauntering, and of indolent careless application,
which is naturally, or rather necessarily, acquired by every country
workman who is obliged to change his work and his tools every half hour,
and to apply his hand in twenty different ways almost every day of his life,
renders him almost always slothful and lazy, and incapable of any vigorous
application, even on the most pressing occasions. Independent, therefore, of
his deficiency in point of dexterity, this cause alone must always reduce
considerably the quantity of work which he is capable of performing.
Thirdly, and lastly, everybody must be sensible how much labour is
facilitated and abridged by the application of proper machinery. It is
unnecessary to give any example. I shall only observe, therefore, that the
invention of all those machines by which labour is so much facilitated and
abridged, seems to have been originally owing to the division of labour.
Men are much more likely to discover easier and readier methods of
attaining any object, when the whole attention of their minds is directed
towards that single object, than when it is dissipated among a great variety
of things. But, in consequence of the division of labour, the whole of every
man’s attention comes naturally to be directed towards some one very
simple object. It is naturally to be expected, therefore, that some one or
other of those who are employed in each particular branch of labour should
soon find out easier and readier methods of performing their own particular
work, whenever the nature of it admits of such improvement. A great part
of the machines made use of in those manufactures in which labour is most
subdivided, were originally the invention of common workmen, who, being
each of them employed in some very simple operation, naturally turned
their thoughts towards finding out easier and readier methods of performing
it. Whoever has been much accustomed to visit such manufactures, must
frequently have been shewn very pretty machines, which were the
inventions of such workmen, in order to facilitate and quicken their own
particular part of the work. In the first fire engines {this was the current
designation for steam engines}, a boy was constantly employed to open and
shut alternately the communication between the boiler and the cylinder,
according as the piston either ascended or descended. One of those boys,
who loved to play with his companions, observed that, by tying a string
from the handle of the valve which opened this communication to another
part of the machine, the valve would open and shut without his assistance,
and leave him at liberty to divert himself with his play-fellows. One of the
greatest improvements that has been made upon this machine, since it was
first invented, was in this manner the discovery of a boy who wanted to
save his own labour.
All the improvements in machinery, however, have by no means been the
inventions of those who had occasion to use the machines. Many
improvements have been made by the ingenuity of the makers of the
machines, when to make them became the business of a peculiar trade; and
some by that of those who are called philosophers, or men of speculation,
whose trade it is not to do any thing, but to observe every thing, and who,
upon that account, are often capable of combining together the powers of
the most distant and dissimilar objects in the progress of society, philosophy
or speculation becomes, like every other employment, the principal or sole
trade and occupation of a particular class of citizens. Like every other
employment, too, it is subdivided into a great number of different branches,
each of which affords occupation to a peculiar tribe or class of
philosophers; and this subdivision of employment in philosophy, as well as
in every other business, improves dexterity, and saves time. Each individual
becomes more expert in his own peculiar branch, more work is done upon
the whole, and the quantity of science is considerably increased by it.
It is the great multiplication of the productions of all the different arts, in
consequence of the division of labour, which occasions, in a well-governed
society, that universal opulence which extends itself to the lowest ranks of
the people. Every workman has a great quantity of his own work to dispose
of beyond what he himself has occasion for; and every other workman
being exactly in the same situation, he is enabled to exchange a great
quantity of his own goods for a great quantity or, what comes to the same
thing, for the price of a great quantity of theirs. He supplies them
abundantly with what they have occasion for, and they accommodate him as
amply with what he has occasion for, and a general plenty diffuses itself
through all the different ranks of the society.
Observe the accommodation of the most common artificer or daylabourer
in a civilized and thriving country, and you will perceive that the number of
people, of whose industry a part, though but a small part, has been
employed in procuring him this accommodation, exceeds all computation.
The woollen coat, for example, which covers the day-labourer, as coarse
and rough as it may appear, is the produce of the joint labour of a great
multitude of workmen. The shepherd, the sorter of the wool, the wool-
comber or carder, the dyer, the scribbler, the spinner, the weaver, the fuller,
the dresser, with many others, must all join their different arts in order to
complete even this homely production. How many merchants and carriers,
besides, must have been employed in transporting the materials from some
of those workmen to others who often live in a very distant part of the
country? How much commerce and navigation in particular, how many
ship-builders, sailors, sail-makers, rope-makers, must have been employed
in order to bring together the different drugs made use of by the dyer, which
often come from the remotest corners of the world? What a variety of
labour, too, is necessary in order to produce the tools of the meanest of
those workmen! To say nothing of such complicated machines as the ship of
the sailor, the mill of the fuller, or even the loom of the weaver, let us
consider only what a variety of labour is requisite in order to form that very
simple machine, the shears with which the shepherd clips the wool. The
miner, the builder of the furnace for smelting the ore, the feller of the
timber, the burner of the charcoal to be made use of in the smelting-house,
the brickmaker, the bricklayer, the workmen who attend the furnace, the
millwright, the forger, the smith, must all of them join their different arts in
order to produce them. Were we to examine, in the same manner, all the
different parts of his dress and household furniture, the coarse linen shirt
which he wears next his skin, the shoes which cover his feet, the bed which
he lies on, and all the different parts which compose it, the kitchen-grate at
which he prepares his victuals, the coals which he makes use of for that
purpose, dug from the bowels of the earth, and brought to him, perhaps, by
a long sea and a long land-carriage, all the other utensils of his kitchen, all
the furniture of his table, the knives and forks, the earthen or pewter plates
upon which he serves up and divides his victuals, the different hands
employed in preparing his bread and his beer, the glass window which lets
in the heat and the light, and keeps out the wind and the rain, with all the
knowledge and art requisite for preparing that beautiful and happy
invention, without which these northern parts of the world could scarce
have afforded a very comfortable habitation, together with the tools of all
the different workmen employed in producing those different
conveniencies; if we examine, I say, all these things, and consider what a
variety of labour is employed about each of them, we shall be sensible that,
without the assistance and co-operation of many thousands, the very
meanest person in a civilized country could not be provided, even according
to, what we very falsely imagine, the easy and simple manner in which he is
commonly accommodated. Compared, indeed, with the more extravagant
luxury of the great, his accommodation must no doubt appear extremely
simple and easy; and yet it may be true, perhaps, that the accommodation of
an European prince does not always so much exceed that of an industrious
and frugal peasant, as the accommodation of the latter exceeds that of many
an African king, the absolute masters of the lives and liberties of ten
thousand naked savages.
CHAPTER II.
OF THE PRINCIPLE WHICH GIVES OCCASION
TO THE DIVISION OF LABOUR.
This division of labour, from which so many advantages are derived, is
not originally the effect of any human wisdom, which foresees and intends
that general opulence to which it gives occasion. It is the necessary, though
very slow and gradual, consequence of a certain propensity in human
nature, which has in view no such extensive utility; the propensity to truck,
barter, and exchange one thing for another.
Whether this propensity be one of those original principles in human
nature, of which no further account can be given, or whether, as seems more
probable, it be the necessary consequence of the faculties of reason and
speech, it belongs not to our present subject to inquire. It is common to all
men, and to be found in no other race of animals, which seem to know
neither this nor any other species of contracts. Two greyhounds, in running
down the same hare, have sometimes the appearance of acting in some sort
of concert. Each turns her towards his companion, or endeavours to
intercept her when his companion turns her towards himself. This, however,
is not the effect of any contract, but of the accidental concurrence of their
passions in the same object at that particular time. Nobody ever saw a dog
make a fair and deliberate exchange of one bone for another with another
dog. Nobody ever saw one animal, by its gestures and natural cries signify
to another, this is mine, that yours; I am willing to give this for that. When
an animal wants to obtain something either of a man, or of another animal,
it has no other means of persuasion, but to gain the favour of those whose
service it requires. A puppy fawns upon its dam, and a spaniel endeavours,
by a thousand attractions, to engage the attention of its master who is at
dinner, when it wants to be fed by him. Man sometimes uses the same arts
with his brethren, and when he has no other means of engaging them to act
according to his inclinations, endeavours by every servile and fawning
attention to obtain their good will. He has not time, however, to do this
upon every occasion. In civilized society he stands at all times in need of
the co-operation and assistance of great multitudes, while his whole life is
scarce sufficient to gain the friendship of a few persons. In almost every
other race of animals, each individual, when it is grown up to maturity, is
entirely independent, and in its natural state has occasion for the assistance
of no other living creature. But man has almost constant occasion for the
help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect it from their
benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their
self-love in his favour, and shew them that it is for their own advantage to
do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of
any kind, proposes to do this. Give me that which I want, and you shall
have this which you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in
this manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those
good offices which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence of
the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from
their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their
humanity, but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own
necessities, but of their advantages. Nobody but a beggar chooses to depend
chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens. Even a beggar does not
depend upon it entirely. The charity of well-disposed people, indeed,
supplies him with the whole fund of his subsistence. But though this
principle ultimately provides him with all the necessaries of life which he
has occasion for, it neither does nor can provide him with them as he has
occasion for them. The greater part of his occasional wants are supplied in
the same manner as those of other people, by treaty, by barter, and by
purchase. With the money which one man gives him he purchases food. The
old clothes which another bestows upon him he exchanges for other clothes
which suit him better, or for lodging, or for food, or for money, with which
he can buy either food, clothes, or lodging, as he has occasion.
As it is by treaty, by barter, and by purchase, that we obtain from one
another the greater part of those mutual good offices which we stand in
need of, so it is this same trucking disposition which originally gives
occasion to the division of labour. In a tribe of hunters or shepherds, a
particular person makes bows and arrows, for example, with more readiness
and dexterity than any other. He frequently exchanges them for cattle or for
venison, with his companions; and he finds at last that he can, in this
manner, get more cattle and venison, than if he himself went to the field to
catch them. From a regard to his own interest, therefore, the making of
bows and arrows grows to be his chief business, and he becomes a sort of
armourer. Another excels in making the frames and covers of their little
huts or moveable houses. He is accustomed to be of use in this way to his
neighbours, who reward him in the same manner with cattle and with
venison, till at last he finds it his interest to dedicate himself entirely to this
employment, and to become a sort of house-carpenter. In the same manner a
third becomes a smith or a brazier; a fourth, a tanner or dresser of hides or
skins, the principal part of the clothing of savages. And thus the certainty of
being able to exchange all that surplus part of the produce of his own
labour, which is over and above his own consumption, for such parts of the
produce of other men’s labour as he may have occasion for, encourages
every man to apply himself to a particular occupation, and to cultivate and
bring to perfection whatever talent of genius he may possess for that
particular species of business.
The difference of natural talents in different men, is, in reality, much less
than we are aware of; and the very different genius which appears to
distinguish men of different professions, when grown up to maturity, is not
upon many occasions so much the cause, as the effect of the division of
labour. The difference between the most dissimilar characters, between a
philosopher and a common street porter, for example, seems to arise not so
much from nature, as from habit, custom, and education. When they came
in to the world, and for the first six or eight years of their existence, they
were, perhaps, very much alike, and neither their parents nor play-fellows
could perceive any remarkable difference. About that age, or soon after,
they come to be employed in very different occupations. The difference of
talents comes then to be taken notice of, and widens by degrees, till at last
the vanity of the philosopher is willing to acknowledge scarce any
resemblance. But without the disposition to truck, barter, and exchange,
every man must have procured to himself every necessary and conveniency
of life which he wanted. All must have had the same duties to perform, and
the same work to do, and there could have been no such difference of
employment as could alone give occasion to any great difference of talents.
As it is this disposition which forms that difference of talents, so
remarkable among men of different professions, so it is this same
disposition which renders that difference useful. Many tribes of animals,
acknowledged to be all of the same species, derive from nature a much
more remarkable distinction of genius, than what, antecedent to custom and
education, appears to take place among men. By nature a philosopher is not
in genius and disposition half so different from a street porter, as a mastiff is
from a grey-hound, or a grey-hound from a spaniel, or this last from a
shepherd’s dog. Those different tribes of animals, however, though all of
the same species are of scarce any use to one another. The strength of the
mastiff is not in the least supported either by the swiftness of the
greyhound, or by the sagacity of the spaniel, or by the docility of the
shepherd’s dog. The effects of those different geniuses and talents, for want
of the power or disposition to barter and exchange, cannot be brought into a
common stock, and do not in the least contribute to the better
accommodation and conveniency of the species. Each animal is still obliged
to support and defend itself, separately and independently, and derives no
sort of advantage from that variety of talents with which nature has
distinguished its fellows. Among men, on the contrary, the most dissimilar
geniuses are of use to one another; the different produces of their respective
talents, by the general disposition to truck, barter, and exchange, being
brought, as it were, into a common stock, where every man may purchase
whatever part of the produce of other men’s talents he has occasion for.
CHAPTER III.
THAT THE DIVISION OF LABOUR IS LIMITED
BY THE EXTENT OF THE MARKET.
As it is the power of exchanging that gives occasion to the division of
labour, so the extent of this division must always be limited by the extent of
that power, or, in other words, by the extent of the market. When the market
is very small, no person can have any encouragement to dedicate himself
entirely to one employment, for want of the power to exchange all that
surplus part of the produce of his own labour, which is over and above his
own consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men’s labour as he
has occasion for.
There are some sorts of industry, even of the lowest kind, which can be
carried on nowhere but in a great town. A porter, for example, can find
employment and subsistence in no other place. A village is by much too
narrow a sphere for him; even an ordinary market-town is scarce large
enough to afford him constant occupation. In the lone houses and very
small villages which are scattered about in so desert a country as the
highlands of Scotland, every farmer must be butcher, baker, and brewer, for
his own family. In such situations we can scarce expect to find even a
smith, a carpenter, or a mason, within less than twenty miles of another of
the same trade. The scattered families that live at eight or ten miles distance
from the nearest of them, must learn to perform themselves a great number
of little pieces of work, for which, in more populous countries, they would
call in the assistance of those workmen. Country workmen are almost
everywhere obliged to apply themselves to all the different branches of
industry that have so much affinity to one another as to be employed about
the same sort of materials. A country carpenter deals in every sort of work
that is made of wood; a country smith in every sort of work that is made of
iron. The former is not only a carpenter, but a joiner, a cabinet-maker, and
even a carver in wood, as well as a wheel-wright, a plough-wright, a cart
and waggon-maker. The employments of the latter are still more various. It
is impossible there should be such a trade as even that of a nailer in the
remote and inland parts of the highlands of Scotland. Such a workman at
the rate of a thousand nails a-day, and three hundred working days in the
year, will make three hundred thousand nails in the year. But in such a
situation it would be impossible to dispose of one thousand, that is, of one
day’s work in the year. As by means of water-carriage, a more extensive
market is opened to every sort of industry than what land-carriage alone can
afford it, so it is upon the sea-coast, and along the banks of navigable rivers,
that industry of every kind naturally begins to subdivide and improve itself,
and it is frequently not till a long time after that those improvements extend
themselves to the inland parts of the country. A broad-wheeled waggon,
attended by two men, and drawn by eight horses, in about six weeks time,
carries and brings back between London and Edinburgh near four ton
weight of goods. In about the same time a ship navigated by six or eight
men, and sailing between the ports of London and Leith, frequently carries
and brings back two hundred ton weight of goods. Six or eight men,
therefore, by the help of water-carriage, can carry and bring back, in the
same time, the same quantity of goods between London and Edinburgh as
fifty broad-wheeled waggons, attended by a hundred men, and drawn by
four hundred horses. Upon two hundred tons of goods, therefore, carried by
the cheapest land-carriage from London to Edinburgh, there must be
charged the maintenance of a hundred men for three weeks, and both the
maintenance and what is nearly equal to maintenance the wear and tear of
four hundred horses, as well as of fifty great waggons. Whereas, upon the
same quantity of goods carried by water, there is to be charged only the
maintenance of six or eight men, and the wear and tear of a ship of two
hundred tons burthen, together with the value of the superior risk, or the
difference of the insurance between land and water-carriage. Were there no
other communication between those two places, therefore, but by land-
carriage, as no goods could be transported from the one to the other, except
such whose price was very considerable in proportion to their weight, they
could carry on but a small part of that commerce which at present subsists
between them, and consequently could give but a small part of that
encouragement which they at present mutually afford to each other’s
industry. There could be little or no commerce of any kind between the
distant parts of the world. What goods could bear the expense of land-
carriage between London and Calcutta? Or if there were any so precious as
to be able to support this expense, with what safety could they be
transported through the territories of so many barbarous nations? Those two
cities, however, at present carry on a very considerable commerce with each
other, and by mutually affording a market, give a good deal of
encouragement to each other’s industry.
Since such, therefore, are the advantages of water-carriage, it is natural
that the first improvements of art and industry should be made where this
conveniency opens the whole world for a market to the produce of every
sort of labour, and that they should always be much later in extending
themselves into the inland parts of the country. The inland parts of the
country can for a long time have no other market for the greater part of their
goods, but the country which lies round about them, and separates them
from the sea-coast, and the great navigable rivers. The extent of the market,
therefore, must for a long time be in proportion to the riches and
populousness of that country, and consequently their improvement must
always be posterior to the improvement of that country. In our North
American colonies, the plantations have constantly followed either the sea-
coast or the banks of the navigable rivers, and have scarce anywhere
extended themselves to any considerable distance from both.
The nations that, according to the best authenticated history, appear to
have been first civilized, were those that dwelt round the coast of the
Mediterranean sea. That sea, by far the greatest inlet that is known in the
world, having no tides, nor consequently any waves, except such as are
caused by the wind only, was, by the smoothness of its surface, as well as
by the multitude of its islands, and the proximity of its neighbouring shores,
extremely favourable to the infant navigation of the world; when, from their
ignorance of the compass, men were afraid to quit the view of the coast, and
from the imperfection of the art of ship-building, to abandon themselves to
the boisterous waves of the ocean. To pass beyond the pillars of Hercules,
that is, to sail out of the straits of Gibraltar, was, in the ancient world, long
considered as a most wonderful and dangerous exploit of navigation. It was
late before even the Phoenicians and Carthaginians, the most skilful
navigators and ship-builders of those old times, attempted it; and they were,
for a long time, the only nations that did attempt it.
Of all the countries on the coast of the Mediterranean sea, Egypt seems to
have been the first in which either agriculture or manufactures were
cultivated and improved to any considerable degree. Upper Egypt extends
itself nowhere above a few miles from the Nile; and in Lower Egypt, that
great river breaks itself into many different canals, which, with the
assistance of a little art, seem to have afforded a communication by water-
carriage, not only between all the great towns, but between all the
considerable villages, and even to many farm-houses in the country, nearly
in the same manner as the Rhine and the Maese do in Holland at present.
The extent and easiness of this inland navigation was probably one of the
principal causes of the early improvement of Egypt.
The improvements in agriculture and manufactures seem likewise to have
been of very great antiquity in the provinces of Bengal, in the East Indies,
and in some of the eastern provinces of China, though the great extent of
this antiquity is not authenticated by any histories of whose authority we, in
this part of the world, are well assured. In Bengal, the Ganges, and several
other great rivers, form a great number of navigable canals, in the same
manner as the Nile does in Egypt. In the eastern provinces of China, too,
several great rivers form, by their different branches, a multitude of canals,
and, by communicating with one another, afford an inland navigation much
more extensive than that either of the Nile or the Ganges, or, perhaps, than
both of them put together. It is remarkable, that neither the ancient
Egyptians, nor the Indians, nor the Chinese, encouraged foreign commerce,
but seem all to have derived their great opulence from this inland
navigation.
All the inland parts of Africa, and all that part of Asia which lies any
considerable way north of the Euxine and Caspian seas, the ancient Scythia,
the modern Tartary and Siberia, seem, in all ages of the world, to have been
in the same barbarous and uncivilized state in which we find them at
present. The sea of Tartary is the frozen ocean, which admits of no
navigation; and though some of the greatest rivers in the world run through
that country, they are at too great a distance from one another to carry
commerce and communication through the greater part of it. There are in
Africa none of those great inlets, such as the Baltic and Adriatic seas in
Europe, the Mediterranean and Euxine seas in both Europe and Asia, and
the gulfs of Arabia, Persia, India, Bengal, and Siam, in Asia, to carry
maritime commerce into the interior parts of that great continent; and the
great rivers of Africa are at too great a distance from one another to give
occasion to any considerable inland navigation. The commerce, besides,
which any nation can carry on by means of a river which does not break
itself into any great number of branches or canals, and which runs into
another territory before it reaches the sea, can never be very considerable,
because it is always in the power of the nations who possess that other
territory to obstruct the communication between the upper country and the
sea. The navigation of the Danube is of very little use to the different states
of Bavaria, Austria, and Hungary, in comparison of what it would be, if any
of them possessed the whole of its course, till it falls into the Black sea.
CHAPTER IV.
OF THE ORIGIN AND USE OF MONEY.
When the division of labour has been once thoroughly established, it is
but a very small part of a man’s wants which the produce of his own labour
can supply. He supplies the far greater part of them by exchanging that
surplus part of the produce of his own labour, which is over and above his
own consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men’s labour as he
has occasion for. Every man thus lives by exchanging, or becomes, in some
measure, a merchant, and the society itself grows to be what is properly a
commercial society.
But when the division of labour first began to take place, this power of
exchanging must frequently have been very much clogged and embarrassed
in its operations. One man, we shall suppose, has more of a certain
commodity than he himself has occasion for, while another has less. The
former, consequently, would be glad to dispose of; and the latter to
purchase, a part of this superfluity. But if this latter should chance to have
nothing that the former stands in need of, no exchange can be made
between them. The butcher has more meat in his shop than he himself can
consume, and the brewer and the baker would each of them be willing to
purchase a part of it. But they have nothing to offer in exchange, except the
different productions of their respective trades, and the butcher is already
provided with all the bread and beer which he has immediate occasion for.
No exchange can, in this case, be made between them. He cannot be their
merchant, nor they his customers; and they are all of them thus mutually
less serviceable to one another. In order to avoid the inconveniency of such
situations, every prudent man in every period of society, after the first
establishment of the division of labour, must naturally have endeavoured to
manage his affairs in such a manner, as to have at all times by him, besides
the peculiar produce of his own industry, a certain quantity of some one
commodity or other, such as he imagined few people would be likely to
refuse in exchange for the produce of their industry. Many different
commodities, it is probable, were successively both thought of and
employed for this purpose. In the rude ages of society, cattle are said to
have been the common instrument of commerce; and, though they must
have been a most inconvenient one, yet, in old times, we find things were
frequently valued according to the number of cattle which had been given
in exchange for them. The armour of Diomede, says Homer, cost only nine
oxen; but that of Glaucus cost a hundred oxen. Salt is said to be the
common instrument of commerce and exchanges in Abyssinia; a species of
shells in some parts of the coast of India; dried cod at Newfoundland;
tobacco in Virginia; sugar in some of our West India colonies; hides or
dressed leather in some other countries; and there is at this day a village in
Scotland, where it is not uncommon, I am told, for a workman to carry nails
instead of money to the baker’s shop or the ale-house.
In all countries, however, men seem at last to have been determined by
irresistible reasons to give the preference, for this employment, to metals
above every other commodity. Metals can not only be kept with as little loss
as any other commodity, scarce any thing being less perishable than they
are, but they can likewise, without any loss, be divided into any number of
parts, as by fusion those parts can easily be re-united again; a quality which
no other equally durable commodities possess, and which, more than any
other quality, renders them fit to be the instruments of commerce and
circulation. The man who wanted to buy salt, for example, and had nothing
but cattle to give in exchange for it, must have been obliged to buy salt to
the value of a whole ox, or a whole sheep, at a time. He could seldom buy
less than this, because what he was to give for it could seldom be divided
without loss; and if he had a mind to buy more, he must, for the same
reasons, have been obliged to buy double or triple the quantity, the value, to
wit, of two or three oxen, or of two or three sheep. If, on the contrary,
instead of sheep or oxen, he had metals to give in exchange for it, he could
easily proportion the quantity of the metal to the precise quantity of the
commodity which he had immediate occasion for.
Different metals have been made use of by different nations for this
purpose. Iron was the common instrument of commerce among the ancient
Spartans, copper among the ancient Romans, and gold and silver among all
rich and commercial nations.
Those metals seem originally to have been made use of for this purpose
in rude bars, without any stamp or coinage. Thus we are told by Pliny (Plin.
Hist Nat. lib. 33, cap. 3), upon the authority of Timaeus, an ancient
historian, that, till the time of Servius Tullius, the Romans had no coined
money, but made use of unstamped bars of copper, to purchase whatever
they had occasion for. These rude bars, therefore, performed at this time the
function of money.
The use of metals in this rude state was attended with two very
considerable inconveniences; first, with the trouble of weighing, and
secondly, with that of assaying them. In the precious metals, where a small
difference in the quantity makes a great difference in the value, even the
business of weighing, with proper exactness, requires at least very accurate
weights and scales. The weighing of gold, in particular, is an operation of
some nicety in the coarser metals, indeed, where a small error would be of
little consequence, less accuracy would, no doubt, be necessary. Yet we
should find it excessively troublesome if every time a poor man had
occasion either to buy or sell a farthing’s worth of goods, he was obliged to
weigh the farthing. The operation of assaying is still more difficult, still
more tedious; and, unless a part of the metal is fairly melted in the crucible,
with proper dissolvents, any conclusion that can be drawn from it is
extremely uncertain. Before the institution of coined money, however,
unless they went through this tedious and difficult operation, people must
always have been liable to the grossest frauds and impositions; and instead
of a pound weight of pure silver, or pure copper, might receive, in exchange
for their goods, an adulterated composition of the coarsest and cheapest
materials, which had, however, in their outward appearance, been made to
resemble those metals. To prevent such abuses, to facilitate exchanges, and
thereby to encourage all sorts of industry and commerce, it has been found
necessary, in all countries that have made any considerable advances
towards improvement, to affix a public stamp upon certain quantities of
such particular metals, as were in those countries commonly made use of to
purchase goods. Hence the origin of coined money, and of those public
offices called mints; institutions exactly of the same nature with those of the
aulnagers and stamp-masters of woollen and linen cloth. All of them are
equally meant to ascertain, by means of a public stamp, the quantity and
uniform goodness of those different commodities when brought to market.
The first public stamps of this kind that were affixed to the current
metals, seem in many cases to have been intended to ascertain, what it was
both most difficult and most important to ascertain, the goodness or
fineness of the metal, and to have resembled the sterling mark which is at
present affixed to plate and bars of silver, or the Spanish mark which is
sometimes affixed to ingots of gold, and which, being struck only upon one
side of the piece, and not covering the whole surface, ascertains the
fineness, but not the weight of the metal. Abraham weighs to Ephron the
four hundred shekels of silver which he had agreed to pay for the field of
Machpelah. They are said, however, to be the current money of the
merchant, and yet are received by weight, and not by tale, in the same
manner as ingots of gold and bars of silver are at present. The revenues of
the ancient Saxon kings of England are said to have been paid, not in
money, but in kind, that is, in victuals and provisions of all sorts. William
the Conqueror introduced the custom of paying them in money. This
money, however, was for a long time, received at the exchequer, by weight,
and not by tale.
The inconveniency and difficulty of weighing those metals with
exactness, gave occasion to the institution of coins, of which the stamp,
covering entirely both sides of the piece, and sometimes the edges too, was
supposed to ascertain not only the fineness, but the weight of the metal.
Such coins, therefore, were received by tale, as at present, without the
trouble of weighing.
The denominations of those coins seem originally to have expressed the
weight or quantity of metal contained in them. In the time of Servius
Tullius, who first coined money at Rome, the Roman as or pondo contained
a Roman pound of good copper. It was divided, in the same manner as our
Troyes pound, into twelve ounces, each of which contained a real ounce of
good copper. The English pound sterling, in the time of Edward I. contained
a pound, Tower weight, of silver of a known fineness. The Tower pound
seems to have been something more than the Roman pound, and something
less than the Troyes pound. This last was not introduced into the mint of
England till the 18th of Henry the VIII. The French livre contained, in the
time of Charlemagne, a pound, Troyes weight, of silver of a known
fineness. The fair of Troyes in Champaign was at that time frequented by all
the nations of Europe, and the weights and measures of so famous a market
were generally known and esteemed. The Scots money pound contained,
from the time of Alexander the First to that of Robert Bruce, a pound of
silver of the same weight and fineness with the English pound sterling.
English, French, and Scots pennies, too, contained all of them originally a
real penny-weight of silver, the twentieth part of an ounce, and the two
hundred-and-fortieth part of a pound. The shilling, too, seems originally to
have been the denomination of a weight. “When wheat is at twelve shillings
the quarter,” says an ancient statute of Henry III. “then wastel bread of a
farthing shall weigh eleven shillings and fourpence”. The proportion,
however, between the shilling, and either the penny on the one hand, or the
pound on the other, seems not to have been so constant and uniform as that
between the penny and the pound. During the first race of the kings of
France, the French sou or shilling appears upon different occasions to have
contained five, twelve, twenty, and forty pennies. Among the ancient
Saxons, a shilling appears at one time to have contained only five pennies,
and it is not improbable that it may have been as variable among them as
among their neighbours, the ancient Franks. From the time of Charlemagne
among the French, and from that of William the Conqueror among the
English, the proportion between the pound, the shilling, and the penny,
seems to have been uniformly the same as at present, though the value of
each has been very different; for in every country of the world, I believe,
the avarice and injustice of princes and sovereign states, abusing the
confidence of their subjects, have by degrees diminished the real quantity of
metal, which had been originally contained in their coins. The Roman as, in
the latter ages of the republic, was reduced to the twenty-fourth part of its
original value, and, instead of weighing a pound, came to weigh only half
an ounce. The English pound and penny contain at present about a third
only; the Scots pound and penny about a thirty-sixth; and the French pound
and penny about a sixty-sixth part of their original value. By means of those
operations, the princes and sovereign states which performed them were
enabled, in appearance, to pay their debts and fulfil their engagements with
a smaller quantity of silver than would otherwise have been requisite. It was
indeed in appearance only; for their creditors were really defrauded of a
part of what was due to them. All other debtors in the state were allowed
the same privilege, and might pay with the same nominal sum of the new
and debased coin whatever they had borrowed in the old. Such operations,
therefore, have always proved favourable to the debtor, and ruinous to the
creditor, and have sometimes produced a greater and more universal
revolution in the fortunes of private persons, than could have been
occasioned by a very great public calamity.
It is in this manner that money has become, in all civilized nations, the
universal instrument of commerce, by the intervention of which goods of all
kinds are bought and sold, or exchanged for one another.
What are the rules which men naturally observe, in exchanging them
either for money, or for one another, I shall now proceed to examine. These
rules determine what may be called the relative or exchangeable value of
goods.
The word VALUE, it is to be observed, has two different meanings, and
sometimes expresses the utility of some particular object, and sometimes
the power of purchasing other goods which the possession of that object
conveys. The one may be called ‘value in use;’ the other, ‘value in
exchange.’ The things which have the greatest value in use have frequently
little or no value in exchange; and, on the contrary, those which have the
greatest value in exchange have frequently little or no value in use. Nothing
is more useful than water; but it will purchase scarce any thing; scarce any
thing can be had in exchange for it. A diamond, on the contrary, has scarce
any value in use; but a very great quantity of other goods may frequently be
had in exchange for it.
In order to investigate the principles which regulate the exchangeable
value of commodities, I shall endeavour to shew,
First, what is the real measure of this exchangeable value; or wherein
consists the real price of all commodities.
Secondly, what are the different parts of which this real price is
composed or made up.
And, lastly, what are the different circumstances which sometimes raise
some or all of these different parts of price above, and sometimes sink them
below, their natural or ordinary rate; or, what are the causes which
sometimes hinder the market price, that is, the actual price of commodities,
from coinciding exactly with what may be called their natural price.
I shall endeavour to explain, as fully and distinctly as I can, those three
subjects in the three following chapters, for which I must very earnestly
entreat both the patience and attention of the reader: his patience, in order to
examine a detail which may, perhaps, in some places, appear unnecessarily
tedious; and his attention, in order to understand what may perhaps, after
the fullest explication which I am capable of giving it, appear still in some
degree obscure. I am always willing to run some hazard of being tedious, in
order to be sure that I am perspicuous; and, after taking the utmost pains
that I can to be perspicuous, some obscurity may still appear to remain upon
a subject, in its own nature extremely abstracted.
CHAPTER V.
OF THE REAL AND NOMINAL PRICE OF
COMMODITIES, OR OF THEIR PRICE IN
LABOUR, AND THEIR PRICE IN MONEY.
Every man is rich or poor according to the degree in which he can afford
to enjoy the necessaries, conveniencies, and amusements of human life. But
after the division of labour has once thoroughly taken place, it is but a very
small part of these with which a man’s own labour can supply him. The far
greater part of them he must derive from the labour of other people, and he
must be rich or poor according to the quantity of that labour which he can
command, or which he can afford to purchase. The value of any
commodity, therefore, to the person who possesses it, and who means not to
use or consume it himself, but to exchange it for other commodities, is
equal to the quantity of labour which it enables him to purchase or
command. Labour therefore, is the real measure of the exchangeable value
of all commodities.
The real price of every thing, what every thing really costs to the man
who wants to acquire it, is the toil and trouble of acquiring it. What every
thing is really worth to the man who has acquired it and who wants to
dispose of it, or exchange it for something else, is the toil and trouble which
it can save to himself, and which it can impose upon other people. What is
bought with money, or with goods, is purchased by labour, as much as what
we acquire by the toil of our own body. That money, or those goods, indeed,
save us this toil. They contain the value of a certain quantity of labour,
which we exchange for what is supposed at the time to contain the value of
an equal quantity. Labour was the first price, the original purchase money
that was paid for all things. It was not by gold or by silver, but by labour,
that all the wealth of the world was originally purchased; and its value, to
those who possess it, and who want to exchange it for some new
productions, is precisely equal to the quantity of labour which it can enable
them to purchase or command.
Wealth, as Mr Hobbes says, is power. But the person who either acquires,
or succeeds to a great fortune, does not necessarily acquire or succeed to
any political power, either civil or military. His fortune may, perhaps, afford
him the means of acquiring both; but the mere possession of that fortune
does not necessarily convey to him either. The power which that possession
immediately and directly conveys to him, is the power of purchasing a
certain command over all the labour, or over all the produce of labour
which is then in the market. His fortune is greater or less, precisely in
proportion to the extent of this power, or to the quantity either of other
men’s labour, or, what is the same thing, of the produce of other men’s
labour, which it enables him to purchase or command. The exchangeable
value of every thing must always be precisely equal to the extent of this
power which it conveys to its owner.
But though labour be the real measure of the exchangeable value of all
commodities, it is not that by which their value is commonly estimated. It is
often difficult to ascertain the proportion between two different quantities of
labour. The time spent in two different sorts of work will not always alone
determine this proportion. The different degrees of hardship endured, and of
ingenuity exercised, must likewise be taken into account. There may be
more labour in an hour’s hard work, than in two hours easy business; or in
an hour’s application to a trade which it cost ten years labour to learn, than
in a month’s industry, at an ordinary and obvious employment. But it is not
easy to find any accurate measure either of hardship or ingenuity. In
exchanging, indeed, the different productions of different sorts of labour for
one another, some allowance is commonly made for both. It is adjusted,
however, not by any accurate measure, but by the higgling and bargaining
of the market, according to that sort of rough equality which, though not
exact, is sufficient for carrying on the business of common life.
Every commodity, besides, is more frequently exchanged for, and thereby
compared with, other commodities, than with labour. It is more natural,
therefore, to estimate its exchangeable value by the quantity of some other
commodity, than by that of the labour which it can produce. The greater
part of people, too, understand better what is meant by a quantity of a
particular commodity, than by a quantity of labour. The one is a plain
palpable object; the other an abstract notion, which though it can be made
sufficiently intelligible, is not altogether so natural and obvious.
But when barter ceases, and money has become the common instrument
of commerce, every particular commodity is more frequently exchanged for
money than for any other commodity. The butcher seldom carries his beef
or his mutton to the baker or the brewer, in order to exchange them for
bread or for beer; but he carries them to the market, where he exchanges
them for money, and afterwards exchanges that money for bread and for
beer. The quantity of money which he gets for them regulates, too, the
quantity of bread and beer which he can afterwards purchase. It is more
natural and obvious to him, therefore, to estimate their value by the quantity
of money, the commodity for which he immediately exchanges them, than
by that of bread and beer, the commodities for which he can exchange them
only by the intervention of another commodity; and rather to say that his
butcher’s meat is worth three-pence or fourpence a-pound, than that it is
worth three or four pounds of bread, or three or four quarts of small beer.
Hence it comes to pass, that the exchangeable value of every commodity is
more frequently estimated by the quantity of money, than by the quantity
either of labour or of any other commodity which can be had in exchange
for it.
Gold and silver, however, like every other commodity, vary in their
value; are sometimes cheaper and sometimes dearer, sometimes of easier
and sometimes of more difficult purchase. The quantity of labour which any
particular quantity of them can purchase or command, or the quantity of
other goods which it will exchange for, depends always upon the fertility or
barrenness of the mines which happen to be known about the time when
such exchanges are made. The discovery of the abundant mines of America,
reduced, in the sixteenth century, the value of gold and silver in Europe to
about a third of what it had been before. As it cost less labour to bring those
metals from the mine to the market, so, when they were brought thither,
they could purchase or command less labour; and this revolution in their
value, though perhaps the greatest, is by no means the only one of which
history gives some account. But as a measure of quantity, such as the
natural foot, fathom, or handful, which is continually varying in its own
quantity, can never be an accurate measure of the quantity of other things;
so a commodity which is itself continually varying in its own value, can
never be an accurate measure of the value of other commodities. Equal
quantities of labour, at all times and places, may be said to be of equal value
to the labourer. In his ordinary state of health, strength, and spirits; in the
ordinary degree of his skill and dexterity, he must always lay down the
same portion of his ease, his liberty, and his happiness. The price which he
pays must always be the same, whatever may be the quantity of goods
which he receives in return for it. Of these, indeed, it may sometimes
purchase a greater and sometimes a smaller quantity; but it is their value
which varies, not that of the labour which purchases them. At all times and
places, that is dear which it is difficult to come at, or which it costs much
labour to acquire; and that cheap which is to be had easily, or with very
little labour. Labour alone, therefore, never varying in its own value, is
alone the ultimate and real standard by which the value of all commodities
can at all times and places be estimated and compared. It is their real price;
money is their nominal price only.
But though equal quantities of labour are always of equal value to the
labourer, yet to the person who employs him they appear sometimes to be
of greater, and sometimes of smaller value. He purchases them sometimes
with a greater, and sometimes with a smaller quantity of goods, and to him
the price of labour seems to vary like that of all other things. It appears to
him dear in the one case, and cheap in the other. In reality, however, it is the
goods which are cheap in the one case, and dear in the other.
In this popular sense, therefore, labour, like commodities, may be said to
have a real and a nominal price. Its real price may be said to consist in the
quantity of the necessaries and conveniencies of life which are given for it;
its nominal price, in the quantity of money. The labourer is rich or poor, is
well or ill rewarded, in proportion to the real, not to the nominal price of his
labour.
The distinction between the real and the nominal price of commodities
and labour is not a matter of mere speculation, but may sometimes be of
considerable use in practice. The same real price is always of the same
value; but on account of the variations in the value of gold and silver, the
same nominal price is sometimes of very different values. When a landed
estate, therefore, is sold with a reservation of a perpetual rent, if it is
intended that this rent should always be of the same value, it is of
importance to the family in whose favour it is reserved, that it should not
consist in a particular sum of money. Its value would in this case be liable
to variations of two different kinds: first, to those which arise from the
different quantities of gold and silver which are contained at different times
in coin of the same denomination; and, secondly, to those which arise from
the different values of equal quantities of gold and silver at different times.
Princes and sovereign states have frequently fancied that they had a
temporary interest to diminish the quantity of pure metal contained in their
coins; but they seldom have fancied that they had any to augment it. The
quantity of metal contained in the coins, I believe of all nations, has
accordingly been almost continually diminishing, and hardly ever
augmenting. Such variations, therefore, tend almost always to diminish the
value of a money rent.
The discovery of the mines of America diminished the value of gold and
silver in Europe. This diminution, it is commonly supposed, though I
apprehend without any certain proof, is still going on gradually, and is
likely to continue to do so for a long time. Upon this supposition, therefore,
such variations are more likely to diminish than to augment the value of a
money rent, even though it should be stipulated to be paid, not in such a
quantity of coined money of such a denomination (in so many pounds
sterling, for example), but in so many ounces, either of pure silver, or of
silver of a certain standard.
The rents which have been reserved in corn, have preserved their value
much better than those which have been reserved in money, even where the
denomination of the coin has not been altered. By the 18th of Elizabeth, it
was enacted, that a third of the rent of all college leases should be reserved
in corn, to be paid either in kind, or according to the current prices at the
nearest public market. The money arising from this corn rent, though
originally but a third of the whole, is, in the present times, according to Dr.
Blackstone, commonly near double of what arises from the other two-
thirds. The old money rents of colleges must, according to this account,
have sunk almost to a fourth part of their ancient value, or are worth little
more than a fourth part of the corn which they were formerly worth. But
since the reign of Philip and Mary, the denomination of the English coin has
undergone little or no alteration, and the same number of pounds, shillings,
and pence, have contained very nearly the same quantity of pure silver. This
degradation, therefore, in the value of the money rents of colleges, has
arisen altogether from the degradation in the price of silver.
When the degradation in the value of silver is combined with the
diminution of the quantity of it contained in the coin of the same
denomination, the loss is frequently still greater. In Scotland, where the
denomination of the coin has undergone much greater alterations than it
ever did in England, and in France, where it has undergone still greater than
it ever did in Scotland, some ancient rents, originally of considerable value,
have, in this manner, been reduced almost to nothing.
Equal quantities of labour will, at distant times, be purchased more nearly
with equal quantities of corn, the subsistence of the labourer, than with
equal quantities of gold and silver, or, perhaps, of any other commodity.
Equal quantities of corn, therefore, will, at distant times, be more nearly of
the same real value, or enable the possessor to purchase or command more
nearly the same quantity of the labour of other people. They will do this, I
say, more nearly than equal quantities of almost any other commodity; for
even equal quantities of corn will not do it exactly. The subsistence of the
labourer, or the real price of labour, as I shall endeavour to shew hereafter,
is very different upon different occasions; more liberal in a society
advancing to opulence, than in one that is standing still, and in one that is
standing still, than in one that is going backwards. Every other commodity,
however, will, at any particular time, purchase a greater or smaller quantity
of labour, in proportion to the quantity of subsistence which it can purchase
at that time. A rent, therefore, reserved in corn, is liable only to the
variations in the quantity of labour which a certain quantity of corn can
purchase. But a rent reserved in any other commodity is liable, not only to
the variations in the quantity of labour which any particular quantity of corn
can purchase, but to the variations in the quantity of corn which can be
purchased by any particular quantity of that commodity.
Though the real value of a corn rent, it is to be observed, however, varies
much less from century to century than that of a money rent, it varies much
more from year to year. The money price of labour, as I shall endeavour to
shew hereafter, does not fluctuate from year to year with the money price of
corn, but seems to be everywhere accommodated, not to the temporary or
occasional, but to the average or ordinary price of that necessary of life. The
average or ordinary price of corn, again is regulated, as I shall likewise
endeavour to shew hereafter, by the value of silver, by the richness or
barrenness of the mines which supply the market with that metal, or by the
quantity of labour which must be employed, and consequently of corn
which must be consumed, in order to bring any particular quantity of silver
from the mine to the market. But the value of silver, though it sometimes
varies greatly from century to century, seldom varies much from year to
year, but frequently continues the same, or very nearly the same, for half a
century or a century together. The ordinary or average money price of corn,
therefore, may, during so long a period, continue the same, or very nearly
the same, too, and along with it the money price of labour, provided, at
least, the society continues, in other respects, in the same, or nearly in the
same, condition. In the mean time, the temporary and occasional price of
corn may frequently be double one year of what it had been the year before,
or fluctuate, for example, from five-and-twenty to fifty shillings the quarter.
But when corn is at the latter price, not only the nominal, but the real value
of a corn rent, will be double of what it is when at the former, or will
command double the quantity either of labour, or of the greater part of other
commodities; the money price of labour, and along with it that of most
other things, continuing the same during all these fluctuations.
Labour, therefore, it appears evidently, is the only universal, as well as
the only accurate, measure of value, or the only standard by which we can
compare the values of different commodities, at all times, and at all places.
We cannot estimate, it is allowed, the real value of different commodities
from century to century by the quantities of silver which were given for
them. We cannot estimate it from year to year by the quantities of corn. By
the quantities of labour, we can, with the greatest accuracy, estimate it, both
from century to century, and from year to year. From century to century,
corn is a better measure than silver, because, from century to century, equal
quantities of corn will command the same quantity of labour more nearly
than equal quantities of silver. From year to year, on the contrary, silver is a
better measure than corn, because equal quantities of it will more nearly
command the same quantity of labour.
But though, in establishing perpetual rents, or even in letting very long
leases, it may be of use to distinguish between real and nominal price; it is
of none in buying and selling, the more common and ordinary transactions
of human life.
At the same time and place, the real and the nominal price of all
commodities are exactly in proportion to one another. The more or less
money you get for any commodity, in the London market, for example, the
more or less labour it will at that time and place enable you to purchase or
command. At the same time and place, therefore, money is the exact
measure of the real exchangeable value of all commodities. It is so,
however, at the same time and place only.
Though at distant places there is no regular proportion between the real
and the money price of commodities, yet the merchant who carries goods
from the one to the other, has nothing to consider but the money price, or
the difference between the quantity of silver for which he buys them, and
that for which he is likely to sell them. Half an ounce of silver at Canton in
China may command a greater quantity both of labour and of the
necessaries and conveniencies of life, than an ounce at London. A
commodity, therefore, which sells for half an ounce of silver at Canton, may
there be really dearer, of more real importance to the man who possesses it
there, than a commodity which sells for an ounce at London is to the man
who possesses it at London. If a London merchant, however, can buy at
Canton, for half an ounce of silver, a commodity which he can afterwards
sell at London for an ounce, he gains a hundred per cent. by the bargain,
just as much as if an ounce of silver was at London exactly of the same
value as at Canton. It is of no importance to him that half an ounce of silver
at Canton would have given him the command of more labour, and of a
greater quantity of the necessaries and conveniencies of life than an ounce
can do at London. An ounce at London will always give him the command
of double the quantity of all these, which half an ounce could have done
there, and this is precisely what he wants.
As it is the nominal or money price of goods, therefore, which finally
determines the prudence or imprudence of all purchases and sales, and
thereby regulates almost the whole business of common life in which price
is concerned, we cannot wonder that it should have been so much more
attended to than the real price.
In such a work as this, however, it may sometimes be of use to compare
the different real values of a particular commodity at different times and
places, or the different degrees of power over the labour of other people
which it may, upon different occasions, have given to those who possessed
it. We must in this case compare, not so much the different quantities of
silver for which it was commonly sold, as the different quantities or labour
which those different quantities of silver could have purchased. But the
current prices of labour, at distant times and places, can scarce ever be
known with any degree of exactness. Those of corn, though they have in
few places been regularly recorded, are in general better known, and have
been more frequently taken notice of by historians and other writers. We
must generally, therefore, content ourselves with them, not as being always
exactly in the same proportion as the current prices of labour, but as being
the nearest approximation which can commonly be had to that proportion. I
shall hereafter have occasion to make several comparisons of this kind.
In the progress of industry, commercial nations have found it convenient
to coin several different metals into money; gold for larger payments, silver
for purchases of moderate value, and copper, or some other coarse metal,
for those of still smaller consideration, They have always, however,
considered one of those metals as more peculiarly the measure of value than
any of the other two; and this preference seems generally to have been
given to the metal which they happen first to make use of as the instrument
of commerce. Having once begun to use it as their standard, which they
must have done when they had no other money, they have generally
continued to do so even when the necessity was not the same.
The Romans are said to have had nothing but copper money till within
five years before the first Punic war (Pliny, lib. xxxiii. cap. 3), when they
first began to coin silver. Copper, therefore, appears to have continued
always the measure of value in that republic. At Rome all accounts appear
to have been kept, and the value of all estates to have been computed, either
in asses or in sestertii. The as was always the denomination of a copper
coin. The word sestertius signifies two asses and a half. Though the
sestertius, therefore, was originally a silver coin, its value was estimated in
copper. At Rome, one who owed a great deal of money was said to have a
great deal of other people’s copper.
The northern nations who established themselves upon the ruins of the
Roman empire, seem to have had silver money from the first beginning of
their settlements, and not to have known either gold or copper coins for
several ages thereafter. There were silver coins in England in the time of the
Saxons; but there was little gold coined till the time of Edward III nor any
copper till that of James I. of Great Britain. In England, therefore, and for
the same reason, I believe, in all other modern nations of Europe, all
accounts are kept, and the value of all goods and of all estates is generally
computed, in silver: and when we mean to express the amount of a person’s
fortune, we seldom mention the number of guineas, but the number of
pounds sterling which we suppose would be given for it.
Originally, in all countries, I believe, a legal tender of payment could be
made only in the coin of that metal which was peculiarly considered as the
standard or measure of value. In England, gold was not considered as a
legal tender for a long time after it was coined into money. The proportion
between the values of gold and silver money was not fixed by any public
law or proclamation, but was left to be settled by the market. If a debtor
offered payment in gold, the creditor might either reject such payment
altogether, or accept of it at such a valuation of the gold as he and his debtor
could agree upon. Copper is not at present a legal tender, except in the
change of the smaller silver coins.
In this state of things, the distinction between the metal which was the
standard, and that which was not the standard, was something more than a
nominal distinction.
In process of time, and as people became gradually more familiar with
the use of the different metals in coin, and consequently better acquainted
with the proportion between their respective values, it has, in most
countries, I believe, been found convenient to ascertain this proportion, and
to declare by a public law, that a guinea, for example, of such a weight and
fineness, should exchange for one-and-twenty shillings, or be a legal tender
for a debt of that amount. In this state of things, and during the continuance
of any one regulated proportion of this kind, the distinction between the
metal, which is the standard, and that which is not the standard, becomes
little more than a nominal distinction.
In consequence of any change, however, in this regulated proportion, this
distinction becomes, or at least seems to become, something more than
nominal again. If the regulated value of a guinea, for example, was either
reduced to twenty, or raised to two-and-twenty shillings, all accounts being
kept, and almost all obligations for debt being expressed, in silver money,
the greater part of payments could in either case be made with the same
quantity of silver money as before; but would require very different
quantities of gold money; a greater in the one case, and a smaller in the
other. Silver would appear to be more invariable in its value than gold.
Silver would appear to measure the value of gold, and gold would not
appear to measure the value of silver. The value of gold would seem to
depend upon the quantity of silver which it would exchange for, and the
value of silver would not seem to depend upon the quantity of gold which it
would exchange for. This difference, however, would be altogether owing
to the custom of keeping accounts, and of expressing the amount of all great
and small sums rather in silver than in gold money. One of Mr Drummond’s
notes for five-and-twenty or fifty guineas would, after an alteration of this
kind, be still payable with five-and-twenty or fifty guineas, in the same
manner as before. It would, after such an alteration, be payable with the
same quantity of gold as before, but with very different quantities of silver.
In the payment of such a note, gold would appear to be more invariable in
its value than silver. Gold would appear to measure the value of silver, and
silver would not appear to measure the value of gold. If the custom of
keeping accounts, and of expressing promissory-notes and other obligations
for money, in this manner should ever become general, gold, and not silver,
would be considered as the metal which was peculiarly the standard or
measure of value.
In reality, during the continuance of any one regulated proportion
between the respective values of the different metals in coin, the value of
the most precious metal regulates the value of the whole coin. Twelve
copper pence contain half a pound avoirdupois of copper, of not the best
quality, which, before it is coined, is seldom worth seven-pence in silver.
But as, by the regulation, twelve such pence are ordered to exchange for a
shilling, they are in the market considered as worth a shilling, and a shilling
can at any time be had for them. Even before the late reformation of the
gold coin of Great Britain, the gold, that part of it at least which circulated
in London and its neighbourhood, was in general less degraded below its
standard weight than the greater part of the silver. One-and-twenty worn
and defaced shillings, however, were considered as equivalent to a guinea,
which, perhaps, indeed, was worn and defaced too, but seldom so much so.
The late regulations have brought the gold coin as near, perhaps, to its
standard weight as it is possible to bring the current coin of any nation; and
the order to receive no gold at the public offices but by weight, is likely to
preserve it so, as long as that order is enforced. The silver coin still
continues in the same worn and degraded state as before the reformation of
the cold coin. In the market, however, one-and-twenty shillings of this
degraded silver coin are still considered as worth a guinea of this excellent
gold coin.
The reformation of the gold coin has evidently raised the value of the
silver coin which can be exchanged for it.
In the English mint, a pound weight of gold is coined into forty-four
guineas and a half, which at one-and-twenty shillings the guinea, is equal to
forty-six pounds fourteen shillings and sixpence. An ounce of such gold
coin, therefore, is worth £ 3:17:10½ in silver. In England, no duty or
seignorage is paid upon the coinage, and he who carries a pound weight or
an ounce weight of standard gold bullion to the mint, gets back a pound
weight or an ounce weight of gold in coin, without any deduction. Three
pounds seventeen shillings and tenpence halfpenny an ounce, therefore, is
said to be the mint price of gold in England, or the quantity of gold coin
which the mint gives in return for standard gold bullion.
Before the reformation of the gold coin, the price of standard gold bullion
in the market had, for many years, been upwards of £3:18s. sometimes £
3:19s, and very frequently £4 an ounce; that sum, it is probable, in the worn
and degraded gold coin, seldom containing more than an ounce of standard
gold. Since the reformation of the gold coin, the market price of standard
gold bullion seldom exceeds £ 3:17:7 an ounce. Before the reformation of
the gold coin, the market price was always more or less above the mint
price. Since that reformation, the market price has been constantly below
the mint price. But that market price is the same whether it is paid in gold or
in silver coin. The late reformation of the gold coin, therefore, has raised
not only the value of the gold coin, but likewise that of the silver coin in
proportion to gold bullion, and probably, too, in proportion to all other
commodities; though the price of the greater part of other commodities
being influenced by so many other causes, the rise in the value of either
gold or silver coin in proportion to them may not be so distinct and sensible.
In the English mint, a pound weight of standard silver bullion is coined
into sixty-two shillings, containing, in the same manner, a pound weight of
standard silver. Five shillings and twopence an ounce, therefore, is said to
be the mint price of silver in England, or the quantity of silver coin which
the mint gives in return for standard silver bullion. Before the reformation
of the gold coin, the market price of standard silver bullion was, upon
different occasions, five shillings and fourpence, five shillings and
fivepence, five shillings and sixpence, five shillings and sevenpence, and
very often five shillings and eightpence an ounce. Five shillings and
sevenpence, however, seems to have been the most common price. Since
the reformation of the gold coin, the market price of standard silver bullion
has fallen occasionally to five shillings and threepence, five shillings and
fourpence, and five shillings and fivepence an ounce, which last price it has
scarce ever exceeded. Though the market price of silver bullion has fallen
considerably since the reformation of the gold coin, it has not fallen so low
as the mint price.
In the proportion between the different metals in the English coin, as
copper is rated very much above its real value, so silver is rated somewhat
below it. In the market of Europe, in the French coin and in the Dutch coin,
an ounce of fine gold exchanges for about fourteen ounces of fine silver. In
the English coin, it exchanges for about fifteen ounces, that is, for more
silver than it is worth, according to the common estimation of Europe. But
as the price of copper in bars is not, even in England, raised by the high
price of copper in English coin, so the price of silver in bullion is not sunk
by the low rate of silver in English coin. Silver in bullion still preserves its
proper proportion to gold, for the same reason that copper in bars preserves
its proper proportion to silver.
Upon the reformation of the silver coin, in the reign of William III., the
price of silver bullion still continued to be somewhat above the mint price.
Mr Locke imputed this high price to the permission of exporting silver
bullion, and to the prohibition of exporting silver coin. This permission of
exporting, he said, rendered the demand for silver bullion greater than the
demand for silver coin. But the number of people who want silver coin for
the common uses of buying and selling at home, is surely much greater than
that of those who want silver bullion either for the use of exportation or for
any other use. There subsists at present a like permission of exporting gold
bullion, and a like prohibition of exporting gold coin; and yet the price of
gold bullion has fallen below the mint price. But in the English coin, silver
was then, in the same manner as now, under-rated in proportion to gold; and
the gold coin (which at that time, too, was not supposed to require any
reformation) regulated then, as well as now, the real value of the whole
coin. As the reformation of the silver coin did not then reduce the price of
silver bullion to the mint price, it is not very probable that a like
reformation will do so now.
Were the silver coin brought back as near to its standard weight as the
gold, a guinea, it is probable, would, according to the present proportion,
exchange for more silver in coin than it would purchase in bullion. The
silver coin containing its full standard weight, there would in this case, be a
profit in melting it down, in order, first to sell the bullion for gold coin, and
afterwards to exchange this gold coin for silver coin, to be melted down in
the same manner. Some alteration in the present proportion seems to be the
only method of preventing this inconveniency.
The inconveniency, perhaps, would be less, if silver was rated in the coin
as much above its proper proportion to gold as it is at present rated below it,
provided it was at the same time enacted, that silver should not be a legal
tender for more than the change of a guinea, in the same manner as copper
is not a legal tender for more than the change of a shilling. No creditor
could, in this case, be cheated in consequence of the high valuation of silver
in coin; as no creditor can at present be cheated in consequence of the high
valuation of copper. The bankers only would suffer by this regulation.
When a run comes upon them, they sometimes endeavour to gain time, by
paying in sixpences, and they would be precluded by this regulation from
this discreditable method of evading immediate payment. They would be
obliged, in consequence, to keep at all times in their coffers a greater
quantity of cash than at present; and though this might, no doubt, be a
considerable inconveniency to them, it would, at the same time, be a
considerable security to their creditors.
Three pounds seventeen shillings and tenpence halfpenny (the mint price
of gold) certainly does not contain, even in our present excellent gold coin,
more than an ounce of standard gold, and it may be thought, therefore,
should not purchase more standard bullion. But gold in coin is more
convenient than gold in bullion; and though, in England, the coinage is free,
yet the gold which is carried in bullion to the mint, can seldom be returned
in coin to the owner till after a delay of several weeks. In the present hurry
of the mint, it could not be returned till after a delay of several months. This
delay is equivalent to a small duty, and renders gold in coin somewhat more
valuable than an equal quantity of gold in bullion. If, in the English coin,
silver was rated according to its proper proportion to gold, the price of
silver bullion would probably fall below the mint price, even without any
reformation of the silver coin; the value even of the present worn and
defaced silver coin being regulated by the value of the excellent gold coin
for which it can be changed.
A small seignorage or duty upon the coinage of both gold and silver,
would probably increase still more the superiority of those metals in coin
above an equal quantity of either of them in bullion. The coinage would, in
this case, increase the value of the metal coined in proportion to the extent
of this small duty, for the same reason that the fashion increases the value of
plate in proportion to the price of that fashion. The superiority of coin
above bullion would prevent the melting down of the coin, and would
discourage its exportation. If, upon any public exigency, it should become
necessary to export the coin, the greater part of it would soon return again,
of its own accord. Abroad, it could sell only for its weight in bullion. At
home, it would buy more than that weight. There would be a profit,
therefore, in bringing it home again. In France, a seignorage of about eight
per cent. is imposed upon the coinage, and the French coin, when exported,
is said to return home again, of its own accord.
The occasional fluctuations in the market price of gold and silver bullion
arise from the same causes as the like fluctuations in that of all other
commodities. The frequent loss of those metals from various accidents by
sea and by land, the continual waste of them in gilding and plating, in lace
and embroidery, in the wear and tear of coin, and in that of plate, require, in
all countries which possess no mines of their own, a continual importation,
in order to repair this loss and this waste. The merchant importers, like all
other merchants, we may believe, endeavour, as well as they can, to suit
their occasional importations to what they judge is likely to be the
immediate demand. With all their attention, however, they sometimes
overdo the business, and sometimes underdo it. When they import more
bullion than is wanted, rather than incur the risk and trouble of exporting it
again, they are sometimes willing to sell a part of it for something less than
the ordinary or average price. When, on the other hand, they import less
than is wanted, they get something more than this price. But when, under all
those occasional fluctuations, the market price either of gold or silver
bullion continues for several years together steadily and constantly, either
more or less above, or more or less below the mint price, we may be
assured that this steady and constant, either superiority or inferiority of
price, is the effect of something in the state of the coin, which, at that time,
renders a certain quantity of coin either of more value or of less value than
the precise quantity of bullion which it ought to contain. The constancy and
steadiness of the effect supposes a proportionable constancy and steadiness
in the cause.
The money of any particular country is, at any particular time and place,
more or less an accurate measure or value, according as the current coin is
more or less exactly agreeable to its standard, or contains more or less
exactly the precise quantity of pure gold or pure silver which it ought to
contain. If in England, for example, forty-four guineas and a half contained
exactly a pound weight of standard gold, or eleven ounces of fine gold, and
one ounce of alloy, the gold coin of England would be as accurate a
measure of the actual value of goods at any particular time and place as the
nature of the thing would admit. But if, by rubbing and wearing, forty-four
guineas and a half generally contain less than a pound weight of standard
gold, the diminution, however, being greater in some pieces than in others,
the measure of value comes to be liable to the same sort of uncertainty to
which all other weights and measures are commonly exposed. As it rarely
happens that these are exactly agreeable to their standard, the merchant
adjusts the price of his goods as well as he can, not to what those weights
and measures ought to be, but to what, upon an average, he finds, by
experience, they actually are. In consequence of a like disorder in the coin,
the price of goods comes, in the same manner, to be adjusted, not to the
quantity of pure gold or silver which the coin ought to contain, but to that
which, upon an average, it is found, by experience, it actually does contain.
By the money price of goods, it is to be observed, I understand always
the quantity of pure gold or silver for which they are sold, without any
regard to the denomination of the coin. Six shillings and eight pence, for
example, in the time of Edward I., I consider as the same money price with
a pound sterling in the present times, because it contained, as nearly as we
can judge, the same quantity of pure silver.
CHAPTER VI.
OF THE COMPONENT PART OF THE PRICE OF
COMMODITIES.
In that early and rude state of society which precedes both the
accumulation of stock and the appropriation of land, the proportion between
the quantities of labour necessary for acquiring different objects, seems to
be the only circumstance which can afford any rule for exchanging them for
one another. If among a nation of hunters, for example, it usually costs
twice the labour to kill a beaver which it does to kill a deer, one beaver
should naturally exchange for or be worth two deer. It is natural that what is
usually the produce of two days or two hours labour, should be worth
double of what is usually the produce of one day’s or one hour’s labour.
If the one species of labour should be more severe than the other, some
allowance will naturally be made for this superior hardship; and the produce
of one hour’s labour in the one way may frequently exchange for that of
two hour’s labour in the other.
Or if the one species of labour requires an uncommon degree of dexterity
and ingenuity, the esteem which men have for such talents, will naturally
give a value to their produce, superior to what would be due to the time
employed about it. Such talents can seldom be acquired but in consequence
of long application, and the superior value of their produce may frequently
be no more than a reasonable compensation for the time and labour which
must be spent in acquiring them. In the advanced state of society,
allowances of this kind, for superior hardship and superior skill, are
commonly made in the wages of labour; and something of the same kind
must probably have taken place in its earliest and rudest period.
In this state of things, the whole produce of labour belongs to the
labourer; and the quantity of labour commonly employed in acquiring or
producing any commodity, is the only circumstance which can regulate the
quantity of labour which it ought commonly to purchase, command, or
exchange for.
As soon as stock has accumulated in the hands of particular persons,
some of them will naturally employ it in setting to work industrious people,
whom they will supply with materials and subsistence, in order to make a
profit by the sale of their work, or by what their labour adds to the value of
the materials. In exchanging the complete manufacture either for money, for
labour, or for other goods, over and above what may be sufficient to pay the
price of the materials, and the wages of the workmen, something must be
given for the profits of the undertaker of the work, who hazards his stock in
this adventure. The value which the workmen add to the materials,
therefore, resolves itself in this case into two parts, of which the one pays
their wages, the other the profits of their employer upon the whole stock of
materials and wages which he advanced. He could have no interest to
employ them, unless he expected from the sale of their work something
more than what was sufficient to replace his stock to him; and he could
have no interest to employ a great stock rather than a small one, unless his
profits were to bear some proportion to the extent of his stock.
The profits of stock, it may perhaps be thought, are only a different name
for the wages of a particular sort of labour, the labour of inspection and
direction. They are, however, altogether different, are regulated by quite
different principles, and bear no proportion to the quantity, the hardship, or
the ingenuity of this supposed labour of inspection and direction. They are
regulated altogether by the value of the stock employed, and are greater or
smaller in proportion to the extent of this stock. Let us suppose, for
example, that in some particular place, where the common annual profits of
manufacturing stock are ten per cent. there are two different manufactures,
in each of which twenty workmen are employed, at the rate of fifteen
pounds a year each, or at the expense of three hundred a-year in each
manufactory. Let us suppose, too, that the coarse materials annually
wrought up in the one cost only seven hundred pounds, while the finer
materials in the other cost seven thousand. The capital annually employed
in the one will, in this case, amount only to one thousand pounds; whereas
that employed in the other will amount to seven thousand three hundred
pounds. At the rate of ten per cent. therefore, the undertaker of the one will
expect a yearly profit of about one hundred pounds only; while that of the
other will expect about seven hundred and thirty pounds. But though their
profits are so very different, their labour of inspection and direction may be
either altogether or very nearly the same. In many great works, almost the
whole labour of this kind is committed to some principal clerk. His wages
properly express the value of this labour of inspection and direction.
Though in settling them some regard is had commonly, not only to his
labour and skill, but to the trust which is reposed in him, yet they never bear
any regular proportion to the capital of which he oversees the management;
and the owner of this capital, though he is thus discharged of almost all
labour, still expects that his profit should bear a regular proportion to his
capital. In the price of commodities, therefore, the profits of stock constitute
a component part altogether different from the wages of labour, and
regulated by quite different principles.
In this state of things, the whole produce of labour does not always
belong to the labourer. He must in most cases share it with the owner of the
stock which employs him. Neither is the quantity of labour commonly
employed in acquiring or producing any commodity, the only circumstance
which can regulate the quantity which it ought commonly to purchase,
command or exchange for. An additional quantity, it is evident, must be due
for the profits of the stock which advanced the wages and furnished the
materials of that labour.
As soon as the land of any country has all become private property, the
landlords, like all other men, love to reap where they never sowed, and
demand a rent even for its natural produce. The wood of the forest, the
grass of the field, and all the natural fruits of the earth, which, when land
was in common, cost the labourer only the trouble of gathering them, come,
even to him, to have an additional price fixed upon them. He must then pay
for the licence to gather them, and must give up to the landlord a portion of
what his labour either collects or produces. This portion, or, what comes to
the same thing, the price of this portion, constitutes the rent of land, and in
the price of the greater part of commodities, makes a third component part.
The real value of all the different component parts of price, it must be
observed, is measured by the quantity of labour which they can, each of
them, purchase or command. Labour measures the value, not only of that
part of price which resolves itself into labour, but of that which resolves
itself into rent, and of that which resolves itself into profit.
In every society, the price of every commodity finally resolves itself into
some one or other, or all of those three parts; and in every improved society,
all the three enter, more or less, as component parts, into the price of the far
greater part of commodities.
In the price of corn, for example, one part pays the rent of the landlord,
another pays the wages or maintenance of the labourers and labouring cattle
employed in producing it, and the third pays the profit of the farmer. These
three parts seem either immediately or ultimately to make up the whole
price of corn. A fourth part, it may perhaps be thought is necessary for
replacing the stock of the farmer, or for compensating the wear and tear of
his labouring cattle, and other instruments of husbandry. But it must be
considered, that the price of any instrument of husbandry, such as a
labouring horse, is itself made up of the same time parts; the rent of the land
upon which he is reared, the labour of tending and rearing him, and the
profits of the farmer, who advances both the rent of this land, and the wages
of this labour. Though the price of the corn, therefore, may pay the price as
well as the maintenance of the horse, the whole price still resolves itself,
either immediately or ultimately, into the same three parts of rent, labour,
and profit.
In the price of flour or meal, we must add to the price of the corn, the
profits of the miller, and the wages of his servants; in the price of bread, the
profits of the baker, and the wages of his servants; and in the price of both,
the labour of transporting the corn from the house of the farmer to that of
the miller, and from that of the miller to that of the baker, together with the
profits of those who advance the wages of that labour.
The price of flax resolves itself into the same three parts as that of corn.
In the price of linen we must add to this price the wages of the flax-dresser,
of the spinner, of the weaver, of the bleacher, etc. together with the profits
of their respective employers.
As any particular commodity comes to be more manufactured, that part
of the price which resolves itself into wages and profit, comes to be greater
in proportion to that which resolves itself into rent. In the progress of the
manufacture, not only the number of profits increase, but every subsequent
profit is greater than the foregoing; because the capital from which it is
derived must always be greater. The capital which employs the weavers, for
example, must be greater than that which employs the spinners; because it
not only replaces that capital with its profits, but pays, besides, the wages of
the weavers: and the profits must always bear some proportion to the
capital.
In the most improved societies, however, there are always a few
commodities of which the price resolves itself into two parts only: the
wages of labour, and the profits of stock; and a still smaller number, in
which it consists altogether in the wages of labour. In the price of sea-fish,
for example, one part pays the labour of the fisherman, and the other the
profits of the capital employed in the fishery. Rent very seldom makes any
part of it, though it does sometimes, as I shall shew hereafter. It is
otherwise, at least through the greater part of Europe, in river fisheries. A
salmon fishery pays a rent; and rent, though it cannot well be called the rent
of land, makes a part of the price of a salmon, as well as wares and profit.
In some parts of Scotland, a few poor people make a trade of gathering,
along the sea-shore, those little variegated stones commonly known by the
name of Scotch pebbles. The price which is paid to them by the stone-
cutter, is altogether the wages of their labour; neither rent nor profit makes
an part of it.
But the whole price of any commodity must still finally resolve itself into
some one or other or all of those three parts; as whatever part of it remains
after paying the rent of the land, and the price of the whole labour employed
in raising, manufacturing, and bringing it to market, must necessarily be
profit to somebody.
As the price or exchangeable value of every particular commodity, taken
separately, resolves itself into some one or other, or all of those three parts;
so that of all the commodities which compose the whole annual produce of
the labour of every country, taken complexly, must resolve itself into the
same three parts, and be parcelled out among different inhabitants of the
country, either as the wages of their labour, the profits of their stock, or the
rent of their land. The whole of what is annually either collected or
produced by the labour of every society, or, what comes to the same thing,
the whole price of it, is in this manner originally distributed among some of
its different members. Wages, profit, and rent, are the three original sources
of all revenue, as well as of all exchangeable value. All other revenue is
ultimately derived from some one or other of these.
Whoever derives his revenue from a fund which is his own, must draw it
either from his labour, from his stock, or from his land. The revenue derived
from labour is called wages; that derived from stock, by the person who
manages or employs it, is called profit; that derived from it by the person
who does not employ it himself, but lends it to another, is called the interest
or the use of money. It is the compensation which the borrower pays to the
lender, for the profit which he has an opportunity of making by the use of
the money. Part of that profit naturally belongs to the borrower, who runs
the risk and takes the trouble of employing it, and part to the lender, who
affords him the opportunity of making this profit. The interest of money is
always a derivative revenue, which, if it is not paid from the profit which is
made by the use of the money, must be paid from some other source of
revenue, unless perhaps the borrower is a spendthrift, who contracts a
second debt in order to pay the interest of the first. The revenue which
proceeds altogether from land, is called rent, and belongs to the landlord.
The revenue of the farmer is derived partly from his labour, and partly from
his stock. To him, land is only the instrument which enables him to earn the
wages of this labour, and to make the profits of this stock. All taxes, and all
the revenue which is founded upon them, all salaries, pensions, and
annuities of every kind, are ultimately derived from some one or other of
those three original sources of revenue, and are paid either immediately or
mediately from the wages of labour, the profits of stock, or the rent of land.
When those three different sorts of revenue belong to different persons,
they are readily distinguished; but when they belong to the same, they are
sometimes confounded with one another, at least in common language.
A gentleman who farms a part of his own estate, after paying the expense
of cultivation, should gain both the rent of the landlord and the profit of the
farmer. He is apt to denominate, however, his whole gain, profit, and thus
confounds rent with profit, at least in common language. The greater part of
our North American and West Indian planters are in this situation. They
farm, the greater part of them, their own estates: and accordingly we seldom
hear of the rent of a plantation, but frequently of its profit.
Common farmers seldom employ any overseer to direct the general
operations of the farm. They generally, too, work a good deal with their
own hands, as ploughmen, harrowers, etc. What remains of the crop, after
paying the rent, therefore, should not only replace to them their stock
employed in cultivation, together with its ordinary profits, but pay them the
wages which are due to them, both as labourers and overseers. Whatever
remains, however, after paying the rent and keeping up the stock, is called
profit. But wages evidently make a part of it. The farmer, by saving these
wages, must necessarily gain them. Wages, therefore, are in this case
confounded with profit.
An independent manufacturer, who has stock enough both to purchase
materials, and to maintain himself till he can carry his work to market,
should gain both the wages of a journeyman who works under a master, and
the profit which that master makes by the sale of that journeyman’s work.
His whole gains, however, are commonly called profit, and wages are, in
this case, too, confounded with profit.
A gardener who cultivates his own garden with his own hands, unites in
his own person the three different characters, of landlord, farmer, and
labourer. His produce, therefore, should pay him the rent of the first, the
profit of the second, and the wages of the third. The whole, however, is
commonly considered as the earnings of his labour. Both rent and profit are,
in this case, confounded with wages.
As in a civilized country there are but few commodities of which the
exchangeable value arises from labour only, rent and profit contributing
largely to that of the far greater part of them, so the annual produce of its
labour will always be sufficient to purchase or command a much greater
quantity of labour than what was employed in raising, preparing, and
bringing that produce to market. If the society were annually to employ all
the labour which it can annually purchase, as the quantity of labour would
increase greatly every year, so the produce of every succeeding year would
be of vastly greater value than that of the foregoing. But there is no country
in which the whole annual produce is employed in maintaining the
industrious. The idle everywhere consume a great part of it; and, according
to the different proportions in which it is annually divided between those
two different orders of people, its ordinary or average value must either
annually increase or diminish, or continue the same from one year to
another.
CHAPTER VII.
OF THE NATURAL AND MARKET PRICE OF
COMMODITIES.
There is in every society or neighbourhood an ordinary or average rate,
both of wages and profit, in every different employment of labour and
stock. This rate is naturally regulated, as I shall shew hereafter, partly by the
general circumstances of the society, their riches or poverty, their
advancing, stationary, or declining condition, and partly by the particular
nature of each employment.
There is likewise in every society or neighbourhood an ordinary or
average rate of rent, which is regulated, too, as I shall shew hereafter, partly
by the general circumstances of the society or neighbourhood in which the
land is situated, and partly by the natural or improved fertility of the land.
These ordinary or average rates may be called the natural rates of wages,
profit and rent, at the time and place in which they commonly prevail.
When the price of any commodity is neither more nor less than what is
sufficient to pay the rent of the land, the wages of the labour, and the profits
of the stock employed in raising, preparing, and bringing it to market,
according to their natural rates, the commodity is then sold for what may be
called its natural price.
The commodity is then sold precisely for what it is worth, or for what it
really costs the person who brings it to market; for though, in common
language, what is called the prime cost of any commodity does not
comprehend the profit of the person who is to sell it again, yet, if he sells it
at a price which does not allow him the ordinary rate of profit in his
neighbourhood, he is evidently a loser by the trade; since, by employing his
stock in some other way, he might have made that profit. His profit, besides,
is his revenue, the proper fund of his subsistence. As, while he is preparing
and bringing the goods to market, he advances to his workmen their wages,
or their subsistence; so he advances to himself, in the same manner, his own
subsistence, which is generally suitable to the profit which he may
reasonably expect from the sale of his goods. Unless they yield him this
profit, therefore, they do not repay him what they may very properly be said
to have really cost him.
Though the price, therefore, which leaves him this profit, is not always
the lowest at which a dealer may sometimes sell his goods, it is the lowest
at which he is likely to sell them for any considerable time; at least where
there is perfect liberty, or where he may change his trade as often as he
pleases.
The actual price at which any commodity is commonly sold, is called its
market price. It may either be above, or below, or exactly the same with its
natural price.
The market price of every particular commodity is regulated by the
proportion between the quantity which is actually brought to market, and
the demand of those who are willing to pay the natural price of the
commodity, or the whole value of the rent, labour, and profit, which must be
paid in order to bring it thither. Such people may be called the effectual
demanders, and their demand the effectual demand; since it maybe
sufficient to effectuate the bringing of the commodity to market. It is
different from the absolute demand. A very poor man may be said, in some
sense, to have a demand for a coach and six; he might like to have it; but his
demand is not an effectual demand, as the commodity can never be brought
to market in order to satisfy it.
When the quantity of any commodity which is brought to market falls
short of the effectual demand, all those who are willing to pay the whole
value of the rent, wages, and profit, which must be paid in order to bring it
thither, cannot be supplied with the quantity which they want. Rather than
want it altogether, some of them will be willing to give more. A
competition will immediately begin among them, and the market price will
rise more or less above the natural price, according as either the greatness
of the deficiency, or the wealth and wanton luxury of the competitors,
happen to animate more or less the eagerness of the competition. Among
competitors of equal wealth and luxury, the same deficiency will generally
occasion a more or less eager competition, according as the acquisition of
the commodity happens to be of more or less importance to them. Hence
the exorbitant price of the necessaries of life during the blockade of a town,
or in a famine.
When the quantity brought to market exceeds the effectual demand, it
cannot be all sold to those who are willing to pay the whole value of the
rent, wages, and profit, which must be paid in order to bring it thither. Some
part must be sold to those who are willing to pay less, and the low price
which they give for it must reduce the price of the whole. The market price
will sink more or less below the natural price, according as the greatness of
the excess increases more or less the competition of the sellers, or according
as it happens to be more or less important to them to get immediately rid of
the commodity. The same excess in the importation of perishable, will
occasion a much greater competition than in that of durable commodities; in
the importation of oranges, for example, than in that of old iron.
When the quantity brought to market is just sufficient to supply the
effectual demand, and no more, the market price naturally comes to be
either exactly, or as nearly as can be judged of, the same with the natural
price. The whole quantity upon hand can be disposed of for this price, and
can not be disposed of for more. The competition of the different dealers
obliges them all to accept of this price, but does not oblige them to accept
of less.
The quantity of every commodity brought to market naturally suits itself
to the effectual demand. It is the interest of all those who employ their land,
labour, or stock, in bringing any commodity to market, that the quantity
never should exceed the effectual demand; and it is the interest of all other
people that it never should fall short of that demand.
If at any time it exceeds the effectual demand, some of the component
parts of its price must be paid below their natural rate. If it is rent, the
interest of the landlords will immediately prompt them to withdraw a part
of their land; and if it is wages or profit, the interest of the labourers in the
one case, and of their employers in the other, will prompt them to withdraw
a part of their labour or stock, from this employment. The quantity brought
to market will soon be no more than sufficient to supply the effectual
demand. All the different parts of its price will rise to their natural rate, and
the whole price to its natural price.
If, on the contrary, the quantity brought to market should at any time fall
short of the effectual demand, some of the component parts of its price must
rise above their natural rate. If it is rent, the interest of all other landlords
will naturally prompt them to prepare more land for the raising of this
commodity; if it is wages or profit, the interest of all other labourers and
dealers will soon prompt them to employ more labour and stock in
preparing and bringing it to market. The quantity brought thither will soon
be sufficient to supply the effectual demand. All the different parts of its
price will soon sink to their natural rate, and the whole price to its natural
price.
The natural price, therefore, is, as it were, the central price, to which the
prices of all commodities are continually gravitating. Different accidents
may sometimes keep them suspended a good deal above it, and sometimes
force them down even somewhat below it. But whatever may be the
obstacles which hinder them from settling in this centre of repose and
continuance, they are constantly tending towards it.
The whole quantity of industry annually employed in order to bring any
commodity to market, naturally suits itself in this manner to the effectual
demand. It naturally aims at bringing always that precise quantity thither
which may be sufficient to supply, and no more than supply, that demand.
But, in some employments, the same quantity of industry will, in
different years, produce very different quantities of commodities; while, in
others, it will produce always the same, or very nearly the same. The same
number of labourers in husbandry will, in different years, produce very
different quantities of corn, wine, oil, hops, etc. But the same number of
spinners or weavers will every year produce the same, or very nearly the
same, quantity of linen and woollen cloth. It is only the average produce of
the one species of industry which can be suited, in any respect, to the
effectual demand; and as its actual produce is frequently much greater, and
frequently much less, than its average produce, the quantity of the
commodities brought to market will sometimes exceed a good deal, and
sometimes fall short a good deal, of the effectual demand. Even though that
demand, therefore, should continue always the same, their market price will
be liable to great fluctuations, will sometimes fall a good deal below, and
sometimes rise a good deal above, their natural price. In the other species of
industry, the produce of equal quantities of labour being always the same,
or very nearly the same, it can be more exactly suited to the effectual
demand. While that demand continues the same, therefore, the market price
of the commodities is likely to do so too, and to be either altogether, or as
nearly as can be judged of, the same with the natural price. That the price of
linen and woollen cloth is liable neither to such frequent, nor to such great
variations, as the price of corn, every man’s experience will inform him.
The price of the one species of commodities varies only with the variations
in the demand; that of the other varies not only with the variations in the
demand, but with the much greater, and more frequent, variations in the
quantity of what is brought to market, in order to supply that demand.
The occasional and temporary fluctuations in the market price of any
commodity fall chiefly upon those parts of its price which resolve
themselves into wages and profit. That part which resolves itself into rent is
less affected by them. A rent certain in money is not in the least affected by
them, either in its rate or in its value. A rent which consists either in a
certain proportion, or in a certain quantity, of the rude produce, is no doubt
affected in its yearly value by all the occasional and temporary fluctuations
in the market price of that rude produce; but it is seldom affected by them in
its yearly rate. In settling the terms of the lease, the landlord and farmer
endeavour, according to their best judgment, to adjust that rate, not to the
temporary and occasional, but to the average and ordinary price of the
produce.
Such fluctuations affect both the value and the rate, either of wages or of
profit, according as the market happens to be either overstocked or
understocked with commodities or with labour, with work done, or with
work to be done. A public mourning raises the price of black cloth (with
which the market is almost always understocked upon such occasions), and
augments the profits of the merchants who possess any considerable
quantity of it. It has no effect upon the wages of the weavers. The market is
understocked with commodities, not with labour, with work done, not with
work to be done. It raises the wages of journeymen tailors. The market is
here understocked with labour. There is an effectual demand for more
labour, for more work to be done, than can be had. It sinks the price of
coloured silks and cloths, and thereby reduces the profits of the merchants
who have any considerable quantity of them upon hand. It sinks, too, the
wages of the workmen employed in preparing such commodities, for which
all demand is stopped for six months, perhaps for a twelvemonth. The
market is here overstocked both with commodities and with labour.
But though the market price of every particular commodity is in this
manner continually gravitating, if one may say so, towards the natural price;
yet sometimes particular accidents, sometimes natural causes, and
sometimes particular regulations of policy, may, in many commodities, keep
up the market price, for a long time together, a good deal above the natural
price.
When, by an increase in the effectual demand, the market price of some
particular commodity happens to rise a good deal above the natural price,
those who employ their stocks in supplying that market, are generally
careful to conceal this change. If it was commonly known, their great profit
would tempt so many new rivals to employ their stocks in the same way,
that, the effectual demand being fully supplied, the market price would soon
be reduced to the natural price, and, perhaps, for some time even below it.
If the market is at a great distance from the residence of those who supply
it, they may sometimes be able to keep the secret for several years together,
and may so long enjoy their extraordinary profits without any new rivals.
Secrets of this kind, however, it must be acknowledged, can seldom be long
kept; and the extraordinary profit can last very little longer than they are
kept.
Secrets in manufactures are capable of being longer kept than secrets in
trade. A dyer who has found the means of producing a particular colour
with materials which cost only half the price of those commonly made use
of, may, with good management, enjoy the advantage of his discovery as
long as he lives, and even leave it as a legacy to his posterity. His
extraordinary gains arise from the high price which is paid for his private
labour. They properly consist in the high wages of that labour. But as they
are repeated upon every part of his stock, and as their whole amount bears,
upon that account, a regular proportion to it, they are commonly considered
as extraordinary profits of stock.
Such enhancements of the market price are evidently the effects of
particular accidents, of which, however, the operation may sometimes last
for many years together.
Some natural productions require such a singularity of soil and situation,
that all the land in a great country, which is fit for producing them, may not
be sufficient to supply the effectual demand. The whole quantity brought to
market, therefore, may be disposed of to those who are willing to give more
than what is sufficient to pay the rent of the land which produced them,
together with the wages of the labour and the profits of the stock which
were employed in preparing and bringing them to market, according to their
natural rates. Such commodities may continue for whole centuries together
to be sold at this high price; and that part of it which resolves itself into the
rent of land, is in this case the part which is generally paid above its natural
rate. The rent of the land which affords such singular and esteemed
productions, like the rent of some vineyards in France of a peculiarly happy
soil and situation, bears no regular proportion to the rent of other equally
fertile and equally well cultivated land in its neighbourhood. The wages of
the labour, and the profits of the stock employed in bringing such
commodities to market, on the contrary, are seldom out of their natural
proportion to those of the other employments of labour and stock in their
neighbourhood.
Such enhancements of the market price are evidently the effect of natural
causes, which may hinder the effectual demand from ever being fully
supplied, and which may continue, therefore, to operate for ever.
A monopoly granted either to an individual or to a trading company, has
the same effect as a secret in trade or manufactures. The monopolists, by
keeping the market constantly understocked by never fully supplying the
effectual demand, sell their commodities much above the natural price, and
raise their emoluments, whether they consist in wages or profit, greatly
above their natural rate.
The price of monopoly is upon every occasion the highest which can be
got. The natural price, or the price of free competition, on the contrary, is
the lowest which can be taken, not upon every occasion indeed, but for any
considerable time together. The one is upon every occasion the highest
which can be squeezed out of the buyers, or which it is supposed they will
consent to give; the other is the lowest which the sellers can commonly
afford to take, and at the same time continue their business.
The exclusive privileges of corporations, statutes of apprenticeship, and
all those laws which restrain in particular employments, the competition to
a smaller number than might otherwise go into them, have the same
tendency, though in a less degree. They are a sort of enlarged monopolies,
and may frequently, for ages together, and in whole classes of
employments, keep up the market price of particular commodities above the
natural price, and maintain both the wages of the labour and the profits of
the stock employed about them somewhat above their natural rate.
Such enhancements of the market price may last as long as the
regulations of policy which give occasion to them.
The market price of any particular commodity, though it may continue
long above, can seldom continue long below, its natural price. Whatever
part of it was paid below the natural rate, the persons whose interest it
affected would immediately feel the loss, and would immediately withdraw
either so much land or so much labour, or so much stock, from being
employed about it, that the quantity brought to market would soon be no
more than sufficient to supply the effectual demand. Its market price,
therefore, would soon rise to the natural price; this at least would be the
case where there was perfect liberty.
The same statutes of apprenticeship and other corporation laws, indeed,
which, when a manufacture is in prosperity, enable the workman to raise his
wages a good deal above their natural rate, sometimes oblige him, when it
decays, to let them down a good deal below it. As in the one case they
exclude many people from his employment, so in the other they exclude
him from many employments. The effect of such regulations, however, is
not near so durable in sinking the workman’s wages below, as in raising
them above their natural rate. Their operation in the one way may endure
for many centuries, but in the other it can last no longer than the lives of
some of the workmen who were bred to the business in the time of its
prosperity. When they are gone, the number of those who are afterwards
educated to the trade will naturally suit itself to the effectual demand. The
policy must be as violent as that of Indostan or ancient Egypt (where every
man was bound by a principle of religion to follow the occupation of his
father, and was supposed to commit the most horrid sacrilege if he changed
it for another), which can in any particular employment, and for several
generations together, sink either the wages of labour or the profits of stock
below their natural rate.
This is all that I think necessary to be observed at present concerning the
deviations, whether occasional or permanent, of the market price of
commodities from the natural price.
The natural price itself varies with the natural rate of each of its
component parts, of wages, profit, and rent; and in every society this rate
varies according to their circumstances, according to their riches or poverty,
their advancing, stationary, or declining condition. I shall, in the four
following chapters, endeavour to explain, as fully and distinctly as I can, the
causes of those different variations.
First, I shall endeavour to explain what are the circumstances which
naturally determine the rate of wages, and in what manner those
circumstances are affected by the riches or poverty, by the advancing,
stationary, or declining state of the society.
Secondly, I shall endeavour to shew what are the circumstances which
naturally determine the rate of profit; and in what manner, too, those
circumstances are affected by the like variations in the state of the society.
Though pecuniary wages and profit are very different in the different
employments of labour and stock; yet a certain proportion seems commonly
to take place between both the pecuniary wages in all the different
employments of labour, and the pecuniary profits in all the different
employments of stock. This proportion, it will appear hereafter, depends
partly upon the nature of the different employments, and partly upon the
different laws and policy of the society in which they are carried on. But
though in many respects dependent upon the laws and policy, this
proportion seems to be little affected by the riches or poverty of that society,
by its advancing, stationary, or declining condition, but to remain the same,
or very nearly the same, in all those different states. I shall, in the third
place, endeavour to explain all the different circumstances which regulate
this proportion.
In the fourth and last place, I shall endeavour to shew what are the
circumstances which regulate the rent of land, and which either raise or
lower the real price of all the different substances which it produces.
CHAPTER VIII.
OF THE WAGES OF LABOUR.
The produce of labour constitutes the natural recompence or wages of
labour. In that original state of things which precedes both the appropriation
of land and the accumulation of stock, the whole produce of labour belongs
to the labourer. He has neither landlord nor master to share with him.
Had this state continued, the wages of labour would have augmented
with all those improvements in its productive powers, to which the division
of labour gives occasion. All things would gradually have become cheaper.
They would have been produced by a smaller quantity of labour; and as the
commodities produced by equal quantities of labour would naturally in this
state of things be exchanged for one another, they would have been
purchased likewise with the produce of a smaller quantity.
But though all things would have become cheaper in reality, in
appearance many things might have become dearer, than before, or have
been exchanged for a greater quantity of other goods. Let us suppose, for
example, that in the greater part of employments the productive powers of
labour had been improved to tenfold, or that a day’s labour could produce
ten times the quantity of work which it had done originally; but that in a
particular employment they had been improved only to double, or that a
day’s labour could produce only twice the quantity of work which it had
done before. In exchanging the produce of a day’s labour in the greater part
of employments for that of a day’s labour in this particular one, ten times
the original quantity of work in them would purchase only twice the
original quantity in it. Any particular quantity in it, therefore, a pound
weight, for example, would appear to be five times dearer than before. In
reality, however, it would be twice as cheap. Though it required five times
the quantity of other goods to purchase it, it would require only half the
quantity of labour either to purchase or to produce it. The acquisition,
therefore, would be twice as easy as before.
But this original state of things, in which the labourer enjoyed the whole
produce of his own labour, could not last beyond the first introduction of
the appropriation of land and the accumulation of stock. It was at an end,
therefore, long before the most considerable improvements were made in
the productive powers of labour; and it would be to no purpose to trace
further what might have been its effects upon the recompence or wages of
labour.
As soon as land becomes private property, the landlord demands a share
of almost all the produce which the labourer can either raise or collect from
it. His rent makes the first deduction from the produce of the labour which
is employed upon land.
It seldom happens that the person who tills the ground has wherewithal to
maintain himself till he reaps the harvest. His maintenance is generally
advanced to him from the stock of a master, the farmer who employs him,
and who would have no interest to employ him, unless he was to share in
the produce of his labour, or unless his stock was to be replaced to him with
a profit. This profit makes a second deduction from the produce of the
labour which is employed upon land.
The produce of almost all other labour is liable to the like deduction of
profit. In all arts and manufactures, the greater part of the workmen stand in
need of a master, to advance them the materials of their work, and their
wages and maintenance, till it be completed. He shares in the produce of
their labour, or in the value which it adds to the materials upon which it is
bestowed; and in this share consists his profit.
It sometimes happens, indeed, that a single independent workman has
stock sufficient both to purchase the materials of his work, and to maintain
himself till it be completed. He is both master and workman, and enjoys the
whole produce of his own labour, or the whole value which it adds to the
materials upon which it is bestowed. It includes what are usually two
distinct revenues, belonging to two distinct persons, the profits of stock, and
the wages of labour.
Such cases, however, are not very frequent; and in every part of Europe
twenty workmen serve under a master for one that is independent, and the
wages of labour are everywhere understood to be, what they usually are,
when the labourer is one person, and the owner of the stock which employs
him another.
What are the common wages of labour, depends everywhere upon the
contract usually made between those two parties, whose interests are by no
means the same. The workmen desire to get as much, the masters to give as
little, as possible. The former are disposed to combine in order to raise, the
latter in order to lower, the wages of labour.
It is not, however, difficult to foresee which of the two parties must, upon
all ordinary occasions, have the advantage in the dispute, and force the
other into a compliance with their terms. The masters, being fewer in
number, can combine much more easily: and the law, besides, authorises, or
at least does not prohibit, their combinations, while it prohibits those of the
workmen. We have no acts of parliament against combining to lower the
price of work, but many against combining to raise it. In all such disputes,
the masters can hold out much longer. A landlord, a farmer, a master
manufacturer, or merchant, though they did not employ a single workman,
could generally live a year or two upon the stocks, which they have already
acquired. Many workmen could not subsist a week, few could subsist a
month, and scarce any a year, without employment. In the long run, the
workman may be as necessary to his master as his master is to him; but the
necessity is not so immediate.
We rarely hear, it has been said, of the combinations of masters, though
frequently of those of workmen. But whoever imagines, upon this account,
that masters rarely combine, is as ignorant of the world as of the subject.
Masters are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and
uniform, combination, not to raise the wages of labour above their actual
rate. To violate this combination is everywhere a most unpopular action,
and a sort of reproach to a master among his neighbours and equals. We
seldom, indeed, hear of this combination, because it is the usual, and, one
may say, the natural state of things, which nobody ever hears of. Masters,
too, sometimes enter into particular combinations to sink the wages of
labour even below this rate. These are always conducted with the utmost
silence and secrecy till the moment of execution; and when the workmen
yield, as they sometimes do without resistance, though severely felt by
them, they are never heard of by other people. Such combinations, however,
are frequently resisted by a contrary defensive combination of the
workmen, who sometimes, too, without any provocation of this kind,
combine, of their own accord, to raise the price of their labour. Their usual
pretences are, sometimes the high price of provisions, sometimes the great
profit which their masters make by their work. But whether their
combinations be offensive or defensive, they are always abundantly heard
of. In order to bring the point to a speedy decision, they have always
recourse to the loudest clamour, and sometimes to the most shocking
violence and outrage. They are desperate, and act with the folly and
extravagance of desperate men, who must either starve, or frighten their
masters into an immediate compliance with their demands. The masters,
upon these occasions, are just as clamorous upon the other side, and never
cease to call aloud for the assistance of the civil magistrate, and the rigorous
execution of those laws which have been enacted with so much severity
against the combination of servants, labourers, and journeymen. The
workmen, accordingly, very seldom derive any advantage from the violence
of those tumultuous combinations, which, partly from the interposition of
the civil magistrate, partly from the superior steadiness of the masters,
partly from the necessity which the greater part of the workmen are under
of submitting for the sake of present subsistence, generally end in nothing
but the punishment or ruin of the ringleaders.
But though, in disputes with their workmen, masters must generally have
the advantage, there is, however, a certain rate, below which it seems
impossible to reduce, for any considerable time, the ordinary wages even of
the lowest species of labour.
A man must always live by his work, and his wages must at least be
sufficient to maintain him. They must even upon most occasions be
somewhat more, otherwise it would be impossible for him to bring up a
family, and the race of such workmen could not last beyond the first
generation. Mr Cantillon seems, upon this account, to suppose that the
lowest species of common labourers must everywhere earn at least double
their own maintenance, in order that, one with another, they may be enabled
to bring up two children; the labour of the wife, on account of her necessary
attendance on the children, being supposed no more than sufficient to
provide for herself: But one half the children born, it is computed, die
before the age of manhood. The poorest labourers, therefore, according to
this account, must, one with another, attempt to rear at least four children, in
order that two may have an equal chance of living to that age. But the
necessary maintenance of four children, it is supposed, may be nearly equal
to that of one man. The labour of an able-bodied slave, the same author
adds, is computed to be worth double his maintenance; and that of the
meanest labourer, he thinks, cannot be worth less than that of an able-
bodied slave. Thus far at least seems certain, that, in order to bring up a
family, the labour of the husband and wife together must, even in the lowest
species of common labour, be able to earn something more than what is
precisely necessary for their own maintenance; but in what proportion,
whether in that above-mentioned, or many other, I shall not take upon me to
determine.
There are certain circumstances, however, which sometimes give the
labourers an advantage, and enable them to raise their wages considerably
above this rate, evidently the lowest which is consistent with common
humanity.
When in any country the demand for those who live by wages, labourers,
journeymen, servants of every kind, is continually increasing; when every
year furnishes employment for a greater number than had been employed
the year before, the workmen have no occasion to combine in order to raise
their wages. The scarcity of hands occasions a competition among masters,
who bid against one another in order to get workmen, and thus voluntarily
break through the natural combination of masters not to raise wages. The
demand for those who live by wages, it is evident, cannot increase but in
proportion to the increase of the funds which are destined to the payment of
wages. These funds are of two kinds, first, the revenue which is over and
above what is necessary for the maintenance; and, secondly, the stock
which is over and above what is necessary for the employment of their
masters.
When the landlord, annuitant, or monied man, has a greater revenue than
what he judges sufficient to maintain his own family, he employs either the
whole or a part of the surplus in maintaining one or more menial servants.
Increase this surplus, and he will naturally increase the number of those
servants.
When an independent workman, such as a weaver or shoemaker, has got
more stock than what is sufficient to purchase the materials of his own
work, and to maintain himself till he can dispose of it, he naturally employs
one or more journeymen with the surplus, in order to make a profit by their
work. Increase this surplus, and he will naturally increase the number of his
journeymen.
The demand for those who live by wages, therefore, necessarily increases
with the increase of the revenue and stock of every country, and cannot
possibly increase without it. The increase of revenue and stock is the
increase of national wealth. The demand for those who live by wages,
therefore, naturally increases with the increase of national wealth, and
cannot possibly increase without it.
It is not the actual greatness of national wealth, but its continual increase,
which occasions a rise in the wages of labour. It is not, accordingly, in the
richest countries, but in the most thriving, or in those which are growing
rich the fastest, that the wages of labour are highest. England is certainly, in
the present times, a much richer country than any part of North America.
The wages of labour, however, are much higher in North America than in
any part of England. In the province of New York, common labourers
earned in 1773, before the commencement of the late disturbances, three
shillings and sixpence currency, equal to two shillings sterling, a-day; ship-
carpenters, ten shillings and sixpence currency, with a pint of rum, worth
sixpence sterling, equal in all to six shillings and sixpence sterling; house-
carpenters and bricklayers, eight shillings currency, equal to four shillings
and sixpence sterling; journeymen tailors, five shillings currency, equal to
about two shillings and tenpence sterling. These prices are all above the
London price; and wages are said to be as high in the other colonies as in
New York. The price of provisions is everywhere in North America much
lower than in England. A dearth has never been known there. In the worst
seasons they have always had a sufficiency for themselves, though less for
exportation. If the money price of labour, therefore, be higher than it is
anywhere in the mother-country, its real price, the real command of the
necessaries and conveniencies of life which it conveys to the labourer, must
be higher in a still greater proportion.
But though North America is not yet so rich as England, it is much more
thriving, and advancing with much greater rapidity to the further acquisition
of riches. The most decisive mark of the prosperity of any country is the
increase of the number of its inhabitants. In Great Britain, and most other
European countries, they are not supposed to double in less than five
hundred years. In the British colonies in North America, it has been found
that they double in twenty or five-and-twenty years. Nor in the present
times is this increase principally owing to the continual importation of new
inhabitants, but to the great multiplication of the species. Those who live to
old age, it is said, frequently see there from fifty to a hundred, and
sometimes many more, descendants from their own body. Labour is there so
well rewarded, that a numerous family of children, instead of being a
burden, is a source of opulence and prosperity to the parents. The labour of
each child, before it can leave their house, is computed to be worth a
hundred pounds clear gain to them. A young widow with four or five young
children, who, among the middling or inferior ranks of people in Europe,
would have so little chance for a second husband, is there frequently
courted as a sort of fortune. The value of children is the greatest of all
encouragements to marriage. We cannot, therefore, wonder that the people
in North America should generally marry very young. Notwithstanding the
great increase occasioned by such early marriages, there is a continual
complaint of the scarcity of hands in North America. The demand for
labourers, the funds destined for maintaining them increase, it seems, still
faster than they can find labourers to employ.
Though the wealth of a country should be very great, yet if it has been
long stationary, we must not expect to find the wages of labour very high in
it. The funds destined for the payment of wages, the revenue and stock of
its inhabitants, may be of the greatest extent; but if they have continued for
several centuries of the same, or very nearly of the same extent, the number
of labourers employed every year could easily supply, and even more than
supply, the number wanted the following year. There could seldom be any
scarcity of hands, nor could the masters be obliged to bid against one
another in order to get them. The hands, on the contrary, would, in this case,
naturally multiply beyond their employment. There would be a constant
scarcity of employment, and the labourers would be obliged to bid against
one another in order to get it. If in such a country the wages of labour had
ever been more than sufficient to maintain the labourer, and to enable him
to bring up a family, the competition of the labourers and the interest of the
masters would soon reduce them to the lowest rate which is consistent with
common humanity. China has been long one of the richest, that is, one of
the most fertile, best cultivated, most industrious, and most populous,
countries in the world. It seems, however, to have been long stationary.
Marco Polo, who visited it more than five hundred years ago, describes its
cultivation, industry, and populousness, almost in the same terms in which
they are described by travellers in the present times. It had, perhaps, even
long before his time, acquired that full complement of riches which the
nature of its laws and institutions permits it to acquire. The accounts of all
travellers, inconsistent in many other respects, agree in the low wages of
labour, and in the difficulty which a labourer finds in bringing up a family
in China. If by digging the ground a whole day he can get what will
purchase a small quantity of rice in the evening, he is contented. The
condition of artificers is, if possible, still worse. Instead of waiting
indolently in their work-houses for the calls of their customers, as in
Europe, they are continually running about the streets with the tools of their
respective trades, offering their services, and, as it were, begging
employment. The poverty of the lower ranks of people in China far
surpasses that of the most beggarly nations in Europe. In the neighbourhood
of Canton, many hundred, it is commonly said, many thousand families
have no habitation on the land, but live constantly in little fishing-boats
upon the rivers and canals. The subsistence which they find there is so
scanty, that they are eager to fish up the nastiest garbage thrown overboard
from any European ship. Any carrion, the carcase of a dead dog or cat, for
example, though half putrid and stinking, is as welcome to them as the most
wholesome food to the people of other countries. Marriage is encouraged in
China, not by the profitableness of children, but by the liberty of destroying
them. In all great towns, several are every night exposed in the street, or
drowned like puppies in the water. The performance of this horrid office is
even said to be the avowed business by which some people earn their
subsistence.
China, however, though it may, perhaps, stand still, does not seem to go
backwards. Its towns are nowhere deserted by their inhabitants. The lands
which had once been cultivated, are nowhere neglected. The same, or very
nearly the same, annual labour, must, therefore, continue to be performed,
and the funds destined for maintaining it must not, consequently, be
sensibly diminished. The lowest class of labourers, therefore,
notwithstanding their scanty subsistence, must some way or another make
shift to continue their race so far as to keep up their usual numbers.
But it would be otherwise in a country where the funds destined for the
maintenance of labour were sensibly decaying. Every year the demand for
servants and labourers would, in all the different classes of employments,
be less than it had been the year before. Many who had been bred in the
superior classes, not being able to find employment in their own business,
would be glad to seek it in the lowest. The lowest class being not only
overstocked with its own workmen, but with the overflowings of all the
other classes, the competition for employment would be so great in it, as to
reduce the wages of labour to the most miserable and scanty subsistence of
the labourer. Many would not be able to find employment even upon these
hard terms, but would either starve, or be driven to seek a subsistence,
either by begging, or by the perpetration perhaps, of the greatest enormities.
Want, famine, and mortality, would immediately prevail in that class, and
from thence extend themselves to all the superior classes, till the number of
inhabitants in the country was reduced to what could easily be maintained
by the revenue and stock which remained in it, and which had escaped
either the tyranny or calamity which had destroyed the rest. This, perhaps,
is nearly the present state of Bengal, and of some other of the English
settlements in the East Indies. In a fertile country, which had before been
much depopulated, where subsistence, consequently, should not be very
difficult, and where, notwithstanding, three or four hundred thousand
people die of hunger in one year, we may be assured that the funds destined
for the maintenance of the labouring poor are fast decaying. The difference
between the genius of the British constitution, which protects and governs
North America, and that of the mercantile company which oppresses and
domineers in the East Indies, cannot, perhaps, be better illustrated than by
the different state of those countries.
The liberal reward of labour, therefore, as it is the necessary effect, so it
is the natural symptom of increasing national wealth. The scanty
maintenance of the labouring poor, on the other hand, is the natural
symptom that things are at a stand, and their starving condition, that they
are going fast backwards.
In Great Britain, the wages of labour seem, in the present times, to be
evidently more than what is precisely necessary to enable the labourer to
bring up a family. In order to satisfy ourselves upon this point, it will not be
necessary to enter into any tedious or doubtful calculation of what may be
the lowest sum upon which it is possible to do this. There are many plain
symptoms, that the wages of labour are nowhere in this country regulated
by this lowest rate, which is consistent with common humanity.
First, in almost every part of Great Britain there is a distinction, even in
the lowest species of labour, between summer and winter wages. Summer
wages are always highest. But, on account of the extraordinary expense of
fuel, the maintenance of a family is most expensive in winter. Wages,
therefore, being highest when this expense is lowest, it seems evident that
they are not regulated by what is necessary for this expense, but by the
quantity and supposed value of the work. A labourer, it may be said, indeed,
ought to save part of his summer wages, in order to defray his winter
expense; and that, through the whole year, they do not exceed what is
necessary to maintain his family through the whole year. A slave, however,
or one absolutely dependent on us for immediate subsistence, would not be
treated in this manner. His daily subsistence would be proportioned to his
daily necessities.
Secondly, the wages of labour do not, in Great Britain, fluctuate with the
price of provisions. These vary everywhere from year to year, frequently
from month to month. But in many places, the money price of labour
remains uniformly the same, sometimes for half a century together. If, in
these places, therefore, the labouring poor can maintain their families in
dear years, they must be at their ease in times of moderate plenty, and in
affluence in those of extraordinary cheapness. The high price of provisions
during these ten years past, has not, in many parts of the kingdom, been
accompanied with any sensible rise in the money price of labour. It has,
indeed, in some; owing, probably, more to the increase of the demand for
labour, than to that of the price of provisions.
Thirdly, as the price of provisions varies more from year to year than the
wages of labour, so, on the other hand, the wages of labour vary more from
place to place than the price of provisions. The prices of bread and
butchers’ meat are generally the same, or very nearly the same, through the
greater part of the united kingdom. These, and most other things which are
sold by retail, the way in which the labouring poor buy all things, are
generally fully as cheap, or cheaper, in great towns than in the remoter parts
of the country, for reasons which I shall have occasion to explain hereafter.
But the wages of labour in a great town and its neighbourhood are
frequently a fourth or a fifth part, twenty or five-and—twenty per cent.
higher than at a few miles distance. Eighteen pence a day may be reckoned
the common price of labour in London and its neighbourhood. At a few
miles distance, it falls to fourteen and fifteen pence. Tenpence may be
reckoned its price in Edinburgh and its neighbourhood. At a few miles
distance, it falls to eightpence, the usual price of common labour through
the greater part of the low country of Scotland, where it varies a good deal
less than in England. Such a difference of prices, which, it seems, is not
always sufficient to transport a man from one parish to another, would
necessarily occasion so great a transportation of the most bulky
commodities, not only from one parish to another, but from one end of the
kingdom, almost from one end of the world to the other, as would soon
reduce them more nearly to a level. After all that has been said of the levity
and inconstancy of human nature, it appears evidently from experience, that
man is, of all sorts of luggage, the most difficult to be transported. If the
labouring poor, therefore, can maintain their families in those parts of the
kingdom where the price of labour is lowest, they must be in affluence
where it is highest.
Fourthly, the variations in the price of labour not only do not correspond,
either in place or time, with those in the price of provisions, but they are
frequently quite opposite.
Grain, the food of the common people, is dearer in Scotland than in
England, whence Scotland receives almost every year very large supplies.
But English corn must be sold dearer in Scotland, the country to which it is
brought, than in England, the country from which it comes; and in
proportion to its quality it cannot be sold dearer in Scotland than the Scotch
corn that comes to the same market in competition with it. The quality of
grain depends chiefly upon the quantity of flour or meal which it yields at
the mill; and, in this respect, English grain is so much superior to the
Scotch, that though often dearer in appearance, or in proportion to the
measure of its bulk, it is generally cheaper in reality, or in proportion to its
quality, or even to the measure of its weight. The price of labour, on the
contrary, is dearer in England than in Scotland. If the labouring poor,
therefore, can maintain their families in the one part of the united kingdom,
they must be in affluence in the other. Oatmeal, indeed, supplies the
common people in Scotland with the greatest and the best part of their food,
which is, in general, much inferior to that of their neighbours of the same
rank in England. This difference, however, in the mode of their subsistence,
is not the cause, but the effect, of the difference in their wages; though, by a
strange misapprehension, I have frequently heard it represented as the
cause. It is not because one man keeps a coach, while his neighbour walks
a-foot, that the one is rich, and the other poor; but because the one is rich,
he keeps a coach, and because the other is poor, he walks a-foot.
During the course of the last century, taking one year with another, grain
was dearer in both parts of the united kingdom than during that of the
present. This is a matter of fact which cannot now admit of any reasonable
doubt; and the proof of it is, if possible, still more decisive with regard to
Scotland than with regard to England. It is in Scotland supported by the
evidence of the public fiars, annual valuations made upon oath, according to
the actual state of the markets, of all the different sorts of grain in every
different county of Scotland. If such direct proof could require any
collateral evidence to confirm it, I would observe, that this has likewise
been the case in France, and probably in most other parts of Europe. With
regard to France, there is the clearest proof. But though it is certain, that in
both parts of the united kingdom grain was somewhat dearer in the last
century than in the present, it is equally certain that labour was much
cheaper. If the labouring poor, therefore, could bring up their families then,
they must be much more at their ease now. In the last century, the most
usual day-wages of common labour through the greater part of Scotland
were sixpence in summer, and fivepence in winter. Three shillings a-week,
the same price, very nearly still continues to be paid in some parts of the
Highlands and Western islands. Through the greater part of the Low
country, the most usual wages of common labour are now eight pence a-
day; tenpence, sometimes a shilling, about Edinburgh, in the counties which
border upon England, probably on account of that neighbourhood, and in a
few other places where there has lately been a considerable rise in the
demand for labour, about Glasgow, Carron, Ayrshire, etc. In England, the
improvements of agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, began much
earlier than in Scotland. The demand for labour, and consequently its price,
must necessarily have increased with those improvements. In the last
century, accordingly, as well as in the present, the wages of labour were
higher in England than in Scotland. They have risen, too, considerably since
that time, though, on account of the greater variety of wages paid there in
different places, it is more difficult to ascertain how much. In 1614, the pay
of a foot soldier was the same as in the present times, eightpence a-day.
When it was first established, it would naturally be regulated by the usual
wages of common labourers, the rank of people from which foot soldiers
are commonly drawn. Lord-chief-justice Hales, who wrote in the time of
Charles II. computes the necessary expense of a labourer’s family,
consisting of six persons, the father and mother, two children able to do
something, and two not able, at ten shillings a-week, or twenty-six pounds
a-year. If they cannot earn this by their labour, they must make it up, he
supposes, either by begging or stealing. He appears to have enquired very
carefully into this subject {See his scheme for the maintenance of the poor,
in Burn’s History of the Poor Laws.}. In 1688, Mr Gregory King, whose
skill in political arithmetic is so much extolled by Dr Davenant, computed
the ordinary income of labourers and out-servants to be fifteen pounds a-
year to a family, which he supposed to consist, one with another, of three
and a half persons. His calculation, therefore, though different in
appearance, corresponds very nearly at bottom with that of Judge Hales.
Both suppose the weekly expense of such families to be about twenty-pence
a-head. Both the pecuniary income and expense of such families have
increased considerably since that time through the greater part of the
kingdom, in some places more, and in some less, though perhaps scarce
anywhere so much as some exaggerated accounts of the present wages of
labour have lately represented them to the public. The price of labour, it
must be observed, cannot be ascertained very accurately anywhere,
different prices being often paid at the same place and for the same sort of
labour, not only according to the different abilities of the workman, but
according to the easiness or hardness of the masters. Where wages are not
regulated by law, all that we can pretend to determine is, what are the most
usual; and experience seems to shew that law can never regulate them
properly, though it has often pretended to do so.
The real recompence of labour, the real quantity of the necessaries and
conveniencies of life which it can procure to the labourer, has, during the
course of the present century, increased perhaps in a still greater proportion
than its money price. Not only grain has become somewhat cheaper, but
many other things, from which the industrious poor derive an agreeable and
wholesome variety of food, have become a great deal cheaper. Potatoes, for
example, do not at present, through the greater part of the kingdom, cost
half the price which they used to do thirty or forty years ago. The same
thing may be said of turnips, carrots, cabbages; things which were formerly
never raised but by the spade, but which are now commonly raised by the
plough. All sort of garden stuff, too, has become cheaper. The greater part
of the apples, and even of the onions, consumed in Great Britain, were, in
the last century, imported from Flanders. The great improvements in the
coarser manufactories of both linen and woollen cloth furnish the labourers
with cheaper and better clothing; and those in the manufactories of the
coarser metals, with cheaper and better instruments of trade, as well as with
many agreeable and convenient pieces of household furniture. Soap, salt,
candles, leather, and fermented liquors, have, indeed, become a good deal
dearer, chiefly from the taxes which have been laid upon them. The quantity
of these, however, which the labouring poor are under any necessity of
consuming, is so very small, that the increase in their price does not
compensate the diminution in that of so many other things. The common
complaint, that luxury extends itself even to the lowest ranks of the people,
and that the labouring poor will not now be contented with the same food,
clothing, and lodging, which satisfied them in former times, may convince
us that it is not the money price of labour only, but its real recompence,
which has augmented.
Is this improvement in the circumstances of the lower ranks of the people
to be regarded as an advantage, or as an inconveniency, to the society? The
answer seems at first abundantly plain. Servants, labourers, and workmen of
different kinds, make up the far greater part of every great political society.
But what improves the circumstances of the greater part, can never be
regarded as any inconveniency to the whole. No society can surely be
flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the members are poor
and miserable. It is but equity, besides, that they who feed, clothe, and
lodge the whole body of the people, should have such a share of the
produce of their own labour as to be themselves tolerably well fed, clothed,
and lodged.
Poverty, though it no doubt discourages, does not always prevent,
marriage. It seems even to be favourable to generation. A half-starved
Highland woman frequently bears more than twenty children, while a
pampered fine lady is often incapable of bearing any, and is generally
exhausted by two or three. Barrenness, so frequent among women of
fashion, is very rare among those of inferior station. Luxury, in the fair sex,
while it inflames, perhaps, the passion for enjoyment, seems always to
weaken, and frequently to destroy altogether, the powers of generation.
But poverty, though it does not prevent the generation, is extremely
unfavourable to the rearing of children. The tender plant is produced; but in
so cold a soil, and so severe a climate, soon withers and dies. It is not
uncommon, I have been frequently told, in the Highlands of Scotland, for a
mother who has born twenty children not to have two alive. Several officers
of great experience have assured me, that, so far from recruiting their
regiment, they have never been able to supply it with drums and fifes, from
all the soldiers’ children that were born in it. A greater number of fine
children, however, is seldom seen anywhere than about a barrack of
soldiers. Very few of them, it seems, arrive at the age of thirteen or
fourteen. In some places, one half the children die before they are four years
of age, in many places before they are seven, and in almost all places before
they are nine or ten. This great mortality, however will everywhere be found
chiefly among the children of the common people, who cannot afford to
tend them with the same care as those of better station. Though their
marriages are generally more fruitful than those of people of fashion, a
smaller proportion of their children arrive at maturity. In foundling
hospitals, and among the children brought up by parish charities, the
mortality is still greater than among those of the common people.
Every species of animals naturally multiplies in proportion to the means
of their subsistence, and no species can ever multiply beyond it. But in
civilized society, it is only among the inferior ranks of people that the
scantiness of subsistence can set limits to the further multiplication of the
human species; and it can do so in no other way than by destroying a great
part of the children which their fruitful marriages produce.
The liberal reward of labour, by enabling them to provide better for their
children, and consequently to bring up a greater number, naturally tends to
widen and extend those limits. It deserves to be remarked, too, that it
necessarily does this as nearly as possible in the proportion which the
demand for labour requires. If this demand is continually increasing, the
reward of labour must necessarily encourage in such a manner the marriage
and multiplication of labourers, as may enable them to supply that
continually increasing demand by a continually increasing population. If the
reward should at any time be less than what was requisite for this purpose,
the deficiency of hands would soon raise it; and if it should at any time be
more, their excessive multiplication would soon lower it to this necessary
rate. The market would be so much understocked with labour in the one
case, and so much overstocked in the other, as would soon force back its
price to that proper rate which the circumstances of the society required. It
is in this manner that the demand for men, like that for any other
commodity, necessarily regulates the production of men, quickens it when it
goes on too slowly, and stops it when it advances too fast. It is this demand
which regulates and determines the state of propagation in all the different
countries of the world; in North America, in Europe, and in China; which
renders it rapidly progressive in the first, slow and gradual in the second,
and altogether stationary in the last.
The wear and tear of a slave, it has been said, is at the expense of his
master; but that of a free servant is at his own expense. The wear and tear of
the latter, however, is, in reality, as much at the expense of his master as
that of the former. The wages paid to journeymen and servants of every
kind must be such as may enable them, one with another to continue the
race of journeymen and servants, according as the increasing, diminishing,
or stationary demand of the society, may happen to require. But though the
wear and tear of a free servant be equally at the expense of his master, it
generally costs him much less than that of a slave. The fund destined for
replacing or repairing, if I may say so, the wear and tear of the slave, is
commonly managed by a negligent master or careless overseer. That
destined for performing the same office with regard to the freeman is
managed by the freeman himself. The disorders which generally prevail in
the economy of the rich, naturally introduce themselves into the
management of the former; the strict frugality and parsimonious attention of
the poor as naturally establish themselves in that of the latter. Under such
different management, the same purpose must require very different degrees
of expense to execute it. It appears, accordingly, from the experience of all
ages and nations, I believe, that the work done by freemen comes cheaper in
the end than that performed by slaves. It is found to do so even at Boston,
New-York, and Philadelphia, where the wages of common labour are so
very high.
The liberal reward of labour, therefore, as it is the effect of increasing
wealth, so it is the cause of increasing population. To complain of it, is to
lament over the necessary cause and effect of the greatest public prosperity.
It deserves to be remarked, perhaps, that it is in the progressive state,
while the society is advancing to the further acquisition, rather than when it
has acquired its full complement of riches, that the condition of the
labouring poor, of the great body of the people, seems to be the happiest
and the most comfortable. It is hard in the stationary, and miserable in the
declining state. The progressive state is, in reality, the cheerful and the
hearty state to all the different orders of the society; the stationary is dull;
the declining melancholy.
The liberal reward of labour, as it encourages the propagation, so it
increases the industry of the common people. The wages of labour are the
encouragement of industry, which, like every other human quality, improves
in proportion to the encouragement it receives. A plentiful subsistence
increases the bodily strength of the labourer, and the comfortable hope of
bettering his condition, and of ending his days, perhaps, in ease and plenty,
animates him to exert that strength to the utmost. Where wages are high,
accordingly, we shall always find the workmen more active, diligent, and
expeditious, than where they are low; in England, for example, than in
Scotland; in the neighbourhood of great towns, than in remote country
places. Some workmen, indeed, when they can earn in four days what will
maintain them through the week, will be idle the other three. This, however,
is by no means the case with the greater part. Workmen, on the contrary,
when they are liberally paid by the piece, are very apt to overwork
themselves, and to ruin their health and constitution in a few years. A
carpenter in London, and in some other places, is not supposed to last in his
utmost vigour above eight years. Something of the same kind happens in
many other trades, in which the workmen are paid by the piece; as they
generally are in manufactures, and even in country labour, wherever wages
are higher than ordinary. Almost every class of artificers is subject to some
peculiar infirmity occasioned by excessive application to their peculiar
species of work. Ramuzzini, an eminent Italian physician, has written a
particular book concerning such diseases. We do not reckon our soldiers the
most industrious set of people among us; yet when soldiers have been
employed in some particular sorts of work, and liberally paid by the piece,
their officers have frequently been obliged to stipulate with the undertaker,
that they should not be allowed to earn above a certain sum every day,
according to the rate at which they were paid. Till this stipulation was
made, mutual emulation, and the desire of greater gain, frequently prompted
them to overwork themselves, and to hurt their health by excessive labour.
Excessive application, during four days of the week, is frequently the real
cause of the idleness of the other three, so much and so loudly complained
of. Great labour, either of mind or body, continued for several days together
is, in most men, naturally followed by a great desire of relaxation, which, if
not restrained by force, or by some strong necessity, is almost irresistible. It
is the call of nature, which requires to be relieved by some indulgence,
sometimes of ease only, but sometimes too of dissipation and diversion. If it
is not complied with, the consequences are often dangerous and sometimes
fatal, and such as almost always, sooner or later, bring on the peculiar
infirmity of the trade. If masters would always listen to the dictates of
reason and humanity, they have frequently occasion rather to moderate, than
to animate the application of many of their workmen. It will be found, I
believe, in every sort of trade, that the man who works so moderately, as to
be able to work constantly, not only preserves his health the longest, but, in
the course of the year, executes the greatest quantity of work.
In cheap years it is pretended, workmen are generally more idle, and in
dear times more industrious than ordinary. A plentiful subsistence,
therefore, it has been concluded, relaxes, and a scanty one quickens their
industry. That a little more plenty than ordinary may render some workmen
idle, cannot be well doubted; but that it should have this effect upon the
greater part, or that men in general should work better when they are ill fed,
than when they are well fed, when they are disheartened than when they are
in good spirits, when they are frequently sick than when they are generally
in good health, seems not very probable. Years of dearth, it is to be
observed, are generally among the common people years of sickness and
mortality, which cannot fail to diminish the produce of their industry.
In years of plenty, servants frequently leave their masters, and trust their
subsistence to what they can make by their own industry. But the same
cheapness of provisions, by increasing the fund which is destined for the
maintenance of servants, encourages masters, farmers especially, to employ
a greater number. Farmers, upon such occasions, expect more profit from
their corn by maintaining a few more labouring servants, than by selling it
at a low price in the market. The demand for servants increases, while the
number of those who offer to supply that demand diminishes. The price of
labour, therefore, frequently rises in cheap years.
In years of scarcity, the difficulty and uncertainty of subsistence make all
such people eager to return to service. But the high price of provisions, by
diminishing the funds destined for the maintenance of servants, disposes
masters rather to diminish than to increase the number of those they have.
In dear years, too, poor independent workmen frequently consume the little
stock with which they had used to supply themselves with the materials of
their work, and are obliged to become journeymen for subsistence. More
people want employment than easily get it; many are willing to take it upon
lower terms than ordinary; and the wages of both servants and journeymen
frequently sink in dear years.
Masters of all sorts, therefore, frequently make better bargains with their
servants in dear than in cheap years, and find them more humble and
dependent in the former than in the latter. They naturally, therefore,
commend the former as more favourable to industry. Landlords and
farmers, besides, two of the largest classes of masters, have another reason
for being pleased with dear years. The rents of the one, and the profits of
the other, depend very much upon the price of provisions. Nothing can be
more absurd, however, than to imagine that men in general should work less
when they work for themselves, than when they work for other people. A
poor independent workman will generally be more industrious than even a
journeyman who works by the piece. The one enjoys the whole produce of
his own industry, the other shares it with his master. The one, in his separate
independent state, is less liable to the temptations of bad company, which,
in large manufactories, so frequently ruin the morals of the other. The
superiority of the independent workman over those servants who are hired
by the month or by the year, and whose wages and maintenance are the
same, whether they do much or do little, is likely to be still greater. Cheap
years tend to increase the proportion of independent workmen to
journeymen and servants of all kinds, and dear years to diminish it.
A French author of great knowledge and ingenuity, Mr Messance,
receiver of the tallies in the election of St Etienne, endeavours to shew that
the poor do more work in cheap than in dear years, by comparing the
quantity and value of the goods made upon those different occasions in
three different manufactures; one of coarse woollens, carried on at Elbeuf;
one of linen, and another of silk, both which extend through the whole
generality of Rouen. It appears from his account, which is copied from the
registers of the public offices, that the quantity and value of the goods made
in all those three manufactories has generally been greater in cheap than in
dear years, and that it has always been greatest in the cheapest, and least in
the dearest years. All the three seem to be stationary manufactures, or
which, though their produce may vary somewhat from year to year, are,
upon the whole, neither going backwards nor forwards.
The manufacture of linen in Scotland, and that of coarse woollens in the
West Riding of Yorkshire, are growing manufactures, of which the produce
is generally, though with some variations, increasing both in quantity and
value. Upon examining, however, the accounts which have been published
of their annual produce, I have not been able to observe that its variations
have had any sensible connection with the dearness or cheapness of the
seasons. In 1740, a year of great scarcity, both manufactures, indeed, appear
to have declined very considerably. But in 1756, another year of great
scarcity, the Scotch manufactures made more than ordinary advances. The
Yorkshire manufacture, indeed, declined, and its produce did not rise to
what it had been in 1755, till 1766, after the repeal of the American stamp
act. In that and the following year, it greatly exceeded what it had ever been
before, and it has continued to advance ever since.
The produce of all great manufactures for distant sale must necessarily
depend, not so much upon the dearness or cheapness of the seasons in the
countries where they are carried on, as upon the circumstances which affect
the demand in the countries where they are consumed; upon peace or war,
upon the prosperity or declension of other rival manufactures and upon the
good or bad humour of their principal customers. A great part of the
extraordinary work, besides, which is probably done in cheap years, never
enters the public registers of manufactures. The men-servants, who leave
their masters, become independent labourers. The women return to their
parents, and commonly spin, in order to make clothes for themselves and
their families. Even the independent workmen do not always, work for
public sale, but are employed by some of their neighbours in manufactures
for family use. The produce of their labour, therefore, frequently makes no
figure in those public registers, of which the records are sometimes
published with so much parade, and from which our merchants and
manufacturers would often vainly pretend to announce the prosperity or
declension of the greatest empires.
Though the variations in the price of labour not only do not always
correspond with those in the price of provisions, but are frequently quite
opposite, we must not, upon this account, imagine that the price of
provisions has no influence upon that of labour. The money price of labour
is necessarily regulated by two circumstances; the demand for labour, and
the price of the necessaries and conveniencies of life. The demand for
labour, according as it happens to be increasing, stationary, or declining, or
to require an increasing, stationary, or declining population, determines the
quantities of the necessaries and conveniencies of life which must be given
to the labourer; and the money price of labour is determined by what is
requisite for purchasing this quantity. Though the money price of labour,
therefore, is sometimes high where the price of provisions is low, it would
be still higher, the demand continuing the same, if the price of provisions
was high.
It is because the demand for labour increases in years of sudden and
extraordinary plenty, and diminishes in those of sudden and extraordinary
scarcity, that the money price of labour sometimes rises in the one, and
sinks in the other.
In a year of sudden and extraordinary plenty, there are funds in the hands
of many of the employers of industry, sufficient to maintain and employ a
greater number of industrious people than had been employed the year
before; and this extraordinary number cannot always be had. Those masters,
therefore, who want more workmen, bid against one another, in order to get
them, which sometimes raises both the real and the money price of their
labour.
The contrary of this happens in a year of sudden and extraordinary
scarcity. The funds destined for employing industry are less than they had
been the year before. A considerable number of people are thrown out of
employment, who bid one against another, in order to get it, which
sometimes lowers both the real and the money price of labour. In 1740, a
year of extraordinary scarcity, many people were willing to work for bare
subsistence. In the succeeding years of plenty, it was more difficult to get
labourers and servants. The scarcity of a dear year, by diminishing the
demand for labour, tends to lower its price, as the high price of provisions
tends to raise it. The plenty of a cheap year, on the contrary, by increasing
the demand, tends to raise the price of labour, as the cheapness of
provisions tends to lower it. In the ordinary variations of the prices of
provisions, those two opposite causes seem to counterbalance one another,
which is probably, in part, the reason why the wages of labour are
everywhere so much more steady and permanent than the price of
provisions.
The increase in the wages of labour necessarily increases the price of
many commodities, by increasing that part of it which resolves itself into
wages, and so far tends to diminish their consumption, both at home and
abroad. The same cause, however, which raises the wages of labour, the
increase of stock, tends to increase its productive powers, and to make a
smaller quantity of labour produce a greater quantity of work. The owner of
the stock which employs a great number of labourers necessarily
endeavours, for his own advantage, to make such a proper division and
distribution of employment, that they may be enabled to produce the
greatest quantity of work possible. For the same reason, he endeavours to
supply them with the best machinery which either he or they can think of.
What takes place among the labourers in a particular workhouse, takes
place, for the same reason, among those of a great society. The greater their
number, the more they naturally divide themselves into different classes and
subdivisions of employments. More heads are occupied in inventing the
most proper machinery for executing the work of each, and it is, therefore,
more likely to be invented. There are many commodities, therefore, which,
in consequence of these improvements, come to be produced by so much
less labour than before, that the increase of its price is more than
compensated by the diminution of its quantity.
CHAPTER IX.
OF THE PROFITS OF STOCK.
The rise and fall in the profits of stock depend upon the same causes with
the rise and fall in the wages of labour, the increasing or declining state of
the wealth of the society; but those causes affect the one and the other very
differently.
The increase of stock, which raises wages, tends to lower profit. When
the stocks of many rich merchants are turned into the same trade, their
mutual competition naturally tends to lower its profit; and when there is a
like increase of stock in all the different trades carried on in the same
society, the same competition must produce the same effect in them all.
It is not easy, it has already been observed, to ascertain what are the
average wages of labour, even in a particular place, and at a particular time.
We can, even in this case, seldom determine more than what are the most
usual wages. But even this can seldom be done with regard to the profits of
stock. Profit is so very fluctuating, that the person who carries on a
particular trade, cannot always tell you himself what is the average of his
annual profit. It is affected, not only by every variation of price in the
commodities which he deals in, but by the good or bad fortune both of his
rivals and of his customers, and by a thousand other accidents, to which
goods, when carried either by sea or by land, or even when stored in a
warehouse, are liable. It varies, therefore, not only from year to year, but
from day to day, and almost from hour to hour. To ascertain what is the
average profit of all the different trades carried on in a great kingdom, must
be much more difficult; and to judge of what it may have been formerly, or
in remote periods of time, with any degree of precision, must be altogether
impossible.
But though it may be impossible to determine, with any degree of
precision, what are or were the average profits of stock, either in the present
or in ancient times, some notion may be formed of them from the interest of
money. It may be laid down as a maxim, that wherever a great deal can be
made by the use of money, a great deal will commonly be given for the use
of it; and that, wherever little can be made by it, less will commonly he
given for it. Accordingly, therefore, as the usual market rate of interest
varies in any country, we may be assured that the ordinary profits of stock
must vary with it, must sink as it sinks, and rise as it rises. The progress of
interest, therefore, may lead us to form some notion of the progress of
profit.
By the 37th of Henry VIII. all interest above ten per cent. was declared
unlawful. More, it seems, had sometimes been taken before that. In the
reign of Edward VI. religious zeal prohibited all interest. This prohibition,
however, like all others of the same kind, is said to have produced no effect,
and probably rather increased than diminished the evil of usury. The statute
of Henry VIII. was revived by the 13th of Elizabeth, cap. 8. and ten per
cent. continued to be the legal rate of interest till the 21st of James I. when
it was restricted to eight per cent. It was reduced to six per cent. soon after
the Restoration, and by the 12th of Queen Anne, to five per cent. All these
different statutory regulations seem to have been made with great propriety.
They seem to have followed, and not to have gone before, the market rate
of interest, or the rate at which people of good credit usually borrowed.
Since the time of Queen Anne, five per cent. seems to have been rather
above than below the market rate. Before the late war, the government
borrowed at three per cent.; and people of good credit in the capital, and in
many other parts of the kingdom, at three and a-half, four, and four and a-
half per cent.
Since the time of Henry VIII. the wealth and revenue of the country have
been continually advancing, and in the course of their progress, their pace
seems rather to have been gradually accelerated than retarded. They seem
not only to have been going on, but to have been going on faster and faster.
The wages of labour have been continually increasing during the same
period, and, in the greater part of the different branches of trade and
manufactures, the profits of stock have been diminishing.
It generally requires a greater stock to carry on any sort of trade in a great
town than in a country village. The great stocks employed in every branch
of trade, and the number of rich competitors, generally reduce the rate of
profit in the former below what it is in the latter. But the wages of labour
are generally higher in a great town than in a country village. In a thriving
town, the people who have great stocks to employ, frequently cannot get the
number of workmen they want, and therefore bid against one another, in
order to get as many as they can, which raises the wages of labour, and
lowers the profits of stock. In the remote parts of the country, there is
frequently not stock sufficient to employ all the people, who therefore bid
against one another, in order to get employment, which lowers the wages of
labour, and raises the profits of stock.
In Scotland, though the legal rate of interest is the same as in England,
the market rate is rather higher. People of the best credit there seldom
borrow under five per cent. Even private bankers in Edinburgh give four per
cent. upon their promissory-notes, of which payment, either in whole or in
part may be demanded at pleasure. Private bankers in London give no
interest for the money which is deposited with them. There are few trades
which cannot be carried on with a smaller stock in Scotland than in
England. The common rate of profit, therefore, must be somewhat greater.
The wages of labour, it has already been observed, are lower in Scotland
than in England. The country, too, is not only much poorer, but the steps by
which it advances to a better condition, for it is evidently advancing, seem
to be much slower and more tardy. The legal rate of interest in France has
not during the course of the present century, been always regulated by the
market rate {See Denisart, Article Taux des Interests, tom. iii, p.13}. In
1720, interest was reduced from the twentieth to the fiftieth penny, or from
five to two per cent. In 1724, it was raised to the thirtieth penny, or to three
and a third per cent. In 1725, it was again raised to the twentieth penny, or
to five per cent. In 1766, during the administration of Mr Laverdy, it was
reduced to the twenty-fifth penny, or to four per cent. The Abbé Terray
raised it afterwards to the old rate of five per cent. The supposed purpose of
many of those violent reductions of interest was to prepare the way for
reducing that of the public debts; a purpose which has sometimes been
executed. France is, perhaps, in the present times, not so rich a country as
England; and though the legal rate of interest has in France frequently been
lower than in England, the market rate has generally been higher; for there,
as in other countries, they have several very safe and easy methods of
evading the law. The profits of trade, I have been assured by British
merchants who had traded in both countries, are higher in France than in
England; and it is no doubt upon this account, that many British subjects
chuse rather to employ their capitals in a country where trade is in disgrace,
than in one where it is highly respected. The wages of labour are lower in
France than in England. When you go from Scotland to England, the
difference which you may remark between the dress and countenance of the
common people in the one country and in the other, sufficiently indicates
the difference in their condition. The contrast is still greater when you
return from France. France, though no doubt a richer country than Scotland,
seems not to be going forward so fast. It is a common and even a popular
opinion in the country, that it is going backwards; an opinion which I
apprehend, is ill-founded, even with regard to France, but which nobody
can possibly entertain with regard to Scotland, who sees the country now,
and who saw it twenty or thirty years ago.
The province of Holland, on the other hand, in proportion to the extent of
its territory and the number of its people, is a richer country than England.
The government there borrow at two per cent. and private people of good
credit at three. The wages of labour are said to be higher in Holland than in
England, and the Dutch, it is well known, trade upon lower profits than any
people in Europe. The trade of Holland, it has been pretended by some
people, is decaying, and it may perhaps be true that some particular
branches of it are so; but these symptoms seem to indicate sufficiently that
there is no general decay. When profit diminishes, merchants are very apt to
complain that trade decays, though the diminution of profit is the natural
effect of its prosperity, or of a greater stock being employed in it than
before. During the late war, the Dutch gained the whole carrying trade of
France, of which they still retain a very large share. The great property
which they possess both in French and English funds, about forty millions,
it is said in the latter (in which, I suspect, however, there is a considerable
exaggeration ), the great sums which they lend to private people, in
countries where the rate of interest is higher than in their own, are
circumstances which no doubt demonstrate the redundancy of their stock, or
that it has increased beyond what they can employ with tolerable profit in
the proper business of their own country; but they do not demonstrate that
that business has decreased. As the capital of a private man, though
acquired by a particular trade, may increase beyond what he can employ in
it, and yet that trade continue to increase too, so may likewise the capital of
a great nation.
In our North American and West Indian colonies, not only the wages of
labour, but the interest of money, and consequently the profits of stock, are
higher than in England. In the different colonies, both the legal and the
market rate of interest run from six to eight percent. High wages of labour
and high profits of stock, however, are things, perhaps, which scarce ever
go together, except in the peculiar circumstances of new colonies. A new
colony must always, for some time, be more understocked in proportion to
the extent of its territory, and more underpeopled in proportion to the extent
of its stock, than the greater part of other countries. They have more land
than they have stock to cultivate. What they have, therefore, is applied to
the cultivation only of what is most fertile and most favourably situated, the
land near the sea-shore, and along the banks of navigable rivers. Such land,
too, is frequently purchased at a price below the value even of its natural
produce. Stock employed in the purchase and improvement of such lands,
must yield a very large profit, and, consequently, afford to pay a very large
interest. Its rapid accumulation in so profitable an employment enables the
planter to increase the number of his hands faster than he can find them in a
new settlement. Those whom he can find, therefore, are very liberally
rewarded. As the colony increases, the profits of stock gradually diminish.
When the most fertile and best situated lands have been all occupied, less
profit can be made by the cultivation of what is inferior both in soil and
situation, and less interest can be afforded for the stock which is so
employed. In the greater part of our colonies, accordingly, both the legal
and the market rate of interest have been considerably reduced during the
course of the present century. As riches, improvement, and population, have
increased, interest has declined. The wages of labour do not sink with the
profits of stock. The demand for labour increases with the increase of stock,
whatever be its profits; and after these are diminished, stock may not only
continue to increase, but to increase much faster than before. It is with
industrious nations, who are advancing in the acquisition of riches, as with
industrious individuals. A great stock, though with small profits, generally
increases faster than a small stock with great profits. Money, says the
proverb, makes money. When you have got a little, it is often easy to get
more. The great difficulty is to get that little. The connection between the
increase of stock and that of industry, or of the demand for useful labour,
has partly been explained already, but will be explained more fully
hereafter, in treating of the accumulation of stock.
The acquisition of new territory, or of new branches of trade, may
sometimes raise the profits of stock, and with them the interest of money,
even in a country which is fast advancing in the acquisition of riches. The
stock of the country, not being sufficient for the whole accession of
business which such acquisitions present to the different people among
whom it is divided, is applied to those particular branches only which afford
the greatest profit. Part of what had before been employed in other trades, is
necessarily withdrawn from them, and turned into some of the new and
more profitable ones. In all those old trades, therefore, the competition
comes to be less than before. The market comes to be less fully supplied
with many different sorts of goods. Their price necessarily rises more or
less, and yields a greater profit to those who deal in them, who can,
therefore, afford to borrow at a higher interest. For some time after the
conclusion of the late war, not only private people of the best credit, but
some of the greatest companies in London, commonly borrowed at five per
cent. who, before that, had not been used to pay more than four, and four
and a half per cent. The great accession both of territory and trade by our
acquisitions in North America and the West Indies, will sufficiently account
for this, without supposing any diminution in the capital stock of the
society. So great an accession of new business to be carried on by the old
stock, must necessarily have diminished the quantity employed in a great
number of particular branches, in which the competition being less, the
profits must have been greater. I shall hereafter have occasion to mention
the reasons which dispose me to believe that the capital stock of Great
Britain was not diminished, even by the enormous expense of the late war.
The diminution of the capital stock of the society, or of the funds
destined for the maintenance of industry, however, as it lowers the wages of
labour, so it raises the profits of stock, and consequently the interest of
money. By the wages of labour being lowered, the owners of what stock
remains in the society can bring their goods at less expense to market than
before; and less stock being employed in supplying the market than before,
they can sell them dearer. Their goods cost them less, and they get more for
them. Their profits, therefore, being augmented at both ends, can well
afford a large interest. The great fortunes so suddenly and so easily acquired
in Bengal and the other British settlements in the East Indies, may satisfy
us, that as the wages of labour are very low, so the profits of stock are very
high in those ruined countries. The interest of money is proportionably so.
In Bengal, money is frequently lent to the farmers at forty, fifty, and sixty
per cent. and the succeeding crop is mortgaged for the payment. As the
profits which can afford such an interest must eat up almost the whole rent
of the landlord, so such enormous usury must in its turn eat up the greater
part of those profits. Before the fall of the Roman republic, a usury of the
same kind seems to have been common in the provinces, under the ruinous
administration of their proconsuls. The virtuous Brutus lent money in
Cyprus at eight-and-forty per cent. as we learn from the letters of Cicero.
In a country which had acquired that full complement of riches which the
nature of its soil and climate, and its situation with respect to other
countries, allowed it to acquire, which could, therefore, advance no further,
and which was not going backwards, both the wages of labour and the
profits of stock would probably be very low. In a country fully peopled in
proportion to what either its territory could maintain, or its stock employ,
the competition for employment would necessarily be so great as to reduce
the wages of labour to what was barely sufficient to keep up the number of
labourers, and the country being already fully peopled, that number could
never be augmented. In a country fully stocked in proportion to all the
business it had to transact, as great a quantity of stock would be employed
in every particular branch as the nature and extent of the trade would admit.
The competition, therefore, would everywhere be as great, and,
consequently, the ordinary profit as low as possible.
But, perhaps, no country has ever yet arrived at this degree of opulence.
China seems to have been long stationary, and had, probably, long ago
acquired that full complement of riches which is consistent with the nature
of its laws and institutions. But this complement may be much inferior to
what, with other laws and institutions, the nature of its soil, climate, and
situation, might admit of. A country which neglects or despises foreign
commerce, and which admits the vessel of foreign nations into one or two
of its ports only, cannot transact the same quantity of business which it
might do with different laws and institutions. In a country, too, where,
though the rich, or the owners of large capitals, enjoy a good deal of
security, the poor, or the owners of small capitals, enjoy scarce any, but are
liable, under the pretence of justice, to be pillaged and plundered at any
time by the inferior mandarins, the quantity of stock employed in all the
different branches of business transacted within it, can never be equal to
what the nature and extent of that business might admit. In every different
branch, the oppression of the poor must establish the monopoly of the rich,
who, by engrossing the whole trade to themselves, will be able to make
very large profits. Twelve per cent. accordingly, is said to be the common
interest of money in China, and the ordinary profits of stock must be
sufficient to afford this large interest.
A defect in the law may sometimes raise the rate of interest considerably
above what the condition of the country, as to wealth or poverty, would
require. When the law does not enforce the performance of contracts, it puts
all borrowers nearly upon the same footing with bankrupts, or people of
doubtful credit, in better regulated countries. The uncertainty of recovering
his money makes the lender exact the same usurious interest which is
usually required from bankrupts. Among the barbarous nations who overran
the western provinces of the Roman empire, the performance of contracts
was left for many ages to the faith of the contracting parties. The courts of
justice of their kings seldom intermeddled in it. The high rate of interest
which took place in those ancient times, may, perhaps, be partly accounted
for from this cause.
When the law prohibits interest altogether, it does not prevent it. Many
people must borrow, and nobody will lend without such a consideration for
the use of their money as is suitable, not only to what can be made by the
use of it, but to the difficulty and danger of evading the law. The high rate
of interest among all Mahometan nations is accounted for by M.
Montesquieu, not from their poverty, but partly from this, and partly from
the difficulty of recovering the money.
The lowest ordinary rate of profit must always be something more than
what is sufficient to compensate the occasional losses to which every
employment of stock is exposed. It is this surplus only which is neat or
clear profit. What is called gross profit, comprehends frequently not only
this surplus, but what is retained for compensating such extraordinary
losses. The interest which the borrower can afford to pay is in proportion to
the clear profit only. The lowest ordinary rate of interest must, in the same
manner, be something more than sufficient to compensate the occasional
losses to which lending, even with tolerable prudence, is exposed. Were it
not, mere charity or friendship could be the only motives for lending.
In a country which had acquired its full complement of riches, where, in
every particular branch of business, there was the greatest quantity of stock
that could be employed in it, as the ordinary rate of clear profit would be
very small, so the usual market rate of interest which could be afforded out
of it would be so low as to render it impossible for any but the very
wealthiest people to live upon the interest of their money. All people of
small or middling fortunes would be obliged to superintend themselves the
employment of their own stocks. It would be necessary that almost every
man should be a man of business, or engage in some sort of trade. The
province of Holland seems to be approaching near to this state. It is there
unfashionable not to be a man of business. Necessity makes it usual for
almost every man to be so, and custom everywhere regulates fashion. As it
is ridiculous not to dress, so is it, in some measure, not to be employed like
other people. As a man of a civil profession seems awkward in a camp or a
garrison, and is even in some danger of being despised there, so does an
idle man among men of business.
The highest ordinary rate of profit may be such as, in the price of the
greater part of commodities, eats up the whole of what should go to the rent
of the land, and leaves only what is sufficient to pay the labour of preparing
and bringing them to market, according to the lowest rate at which labour
can anywhere be paid, the bare subsistence of the labourer. The workman
must always have been fed in some way or other while he was about the
work, but the landlord may not always have been paid. The profits of the
trade which the servants of the East India Company carry on in Bengal may
not, perhaps, be very far from this rate.
The proportion which the usual market rate of interest ought to bear to
the ordinary rate of clear profit, necessarily varies as profit rises or falls.
Double interest is in Great Britain reckoned what the merchants call a good,
moderate, reasonable profit; terms which, I apprehend, mean no more than
a common and usual profit. In a country where the ordinary rate of clear
profit is eight or ten per cent. it may be reasonable that one half of it should
go to interest, wherever business is carried on with borrowed money. The
stock is at the risk of the borrower, who, as it were, insures it to the lender;
and four or five per cent. may, in the greater part of trades, be both a
sufficient profit upon the risk of this insurance, and a sufficient recompence
for the trouble of employing the stock. But the proportion between interest
and clear profit might not be the same in countries where the ordinary rate
of profit was either a good deal lower, or a good deal higher. If it were a
good deal lower, one half of it, perhaps, could not be afforded for interest;
and more might be afforded if it were a good deal higher.
In countries which are fast advancing to riches, the low rate of profit
may, in the price of many commodities, compensate the high wages of
labour, and enable those countries to sell as cheap as their less thriving
neighbours, among whom the wages of labour may be lower.
In reality, high profits tend much more to raise the price of work than
high wages. If, in the linen manufacture, for example, the wages of the
different working people, the flax-dressers, the spinners, the weavers, etc.
should all of them be advanced twopence a-day, it would be necessary to
heighten the price of a piece of linen only by a number of twopences equal
to the number of people that had been employed about it, multiplied by the
number of days during which they had been so employed. That part of the
price of the commodity which resolved itself into the wages, would,
through all the different stages of the manufacture, rise only in arithmetical
proportion to this rise of wages. But if the profits of all the different
employers of those working people should be raised five per cent. that part
of the price of the commodity which resolved itself into profit would,
through all the different stages of the manufacture, rise in geometrical
proportion to this rise of profit. The employer of the flax dressers would, in
selling his flax, require an additional five per cent. upon the whole value of
the materials and wages which he advanced to his workmen. The employer
of the spinners would require an additional five per cent. both upon the
advanced price of the flax, and upon the wages of the spinners. And the
employer of the weavers would require alike five per cent. both upon the
advanced price of the linen-yarn, and upon the wages of the weavers. In
raising the price of commodities, the rise of wages operates in the same
manner as simple interest does in the accumulation of debt. The rise of
profit operates like compound interest. Our merchants and master
manufacturers complain much of the bad effects of high wages in raising
the price, and thereby lessening the sale of their goods, both at home and
abroad. They say nothing concerning the bad effects of high profits; they
are silent with regard to the pernicious effects of their own gains; they
complain only of those of other people.
CHAPTER X.
OF WAGES AND PROFIT IN THE DIFFERENT
EMPLOYMENTS OF LABOUR AND STOCK.
The whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the different
employments of labour and stock, must, in the same neighbourhood, be
either perfectly equal, or continually tending to equality. If, in the same
neighbourhood, there was any employment evidently either more or less
advantageous than the rest, so many people would crowd into it in the one
case, and so many would desert it in the other, that its advantages would
soon return to the level of other employments. This, at least, would be the
case in a society where things were left to follow their natural course, where
there was perfect liberty, and where every man was perfectly free both to
choose what occupation he thought proper, and to change it as often as he
thought proper. Every man’s interest would prompt him to seek the
advantageous, and to shun the disadvantageous employment.
Pecuniary wages and profit, indeed, are everywhere in Europe extremely
different, according to the different employments of labour and stock. But
this difference arises, partly from certain circumstances in the employments
themselves, which, either really, or at least in the imagination of men, make
up for a small pecuniary gain in some, and counterbalance a great one in
others, and partly from the policy of Europe, which nowhere leaves things
at perfect liberty.
The particular consideration of those circumstances, and of that policy,
will divide this Chapter into two parts.
PART I. Inequalities arising from the nature of the employments
themselves.
The five following are the principal circumstances which, so far as I have
been able to observe, make up for a small pecuniary gain in some
employments, and counterbalance a great one in others. First, the
agreeableness or disagreeableness of the employments themselves;
secondly, the easiness and cheapness, or the difficulty and expense of
learning them; thirdly, the constancy or inconstancy of employment in
them; fourthly, the small or great trust which must be reposed in those who
exercise them; and, fifthly, the probability or improbability of success in
them.
First, the wages of labour vary with the ease or hardship, the cleanliness
or dirtiness, the honourableness or dishonourableness, of the employment.
Thus in most places, take the year round, a journeyman tailor earns less
than a journeyman weaver. His work is much easier. A journeyman weaver
earns less than a journeyman smith. His work is not always easier, but it is
much cleanlier. A journeyman blacksmith, though an artificer, seldom earns
so much in twelve hours, as a collier, who is only a labourer, does in eight.
His work is not quite so dirty, is less dangerous, and is carried on in day-
light, and above ground. Honour makes a great part of the reward of all
honourable professions. In point of pecuniary gain, all things considered,
they are generally under-recompensed, as I shall endeavour to shew by and
by. Disgrace has the contrary effect. The trade of a butcher is a brutal and
an odious business; but it is in most places more profitable than the greater
part of common trades. The most detestable of all employments, that of
public executioner, is, in proportion to the quantity of work done, better
paid than any common trade whatever.
Hunting and fishing, the most important employments of mankind in the
rude state of society, become, in its advanced state, their most agreeable
amusements, and they pursue for pleasure what they once followed from
necessity. In the advanced state of society, therefore, they are all very poor
people who follow as a trade, what other people pursue as a pastime.
Fishermen have been so since the time of Theocritus. {See Idyllium xxi.}.
A poacher is everywhere a very poor man in Great Britain. In countries
where the rigour of the law suffers no poachers, the licensed hunter is not in
a much better condition. The natural taste for those employments makes
more people follow them, than can live comfortably by them; and the
produce of their labour, in proportion to its quantity, comes always too
cheap to market, to afford any thing but the most scanty subsistence to the
labourers.
Disagreeableness and disgrace affect the profits of stock in the same
manner as the wages of labour. The keeper of an inn or tavern, who is never
master of his own house, and who is exposed to the brutality of every
drunkard, exercises neither a very agreeable nor a very creditable business.
But there is scarce any common trade in which a small stock yields so great
a profit.
Secondly, the wages of labour vary with the easiness and cheapness, or
the difficulty and expense, of learning the business.
When any expensive machine is erected, the extraordinary work to be
performed by it before it is worn out, it must be expected, will replace the
capital laid out upon it, with at least the ordinary profits. A man educated at
the expense of much labour and time to any of those employments which
require extraordinary dexterity and skill, may be compared to one of those
expensive machines. The work which he learns to perform, it must be
expected, over and above the usual wages of common labour, will replace
to him the whole expense of his education, with at least the ordinary profits
of an equally valuable capital. It must do this too in a reasonable time,
regard being had to the very uncertain duration of human life, in the same
manner as to the more certain duration of the machine.
The difference between the wages of skilled labour and those of common
labour, is founded upon this principle.
The policy of Europe considers the labour of all mechanics, artificers,
and manufacturers, as skilled labour; and that of all country labourers as
common labour. It seems to suppose that of the former to be of a more nice
and delicate nature than that of the latter. It is so perhaps in some cases; but
in the greater part it is quite otherwise, as I shall endeavour to shew by and
by. The laws and customs of Europe, therefore, in order to qualify any
person for exercising the one species of labour, impose the necessity of an
apprenticeship, though with different degrees of rigour in different places.
They leave the other free and open to every body. During the continuance of
the apprenticeship, the whole labour of the apprentice belongs to his master.
In the meantime he must, in many cases, be maintained by his parents or
relations, and, in almost all cases, must be clothed by them. Some money,
too, is commonly given to the master for teaching him his trade. They who
cannot give money, give time, or become bound for more than the usual
number of years; a consideration which, though it is not always
advantageous to the master, on account of the usual idleness of apprentices,
is always disadvantageous to the apprentice. In country labour, on the
contrary, the labourer, while he is employed about the easier, learns the
more difficult parts of his business, and his own labour maintains him
through all the different stages of his employment. It is reasonable,
therefore, that in Europe the wages of mechanics, artificers, and
manufacturers, should be somewhat higher than those of common
labourers. They are so accordingly, and their superior gains make them, in
most places, be considered as a superior rank of people. This superiority,
however, is generally very small: the daily or weekly earnings of
journeymen in the more common sorts of manufactures, such as those of
plain linen and woollen cloth, computed at an average, are, in most places,
very little more than the day-wages of common labourers. Their
employment, indeed, is more steady and uniform, and the superiority of
their earnings, taking the whole year together, may be somewhat greater. It
seems evidently, however, to be no greater than what is sufficient to
compensate the superior expense of their education. Education in the
ingenious arts, and in the liberal professions, is still more tedious and
expensive. The pecuniary recompence, therefore, of painters and sculptors,
of lawyers and physicians, ought to be much more liberal; and it is so
accordingly.
The profits of stock seem to be very little affected by the easiness or
difficulty of learning the trade in which it is employed. All the different
ways in which stock is commonly employed in great towns seem, in reality,
to be almost equally easy and equally difficult to learn. One branch, either
of foreign or domestic trade, cannot well be a much more intricate business
than another.
Thirdly, the wages of labour in different occupations vary with the
constancy or inconstancy of employment.
Employment is much more constant in some trades than in others. In the
greater part of manufactures, a journeyman maybe pretty sure of
employment almost every day in the year that he is able to work. A mason
or bricklayer, on the contrary, can work neither in hard frost nor in foul
weather, and his employment at all other times depends upon the occasional
calls of his customers. He is liable, in consequence, to be frequently without
any. What he earns, therefore, while he is employed, must not only maintain
him while he is idle, but make him some compensation for those anxious
and desponding moments which the thought of so precarious a situation
must sometimes occasion. Where the computed earnings of the greater part
of manufacturers, accordingly, are nearly upon a level with the day-wages
of common labourers, those of masons and bricklayers are generally from
one-half more to double those wages. Where common labourers earn four
or five shillings a-week, masons and bricklayers frequently earn seven and
eight; where the former earn six, the latter often earn nine and ten; and
where the former earn nine and ten, as in London, the latter commonly earn
fifteen and eighteen. No species of skilled labour, however, seems more
easy to learn than that of masons and bricklayers. Chairmen in London,
during the summer season, are said sometimes to be employed as
bricklayers. The high wages of those workmen, therefore, are not so much
the recompence of their skill, as the compensation for the inconstancy of
their employment.
A house-carpenter seems to exercise rather a nicer and a more ingenious
trade than a mason. In most places, however, for it is not universally so, his
day-wages are somewhat lower. His employment, though it depends much,
does not depend so entirely upon the occasional calls of his customers; and
it is not liable to be interrupted by the weather.
When the trades which generally afford constant employment, happen in
a particular place not to do so, the wages of the workmen always rise a
good deal above their ordinary proportion to those of common labour. In
London, almost all journeymen artificers are liable to be called upon and
dismissed by their masters from day to day, and from week to week, in the
same manner as day-labourers in other places. The lowest order of
artificers, journeymen tailors, accordingly, earn their half-a-crown a-day,
though eighteen pence may be reckoned the wages of common labour. In
small towns and country villages, the wages of journeymen tailors
frequently scarce equal those of common labour; but in London they are
often many weeks without employment, particularly during the summer.
When the inconstancy of employment is combined with the hardship,
disagreeableness, and dirtiness of the work, it sometimes raises the wages
of the most common labour above those of the most skilful artificers. A
collier working by the piece is supposed, at Newcastle, to earn commonly
about double, and, in many parts of Scotland, about three times, the wages
of common labour. His high wages arise altogether from the hardship,
disagreeableness, and dirtiness of his work. His employment may, upon
most occasions, be as constant as he pleases. The coal-heavers in London
exercise a trade which, in hardship, dirtiness, and disagreeableness, almost
equals that of colliers; and, from the unavoidable irregularity in the arrivals
of coal-ships, the employment of the greater part of them is necessarily very
inconstant. If colliers, therefore, commonly earn double and triple the
wages of common labour, it ought not to seem unreasonable that coal-
heavers should sometimes earn four and five times those wages. In the
inquiry made into their condition a few years ago, it was found that, at the
rate at which they were then paid, they could earn from six to ten shillings
a-day. Six shillings are about four times the wages of common labour in
London; and, in every particular trade, the lowest common earnings may
always be considered as those of the far greater number. How extravagant
soever those earnings may appear, if they were more than sufficient to
compensate all the disagreeable circumstances of the business, there would
soon be so great a number of competitors, as, in a trade which has no
exclusive privilege, would quickly reduce them to a lower rate.
The constancy or inconstancy of employment cannot affect the ordinary
profits of stock in any particular trade. Whether the stock is or is not
constantly employed, depends, not upon the trade, but the trader.
Fourthly, the wages of labour vary according to the small or great trust
which must be reposed in the workmen.
The wages of goldsmiths and jewellers are everywhere superior to those
of many other workmen, not only of equal, but of much superior ingenuity,
on account of the precious materials with which they are entrusted. We trust
our health to the physician, our fortune, and sometimes our life and
reputation, to the lawyer and attorney. Such confidence could not safely be
reposed in people of a very mean or low condition. Their reward must be
such, therefore, as may give them that rank in the society which so
important a trust requires. The long time and the great expense which must
be laid out in their education, when combined with this circumstance,
necessarily enhance still further the price of their labour.
When a person employs only his own stock in trade, there is no trust; and
the credit which he may get from other people, depends, not upon the nature
of the trade, but upon their opinion of his fortune, probity and prudence.
The different rates of profit, therefore, in the different branches of trade,
cannot arise from the different degrees of trust reposed in the traders.
Fifthly, the wages of labour in different employments vary according to
the probability or improbability of success in them.
The probability that any particular person shall ever be qualified for the
employments to which he is educated, is very different in different
occupations. In the greatest part of mechanic trades success is almost
certain; but very uncertain in the liberal professions. Put your son
apprentice to a shoemaker, there is little doubt of his learning to make a pair
of shoes; but send him to study the law, it as at least twenty to one if he ever
makes such proficiency as will enable him to live by the business. In a
perfectly fair lottery, those who draw the prizes ought to gain all that is lost
by those who draw the blanks. In a profession, where twenty fail for one
that succeeds, that one ought to gain all that should have been gained by the
unsuccessful twenty. The counsellor at law, who, perhaps, at near forty
years of age, begins to make something by his profession, ought to receive
the retribution, not only of his own so tedious and expensive education, but
of that of more than twenty others, who are never likely to make any thing
by it. How extravagant soever the fees of counsellors at law may sometimes
appear, their real retribution is never equal to this. Compute, in any
particular place, what is likely to be annually gained, and what is likely to
be annually spent, by all the different workmen in any common trade, such
as that of shoemakers or weavers, and you will find that the former sum will
generally exceed the latter. But make the same computation with regard to
all the counsellors and students of law, in all the different Inns of Court, and
you will find that their annual gains bear but a very small proportion to their
annual expense, even though you rate the former as high, and the latter as
low, as can well be done. The lottery of the law, therefore, is very far from
being a perfectly fair lottery; and that as well as many other liberal and
honourable professions, is, in point of pecuniary gain, evidently under-
recompensed.
Those professions keep their level, however, with other occupations; and,
notwithstanding these discouragements, all the most generous and liberal
spirits are eager to crowd into them. Two different causes contribute to
recommend them. First, the desire of the reputation which attends upon
superior excellence in any of them; and, secondly, the natural confidence
which every man has, more or less, not only in his own abilities, but in his
own good fortune.
To excel in any profession, in which but few arrive at mediocrity, is the
most decisive mark of what is called genius, or superior talents. The public
admiration which attends upon such distinguished abilities makes always a
part of their reward; a greater or smaller, in proportion as it is higher or
lower in degree. It makes a considerable part of that reward in the
profession of physic; a still greater, perhaps, in that of law; in poetry and
philosophy it makes almost the whole.
There are some very agreeable and beautiful talents, of which the
possession commands a certain sort of admiration, but of which the
exercise, for the sake of gain, is considered, whether from reason or
prejudice, as a sort of public prostitution. The pecuniary recompence,
therefore, of those who exercise them in this manner, must be sufficient, not
only to pay for the time, labour, and expense of acquiring the talents, but for
the discredit which attends the employment of them as the means of
subsistence. The exorbitant rewards of players, opera-singers, opera-
dancers, etc. are founded upon those two principles; the rarity and beauty of
the talents, and the discredit of employing them in this manner. It seems
absurd at first sight, that we should despise their persons, and yet reward
their talents with the most profuse liberality. While we do the one, however,
we must of necessity do the other, Should the public opinion or prejudice
ever alter with regard to such occupations, their pecuniary recompence
would quickly diminish. More people would apply to them, and the
competition would quickly reduce the price of their labour. Such talents,
though far from being common, are by no means so rare as imagined. Many
people possess them in great perfection, who disdain to make this use of
them; and many more are capable of acquiring them, if any thing could be
made honourably by them.
The over-weening conceit which the greater part of men have of their
own abilities, is an ancient evil remarked by the philosophers and moralists
of all ages. Their absurd presumption in their own good fortune has been
less taken notice of. It is, however, if possible, still more universal. There is
no man living, who, when in tolerable health and spirits, has not some share
of it. The chance of gain is by every man more or less over-valued, and the
chance of loss is by most men under-valued, and by scarce any man, who is
in tolerable health and spirits, valued more than it is worth.
That the chance of gain is naturally overvalued, we may learn from the
universal success of lotteries. The world neither ever saw, nor ever will see,
a perfectly fair lottery, or one in which the whole gain compensated the
whole loss; because the undertaker could make nothing by it. In the state
lotteries, the tickets are really not worth the price which is paid by the
original subscribers, and yet commonly sell in the market for twenty, thirty,
and sometimes forty per cent. advance. The vain hopes of gaining some of
the great prizes is the sole cause of this demand. The soberest people scarce
look upon it as a folly to pay a small sum for the chance of gaining ten or
twenty thousand pounds, though they know that even that small sum is
perhaps twenty or thirty per cent. more than the chance is worth. In a lottery
in which no prize exceeded twenty pounds, though in other respects it
approached much nearer to a perfectly fair one than the common state
lotteries, there would not be the same demand for tickets. In order to have a
better chance for some of the great prizes, some people purchase several
tickets; and others, small shares in a still greater number. There is not,
however, a more certain proposition in mathematics, than that the more
tickets you adventure upon, the more likely you are to be a loser. Adventure
upon all the tickets in the lottery, and you lose for certain; and the greater
the number of your tickets, the nearer you approach to this certainty.
That the chance of loss is frequently undervalued, and scarce ever valued
more than it is worth, we may learn from the very moderate profit of
insurers. In order to make insurance, either from fire or sea-risk, a trade at
all, the common premium must be sufficient to compensate the common
losses, to pay the expense of management, and to afford such a profit as
might have been drawn from an equal capital employed in any common
trade. The person who pays no more than this, evidently pays no more than
the real value of the risk, or the lowest price at which he can reasonably
expect to insure it. But though many people have made a little money by
insurance, very few have made a great fortune; and, from this consideration
alone, it seems evident enough that the ordinary balance of profit and loss is
not more advantageous in this than in other common trades, by which so
many people make fortunes. Moderate, however, as the premium of
insurance commonly is, many people despise the risk too much to care to
pay it. Taking the whole kingdom at an average, nineteen houses in twenty,
or rather, perhaps, ninety-nine in a hundred, are not insured from fire. Sea-
risk is more alarming to the greater part of people; and the proportion of
ships insured to those not insured is much greater. Many sail, however, at
all seasons, and even in time of war, without any insurance. This may
sometimes, perhaps, be done without any imprudence. When a great
company, or even a great merchant, has twenty or thirty ships at sea, they
may, as it were, insure one another. The premium saved up on them all may
more than compensate such losses as they are likely to meet with in the
common course of chances. The neglect of insurance upon shipping,
however, in the same manner as upon houses, is, in most cases, the effect of
no such nice calculation, but of mere thoughtless rashness, and
presumptuous contempt of the risk.
The contempt of risk, and the presumptuous hope of success, are in no
period of life more active than at the age at which young people choose
their professions. How little the fear of misfortune is then capable of
balancing the hope of good luck, appears still more evidently in the
readiness of the common people to enlist as soldiers, or to go to sea, than in
the eagerness of those of better fashion to enter into what are called the
liberal professions.
What a common soldier may lose is obvious enough. Without regarding
the danger, however, young volunteers never enlist so readily as at the
beginning of a new war; and though they have scarce any chance of
preferment, they figure to themselves, in their youthful fancies, a thousand
occasions of acquiring honour and distinction which never occur. These
romantic hopes make the whole price of their blood. Their pay is less than
that of common labourers, and, in actual service, their fatigues are much
greater.
The lottery of the sea is not altogether so disadvantageous as that of the
army. The son of a creditable labourer or artificer may frequently go to sea
with his father’s consent; but if he enlists as a soldier, it is always without it.
Other people see some chance of his making something by the one trade;
nobody but himself sees any of his making any thing by the other. The great
admiral is less the object of public admiration than the great general; and
the highest success in the sea service promises a less brilliant fortune and
reputation than equal success in the land. The same difference runs through
all the inferior degrees of preferment in both. By the rules of precedency, a
captain in the navy ranks with a colonel in the army; but he does not rank
with him in the common estimation. As the great prizes in the lottery are
less, the smaller ones must be more numerous. Common sailors, therefore,
more frequently get some fortune and preferment than common soldiers;
and the hope of those prizes is what principally recommends the trade.
Though their skill and dexterity are much superior to that of almost any
artificers; and though their whole life is one continual scene of hardship and
danger; yet for all this dexterity and skill, for all those hardships and
dangers, while they remain in the condition of common sailors, they receive
scarce any other recompence but the pleasure of exercising the one and of
surmounting the other. Their wages are not greater than those of common
labourers at the port which regulates the rate of seamen’s wages. As they
are continually going from port to port, the monthly pay of those who sail
from all the different ports of Great Britain, is more nearly upon a level than
that of any other workmen in those different places; and the rate of the port
to and from which the greatest number sail, that is, the port of London,
regulates that of all the rest. At London, the wages of the greater part of the
different classes of workmen are about double those of the same classes at
Edinburgh. But the sailors who sail from the port of London, seldom earn
above three or four shillings a month more than those who sail from the
port of Leith, and the difference is frequently not so great. In time of peace,
and in the merchant-service, the London price is from a guinea to about
seven-and-twenty shillings the calendar month. A common labourer in
London, at the rate of nine or ten shillings a week, may earn in the calendar
month from forty to five-and-forty shillings. The sailor, indeed, over and
above his pay, is supplied with provisions. Their value, however, may not
perhaps always exceed the difference between his pay and that of the
common labourer; and though it sometimes should, the excess will not be
clear gain to the sailor, because he cannot share it with his wife and family,
whom he must maintain out of his wages at home.
The dangers and hair-breadth escapes of a life of adventures, instead of
disheartening young people, seem frequently to recommend a trade to them.
A tender mother, among the inferior ranks of people, is often afraid to send
her son to school at a sea-port town, lest the sight of the ships, and the
conversation and adventures of the sailors, should entice him to go to sea.
The distant prospect of hazards, from which we can hope to extricate
ourselves by courage and address, is not disagreeable to us, and does not
raise the wages of labour in any employment. It is otherwise with those in
which courage and address can be of no avail. In trades which are known to
be very unwholesome, the wages of labour are always remarkably high.
Unwholesomeness is a species of disagreeableness, and its effects upon the
wages of labour are to be ranked under that general head.
In all the different employments of stock, the ordinary rate of profit
varies more or less with the certainty or uncertainty of the returns. These
are, in general, less uncertain in the inland than in the foreign trade, and in
some branches of foreign trade than in others; in the trade to North
America, for example, than in that to Jamaica. The ordinary rate of profit
always rises more or less with the risk. It does not, however, seem to rise in
proportion to it, or so as to compensate it completely. Bankruptcies are most
frequent in the most hazardous trades. The most hazardous of all trades, that
of a smuggler, though, when the adventure succeeds, it is likewise the most
profitable, is the infallible road to bankruptcy. The presumptuous hope of
success seems to act here as upon all other occasions, and to entice so many
adventurers into those hazardous trades, that their competition reduces the
profit below what is sufficient to compensate the risk. To compensate it
completely, the common returns ought, over and above the ordinary profits
of stock, not only to make up for all occasional losses, but to afford a
surplus profit to the adventurers, of the same nature with the profit of
insurers. But if the common returns were sufficient for all this, bankruptcies
would not be more frequent in these than in other trades.
Of the five circumstances, therefore, which vary the wages of labour, two
only affect the profits of stock; the agreeableness or disagreeableness of the
business, and the risk or security with which it is attended. In point of
agreeableness or disagreeableness, there is little or no difference in the far
greater part of the different employments of stock, but a great deal in those
of labour; and the ordinary profit of stock, though it rises with the risk, does
not always seem to rise in proportion to it. It should follow from all this,
that, in the same society or neighbourhood, the average and ordinary rates
of profit in the different employments of stock should be more nearly upon
a level than the pecuniary wages of the different sorts of labour.
They are so accordingly. The difference between the earnings of a
common labourer and those of a well employed lawyer or physician, is
evidently much greater than that between the ordinary profits in any two
different branches of trade. The apparent difference, besides, in the profits
of different trades, is generally a deception arising from our not always
distinguishing what ought to be considered as wages, from what ought to be
considered as profit.
Apothecaries’ profit is become a bye-word, denoting something
uncommonly extravagant. This great apparent profit, however, is frequently
no more than the reasonable wages of labour. The skill of an apothecary is a
much nicer and more delicate matter than that of any artificer whatever; and
the trust which is reposed in him is of much greater importance. He is the
physician of the poor in all cases, and of the rich when the distress or
danger is not very great. His reward, therefore, ought to be suitable to his
skill and his trust; and it arises generally from the price at which he sells his
drugs. But the whole drugs which the best employed apothecary in a large
market-town, will sell in a year, may not perhaps cost him above thirty or
forty pounds. Though he should sell them, therefore, for three or four
hundred, or at a thousand per cent. profit, this may frequently be no more
than the reasonable wages of his labour, charged, in the only way in which
he can charge them, upon the price of his drugs. The greater part of the
apparent profit is real wages disguised in the garb of profit.
In a small sea-port town, a little grocer will make forty or fifty per cent.
upon a stock of a single hundred pounds, while a considerable wholesale
merchant in the same place will scarce make eight or ten per cent. upon a
stock of ten thousand. The trade of the grocer may be necessary for the
conveniency of the inhabitants, and the narrowness of the market may not
admit the employment of a larger capital in the business. The man,
however, must not only live by his trade, but live by it suitably to the
qualifications which it requires. Besides possessing a little capital, he must
be able to read, write, and account and must be a tolerable judge, too, of
perhaps fifty or sixty different sorts of goods, their prices, qualities, and the
markets where they are to be had cheapest. He must have all the knowledge,
in short, that is necessary for a great merchant, which nothing hinders him
from becoming but the want of a sufficient capital. Thirty or forty pounds a
year cannot be considered as too great a recompence for the labour of a
person so accomplished. Deduct this from the seemingly great profits of his
capital, and little more will remain, perhaps, than the ordinary profits of
stock. The greater part of the apparent profit is, in this case too, real wages.
The difference between the apparent profit of the retail and that of the
wholesale trade, is much less in the capital than in small towns and country
villages. Where ten thousand pounds can be employed in the grocery trade,
the wages of the grocer’s labour must be a very trifling addition to the real
profits of so great a stock. The apparent profits of the wealthy retailer,
therefore, are there more nearly upon a level with those of the wholesale
merchant. It is upon this account that goods sold by retail are generally as
cheap, and frequently much cheaper, in the capital than in small towns and
country villages. Grocery goods, for example, are generally much cheaper;
bread and butchers’ meat frequently as cheap. It costs no more to bring
grocery goods to the great town than to the country village; but it costs a
great deal more to bring corn and cattle, as the greater part of them must be
brought from a much greater distance. The prime cost of grocery goods,
therefore, being the same in both places, they are cheapest where the least
profit is charged upon them. The prime cost of bread and butchers’ meat is
greater in the great town than in the country village; and though the profit is
less, therefore they are not always cheaper there, but often equally cheap. In
such articles as bread and butchers’ meat, the same cause which diminishes
apparent profit, increases prime cost. The extent of the market, by giving
employment to greater stocks, diminishes apparent profit; but by requiring
supplies from a greater distance, it increases prime cost. This diminution of
the one and increase of the other, seem, in most cases, nearly to
counterbalance one another; which is probably the reason that, though the
prices of corn and cattle are commonly very different in different parts of
the kingdom, those of bread and butchers’ meat are generally very nearly
the same through the greater part of it.
Though the profits of stock, both in the wholesale and retail trade, are
generally less in the capital than in small towns and country villages, yet
great fortunes are frequently acquired from small beginnings in the former,
and scarce ever in the latter. In small towns and country villages, on account
of the narrowness of the market, trade cannot always be extended as stock
extends. In such places, therefore, though the rate of a particular person’s
profits may be very high, the sum or amount of them can never be very
great, nor consequently that of his annual accumulation. In great towns, on
the contrary, trade can be extended as stock increases, and the credit of a
frugal and thriving man increases much faster than his stock. His trade is
extended in proportion to the amount of both; and the sum or amount of his
profits is in proportion to the extent of his trade, and his annual
accumulation in proportion to the amount of his profits. It seldom happens,
however, that great fortunes are made, even in great towns, by any one
regular, established, and well-known branch of business, but in
consequence of a long life of industry, frugality, and attention. Sudden
fortunes, indeed, are sometimes made in such places, by what is called the
trade of speculation. The speculative merchant exercises no one regular,
established, or well-known branch of business. He is a corn merchant this
year, and a wine merchant the next, and a sugar, tobacco, or tea merchant
the year after. He enters into every trade, when he foresees that it is likely to
be more than commonly profitable, and he quits it when he foresees that its
profits are likely to return to the level of other trades. His profits and losses,
therefore, can bear no regular proportion to those of any one established and
well-known branch of business. A bold adventurer may sometimes acquire
a considerable fortune by two or three successful speculations, but is just as
likely to lose one by two or three unsuccessful ones. This trade can be
carried on nowhere but in great towns. It is only in places of the most
extensive commerce and correspondence that the intelligence requisite for it
can be had.
The five circumstances above mentioned, though they occasion
considerable inequalities in the wages of labour and profits of stock,
occasion none in the whole of the advantages and disadvantages, real or
imaginary, of the different employments of either. The nature of those
circumstances is such, that they make up for a small pecuniary gain in
some, and counterbalance a great one in others.
In order, however, that this equality may take place in the whole of their
advantages or disadvantages, three things are requisite, even where there is
the most perfect freedom. First the employments must be well known and
long established in the neighbourhood; secondly, they must be in their
ordinary, or what may be called their natural state; and, thirdly, they must be
the sole or principal employments of those who occupy them.
First, this equality can take place only in those employments which are
well known, and have been long established in the neighbourhood.
Where all other circumstances are equal, wages are generally higher in
new than in old trades. When a projector attempts to establish a new
manufacture, he must at first entice his workmen from other employments,
by higher wages than they can either earn in their own trades, or than the
nature of his work would otherwise require; and a considerable time must
pass away before he can venture to reduce them to the common level.
Manufactures for which the demand arises altogether from fashion and
fancy, are continually changing, and seldom last long enough to be
considered as old established manufactures. Those, on the contrary, for
which the demand arises chiefly from use or necessity, are less liable to
change, and the same form or fabric may continue in demand for whole
centuries together. The wages of labour, therefore, are likely to be higher in
manufactures of the former, than in those of the latter kind. Birmingham
deals chiefly in manufactures of the former kind; Sheffield in those of the
latter; and the wages of labour in those two different places are said to be
suitable to this difference in the nature of their manufactures.
The establishment of any new manufacture, of any new branch of
commerce, or of any new practice in agriculture, is always a speculation
from which the projector promises himself extraordinary profits. These
profits sometimes are very great, and sometimes, more frequently, perhaps,
they are quite otherwise; but, in general, they bear no regular proportion to
those of other old trades in the neighbourhood. If the project succeeds, they
are commonly at first very high. When the trade or practice becomes
thoroughly established and well known, the competition reduces them to the
level of other trades.
Secondly, this equality in the whole of the advantages and disadvantages
of the different employments of labour and stock, can take place only in the
ordinary, or what may be called the natural state of those employments.
The demand for almost every different species of labour is sometimes
greater, and sometimes less than usual. In the one case, the advantages of
the employment rise above, in the other they fall below the common level.
The demand for country labour is greater at hay-time and harvest than
during the greater part of the year; and wages rise with the demand. In time
of war, when forty or fifty thousand sailors are forced from the merchant
service into that of the king, the demand for sailors to merchant ships
necessarily rises with their scarcity; and their wages, upon such occasions,
commonly rise from a guinea and seven-and-twenty shillings to forty
shillings and three pounds a-month. In a decaying manufacture, on the
contrary, many workmen, rather than quit their own trade, are contented
with smaller wages than would otherwise be suitable to the nature of their
employment.
The profits of stock vary with the price of the commodities in which it is
employed. As the price of any commodity rises above the ordinary or
average rate, the profits of at least some part of the stock that is employed
in bringing it to market, rise above their proper level, and as it falls they
sink below it. All commodities are more or less liable to variations of price,
but some are much more so than others. In all commodities which are
produced by human industry, the quantity of industry annually employed is
necessarily regulated by the annual demand, in such a manner that the
average annual produce may, as nearly as possible, be equal to the average
annual consumption. In some employments, it has already been observed,
the same quantity of industry will always produce the same, or very nearly
the same quantity of commodities. In the linen or woollen manufactures, for
example, the same number of hands will annually work up very nearly the
same quantity of linen and woollen cloth. The variations in the market price
of such commodities, therefore, can arise only from some accidental
variation in the demand. A public mourning raises the price of black cloth.
But as the demand for most sorts of plain linen and woollen cloth is pretty
uniform, so is likewise the price. But there are other employments in which
the same quantity of industry will not always produce the same quantity of
commodities. The same quantity of industry, for example, will, in different
years, produce very different quantities of corn, wine, hops, sugar tobacco,
etc. The price of such commodities, therefore, varies not only with the
variations of demand, but with the much greater and more frequent
variations of quantity, and is consequently extremely fluctuating; but the
profit of some of the dealers must necessarily fluctuate with the price of the
commodities. The operations of the speculative merchant are principally
employed about such commodities. He endeavours to buy them up when he
foresees that their price is likely to rise, and to sell them when it is likely to
fall.
Thirdly, this equality in the whole of the advantages and disadvantages of
the different employments of labour and stock, can take place only in such
as are the sole or principal employments of those who occupy them.
When a person derives his subsistence from one employment, which does
not occupy the greater part of his time, in the intervals of his leisure he is
often willing to work at another for less wages than would otherwise suit
the nature of the employment.
There still subsists, in many parts of Scotland, a set of people called
cottars or cottagers, though they were more frequent some years ago than
they are now. They are a sort of out-servants of the landlords and farmers.
The usual reward which they receive from their master is a house, a small
garden for pot-herbs, as much grass as will feed a cow, and, perhaps, an
acre or two of bad arable land. When their master has occasion for their
labour, he gives them, besides, two pecks of oatmeal a-week, worth about
sixteen pence sterling. During a great part of the year, he has little or no
occasion for their labour, and the cultivation of their own little possession is
not sufficient to occupy the time which is left at their own disposal. When
such occupiers were more numerous than they are at present, they are said
to have been willing to give their spare time for a very small recompence to
any body, and to have wrought for less wages than other labourers. In
ancient times, they seem to have been common all over Europe. In
countries ill cultivated, and worse inhabited, the greater part of landlords
and farmers could not otherwise provide themselves with the extraordinary
number of hands which country labour requires at certain seasons. The
daily or weekly recompence which such labourers occasionally received
from their masters, was evidently not the whole price of their labour. Their
small tenement made a considerable part of it. This daily or weekly
recompence, however, seems to have been considered as the whole of it, by
many writers who have collected the prices of labour and provisions in
ancient times, and who have taken pleasure in representing both as
wonderfully low.
The produce of such labour comes frequently cheaper to market than
would otherwise be suitable to its nature. Stockings, in many parts of
Scotland, are knit much cheaper than they can anywhere be wrought upon
the loom. They are the work of servants and labourers who derive the
principal part of their subsistence from some other employment. More than
a thousand pair of Shetland stockings are annually imported into Leith, of
which the price is from fivepence to seven-pence a pair. At Lerwick, the
small capital of the Shetland islands, tenpence a-day, I have been assured, is
a common price of common labour. In the same islands, they knit worsted
stockings to the value of a guinea a pair and upwards.
The spinning of linen yarn is carried on in Scotland nearly in the same
way as the knitting of stockings, by servants, who are chiefly hired for other
purposes. They earn but a very scanty subsistence, who endeavour to get
their livelihood by either of those trades. In most parts of Scotland, she is a
good spinner who can earn twentypence a-week.
In opulent countries, the market is generally so extensive, that any one
trade is sufficient to employ the whole labour and stock of those who
occupy it. Instances of people living by one employment, and, at the same
time, deriving some little advantage from another, occur chiefly in poor
countries. The following instance, however, of something of the same kind,
is to be found in the capital of a very rich one. There is no city in Europe, I
believe, in which house-rent is dearer than in London, and yet I know no
capital in which a furnished apartment can be hired so cheap. Lodging is
not only much cheaper in London than in Paris; it is much cheaper than in
Edinburgh, of the same degree of goodness; and, what may seem
extraordinary, the dearness of house-rent is the cause of the cheapness of
lodging. The dearness of house-rent in London arises, not only from those
causes which render it dear in all great capitals, the dearness of labour, the
dearness of all the materials of building, which must generally be brought
from a great distance, and, above all, the dearness of ground-rent, every
landlord acting the part of a monopolist, and frequently exacting a higher
rent for a single acre of bad land in a town, than can be had for a hundred of
the best in the country; but it arises in part from the peculiar manners and
customs of the people, which oblige every master of a family to hire a
whole house from top to bottom. A dwelling-house in England means every
thing that is contained under the same roof. In France, Scotland, and many
other parts of Europe, it frequently means no more than a single storey. A
tradesman in London is obliged to hire a whole house in that part of the
town where his customers live. His shop is upon the ground floor, and he
and his family sleep in the garret; and he endeavours to pay a part of his
house-rent by letting the two middle storeys to lodgers. He expects to
maintain his family by his trade, and not by his lodgers. Whereas at Paris
and Edinburgh, people who let lodgings have commonly no other means of
subsistence; and the price of the lodging must pay, not only the rent of the
house, but the whole expense of the family.
PART II.—Inequalities occasioned by the Policy of Europe.
Such are the inequalities in the whole of the advantages and
disadvantages of the different employments of labour and stock, which the
defect of any of the three requisites above mentioned must occasion, even
where there is the most perfect liberty. But the policy of Europe, by not
leaving things at perfect liberty, occasions other inequalities of much
greater importance.
It does this chiefly in the three following ways. First, by restraining the
competition in some employments to a smaller number than would
otherwise be disposed to enter into them; secondly, by increasing it in
others beyond what it naturally would be; and, thirdly, by obstructing the
free circulation of labour and stock, both from employment to employment,
and from place to place.
First, The policy of Europe occasions a very important inequality in the
whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the different employments of
labour and stock, by restraining the competition in some employments to a
smaller number than might otherwise be disposed to enter into them.
The exclusive privileges of corporations are the principal means it makes
use of for this purpose.
The exclusive privilege of an incorporated trade necessarily restrains the
competition, in the town where it is established, to those who are free of the
trade. To have served an apprenticeship in the town, under a master
properly qualified, is commonly the necessary requisite for obtaining this
freedom. The bye-laws of the corporation regulate sometimes the number of
apprentices which any master is allowed to have, and almost always the
number of years which each apprentice is obliged to serve. The intention of
both regulations is to restrain the competition to a much smaller number
than might otherwise be disposed to enter into the trade. The limitation of
the number of apprentices restrains it directly. A long term of
apprenticeship restrains it more indirectly, but as effectually, by increasing
the expense of education.
In Sheffield, no master cutler can have more than one apprentice at a
time, by a bye-law of the corporation. In Norfolk and Norwich, no master
weaver can have more than two apprentices, under pain of forfeiting five
pounds a-month to the king. No master hatter can have more than two
apprentices anywhere in England, or in the English plantations, under pain
of forfeiting; five pounds a-month, half to the king, and half to him who
shall sue in any court of record. Both these regulations, though they have
been confirmed by a public law of the kingdom, are evidently dictated by
the same corporation-spirit which enacted the bye-law of Sheffield. The
silk-weavers in London had scarce been incorporated a year, when they
enacted a bye-law, restraining any master from having more than two
apprentices at a time. It required a particular act of parliament to rescind
this bye-law.
Seven years seem anciently to have been, all over Europe, the usual term
established for the duration of apprenticeships in the greater part of
incorporated trades. All such incorporations were anciently called
universities, which, indeed, is the proper Latin name for any incorporation
whatever. The university of smiths, the university of tailors, etc. are
expressions which we commonly meet with in the old charters of ancient
towns. When those particular incorporations, which are now peculiarly
called universities, were first established, the term of years which it was
necessary to study, in order to obtain the degree of master of arts, appears
evidently to have been copied from the term of apprenticeship in common
trades, of which the incorporations were much more ancient. As to have
wrought seven years under a master properly qualified, was necessary, in
order to entitle any person to become a master, and to have himself
apprentices in a common trade; so to have studied seven years under a
master properly qualified, was necessary to entitle him to become a master,
teacher, or doctor (words anciently synonymous), in the liberal arts, and to
have scholars or apprentices (words likewise originally synonymous) to
study under him.
By the 5th of Elizabeth, commonly called the Statute of Apprenticeship,
it was enacted, that no person should, for the future, exercise any trade,
craft, or mystery, at that time exercised in England, unless he had
previously served to it an apprenticeship of seven years at least; and what
before had been the bye-law of many particular corporations, became in
England the general and public law of all trades carried on in market towns.
For though the words of the statute are very general, and seem plainly to
include the whole kingdom, by interpretation its operation has been limited
to market towns; it having been held that, in country villages, a person may
exercise several different trades, though he has not served a seven years
apprenticeship to each, they being necessary for the conveniency of the
inhabitants, and the number of people frequently not being sufficient to
supply each with a particular set of hands. By a strict interpretation of the
words, too, the operation of this statute has been limited to those trades
which were established in England before the 5th of Elizabeth, and has
never been extended to such as have been introduced since that time. This
limitation has given occasion to several distinctions, which, considered as
rules of police, appear as foolish as can well be imagined. It has been
adjudged, for example, that a coach-maker can neither himself make nor
employ journeymen to make his coach-wheels, but must buy them of a
master wheel-wright; this latter trade having been exercised in England
before the 5th of Elizabeth. But a wheel-wright, though he has never served
an apprenticeship to a coachmaker, may either himself make or employ
journeymen to make coaches; the trade of a coachmaker not being within
the statute, because not exercised in England at the time when it was made.
The manufactures of Manchester, Birmingham, and Wolverhampton, are
many of them, upon this account, not within the statute, not having been
exercised in England before the 5th of Elizabeth.
In France, the duration of apprenticeships is different in different towns
and in different trades. In Paris, five years is the term required in a great
number; but, before any person can be qualified to exercise the trade as a
master, he must, in many of them, serve five years more as a journeyman.
During this latter term, he is called the companion of his master, and the
term itself is called his companionship.
In Scotland, there is no general law which regulates universally the
duration of apprenticeships. The term is different in different corporations.
Where it is long, a part of it may generally be redeemed by paying a small
fine. In most towns, too, a very small fine is sufficient to purchase the
freedom of any corporation. The weavers of linen and hempen cloth, the
principal manufactures of the country, as well as all other artificers
subservient to them, wheel-makers, reel-makers, etc. may exercise their
trades in any town-corporate without paying any fine. In all towns-
corporate, all persons are free to sell butchers’ meat upon any lawful day of
the week. Three years is, in Scotland, a common term of apprenticeship,
even in some very nice trades; and, in general, I know of no country in
Europe, in which corporation laws are so little oppressive.
The property which every man has in his own labour, as it is the original
foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. The
patrimony of a poor man lies in the strength and dexterity of his hands; and
to hinder him from employing this strength and dexterity in what manner he
thinks proper, without injury to his neighbour, is a plain violation of this
most sacred property. It is a manifest encroachment upon the just liberty,
both of the workman, and of those who might be disposed to employ him.
As it hinders the one from working at what he thinks proper, so it hinders
the others from employing whom they think proper. To judge whether he is
fit to be employed, may surely be trusted to the discretion of the employers,
whose interest it so much concerns. The affected anxiety of the lawgiver,
lest they should employ an improper person, is evidently as impertinent as it
is oppressive.
The institution of long apprenticeships can give no security that
insufficient workmanship shall not frequently be exposed to public sale.
When this is done, it is generally the effect of fraud, and not of inability;
and the longest apprenticeship can give no security against fraud. Quite
different regulations are necessary to prevent this abuse. The sterling mark
upon plate, and the stamps upon linen and woollen cloth, give the purchaser
much greater security than any statute of apprenticeship. He generally looks
at these, but never thinks it worth while to enquire whether the workman
had served a seven years apprenticeship.
The institution of long apprenticeships has no tendency to form young
people to industry. A journeyman who works by the piece is likely to be
industrious, because he derives a benefit from every exertion of his
industry. An apprentice is likely to be idle, and almost always is so, because
he has no immediate interest to be otherwise. In the inferior employments,
the sweets of labour consist altogether in the recompence of labour. They
who are soonest in a condition to enjoy the sweets of it, are likely soonest to
conceive a relish for it, and to acquire the early habit of industry. A young
man naturally conceives an aversion to labour, when for a long time he
receives no benefit from it. The boys who are put out apprentices from
public charities are generally bound for more than the usual number of
years, and they generally turn out very idle and worthless.
Apprenticeships were altogether unknown to the ancients. The reciprocal
duties of master and apprentice make a considerable article in every modern
code. The Roman law is perfectly silent with regard to them. I know no
Greek or Latin word (I might venture, I believe, to assert that there is none)
which expresses the idea we now annex to the word apprentice, a servant
bound to work at a particular trade for the benefit of a master, during a term
of years, upon condition that the master shall teach him that trade.
Long apprenticeships are altogether unnecessary. The arts, which are
much superior to common trades, such as those of making clocks and
watches, contain no such mystery as to require a long course of instruction.
The first invention of such beautiful machines, indeed, and even that of
some of the instruments employed in making them, must no doubt have
been the work of deep thought and long time, and may justly be considered
as among the happiest efforts of human ingenuity. But when both have been
fairly invented, and are well understood, to explain to any young man, in
the completest manner, how to apply the instruments, and how to construct
the machines, cannot well require more than the lessons of a few weeks;
perhaps those of a few days might be sufficient. In the common mechanic
trades, those of a few days might certainly be sufficient. The dexterity of
hand, indeed, even in common trades, cannot be acquired without much
practice and experience. But a young man would practice with much more
diligence and attention, if from the beginning he wrought as a journeyman,
being paid in proportion to the little work which he could execute, and
paying in his turn for the materials which he might sometimes spoil through
awkwardness and inexperience. His education would generally in this way
be more effectual, and always less tedious and expensive. The master,
indeed, would be a loser. He would lose all the wages of the apprentice,
which he now saves, for seven years together. In the end, perhaps, the
apprentice himself would be a loser. In a trade so easily learnt he would
have more competitors, and his wages, when he came to be a complete
workman, would be much less than at present. The same increase of
competition would reduce the profits of the masters, as well as the wages of
workmen. The trades, the crafts, the mysteries, would all be losers. But the
public would be a gainer, the work of all artificers coming in this way much
cheaper to market.
It is to prevent his reduction of price, and consequently of wages and
profit, by restraining that free competition which would most certainly
occasion it, that all corporations, and the greater part of corporation laws
have been established. In order to erect a corporation, no other authority in
ancient times was requisite, in many parts of Europe, but that of the town-
corporate in which it was established. In England, indeed, a charter from the
king was likewise necessary. But this prerogative of the crown seems to
have been reserved rather for extorting money from the subject, than for the
defence of the common liberty against such oppressive monopolies. Upon
paying a fine to the king, the charter seems generally to have been readily
granted; and when any particular class of artificers or traders thought proper
to act as a corporation, without a charter, such adulterine guilds, as they
were called, were not always disfranchised upon that account, but obliged
to fine annually to the king, for permission to exercise their usurped
privileges {See Madox Firma Burgi p. 26 etc.}. The immediate inspection
of all corporations, and of the bye-laws which they might think proper to
enact for their own government, belonged to the town-corporate in which
they were established; and whatever discipline was exercised over them,
proceeded commonly, not from the king, but from that greater incorporation
of which those subordinate ones were only parts or members.
The government of towns-corporate was altogether in the hands of
traders and artificers, and it was the manifest interest of every particular
class of them, to prevent the market from being overstocked, as they
commonly express it, with their own particular species of industry; which is
in reality to keep it always understocked. Each class was eager to establish
regulations proper for this purpose, and, provided it was allowed to do so,
was willing to consent that every other class should do the same. In
consequence of such regulations, indeed, each class was obliged to buy the
goods they had occasion for from every other within the town, somewhat
dearer than they otherwise might have done. But, in recompence, they were
enabled to sell their own just as much dearer; so that, so far it was as broad
as long, as they say; and in the dealings of the different classes within the
town with one another, none of them were losers by these regulations. But
in their dealings with the country they were all great gainers; and in these
latter dealings consist the whole trade which supports and enriches every
town.
Every town draws its whole subsistence, and all the materials of its
industry, from the: country. It pays for these chiefly in two ways. First, by
sending back to the country a part of those materials wrought up and
manufactured; in which case, their price is augmented by the wages of the
workmen, and the profits of their masters or immediate employers;
secondly, by sending to it a part both of the rude and manufactured produce,
either of other countries, or of distant parts of the same country, imported
into the town; in which case, too, the original price of those goods is
augmented by the wages of the carriers or sailors, and by the profits of the
merchants who employ them. In what is gained upon the first of those
branches of commerce, consists the advantage which the town makes by its
manufactures; in what is gained upon the second, the advantage of its inland
and foreign trade. The wages of the workmen, and the profits of their
different employers, make up the whole of what is gained upon both.
Whatever regulations, therefore, tend to increase those wages and profits
beyond what they otherwise: would be, tend to enable the town to purchase,
with a smaller quantity of its labour, the produce of a greater quantity of the
labour of the country. They give the traders and artificers in the town an
advantage over the landlords, farmers, and labourers, in the country, and
break down that natural equality which would otherwise take place in the
commerce which is carried on between them. The whole annual produce of
the labour of the society is annually divided between those two different
sets of people. By means of those regulations, a greater share of it is given
to the inhabitants of the town than would otherwise fall to them, and a less
to those of the country.
The price which the town really pays for the provisions and materials
annually imported into it, is the quantity of manufactures and other goods
annually exported from it. The dearer the latter are sold, the cheaper the
former are bought. The industry of the town becomes more, and that of the
country less advantageous.
That the industry which is carried on in towns is, everywhere in Europe,
more advantageous than that which is carried on in the country, without
entering into any very nice computations, we may satisfy ourselves by one
very simple and obvious observation. In every country of Europe, we find
at least a hundred people who have acquired great fortunes, from small
beginnings, by trade and manufactures, the industry which properly belongs
to towns, for one who has done so by that which properly belongs to the
country, the raising of rude produce by the improvement and cultivation of
land. Industry, therefore, must be better rewarded, the wages of labour and
the profits of stock must evidently be greater, in the one situation than in the
other. But stock and labour naturally seek the most advantageous
employment. They naturally, therefore, resort as much as they can to the
town, and desert the country.
The inhabitants of a town being collected into one place, can easily
combine together. The most insignificant trades carried on in towns have,
accordingly, in some place or other, been incorporated; and even where they
have never been incorporated, yet the corporation-spirit, the jealousy of
strangers, the aversion to take apprentices, or to communicate the secret of
their trade, generally prevail in them, and often teach them, by voluntary
associations and agreements, to prevent that free competition which they
cannot prohibit by bye-laws. The trades which employ but a small number
of hands, run most easily into such combinations. Half-a-dozen wool-
combers, perhaps, are necessary to keep a thousand spinners and weavers at
work. By combining not to take apprentices, they can not only engross the
employment, but reduce the whole manufacture into a sort of slavery to
themselves, and raise the price of their labour much above what is due to
the nature of their work.
The inhabitants of the country, dispersed in distant places, cannot easily
combine together. They have not only never been incorporated, but the
incorporation spirit never has prevailed among them. No apprenticeship has
ever been thought necessary to qualify for husbandry, the great trade of the
country. After what are called the fine arts, and the liberal professions,
however, there is perhaps no trade which requires so great a variety of
knowledge and experience. The innumerable volumes which have been
written upon it in all languages, may satisfy us, that among the wisest and
most learned nations, it has never been regarded as a matter very easily
understood. And from all those volumes we shall in vain attempt to collect
that knowledge of its various and complicated operations which is
commonly possessed even by the common farmer; how contemptuously
soever the very contemptible authors of some of them may sometimes
affect to speak of him. There is scarce any common mechanic trade, on the
contrary, of which all the operations may not be as completely and
distinctly explained in a pamphlet of a very few pages, as it is possible for
words illustrated by figures to explain them. In the history of the arts, now
publishing by the French Academy of Sciences, several of them are actually
explained in this manner. The direction of operations, besides, which must
be varied with every change of the weather, as well as with many other
accidents, requires much more judgment and discretion, than that of those
which are always the same, or very nearly the same.
Not only the art of the farmer, the general direction of the operations of
husbandry, but many inferior branches of country labour require much more
skill and experience than the greater part of mechanic trades. The man who
works upon brass and iron, works with instruments, and upon materials of
which the temper is always the same, or very nearly the same. But the man
who ploughs the ground with a team of horses or oxen, works with
instruments of which the health, strength, and temper, are very different
upon different occasions. The condition of the materials which he works
upon, too, is as variable as that of the instruments which he works with, and
both require to be managed with much judgment and discretion. The
common ploughman, though generally regarded as the pattern of stupidity
and ignorance, is seldom defective in this judgment and discretion. He is
less accustomed, indeed, to social intercourse, than the mechanic who lives
in a town. His voice and language are more uncouth, and more difficult to
be understood by those who are not used to them. His understanding,
however, being accustomed to consider a greater variety of objects, is
generally much superior to that of the other, whose whole attention, from
morning till night, is commonly occupied in performing one or two very
simple operations. How much the lower ranks of people in the country are
really superior to those of the town, is well known to every man whom
either business or curiosity has led to converse much with both. In China
and Indostan, accordingly, both the rank and the wages of country labourers
are said to be superior to those of the greater part of artificers and
manufacturers. They would probably be so everywhere, if corporation laws
and the corporation spirit did not prevent it.
The superiority which the industry of the towns has everywhere in
Europe over that of the country, is not altogether owing to corporations and
corporation laws. It is supported by many other regulations. The high duties
upon foreign manufactures, and upon all goods imported by alien
merchants, all tend to the same purpose. Corporation laws enable the
inhabitants of towns to raise their prices, without fearing to be undersold by
the free competition of their own countrymen. Those other regulations
secure them equally against that of foreigners. The enhancement of price
occasioned by both is everywhere finally paid by the landlords, farmers,
and labourers, of the country, who have seldom opposed the establishment
of such monopolies. They have commonly neither inclination nor fitness to
enter into combinations; and the clamour and sophistry of merchants and
manufacturers easily persuade them, that the private interest of a part, and
of a subordinate part, of the society, is the general interest of the whole.
In Great Britain, the superiority of the industry of the towns over that of
the country seems to have been greater formerly than in the present times.
The wages of country labour approach nearer to those of manufacturing
labour, and the profits of stock employed in agriculture to those of trading
and manufacturing stock, than they are said to have done in the last century,
or in the beginning of the present. This change may be regarded as the
necessary, though very late consequence of the extraordinary
encouragement given to the industry of the towns. The stocks accumulated
in them come in time to be so great, that it can no longer be employed with
the ancient profit in that species of industry which is peculiar to them. That
industry has its limits like every other; and the increase of stock, by
increasing the competition, necessarily reduces the profit. The lowering of
profit in the town forces out stock to the country, where, by creating a new
demand for country labour, it necessarily raises its wages. It then spreads
itself, if I my say so, over the face of the land, and, by being employed in
agriculture, is in part restored to the country, at the expense of which, in a
great measure, it had originally been accumulated in the town. That
everywhere in Europe the greatest improvements of the country have been
owing to such over flowings of the stock originally accumulated in the
towns, I shall endeavour to shew hereafter, and at the same time to
demonstrate, that though some countries have, by this course, attained to a
considerable degree of opulence, it is in itself necessarily slow, uncertain,
liable to be disturbed and interrupted by innumerable accidents, and, in
every respect, contrary to the order of nature and of reason. The interests,
prejudices, laws, and customs, which have given occasion to it, I shall
endeavour to explain as fully and distinctly as I can in the third and fourth
books of this Inquiry.
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in
some contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible, indeed, to prevent such
meetings, by any law which either could be executed, or would be
consistent with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder people
of the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do
nothing to facilitate such assemblies, much less to render them necessary.
A regulation which obliges all those of the same trade in a particular
town to enter their names and places of abode in a public register, facilitates
such assemblies. It connects individuals who might never otherwise be
known to one another, and gives every man of the trade a direction where to
find every other man of it.
A regulation which enables those of the same trade to tax themselves, in
order to provide for their poor, their sick, their widows and orphans, by
giving them a common interest to manage, renders such assemblies
necessary.
An incorporation not only renders them necessary, but makes the act of
the majority binding upon the whole. In a free trade, an effectual
combination cannot be established but by the unanimous consent of every
single trader, and it cannot last longer than every single trader continues of
the same mind. The majority of a corporation can enact a bye-law, with
proper penalties, which will limit the competition more effectually and
more durably than any voluntary combination whatever.
The pretence that corporations are necessary for the better government of
the trade, is without any foundation. The real and effectual discipline which
is exercised over a workman, is not that of his corporation, but that of his
customers. It is the fear of losing their employment which restrains his
frauds and corrects his negligence. An exclusive corporation necessarily
weakens the force of this discipline. A particular set of workmen must then
be employed, let them behave well or ill. It is upon this account that, in
many large incorporated towns, no tolerable workmen are to be found, even
in some of the most necessary trades. If you would have your work
tolerably executed, it must be done in the suburbs, where the workmen,
having no exclusive privilege, have nothing but their character to depend
upon, and you must then smuggle it into the town as well as you can.
It is in this manner that the policy of Europe, by restraining the
competition in some employments to a smaller number than would
otherwise be disposed to enter into them, occasions a very important
inequality in the whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the different
employments of labour and stock.
Secondly, the policy of Europe, by increasing the competition in some
employments beyond what it naturally would be, occasions another
inequality, of an opposite kind, in the whole of the advantages and
disadvantages of the different employments of labour and stock.
It has been considered as of so much importance that a proper number of
young people should be educated for certain professions, that sometimes the
public, and sometimes the piety of private founders, have established many
pensions, scholarships, exhibitions, bursaries, etc. for this purpose, which
draw many more people into those trades than could otherwise pretend to
follow them. In all Christian countries, I believe, the education of the
greater part of churchmen is paid for in this manner. Very few of them are
educated altogether at their own expense. The long, tedious, and expensive
education, therefore, of those who are, will not always procure them a
suitable reward, the church being crowded with people, who, in order to get
employment, are willing to accept of a much smaller recompence than what
such an education would otherwise have entitled them to; and in this
manner the competition of the poor takes away the reward of the rich. It
would be indecent, no doubt, to compare either a curate or a chaplain with a
journeyman in any common trade. The pay of a curate or chaplain,
however, may very properly be considered as of the same nature with the
wages of a journeyman. They are all three paid for their work according to
the contract which they may happen to make with their respective superiors.
Till after the middle of the fourteenth century, five merks, containing about
as much silver as ten pounds of our present money, was in England the
usual pay of a curate or a stipendiary parish priest, as we find it regulated
by the decrees of several different national councils. At the same period,
fourpence a-day, containing the same quantity of silver as a shilling of our
present money, was declared to be the pay of a master mason; and
threepence a-day, equal to ninepence of our present money, that of a
journeyman mason. {See the Statute of Labourers, 25, Ed. III.} The wages
of both these labourers, therefore, supposing them to have been constantly
employed, were much superior to those of the curate. The wages of the
master mason, supposing him to have been without employment one-third
of the year, would have fully equalled them. By the 12th of Queen Anne, c.
12. it is declared, “That whereas, for want of sufficient maintenance and
encouragement to curates, the cures have, in several places, been meanly
supplied, the bishop is, therefore, empowered to appoint, by writing under
his hand and seal, a sufficient certain stipend or allowance, not exceeding
fifty, and not less than twenty pounds a-year”. Forty pounds a-year is
reckoned at present very good pay for a curate; and, notwithstanding this
act of parliament, there are many curacies under twenty pounds a-year.
There are journeymen shoemakers in London who earn forty pounds a-year,
and there is scarce an industrious workman of any kind in that metropolis
who does not earn more than twenty. This last sum, indeed, does not exceed
what is frequently earned by common labourers in many country parishes.
Whenever the law has attempted to regulate the wages of workmen, it has
always been rather to lower them than to raise them. But the law has, upon
many occasions, attempted to raise the wages of curates, and, for the dignity
of the church, to oblige the rectors of parishes to give them more than the
wretched maintenance which they themselves might be willing to accept of.
And, in both cases, the law seems to have been equally ineffectual, and has
never either been able to raise the wages of curates, or to sink those of
labourers to the degree that was intended; because it has never been able to
hinder either the one from being willing to accept of less than the legal
allowance, on account of the indigence of their situation and the multitude
of their competitors, or the other from receiving more, on account of the
contrary competition of those who expected to derive either profit or
pleasure from employing them.
The great benefices and other ecclesiastical dignities support the honour
of the church, notwithstanding the mean circumstances of some of its
inferior members. The respect paid to the profession, too, makes some
compensation even to them for the meanness of their pecuniary
recompence. In England, and in all Roman catholic countries, the lottery of
the church is in reality much more advantageous than is necessary. The
example of the churches of Scotland, of Geneva, and of several other
protestant churches, may satisfy us, that in so creditable a profession, in
which education is so easily procured, the hopes of much more moderate
benefices will draw a sufficient number of learned, decent, and respectable
men into holy orders.
In professions in which there are no benefices, such as law and physic, if
an equal proportion of people were educated at the public expense, the
competition would soon be so great as to sink very much their pecuniary
reward. It might then not be worth any man’s while to educate his son to
either of those professions at his own expense. They would be entirely
abandoned to such as had been educated by those public charities, whose
numbers and necessities would oblige them in general to content
themselves with a very miserable recompence, to the entire degradation of
the now respectable professions of law and physic.
That unprosperous race of men, commonly called men of letters, are
pretty much in the situation which lawyers and physicians probably would
be in, upon the foregoing supposition. In every part of Europe, the greater
part of them have been educated for the church, but have been hindered by
different reasons from entering into holy orders. They have generally,
therefore, been educated at the public expense; and their numbers are
everywhere so great, as commonly to reduce the price of their labour to a
very paltry recompence.
Before the invention of the art of printing, the only employment by which
a man of letters could make any thing by his talents, was that of a public or
private teacher, or by communicating to other people the curious and useful
knowledge which he had acquired himself; and this is still surely a more
honourable, a more useful, and, in general, even a more profitable
employment than that other of writing for a bookseller, to which the art of
printing has given occasion. The time and study, the genius, knowledge, and
application requisite to qualify an eminent teacher of the sciences, are at
least equal to what is necessary for the greatest practitioners in law and
physic. But the usual reward of the eminent teacher bears no proportion to
that of the lawyer or physician, because the trade of the one is crowded with
indigent people, who have been brought up to it at the public expense;
whereas those of the other two are encumbered with very few who have not
been educated at their own. The usual recompence, however, of public and
private teachers, small as it may appear, would undoubtedly be less than it
is, if the competition of those yet more indigent men of letters, who write
for bread, was not taken out of the market. Before the invention of the art of
printing, a scholar and a beggar seem to have been terms very nearly
synonymous. The different governors of the universities, before that time,
appear to have often granted licences to their scholars to beg.
In ancient times, before any charities of this kind had been established for
the education of indigent people to the learned professions, the rewards of
eminent teachers appear to have been much more considerable. Isocrates, in
what is called his discourse against the sophists, reproaches the teachers of
his own times with inconsistency. “They make the most magnificent
promises to their scholars,” says he, “and undertake to teach them to be
wise, to be happy, and to be just; and, in return for so important a service,
they stipulate the paltry reward of four or five minae.” “They who teach
wisdom,” continues he, “ought certainly to be wise themselves; but if any
man were to sell such a bargain for such a price, he would be convicted of
the most evident folly.” He certainly does not mean here to exaggerate the
reward, and we may be assured that it was not less than he represents it.
Four minae were equal to thirteen pounds six shillings and eightpence; five
minae to sixteen pounds thirteen shillings and fourpence. Something not
less than the largest of those two sums, therefore, must at that time have
been usually paid to the most eminent teachers at Athens. Isocrates himself
demanded ten minae, or £ 33:6:8 from each scholar. When he taught at
Athens, he is said to have had a hundred scholars. I understand this to be the
number whom he taught at one time, or who attended what we would call
one course of lectures; a number which will not appear extraordinary from
so great a city to so famous a teacher, who taught, too, what was at that time
the most fashionable of all sciences, rhetoric. He must have made,
therefore, by each course of lectures, a thousand minae, or £ 3335:6:8. A
thousand minae, accordingly, is said by Plutarch, in another place, to have
been his didactron, or usual price of teaching. Many other eminent teachers
in those times appear to have acquired great fortunes. Georgias made a
present to the temple of Delphi of his own statue in solid gold. We must not,
I presume, suppose that it was as large as the life. His way of living, as well
as that of Hippias and Protagoras, two other eminent teachers of those
times, is represented by Plato as splendid, even to ostentation. Plato himself
is said to have lived with a good deal of magnificence. Aristotle, after
having been tutor to Alexander, and most munificently rewarded, as it is
universally agreed, both by him and his father, Philip, thought it worth
while, notwithstanding, to return to Athens, in order to resume the teaching
of his school. Teachers of the sciences were probably in those times less
common than they came to be in an age or two afterwards, when the
competition had probably somewhat reduced both the price of their labour
and the admiration for their persons. The most eminent of them, however,
appear always to have enjoyed a degree of consideration much superior to
any of the like profession in the present times. The Athenians sent
Carneades the academic, and Diogenes the stoic, upon a solemn embassy to
Rome; and though their city had then declined from its former grandeur, it
was still an independent and considerable republic.
Carneades, too, was a Babylonian by birth; and as there never was a
people more jealous of admitting foreigners to public offices than the
Athenians, their consideration for him must have been very great.
This inequality is, upon the whole, perhaps rather advantageous than
hurtful to the public. It may somewhat degrade the profession of a public
teacher; but the cheapness of literary education is surely an advantage
which greatly overbalances this trifling inconveniency. The public, too,
might derive still greater benefit from it, if the constitution of those schools
and colleges, in which education is carried on, was more reasonable than it
is at present through the greater part of Europe.
Thirdly, the policy of Europe, by obstructing the free circulation of
labour and stock, both from employment to employment, and from place to
place, occasions, in some cases, a very inconvenient inequality in the whole
of the advantages and disadvantages of their different employments.
The statute of apprenticeship obstructs the free circulation of labour from
one employment to another, even in the same place. The exclusive
privileges of corporations obstruct it from one place to another, even in the
same employment.
It frequently happens, that while high wages are given to the workmen in
one manufacture, those in another are obliged to content themselves with
bare subsistence. The one is in an advancing state, and has therefore a
continual demand for new hands; the other is in a declining state, and the
superabundance of hands is continually increasing. Those two manufactures
may sometimes be in the same town, and sometimes in the same
neighbourhood, without being able to lend the least assistance to one
another. The statute of apprenticeship may oppose it in the one case, and
both that and an exclusive corporation in the other. In many different
manufactures, however, the operations are so much alike, that the workmen
could easily change trades with one another, if those absurd laws did not
hinder them. The arts of weaving plain linen and plain silk, for example, are
almost entirely the same. That of weaving plain woollen is somewhat
different; but the difference is so insignificant, that either a linen or a silk
weaver might become a tolerable workman in a very few days. If any of
those three capital manufactures, therefore, were decaying, the workmen
might find a resource in one of the other two which was in a more
prosperous condition; and their wages would neither rise too high in the
thriving, nor sink too low in the decaying manufacture. The linen
manufacture, indeed, is in England, by a particular statute, open to every
body; but as it is not much cultivated through the greater part of the country,
it can afford no general resource to the work men of other decaying
manufactures, who, wherever the statute of apprenticeship takes place, have
no other choice, but either to come upon the parish, or to work as common
labourers; for which, by their habits, they are much worse qualified than for
any sort of manufacture that bears any resemblance to their own. They
generally, therefore, chuse to come upon the parish.
Whatever obstructs the free circulation of labour from one employment
to another, obstructs that of stock likewise; the quantity of stock which can
be employed in any branch of business depending very much upon that of
the labour which can be employed in it. Corporation laws, however, give
less obstruction to the free circulation of stock from one place to another,
than to that of labour. It is everywhere much easier for a wealthy merchant
to obtain the privilege of trading in a town-corporate, than for a poor
artificer to obtain that of working in it.
The obstruction which corporation laws give to the free circulation of
labour is common, I believe, to every part of Europe. That which is given to
it by the poor laws is, so far as I know, peculiar to England. It consists in
the difficulty which a poor man finds in obtaining a settlement, or even in
being allowed to exercise his industry in any parish but that to which he
belongs. It is the labour of artificers and manufacturers only of which the
free circulation is obstructed by corporation laws. The difficulty of
obtaining settlements obstructs even that of common labour. It may be
worth while to give some account of the rise, progress, and present state of
this disorder, the greatest, perhaps, of any in the police of England.
When, by the destruction of monasteries, the poor had been deprived of
the charity of those religious houses, after some other ineffectual attempts
for their relief, it was enacted, by the 43d of Elizabeth, c. 2. that every
parish should be bound to provide for its own poor, and that overseers of
the poor should be annually appointed, who, with the church-wardens,
should raise, by a parish rate, competent sums for this purpose.
By this statute, the necessity of providing for their own poor was
indispensably imposed upon every parish. Who were to be considered as
the poor of each parish became, therefore, a question of some importance.
This question, after some variation, was at last determined by the 13th and
14th of Charles II. when it was enacted, that forty days undisturbed
residence should gain any person a settlement in any parish; but that within
that time it should be lawful for two justices of the peace, upon complaint
made by the church-wardens or overseers of the poor, to remove any new
inhabitant to the parish where he was last legally settled; unless he either
rented a tenement of ten pounds a-year, or could give such security for the
discharge of the parish where he was then living, as those justices should
judge sufficient.
Some frauds, it is said, were committed in consequence of this statute;
parish officers sometimes bribing their own poor to go clandestinely to
another parish, and, by keeping themselves concealed for forty days, to gain
a settlement there, to the discharge of that to which they properly belonged.
It was enacted, therefore, by the 1st of James II. that the forty days
undisturbed residence of any person necessary to gain a settlement, should
be accounted only from the time of his delivering notice, in writing, of the
place of his abode and the number of his family, to one of the church-
wardens or overseers of the parish where he came to dwell.
But parish officers, it seems, were not always more honest with regard to
their own than they had been with regard to other parishes, and sometimes
connived at such intrusions, receiving the notice, and taking no proper steps
in consequence of it. As every person in a parish, therefore, was supposed
to have an interest to prevent as much as possible their being burdened by
such intruders, it was further enacted by the 3rd of William III. that the
forty days residence should be accounted only from the publication of such
notice in writing on Sunday in the church, immediately after divine service.
“After all,” says Doctor Burn, “this kind of settlement, by continuing
forty days after publication of notice in writing, is very seldom obtained;
and the design of the acts is not so much for gaining of settlements, as for
the avoiding of them by persons coming into a parish clandestinely, for the
giving of notice is only putting a force upon the parish to remove. But if a
person’s situation is such, that it is doubtful whether he is actually
removable or not, he shall, by giving of notice, compel the parish either to
allow him a settlement uncontested, by suffering him to continue forty days,
or by removing him to try the right.”
This statute, therefore, rendered it almost impracticable for a poor man to
gain a new settlement in the old way, by forty days inhabitancy. But that it
might not appear to preclude altogether the common people of one parish
from ever establishing themselves with security in another, it appointed four
other ways by which a settlement might be gained without any notice
delivered or published. The first was, by being taxed to parish rates and
paying them; the second, by being elected into an annual parish office, and
serving in it a year; the third, by serving an apprenticeship in the parish; the
fourth, by being hired into service there for a year, and continuing in the
same service during the whole of it. Nobody can gain a settlement by either
of the two first ways, but by the public deed of the whole parish, who are
too well aware of the consequences to adopt any new-comer, who has
nothing but his labour to support him, either by taxing him to parish rates,
or by electing him into a parish office.
No married man can well gain any settlement in either of the two last
ways. An apprentice is scarce ever married; and it is expressly enacted, that
no married servant shall gain any settlement by being hired for a year. The
principal effect of introducing settlement by service, has been to put out in a
great measure the old fashion of hiring for a year; which before had been so
customary in England, that even at this day, if no particular term is agreed
upon, the law intends that every servant is hired for a year. But masters are
not always willing to give their servants a settlement by hiring them in this
manner; and servants are not always willing to be so hired, because, as
every last settlement discharges all the foregoing, they might thereby lose
their original settlement in the places of their nativity, the habitation of their
parents and relations.
No independent workman, it is evident, whether labourer or artificer, is
likely to gain any new settlement, either by apprenticeship or by service.
When such a person, therefore, carried his industry to a new parish, he was
liable to be removed, how healthy and industrious soever, at the caprice of
any churchwarden or overseer, unless he either rented a tenement of ten
pounds a-year, a thing impossible for one who has nothing but his labour to
live by, or could give such security for the discharge of the parish as two
justices of the peace should judge sufficient.
What security they shall require, indeed, is left altogether to their
discretion; but they cannot well require less than thirty pounds, it having
been enacted, that the purchase even of a freehold estate of less than thirty
pounds value, shall not gain any person a settlement, as not being sufficient
for the discharge of the parish. But this is a security which scarce any man
who lives by labour can give; and much greater security is frequently
demanded.
In order to restore, in some measure, that free circulation of labour which
those different statutes had almost entirely taken away, the invention of
certificates was fallen upon. By the 8th and 9th of William III. it was
enacted that if any person should bring a certificate from the parish where
he was last legally settled, subscribed by the church-wardens and overseers
of the poor, and allowed by two justices of the peace, that every other parish
should be obliged to receive him; that he should not be removable merely
upon account of his being likely to become chargeable, but only upon his
becoming actually chargeable; and that then the parish which granted the
certificate should be obliged to pay the expense both of his maintenance
and of his removal. And in order to give the most perfect security to the
parish where such certificated man should come to reside, it was further
enacted by the same statute, that he should gain no settlement there by any
means whatever, except either by renting a tenement of ten pounds a-year,
or by serving upon his own account in an annual parish office for one whole
year; and consequently neither by notice nor by service, nor by
apprenticeship, nor by paying parish rates. By the 12th of Queen Anne, too,
stat. 1, c.18, it was further enacted, that neither the servants nor apprentices
of such certificated man should gain any settlement in the parish where he
resided under such certificate.
How far this invention has restored that free circulation of labour, which
the preceding statutes had almost entirely taken away, we may learn from
the following very judicious observation of Doctor Burn. “It is obvious,”
says he, “that there are divers good reasons for requiring certificates with
persons coming to settle in any place; namely, that persons residing under
them can gain no settlement, neither by apprenticeship, nor by service, nor
by giving notice, nor by paying parish rates; that they can settle neither
apprentices nor servants; that if they become chargeable, it is certainly
known whither to remove them, and the parish shall be paid for the
removal, and for their maintenance in the mean time; and that, if they fall
sick, and cannot be removed, the parish which gave the certificate must
maintain them; none of all which can be without a certificate. Which
reasons will hold proportionably for parishes not granting certificates in
ordinary cases; for it is far more than an equal chance, but that they will
have the certificated persons again, and in a worse condition.” The moral of
this observation seems to be, that certificates ought always to be required by
the parish where any poor man comes to reside, and that they ought very
seldom to be granted by that which he purposes to leave. “There is
somewhat of hardship in this matter of certificates,” says the same very
intelligent author, in his History of the Poor Laws, “by putting it in the
power of a parish officer to imprison a man as it were for life, however
inconvenient it may be for him to continue at that place where he has had
the misfortune to acquire what is called a settlement, or whatever advantage
he may propose himself by living elsewhere.”
Though a certificate carries along with it no testimonial of good
behaviour, and certifies nothing but that the person belongs to the parish to
which he really does belong, it is altogether discretionary in the parish
officers either to grant or to refuse it. A mandamus was once moved for,
says Doctor Burn, to compel the church-wardens and overseers to sign a
certificate; but the Court of King’s Bench rejected the motion as a very
strange attempt.
The very unequal price of labour which we frequently find in England, in
places at no great distance from one another, is probably owing to the
obstruction which the law of settlements gives to a poor man who would
carry his industry from one parish to another without a certificate. A single
man, indeed who is healthy and industrious, may sometimes reside by
sufferance without one; but a man with a wife and family who should
attempt to do so, would, in most parishes, be sure of being removed; and, if
the single man should afterwards marry, he would generally be removed
likewise. The scarcity of hands in one parish, therefore, cannot always be
relieved by their superabundance in another, as it is constantly in Scotland,
and I believe, in all other countries where there is no difficulty of
settlement. In such countries, though wages may sometimes rise a little in
the neighbourhood of a great town, or wherever else there is an
extraordinary demand for labour, and sink gradually as the distance from
such places increases, till they fall back to the common rate of the country;
yet we never meet with those sudden and unaccountable differences in the
wages of neighbouring places which we sometimes find in England, where
it is often more difficult for a poor man to pass the artificial boundary of a
parish, than an arm of the sea, or a ridge of high mountains, natural
boundaries which sometimes separate very distinctly different rates of
wages in other countries.
To remove a man who has committed no misdemeanour, from the parish
where he chooses to reside, is an evident violation of natural liberty and
justice. The common people of England, however, so jealous of their
liberty, but like the common people of most other countries, never rightly
understanding wherein it consists, have now, for more than a century
together, suffered themselves to be exposed to this oppression without a
remedy. Though men of reflection, too, have sometimes complained of the
law of settlements as a public grievance; yet it has never been the object of
any general popular clamour, such as that against general warrants, an
abusive practice undoubtedly, but such a one as was not likely to occasion
any general oppression. There is scarce a poor man in England, of forty
years of age, I will venture to say, who has not, in some part of his life, felt
himself most cruelly oppressed by this ill-contrived law of settlements.
I shall conclude this long chapter with observing, that though anciently it
was usual to rate wages, first by general laws extending over the whole
kingdom, and afterwards by particular orders of the justices of peace in
every particular county, both these practices have now gone entirely into
disuse. “By the experience of above four hundred years,” says Doctor Burn,
“it seems time to lay aside all endeavours to bring under strict regulations,
what in its own nature seems incapable of minute limitation; for if all
persons in the same kind of work were to receive equal wages, there would
be no emulation, and no room left for industry or ingenuity.”
Particular acts of parliament, however, still attempt sometimes to regulate
wages in particular trades, and in particular places. Thus the 8th of George
III. prohibits, under heavy penalties, all master tailors in London, and five
miles round it, from giving, and their workmen from accepting, more than
two shillings and sevenpence halfpenny a-day, except in the case of a
general mourning. Whenever the legislature attempts to regulate the
differences between masters and their workmen, its counsellors are always
the masters. When the regulation, therefore, is in favour of the workmen, it
is always just and equitable; but it is sometimes otherwise when in favour
of the masters. Thus the law which obliges the masters in several different
trades to pay their workmen in money, and not in goods, is quite just and
equitable. It imposes no real hardship upon the masters. It only obliges
them to pay that value in money, which they pretended to pay, but did not
always really pay, in goods. This law is in favour of the workmen; but the
8th of George III. is in favour of the masters. When masters combine
together, in order to reduce the wages of their workmen, they commonly
enter into a private bond or agreement, not to give more than a certain
wage, under a certain penalty. Were the workmen to enter into a contrary
combination of the same kind, not to accept of a certain wage, under a
certain penalty, the law would punish them very severely; and, if it dealt
impartially, it would treat the masters in the same manner. But the 8th of
George III. enforces by law that very regulation which masters sometimes
attempt to establish by such combinations. The complaint of the workmen,
that it puts the ablest and most industrious upon the same footing with an
ordinary workman, seems perfectly well founded.
In ancient times, too, it was usual to attempt to regulate the profits of
merchants and other dealers, by regulating the price of provisions and ether
goods. The assize of bread is, so far as I know, the only remnant of this
ancient usage. Where there is an exclusive corporation, it may, perhaps, be
proper to regulate the price of the first necessary of life; but, where there is
none, the competition will regulate it much better than any assize. The
method of fixing the assize of bread, established by the 31st of George II.
could not be put in practice in Scotland, on account of a defect in the law,
its execution depending upon the office of clerk of the market, which does
not exist there. This defect was not remedied till the third of George III. The
want of an assize occasioned no sensible inconveniency; and the
establishment of one in the few places where it has yet taken place has
produced no sensible advantage. In the greater part of the towns in
Scotland, however, there is an incorporation of bakers, who claim exclusive
privileges, though they are not very strictly guarded. The proportion
between the different rates, both of wages and profit, in the different
employments of labour and stock, seems not to be much affected, as has
already been observed, by the riches or poverty, the advancing, stationary,
or declining state of the society. Such revolutions in the public welfare,
though they affect the general rates both of wages and profit, must, in the
end, affect them equally in all different employments. The proportion
between them, therefore, must remain the same, and cannot well be altered,
at least for any considerable time, by any such revolutions.
CHAPTER XI.
OF THE RENT OF LAND.
Rent, considered as the price paid for the use of land, is naturally the
highest which the tenant can afford to pay in the actual circumstances of the
land. In adjusting the terms of the lease, the landlord endeavours to leave
him no greater share of the produce than what is sufficient to keep up the
stock from which he furnishes the seed, pays the labour, and purchases and
maintains the cattle and other instruments of husbandry, together with the
ordinary profits of farming stock in the neighbourhood. This is evidently
the smallest share with which the tenant can content himself, without being
a loser, and the landlord seldom means to leave him any more. Whatever
part of the produce, or, what is the same thing, whatever part of its price, is
over and above this share, he naturally endeavours to reserve to himself as
the rent of his land, which is evidently the highest the tenant can afford to
pay in the actual circumstances of the land. Sometimes, indeed, the
liberality, more frequently the ignorance, of the landlord, makes him accept
of somewhat less than this portion; and sometimes, too, though more rarely,
the ignorance of the tenant makes him undertake to pay somewhat more, or
to content himself with somewhat less, than the ordinary profits of farming
stock in the neighbourhood. This portion, however, may still be considered
as the natural rent of land, or the rent at which it is naturally meant that land
should, for the most part, be let.
The rent of land, it may be thought, is frequently no more than a
reasonable profit or interest for the stock laid out by the landlord upon its
improvement. This, no doubt, may be partly the case upon some occasions;
for it can scarce ever be more than partly the case. The landlord demands a
rent even for unimproved land, and the supposed interest or profit upon the
expense of improvement is generally an addition to this original rent. Those
improvements, besides, are not always made by the stock of the landlord,
but sometimes by that of the tenant. When the lease comes to be renewed,
however, the landlord commonly demands the same augmentation of rent as
if they had been all made by his own.
He sometimes demands rent for what is altogether incapable of human
improvements. Kelp is a species of sea-weed, which, when burnt, yields an
alkaline salt, useful for making glass, soap, and for several other purposes.
It grows in several parts of Great Britain, particularly in Scotland, upon
such rocks only as lie within the high-water mark, which are twice every
day covered with the sea, and of which the produce, therefore, was never
augmented by human industry. The landlord, however, whose estate is
bounded by a kelp shore of this kind, demands a rent for it as much as for
his corn-fields.
The sea in the neighbourhood of the islands of Shetland is more than
commonly abundant in fish, which makes a great part of the subsistence of
their inhabitants. But, in order to profit by the produce of the water, they
must have a habitation upon the neighbouring land. The rent of the landlord
is in proportion, not to what the farmer can make by the land, but to what he
can make both by the land and the water. It is partly paid in sea-fish; and
one of the very few instances in which rent makes a part of the price of that
commodity, is to be found in that country.
The rent of land, therefore, considered as the price paid for the use of the
land, is naturally a monopoly price. It is not at all proportioned to what the
landlord may have laid out upon the improvement of the land, or to what he
can afford to take, but to what the farmer can afford to give.
Such parts only of the produce of land can commonly be brought to
market, of which the ordinary price is sufficient to replace the stock which
must be employed in bringing them thither, together with its ordinary
profits. If the ordinary price is more than this, the surplus part of it will
naturally go to the rent of the land. If it is not more, though the commodity
may be brought to market, it can afford no rent to the landlord. Whether the
price is, or is not more, depends upon the demand.
There are some parts of the produce of land, for which the demand must
always be such as to afford a greater price than what is sufficient to bring
them to market; and there are others for which it either may or may not be
such as to afford this greater price. The former must always afford a rent to
the landlord. The latter sometimes may and sometimes may not, according
to different circumstances.
Rent, it is to be observed, therefore, enters into the composition of the
price of commodities in a different way from wages and profit. High or low
wages and profit are the causes of high or low price; high or low rent is the
effect of it. It is because high or low wages and profit must be paid, in order
to bring a particular commodity to market, that its price is high or low. But
it is because its price is high or low, a great deal more, or very little more,
or no more, than what is sufficient to pay those wages and profit, that it
affords a high rent, or a low rent, or no rent at all.
The particular consideration, first, of those parts of the produce of land
which always afford some rent; secondly, of those which sometimes may
and sometimes may not afford rent; and, thirdly, of the variations which, in
the different periods of improvement, naturally take place in the relative
value of those two different sorts of rude produce, when compared both
with one another and with manufactured commodities, will divide this
chapter into three parts.
PART I.—Of the Produce of Land which always affords Rent.
As men, like all other animals, naturally multiply in proportion to the
means of their subsistence, food is always more or less in demand. It can
always purchase or command a greater or smaller quantity of labour, and
somebody can always be found who is willing to do something in order to
obtain it. The quantity of labour, indeed, which it can purchase, is not
always equal to what it could maintain, if managed in the most economical
manner, on account of the high wages which are sometimes given to labour;
but it can always purchase such a quantity of labour as it can maintain,
according to the rate at which that sort of labour is commonly maintained in
the neighbourhood.
But land, in almost any situation, produces a greater quantity of food than
what is sufficient to maintain all the labour necessary for bringing it to
market, in the most liberal way in which that labour is ever maintained. The
surplus, too, is always more than sufficient to replace the stock which
employed that labour, together with its profits. Something, therefore,
always remains for a rent to the landlord.
The most desert moors in Norway and Scotland produce some sort of
pasture for cattle, of which the milk and the increase are always more than
sufficient, not only to maintain all the labour necessary for tending them,
and to pay the ordinary profit to the farmer or the owner of the herd or
flock, but to afford some small rent to the landlord. The rent increases in
proportion to the goodness of the pasture. The same extent of ground not
only maintains a greater number of cattle, but as they are brought within a
smaller compass, less labour becomes requisite to tend them, and to collect
their produce. The landlord gains both ways; by the increase of the produce,
and by the diminution of the labour which must be maintained out of it.
The rent of land not only varies with its fertility, whatever be its produce,
but with its situation, whatever be its fertility. Land in the neighbourhood of
a town gives a greater rent than land equally fertile in a distant part of the
country. Though it may cost no more labour to cultivate the one than the
other, it must always cost more to bring the produce of the distant land to
market. A greater quantity of labour, therefore, must be maintained out of it;
and the surplus, from which are drawn both the profit of the farmer and the
rent of the landlord, must be diminished. But in remote parts of the country,
the rate of profit, as has already been shewn, is generally higher than in the
neighbourhood of a large town. A smaller proportion of this diminished
surplus, therefore, must belong to the landlord.
Good roads, canals, and navigable rivers, by diminishing the expense of
carriage, put the remote parts of the country more nearly upon a level with
those in the neighbourhood of the town. They are upon that account the
greatest of all improvements. They encourage the cultivation of the remote,
which must always be the most extensive circle of the country. They are
advantageous to the town by breaking down the monopoly of the country in
its neighbourhood. They are advantageous even to that part of the country.
Though they introduce some rival commodities into the old market, they
open many new markets to its produce. Monopoly, besides, is a great enemy
to good management, which can never be universally established, but in
consequence of that free and universal competition which forces every body
to have recourse to it for the sake of self defence. It is not more than fifty
years ago, that some of the counties in the neighbourhood of London
petitioned the parliament against the extension of the turnpike roads into the
remoter counties. Those remoter counties, they pretended, from the
cheapness of labour, would be able to sell their grass and corn cheaper in
the London market than themselves, and would thereby reduce their rents,
and ruin their cultivation. Their rents, however, have risen, and their
cultivation has been improved since that time.
A corn field of moderate fertility produces a much greater quantity of
food for man, than the best pasture of equal extent. Though its cultivation
requires much more labour, yet the surplus which remains after replacing
the seed and maintaining all that labour, is likewise much greater. If a pound
of butcher’s meat, therefore, was never supposed to be worth more than a
pound of bread, this greater surplus would everywhere be of greater value
and constitute a greater fund, both for the profit of the farmer and the rent
of the landlord. It seems to have done so universally in the rude beginnings
of agriculture.
But the relative values of those two different species of food, bread and
butcher’s meat, are very different in the different periods of agriculture. In
its rude beginnings, the unimproved wilds, which then occupy the far
greater part of the country, are all abandoned to cattle. There is more
butcher’s meat than bread; and bread, therefore, is the food for which there
is the greatest competition, and which consequently brings the greatest
price. At Buenos Ayres, we are told by Ulloa, four reals, one-and-twenty
pence halfpenny sterling, was, forty or fifty years ago, the ordinary price of
an ox, chosen from a herd of two or three hundred. He says nothing of the
price of bread, probably because he found nothing remarkable about it. An
ox there, he says, costs little more than the labour of catching him. But corn
can nowhere be raised without a great deal of labour; and in a country
which lies upon the river Plate, at that time the direct road from Europe to
the silver mines of Potosi, the money-price of labour could be very cheap. It
is otherwise when cultivation is extended over the greater part of the
country. There is then more bread than butcher’s meat. The competition
changes its direction, and the price of butcher’s meat becomes greater than
the price of bread.
By the extension, besides, of cultivation, the unimproved wilds become
insufficient to supply the demand for butcher’s meat. A great part of the
cultivated lands must be employed in rearing and fattening cattle; of which
the price, therefore, must be sufficient to pay, not only the labour necessary
for tending them, but the rent which the landlord, and the profit which the
farmer, could have drawn from such land employed in tillage. The cattle
bred upon the most uncultivated moors, when brought to the same market,
are, in proportion to their weight or goodness, sold at the same price as
those which are reared upon the most improved land. The proprietors of
those moors profit by it, and raise the rent of their land in proportion to the
price of their cattle. It is not more than a century ago, that in many parts of
the Highlands of Scotland, butcher’s meat was as cheap or cheaper than
even bread made of oatmeal. The Union opened the market of England to
the Highland cattle. Their ordinary price, at present, is about three times
greater than at the beginning of the century, and the rents of many Highland
estates have been tripled and quadrupled in the same time. In almost every
part of Great Britain, a pound of the best butcher’s meat is, in the present
times, generally worth more than two pounds of the best white bread; and in
plentiful years it is sometimes worth three or four pounds.
It is thus that, in the progress of improvement, the rent and profit of
unimproved pasture come to be regulated in some measure by the rent and
profit of what is improved, and these again by the rent and profit of corn.
Corn is an annual crop; butcher’s meat, a crop which requires four or five
years to grow. As an acre of land, therefore, will produce a much smaller
quantity of the one species of food than of the other, the inferiority of the
quantity must be compensated by the superiority of the price. If it was more
than compensated, more corn-land would be turned into pasture; and if it
was not compensated, part of what was in pasture would be brought back
into corn.
This equality, however, between the rent and profit of grass and those of
corn; of the land of which the immediate produce is food for cattle, and of
that of which the immediate produce is food for men, must be understood to
take place only through the greater part of the improved lands of a great
country. In some particular local situations it is quite otherwise, and the rent
and profit of grass are much superior to what can be made by corn.
Thus, in the neighbourhood of a great town, the demand for milk, and for
forage to horses, frequently contribute, together with the high price of
butcher’s meat, to raise the value of grass above what may be called its
natural proportion to that of corn. This local advantage, it is evident, cannot
be communicated to the lands at a distance.
Particular circumstances have sometimes rendered some countries so
populous, that the whole territory, like the lands in the neighbourhood of a
great town, has not been sufficient to produce both the grass and the corn
necessary for the subsistence of their inhabitants. Their lands, therefore,
have been principally employed in the production of grass, the more bulky
commodity, and which cannot be so easily brought from a great distance;
and corn, the food of the great body of the people, has been chiefly
imported from foreign countries. Holland is at present in this situation; and
a considerable part of ancient Italy seems to have been so during the
prosperity of the Romans. To feed well, old Cato said, as we are told by
Cicero, was the first and most profitable thing in the management of a
private estate; to feed tolerably well, the second; and to feed ill, the third.
To plough, he ranked only in the fourth place of profit and advantage.
Tillage, indeed, in that part of ancient Italy which lay in the neighbour hood
of Rome, must have been very much discouraged by the distributions of
corn which were frequently made to the people, either gratuitously, or at a
very low price. This corn was brought from the conquered provinces, of
which several, instead of taxes, were obliged to furnish a tenth part of their
produce at a stated price, about sixpence a-peck, to the republic. The low
price at which this corn was distributed to the people, must necessarily have
sunk the price of what could be brought to the Roman market from Latium,
or the ancient territory of Rome, and must have discouraged its cultivation
in that country.
In an open country, too, of which the principal produce is corn, a well-
inclosed piece of grass will frequently rent higher than any corn field in its
neighbourhood. It is convenient for the maintenance of the cattle employed
in the cultivation of the corn; and its high rent is, in this case, not so
properly paid from the value of its own produce, as from that of the corn
lands which are cultivated by means of it. It is likely to fall, if ever the
neighbouring lands are completely inclosed. The present high rent of
inclosed land in Scotland seems owing to the scarcity of inclosure, and will
probably last no longer than that scarcity. The advantage of inclosure is
greater for pasture than for corn. It saves the labour of guarding the cattle,
which feed better, too, when they are not liable to be disturbed by their
keeper or his dog.
But where there is no local advantage of this kind, the rent and profit of
corn, or whatever else is the common vegetable food of the people, must
naturally regulate upon the land which is fit for producing it, the rent and
profit of pasture.
The use of the artificial grasses, of turnips, carrots, cabbages, and the
other expedients which have been fallen upon to make an equal quantity of
land feed a greater number of cattle than when in natural grass, should
somewhat reduce, it might be expected, the superiority which, in an
improved country, the price of butcher’s meat naturally has over that of
bread. It seems accordingly to have done so; and there is some reason for
believing that, at least in the London market, the price of butcher’s meat, in
proportion to the price of bread, is a good deal lower in the present times
than it was in the beginning of the last century.
In the Appendix to the life of Prince Henry, Doctor Birch has given us an
account of the prices of butcher’s meat as commonly paid by that prince. It
is there said, that the four quarters of an ox, weighing six hundred pounds,
usually cost him nine pounds ten shillings, or thereabouts; that is thirty-one
shillings and eight-pence per hundred pounds weight. Prince Henry died on
the 6th of November 1612, in the nineteenth year of his age.
In March 1764, there was a parliamentary inquiry into the causes of the
high price of provisions at that time. It was then, among other proof to the
same purpose, given in evidence by a Virginia merchant, that in March
1763, he had victualled his ships for twentyfour or twenty-five shillings the
hundred weight of beef, which he considered as the ordinary price; whereas,
in that dear year, he had paid twenty-seven shillings for the same weight
and sort. This high price in 1764 is, however, four shillings and eight-pence
cheaper than the ordinary price paid by Prince Henry; and it is the best beef
only, it must be observed, which is fit to be salted for those distant voyages.
The price paid by Prince Henry amounts to 3d. 4/5ths per pound weight
of the whole carcase, coarse and choice pieces taken together; and at that
rate the choice pieces could not have been sold by retail for less than 4½d.
or 5d. the pound.
In the parliamentary inquiry in 1764, the witnesses stated the price of the
choice pieces of the best beef to be to the consumer 4d. and 4½d. the
pound; and the coarse pieces in general to be from seven farthings to 2½d.
and 2¾d.; and this, they said, was in general one halfpenny dearer than the
same sort of pieces had usually been sold in the month of March. But even
this high price is still a good deal cheaper than what we can well suppose
the ordinary retail price to have been in the time of Prince Henry.
During the first twelve years of the last century, the average price of the
best wheat at the Windsor market was £ 1:18:3½d. the quarter of nine
Winchester bushels.
But in the twelve years preceding 1764 including that year, the average
price of the same measure of the best wheat at the same market was £
2:1:9½d.
In the first twelve years of the last century, therefore, wheat appears to
have been a good deal cheaper, and butcher’s meat a good deal dearer, than
in the twelve years preceding 1764, including that year.
In all great countries, the greater part of the cultivated lands are
employed in producing either food for men or food for cattle. The rent and
profit of these regulate the rent and profit of all other cultivated land. If any
particular produce afforded less, the land would soon be turned into corn or
pasture; and if any afforded more, some part of the lands in corn or pasture
would soon be turned to that produce.
Those productions, indeed, which require either a greater original
expense of improvement, or a greater annual expense of cultivation in order
to fit the land for them, appear commonly to afford, the one a greater rent,
the other a greater profit, than corn or pasture. This superiority, however,
will seldom be found to amount to more than a reasonable interest or
compensation for this superior expense.
In a hop garden, a fruit garden, a kitchen garden, both the rent of the
landlord, and the profit of the farmer, are generally greater than in acorn or
grass field. But to bring the ground into this condition requires more
expense. Hence a greater rent becomes due to the landlord. It requires, too,
a more attentive and skilful management. Hence a greater profit becomes
due to the farmer. The crop, too, at least in the hop and fruit garden, is more
precarious. Its price, therefore, besides compensating all occasional losses,
must afford something like the profit of insurance. The circumstances of
gardeners, generally mean, and always moderate, may satisfy us that their
great ingenuity is not commonly over-recompensed. Their delightful art is
practised by so many rich people for amusement, that little advantage is to
be made by those who practise it for profit; because the persons who should
naturally be their best customers, supply themselves with all their most
precious productions.
The advantage which the landlord derives from such improvements,
seems at no time to have been greater than what was sufficient to
compensate the original expense of making them. In the ancient husbandry,
after the vineyard, a well-watered kitchen garden seems to have been the
part of the farm which was supposed to yield the most valuable produce.
But Democritus, who wrote upon husbandry about two thousand years ago,
and who was regarded by the ancients as one of the fathers of the art,
thought they did not act wisely who inclosed a kitchen garden. The profit,
he said, would not compensate the expense of a stone-wall: and bricks (he
meant, I suppose, bricks baked in the sun) mouldered with the rain and the
winter-storm, and required continual repairs. Columella, who reports this
judgment of Democritus, does not controvert it, but proposes a very frugal
method of inclosing with a hedge of brambles and briars, which he says he
had found by experience to be both a lasting and an impenetrable fence; but
which, it seems, was not commonly known in the time of Democritus.
Palladius adopts the opinion of Columella, which had before been
recommended by Varro. In the judgment of those ancient improvers, the
produce of a kitchen garden had, it seems, been little more than sufficient to
pay the extraordinary culture and the expense of watering; for in countries
so near the sun, it was thought proper, in those times as in the present, to
have the command of a stream of water, which could be conducted to every
bed in the garden. Through the greater part of Europe, a kitchen garden is
not at present supposed to deserve a better inclosure than that recommended
by Columella. In Great Britain, and some other northern countries, the finer
fruits cannot be brought to perfection but by the assistance of a wall. Their
price, therefore, in such countries, must be sufficient to pay the expense of
building and maintaining what they cannot be had without. The fruit-wall
frequently surrounds the kitchen garden, which thus enjoys the benefit of an
inclosure which its own produce could seldom pay for.
That the vineyard, when properly planted and brought to perfection, was
the most valuable part of the farm, seems to have been an undoubted maxim
in the ancient agriculture, as it is in the modern, through all the wine
countries. But whether it was advantageous to plant a new vineyard, was a
matter of dispute among the ancient Italian husbandmen, as we learn from
Columella. He decides, like a true lover of all curious cultivation, in favour
of the vineyard; and endeavours to shew, by a comparison of the profit and
expense, that it was a most advantageous improvement. Such comparisons,
however, between the profit and expense of new projects are commonly
very fallacious; and in nothing more so than in agriculture. Had the gain
actually made by such plantations been commonly as great as he imagined
it might have been, there could have been no dispute about it. The same
point is frequently at this day a matter of controversy in the wine countries.
Their writers on agriculture, indeed, the lovers and promoters of high
cultivation, seem generally disposed to decide with Columella in favour of
the vineyard. In France, the anxiety of the proprietors of the old vineyards
to prevent the planting of any new ones, seems to favour their opinion, and
to indicate a consciousness in those who must have the experience, that this
species of cultivation is at present in that country more profitable than any
other. It seems, at the same time, however, to indicate another opinion, that
this superior profit can last no longer than the laws which at present restrain
the free cultivation of the vine. In 1731, they obtained an order of council,
prohibiting both the planting of new vineyards, and the renewal of these old
ones, of which the cultivation had been interrupted for two years, without a
particular permission from the king, to be granted only in consequence of
an information from the intendant of the province, certifying that he had
examined the land, and that it was incapable of any other culture. The
pretence of this order was the scarcity of corn and pasture, and the
superabundance of wine. But had this superabundance been real, it would,
without any order of council, have effectually prevented the plantation of
new vineyards, by reducing the profits of this species of cultivation below
their natural proportion to those of corn and pasture. With regard to the
supposed scarcity of corn occasioned by the multiplication of vineyards,
corn is nowhere in France more carefully cultivated than in the wine
provinces, where the land is fit for producing it: as in Burgundy, Guienne,
and the Upper Languedoc. The numerous hands employed in the one
species of cultivation necessarily encourage the other, by affording a ready
market for its produce. To diminish the number of those who are capable of
paying it, is surely a most unpromising expedient for encouraging the
cultivation of corn. It is like the policy which would promote agriculture, by
discouraging manufactures.
The rent and profit of those productions, therefore, which require either a
greater original expense of improvement in order to fit the land for them, or
a greater annual expense of cultivation, though often much superior to those
of corn and pasture, yet when they do no more than compensate such
extraordinary expense, are in reality regulated by the rent and profit of those
common crops.
It sometimes happens, indeed, that the quantity of land which can be
fitted for some particular produce, is too small to supply the effectual
demand. The whole produce can be disposed of to those who are willing to
give somewhat more than what is sufficient to pay the whole rent, wages,
and profit, necessary for raising and bringing it to market, according to their
natural rates, or according to the rates at which they are paid in the greater
part of other cultivated land. The surplus part of the price which remains
after defraying the whole expense of improvement and cultivation, may
commonly, in this case, and in this case only, bear no regular proportion to
the like surplus in corn or pasture, but may exceed it in almost any degree;
and the greater part of this excess naturally goes to the rent of the landlord.
The usual and natural proportion, for example, between the rent and
profit of wine, and those of corn and pasture, must be understood to take
place only with regard to those vineyards which produce nothing but good
common wine, such as can be raised almost anywhere, upon any light,
gravelly, or sandy soil, and which has nothing to recommend it but its
strength and wholesomeness. It is with such vineyards only, that the
common land of the country can be brought into competition; for with those
of a peculiar quality it is evident that it cannot.
The vine is more affected by the difference of soils than any other fruit-
tree. From some it derives a flavour which no culture or management can
equal, it is supposed, upon any other. This flavour, real or imaginary, is
sometimes peculiar to the produce of a few vineyards; sometimes it extends
through the greater part of a small district, and sometimes through a
considerable part of a large province. The whole quantity of such wines that
is brought to market falls short of the effectual demand, or the demand of
those who would be willing to pay the whole rent, profit, and wages,
necessary for preparing and bringing them thither, according to the ordinary
rate, or according to the rate at which they are paid in common vineyards.
The whole quantity, therefore, can be disposed of to those who are willing
to pay more, which necessarily raises their price above that of common
wine. The difference is greater or less, according as the fashionableness and
scarcity of the wine render the competition of the buyers more or less eager.
Whatever it be, the greater part of it goes to the rent of the landlord. For
though such vineyards are in general more carefully cultivated than most
others, the high price of the wine seems to be, not so much the effect, as the
cause of this careful cultivation. In so valuable a produce, the loss
occasioned by negligence is so great, as to force even the most careless to
attention. A small part of this high price, therefore, is sufficient to pay the
wages of the extraordinary labour bestowed upon their cultivation, and the
profits of the extraordinary stock which puts that labour into motion.
The sugar colonies possessed by the European nations in the West Indies
may be compared to those precious vineyards. Their whole produce falls
short of the effectual demand of Europe, and can be disposed of to those
who are willing to give more than what is sufficient to pay the whole rent,
profit, and wages, necessary for preparing and bringing it to market,
according to the rate at which they are commonly paid by any other
produce. In Cochin China, the finest white sugar generally sells for three
piastres the quintal, about thirteen shillings and sixpence of our money, as
we are told by Mr Poivre {Voyages d’un Philosophe.}, a very careful
observer of the agriculture of that country. What is there called the quintal,
weighs from a hundred and fifty to two hundred Paris pounds, or a hundred
and seventy-five Paris pounds at a medium, which reduces the price of the
hundred weight English to about eight shillings sterling; not a fourth part of
what is commonly paid for the brown or muscovada sugars imported from
our colonies, and not a sixth part of what is paid for the finest white sugar.
The greater part of the cultivated lands in Cochin China are employed in
producing corn and rice, the food of the great body of the people. The
respective prices of corn, rice, and sugar, are there probably in the natural
proportion, or in that which naturally takes place in the different crops of
the greater part of cultivated land, and which recompenses the landlord and
farmer, as nearly as can be computed, according to what is usually the
original expense of improvement, and the annual expense of cultivation.
But in our sugar colonies, the price of sugar bears no such proportion to that
of the produce of a rice or corn field either in Europe or America. It is
commonly said that a sugar planter expects that the rum and the molasses
should defray the whole expense of his cultivation, and that his sugar
should be all clear profit. If this be true, for I pretend not to affirm it, it is as
if a corn farmer expected to defray the expense of his cultivation with the
chaff and the straw, and that the grain should be all clear profit. We see
frequently societies of merchants in London, and other trading towns,
purchase waste lands in our sugar colonies, which they expect to improve
and cultivate with profit, by means of factors and agents, notwithstanding
the great distance and the uncertain returns, from the defective
administration of justice in those countries. Nobody will attempt to improve
and cultivate in the same manner the most fertile lands of Scotland, Ireland,
or the corn provinces of North America, though, from the more exact
administration of justice in these countries, more regular returns might be
expected.
In Virginia and Maryland, the cultivation of tobacco is preferred, as most
profitable, to that of corn. Tobacco might be cultivated with advantage
through the greater part of Europe; but, in almost every part of Europe, it
has become a principal subject of taxation; and to collect a tax from every
different farm in the country where this plant might happen to be cultivated,
would be more difficult, it has been supposed, than to levy one upon its
importation at the custom-house. The cultivation of tobacco has, upon this
account, been most absurdly prohibited through the greater part of Europe,
which necessarily gives a sort of monopoly to the countries where it is
allowed; and as Virginia and Maryland produce the greatest quantity of it,
they share largely, though with some competitors, in the advantage of this
monopoly. The cultivation of tobacco, however, seems not to be so
advantageous as that of sugar. I have never even heard of any tobacco
plantation that was improved and cultivated by the capital of merchants
who resided in Great Britain; and our tobacco colonies send us home no
such wealthy planters as we see frequently arrive from our sugar islands.
Though, from the preference given in those colonies to the cultivation of
tobacco above that of corn, it would appear that the effectual demand of
Europe for tobacco is not completely supplied, it probably is more nearly so
than that for sugar; and though the present price of tobacco is probably
more than sufficient to pay the whole rent, wages, and profit, necessary for
preparing and bringing it to market, according to the rate at which they are
commonly paid in corn land, it must not be so much more as the present
price of sugar. Our tobacco planters, accordingly, have shewn the same fear
of the superabundance of tobacco, which the proprietors of the old
vineyards in France have of the superabundance of wine. By act of
assembly, they have restrained its cultivation to six thousand plants,
supposed to yield a thousand weight of tobacco, for every negro between
sixteen and sixty years of age. Such a negro, over and above this quantity of
tobacco, can manage, they reckon, four acres of Indian corn. To prevent the
market from being overstocked, too, they have sometimes, in plentiful
years, we are told by Dr Douglas {Douglas’s Summary, vol. ii. p. 379,
373.} (I suspect he has been ill informed), burnt a certain quantity of
tobacco for every negro, in the same manner as the Dutch are said to do of
spices. If such violent methods are necessary to keep up the present price of
tobacco, the superior advantage of its culture over that of corn, if it still has
any, will not probably be of long continuance.
It is in this manner that the rent of the cultivated land, of which the
produce is human food, regulates the rent of the greater part of other
cultivated land. No particular produce can long afford less, because the land
would immediately be turned to another use; and if any particular produce
commonly affords more, it is because the quantity of land which can be
fitted for it is too small to supply the effectual demand.
In Europe, corn is the principal produce of land, which serves
immediately for human food. Except in particular situations, therefore, the
rent of corn land regulates in Europe that of all other cultivated land. Britain
need envy neither the vineyards of France, nor the olive plantations of Italy.
Except in particular situations, the value of these is regulated by that of
corn, in which the fertility of Britain is not much inferior to that of either of
those two countries.
If, in any country, the common and favourite vegetable food of the
people should be drawn from a plant of which the most common land, with
the same, or nearly the same culture, produced a much greater quantity than
the most fertile does of corn; the rent of the landlord, or the surplus quantity
of food which would remain to him, after paying the labour, and replacing
the stock of the farmer, together with its ordinary profits, would necessarily
be much greater. Whatever was the rate at which labour was commonly
maintained in that country, this greater surplus could always maintain a
greater quantity of it, and, consequently, enable the landlord to purchase or
command a greater quantity of it. The real value of his rent, his real power
and authority, his command of the necessaries and conveniencies of life
with which the labour of other people could supply him, would necessarily
be much greater.
A rice field produces a much greater quantity of food than the most
fertile corn field. Two crops in the year, from thirty to sixty bushels each,
are said to be the ordinary produce of an acre. Though its cultivation,
therefore, requires more labour, a much greater surplus remains after
maintaining all that labour. In those rice countries, therefore, where rice is
the common and favourite vegetable food of the people, and where the
cultivators are chiefly maintained with it, a greater share of this greater
surplus should belong to the landlord than in corn countries. In Carolina,
where the planters, as in other British colonies, are generally both farmers
and landlords, and where rent, consequently, is confounded with profit, the
cultivation of rice is found to be more profitable than that of corn, though
their fields produce only one crop in the year, and though, from the
prevalence of the customs of Europe, rice is not there the common and
favourite vegetable food of the people.
A good rice field is a bog at all seasons, and at one season a bog covered
with water. It is unfit either for corn, or pasture, or vineyard, or, indeed, for
any other vegetable produce that is very useful to men; and the lands which
are fit for those purposes are not fit for rice. Even in the rice countries,
therefore, the rent of rice lands cannot regulate the rent of the other
cultivated land which can never be turned to that produce.
The food produced by a field of potatoes is not inferior in quantity to that
produced by a field of rice, and much superior to what is produced by a
field of wheat. Twelve thousand weight of potatoes from an acre of land is
not a greater produce than two thousand weight of wheat. The food or solid
nourishment, indeed, which can be drawn from each of those two plants, is
not altogether in proportion to their weight, on account of the watery nature
of potatoes. Allowing, however, half the weight of this root to go to water, a
very large allowance, such an acre of potatoes will still produce six
thousand weight of solid nourishment, three times the quantity produced by
the acre of wheat. An acre of potatoes is cultivated with less expense than
an acre of wheat; the fallow, which generally precedes the sowing of wheat,
more than compensating the hoeing and other extraordinary culture which
is always given to potatoes. Should this root ever become in any part of
Europe, like rice in some rice countries, the common and favourite
vegetable food of the people, so as to occupy the same proportion of the
lands in tillage, which wheat and other sorts of grain for human food do at
present, the same quantity of cultivated land would maintain a much greater
number of people; and the labourers being generally fed with potatoes, a
greater surplus would remain after replacing all the stock, and maintaining
all the labour employed in cultivation. A greater share of this surplus, too,
would belong to the landlord. Population would increase, and rents would
rise much beyond what they are at present.
The land which is fit for potatoes, is fit for almost every other useful
vegetable. If they occupied the same proportion of cultivated land which
corn does at present, they would regulate, in the same manner, the rent of
the greater part of other cultivated land.
In some parts of Lancashire, it is pretended, I have been told, that bread
of oatmeal is a heartier food for labouring people than wheaten bread, and I
have frequently heard the same doctrine held in Scotland. I am, however,
somewhat doubtful of the truth of it. The common people in Scotland, who
are fed with oatmeal, are in general neither so strong nor so handsome as
the same rank of people in England, who are fed with wheaten bread. They
neither work so well, nor look so well; and as there is not the same
difference between the people of fashion in the two countries, experience
would seem to shew, that the food of the common people in Scotland is not
so suitable to the human constitution as that of their neighbours of the same
rank in England. But it seems to be otherwise with potatoes. The chairmen,
porters, and coal-heavers in London, and those unfortunate women who live
by prostitution, the strongest men and the most beautiful women perhaps in
the British dominions, are said to be, the greater part of them, from the
lowest rank of people in Ireland, who are generally fed with this root. No
food can afford a more decisive proof of its nourishing quality, or of its
being peculiarly suitable to the health of the human constitution.
It is difficult to preserve potatoes through the year, and impossible to
store them like corn, for two or three years together. The fear of not being
able to sell them before they rot, discourages their cultivation, and is,
perhaps, the chief obstacle to their ever becoming in any great country, like
bread, the principal vegetable food of all the different ranks of the people.
PART II.—Of the Produce of Land, which sometimes does, and
sometimes does not, afford Rent.
Human food seems to be the only produce of land, which always and
necessarily affords some rent to the landlord. Other sorts of produce
sometimes may, and sometimes may not, according to different
circumstances.
After food, clothing and lodging are the two great wants of mankind.
Land, in its original rude state, can afford the materials of clothing and
lodging to a much greater number of people than it can feed. In its
improved state, it can sometimes feed a greater number of people than it
can supply with those materials; at least in the way in which they require
them, and are willing to pay for them. In the one state, therefore, there is
always a superabundance of these materials, which are frequently, upon that
account, of little or no value. In the other, there is often a scarcity, which
necessarily augments their value. In the one state, a great part of them is
thrown away as useless and the price of what is used is considered as equal
only to the labour and expense of fitting it for use, and can, therefore, afford
no rent to the landlord. In the other, they are all made use of, and there is
frequently a demand for more than can be had. Somebody is always willing
to give more for every part of them, than what is sufficient to pay the
expense of bringing them to market. Their price, therefore, can always
afford some rent to the landlord.
The skins of the larger animals were the original materials of clothing.
Among nations of hunters and shepherds, therefore, whose food consists
chiefly in the flesh of those animals, everyman, by providing himself with
food, provides himself with the materials of more clothing than he can
wear. If there was no foreign commerce, the greater part of them would be
thrown away as things of no value. This was probably the case among the
hunting nations of North America, before their country was discovered by
the Europeans, with whom they now exchange their surplus peltry, for
blankets, fire-arms, and brandy, which gives it some value. In the present
commercial state of the known world, the most barbarous nations, I believe,
among whom land property is established, have some foreign commerce of
this kind, and find among their wealthier neighbours such a demand for all
the materials of clothing, which their land produces, and which can neither
be wrought up nor consumed at home, as raises their price above what it
costs to send them to those wealthier neighbours. It affords, therefore, some
rent to the landlord. When the greater part of the Highland cattle were
consumed on their own hills, the exportation of their hides made the most
considerable article of the commerce of that country, and what they were
exchanged for afforded some addition to the rent of the Highland estates.
The wool of England, which in old times, could neither be consumed nor
wrought up at home, found a market in the then wealthier and more
industrious country of Flanders, and its price afforded something to the rent
of the land which produced it. In countries not better cultivated than
England was then, or than the Highlands of Scotland are now, and which
had no foreign commerce, the materials of clothing would evidently be so
superabundant, that a great part of them would be thrown away as useless,
and no part could afford any rent to the landlord.
The materials of lodging cannot always be transported to so great a
distance as those of clothing, and do not so readily become an object of
foreign commerce. When they are superabundant in the country which
produces them, it frequently happens, even in the present commercial state
of the world, that they are of no value to the landlord. A good stone quarry
in the neighbourhood of London would afford a considerable rent. In many
parts of Scotland and Wales it affords none. Barren timber for building is of
great value in a populous and well-cultivated country, and the land which
produces it affords a considerable rent. But in many parts of North America,
the landlord would be much obliged to any body who would carry away the
greater part of his large trees. In some parts of the Highlands of Scotland,
the bark is the only part of the wood which, for want of roads and water-
carriage, can be sent to market; the timber is left to rot upon the ground.
When the materials of lodging are so superabundant, the part made use of is
worth only the labour and expense of fitting it for that use. It affords no rent
to the landlord, who generally grants the use of it to whoever takes the
trouble of asking it. The demand of wealthier nations, however, sometimes
enables him to get a rent for it. The paving of the streets of London has
enabled the owners of some barren rocks on the coast of Scotland to draw a
rent from what never afforded any before. The woods of Norway, and of the
coasts of the Baltic, find a market in many parts of Great Britain, which
they could not find at home, and thereby afford some rent to their
proprietors.
Countries are populous, not in proportion to the number of people whom
their produce can clothe and lodge, but in proportion to that of those whom
it can feed. When food is provided, it is easy to find the necessary clothing
and lodging. But though these are at hand, it may often be difficult to find
food. In some parts of the British dominions, what is called a house may be
built by one day’s labour of one man. The simplest species of clothing, the
skins of animals, require somewhat more labour to dress and prepare them
for use. They do not, however, require a great deal. Among savage or
barbarous nations, a hundredth, or little more than a hundredth part of the
labour of the whole year, will be sufficient to provide them with such
clothing and lodging as satisfy the greater part of the people. All the other
ninety-nine parts are frequently no more than enough to provide them with
food.
But when, by the improvement and cultivation of land, the labour of one
family can provide food for two, the labour of half the society becomes
sufficient to provide food for the whole. The other half, therefore, or at least
the greater part of them, can be employed in providing other things, or in
satisfying the other wants and fancies of mankind. Clothing and lodging,
household furniture, and what is called equipage, are the principal objects
of the greater part of those wants and fancies. The rich man consumes no
more food than his poor neighbour. In quality it may be very different, and
to select and prepare it may require more labour and art; but in quantity it is
very nearly the same. But compare the spacious palace and great wardrobe
of the one, with the hovel and the few rags of the other, and you will be
sensible that the difference between their clothing, lodging, and household
furniture, is almost as great in quantity as it is in quality. The desire of food
is limited in every man by the narrow capacity of the human stomach; but
the desire of the conveniencies and ornaments of building, dress, equipage,
and household furniture, seems to have no limit or certain boundary. Those,
therefore, who have the command of more food than they themselves can
consume, are always willing to exchange the surplus, or, what is the same
thing, the price of it, for gratifications of this other kind. What is over and
above satisfying the limited desire, is given for the amusement of those
desires which cannot be satisfied, but seem to be altogether endless. The
poor, in order to obtain food, exert themselves to gratify those fancies of the
rich; and to obtain it more certainly, they vie with one another in the
cheapness and perfection of their work. The number of workmen increases
with the increasing quantity of food, or with the growing improvement and
cultivation of the lands; and as the nature of their business admits of the
utmost subdivisions of labour, the quantity of materials which they can
work up, increases in a much greater proportion than their numbers. Hence
arises a demand for every sort of material which human invention can
employ, either usefully or ornamentally, in building, dress, equipage, or
household furniture; for the fossils and minerals contained in the bowels of
the earth, the precious metals, and the precious stones.
Food is, in this manner, not only the original source of rent, but every
other part of the produce of land which afterwards affords rent, derives that
part of its value from the improvement of the powers of labour in producing
food, by means of the improvement and cultivation of land.
Those other parts of the produce of land, however, which afterwards
afford rent, do not afford it always. Even in improved and cultivated
countries, the demand for them is not always such as to afford a greater
price than what is sufficient to pay the labour, and replace, together with its
ordinary profits, the stock which must be employed in bringing them to
market. Whether it is or is not such, depends upon different circumstances.
Whether a coal mine, for example, can afford any rent, depends partly
upon its fertility, and partly upon its situation.
A mine of any kind may be said to be either fertile or barren, according
as the quantity of mineral which can be brought from it by a certain
quantity of labour, is greater or less than what can be brought by an equal
quantity from the greater part of other mines of the same kind.
Some coal mines, advantageously situated, cannot be wrought on account
of their barrenness. The produce does not pay the expense. They can afford
neither profit nor rent.
There are some, of which the produce is barely sufficient to pay the
labour, and replace, together with its ordinary profits, the stock employed in
working them. They afford some profit to the undertaker of the work, but
no rent to the landlord. They can be wrought advantageously by nobody but
the landlord, who, being himself the undertaker of the work, gets the
ordinary profit of the capital which he employs in it. Many coal mines in
Scotland are wrought in this manner, and can be wrought in no other. The
landlord will allow nobody else to work them without paying some rent,
and nobody can afford to pay any.
Other coal mines in the same country, sufficiently fertile, cannot be
wrought on account of their situation. A quantity of mineral, sufficient to
defray the expense of working, could be brought from the mine by the
ordinary, or even less than the ordinary quantity of labour: but in an inland
country, thinly inhabited, and without either good roads or water-carriage,
this quantity could not be sold.
Coals are a less agreeable fuel than wood: they are said too to be less
wholesome. The expense of coals, therefore, at the place where they are
consumed, must generally be somewhat less than that of wood.
The price of wood, again, varies with the state of agriculture, nearly in
the same manner, and exactly for the same reason, as the price of cattle. In
its rude beginnings, the greater part of every country is covered with wood,
which is then a mere incumbrance, of no value to the landlord, who would
gladly give it to any body for the cutting. As agriculture advances, the
woods are partly cleared by the progress of tillage, and partly go to decay in
consequence of the increased number of cattle. These, though they do not
increase in the same proportion as corn, which is altogether the acquisition
of human industry, yet multiply under the care and protection of men, who
store up in the season of plenty what may maintain them in that of scarcity;
who, through the whole year, furnish them with a greater quantity of food
than uncultivated nature provides for them; and who, by destroying and
extirpating their enemies, secure them in the free enjoyment of all that she
provides. Numerous herds of cattle, when allowed to wander through the
woods, though they do not destroy the old trees, hinder any young ones
from coming up; so that, in the course of a century or two, the whole forest
goes to ruin. The scarcity of wood then raises its price. It affords a good
rent; and the landlord sometimes finds that he can scarce employ his best
lands more advantageously than in growing barren timber, of which the
greatness of the profit often compensates the lateness of the returns. This
seems, in the present times, to be nearly the state of things in several parts
of Great Britain, where the profit of planting is found to be equal to that of
either corn or pasture. The advantage which the landlord derives from
planting can nowhere exceed, at least for any considerable time, the rent
which these could afford him; and in an inland country, which is highly
cultivated, it will frequently not fall much short of this rent. Upon the sea-
coast of a well-improved country, indeed, if coals can conveniently be had
for fuel, it may sometimes be cheaper to bring barren timber for building
from less cultivated foreign countries than to raise it at home. In the new
town of Edinburgh, built within these few years, there is not, perhaps, a
single stick of Scotch timber.
Whatever may be the price of wood, if that of coals is such that the
expense of a coal fire is nearly equal to that of a wood one we may be
assured, that at that place, and in these circumstances, the price of coals is
as high as it can be. It seems to be so in some of the inland parts of
England, particularly in Oxfordshire, where it is usual, even in the fires of
the common people, to mix coals and wood together, and where the
difference in the expense of those two sorts of fuel cannot, therefore, be
very great. Coals, in the coal countries, are everywhere much below this
highest price. If they were not, they could not bear the expense of a distant
carriage, either by land or by water. A small quantity only could be sold;
and the coal masters and the coal proprietors find it more for their interest
to sell a great quantity at a price somewhat above the lowest, than a small
quantity at the highest. The most fertile coal mine, too, regulates the price
of coals at all the other mines in its neighbourhood. Both the proprietor and
the undertaker of the work find, the one that he can get a greater rent, the
other that he can get a greater profit, by somewhat underselling all their
neighbours. Their neighbours are soon obliged to sell at the same price,
though they cannot so well afford it, and though it always diminishes, and
sometimes takes away altogether, both their rent and their profit. Some
works are abandoned altogether; others can afford no rent, and can be
wrought only by the proprietor.
The lowest price at which coals can be sold for any considerable time, is,
like that of all other commodities, the price which is barely sufficient to
replace, together with its ordinary profits, the stock which must be
employed in bringing them to market. At a coal mine for which the landlord
can get no rent, but, which he must either work himself or let it alone
altogether, the price of coals must generally be nearly about this price.
Rent, even where coals afford one, has generally a smaller share in their
price than in that of most other parts of the rude produce of land. The rent
of an estate above ground, commonly amounts to what is supposed to be a
third of the gross produce; and it is generally a rent certain and independent
of the occasional variations in the crop. In coal mines, a fifth of the gross
produce is a very great rent, a tenth the common rent; and it is seldom a rent
certain, but depends upon the occasional variations in the produce. These
are so great, that in a country where thirty years purchase is considered as a
moderate price for the property of a landed estate, ten years purchase is
regarded as a good price for that of a coal mine.
The value of a coal mine to the proprietor, frequently depends as much
upon its situation as upon its fertility. That of a metallic mine depends more
upon its fertility, and less upon its situation. The coarse, and still more the
precious metals, when separated from the ore, are so valuable, that they can
generally bear the expense of a very long land, and of the most distant sea
carriage. Their market is not confined to the countries in the neighbourhood
of the mine, but extends to the whole world. The copper of Japan makes an
article of commerce in Europe; the iron of Spain in that of Chili and Peru.
The silver of Peru finds its way, not only to Europe, but from Europe to
China.
The price of coals in Westmoreland or Shropshire can have little effect on
their price at Newcastle; and their price in the Lionnois can have none at all.
The productions of such distant coal mines can never be brought into
competition with one another. But the productions of the most distant
metallic mines frequently may, and in fact commonly are.
The price, therefore, of the coarse, and still more that of the precious
metals, at the most fertile mines in the world, must necessarily more or less
affect their price at every other in it. The price of copper in Japan must have
some influence upon its price at the copper mines in Europe. The price of
silver in Peru, or the quantity either of labour or of other goods which it will
purchase there, must have some influence on its price, not only at the silver
mines of Europe, but at those of China. After the discovery of the mines of
Peru, the silver mines of Europe were, the greater part of them, abandoned.
The value of silver was so much reduced, that their produce could no longer
pay the expense of working them, or replace, with a profit, the food,
clothes, lodging, and other necessaries which were consumed in that
operation. This was the case, too, with the mines of Cuba and St. Domingo,
and even with the ancient mines of Peru, after the discovery of those of
Potosi. The price of every metal, at every mine, therefore, being regulated
in some measure by its price at the most fertile mine in the world that is
actually wrought, it can, at the greater part of mines, do very little more
than pay the expense of working, and can seldom afford a very high rent to
the landlord. Rent accordingly, seems at the greater part of mines to have
but a small share in the price of the coarse, and a still smaller in that of the
precious metals. Labour and profit make up the greater part of both.
A sixth part of the gross produce may be reckoned the average rent of the
tin mines of Cornwall, the most fertile that are known in the world, as we
are told by the Rev. Mr. Borlace, vice-warden of the stannaries. Some, he
says, afford more, and some do not afford so much. A sixth part of the gross
produce is the rent, too, of several very fertile lead mines in Scotland.
In the silver mines of Peru, we are told by Frezier and Ulloa, the
proprietor frequently exacts no other acknowledgment from the undertaker
of the mine, but that he will grind the ore at his mill, paying him the
ordinary multure or price of grinding. Till 1736, indeed, the tax of the king
of Spain amounted to one fifth of the standard silver, which till then might
be considered as the real rent of the greater part of the silver mines of Peru,
the richest which have been known in the world. If there had been no tax,
this fifth would naturally have belonged to the landlord, and many mines
might have been wrought which could not then be wrought, because they
could not afford this tax. The tax of the duke of Cornwall upon tin is
supposed to amount to more than five per cent. or one twentieth part of the
value; and whatever may be his proportion, it would naturally, too, belong
to the proprietor of the mine, if tin was duty free. But if you add one
twentieth to one sixth, you will find that the whole average rent of the tin
mines of Cornwall, was to the whole average rent of the silver mines of
Peru, as thirteen to twelve. But the silver mines of Peru are not now able to
pay even this low rent; and the tax upon silver was, in 1736, reduced from
one fifth to one tenth. Even this tax upon silver, too, gives more temptation
to smuggling than the tax of one twentieth upon tin; and smuggling must be
much easier in the precious than in the bulky commodity. The tax of the
king of Spain, accordingly, is said to be very ill paid, and that of the duke of
Cornwall very well. Rent, therefore, it is probable, makes a greater part of
the price of tin at the most fertile tin mines than it does of silver at the most
fertile silver mines in the world. After replacing the stock employed in
working those different mines, together with its ordinary profits, the residue
which remains to the proprietor is greater, it seems, in the coarse, than in the
precious metal.
Neither are the profits of the undertakers of silver mines commonly very
great in Peru. The same most respectable and well-informed authors
acquaint us, that when any person undertakes to work a new mine in Peru,
he is universally looked upon as a man destined to bankruptcy and ruin, and
is upon that account shunned and avoided by every body. Mining, it seems,
is considered there in the same light as here, as a lottery, in which the prizes
do not compensate the blanks, though the greatness of some tempts many
adventurers to throw away their fortunes in such unprosperous projects.
As the sovereign, however, derives a considerable part of his revenue
from the produce of silver mines, the law in Peru gives every possible
encouragement to the discovery and working of new ones. Whoever
discovers a new mine, is entitled to measure off two hundred and forty-six
feet in length, according to what he supposes to be the direction of the vein,
and half as much in breadth. He becomes proprietor of this portion of the
mine, and can work it without paving any acknowledgment to the landlord.
The interest of the duke of Cornwall has given occasion to a regulation
nearly of the same kind in that ancient dutchy. In waste and uninclosed
lands, any person who discovers a tin mine may mark out its limits to a
certain extent, which is called bounding a mine. The bounder becomes the
real proprietor of the mine, and may either work it himself, or give it in
lease to another, without the consent of the owner of the land, to whom,
however, a very small acknowledgment must be paid upon working it. In
both regulations, the sacred rights of private property are sacrificed to the
supposed interests of public revenue.
The same encouragement is given in Peru to the discovery and working
of new gold mines; and in gold the king’s tax amounts only to a twentieth
part of the standard rental. It was once a fifth, and afterwards a tenth, as in
silver; but it was found that the work could not bear even the lowest of
these two taxes. If it is rare, however, say the same authors, Frezier and
Ulloa, to find a person who has made his fortune by a silver, it is still much
rarer to find one who has done so by a gold mine. This twentieth part seems
to be the whole rent which is paid by the greater part of the gold mines of
Chili and Peru. Gold, too, is much more liable to be smuggled than even
silver; not only on account of the superior value of the metal in proportion
to its bulk, but on account of the peculiar way in which nature produces it.
Silver is very seldom found virgin, but, like most other metals, is generally
mineralized with some other body, from which it is impossible to separate it
in such quantities as will pay for the expense, but by a very laborious and
tedious operation, which cannot well be carried on but in work-houses
erected for the purpose, and, therefore, exposed to the inspection of the
king’s officers. Gold, on the contrary, is almost always found virgin. It is
sometimes found in pieces of some bulk; and, even when mixed, in small
and almost insensible particles, with sand, earth, and other extraneous
bodies, it can be separated from them by a very short and simple operation,
which can be carried on in any private house by any body who is possessed
of a small quantity of mercury. If the king’s tax, therefore, is but ill paid
upon silver, it is likely to be much worse paid upon gold; and rent must
make a much smaller part of the price of gold than that of silver.
The lowest price at which the precious metals can be sold, or the smallest
quantity of other goods for which they can be exchanged, during any
considerable time, is regulated by the same principles which fix the lowest
ordinary price of all other goods. The stock which must commonly be
employed, the food, clothes, and lodging, which must commonly be
consumed in bringing them from the mine to the market, determine it. It
must at least be sufficient to replace that stock, with the ordinary profits.
Their highest price, however, seems not to be necessarily determined by
any thing but the actual scarcity or plenty of these metals themselves. It is
not determined by that of any other commodity, in the same manner as the
price of coals is by that of wood, beyond which no scarcity can ever raise it.
Increase the scarcity of gold to a certain degree, and the smallest bit of it
may become more precious than a diamond, and exchange for a greater
quantity of other goods.
The demand for those metals arises partly from their utility, and partly
from their beauty. If you except iron, they are more useful than, perhaps,
any other metal. As they are less liable to rust and impurity, they can more
easily be kept clean; and the utensils, either of the table or the kitchen, are
often, upon that account, more agreeable when made of them. A silver
boiler is more cleanly than a lead, copper, or tin one; and the same quality
would render a gold boiler still better than a silver one. Their principal
merit, however, arises from their beauty, which renders them peculiarly fit
for the ornaments of dress and furniture. No paint or dye can give so
splendid a colour as gilding. The merit of their beauty is greatly enhanced
by their scarcity. With the greater part of rich people, the chief enjoyment of
riches consists in the parade of riches; which, in their eye, is never so
complete as when they appear to possess those decisive marks of opulence
which nobody can possess but themselves. In their eyes, the merit of an
object, which is in any degree either useful or beautiful, is greatly enhanced
by its scarcity, or by the great labour which it requires to collect any
considerable quantity of it; a labour which nobody can afford to pay but
themselves. Such objects they are willing to purchase at a higher price than
things much more beautiful and useful, but more common. These qualities
of utility, beauty, and scarcity, are the original foundation of the high price
of those metals, or of the great quantity of other goods for which they can
everywhere be exchanged. This value was antecedent to, and independent
of their being employed as coin, and was the quality which fitted them for
that employment. That employment, however, by occasioning a new
demand, and by diminishing the quantity which could be employed in any
other way, may have afterwards contributed to keep up or increase their
value.
The demand for the precious stones arises altogether from their beauty.
They are of no use but as ornaments; and the merit of their beauty is greatly
enhanced by their scarcity, or by the difficulty and expense of getting them
from the mine. Wages and profit accordingly make up, upon most
occasions, almost the whole of the high price. Rent comes in but for a very
small share, frequently for no share; and the most fertile mines only afford
any considerable rent. When Tavernier, a jeweller, visited the diamond
mines of Golconda and Visiapour, he was informed that the sovereign of the
country, for whose benefit they were wrought, had ordered all of them to be
shut up except those which yielded the largest and finest stones. The other,
it seems, were to the proprietor not worth the working.
As the prices, both of the precious metals and of the precious stones, is
regulated all over the world by their price at the most fertile mine in it, the
rent which a mine of either can afford to its proprietor is in proportion, not
to its absolute, but to what may be called its relative fertility, or to its
superiority over other mines of the same kind. If new mines were
discovered, as much superior to those of Potosi, as they were superior to
those of Europe, the value of silver might be so much degraded as to render
even the mines of Potosi not worth the working. Before the discovery of the
Spanish West Indies, the most fertile mines in Europe may have afforded as
great a rent to their proprietors as the richest mines in Peru do at present.
Though the quantity of silver was much less, it might have exchanged for
an equal quantity of other goods, and the proprietor’s share might have
enabled him to purchase or command an equal quantity either of labour or
of commodities.
The value, both of the produce and of the rent, the real revenue which
they afforded, both to the public and to the proprietor, might have been the
same.
The most abundant mines, either of the precious metals, or of the
precious stones, could add little to the wealth of the world. A produce, of
which the value is principally derived from its scarcity, is necessarily
degraded by its abundance. A service of plate, and the other frivolous
ornaments of dress and furniture, could be purchased for a smaller quantity
of commodities; and in this would consist the sole advantage which the
world could derive from that abundance.
It is otherwise in estates above ground. The value, both of their produce
and of their rent, is in proportion to their absolute, and not to their relative
fertility. The land which produces a certain quantity of food, clothes, and
lodging, can always feed, clothe, and lodge, a certain number of people; and
whatever may be the proportion of the landlord, it will always give him a
proportionable command of the labour of those people, and of the
commodities with which that labour can supply him. The value of the most
barren land is not diminished by the neighbourhood of the most fertile. On
the contrary, it is generally increased by it. The great number of people
maintained by the fertile lands afford a market to many parts of the produce
of the barren, which they could never have found among those whom their
own produce could maintain.
Whatever increases the fertility of land in producing food, increases not
only the value of the lands upon which the improvement is bestowed, but
contributes likewise to increase that of many other lands, by creating a new
demand for their produce. That abundance of food, of which, in
consequence of the improvement of land, many people have the disposal
beyond what they themselves can consume, is the great cause of the
demand, both for the precious metals and the precious stones, as well as for
every other conveniency and ornament of dress, lodging, household
furniture, and equipage. Food not only constitutes the principal part of the
riches of the world, but it is the abundance of food which gives the principal
part of their value to many other sorts of riches. The poor inhabitants of
Cuba and St. Domingo, when they were first discovered by the Spaniards,
used to wear little bits of gold as ornaments in their hair and other parts of
their dress. They seemed to value them as we would do any little pebbles of
somewhat more than ordinary beauty, and to consider them as just worth the
picking up, but not worth the refusing to any body who asked them, They
gave them to their new guests at the first request, without seeming to think
that they had made them any very valuable present. They were astonished
to observe the rage of the Spaniards to obtain them; and had no notion that
there could anywhere be a country in which many people had the disposal
of so great a superfluity of food; so scanty always among themselves, that,
for a very small quantity of those glittering baubles, they would willingly
give as much as might maintain a whole family for many years. Could they
have been made to understand this, the passion of the Spaniards would not
have surprised them.
PART III.—Of the variations in the Proportion between the
respective Values of that sort of Produce which always affords
Rent, and of that which sometimes does, and sometimes does not,
afford Rent.
The increasing abundance of food, in consequence of the increasing
improvement and cultivation, must necessarily increase the demand for
every part of the produce of land which is not food, and which can be
applied either to use or to ornament. In the whole progress of improvement,
it might, therefore, be expected there should be only one variation in the
comparative values of those two different sorts of produce. The value of
that sort which sometimes does, and sometimes does not afford rent, should
constantly rise in proportion to that which always affords some rent. As art
and industry advance, the materials of clothing and lodging, the useful
fossils and materials of the earth, the precious metals and the precious
stones, should gradually come to be more and more in demand, should
gradually exchange for a greater and a greater quantity of food; or, in other
words, should gradually become dearer and dearer. This, accordingly, has
been the case with most of these things upon most occasions, and would
have been the case with all of them upon all occasions, if particular
accidents had not, upon some occasions, increased the supply of some of
them in a still greater proportion than the demand.
The value of a free-stone quarry, for example, will necessarily increase
with the increasing improvement and population of the country round about
it, especially if it should be the only one in the neighbourhood. But the
value of a silver mine, even though there should not be another within a
thousand miles of it, will not necessarily increase with the improvement of
the country in which it is situated. The market for the produce of a free-
stone quarry can seldom extend more than a few miles round about it, and
the demand must generally be in proportion to the improvement and
population of that small district; but the market for the produce of a silver
mine may extend over the whole known world. Unless the world in general,
therefore, be advancing in improvement and population, the demand for
silver might not be at all increased by the improvement even of a large
country in the neighbourhood of the mine. Even though the world in general
were improving, yet if, in the course of its improvements, new mines should
be discovered, much more fertile than any which had been known before,
though the demand for silver would necessarily increase, yet the supply
might increase in so much a greater proportion, that the real price of that
metal might gradually fall; that is, any given quantity, a pound weight of it,
for example, might gradually purchase or command a smaller and a smaller
quantity of labour, or exchange for a smaller and a smaller quantity of corn,
the principal part of the subsistence of the labourer.
The great market for silver is the commercial and civilized part of the
world.
If, by the general progress of improvement, the demand of this market
should increase, while, at the same time, the supply did not increase in the
same proportion, the value of silver would gradually rise in proportion to
that of corn. Any given quantity of silver would exchange for a greater and
a greater quantity of corn; or, in other words, the average money price of
corn would gradually become cheaper and cheaper.
If, on the contrary, the supply, by some accident, should increase, for
many years together, in a greater proportion than the demand, that metal
would gradually become cheaper and cheaper; or, in other words, the
average money price of corn would, in spite of all improvements, gradually
become dearer and dearer.
But if, on the other hand, the supply of that metal should increase nearly
in the same proportion as the demand, it would continue to purchase or
exchange for nearly the same quantity of corn; and the average money price
of corn would, in spite of all improvements. continue very nearly the same.
These three seem to exhaust all the possible combinations of events
which can happen in the progress of improvement; and during the course of
the four centuries preceding the present, if we may judge by what has
happened both in France and Great Britain, each of those three different
combinations seems to have taken place in the European market, and nearly
in the same order, too, in which I have here set them down.
Digression concerning the Variations in the value of Silver during the
Course of the Four last Centuries.
First Period.—In 1350, and for some time before, the average price of the
quarter of wheat in England seems not to have been estimated lower than
four ounces of silver, Tower weight, equal to about twenty shillings of our
present money. From this price it seems to have fallen gradually to two
ounces of silver, equal to about ten shillings of our present money, the price
at which we find it estimated in the beginning of the sixteenth century, and
at which it seems to have continued to be estimated till about 1570.
In 1350, being the 25th of Edward III. was enacted what is called the
Statute of Labourers. In the preamble, it complains much of the insolence of
servants, who endeavoured to raise their wages upon their masters. It
therefore ordains, that all servants and labourers should, for the future, be
contented with the same wages and liveries (liveries in those times signified
not only clothes, but provisions) which they had been accustomed to
receive in the 20th year of the king, and the four preceding years; that, upon
this account, their livery-wheat should nowhere be estimated higher than
tenpence a-bushel, and that it should always be in the option of the master
to deliver them either the wheat or the money. Tenpence: a-bushel,
therefore, had, in the 25th of Edward III. been reckoned a very moderate
price of wheat, since it required a particular statute to oblige servants to
accept of it in exchange for their usual livery of provisions; and it had been
reckoned a reasonable price ten years before that, or in the 16th year of the
king, the term to which the statute refers. But in the 16th year of Edward
III. tenpence contained about half an ounce of silver, Tower weight, and
was nearly equal to half-a-crown of our present money. Four ounces of
silver, Tower weight, therefore, equal to six shillings and eightpence of the
money of those times, and to near twenty shillings of that of the present,
must have been reckoned a moderate price for the quarter of eight bushels.
This statute is surely a better evidence of what was reckoned, in those
times, a moderate price of grain, than the prices of some particular years,
which have generally been recorded by historians and other writers, on
account of their extraordinary dearness or cheapness, and from which,
therefore, it is difficult to form any judgment concerning what may have
been the ordinary price. There are, besides, other reasons for believing that,
in the beginning of the fourteenth century, and for some time before, the
common price of wheat was not less than four ounces of silver the quarter,
and that of other grain in proportion.
In 1309, Ralph de Born, prior of St Augustine’s, Canterbury, gave a feast
upon his installation-day, of which William Thorn has preserved, not only
the bill of fare, but the prices of many particulars. In that feast were
consumed, 1st, fifty-three quarters of wheat, which cost nineteen pounds, or
seven shillings, and twopence a-quarter, equal to about one-and-twenty
shillings and sixpence of our present money; 2dly, fifty-eight quarters of
malt, which cost seventeen pounds ten shillings, or six shillings a-quarter,
equal to about eighteen shillings of our present money; 3dly, twenty
quarters of oats, which cost four pounds, or four shillings a-quarter, equal to
about twelve shillings of our present money. The prices of malt and oats
seem here to lie higher than their ordinary proportion to the price of wheat.
These prices are not recorded, on account of their extraordinary dearness
or cheapness, but are mentioned accidentally, as the prices actually paid for
large quantities of grain consumed at a feast, which was famous for its
magnificence.
In 1262, being the 51st of Henry III. was revived an ancient statute,
called the assize of bread and ale, which, the king says in the preamble, had
been made in the times of his progenitors, some time kings of England. It is
probably, therefore, as old at least as the time of his grandfather, Henry II.
and may have been as old as the Conquest. It regulates the price of bread
according as the prices of wheat may happen to be, from one shilling to
twenty shillings the quarter of the money of those times. But statutes of this
kind are generally presumed to provide with equal care for all deviations
from the middle price, for those below it, as well as for those above it. Ten
shillings, therefore, containing six ounces of silver, Tower weight, and
equal to about thirty shillings of our present money, must, upon this
supposition, have been reckoned the middle price of the quarter of wheat
when this statute was first enacted, and must have continued to be so in the
51st of Henry III. We cannot, therefore, be very wrong in supposing that the
middle price was not less than one-third of the highest price at which this
statute regulates the price of bread, or than six shillings and eightpence of
the money of those times, containing four ounces of silver, Tower weight.
From these different facts, therefore, we seem to have some reason to
conclude that, about the middle of the fourteenth century, and for a
considerable time before, the average or ordinary price of the quarter of
wheat was not supposed to be less than four ounces of silver, Tower weight.
From about the middle of the fourteenth to the beginning of the sixteenth
century, what was reckoned the reasonable and moderate, that is, the
ordinary or average price of wheat, seems to have sunk gradually to about
one half of this price; so as at last to have fallen to about two ounces of
silver, Tower weight, equal to about ten shillings of our present money. It
continued to be estimated at this price till about 1570.
In the household book of Henry, the fifth earl of Northumberland, drawn
up in 1512 there are two different estimations of wheat. In one of them it is
computed at six shilling and eightpence the quarter, in the other at five
shillings and eightpence only. In 1512, six shillings and eightpence
contained only two ounces of silver, Tower weight, and were equal to about
ten shillings of our present money.
From the 25th of Edward III. to the beginning of the reign of Elizabeth,
during the space of more than two hundred years, six shillings and
eightpence, it appears from several different statutes, had continued to be
considered as what is called the moderate and reasonable, that is, the
ordinary or average price of wheat. The quantity of silver, however,
contained in that nominal sum was, during the course of this period,
continually diminishing in consequence of some alterations which were
made in the coin. But the increase of the value of silver had, it seems, so far
compensated the diminution of the quantity of it contained in the same
nominal sum, that the legislature did not think it worth while to attend to
this circumstance.
Thus, in 1436, it was enacted, that wheat might be exported without a
licence when the price was so low as six shillings and eightpence: and in
1463, it was enacted, that no wheat should be imported if the price was not
above six shillings and eightpence the quarter: The legislature had
imagined, that when the price was so low, there could be no inconveniency
in exportation, but that when it rose higher, it became prudent to allow of
importation. Six shillings and eightpence, therefore, containing about the
same quantity of silver as thirteen shillings and fourpence of our present
money (one-third part less than the same nominal sum contained in the time
of Edward III), had, in those times, been considered as what is called the
moderate and reasonable price of wheat.
In 1554, by the 1st and 2nd of Philip and Mary, and in 1558, by the 1st of
Elizabeth, the exportation of wheat was in the same manner prohibited,
whenever the price of the quarter should exceed six shillings and
eightpence, which did not then contain two penny worth more silver than
the same nominal sum does at present. But it had soon been found, that to
restrain the exportation of wheat till the price was so very low, was, in
reality, to prohibit it altogether. In 1562, therefore, by the 5th of Elizabeth,
the exportation of wheat was allowed from certain ports, whenever the price
of the quarter should not exceed ten shillings, containing nearly the same
quantity of silver as the like nominal sum does at present. This price had at
this time, therefore, been considered as what is called the moderate and
reasonable price of wheat. It agrees nearly with the estimation of the
Northumberland book in 1512.
That in France the average price of grain was, in the same manner, much
lower in the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth century, than
in the two centuries preceding, has been observed both by Mr Dupré de St
Maur, and by the elegant author of the Essay on the Policy of Grain. Its
price, during the same period, had probably sunk in the same manner
through the greater part of Europe.
This rise in the value of silver, in proportion to that of corn, may either
have been owing altogether to the increase of the demand for that metal, in
consequence of increasing improvement and cultivation, the supply, in the
mean time, continuing the same as before; or, the demand continuing the
same as before, it may have been owing altogether to the gradual
diminution of the supply: the greater part of the mines which were then
known in the world being much exhausted, and, consequently, the expense
of working them much increased; or it may have been owing partly to the
one, and partly to the other of those two circumstances. In the end of the
fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth centuries, the greater part of Europe
was approaching towards a more settled form of government than it had
enjoyed for several ages before. The increase of security would naturally
increase industry and improvement; and the demand for the precious
metals, as well as for every other luxury and ornament, would naturally
increase with the increase of riches. A greater annual produce would require
a greater quantity of coin to circulate it; and a greater number of rich people
would require a greater quantity of plate and other ornaments of silver. It is
natural to suppose, too, that the greater part of the mines which then
supplied the European market with silver might be a good deal exhausted,
and have become more expensive in the working. They had been wrought,
many of them, from the time of the Romans.
It has been the opinion, however, of the greater part of those who have
written upon the prices of commodities in ancient times, that, from the
Conquest, perhaps from the invasion of Julius Caesar, till the discovery of
the mines of America, the value of silver was continually diminishing. This
opinion they seem to have been led into, partly by the observations which
they had occasion to make upon the prices both of corn and of some other
parts of the rude produce of land, and partly by the popular notion, that as
the quantity of silver naturally increases in every country with the increase
of wealth, so its value diminishes as it quantity increases.
In their observations upon the prices of corn, three different
circumstances seem frequently to have misled them.
First, in ancient times, almost all rents were paid in kind; in a certain
quantity of corn, cattle, poultry, etc. It sometimes happened, however, that
the landlord would stipulate, that he should be at liberty to demand of the
tenant, either the annual payment in kind or a certain sum of money instead
of it. The price at which the payment in kind was in this manner exchanged
for a certain sum of money, is in Scotland called the conversion price. As
the option is always in the landlord to take either the substance or the price,
it is necessary, for the safety of the tenant, that the conversion price should
rather be below than above the average market price. In many places,
accordingly, it is not much above one half of this price. Through the greater
part of Scotland this custom still continues with regard to poultry, and in
some places with regard to cattle. It might probably have continued to take
place, too, with regard to corn, had not the institution of the public fiars put
an end to it. These are annual valuations, according to the judgment of an
assize, of the average price of all the different sorts of grain, and of all the
different qualities of each, according to the actual market price in every
different county. This institution rendered it sufficiently safe for the tenant,
and much more convenient for the landlord, to convert, as they call it, the
corn rent, rather at what should happen to be the price of the fiars of each
year, than at any certain fixed price. But the writers who have collected the
prices of corn in ancient times seem frequently to have mistaken what is
called in Scotland the conversion price for the actual market price.
Fleetwood acknowledges, upon one occasion, that he had made this
mistake. As he wrote his book, however, for a particular purpose, he does
not think proper to make this acknowledgment till after transcribing this
conversion price fifteen times. The price is eight shillings the quarter of
wheat. This sum in 1423, the year at which he begins with it, contained the
same quantity of silver as sixteen shillings of our present money. But in
1562, the year at which he ends with it, it contained no more than the same
nominal sum does at present.
Secondly, they have been misled by the slovenly manner in which some
ancient statutes of assize had been sometimes transcribed by lazy copiers,
and sometimes, perhaps, actually composed by the legislature.
The ancient statutes of assize seem to have begun always with
determining what ought to be the price of bread and ale when the price of
wheat and barley were at the lowest; and to have proceeded gradually to
determine what it ought to be, according as the prices of those two sorts of
grain should gradually rise above this lowest price. But the transcribers of
those statutes seem frequently to have thought it sufficient to copy the
regulation as far as the three or four first and lowest prices; saving in this
manner their own labour, and judging, I suppose, that this was enough to
show what proportion ought to be observed in all higher prices.
Thus, in the assize of bread and ale, of the 51st of Henry III. the price of
bread was regulated according to the different prices of wheat, from one
shilling to twenty shillings the quarter of the money of those times. But in
the manuscripts from which all the different editions of the statutes,
preceding that of Mr Ruffhead, were printed, the copiers had never
transcribed this regulation beyond the price of twelve shillings. Several
writers, therefore, being misled by this faulty transcription, very naturally
conclude that the middle price, or six shillings the quarter, equal to about
eighteen shillings of our present money, was the ordinary or average price
of wheat at that time.
In the statute of Tumbrel and Pillory, enacted nearly about the same time,
the price of ale is regulated according to every sixpence rise in the price of
barley, from two shillings, to four shillings the quarter. That four shillings,
however, was not considered as the highest price to which barley might
frequently rise in those times, and that these prices were only given as an
example of the proportion which ought to be observed in all other prices,
whether higher or lower, we may infer from the last words of the statute:
“Et sic deinceps crescetur vel diminuetur per sex denarios.” The expression
is very slovenly, but the meaning is plain enough, “that the price of ale is in
this manner to be increased or diminished according to every sixpence rise
or fall in the price of barley.” In the composition of this statute, the
legislature itself seems to have been as negligent as the copiers were in the
transcription of the other.
In an ancient manuscript of the Regiam Majestatem, an old Scotch law
book, there is a statute of assize, in which the price of bread is regulated
according to all the different prices of wheat, from tenpence to three
shillings the Scotch boll, equal to about half an English quarter. Three
shillings Scotch, at the time when this assize is supposed to have been
enacted, were equal to about nine shillings sterling of our present money.
Mr Ruddiman seems {See his Preface to Anderson’s Diplomata Scotiae.} to
conclude from this, that three shillings was the highest price to which wheat
ever rose in those times, and that tenpence, a shilling, or at most two
shillings, were the ordinary prices. Upon consulting the manuscript,
however, it appears evidently, that all these prices are only set down as
examples of the proportion which ought to be observed between the
respective prices of wheat and bread. The last words of the statute are
“reliqua judicabis secundum praescripta, habendo respectum ad pretium
bladi.”—“You shall judge of the remaining cases, according to what is
above written, having respect to the price of corn.”
Thirdly, they seem to have been misled too, by the very low price at
which wheat was sometimes sold in very ancient times; and to have
imagined, that as its lowest price was then much lower than in later times its
ordinary price must likewise have been much lower. They might have
found, however, that in those ancient times its highest price was fully as
much above, as its lowest price was below any thing that had ever been
known in later times. Thus, in 1270, Fleetwood gives us two prices of the
quarter of wheat. The one is four pounds sixteen shillings of the money of
those times, equal to fourteen pounds eight shillings of that of the present;
the other is six pounds eight shillings, equal to nineteen pounds four
shillings of our present money. No price can be found in the end of the
fifteenth, or beginning of the sixteenth century, which approaches to the
extravagance of these. The price of corn, though at all times liable to
variation varies most in those turbulent and disorderly societies, in which
the interruption of all commerce and communication hinders the plenty of
one part of the country from relieving the scarcity of another. In the
disorderly state of England under the Plantagenets, who governed it from
about the middle of the twelfth till towards the end of the fifteenth century,
one district might be in plenty, while another, at no great distance, by
having its crop destroyed, either by some accident of the seasons, or by the
incursion of some neighbouring baron, might be suffering all the horrors of
a famine; and yet if the lands of some hostile lord were interposed between
them, the one might not be able to give the least assistance to the other.
Under the vigorous administration of the Tudors, who governed England
during the latter part of the fifteenth, and through the whole of the sixteenth
century, no baron was powerful enough to dare to disturb the public
security.
The reader will find at the end of this chapter all the prices of wheat
which have been collected by Fleetwood, from 1202 to 1597, both
inclusive, reduced to the money of the present times, and digested,
according to the order of time, into seven divisions of twelve years each. At
the end of each division, too, he will find the average price of the twelve
years of which it consists. In that long period of time, Fleetwood has been
able to collect the prices of no more than eighty years; so that four years are
wanting to make out the last twelve years. I have added, therefore, from the
accounts of Eton college, the prices of 1598, 1599, 1600, and 1601. It is the
only addition which I have made. The reader will see, that from the
beginning of the thirteenth till after the middle of the sixteenth century, the
average price of each twelve years grows gradually lower and lower; and
that towards the end of the sixteenth century it begins to rise again. The
prices, indeed, which Fleetwood has been able to collect, seem to have been
those chiefly which were remarkable for extraordinary dearness or
cheapness; and I do not pretend that any very certain conclusion can be
drawn from them. So far, however, as they prove any thing at all, they
confirm the account which I have been endeavouring to give. Fleetwood
himself, however, seems, with most other writers, to have believed, that,
during all this period, the value of silver, in consequence of its increasing
abundance, was continually diminishing. The prices of corn, which he
himself has collected, certainly do not agree with this opinion. They agree
perfectly with that of Mr Dupré de St Maur, and with that which I have
been endeavouring to explain. Bishop Fleetwood and Mr Dupré de St Maur
are the two authors who seem to have collected, with the greatest diligence
and fidelity, the prices of things in ancient times. It is somewhat curious
that, though their opinions are so very different, their facts, so far as they
relate to the price of corn at least, should coincide so very exactly.
It is not, however, so much from the low price of corn, as from that of
some other parts of the rude produce of land, that the most judicious writers
have inferred the great value of silver in those very ancient times. Corn, it
has been said, being a sort of manufacture, was, in those rude ages, much
dearer in proportion than the greater part of other commodities; it is meant,
I suppose, than the greater part of unmanufactured commodities, such as
cattle, poultry, game of all kinds, etc. That in those times of poverty and
barbarism these were proportionably much cheaper than corn, is
undoubtedly true. But this cheapness was not the effect of the high value of
silver, but of the low value of those commodities. It was not because silver
would in such times purchase or represent a greater quantity of labour, but
because such commodities would purchase or represent a much smaller
quantity than in times of more opulence and improvement. Silver must
certainly be cheaper in Spanish America than in Europe; in the country
where it is produced, than in the country to which it is brought, at the
expense of a long carriage both by land and by sea, of a freight, and an
insurance. One-and-twenty pence halfpenny sterling, however, we are told
by Ulloa, was, not many years ago, at Buenos Ayres, the price of an ox
chosen from a herd of three or four hundred. Sixteen shillings sterling, we
are told by Mr Byron, was the price of a good horse in the capital of Chili.
In a country naturally fertile, but of which the far greater part is altogether
uncultivated, cattle, poultry, game of all kinds, etc. as they can be acquired
with a very small quantity of labour, so they will purchase or command but
a very small quantity. The low money price for which they may be sold, is
no proof that the real value of silver is there very high, but that the real
value of those commodities is very low.
Labour, it must always be remembered, and not any particular
commodity, or set of commodities, is the real measure of the value both of
silver and of all other commodities.
But in countries almost waste, or but thinly inhabited, cattle, poultry,
game of all kinds, etc. as they are the spontaneous productions of Nature, so
she frequently produces them in much greater quantities than the
consumption of the inhabitants requires. In such a state of things, the supply
commonly exceeds the demand. In different states of society, in different
states of improvement, therefore, such commodities will represent, or be
equivalent, to very different quantities of labour.
In every state of society, in every stage of improvement, corn is the
production of human industry. But the average produce of every sort of
industry is always suited, more or less exactly, to the average consumption;
the average supply to the average demand. In every different stage of
improvement, besides, the raising of equal quantities of corn in the same
soil and climate, will, at an average, require nearly equal quantities of
labour; or, what comes to the same thing, the price of nearly equal
quantities; the continual increase of the productive powers of labour, in an
improved state of cultivation, being more or less counterbalanced by the
continual increasing price of cattle, the principal instruments of agriculture.
Upon all these accounts, therefore, we may rest assured, that equal
quantities of corn will, in every state of society, in every stage of
improvement, more nearly represent, or be equivalent to, equal quantities of
labour, than equal quantities of any other part of the rude produce of land.
Corn, accordingly, it has already been observed, is, in all the different stages
of wealth and improvement, a more accurate measure of value than any
other commodity or set of commodities. In all those different stages,
therefore, we can judge better of the real value of silver, by comparing it
with corn, than by comparing it with any other commodity or set of
commodities.
Corn, besides, or whatever else is the common and favourite vegetable
food of the people, constitutes, in every civilized country, the principal part
of the subsistence of the labourer. In consequence of the extension of
agriculture, the land of every country produces a much greater quantity of
vegetable than of animal food, and the labourer everywhere lives chiefly
upon the wholesome food that is cheapest and most abundant. Butcher’s
meat, except in the most thriving countries, or where labour is most highly
rewarded, makes but an insignificant part of his subsistence; poultry makes
a still smaller part of it, and game no part of it. In France, and even in
Scotland, where labour is somewhat better rewarded than in France, the
labouring poor seldom eat butcher’s meat, except upon holidays, and other
extraordinary occasions. The money price of labour, therefore, depends
much more upon the average money price of corn, the subsistence of the
labourer, than upon that of butcher’s meat, or of any other part of the rude
produce of land. The real value of gold and silver, therefore, the real
quantity of labour which they can purchase or command, depends much
more upon the quantity of corn which they can purchase or command, than
upon that of butcher’s meat, or any other part of the rude produce of land.
Such slight observations, however, upon the prices either of corn or of
other commodities, would not probably have misled so many intelligent
authors, had they not been influenced at the same time by the popular
notion, that as the quantity of silver naturally increases in every country
with the increase of wealth, so its value diminishes as its quantity increases.
This notion, however, seems to be altogether groundless.
The quantity of the precious metals may increase in any country from
two different causes; either, first, from the increased abundance of the
mines which supply it; or, secondly, from the increased wealth of the
people, from the increased produce of their annual labour. The first of these
causes is no doubt necessarily connected with the diminution of the value of
the precious metals; but the second is not.
When more abundant mines are discovered, a greater quantity of the
precious metals is brought to market; and the quantity of the necessaries
and conveniencies of life for which they must be exchanged being the same
as before, equal quantities of the metals must be exchanged for smaller
quantities of commodities. So far, therefore, as the increase of the quantity
of the precious metals in any country arises from the increased abundance
of the mines, it is necessarily connected with some diminution of their
value.
When, on the contrary, the wealth of any country increases, when the
annual produce of its labour becomes gradually greater and greater, a
greater quantity of coin becomes necessary in order to circulate a greater
quantity of commodities: and the people, as they can afford it, as they have
more commodities to give for it, will naturally purchase a greater and a
greater quantity of plate. The quantity of their coin will increase from
necessity; the quantity of their plate from vanity and ostentation, or from
the same reason that the quantity of fine statues, pictures, and of every other
luxury and curiosity, is likely to increase among them. But as statuaries and
painters are not likely to be worse rewarded in times of wealth and
prosperity, than in times of poverty and depression, so gold and silver are
not likely to be worse paid for.
The price of gold and silver, when the accidental discovery of more
abundant mines does not keep it down, as it naturally rises with the wealth
of every country, so, whatever be the state of the mines, it is at all times
naturally higher in a rich than in a poor country. Gold and silver, like all
other commodities, naturally seek the market where the best price is given
for them, and the best price is commonly given for every thing in the
country which can best afford it. Labour, it must be remembered, is the
ultimate price which is paid for every thing; and in countries where labour
is equally well rewarded, the money price of labour will be in proportion to
that of the subsistence of the labourer. But gold and silver will naturally
exchange for a greater quantity of subsistence in a rich than in a poor
country; in a country which abounds with subsistence, than in one which is
but indifferently supplied with it. If the two countries are at a great distance,
the difference may be very great; because, though the metals naturally fly
from the worse to the better market, yet it may be difficult to transport them
in such quantities as to bring their price nearly to a level in both. If the
countries are near, the difference will be smaller, and may sometimes be
scarce perceptible; because in this case the transportation will be easy.
China is a much richer country than any part of Europe, and the difference
between the price of subsistence in China and in Europe is very great. Rice
in China is much cheaper than wheat is any where in Europe. England is a
much richer country than Scotland, but the difference between the money
price of corn in those two countries is much smaller, and is but just
perceptible. In proportion to the quantity or measure, Scotch corn generally
appears to be a good deal cheaper than English; but, in proportion to its
quality, it is certainly somewhat dearer. Scotland receives almost every year
very large supplies from England, and every commodity must commonly be
somewhat dearer in the country to which it is brought than in that from
which it comes. English corn, therefore, must be dearer in Scotland than in
England; and yet in proportion to its quality, or to the quantity and goodness
of the flour or meal which can be made from it, it cannot commonly be sold
higher there than the Scotch corn which comes to market in competition
with it.
The difference between the money price of labour in China and in
Europe, is still greater than that between the money price of subsistence;
because the real recompence of labour is higher in Europe than in China,
the greater part of Europe being in an improving state, while China seems
to be standing still. The money price of labour is lower in Scotland than in
England, because the real recompence of labour is much lower: Scotland,
though advancing to greater wealth, advances much more slowly than
England. The frequency of emigration from Scotland, and the rarity of it
from England, sufficiently prove that the demand for labour is very
different in the two countries. The proportion between the real recompence
of labour in different countries, it must be remembered, is naturally
regulated, not by their actual wealth or poverty, but by their advancing,
stationary, or declining condition.
Gold and silver, as they are naturally of the greatest value among the
richest, so they are naturally of the least value among the poorest nations.
Among savages, the poorest of all nations, they are scarce of any value.
In great towns, corn is always dearer than in remote parts of the country.
This, however, is the effect, not of the real cheapness of silver, but of the
real dearness of corn. It does not cost less labour to bring silver to the great
town than to the remote parts of the country; but it costs a great deal more
to bring corn.
In some very rich and commercial countries, such as Holland and the
territory of Genoa, corn is dear for the same reason that it is dear in great
towns. They do not produce enough to maintain their inhabitants. They are
rich in the industry and skill of their artificers and manufacturers, in every
sort of machinery which can facilitate and abridge labour; in shipping, and
in all the other instruments and means of carriage and commerce: but they
are poor in corn, which, as it must be brought to them from distant
countries, must, by an addition to its price, pay for the carriage from those
countries. It does not cost less labour to bring silver to Amsterdam than to
Dantzic; but it costs a great deal more to bring corn. The real cost of silver
must be nearly the same in both places; but that of corn must be very
different. Diminish the real opulence either of Holland or of the territory of
Genoa, while the number of their inhabitants remains the same; diminish
their power of supplying themselves from distant countries; and the price of
corn, instead of sinking with that diminution in the quantity of their silver,
which must necessarily accompany this declension, either as its cause or as
its effect, will rise to the price of a famine. When we are in want of
necessaries, we must part with all superfluities, of which the value, as it
rises in times of opulence and prosperity, so it sinks in times of poverty and
distress. It is otherwise with necessaries. Their real price, the quantity of
labour which they can purchase or command, rises in times of poverty and
distress, and sinks in times of opulence and prosperity, which are always
times of great abundance; for they could not otherwise be times of opulence
and prosperity. Corn is a necessary, silver is only a superfluity.
Whatever, therefore, may have been the increase in the quantity of the
precious metals, which, during the period between the middle of the
fourteenth and that of the sixteenth century, arose from the increase of
wealth and improvement, it could have no tendency to diminish their value,
either in Great Britain, or in my other part of Europe. If those who have
collected the prices of things in ancient times, therefore, had, during this
period, no reason to infer the diminution of the value of silver from any
observations which they had made upon the prices either of corn, or of
other commodities, they had still less reason to infer it from any supposed
increase of wealth and improvement.
Second Period.—But how various soever may have been the opinions of
the learned concerning the progress of the value of silver during the first
period, they are unanimous concerning it during the second.
From about 1570 to about 1640, during a period of about seventy years,
the variation in the proportion between the value of silver and that of corn
held a quite opposite course. Silver sunk in its real value, or would
exchange for a smaller quantity of labour than before; and corn rose in its
nominal price, and, instead of being commonly sold for about two ounces
of silver the quarter, or about ten shillings of our present money, came to be
sold for six and eight ounces of silver the quarter, or about thirty and forty
shillings of our present money.
The discovery of the abundant mines of America seems to have been the
sole cause of this diminution in the value of silver, in proportion to that of
corn. It is accounted for, accordingly, in the same manner by every body;
and there never has been any dispute, either about the fact, or about the
cause of it. The greater part of Europe was, during this period, advancing in
industry and improvement, and the demand for silver must consequently
have been increasing; but the increase of the supply had, it seems, so far
exceeded that of the demand, that the value of that metal sunk considerably.
The discovery of the mines of America, it is to be observed, does not seem
to have had any very sensible effect upon the prices of things in England till
after 1570; though even the mines of Potosi had been discovered more than
twenty years before.
From 1595 to 1620, both inclusive, the average price of the quarter of
nine bushels of the best wheat, at Windsor market, appears, from the
accounts of Eton college, to have been £ 2:1:6 9/13. From which sum,
neglecting the fraction, and deducting a ninth, or 4s. 7 1/3d., the price of the
quarter of eight bushels comes out to have been £ 1:16:10 2/3. And from
this sum, neglecting likewise the fraction, and deducting a ninth, or 4s. 1
1/9d., for the difference between the price of the best wheat and that of the
middle wheat, the price of the middle wheat comes out to have been about £
1:12:8 8/9, or about six ounces and one-third of an ounce of silver.
From 1621 to 1636, both inclusive, the average price of the same
measure of the best wheat, at the same market, appears, from the same
accounts, to have been £ 2:10s.; from which, making the like deductions as
in the foregoing case, the average price of the quarter of eight bushels of
middle wheat comes out to have been £ 1:19:6, or about seven ounces and
two-thirds of an ounce of silver.
Third Period.—Between 1630 and 1640, or about 1636, the effect of the
discovery of the mines of America, in reducing the value of silver, appears
to have been completed, and the value of that metal seems never to have
sunk lower in proportion to that of corn than it was about that time. It seems
to have risen somewhat in the course of the present century, and it had
probably begun to do so, even some time before the end of the last.
From 1637 to 1700, both inclusive, being the sixty-four last years of the
last century the average price of the quarter of nine bushels of the best
wheat, at Windsor market, appears, from the same accounts, to have been £
2:11:0 1/3, which is only 1s. 0 1/3d. dearer than it had been during the
sixteen years before. But, in the course of these sixty-four years, there
happened two events, which must have produced a much greater scarcity of
corn than what the course of the seasons would otherwise have occasioned,
and which, therefore, without supposing any further reduction in the value
of silver, will much more than account for this very small enhancement of
price.
The first of these events was the civil war, which, by discouraging tillage
and interrupting commerce, must have raised the price of corn much above
what the course of the seasons would otherwise have occasioned. It must
have had this effect, more or less, at all the different markets in the
kingdom, but particularly at those in the neighbourhood of London, which
require to be supplied from the greatest distance. In 1648, accordingly, the
price of the best wheat, at Windsor market, appears, from the same
accounts, to have been £ 4:5s., and, in 1649, to have been £ 4, the quarter of
nine bushels. The excess of those two years above £ 2:10s. (the average
price of the sixteen years preceding 1637) is £ 3:5s., which, divided among
the sixty four last years of the last century, will alone very nearly account
for that small enhancement of price which seems to have taken place in
them. These, however, though the highest, are by no means the only high
prices which seem to have been occasioned by the civil wars.
The second event was the bounty upon the exportation of corn, granted in
1688. The bounty, it has been thought by many people, by encouraging
tillage, may, in a long course of years, have occasioned a greater abundance,
and, consequently, a greater cheapness of corn in the home market, than
what would otherwise have taken place there. How far the bounty could
produce this effect at any time I shall examine hereafter: I shall only
observe at present, that between 1688 and 1700, it had not time to produce
any such effect. During this short period, its only effect must have been, by
encouraging the exportation of the surplus produce of every year, and
thereby hindering the abundance of one year from compensating the
scarcity of another, to raise the price in the home market. The scarcity
which prevailed in England, from 1693 to 1699, both inclusive, though no
doubt principally owing to the badness of the seasons, and, therefore,
extending through a considerable part of Europe, must have been somewhat
enhanced by the bounty. In 1699, accordingly, the further exportation of
corn was prohibited for nine months.
There was a third event which occurred in the course of the same period,
and which, though it could not occasion any scarcity of corn, nor, perhaps,
any augmentation in the real quantity of silver which was usually paid for
it, must necessarily have occasioned some augmentation in the nominal
sum. This event was the great debasement of the silver coin, by clipping
and wearing. This evil had begun in the reign of Charles II. and had gone on
continually increasing till 1695; at which time, as we may learn from Mr
Lowndes, the current silver coin was, at an average, near five-and-twenty
per cent. below its standard value. But the nominal sum which constitutes
the market price of every commodity is necessarily regulated, not so much
by the quantity of silver, which, according to the standard, ought to be
contained in it, as by that which, it is found by experience, actually is
contained in it. This nominal sum, therefore, is necessarily higher when the
coin is much debased by clipping and wearing, than when near to its
standard value.
In the course of the present century, the silver coin has not at any time
been more below its standard weight than it is at present. But though very
much defaced, its value has been kept up by that of the gold coin, for which
it is exchanged. For though, before the late recoinage, the gold coin was a
good deal defaced too, it was less so than the silver. In 1695, on the
contrary, the value of the silver coin was not kept up by the gold coin; a
guinea then commonly exchanging for thirty shillings of the worn and clipt
silver. Before the late recoinage of the gold, the price of silver bullion was
seldom higher than five shillings and sevenpence an ounce, which is but
fivepence above the mint price. But in 1695, the common price of silver
bullion was six shillings and fivepence an ounce, {Lowndes’s Essay on the
Silver Coin, 68.} which is fifteen pence above the mint price. Even before
the late recoinage of the gold, therefore, the coin, gold and silver together,
when compared with silver bullion, was not supposed to be more than eight
per cent. below its standard value, In 1695, on the contrary, it had been
supposed to be near five-and-twenty per cent. below that value. But in the
beginning of the present century, that is, immediately after the great
recoinage in King William’s time, the greater part of the current silver coin
must have been still nearer to its standard weight than it is at present. In the
course of the present century, too, there has been no great public calamity,
such as a civil war, which could either discourage tillage, or interrupt the
interior commerce of the country. And though the bounty which has taken
place through the greater part of this century, must always raise the price of
corn somewhat higher than it otherwise would be in the actual state of
tillage; yet, as in the course of this century, the bounty has had full time to
produce all the good effects commonly imputed to it to encourage tillage,
and thereby to increase the quantity of corn in the home market, it may,
upon the principles of a system which I shall explain and examine hereafter,
be supposed to have done something to lower the price of that commodity
the one way, as well as to raise it the other. It is by many people supposed to
have done more. In the sixty-four years of the present century, accordingly,
the average price of the quarter of nine bushels of the best wheat, at
Windsor market, appears, by the accounts of Eton college, to have been £
2:0:6 10/32, which is about ten shillings and sixpence, or more than five-
and-twenty percent. cheaper than it had been during the sixty-four last years
of the last century; and about nine shillings and sixpence cheaper than it had
been during the sixteen years preceding 1636, when the discovery of the
abundant mines of America may be supposed to have produced its full
effect; and about one shilling cheaper than it had been in the twenty-six
years preceding 1620, before that discovery can well be supposed to have
produced its full effect. According to this account, the average price of
middle wheat, during these sixty-four first years of the present century,
comes out to have been about thirty-two shillings the quarter of eight
bushels.
The value of silver, therefore, seems to have risen somewhat in
proportion to that of corn during the course of the present century, and it
had probably begun to do so even some time before the end of the last.
In 1687, the price of the quarter of nine bushels of the best wheat, at
Windsor market, was £ 1:5:2, the lowest price at which it had ever been
from 1595.
In 1688, Mr Gregory King, a man famous for his knowledge in matters of
this kind, estimated the average price of wheat, in years of moderate plenty,
to be to the grower 3s. 6d. the bushel, or eight-and-twenty shillings the
quarter. The grower’s price I understand to be the same with what is
sometimes called the contract price, or the price at which a farmer contracts
for a certain number of years to deliver a certain quantity of corn to a
dealer. As a contract of this kind saves the farmer the expense and trouble
of marketing, the contract price is generally lower than what is supposed to
be the average market price. Mr King had judged eight-and-twenty shillings
the quarter to be at that time the ordinary contract price in years of
moderate plenty. Before the scarcity occasioned by the late extraordinary
course of bad seasons, it was, I have been assured, the ordinary contract
price in all common years.
In 1688 was granted the parliamentary bounty upon the exportation of
corn. The country gentlemen, who then composed a still greater proportion
of the legislature than they do at present, had felt that the money price of
corn was falling. The bounty was an expedient to raise it artificially to the
high price at which it had frequently been sold in the times of Charles I. and
II. It was to take place, therefore, till wheat was so high as fortyeight
shillings the quarter; that is, twenty shillings, or 5-7ths dearer than Mr King
had, in that very year, estimated the grower’s price to be in times of
moderate plenty. If his calculations deserve any part of the reputation which
they have obtained very universally, eight-and-forty shillings the quarter
was a price which, without some such expedient as the bounty, could not at
that time be expected, except in years of extraordinary scarcity. But the
government of King William was not then fully settled. It was in no
condition to refuse anything to the country gentlemen, from whom it was, at
that very time, soliciting the first establishment of the annual land-tax.
The value of silver, therefore, in proportion to that of corn, had probably
risen somewhat before the end of the last century; and it seems to have
continued to do so during the course of the greater part of the present,
though the necessary operation of the bounty must have hindered that rise
from being so sensible as it otherwise would have been in the actual state of
tillage.
In plentiful years, the bounty, by occasioning an extraordinary
exportation, necessarily raises the price of corn above what it otherwise
would be in those years. To encourage tillage, by keeping up the price of
corn, even in the most plentiful years, was the avowed end of the
institution.
In years of great scarcity, indeed, the bounty has generally been
suspended. It must, however, have had some effect upon the prices of many
of those years. By the extraordinary exportation which it occasions in years
of plenty, it must frequently hinder the plenty of one year from
compensating the scarcity of another.
Both in years of plenty and in years of scarcity, therefore, the bounty
raises the price of corn above what it naturally would be in the actual state
of tillage. If during the sixty-four first years of the present century,
therefore, the average price has been lower than during the sixty-four last
years of the last century, it must, in the same state of tillage, have been
much more so, had it not been for this operation of the bounty.
But, without the bounty, it may be said the state of tillage would not have
been the same. What may have been the effects of this institution upon the
agriculture of the country, I shall endeavour to explain hereafter, when I
come to treat particularly of bounties. I shall only observe at present, that
this rise in the value of silver, in proportion to that of corn, has not been
peculiar to England. It has been observed to have taken place in France
during the same period, and nearly in the same proportion, too, by three
very faithful, diligent, and laborious collectors of the prices of corn, Mr
Dupré de St Maur, Mr Messance, and the author of the Essay on the Police
of Grain. But in France, till 1764, the exportation of grain was by law
prohibited; and it is somewhat difficult to suppose, that nearly the same
diminution of price which took place in one country, notwithstanding this
prohibition, should, in another, be owing to the extraordinary
encouragement given to exportation.
It would be more proper, perhaps, to consider this variation in the
average money price of corn as the effect rather of some gradual rise in the
real value of silver in the European market, than of any fall in the real
average value of corn. Corn, it has already been observed, is, at distant
periods of time, a more accurate measure of value than either silver or,
perhaps, any other commodity. When, after the discovery of the abundant
mines of America, corn rose to three and four times its former money price,
this change was universally ascribed, not to any rise in the real value of
corn, but to a fall in the real value of silver. If, during the sixty-four first
years of the present century, therefore, the average money price of corn has
fallen somewhat below what it had been during the greater part of the last
century, we should, in the same manner, impute this change, not to any fall
in the real value of corn, but to some rise in the real value of silver in the
European market.
The high price of corn during these ten or twelve years past, indeed, has
occasioned a suspicion that the real value of silver still continues to fall in
the European market. This high price of corn, however, seems evidently to
have been the effect of the extraordinary unfavourableness of the seasons,
and ought, therefore, to be regarded, not as a permanent, but as a transitory
and occasional event. The seasons, for these ten or twelve years past, have
been unfavourable through the greater part of Europe; and the disorders of
Poland have very much increased the scarcity in all those countries, which,
in dear years, used to be supplied from that market. So long a course of bad
seasons, though not a very common event, is by no means a singular one;
and whoever has inquired much into the history of the prices of corn in
former times, will be at no loss to recollect several other examples of the
same kind. Ten years of extraordinary scarcity, besides, are not more
wonderful than ten years of extraordinary plenty. The low price of corn,
from 1741 to 1750, both inclusive, may very well be set in opposition to its
high price during these last eight or ten years. From 1741 to 1750, the
average price of the quarter of nine bushels of the best wheat, at Windsor
market, it appears from the accounts of Eton college, was only £ 1:13:9 4/5,
which is nearly 6s.3d. below the average price of the sixty-four first years
of the present century. The average price of the quarter of eight bushels of
middle wheat comes out, according to this account, to have been, during
these ten years, only £ 1:6:8.
Between 1741 and 1750, however, the bounty must have hindered the
price of corn from falling so low in the home market as it naturally would
have done. During these ten years, the quantity of all sorts of grain
exported, it appears from the custom-house books, amounted to no less than
8,029,156 quarters, one bushel. The bounty paid for this amounted to £
1,514,962:17:4 1/2. In 1749, accordingly, Mr Pelham, at that time prime
minister, observed to the house of commons, that, for the three years
preceding, a very extraordinary sum had been paid as bounty for the
exportation of corn. He had good reason to make this observation, and in
the following year he might have had still better. In that single year, the
bounty paid amounted to no less than £ 324,176:10:6. {See Tracts on the
Corn Trade, Tract 3,} It is unnecessary to observe how much this forced
exportation must have raised the price of corn above what it otherwise
would have been in the home market.
At the end of the accounts annexed to this chapter the reader will find the
particular account of those ten years separated from the rest. He will find
there, too, the particular account of the preceding ten years, of which the
average is likewise below, though not so much below, the general average
of the sixty-four first years of the century. The year 1740, however, was a
year of extraordinary scarcity. These twenty years preceding 1750 may very
well be set in opposition to the twenty preceding 1770. As the former were
a good deal below the general average of the century, notwithstanding the
intervention of one or two dear years; so the latter have been a good deal
above it, notwithstanding the intervention of one or two cheap ones, of
1759, for example. If the former have not been as much below the general
average as the latter have been above it, we ought probably to impute it to
the bounty. The change has evidently been too sudden to be ascribed to any
change in the value of silver, which is always slow and gradual. The
suddenness of the effect can be accounted for only by a cause which can
operate suddenly, the accidental variations of the seasons.
The money price of labour in Great Britain has, indeed, risen during the
course of the present century. This, however, seems to be the effect, not so
much of any diminution in the value of silver in the European market, as of
an increase in the demand for labour in Great Britain, arising from the great,
and almost universal prosperity of the country. In France, a country not
altogether so prosperous, the money price of labour has, since the middle of
the last century, been observed to sink gradually with the average money
price of corn. Both in the last century and in the present, the day wages of
common labour are there said to have been pretty uniformly about the
twentieth part of the average price of the septier of wheat; a measure which
contains a little more than four Winchester bushels. In Great Britain, the
real recompence of labour, it has already been shewn, the real quantities of
the necessaries and conveniencies of life which are given to the labourer,
has increased considerably during the course of the present century. The rise
in its money price seems to have been the effect, not of any diminution of
the value of silver in the general market of Europe, but of a rise in the real
price of labour, in the particular market of Great Britain, owing to the
peculiarly happy circumstances of the country.
For some time after the first discovery of America, silver would continue
to sell at its former, or not much below its former price. The profits of
mining would for some time be very great, and much above their natural
rate. Those who imported that metal into Europe, however, would soon find
that the whole annual importation could not be disposed of at this high
price. Silver would gradually exchange for a smaller and a smaller quantity
of goods. Its price would sink gradually lower and lower, till it fell to its
natural price; or to what was just sufficient to pay, according to their natural
rates, the wages of the labour, the profits of the stock, and the rent of the
land, which must be paid in order to bring it from the mine to the market. In
the greater part of the silver mines of Peru, the tax of the king of Spain,
amounting to a tenth of the gross produce, eats up, it has already been
observed, the whole rent of the land. This tax was originally a half; it soon
afterwards fell to a third, then to a fifth, and at last to a tenth, at which late it
still continues. In the greater part of the silver mines of Peru, this, it seems,
is all that remains, after replacing the stock of the undertaker of the work,
together with its ordinary profits; and it seems to be universally
acknowledged that these profits, which were once very high, are now as
low as they can well be, consistently with carrying on the works.
The tax of the king of Spain was reduced to a fifth of the registered silver
in 1504 {Solorzano, vol, ii.}, one-and-forty years before 1545, the date of
the discovery of the mines of Potosi. In the course of ninety years, or before
1636, these mines, the most fertile in all America, had time sufficient to
produce their full effect, or to reduce the value of silver in the European
market as low as it could well fall, while it continued to pay this tax to the
king of Spain. Ninety years is time sufficient to reduce any commodity, of
which there is no monopoly, to its natural price, or to the lowest price at
which, while it pays a particular tax, it can continue to be sold for any
considerable time together.
The price of silver in the European market might, perhaps, have fallen
still lower, and it might have become necessary either to reduce the tax
upon it, not only to one-tenth, as in 1736, but to one twentieth, in the same
manner as that upon gold, or to give up working the greater part of the
American mines which are now wrought. The gradual increase of the
demand for silver, or the gradual enlargement of the market for the produce
of the silver mines of America, is probably the cause which has prevented
this from happening, and which has not only kept up the value of silver in
the European market, but has perhaps even raised it somewhat higher than it
was about the middle of the last century.
Since the first discovery of America, the market for the produce of its
silver mines has been growing gradually more and more extensive.
First, the market of Europe has become gradually more and more
extensive. Since the discovery of America, the greater part of Europe has
been much improved. England, Holland, France, and Germany; even
Sweden, Denmark, and Russia, have all advanced considerably, both in
agriculture and in manufactures. Italy seems not to have gone backwards.
The fall of Italy preceded the conquest of Peru. Since that time it seems
rather to have recovered a little. Spain and Portugal, indeed, are supposed to
have gone backwards. Portugal, however, is but a very small part of Europe,
and the declension of Spain is not, perhaps, so great as is commonly
imagined. In the beginning of the sixteenth century, Spain was a very poor
country, even in comparison with France, which has been so much
improved since that time. It was the well known remark of the emperor
Charles V. who had travelled so frequently through both countries, that
every thing abounded in France, but that every thing was wanting in Spain.
The increasing produce of the agriculture and manufactures of Europe must
necessarily have required a gradual increase in the quantity of silver coin to
circulate it; and the increasing number of wealthy individuals must have
required the like increase in the quantity of their plate and other ornaments
of silver.
Secondly, America is itself a new market, for the produce of its own
silver mines; and as its advances in agriculture, industry, and population,
are much more rapid than those of the most thriving countries in Europe, its
demand must increase much more rapidly. The English colonies are
altogether a new market, which, partly for coin, and partly for plate,
requires a continual augmenting supply of silver through a great continent
where there never was any demand before. The greater part, too, of the
Spanish and Portuguese colonies, are altogether new markets. New
Granada, the Yucatan, Paraguay, and the Brazils, were, before discovered
by the Europeans, inhabited by savage nations, who had neither arts nor
agriculture. A considerable degree of both has now been introduced into all
of them. Even Mexico and Peru, though they cannot be considered as
altogether new markets, are certainly much more extensive ones than they
ever were before. After all the wonderful tales which have been published
concerning the splendid state of those countries in ancient times, whoever
reads, with any degree of sober judgment, the history of their first discovery
and conquest, will evidently discern that, in arts, agriculture, and
commerce, their inhabitants were much more ignorant than the Tartars of
the Ukraine are at present. Even the Peruvians, the more civilized nation of
the two, though they made use of gold and silver as ornaments, had no
coined money of any kind. Their whole commerce was carried on by barter,
and there was accordingly scarce any division of labour among them. Those
who cultivated the ground, were obliged to build their own houses, to make
their own household furniture, their own clothes, shoes, and instruments of
agriculture. The few artificers among them are said to have been all
maintained by the sovereign, the nobles, and the priests, and were probably
their servants or slaves. All the ancient arts of Mexico and Peru have never
furnished one single manufacture to Europe. The Spanish armies, though
they scarce ever exceeded five hundred men, and frequently did not amount
to half that number, found almost everywhere great difficulty in procuring
subsistence. The famines which they are said to have occasioned almost
wherever they went, in countries, too, which at the same time are
represented as very populous and well cultivated, sufficiently demonstrate
that the story of this populousness and high cultivation is in a great measure
fabulous. The Spanish colonies are under a government in many respects
less favourable to agriculture, improvement, and population, than that of the
English colonies. They seem, however, to be advancing in all those much
more rapidly than any country in Europe. In a fertile soil and happy climate,
the great abundance and cheapness of land, a circumstance common to all
new colonies, is, it seems, so great an advantage, as to compensate many
defects in civil government. Frezier, who visited Peru in 1713, represents
Lima as containing between twenty-five and twenty-eight thousand
inhabitants. Ulloa, who resided in the same country between 1740 and
1746, represents it as containing more than fifty thousand. The difference in
their accounts of the populousness of several other principal towns of Chili
and Peru is nearly the same; and as there seems to be no reason to doubt of
the good information of either, it marks an increase which is scarce inferior
to that of the English colonies. America, therefore, is a new market for the
produce of its own silver mines, of which the demand must increase much
more rapidly than that of the most thriving country in Europe.
Thirdly, the East Indies is another market for the produce of the silver
mines of America, and a market which, from the time of the first discovery
of those mines, has been continually taking off a greater and a greater
quantity of silver. Since that time, the direct trade between America and the
East Indies, which is carried on by means of the Acapulco ships, has been
continually augmenting, and the indirect intercourse by the way of Europe
has been augmenting in a still greater proportion. During the sixteenth
century, the Portuguese were the only European nation who carried on any
regular trade to the East Indies. In the last years of that century, the Dutch
began to encroach upon this monopoly, and in a few years expelled them
from their principal settlements in India. During the greater part of the last
century, those two nations divided the most considerable part of the East
India trade between them; the trade of the Dutch continually augmenting in
a still greater proportion than that of the Portuguese declined. The English
and French carried on some trade with India in the last century, but it has
been greatly augmented in the course of the present. The East India trade of
the Swedes and Danes began in the course of the present century. Even the
Muscovites now trade regularly with China, by a sort of caravans which go
over land through Siberia and Tartary to Pekin. The East India trade of all
these nations, if we except that of the French, which the last war had well
nigh annihilated, has been almost continually augmenting. The increasing
consumptions of East India goods in Europe is, it seems, so great, as to
afford a gradual increase of employment to them all. Tea, for example, was
a drug very little used in Europe, before the middle of the last century. At
present, the value of the tea annually imported by the English East India
company, for the use of their own countrymen, amounts to more than a
million and a half a year; and even this is not enough; a great deal more
being constantly smuggled into the country from the ports of Holland, from
Gottenburgh in Sweden, and from the coast of France, too, as long as the
French East India company was in prosperity. The consumption of the
porcelain of China, of the spiceries of the Moluccas, of the piece goods of
Bengal, and of innumerable other articles, has increased very nearly in a
like proportion. The tonnage, accordingly, of all the European shipping
employed in the East India trade, at any one time during the last century,
was not, perhaps, much greater than that of the English East India company
before the late reduction of their shipping.
But in the East Indies, particularly in China and Indostan, the value of the
precious metals, when the Europeans first began to trade to those countries,
was much higher than in Europe; and it still continues to be so. In rice
countries, which generally yield two, sometimes three crops in the year,
each of them more plentiful than any common crop of corn, the abundance
of food must be much greater than in any corn country of equal extent. Such
countries are accordingly much more populous. In them, too, the rich,
having a greater superabundance of food to dispose of beyond what they
themselves can consume, have the means of purchasing a much greater
quantity of the labour of other people. The retinue of a grandee in China or
Indostan accordingly is, by all accounts, much more numerous and splendid
than that of the richest subjects in Europe. The same superabundance of
food, of which they have the disposal, enables them to give a greater
quantity of it for all those singular and rare productions which nature
furnishes but in very small quantities; such as the precious metals and the
precious stones, the great objects of the competition of the rich. Though the
mines, therefore, which supplied the Indian market, had been as abundant
as those which supplied the European, such commodities would naturally
exchange for a greater quantity of food in India than in Europe. But the
mines which supplied the Indian market with the precious metals seem to
have been a good deal less abundant, and those which supplied it with the
precious stones a good deal more so, than the mines which supplied the
European. The precious metals, therefore, would naturally exchange in
India for a somewhat greater quantity of the precious stones, and for a much
greater quantity of food than in Europe. The money price of diamonds, the
greatest of all superfluities, would be somewhat lower, and that of food, the
first of all necessaries, a great deal lower in the one country than in the
other. But the real price of labour, the real quantity of the necessaries of life
which is given to the labourer, it has already been observed, is lower both in
China and Indostan, the two great markets of India, than it is through the
greater part of Europe. The wages of the labourer will there purchase a
smaller quantity of food: and as the money price of food is much lower in
India than in Europe, the money price of labour is there lower upon a
double account; upon account both of the small quantity of food which it
will purchase, and of the low price of that food. But in countries of equal art
and industry, the money price of the greater part of manufactures will be in
proportion to the money price of labour; and in manufacturing art and
industry, China and Indostan, though inferior, seem not to be much inferior
to any part of Europe. The money price of the greater part of manufactures,
therefore, will naturally be much lower in those great empires than it is
anywhere in Europe. Through the greater part of Europe, too, the expense
of land-carriage increases very much both the real and nominal price of
most manufactures. It costs more labour, and therefore more money, to
bring first the materials, and afterwards the complete manufacture to
market. In China and Indostan, the extent and variety of inland navigations
save the greater part of this labour, and consequently of this money, and
thereby reduce still lower both the real and the nominal price of the greater
part of their manufactures. Upon all these accounts, the precious metals are
a commodity which it always has been, and still continues to be, extremely
advantageous to carry from Europe to India. There is scarce any commodity
which brings a better price there; or which, in proportion to the quantity of
labour and commodities which it costs in Europe, will purchase or
command a greater quantity of labour and commodities in India. It is more
advantageous, too, to carry silver thither than gold; because in China, and
the greater part of the other markets of India, the proportion between fine
silver and fine gold is but as ten, or at most as twelve to one; whereas in
Europe it is as fourteen or fifteen to one. In China, and the greater part of
the other markets of India, ten, or at most twelve ounces of silver, will
purchase an ounce of gold; in Europe, it requires from fourteen to fifteen
ounces. In the cargoes, therefore, of the greater part of European ships
which sail to India, silver has generally been one of the most valuable
articles. It is the most valuable article in the Acapulco ships which sail to
Manilla. The silver of the new continent seems, in this manner, to be one of
the principal commodities by which the commerce between the two
extremities of the old one is carried on; and it is by means of it, in a great
measure, that those distant parts of the world are connected with one
another.
In order to supply so very widely extended a market, the quantity of
silver annually brought from the mines must not only be sufficient to
support that continued increase, both of coin and of plate, which is required
in all thriving countries; but to repair that continual waste and consumption
of silver which takes place in all countries where that metal is used.
The continual consumption of the precious metals in coin by wearing,
and in plate both by wearing and cleaning, is very sensible; and in
commodities of which the use is so very widely extended, would alone
require a very great annual supply. The consumption of those metals in
some particular manufactures, though it may not perhaps be greater upon
the whole than this gradual consumption, is, however, much more sensible,
as it is much more rapid. In the manufactures of Birmingham alone, the
quantity of gold and silver annually employed in gilding and plating, and
thereby disqualified from ever afterwards appearing in the shape of those
metals, is said to amount to more than fifty thousand pounds sterling. We
may from thence form some notion how great must be the annual
consumption in all the different parts of the world, either in manufactures of
the same kind with those of Birmingham, or in laces, embroideries, gold
and silver stuffs, the gilding of books, furniture, etc. A considerable
quantity, too, must be annually lost in transporting those metals from one
place to another both by sea and by land. In the greater part of the
governments of Asia, besides, the almost universal custom of concealing
treasures in the bowels of the earth, of which the knowledge frequently dies
with the person who makes the concealment, must occasion the loss of a
still greater quantity.
The quantity of gold and silver imported at both Cadiz and Lisbon
(including not only what comes under register, but what may be supposed
to be smuggled) amounts, according to the best accounts, to about six
millions sterling a-year.
According to Mr Meggens {Postscript to the Universal Merchant p. 15
and 16. This postscript was not printed till 1756, three years after the
publication of the book, which has never had a second edition. The
postscript is, therefore, to be found in few copies; it corrects several errors
in the book.}, the annual importation of the precious metals into Spain, at
an average of six years, viz. from 1748 to 1753, both inclusive, and into
Portugal, at an average of seven years, viz. from 1747 to 1753, both
inclusive, amounted in silver to 1,101,107 pounds weight, and in gold to
49,940 pounds weight. The silver, at sixty two shillings the pound troy,
amounts to £ 3,413,431:10s. sterling. The gold, at forty-four guineas and a
half the pound troy, amounts to £ 2,333,446:14s. sterling. Both together
amount to £ 5,746,878:4s. sterling. The account of what was imported
under register, he assures us, is exact. He gives us the detail of the particular
places from which the gold and silver were brought, and of the particular
quantity of each metal, which, according to the register, each of them
afforded. He makes an allowance, too, for the quantity of each metal which,
he supposes, may have been smuggled. The great experience of this
judicious merchant renders his opinion of considerable weight.
According to the eloquent, and sometimes well-informed, author of the
Philosophical and Political History of the Establishment of the Europeans in
the two Indies, the annual importation of registered gold and silver into
Spain, at an average of eleven years, viz. from 1754 to 1764, both inclusive,
amounted to 13,984,185 3/5 piastres of ten reals. On account of what may
have been smuggled, however, the whole annual importation, he supposes,
may have amounted to seventeen millions of piastres, which, at 4s. 6d. the
piastre, is equal to £ 3,825,000 sterling. He gives the detail, too, of the
particular places from which the gold and silver were brought, and of the
particular quantities of each metal, which according to the register, each of
them afforded. He informs us, too, that if we were to judge of the quantity
of gold annually imported from the Brazils to Lisbon, by the amount of the
tax paid to the king of Portugal, which it seems, is one-fifth of the standard
metal, we might value it at eighteen millions of cruzadoes, or forty-five
millions of French livres, equal to about twenty millions sterling. On
account of what may have been smuggled, however, we may safely, he
says, add to this sum an eighth more, or £ 250,000 sterling, so that the
whole will amount to £ 2,250,000 sterling. According to this account,
therefore, the whole annual importation of the precious metals into both
Spain and Portugal, mounts to about £ 6,075,000 sterling.
Several other very well authenticated, though manuscript accounts, I
have been assured, agree in making this whole annual importation amount,
at an average, to about six millions sterling; sometimes a little more,
sometimes a little less.
The annual importation of the precious metals into Cadiz and Lisbon,
indeed, is not equal to the whole annual produce of the mines of America.
Some part is sent annually by the Acapulco ships to Manilla; some part is
employed in a contraband trade, which the Spanish colonies carry on with
those of other European nations; and some part, no doubt, remains in the
country. The mines of America, besides, are by no means the only gold and
silver mines in the world. They, are, however, by far the most abundant.
The produce of all the other mines which are known is insignificant, it is
acknowledged, in comparison with theirs; and the far greater part of their
produce, it is likewise acknowledged, is annually imported into Cadiz and
Lisbon. But the consumption of Birmingham alone, at the rate of fifty
thousand pounds a-year, is equal to the hundred-and-twentieth part of this
annual importation, at the rate of six millions a-year. The whole annual
consumption of gold and silver, therefore, in all the different countries of
the world where those metals are used, may, perhaps, be nearly equal to the
whole annual produce. The remainder may be no more than sufficient to
supply the increasing demand of all thriving countries. It may even have
fallen so far short of this demand, as somewhat to raise the price of those
metals in the European market.
The quantity of brass and iron annually brought from the mine to the
market, is out of all proportion greater than that of gold and silver. We do
not, however, upon this account, imagine that those coarse metals are likely
to multiply beyond the demand, or to become gradually cheaper and
cheaper. Why should we imagine that the precious metals are likely to do
so? The coarse metals, indeed, though harder, are put to much harder uses,
and, as they are of less value, less care is employed in their preservation.
The precious metals, however, are not necessarily immortal any more than
they, but are liable, too, to be lost, wasted, and consumed, in a great variety
of ways.
The price of all metals, though liable to slow and gradual variations,
varies less from year to year than that of almost any other part of the rude
produce of land: and the price of the precious metals is even less liable to
sudden variations than that of the coarse ones. The durableness of metals is
the foundation of this extraordinary steadiness of price. The corn which was
brought to market last year will be all, or almost all, consumed, long before
the end of this year. But some part of the iron which was brought from the
mine two or three hundred years ago, may be still in use, and, perhaps,
some part of the gold which was brought from it two or three thousand
years ago. The different masses of corn, which, in different years, must
supply the consumption of the world, will always be nearly in proportion to
the respective produce of those different years. But the proportion between
the different masses of iron which may be in use in two different years, will
be very little affected by any accidental difference in the produce of the iron
mines of those two years; and the proportion between the masses of gold
will be still less affected by any such difference in the produce of the gold
mines. Though the produce of the greater part of metallic mines, therefore,
varies, perhaps, still more from year to year than that of the greater part of
corn fields, those variations have not the same effect upon the price of the
one species of commodities as upon that of the other.
Variations in the Proportion between the respective Values of Gold and
Silver.
Before the discovery of the mines of America, the value of fine gold to
fine silver was regulated in the different mines of Europe, between the
proportions of one to ten and one to twelve; that is, an ounce of fine gold
was supposed to be worth from ten to twelve ounces of fine silver. About
the middle of the last century, it came to be regulated, between the
proportions of one to fourteen and one to fifteen; that is, an ounce of fine
gold came to be supposed worth between fourteen and fifteen ounces of
fine silver. Gold rose in its nominal value, or in the quantity of silver which
was given for it. Both metals sunk in their real value, or in the quantity of
labour which they could purchase; but silver sunk more than gold. Though
both the gold and silver mines of America exceeded in fertility all those
which had ever been known before, the fertility of the silver mines had, it
seems, been proportionally still greater than that of the gold ones.
The great quantities of silver carried annually from Europe to India, have,
in some of the English settlements, gradually reduced the value of that
metal in proportion to gold. In the mint of Calcutta, an ounce of fine gold is
supposed to be worth fifteen ounces of fine silver, in the same manner as in
Europe. It is in the mint, perhaps, rated too high for the value which it bears
in the market of Bengal. In China, the proportion of gold to silver still
continues as one to ten, or one to twelve. In Japan, it is said to be as one to
eight.
The proportion between the quantities of gold and silver annually
imported into Europe, according to Mr Meggens’ account, is as one to
twenty-two nearly; that is, for one ounce of gold there are imported a little
more than twenty-two ounces of silver. The great quantity of silver sent
annually to the East Indies reduces, he supposes, the quantities of those
metals which remain in Europe to the proportion of one to fourteen or
fifteen, the proportion of their values. The proportion between their values,
he seems to think, must necessarily be the same as that between their
quantities, and would therefore be as one to twenty-two, were it not for this
greater exportation of silver.
But the ordinary proportion between the respective values of two
commodities is not necessarily the same as that between the quantities of
them which are commonly in the market. The price of an ox, reckoned at
ten guineas, is about three score times the price of a lamb, reckoned at 3s.
6d. It would be absurd, however, to infer from thence, that there are
commonly in the market three score lambs for one ox; and it would be just
as absurd to infer, because an ounce of gold will commonly purchase from
fourteen or fifteen ounces of silver, that there are commonly in the market
only fourteen or fifteen ounces of silver for one ounce of gold.
The quantity of silver commonly in the market, it is probable, is much
greater in proportion to that of gold, than the value of a certain quantity of
gold is to that of an equal quantity of silver. The whole quantity of a cheap
commodity brought to market is commonly not only greater, but of greater
value, than the whole quantity of a dear one. The whole quantity of bread
annually brought to market, is not only greater, but of greater value, than
the whole quantity of butcher’s meat; the whole quantity of butcher’s meat,
than the whole quantity of poultry; and the whole quantity of poultry, than
the whole quantity of wild fowl. There are so many more purchasers for the
cheap than for the dear commodity, that, not only a greater quantity of it,
but a greater value can commonly be disposed of. The whole quantity,
therefore, of the cheap commodity, must commonly be greater in proportion
to the whole quantity of the dear one, than the value of a certain quantity of
the dear one, is to the value of an equal quantity of the cheap one. When we
compare the precious metals with one another, silver is a cheap, and gold a
dear commodity. We ought naturally to expect, therefore, that there should
always be in the market, not only a greater quantity, but a greater value of
silver than of gold. Let any man, who has a little of both, compare his own
silver with his gold plate, and he will probably find, that not only the
quantity, but the value of the former, greatly exceeds that of the latter. Many
people, besides, have a good deal of silver who have no gold plate, which,
even with those who have it, is generally confined to watch-cases, snuff-
boxes, and such like trinkets, of which the whole amount is seldom of great
value. In the British coin, indeed, the value of the gold preponderates
greatly, but it is not so in that of all countries. In the coin of some countries,
the value of the two metals is nearly equal. In the Scotch coin, before the
union with England, the gold preponderated very little, though it did
somewhat {See Ruddiman’s Preface to Anderson’s Diplomata, etc.
Scotiae.}, as it appears by the accounts of the mint. In the coin of many
countries the silver preponderates. In France, the largest sums are
commonly paid in that metal, and it is there difficult to get more gold than
what is necessary to carry about in your pocket. The superior value,
however, of the silver plate above that of the gold, which takes place in all
countries, will much more than compensate the preponderancy of the gold
coin above the silver, which takes place only in some countries.
Though, in one sense of the word, silver always has been, and probably
always will be, much cheaper than gold; yet, in another sense, gold may
perhaps, in the present state of the Spanish market, be said to be somewhat
cheaper than silver. A commodity may be said to be dear or cheap not only
according to the absolute greatness or smallness of its usual price, but
according as that price is more or less above the lowest for which it is
possible to bring it to market for any considerable time together. This
lowest price is that which barely replaces, with a moderate profit, the stock
which must be employed in bringing the commodity thither. It is the price
which affords nothing to the landlord, of which rent makes not any
component part, but which resolves itself altogether into wages and profit.
But, in the present state of the Spanish market, gold is certainly somewhat
nearer to this lowest price than silver. The tax of the king of Spain upon
gold is only one-twentieth part of the standard metal, or five per cent.;
whereas his tax upon silver amounts to one-tenth part of it, or to ten per
cent. In these taxes, too, it has already been observed, consists the whole
rent of the greater part of the gold and silver mines of Spanish America; and
that upon gold is still worse paid than that upon silver. The profits of the
undertakers of gold mines, too, as they more rarely make a fortune, must, in
general, be still more moderate than those of the undertakers of silver
mines. The price of Spanish gold, therefore, as it affords both less rent and
less profit, must, in the Spanish market, be somewhat nearer to the lowest
price for which it is possible to bring it thither, than the price of Spanish
silver. When all expenses are computed, the whole quantity of the one
metal, it would seem, cannot, in the Spanish market, be disposed of so
advantageously as the whole quantity of the other. The tax, indeed, of the
king of Portugal upon the gold of the Brazils, is the same with the ancient
tax of the king of Spain upon the silver of Mexico and Peru; or one-fifth
part of the standard metal. It may therefore be uncertain, whether, to the
general market of Europe, the whole mass of American gold comes at a
price nearer to the lowest for which it is possible to bring it thither, than the
whole mass of American silver.
The price of diamonds and other precious stones may, perhaps, be still
nearer to the lowest price at which it is possible to bring them to market,
than even the price of gold.
Though it is not very probable that any part of a tax, which is not only
imposed upon one of the most proper subjects of taxation, a mere luxury
and superfluity, but which affords so very important a revenue as the tax
upon silver, will ever be given up as long as it is possible to pay it; yet the
same impossibility of paying it, which, in 1736. made it necessary to reduce
it from one-fifth to one-tenth, may in time make it necessary to reduce it
still further; in the same manner as it made it necessary to reduce the tax
upon gold to one-twentieth. That the silver mines of Spanish America, like
all other mines, become gradually more expensive in the working, on
account of the greater depths at which it is necessary to carry on the works,
and of the greater expense of drawing out the water, and of supplying them
with fresh air at those depths, is acknowledged by everybody who has
inquired into the state of those mines.
These causes, which are equivalent to a growing scarcity of silver (for a
commodity may be said to grow scarcer when it becomes more difficult and
expensive to collect a certain quantity of it), must, in time, produce one or
other of the three following events: The increase of the expense must either,
first, be compensated altogether by a proportionable increase in the price of
the metal; or, secondly, it must be compensated altogether by a
proportionable diminution of the tax upon silver; or, thirdly, it must be
compensated partly by the one and partly by the other of those two
expedients. This third event is very possible. As gold rose in its price in
proportion to silver, notwithstanding a great diminution of the tax upon
gold, so silver might rise in its price in proportion to labour and
commodities, notwithstanding an equal diminution of the tax upon silver.
Such successive reductions of the tax, however, though they may not
prevent altogether, must certainly retard, more or less, the rise of the value
of silver in the European market. In consequence of such reductions, many
mines may be wrought which could not be wrought before, because they
could not afford to pay the old tax; and the quantity of silver annually
brought to market, must always be somewhat greater, and, therefore, the
value of any given quantity somewhat less, than it otherwise would have
been. In consequence of the reduction in 1736, the value of silver in the
European market, though it may not at this day be lower than before that
reduction, is, probably, at least ten per cent. lower than it would have been,
had the court of Spain continued to exact the old tax. That, notwithstanding
this reduction, the value of silver has, during the course of the present
century, begun to rise somewhat in the European market, the facts and
arguments which have been alleged above, dispose me to believe, or more
properly to suspect and conjecture; for the best opinion which I can form
upon this subject, scarce, perhaps, deserves the name of belief. The rise,
indeed, supposing there has been any, has hitherto been so very small, that
after all that has been said, it may, perhaps, appear to many people
uncertain, not only whether this event has actually taken place, but whether
the contrary may not have taken place, or whether the value of silver may
not still continue to fall in the European market.
It must be observed, however, that whatever may be the supposed annual
importation of gold and silver, there must be a certain period at which the
annual consumption of those metals will be equal to that annual
importation. Their consumption must increase as their mass increases, or
rather in a much greater proportion. As their mass increases, their value
diminishes. They are more used, and less cared for, and their consumption
consequently increases in a greater proportion than their mass. After a
certain period, therefore, the annual consumption of those metals must, in
this manner, become equal to their annual importation, provided that
importation is not continually increasing; which, in the present times, is not
supposed to be the case.
If, when the annual consumption has become equal to the annual
importation, the annual importation should gradually diminish, the annual
consumption may, for some time, exceed the annual importation. The mass
of those metals may gradually and insensibly diminish, and their value
gradually and insensibly rise, till the annual importation becoming again
stationary, the annual consumption will gradually and insensibly
accommodate itself to what that annual importation can maintain.
Grounds of the suspicion that the Value of Silver still continues to decrease.
The increase of the wealth of Europe, and the popular notion, that as the
quantity of the precious metals naturally increases with the increase of
wealth, so their value diminishes as their quantity increases, may, perhaps,
dispose many people to believe that their value still continues to fall in the
European market; and the still gradually increasing price of many parts of
the rude produce of land may confirm them still farther in this opinion.
That that increase in the quantity of the precious metals, which arises in
any country from the increase of wealth, has no tendency to diminish their
value, I have endeavoured to shew already. Gold and silver naturally resort
to a rich country, for the same reason that all sorts of luxuries and
curiosities resort to it; not because they are cheaper there than in poorer
countries, but because they are dearer, or because a better price is given for
them. It is the superiority of price which attracts them; and as soon as that
superiority ceases, they necessarily cease to go thither.
If you except corn, and such other vegetables as are raised altogether by
human industry, that all other sorts of rude produce, cattle, poultry, game of
all kinds, the useful fossils and minerals of the earth, etc. naturally grow
dearer, as the society advances in wealth and improvement, I have
endeavoured to shew already. Though such commodities, therefore, come to
exchange for a greater quantity of silver than before, it will not from thence
follow that silver has become really cheaper, or will purchase less labour
than before; but that such commodities have become really dearer, or will
purchase more labour than before. It is not their nominal price only, but
their real price, which rises in the progress of improvement. The rise of
their nominal price is the effect, not of any degradation of the value of
silver, but of the rise in their real price.
Different Effects of the Progress of Improvement upon three different
sorts of rude Produce.
These different sorts of rude produce may be divided into three classes.
The first comprehends those which it is scarce in the power of human
industry to multiply at all. The second, those which it can multiply in
proportion to the demand. The third, those in which the efficacy of industry
is either limited or uncertain. In the progress of wealth and improvement,
the real price of the first may rise to any degree of extravagance, and seems
not to be limited by any certain boundary. That of the second, though it may
rise greatly, has, however, a certain boundary, beyond which it cannot well
pass for any considerable time together. That of the third, though its natural
tendency is to rise in the progress of improvement, yet in the same degree
of improvement it may sometimes happen even to fall, sometimes to
continue the same, and sometimes to rise more or less, according as
different accidents render the efforts of human industry, in multiplying this
sort of rude produce, more or less successful.
First Sort.—The first sort of rude produce, of which the price rises in the
progress of improvement, is that which it is scarce in the power of human
industry to multiply at all. It consists in those things which nature produces
only in certain quantities, and which being of a very perishable nature, it is
impossible to accumulate together the produce of many different seasons.
Such are the greater part of rare and singular birds and fishes, many
different sorts of game, almost all wild-fowl, all birds of passage in
particular, as well as many other things. When wealth, and the luxury which
accompanies it, increase, the demand for these is likely to increase with
them, and no effort of human industry may be able to increase the supply
much beyond what it was before this increase of the demand. The quantity
of such commodities, therefore, remaining the same, or nearly the same,
while the competition to purchase them is continually increasing, their price
may rise to any degree of extravagance, and seems not to be limited by any
certain boundary. If woodcocks should become so fashionable as to sell for
twenty guineas a-piece, no effort of human industry could increase the
number of those brought to market, much beyond what it is at present. The
high price paid by the Romans, in the time of their greatest grandeur, for
rare birds and fishes, may in this manner easily be accounted for. These
prices were not the effects of the low value of silver in those times, but of
the high value of such rarities and curiosities as human industry could not
multiply at pleasure. The real value of silver was higher at Rome, for
sometime before, and after the fall of the republic, than it is through the
greater part of Europe at present. Three sestertii equal to about sixpence
sterling, was the price which the republic paid for the modius or peck of the
tithe wheat of Sicily. This price, however, was probably below the average
market price, the obligation to deliver their wheat at this rate being
considered as a tax upon the Sicilian farmers. When the Romans, therefore,
had occasion to order more corn than the tithe of wheat amounted to, they
were bound by capitulation to pay for the surplus at the rate of four sestertii,
or eightpence sterling the peck; and this had probably been reckoned the
moderate and reasonable, that is, the ordinary or average contract price of
those times; it is equal to about one-and-twenty shillings the quarter. Eight-
and-twenty shillings the quarter was, before the late years of scarcity, the
ordinary contract price of English wheat, which in quality is inferior to the
Sicilian, and generally sells for a lower price in the European market. The
value of silver, therefore, in those ancient times, must have been to its value
in the present, as three to four inversely; that is, three ounces of silver
would then have purchased the same quantity of labour and commodities
which four ounces will do at present. When we read in Pliny, therefore, that
Seius {Lib. X, c. 29.} bought a white nightingale, as a present for the
empress Agrippina, at the price of six thousand sestertii, equal to about fifty
pounds of our present money; and that Asinius Celer {Lib. IX, c. 17.}
purchased a surmullet at the price of eight thousand sestertii, equal to about
sixty-six pounds thirteen shillings and fourpence of our present money; the
extravagance of those prices, how much soever it may surprise us, is apt,
notwithstanding, to appear to us about one third less than it really was.
Their real price, the quantity of labour and subsistence which was given
away for them, was about one-third more than their nominal price is apt to
express to us in the present times. Seius gave for the nightingale the
command of a quantity of labour and subsistence, equal to what £ 66:13:
4d. would purchase in the present times; and Asinius Celer gave for a
surmullet the command of a quantity equal to what £ 88:17: 9d. would
purchase. What occasioned the extravagance of those high prices was, not
so much the abundance of silver, as the abundance of labour and
subsistence, of which those Romans had the disposal, beyond what was
necessary for their own use. The quantity of silver, of which they had the
disposal, was a good deal less than what the command of the same quantity
of labour and subsistence would have procured to them in the present times.
Second sort.—The second sort of rude produce, of which the price rises
in the progress of improvement, is that which human industry can multiply
in proportion to the demand. It consists in those useful plants and animals,
which, in uncultivated countries, nature produces with such profuse
abundance, that they are of little or no value, and which, as cultivation
advances, are therefore forced to give place to some more profitable
produce. During a long period in the progress of improvement, the quantity
of these is continually diminishing, while, at the same time, the demand for
them is continually increasing. Their real value, therefore, the real quantity
of labour which they will purchase or command, gradually rises, till at last
it gets so high as to render them as profitable a produce as any thing else
which human industry can raise upon the most fertile and best cultivated
land. When it has got so high, it cannot well go higher. If it did, more land
and more industry would soon be employed to increase their quantity.
When the price of cattle, for example, rises so high, that it is as profitable
to cultivate land in order to raise food for them as in order to raise food for
man, it cannot well go higher. If it did, more corn land would soon be
turned into pasture. The extension of tillage, by diminishing the quantity of
wild pasture, diminishes the quantity of butcher’s meat, which the country
naturally produces without labour or cultivation; and, by increasing the
number of those who have either corn, or, what comes to the same thing, the
price of corn, to give in exchange for it, increases the demand. The price of
butcher’s meat, therefore, and, consequently, of cattle, must gradually rise,
till it gets so high, that it becomes as profitable to employ the most fertile
and best cultivated lands in raising food for them as in raising corn. But it
must always be late in the progress of improvement before tillage can be so
far extended as to raise the price of cattle to this height; and, till it has got to
this height, if the country is advancing at all, their price must be continually
rising. There are, perhaps, some parts of Europe in which the price of cattle
has not yet got to this height. It had not got to this height in any part of
Scotland before the Union. Had the Scotch cattle been always confined to
the market of Scotland, in a country in which the quantity of land, which
can be applied to no other purpose but the feeding of cattle, is so great in
proportion to what can be applied to other purposes, it is scarce possible,
perhaps, that their price could ever have risen so high as to render it
profitable to cultivate land for the sake of feeding them. In England, the
price of cattle, it has already been observed, seems, in the neighbourhood of
London, to have got to this height about the beginning of the last century;
but it was much later, probably, before it got through the greater part of the
remoter counties, in some of which, perhaps, it may scarce yet have got to
it. Of all the different substances, however, which compose this second sort
of rude produce, cattle is, perhaps, that of which the price, in the progress of
improvement, rises first to this height.
Till the price of cattle, indeed, has got to this height, it seems scarce
possible that the greater part, even of those lands which are capable of the
highest cultivation, can be completely cultivated. In all farms too distant
from any town to carry manure from it, that is, in the far greater part of
those of every extensive country, the quantity of well cultivated land must
be in proportion to the quantity of manure which the farm itself produces;
and this, again, must be in proportion to the stock of cattle which are
maintained upon it. The land is manured, either by pasturing the cattle upon
it, or by feeding them in the stable, and from thence carrying out their dung
to it. But unless the price of the cattle be sufficient to pay both the rent and
profit of cultivated land, the farmer cannot afford to pasture them upon it;
and he can still less afford to feed them in the stable. It is with the produce
of improved and cultivated land only that cattle can be fed in the stable;
because, to collect the scanty and scattered produce of waste and
unimproved lands, would require too much labour, and be too expensive. It
the price of the cattle, therefore, is not sufficient to pay for the produce of
improved and cultivated land, when they are allowed to pasture it, that price
will be still less sufficient to pay for that produce, when it must be collected
with a good deal of additional labour, and brought into the stable to them. In
these circumstances, therefore, no more cattle can with profit be fed in the
stable than what are necessary for tillage. But these can never afford
manure enough for keeping constantly in good condition all the lands which
they are capable of cultivating. What they afford, being insufficient for the
whole farm, will naturally be reserved for the lands to which it can be most
advantageously or conveniently applied; the most fertile, or those, perhaps,
in the neighbourhood of the farm-yard. These, therefore, will be kept
constantly in good condition, and fit for tillage. The rest will, the greater
part of them, be allowed to lie waste, producing scarce any thing but some
miserable pasture, just sufficient to keep alive a few straggling, half-starved
cattle; the farm, though much overstocked in proportion to what would be
necessary for its complete cultivation, being very frequently overstocked in
proportion to its actual produce. A portion of this waste land, however, after
having been pastured in this wretched manner for six or seven years
together, may be ploughed up, when it will yield, perhaps, a poor crop or
two of bad oats, or of some other coarse grain; and then, being entirely
exhausted, it must be rested and pastured again as before, and another
portion ploughed up, to be in the same manner exhausted and rested again
in its turn. Such, accordingly, was the general system of management all
over the low country of Scotland before the Union. The lands which were
kept constantly well manured and in good condition seldom exceeded a
third or fourth part of the whole farm, and sometimes did not amount to a
fifth or a sixth part of it. The rest were never manured, but a certain portion
of them was in its turn, notwithstanding, regularly cultivated and exhausted.
Under this system of management, it is evident, even that part of the lands
of Scotland which is capable of good cultivation, could produce but little in
comparison of what it may be capable of producing. But how
disadvantageous soever this system may appear, yet, before the Union, the
low price of cattle seems to have rendered it almost unavoidable. If,
notwithstanding a great rise in the price, it still continues to prevail through
a considerable part of the country, it is owing in many places, no doubt, to
ignorance and attachment to old customs, but, in most places, to the
unavoidable obstructions which the natural course of things opposes to the
immediate or speedy establishment of a better system: first, to the poverty
of the tenants, to their not having yet had time to acquire a stock of cattle
sufficient to cultivate their lands more completely, the same rise of price,
which would render it advantageous for them to maintain a greater stock,
rendering it more difficult for them to acquire it; and, secondly, to their not
having yet had time to put their lands in condition to maintain this greater
stock properly, supposing they were capable of acquiring it. The increase of
stock and the improvement of land are two events which must go hand in
hand, and of which the one can nowhere much outrun the other. Without
some increase of stock, there can be scarce any improvement of land, but
there can be no considerable increase of stock, but in consequence of a
considerable improvement of land; because otherwise the land could not
maintain it. These natural obstructions to the establishment of a better
system, cannot be removed but by a long course of frugality and industry;
and half a century or a century more, perhaps, must pass away before the
old system, which is wearing out gradually, can be completely abolished
through all the different parts of the country. Of all the commercial
advantages, however, which Scotland has derived from the Union with
England, this rise in the price of cattle is, perhaps, the greatest. It has not
only raised the value of all highland estates, but it has, perhaps, been the
principal cause of the improvement of the low country.
In all new colonies, the great quantity of waste land, which can for many
years be applied to no other purpose but the feeding of cattle, soon renders
them extremely abundant; and in every thing great cheapness is the
necessary consequence of great abundance. Though all the cattle of the
European colonies in America were originally carried from Europe, they
soon multiplied so much there, and became of so little value, that even
horses were allowed to run wild in the woods, without any owner thinking
it worth while to claim them. It must be a long time after the first
establishment of such colonies, before it can become profitable to feed
cattle upon the produce of cultivated land. The same causes, therefore, the
want of manure, and the disproportion between the stock employed in
cultivation and the land which it is destined to cultivate, are likely to
introduce there a system of husbandry, not unlike that which still continues
to take place in so many parts of Scotland. Mr Kalm, the Swedish traveller,
when he gives an account of the husbandry of some of the English colonies
in North America, as he found it in 1749, observes, accordingly, that he can
with difficulty discover there the character of the English nation, so well
skilled in all the different branches of agriculture. They make scarce any
manure for their corn fields, he says; but when one piece of ground has
been exhausted by continual cropping, they clear and cultivate another
piece of fresh land; and when that is exhausted, proceed to a third. Their
cattle are allowed to wander through the woods and other uncultivated
grounds, where they are half-starved; having long ago extirpated almost all
the annual grasses, by cropping them too early in the spring, before they
had time to form their flowers, or to shed their seeds. {Kalm’s Travels, vol
1, pp. 343, 344.} The annual grasses were, it seems, the best natural grasses
in that part of North America; and when the Europeans first settled there,
they used to grow very thick, and to rise three or four feet high. A piece of
ground which, when he wrote, could not maintain one cow, would in former
times, he was assured, have maintained four, each of which would have
given four times the quantity of milk which that one was capable of giving.
The poorness of the pasture had, in his opinion, occasioned the degradation
of their cattle, which degenerated sensibly from me generation to another.
They were probably not unlike that stunted breed which was common all
over Scotland thirty or forty years ago, and which is now so much mended
through the greater part of the low country, not so much by a change of the
breed, though that expedient has been employed in some places, as by a
more plentiful method of feeding them.
Though it is late, therefore, in the progress of improvement, before cattle
can bring such a price as to render it profitable to cultivate land for the sake
of feeding them; yet of all the different parts which compose this second
sort of rude produce, they are perhaps the first which bring this price;
because, till they bring it, it seems impossible that improvement can be
brought near even to that degree of perfection to which it has arrived in
many parts of Europe.
As cattle are among the first, so perhaps venison is among the last parts
of this sort of rude produce which bring this price. The price of venison in
Great Britain, how extravagant soever it may appear, is not near sufficient
to compensate the expense of a deer park, as is well known to all those who
have had any experience in the feeding of deer. If it was otherwise, the
feeding of deer would soon become an article of common farming, in the
same manner as the feeding of those small birds, called turdi, was among
the ancient Romans. Varro and Columella assure us, that it was a most
profitable article. The fattening of ortolans, birds of passage which arrive
lean in the country, is said to be so in some parts of France. If venison
continues in fashion, and the wealth and luxury of Great Britain increase as
they have done for some time past, its price may very probably rise still
higher than it is at present.
Between that period in the progress of improvement, which brings to its
height the price of so necessary an article as cattle, and that which brings to
it the price of such a superfluity as venison, there is a very long interval, in
the course of which many other sorts of rude produce gradually arrive at
their highest price, some sooner and some later, according to different
circumstances.
Thus, in every farm, the offals of the barn and stable will maintain a
certain number of poultry. These, as they are fed with what would otherwise
be lost, are a mere save-all; and as they cost the farmer scarce any thing, so
he can afford to sell them for very little. Almost all that he gets is pure gain,
and their price can scarce be so low as to discourage him from feeding this
number. But in countries ill cultivated, and therefore but thinly inhabited,
the poultry, which are thus raised without expense, are often fully sufficient
to supply the whole demand. In this state of things, therefore, they are often
as cheap as butcher’s meat, or any other sort of animal food. But the whole
quantity of poultry which the farm in this manner produces without
expense, must always be much smaller than the whole quantity of butcher’s
meat which is reared upon it; and in times of wealth and luxury, what is
rare, with only nearly equal merit, is always preferred to what is common.
As wealth and luxury increase, therefore, in consequence of improvement
and cultivation, the price of poultry gradually rises above that of butcher’s
meat, till at last it gets so high, that it becomes profitable to cultivate land
for the sake of feeding them. When it has got to this height, it cannot well
go higher. If it did, more land would soon be turned to this purpose. In
several provinces of France, the feeding of poultry is considered as a very
important article in rural economy, and sufficiently profitable to encourage
the farmer to raise a considerable quantity of Indian corn and buckwheat for
this purpose. A middling farmer will there sometimes have four hundred
fowls in his yard. The feeding of poultry seems scarce yet to be generally
considered as a matter of so much importance in England. They are
certainly, however, dearer in England than in France, as England receives
considerable supplies from France. In the progress of improvements, the
period at which every particular sort of animal food is dearest, must
naturally be that which immediately precedes the general practice of
cultivating land for the sake of raising it. For some time before this practice
becomes general, the scarcity must necessarily raise the price. After it has
become general, new methods of feeding are commonly fallen upon, which
enable the farmer to raise upon the same quantity of ground a much greater
quantity of that particular sort of animal food. The plenty not only obliges
him to sell cheaper, but, in consequence of these improvements, he can
afford to sell cheaper; for if he could not afford it, the plenty would not be
of long continuance. It has been probably in this manner that the
introduction of clover, turnips, carrots, cabbages, etc. has contributed to
sink the common price of butcher’s meat in the London market, somewhat
below what it was about the beginning of the last century.
The hog, that finds his food among ordure, and greedily devours many
things rejected by every other useful animal, is, like poultry, originally kept
as a save-all. As long as the number of such animals, which can thus be
reared at little or no expense, is fully sufficient to supply the demand, this
sort of butcher’s meat comes to market at a much lower price than any
other. But when the demand rises beyond what this quantity can supply,
when it becomes necessary to raise food on purpose for feeding and
fattening hogs, in the same manner as for feeding and fattening other cattle,
the price necessarily rises, and becomes proportionably either higher or
lower than that of other butcher’s meat, according as the nature of the
country, and the state of its agriculture, happen to render the feeding of hogs
more or less expensive than that of other cattle. In France, according to Mr
Buffon, the price of pork is nearly equal to that of beef. In most parts of
Great Britain it is at present somewhat higher.
The great rise in the price both of hogs and poultry, has, in Great Britain,
been frequently imputed to the diminution of the number of cottagers and
other small occupiers of land; an event which has in every part of Europe
been the immediate forerunner of improvement and better cultivation, but
which at the same time may have contributed to raise the price of those
articles, both somewhat sooner and somewhat faster than it would otherwise
have risen. As the poorest family can often maintain a cat or a dog without
any expense, so the poorest occupiers of land can commonly maintain a few
poultry, or a sow and a few pigs, at very little. The little offals of their own
table, their whey, skimmed milk, and butter milk, supply those animals with
a part of their food, and they find the rest in the neighbouring fields,
without doing any sensible damage to any body. By diminishing the number
of those small occupiers, therefore, the quantity of this sort of provisions,
which is thus produced at little or no expense, must certainly have been a
good deal diminished, and their price must consequently have been raised
both sooner and faster than it would otherwise have risen. Sooner or later,
however, in the progress of improvement, it must at any rate have risen to
the utmost height to which it is capable of rising; or to the price which pays
the labour and expense of cultivating the land which furnishes them with
food, as well as these are paid upon the greater part of other cultivated land.
The business of the dairy, like the feeding of hogs and poultry, is
originally carried on as a save-all. The cattle necessarily kept upon the farm
produce more milk than either the rearing of their own young, or the
consumption of the farmer’s family requires; and they produce most at one
particular season. But of all the productions of land, milk is perhaps the
most perishable. In the warm season, when it is most abundant, it will
scarce keep four-and-twenty hours. The farmer, by making it into fresh
butter, stores a small part of it for a week; by making it into salt butter, for a
year; and by making it into cheese, he stores a much greater part of it for
several years. Part of all these is reserved for the use of his own family; the
rest goes to market, in order to find the best price which is to be had, and
which can scarce be so low is to discourage him from sending thither
whatever is over and above the use of his own family. If it is very low
indeed, he will be likely to manage his dairy in a very slovenly and dirty
manner, and will scarce, perhaps, think it worth while to have a particular
room or building on purpose for it, but will suffer the business to be carried
on amidst the smoke, filth, and nastiness of his own kitchen, as was the case
of almost all the farmers’ dairies in Scotland thirty or forty years ago, and
as is the case of many of them still. The same causes which gradually raise
the price of butcher’s meat, the increase of the demand, and, in consequence
of the improvement of the country, the diminution of the quantity which can
be fed at little or no expense, raise, in the same manner, that of the produce
of the dairy, of which the price naturally connects with that of butcher’s
meat, or with the expense of feeding cattle. The increase of price pays for
more labour, care, and cleanliness. The dairy becomes more worthy of the
farmer’s attention, and the quality of its produce gradually improves. The
price at last gets so high, that it becomes worth while to employ some of the
most fertile and best cultivated lands in feeding cattle merely for the
purpose of the dairy; and when it has got to this height, it cannot well go
higher. If it did, more land would soon be turned to this purpose. It seems to
have got to this height through the greater part of England, where much
good land is commonly employed in this manner. If you except the
neighbourhood of a few considerable towns, it seems not yet to have got to
this height anywhere in Scotland, where common farmers seldom employ
much good land in raising food for cattle, merely for the purpose of the
dairy. The price of the produce, though it has risen very considerably within
these few years, is probably still too low to admit of it. The inferiority of the
quality, indeed, compared with that of the produce of English dairies, is
fully equal to that of the price. But this inferiority of quality is, perhaps,
rather the effect of this lowness of price, than the cause of it. Though the
quality was much better, the greater part of what is brought to market could
not, I apprehend, in the present circumstances of the country, be disposed of
at a much better price; and the present price, it is probable, would not pay
the expense of the land and labour necessary for producing a much better
quality. Through the greater part of England, notwithstanding the
superiority of price, the dairy is not reckoned a more profitable employment
of land than the raising of corn, or the fattening of cattle, the two great
objects of agriculture. Through the greater part of Scotland, therefore, it
cannot yet be even so profitable.
The lands of no country, it is evident, can ever be completely cultivated
and improved, till once the price of every produce, which human industry is
obliged to raise upon them, has got so high as to pay for the expense of
complete improvement and cultivation. In order to do this, the price of each
particular produce must be sufficient, first, to pay the rent of good corn
land, as it is that which regulates the rent of the greater part of other
cultivated land; and, secondly, to pay the labour and expense of the farmer,
as well as they are commonly paid upon good corn land; or, in other words,
to replace with the ordinary profits the stock which he employs about it.
This rise in the price of each particular produce; must evidently be previous
to the improvement and cultivation of the land which is destined for raising
it. Gain is the end of all improvement; and nothing could deserve that name,
of which loss was to be the necessary consequence. But loss must be the
necessary consequence of improving land for the sake of a produce of
which the price could never bring back the expense. If the complete
improvement and cultivation of the country be, as it most certainly is, the
greatest of all public advantages, this rise in the price of all those different
sorts of rude produce, instead of being considered as a public calamity,
ought to be regarded as the necessary forerunner and attendant of the
greatest of all public advantages.
This rise, too, in the nominal or money price of all those different sorts of
rude produce, has been the effect, not of any degradation in the value of
silver, but of a rise in their real price. They have become worth, not only a
greater quantity of silver, but a greater quantity of labour and subsistence
than before. As it costs a greater quantity of labour and subsistence to bring
them to market, so, when they are brought thither they represent, or are
equivalent to a greater quantity.
Third Sort.—The third and last sort of rude produce, of which the price
naturally rises in the progress of improvement, is that in which the efficacy
of human industry, in augmenting the quantity, is either limited or uncertain.
Though the real price of this sort of rude produce, therefore, naturally tends
to rise in the progress of improvement, yet, according as different accidents
happen to render the efforts of human industry more or less successful in
augmenting the quantity, it may happen sometimes even to fall, sometimes
to continue the same, in very different periods of improvement, and
sometimes to rise more or less in the same period.
There are some sorts of rude produce which nature has rendered a kind of
appendages to other sorts; so that the quantity of the one which any country
can afford, is necessarily limited by that of the other. The quantity of wool
or of raw hides, for example, which any country can afford, is necessarily
limited by the number of great and small cattle that are kept in it. The state
of its improvement, and the nature of its agriculture, again necessarily
determine this number.
The same causes which, in the progress of improvement, gradually raise
the price of butcher’s meat, should have the same effect, it may be thought,
upon the prices of wool and raw hides, and raise them, too, nearly in the
same proportion. It probably would be so, if, in the rude beginnings of
improvement, the market for the latter commodities was confined within as
narrow bounds as that for the former. But the extent of their respective
markets is commonly extremely different.
The market for butcher’s meat is almost everywhere confined to the
country which produces it. Ireland, and some part of British America,
indeed, carry on a considerable trade in salt provisions; but they are, I
believe, the only countries in the commercial world which do so, or which
export to other countries any considerable part of their butcher’s meat.
The market for wool and raw hides, on the contrary, is, in the rude
beginnings of improvement, very seldom confined to the country which
produces them. They can easily be transported to distant countries; wool
without any preparation, and raw hides with very little; and as they are the
materials of many manufactures, the industry of other countries may
occasion a demand for them, though that of the country which produces
them might not occasion any.
In countries ill cultivated, and therefore but thinly inhabited, the price of
the wool and the hide bears always a much greater proportion to that of the
whole beast, than in countries where, improvement and population being
further advanced, there is more demand for butcher’s meat. Mr Hume
observes, that in the Saxon times, the fleece was estimated at two-fifths of
the value of the whole sheep and that this was much above the proportion of
its present estimation. In some provinces of Spain, I have been assured, the
sheep is frequently killed merely for the sake of the fleece and the tallow.
The carcase is often left to rot upon the ground, or to be devoured by beasts
and birds of prey. If this sometimes happens even in Spain, it happens
almost constantly in Chili, at Buenos Ayres, and in many other parts of
Spanish America, where the horned cattle are almost constantly killed
merely for the sake of the hide and the tallow. This, too, used to happen
almost constantly in Hispaniola, while it was infested by the buccaneers,
and before the settlement, improvement, and populousness of the French
plantations ( which now extend round the coast of almost the whole western
half of the island) had given some value to the cattle of the Spaniards, who
still continue to possess, not only the eastern part of the coast, but the whole
inland mountainous part of the country.
Though, in the progress of improvement and population, the price of the
whole beast necessarily rises, yet the price of the carcase is likely to be
much more affected by this rise than that of the wool and the hide. The
market for the carcase being in the rude state of society confined always to
the country which produces it, must necessarily be extended in proportion
to the improvement and population of that country. But the market for the
wool and the hides, even of a barbarous country, often extending to the
whole commercial world, it can very seldom be enlarged in the same
proportion. The state of the whole commercial world can seldom be much
affected by the improvement of any particular country; and the market for
such commodities may remain the same, or very nearly the same, after such
improvements, as before. It should, however, in the natural course of things,
rather, upon the whole, be somewhat extended in consequence of them. If
the manufactures, especially, of which those commodities are the materials,
should ever come to flourish in the country, the market, though it might not
be much enlarged, would at least be brought much nearer to the place of
growth than before; and the price of those materials might at least be
increased by what had usually been the expense of transporting them to
distant countries. Though it might not rise, therefore, in the same proportion
as that of butcher’s meat, it ought naturally to rise somewhat, and it ought
certainly not to fall.
In England, however, notwithstanding the flourishing state of its woollen
manufacture, the price of English wool has fallen very considerably since
the time of Edward III. There are many authentic records which
demonstrate that, during the reign of that prince (towards the middle of the
fourteenth century, or about 1339), what was reckoned the moderate and
reasonable price of the tod, or twenty-eight pounds of English wool, was
not less than ten shillings of the money of those times {See Smith’s
Memoirs of Wool, vol. i c. 5, 6, 7. also vol. ii.}, containing, at the rate of
twenty-pence the ounce, six ounces of silver, Tower weight, equal to about
thirty shillings of our present money. In the present times, one-and-twenty
shillings the tod may be reckoned a good price for very good English wool.
The money price of wool, therefore, in the time of Edward III. was to its
money price in the present times as ten to seven. The superiority of its real
price was still greater. At the rate of six shillings and eightpence the quarter,
ten shillings was in those ancient times the price of twelve bushels of
wheat. At the rate of twenty-eight shillings the quarter, one-and-twenty
shillings is in the present times the price of six bushels only. The proportion
between the real price of ancient and modern times, therefore, is as twelve
to six, or as two to one. In those ancient times, a tod of wool would have
purchased twice the quantity of subsistence which it will purchase at
present, and consequently twice the quantity of labour, if the real
recompence of labour had been the same in both periods.
This degradation, both in the real and nominal value of wool, could never
have happened in consequence of the natural course of things. It has
accordingly been the effect of violence and artifice. First, of the absolute
prohibition of exporting wool from England: secondly, of the permission of
importing it from Spain, duty free: thirdly, of the prohibition of exporting it
from Ireland to another country but England. In consequence of these
regulations, the market for English wool, instead of being somewhat
extended, in consequence of the improvement of England, has been
confined to the home market, where the wool of several other countries is
allowed to come into competition with it, and where that of Ireland is
forced into competition with it. As the woollen manufactures, too, of
Ireland, are fully as much discouraged as is consistent with justice and fair
dealing, the Irish can work up but a smaller part of their own wool at home,
and are therefore obliged to send a greater proportion of it to Great Britain,
the only market they are allowed.
I have not been able to find any such authentic records concerning the
price of raw hides in ancient times. Wool was commonly paid as a subsidy
to the king, and its valuation in that subsidy ascertains, at least in some
degree, what was its ordinary price. But this seems not to have been the
case with raw hides. Fleetwood, however, from an account in 1425,
between the prior of Burcester Oxford and one of his canons, gives us their
price, at least as it was stated upon that particular occasion, viz. five ox
hides at twelve shillings; five cow hides at seven shillings and threepence;
thirtysix sheep skins of two years old at nine shillings; sixteen calf skins at
two shillings. In 1425, twelve shillings contained about the same quantity of
silver as four-and-twenty shillings of our present money. An ox hide,
therefore, was in this account valued at the same quantity of silver as 4s.
4/5ths of our present money. Its nominal price was a good deal lower than
at present. But at the rate of six shillings and eightpence the quarter, twelve
shillings would in those times have purchased fourteen bushels and four-
fifths of a bushel of wheat, which, at three and sixpence the bushel, would
in the present times cost 51s. 4d. An ox hide, therefore, would in those
times have purchased as much corn as ten shillings and threepence would
purchase at present. Its real value was equal to ten shillings and threepence
of our present money. In those ancient times, when the cattle were half
starved during the greater part of the winter, we cannot suppose that they
were of a very large size. An ox hide which weighs four stone of sixteen
pounds of avoirdupois, is not in the present times reckoned a bad one; and
in those ancient times would probably have been reckoned a very good one.
But at half-a-crown the stone, which at this moment (February 1773) I
understand to be the common price, such a hide would at present cost only
ten shillings. Through its nominal price, therefore, is higher in the present
than it was in those ancient times, its real price, the real quantity of
subsistence which it will purchase or command, is rather somewhat lower.
The price of cow hides, as stated in the above account, is nearly in the
common proportion to that of ox hides. That of sheep skins is a good deal
above it. They had probably been sold with the wool. That of calves skins,
on the contrary, is greatly below it. In countries where the price of cattle is
very low, the calves, which are not intended to be reared in order to keep up
the stock, are generally killed very young, as was the case in Scotland
twenty or thirty years ago. It saves the milk, which their price would not
pay for. Their skins, therefore, are commonly good for little.
The price of raw hides is a good deal lower at present than it was a few
years ago; owing probably to the taking off the duty upon seal skins, and to
the allowing, for a limited time, the importation of raw hides from Ireland,
and from the plantations, duty free, which was done in 1769. Take the
whole of the present century at an average, their real price has probably
been somewhat higher than it was in those ancient times. The nature of the
commodity renders it not quite so proper for being transported to distant
markets as wool. It suffers more by keeping. A salted hide is reckoned
inferior to a fresh one, and sells for a lower price. This circumstance must
necessarily have some tendency to sink the price of raw hides produced in a
country which does not manufacture them, but is obliged to export them,
and comparatively to raise that of those produced in a country which does
manufacture them. It must have some tendency to sink their price in a
barbarous, and to raise it in an improved and manufacturing country. It must
have had some tendency, therefore, to sink it in ancient, and to raise it in
modern times. Our tanners, besides, have not been quite so successful as
our clothiers, in convincing the wisdom of the nation, that the safety of the
commonwealth depends upon the prosperity of their particular manufacture.
They have accordingly been much less favoured. The exportation of raw
hides has, indeed, been prohibited, and declared a nuisance; but their
importation from foreign countries has been subjected to a duty; and though
this duty has been taken off from those of Ireland and the plantations (for
the limited time of five years only), yet Ireland has not been confined to the
market of Great Britain for the sale of its surplus hides, or of those which
are not manufactured at home. The hides of common cattle have, but within
these few years, been put among the enumerated commodities which the
plantations can send nowhere but to the mother country; neither has the
commerce of Ireland been in this case oppressed hitherto, in order to
support the manufactures of Great Britain.
Whatever regulations tend to sink the price, either of wool or of raw
hides, below what it naturally would he, must, in an improved and
cultivated country, have some tendency to raise the price of butcher’s meat.
The price both of the great and small cattle, which are fed on improved and
cultivated land, must be sufficient to pay the rent which the landlord, and
the profit which the farmer, has reason to expect from improved and
cultivated land. If it is not, they will soon cease to feed them. Whatever part
of this price, therefore, is not paid by the wool and the hide, must be paid by
the carcase. The less there is paid for the one, the more must be paid for the
other. In what manner this price is to be divided upon the different parts of
the beast, is indifferent to the landlords and farmers, provided it is all paid
to them. In an improved and cultivated country, therefore, their interest as
landlords and farmers cannot be much affected by such regulations, though
their interest as consumers may, by the rise in the price of provisions. It
would be quite otherwise, however, in an unimproved and uncultivated
country, where the greater part of the lands could be applied to no other
purpose but the feeding of cattle, and where the wool and the hide made the
principal part of the value of those cattle. Their interest as landlords and
farmers would in this case be very deeply affected by such regulations, and
their interest as consumers very little. The fall in the price of the wool and
the hide would not in this case raise the price of the carcase; because the
greater part of the lands of the country being applicable to no other purpose
but the feeding of cattle, the same number would still continue to be fed.
The same quantity of butcher’s meat would still come to market. The
demand for it would be no greater than before. Its price, therefore, would be
the same as before. The whole price of cattle would fall, and along with it
both the rent and the profit of all those lands of which cattle was the
principal produce, that is, of the greater part of the lands of the country. The
perpetual prohibition of the exportation of wool, which is commonly, but
very falsely, ascribed to Edward III., would, in the then circumstances of the
country, have been the most destructive regulation which could well have
been thought of. It would not only have reduced the actual value of the
greater part of the lands in the kingdom, but by reducing the price of the
most important species of small cattle, it would have retarded very much its
subsequent improvement.
The wool of Scotland fell very considerably in its price in consequence
of the union with England, by which it was excluded from the great market
of Europe, and confined to the narrow one of Great Britain. The value of
the greater part of the lands in the southern counties of Scotland, which are
chiefly a sheep country, would have been very deeply affected by this event,
had not the rise in the price of butcher’s meat fully compensated the fall in
the price of wool.
As the efficacy of human industry, in increasing the quantity either of
wool or of raw hides, is limited, so far as it depends upon the produce of the
country where it is exerted; so it is uncertain so far as it depends upon the
produce of other countries. It so far depends not so much upon the quantity
which they produce, as upon that which they do not manufacture; and upon
the restraints which they may or may not think proper to impose upon the
exportation of this sort of rude produce. These circumstances, as they are
altogether independent of domestic industry, so they necessarily render the
efficacy of its efforts more or less uncertain. In multiplying this sort of rude
produce, therefore, the efficacy of human industry is not only limited, but
uncertain.
In multiplying another very important sort of rude produce, the quantity
of fish that is brought to market, it is likewise both limited and uncertain. It
is limited by the local situation of the country, by the proximity or distance
of its different provinces from the sea, by the number of its lakes and rivers,
and by what may be called the fertility or barrenness of those seas, lakes,
and rivers, as to this sort of rude produce. As population increases, as the
annual produce of the land and labour of the country grows greater and
greater, there come to be more buyers of fish; and those buyers, too, have a
greater quantity and variety of other goods, or, what is the same thing, the
price of a greater quantity and variety of other goods, to buy with. But it
will generally be impossible to supply the great and extended market,
without employing a quantity of labour greater than in proportion to what
had been requisite for supplying the narrow and confined one. A market
which, from requiring only one thousand, comes to require annually ten
thousand ton of fish, can seldom be supplied, without employing more than
ten times the quantity of labour which had before been sufficient to supply
it. The fish must generally be sought for at a greater distance, larger vessels
must be employed, and more expensive machinery of every kind made use
of. The real price of this commodity, therefore, naturally rises in the
progress of improvement. It has accordingly done so, I believe, more or less
in every country.
Though the success of a particular day’s fishing maybe a very uncertain
matter, yet the local situation of the country being supposed, the general
efficacy of industry in bringing a certain quantity of fish to market, taking
the course of a year, or of several years together, it may, perhaps, be thought
is certain enough; and it, no doubt, is so. As it depends more, however,
upon the local situation of the country, than upon the state of its wealth and
industry; as upon this account it may in different countries be the same in
very different periods of improvement, and very different in the same
period; its connection with the state of improvement is uncertain; and it is
of this sort of uncertainty that I am here speaking.
In increasing the quantity of the different minerals and metals which are
drawn from the bowels of the earth, that of the more precious ones
particularly, the efficacy of human industry seems not to be limited, but to
be altogether uncertain.
The quantity of the precious metals which is to be found in any country,
is not limited by any thing in its local situation, such as the fertility or
barrenness of its own mines. Those metals frequently abound in countries
which possess no mines. Their quantity, in every particular country, seems
to depend upon two different circumstances; first, upon its power of
purchasing, upon the state of its industry, upon the annual produce of its
land and labour, in consequence of which it can afford to employ a greater
or a smaller quantity of labour and subsistence, in bringing or purchasing
such superfluities as gold and silver, either from its own mines, or from
those of other countries; and, secondly, upon the fertility or barrenness of
the mines which may happen at any particular time to supply the
commercial world with those metals. The quantity of those metals in the
countries most remote from the mines, must be more or less affected by this
fertility or barrenness, on account of the easy and cheap transportation of
those metals, of their small bulk and great value. Their quantity in China
and Indostan must have been more or less affected by the abundance of the
mines of America.
So far as their quantity in any particular country depends upon the former
of those two circumstances (the power of purchasing), their real price, like
that of all other luxuries and superfluities, is likely to rise with the wealth
and improvement of the country, and to fall with its poverty and depression.
Countries which have a great quantity of labour and subsistence to spare,
can afford to purchase any particular quantity of those metals at the expense
of a greater quantity of labour and subsistence, than countries which have
less to spare.
So far as their quantity in any particular country depends upon the latter
of those two circumstances (the fertility or barrenness of the mines which
happen to supply the commercial world), their real price, the real quantity
of labour and subsistence which they will purchase or exchange for, will, no
doubt, sink more or less in proportion to the fertility, and rise in proportion
to the barrenness of those mines.
The fertility or barrenness of the mines, however, which may happen at
any particular time to supply the commercial world, is a circumstance
which, it is evident, may have no sort of connection with the state of
industry in a particular country. It seems even to have no very necessary
connection with that of the world in general. As arts and commerce, indeed,
gradually spread themselves over a greater and a greater part of the earth,
the search for new mines, being extended over a wider surface, may have
somewhat a better chance for being successful than when confined within
narrower bounds. The discovery of new mines, however, as the old ones
come to be gradually exhausted, is a matter of the greatest uncertainty, and
such as no human skill or industry can insure. All indications, it is
acknowledged, are doubtful; and the actual discovery and successful
working of a new mine can alone ascertain the reality of its value, or even
of its existence. In this search there seem to be no certain limits, either to
the possible success, or to the possible disappointment of human industry.
In the course of a century or two, it is possible that new mines may be
discovered, more fertile than any that have ever yet been known; and it is
just equally possible, that the most fertile mine then known may be more
barren than any that was wrought before the discovery of the mines of
America. Whether the one or the other of those two events may happen to
take place, is of very little importance to the real wealth and prosperity of
the world, to the real value of the annual produce of the land and labour of
mankind. Its nominal value, the quantity of gold and silver by which this
annual produce could be expressed or represented, would, no doubt, be very
different; but its real value, the real quantity of labour which it could
purchase or command, would be precisely the same. A shilling might, in the
one case, represent no more labour than a penny does at present; and a
penny, in the other, might represent as much as a shilling does now. But in
the one case, he who had a shilling in his pocket would be no richer than he
who has a penny at present; and in the other, he who had a penny would be
just as rich as he who has a shilling now. The cheapness and abundance of
gold and silver plate would be the sole advantage which the world could
derive from the one event; and the dearness and scarcity of those trifling
superfluities, the only inconveniency it could suffer from the other.
Conclusion of the Digression concerning the Variations in the
Value of Silver.
The greater part of the writers who have collected the money price of
things in ancient times, seem to have considered the low money price of
corn, and of goods in general, or, in other words, the high value of gold and
silver, as a proof, not only of the scarcity of those metals, but of the poverty
and barbarism of the country at the time when it took place. This notion is
connected with the system of political economy, which represents national
wealth as consisting in the abundance and national poverty in the scarcity,
of gold and silver; a system which I shall endeavour to explain and examine
at great length in the fourth book of this Inquiry. I shall only observe at
present, that the high value of the precious metals can be no proof of the
poverty or barbarism of any particular country at the time when it took
place. It is a proof only of the barrenness of the mines which happened at
that time to supply the commercial world. A poor country, as it cannot
afford to buy more, so it can as little afford to pay dearer for gold and silver
than a rich one; and the value of those metals, therefore, is not likely to be
higher in the former than in the latter. In China, a country much richer than
any part of Europe, the value of the precious metals is much higher than in
any part of Europe. As the wealth of Europe, indeed, has increased greatly
since the discovery of the mines of America, so the value of gold and silver
has gradually diminished. This diminution of their value, however, has not
been owing to the increase of the real wealth of Europe, of the annual
produce of its land and labour, but to the accidental discovery of more
abundant mines than any that were known before. The increase of the
quantity of gold and silver in Europe, and the increase of its manufactures
and agriculture, are two events which, though they have happened nearly
about the same time, yet have arisen from very different causes, and have
scarce any natural connection with one another. The one has arisen from a
mere accident, in which neither prudence nor policy either had or could
have any share; the other, from the fall of the feudal system, and from the
establishment of a government which afforded to industry the only
encouragement which it requires, some tolerable security that it shall enjoy
the fruits of its own labour. Poland, where the feudal system still continues
to take place, is at this day as beggarly a country as it was before the
discovery of America. The money price of corn, however, has risen; the real
value of the precious metals has fallen in Poland, in the same manner as in
other parts of Europe. Their quantity, therefore, must have increased there
as in other places, and nearly in the same proportion to the annual produce
of its land and labour. This increase of the quantity of those metals,
however, has not, it seems, increased that annual produce, has neither
improved the manufactures and agriculture of the country, nor mended the
circumstances of its inhabitants. Spain and Portugal, the countries which
possess the mines, are, after Poland, perhaps the two most beggarly
countries in Europe. The value of the precious metals, however, must be
lower in Spain and Portugal than in any other part of Europe, as they come
from those countries to all other parts of Europe, loaded, not only with a
freight and an insurance, but with the expense of smuggling, their
exportation being either prohibited or subjected to a duty. In proportion to
the annual produce of the land and labour, therefore, their quantity must be
greater in those countries than in any other part of Europe; those countries,
however, are poorer than the greater part of Europe. Though the feudal
system has been abolished in Spain and Portugal, it has not been succeeded
by a much better.
As the low value of gold and silver, therefore, is no proof of the wealth
and flourishing state of the country where it takes place; so neither is their
high value, or the low money price either of goods in general, or of corn in
particular, any proof of its poverty and barbarism.
But though the low money price, either of goods in general, or of corn in
particular, be no proof of the poverty or barbarism of the times, the low
money price of some particular sorts of goods, such as cattle, poultry, game
of all kinds, etc. in proportion to that of corn, is a most decisive one. It
clearly demonstrates, first, their great abundance in proportion to that of
corn, and, consequently, the great extent of the land which they occupied in
proportion to what was occupied by corn; and, secondly, the low value of
this land in proportion to that of corn land, and, consequently, the
uncultivated and unimproved state of the far greater part of the lands of the
country. It clearly demonstrates, that the stock and population of the country
did not bear the same proportion to the extent of its territory, which they
commonly do in civilized countries; and that society was at that time, and in
that country, but in its infancy. From the high or low money price, either of
goods in general, or of corn in particular, we can infer only, that the mines,
which at that time happened to supply the commercial world with gold and
silver, were fertile or barren, not that the country was rich or poor. But from
the high or low money price of some sorts of goods in proportion to that of
others, we can infer, with a degree of probability that approaches almost to
certainty, that it was rich or poor, that the greater part of its lands were
improved or unimproved, and that it was either in a more or less barbarous
state, or in a more or less civilized one.
Any rise in the money price of goods which proceeded altogether from
the degradation of the value of silver, would affect all sorts of goods
equally, and raise their price universally, a third, or a fourth, or a fifth part
higher, according as silver happened to lose a third, or a fourth, or a fifth
part of its former value. But the rise in the price of provisions, which has
been the subject of so much reasoning and conversation, does not affect all
sorts of provisions equally. Taking the course of the present century at an
average, the price of corn, it is acknowledged, even by those who account
for this rise by the degradation of the value of silver, has risen much less
than that of some other sorts of provisions. The rise in the price of those
other sorts of provisions, therefore, cannot be owing altogether to the
degradation of the value of silver. Some other causes must be taken into the
account; and those which have been above assigned, will, perhaps, without
having recourse to the supposed degradation of the value of silver,
sufficiently explain this rise in those particular sorts of provisions, of which
the price has actually risen in proportion to that of corn.
As to the price of corn itself, it has, during the sixty-four first years of the
present century, and before the late extraordinary course of bad seasons,
been somewhat lower than it was during the sixty-four last years of the
preceding century. This fact is attested, not only by the accounts of Windsor
market, but by the public fiars of all the different counties of Scotland, and
by the accounts of several different markets in France, which have been
collected with great diligence and fidelity by Mr Messance, and by Mr
Dupré de St Maur. The evidence is more complete than could well have
been expected in a matter which is naturally so very difficult to be
ascertained.
As to the high price of corn during these last ten or twelve years, it can be
sufficiently accounted for from the badness of the seasons, without
supposing any degradation in the value of silver.
The opinion, therefore, that silver is continually sinking in its value,
seems not to be founded upon any good observations, either upon the prices
of corn, or upon those of other provisions.
The same quantity of silver, it may perhaps be said, will, in the present
times, even according to the account which has been here given, purchase a
much smaller quantity of several sorts of provisions than it would have
done during some part of the last century; and to ascertain whether this
change be owing to a rise in the value of those goods, or to a fall in the
value of silver, is only to establish a vain and useless distinction, which can
be of no sort of service to the man who has only a certain quantity of silver
to go to market with, or a certain fixed revenue in money. I certainly do not
pretend that the knowledge of this distinction will enable him to buy
cheaper. It may not, however, upon that account be altogether useless.
It may be of some use to the public, by affording an easy proof of the
prosperous condition of the country. If the rise in the price of some sorts of
provisions be owing altogether to a fall in the value of silver, it is owing to
a circumstance, from which nothing can be inferred but the fertility of the
American mines. The real wealth of the country, the annual produce of its
land and labour, may, notwithstanding this circumstance, be either gradually
declining, as in Portugal and Poland; or gradually advancing, as in most
other parts of Europe. But if this rise in the price of some sorts of provisions
be owing to a rise in the real value of the land which produces them, to its
increased fertility, or, in consequence of more extended improvement and
good cultivation, to its having been rendered fit for producing corn; it is
owing to a circumstance which indicates, in the clearest manner, the
prosperous and advancing state of the country. The land constitutes by far
the greatest, the most important, and the most durable part of the wealth of
every extensive country. It may surely be of some use, or, at least, it may
give some satisfaction to the public, to have so decisive a proof of the
increasing value of by far the greatest, the most important, and the most
durable part of its wealth.
It may, too, be of some use to the public, in regulating the pecuniary
reward of some of its inferior servants. If this rise in the price of some sorts
of provisions be owing to a fall in the value of silver, their pecuniary
reward, provided it was not too large before, ought certainly to be
augmented in proportion to the extent of this fall. If it is not augmented,
their real recompence will evidently be so much diminished. But if this rise
of price is owing to the increased value, in consequence of the improved
fertility of the land which produces such provisions, it becomes a much
nicer matter to judge, either in what proportion any pecuniary reward ought
to be augmented, or whether it ought to be augmented at all. The extension
of improvement and cultivation, as it necessarily raises more or less, in
proportion to the price of corn, that of every sort of animal food, so it as
necessarily lowers that of, I believe, every sort of vegetable food. It raises
the price of animal food; because a great part of the land which produces it,
being rendered fit for producing corn, must afford to the landlord anti
farmer the rent and profit of corn land. It lowers the price of vegetable food;
because, by increasing the fertility of the land, it increases its abundance.
The improvements of agriculture, too, introduce many sorts of vegetable
food, which requiring less land, and not more labour than corn, come much
cheaper to market. Such are potatoes and maize, or what is called Indian
corn, the two most important improvements which the agriculture of
Europe, perhaps, which Europe itself, has received from the great extension
of its commerce and navigation. Many sorts of vegetable food, besides,
which in the rude state of agriculture are confined to the kitchen-garden,
and raised only by the spade, come, in its improved state, to be introduced
into common fields, and to be raised by the plough; such as turnips, carrots,
cabbages, etc. If, in the progress of improvement, therefore, the real price of
one species of food necessarily rises, that of another as necessarily falls;
and it becomes a matter of more nicety to judge how far the rise in the one
may be compensated by the fall in the other. When the real price of
butcher’s meat has once got to its height (which, with regard to every sort,
except perhaps that of hogs flesh, it seems to have done through a great part
of England more than a century ago), any rise which can afterwards happen
in that of any other sort of animal food, cannot much affect the
circumstances of the inferior ranks of people. The circumstances of the
poor, through a great part of England, cannot surely be so much distressed
by any rise in the price of poultry, fish, wild-fowl, or venison, as they must
be relieved by the fall in that of potatoes.
In the present season of scarcity, the high price of corn no doubt
distresses the poor. But in times of moderate plenty, when corn is at its
ordinary or average price, the natural rise in the price of any other sort of
rude produce cannot much affect them. They suffer more, perhaps, by the
artificial rise which has been occasioned by taxes in the price of some
manufactured commodities, as of salt, soap, leather, candles, malt, beer, ale,
etc.
Effects of the Progress of Improvement upon the real Price of
Manufactures.
It is the natural effect of improvement, however, to diminish gradually
the real price of almost all manufactures. That of the manufacturing
workmanship diminishes, perhaps, in all of them without exception. In
consequence of better machinery, of greater dexterity, and of a more proper
division and distribution of work, all of which are the natural effects of
improvement, a much smaller quantity of labour becomes requisite for
executing any particular piece of work; and though, in consequence of the
flourishing circumstances of the society, the real price of labour should rise
very considerably, yet the great diminution of the quantity will generally
much more than compensate the greatest rise which can happen in the price.
There are, indeed, a few manufactures, in which the necessary rise in the
real price of the rude materials will more than compensate all the
advantages which improvement can introduce into the execution of the
work in carpenters’ and joiners’ work, and in the coarser sort of cabinet
work, the necessary rise in the real price of barren timber, in consequence of
the improvement of land, will more than compensate all the advantages
which can be derived from the best machinery, the greatest dexterity, and
the most proper division and distribution of work.
But in all cases in which the real price of the rude material either does not
rise at all, or does not rise very much, that of the manufactured commodity
sinks very considerably.
This diminution of price has, in the course of the present and preceding
century, been most remarkable in those manufactures of which the materials
are the coarser metals. A better movement of a watch, than about the middle
of the last century could have been bought for twenty pounds, may now
perhaps be had for twenty shillings. In the work of cutlers and locksmiths,
in all the toys which are made of the coarser metals, and in all those goods
which are commonly known by the name of Birmingham and Sheffield
ware, there has been, during the same period, a very great reduction of
price, though not altogether so great as in watch-work. It has, however,
been sufficient to astonish the workmen of every other part of Europe, who
in many cases acknowledge that they can produce no work of equal
goodness for double or even for triple the price. There are perhaps no
manufactures, in which the division of labour can be carried further, or in
which the machinery employed admits of a greater variety of
improvements, than those of which the materials are the coarser metals.
In the clothing manufacture there has, during the same period, been no
such sensible reduction of price. The price of superfine cloth, I have been
assured, on the contrary, has, within these five-and-twenty or thirty years,
risen somewhat in proportion to its quality, owing, it was said, to a
considerable rise in the price of the material, which consists altogether of
Spanish wool. That of the Yorkshire cloth, which is made altogether of
English wool, is said, indeed, during the course of the present century, to
have fallen a good deal in proportion to its quality. Quality, however, is so
very disputable a matter, that I look upon all information of this kind as
somewhat uncertain. In the clothing manufacture, the division of labour is
nearly the same now as it was a century ago, and the machinery employed
is not very different. There may, however, have been some small
improvements in both, which may have occasioned some reduction of price.
But the reduction will appear much more sensible and undeniable, if we
compare the price of this manufacture in the present times with what it was
in a much remoter period, towards the end of the fifteenth century, when the
labour was probably much less subdivided, and the machinery employed
much more imperfect, than it is at present.
In 1487, being the 4th of Henry VII., it was enacted, that “whosoever
shall sell by retail a broad yard of the finest scarlet grained, or of other
grained cloth of the finest making, above sixteen shillings, shall forfeit forty
shillings for every yard so sold.” Sixteen shillings, therefore, containing
about the same quantity of silver as four-and-twenty shillings of our present
money, was, at that time, reckoned not an unreasonable price for a yard of
the finest cloth; and as this is a sumptuary law, such cloth, it is probable,
had usually been sold somewhat dearer. A guinea may be reckoned the
highest price in the present times. Even though the quality of the cloths,
therefore, should be supposed equal, and that of the present times is most
probably much superior, yet, even upon this supposition, the money price of
the finest cloth appears to have been considerably reduced since the end of
the fifteenth century. But its real price has been much more reduced. Six
shillings and eightpence was then, and long afterwards, reckoned the
average price of a quarter of wheat. Sixteen shillings, therefore, was the
price of two quarters and more than three bushels of wheat. Valuing a
quarter of wheat in the present times at eight-and-twenty shillings, the real
price of a yard of fine cloth must, in those times, have been equal to at least
three pounds six shillings and sixpence of our present money. The man who
bought it must have parted with the command of a quantity of labour and
subsistence equal to what that sum would purchase in the present times.
The reduction in the real price of the coarse manufacture, though
considerable, has not been so great as in that of the fine.
In 1463, being the 3rd of Edward IV. it was enacted, that “no servant in
husbandry nor common labourer, nor servant to any artificer inhabiting out
of a city or burgh, shall use or wear in their clothing any cloth above two
shillings the broad yard.” In the 3rd of Edward IV., two shillings contained
very nearly the same quantity of silver as four of our present money. But the
Yorkshire cloth which is now sold at four shillings the yard, is probably
much superior to any that was then made for the wearing of the very
poorest order of common servants. Even the money price of their clothing,
therefore, may, in proportion to the quality, be somewhat cheaper in the
present than it was in those ancient times. The real price is certainly a good
deal cheaper. Tenpence was then reckoned what is called the moderate and
reasonable price of a bushel of wheat. Two shillings, therefore, was the
price of two bushels and near two pecks of wheat, which in the present
times, at three shillings and sixpence the bushel, would be worth eight
shillings and ninepence. For a yard of this cloth the poor servant must have
parted with the power of purchasing a quantity of subsistence equal to what
eight shillings and ninepence would purchase in the present times. This is a
sumptuary law, too, restraining the luxury and extravagance of the poor.
Their clothing, therefore, had commonly been much more expensive.
The same order of people are, by the same law, prohibited from wearing
hose, of which the price should exceed fourteen-pence the pair, equal to
about eight-and-twenty pence of our present money. But fourteen-pence
was in those times the price of a bushel and near two pecks of wheat; which
in the present times, at three and sixpence the bushel, would cost five
shillings and threepence. We should in the present times consider this as a
very high price for a pair of stockings to a servant of the poorest and lowest
order. He must however, in those times, have paid what was really
equivalent to this price for them.
In the time of Edward IV. the art of knitting stockings was probably not
known in any part of Europe. Their hose were made of common cloth,
which may have been one of the causes of their dearness. The first person
that wore stockings in England is said to have been Queen Elizabeth. She
received them as a present from the Spanish ambassador.
Both in the coarse and in the fine woollen manufacture, the machinery
employed was much more imperfect in those ancient, than it is in the
present times. It has since received three very capital improvements,
besides, probably, many smaller ones, of which it may be difficult to
ascertain either the number or the importance. The three capital
improvements are, first, the exchange of the rock and spindle for the
spinning-wheel, which, with the same quantity of labour, will perform more
than double the quantity of work. Secondly, the use of several very
ingenious machines, which facilitate and abridge, in a still greater
proportion, the winding of the worsted and woollen yarn, or the proper
arrangement of the warp and woof before they are put into the loom; an
operation which, previous to the invention of those machines, must have
been extremely tedious and troublesome. Thirdly, the employment of the
fulling-mill for thickening the cloth, instead of treading it in water. Neither
wind nor water mills of any kind were known in England so early as the
beginning of the sixteenth century, nor, so far as I know, in any other part of
Europe north of the Alps. They had been introduced into Italy some time
before.
The consideration of these circumstances may, perhaps, in some measure,
explain to us why the real price both of the coarse and of the fine
manufacture was so much higher in those ancient than it is in the present
times. It cost a greater quantity of labour to bring the goods to market.
When they were brought thither, therefore, they must have purchased, or
exchanged for the price of, a greater quantity.
The coarse manufacture probably was, in those ancient times, carried on
in England in the same manner as it always has been in countries where arts
and manufactures are in their infancy. It was probably a household
manufacture, in which every different part of the work was occasionally
performed by all the different members of almost every private family, but
so as to be their work only when they had nothing else to do, and not to be
the principal business from which any of them derived the greater part of
their subsistence. The work which is performed in this manner, it has
already been observed, comes always much cheaper to market than that
which is the principal or sole fund of the workman’s subsistence. The fine
manufacture, on the other hand, was not, in those times, carried on in
England, but in the rich and commercial country of Flanders; and it was
probably conducted then, in the same manner as now, by people who
derived the whole, or the principal part of their subsistence from it. It was,
besides, a foreign manufacture, and must have paid some duty, the ancient
custom of tonnage and poundage at least, to the king. This duty, indeed,
would not probably be very great. It was not then the policy of Europe to
restrain, by high duties, the importation of foreign manufactures, but rather
to encourage it, in order that merchants might be enabled to supply, at as
easy a rate as possible, the great men with the conveniencies and luxuries
which they wanted, and which the industry of their own country could not
afford them.
The consideration of these circumstances may, perhaps, in some measure
explain to us why, in those ancient times, the real price of the coarse
manufacture was, in proportion to that of the fine, so much lower than in
the present times.
Conclusion of the Chapter.
I shall conclude this very long chapter with observing, that every
improvement in the circumstances of the society tends, either directly or
indirectly, to raise the real rent of land to increase the real wealth of the
landlord, his power of purchasing the labour, or the produce of the labour of
other people.
The extension of improvement and cultivation tends to raise it directly.
The landlord’s share of the produce necessarily increases with the increase
of the produce.
That rise in the real price of those parts of the rude produce of land,
which is first the effect of the extended improvement and cultivation, and
afterwards the cause of their being still further extended, the rise in the
price of cattle, for example, tends, too, to raise the rent of land directly, and
in a still greater proportion. The real value of the landlord’s share, his real
command of the labour of other people, not only rises with the real value of
the produce, but the proportion of his share to the whole produce rises with
it.
That produce, after the rise in its real price, requires no more labour to
collect it than before. A smaller proportion of it will, therefore, be sufficient
to replace, with the ordinary profit, the stock which employs that labour. A
greater proportion of it must consequently belong to the landlord.
All those improvements in the productive powers of labour, which tend
directly to reduce the rent price of manufactures, tend indirectly to raise the
real rent of land. The landlord exchanges that part of his rude produce,
which is over and above his own consumption, or, what comes to the same
thing, the price of that part of it, for manufactured produce. Whatever
reduces the real price of the latter, raises that of the former. An equal
quantity of the former becomes thereby equivalent to a greater quantity of
the latter; and the landlord is enabled to purchase a greater quantity of the
conveniencies, ornaments, or luxuries which he has occasion for.
Every increase in the real wealth of the society, every increase in the
quantity of useful labour employed within it, tends indirectly to raise the
real rent of land. A certain proportion of this labour naturally goes to the
land. A greater number of men and cattle are employed in its cultivation,
the produce increases with the increase of the stock which is thus employed
in raising it, and the rent increases with the produce.
The contrary circumstances, the neglect of cultivation and improvement,
the fall in the real price of any part of the rude produce of land, the rise in
the real price of manufactures from the decay of manufacturing art and
industry, the declension of the real wealth of the society, all tend, on the
other hand, to lower the real rent of land, to reduce the real wealth of the
landlord, to diminish his power of purchasing either the labour, or the
produce of the labour, of other people.
The whole annual produce of the land and labour of every country, or,
what comes to the same thing, the whole price of that annual produce,
naturally divides itself, it has already been observed, into three parts; the
rent of land, the wages of labour, and the profits of stock; and constitutes a
revenue to three different orders of people; to those who live by rent, to
those who live by wages, and to those who live by profit. These are the
three great, original, and constituent, orders of every civilized society, from
whose revenue that of every other order is ultimately derived.
The interest of the first of those three great orders, it appears from what
has been just now said, is strictly and inseparably connected with the
general interest of the society. Whatever either promotes or obstructs the
one, necessarily promotes or obstructs the other. When the public
deliberates concerning any regulation of commerce or police, the
proprietors of land never can mislead it, with a view to promote the interest
of their own particular order; at least, if they have any tolerable knowledge
of that interest. They are, indeed, too often defective in this tolerable
knowledge. They are the only one of the three orders whose revenue costs
them neither labour nor care, but comes to them, as it were, of its own
accord, and independent of any plan or project of their own. That indolence
which is the natural effect of the ease and security of their situation, renders
them too often, not only ignorant, but incapable of that application of mind,
which is necessary in order to foresee and understand the consequence of
any public regulation.
The interest of the second order, that of those who live by wages, is as
strictly connected with the interest of the society as that of the first. The
wages of the labourer, it has already been shewn, are never so high as when
the demand for labour is continually rising, or when the quantity employed
is every year increasing considerably. When this real wealth of the society
becomes stationary, his wages are soon reduced to what is barely enough to
enable him to bring up a family, or to continue the race of labourers. When
the society declines, they fall even below this. The order of proprietors may
perhaps gain more by the prosperity of the society than that of labourers;
but there is no order that suffers so cruelly from its decline. But though the
interest of the labourer is strictly connected with that of the society, he is
incapable either of comprehending that interest, or of understanding its
connexion with his own. His condition leaves him no time to receive the
necessary information, and his education and habits are commonly such as
to render him unfit to judge, even though he was fully informed. In the
public deliberations, therefore, his voice is little heard, and less regarded;
except upon particular occasions, when his clamour is animated, set on, and
supported by his employers, not for his, but their own particular purposes.
His employers constitute the third order, that of those who live by profit.
It is the stock that is employed for the sake of profit, which puts into motion
the greater part of the useful labour of every society. The plans and projects
of the employers of stock regulate and direct all the most important
operation of labour, and profit is the end proposed by all those plans and
projects. But the rate of profit does not, like rent and wages, rise with the
prosperity, and fall with the declension of the society. On the contrary, it is
naturally low in rich, and high in poor countries, and it is always highest in
the countries which are going fastest to ruin. The interest of this third order,
therefore, has not the same connexion with the general interest of the
society, as that of the other two. Merchants and master manufacturers are, in
this order, the two classes of people who commonly employ the largest
capitals, and who by their wealth draw to themselves the greatest share of
the public consideration. As during their whole lives they are engaged in
plans and projects, they have frequently more acuteness of understanding
than the greater part of country gentlemen. As their thoughts, however, are
commonly exercised rather about the interest of their own particular branch
of business. than about that of the society, their judgment, even when given
with the greatest candour (which it has not been upon every occasion), is
much more to be depended upon with regard to the former of those two
objects, than with regard to the latter. Their superiority over the country
gentleman is, not so much in their knowledge of the public interest, as in
their having a better knowledge of their own interest than he has of his. It is
by this superior knowledge of their own interest that they have frequently
imposed upon his generosity, and persuaded him to give up both his own
interest and that of the public, from a very simple but honest conviction,
that their interest, and not his, was the interest of the public. The interest of
the dealers, however, in any particular branch of trade or manufactures, is
always in some respects different from, and even opposite to, that of the
public. To widen the market, and to narrow the competition, is always the
interest of the dealers. To widen the market may frequently be agreeable
enough to the interest of the public; but to narrow the competition must
always be against it, and can only serve to enable the dealers, by raising
their profits above what they naturally would be, to levy, for their own
benefit, an absurd tax upon the rest of their fellow-citizens. The proposal of
any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this order, ought
always to be listened to with great precaution, and ought never to be
adopted till after having been long and carefully examined, not only with
the most scrupulous, but with the most suspicious attention. It comes from
an order of men, whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the
public, who have generally an interest to deceive and even to oppress the
public, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both deceived and
oppressed it.
# PRICES OF WHEAT
  Year    Prices/Quarter  Average of different   Average prices of
          in each year     prices in one year    each year in money
                                                    of 1776
            £   s   d         £   s   d             £   s   d
  1202      0  12   0                               1  16   0
  1205      0  12   0
            0  13   4         0  13   5             2   0   3
            0  15   0
  1223      0  12   0                               1  16   0
  1237      0   3   4                               0  10   0
  1243      0   2   0                               0   6   0
  1244      0   2   0                               0   6   0
  1246      0  16   0                               2   8   0
  1247      0  13   5                               2   0   0
  1257      1   4   0                               3  12   0
  1258      1   0   0
            0  15   0         0  17   0             2  11   0
            0  16   0
  1270      4  16   0
            6   8   0         5  12   0            16  16   0
  1286      0   2   8
            0  16   0         0   9   4             1   8   0
                                          Total    35   9   3
                                          Average   2  19   1¼
  1287      0   3   4                               0  10   0
  1288      0   0   8
            0   1   0
            0   1   4
            0   1   6
            0   1   8         0   3   0¼            0   9   1¾
            0   2   0
            0   3   4
            0   9   4
  1289      0  12   0
            0   6   0
            0   2   0         0  10   1½            1  10   4½
            0  10   8
            1   0   0
  1290      0  16   0                               2   8   0
  1294      0  16   0                               2   8   0
  1302      0   4   0                               0  12   0
  1309      0   7   2                               1   1   6
  1315      1   0   0                               3   0   0
  1316      1   0   0
            1  10   0         1  10   6             4  11   6
            1  12   0
            2   0   0
  1317      2   4   0
            0  14   0
            2  13   0         1  19   6             5  18   6
            4   0   0
            0   6   8
  1336      0   2   0                               0   6   0
  1338      0   3   4                               0  10   0
                                          Total    23   4  11¼
                                          Average   1  18   8
  1339      0   9   0                               1   7   0
  1349      0   2   0                               0   5   2
  1359      1   6   8                               3   2   2
  1361      0   2   0                               0   4   8
  1363      0  15   0                               1  15   0
  1369      1   0   0
            1   4   0         1   2   0             2   9   4
  1379      0   4   0                               0   9   4
  1387      0   2   0                               0   4   8
  1390      0  13   4
            0  14   0         0  14   5             1  13   7
            0  16   0
  1401      0  16   0                               1  17   6
  1407      0   4   4¾
            0   3   4         0   3  10             0   8  10
  1416      0  16   0                               1  12   0
                                         Total     15   9   4
                                         Average    1   5   9½
  1423      0   8   0                                       0
  1425      0   4   0                                       0
  1434      1   6   8                                       4
  1435      0   5   4                                       8
  1439      1   0   0
            1   6   8         1   3   4             2   6   8
  1440      1   4   0                               2   8   0
  1444      0   4   4         0   4   2             0   4   8
            0   4   0
  1445      0   4   6                               0   9   0
  1447      0   8   0                               0  16   0
  1448      0   6   8                               0  13   4
  1449      0   5   0                               0  10   0
  1451      0   8   0                               0  16   0
                                         Total     12  15   4
                                         Average    1   1   3¹/³
  1453      0   5   4                               0  10   8
  1455      0   1   2                               0   2   4
  1457      0   7   8                               1  15   4
  1459      0   5   0                               0  10   0
  1460      0   8   0                               0  16   0
  1463      0   2   0         0   1  10             0   3   8
            0   1   8
  1464      0   6   8                               0  10   0
  1486      1   4   0                               1  17   0
  1491      0  14   8                               1   2   0
  1494      0   4   0                               0   6   0
  1495      0   3   4                               0   5   0
  1497      1   0   0                               1  11   0
                                         Total      8   9   0
                                         Average    0  14   1
  1499      0   4   0                               0   6   0
  1504      0   5   8                               0   8   6
  1521      1   0   0                               1  10   0
  1551      0   8   0                               0   8   0
  1553      0   8   0                               0   8   0
  1554      0   8   0                               0   8   0
  1555      0   8   0                               0   8   0
  1556      0   8   0                               0   8   0
  1557      0   8   0
            0   4   0         0  17   8½            0  17   8½
            0   5   0
            2  13   4
  1558      0   8   0                               0   8   0
  1559      0   8   0                               0   8   0
  1560      0   8   0                               0   8   0
                                         Total      6   0   2½
                                         Average    0  10   0½
  1561      0   8   0                               0   8   0
  1562      0   8   0                               0   8   0
  1574      2  16   0
            1   4   0         2   0   0             2   0   0
  1587      3   4   0                               3   4   0
  1594      2  16   0                               2  16   0
  1595      2  13   0                               2  13   0
  1596      4   0   0                               4   0   0
  1597      5   4   0
            4   0   0         4  12   0             4  12   0
  1598      2  16   8                               2  16   8
  1599      1  19   2                               1  19   8
  1600      1  17   8                               1  17   8
  1601      1  14  10                               1  14  10
                                         Total     28   9   4
                                         Average    2   7   5½
PRICES OF THE QUARTER OF NINE BUSHELS OF THE BEST OR
HIGHEST PRICED WHEAT AT WINDSOR MARKET, ON LADY DAY
AND MICHAELMAS, FROM 1595 TO 1764 BOTH INCLUSIVE; THE
PRICE OF EACH YEAR BEING THE MEDIUM BETWEEN THE
HIGHEST PRICES OF THESE TWO MARKET DAYS.
            £   s   d
  1595      2   0   0
  1596      2   8   0
  1597      3   9   6
  1598      2  16   8
  1599      1  19   2
  1600      1  17   8
  1601      1  14  10
  1602      1   9   4
  1603      1  15   4
  1604      1  10   8
  1605      1  15  10
  1606      1  13   0
  1607      1  16   8
  1608      2  16   8
  1609      2  10   0
  1610      1  15  10
  1611      1  18   8
  1612      2   2   4
  1613      2   8   8
  1614      2   1   8½
  1615      1  18   8
  1616      2   0   4
  1617      2   8   8
  1618      2   6   8
  1619      1  15   4
  1620      1  10   4
        26)54   0   6½
    Average 2   1   6¾
  1621      1  10    4
  1622      2  18    8
  1623      2  12    0
  1624      2   8    0
  1625      2  12    0
  1626      2   9    4
  1627      1  16    0
  1628      1   8    0
  1629      2   2    0
  1630      2  15    8
  1631      3   8    0
  1632      2  13    4
  1633      2  18    0
  1634      2  16    0
  1635      2  16    0
  1636      2  16    8
        16)40   0    0
    Average 2  10    0
  1637      2  13    0
  1638      2  17    4
  1639      2   4   10
  1640      2   4    8
  1641      2   8    0
  1646      2   8    0
  1647      3  13    0
  1648      4   5    0
  1649      4   0    0
  1650      3  16    8
  1651      3  13    4
  1652      2   9    6
  1653      1  15    6
  1654      1   6    0
  1655      1  13    4
  1656      2   3    0
  1657      2   6    8
  1658      3   5    0
  1659      3   6    0
  1660      2  16    6
  1661      3  10    0
  1662      3  14    0
  1663      2  17    0
  1664      2   0    6
  1665      2   9    4
  1666      1  16    0
  1667      1  16    0
  1668      2   0    0
  1669      2   4    4
  1670      2   1    8
  1671      2   2    0
  1672      2   1    0
  1673      2   6    8
  1674      3   8    8
  1675      3   4    8
  1676      1  18    0
  1677      2   2    0
  1678      2  19    0
  1679      3   0    0
  1680      2   5    0
  1681      2   6    8
  1682      2   4    0
  1683      2   0    0
  1684      2   4    0
  1685      2   6    8
  1686      1  14    0
  1687      1   5    2
  1688      2   6    0
  1689      1  10    0
  1690      1  14    8
  1691      1  14    0
  1692      2   6    8
  1693      3   7    8
  1694      3   4    0
  1695      2  13    0
  1696      3  11    0
  1697      3   0    0
  1698      3   8    4
  1699      3   4    0
  1700      2   0    0
      60) 153   1    8
   Average  2  11    0¹/³
  1701      1  17    8
  1702      1   9    6
  1703      1  16    0
  1704      2   6    6
  1705      1  10    0
  1706      1   6    0
  1707      1   8    6
  1708      2   1    6
  1709      3  18    6
  1710      3  18    0
  1711      2  14    0
  1712      2   6    4
  1713      2  11    0
  1714      2  10    4
  1715      2   3    0
  1716      2   8    0
  1717      2   5    8
  1718      1  18   10
  1719      1  15    0
  1720      1  17    0
  1721      1  17    6
  1722      1  16    0
  1723      1  14    8
  1724      1  17    0
  1725      2   8    6
  1726      2   6    0
  1727      2   2    0
  1728      2  14    6
  1729      2   6   10
  1730      1  16    6
  1731      1  12   10                     1  12   10
  1732      1   6    8                     1   6    8
  1733      1   8    4                     1   8    4
  1734      1  18   10                     1  18   10
  1735      2   3    0                     2   3    0
  1736      2   0    4                     2   0    4
  1737      1  18    0                     1  18    0
  1738      1  15    6                     1  15    6
  1739      1  18    6                     1  18    6
  1740      2  10    8                     2  10    8
                                      10) 18  12    8
                                           1  17    3½
  1741      2   6    8                     2   6    8
  1742      1  14    0                     1  14    0
  1743      1   4   10                     1   4   10
  1744      1   4   10                     1   4   10
  1745      1   7    6                     1   7    6
  1746      1  19    0                     1  19    0
  1747      1  14   10                     1  14   10
  1748      1  17    0                     1  17    0
  1749      1  17    0                     1  17    0
  1750      1  12    6                     1  12    6
                                      10) 16  18    2
                                           1  13    9¾
  1751      1  18    6
  1752      2   1   10
  1753      2   4    8
  1754      1  13    8
  1755      1  14   10
  1756      2   5    3
  1757      3   0    0
  1758      2  10    0
  1759      1  19   10
  1760      1  16    6
  1761      1  10    3
  1762      1  19    0
  1763      2   0    9
  1764      2   6    9
      64) 129  13    6
   Average  2   0    6¾
BOOK II.
OF THE NATURE, ACCUMULATION, AND
EMPLOYMENT OF STOCK.
INTRODUCTION.
In that rude state of society, in which there is no division of labour, in
which exchanges are seldom made, and in which every man provides every
thing for himself, it is not necessary that any stock should be accumulated,
or stored up before-hand, in order to carry on the business of the society.
Every man endeavours to supply, by his own industry, his own occasional
wants, as they occur. When he is hungry, he goes to the forest to hunt; when
his coat is worn out, he clothes himself with the skin of the first large
animal he kills: and when his hut begins to go to ruin, he repairs it, as well
as he can, with the trees and the turf that are nearest it.
But when the division of labour has once been thoroughly introduced, the
produce of a man’s own labour can supply but a very small part of his
occasional wants. The far greater part of them are supplied by the produce
of other men’s labour, which he purchases with the produce, or, what is the
same thing, with the price of the produce, of his own. But this purchase
cannot be made till such time as the produce of his own labour has not only
been completed, but sold. A stock of goods of different kinds, therefore,
must be stored up somewhere, sufficient to maintain him, and to supply him
with the materials and tools of his work, till such time at least as both these
events can be brought about. A weaver cannot apply himself entirely to his
peculiar business, unless there is before-hand stored up somewhere, either
in his own possession, or in that of some other person, a stock sufficient to
maintain him, and to supply him with the materials and tools of his work,
till he has not only completed, but sold his web. This accumulation must
evidently be previous to his applying his industry for so long a time to such
a peculiar business.
As the accumulation of stock must, in the nature of things, be previous to
the division of labour, so labour can be more and more subdivided in
proportion only as stock is previously more and more accumulated. The
quantity of materials which the same number of people can work up,
increases in a great proportion as labour comes to be more and more
subdivided; and as the operations of each workman are gradually reduced to
a greater degree of simplicity, a variety of new machines come to be
invented for facilitating and abridging those operations. As the division of
labour advances, therefore, in order to give constant employment to an
equal number of workmen, an equal stock of provisions, and a greater stock
of materials and tools than what would have been necessary in a ruder state
of things, must be accumulated before-hand. But the number of workmen in
every branch of business generally increases with the division of labour in
that branch; or rather it is the increase of their number which enables them
to class and subdivide themselves in this manner.
As the accumulation of stock is previously necessary for carrying on this
great improvement in the productive powers of labour, so that accumulation
naturally leads to this improvement. The person who employs his stock in
maintaining labour, necessarily wishes to employ it in such a manner as to
produce as great a quantity of work as possible. He endeavours, therefore,
both to make among his workmen the most proper distribution of
employment, and to furnish them with the best machines which he can
either invent or afford to purchase. His abilities, in both these respects, are
generally in proportion to the extent of his stock, or to the number of people
whom it can employ. The quantity of industry, therefore, not only increases
in every country with the increase of the stock which employs it, but, in
consequence of that increase, the same quantity of industry produces a
much greater quantity of work.
Such are in general the effects of the increase of stock upon industry and
its productive powers.
In the following book, I have endeavoured to explain the nature of stock,
the effects of its accumulation into capital of different kinds, and the effects
of the different employments of those capitals. This book is divided into
five chapters. In the first chapter, I have endeavoured to shew what are the
different parts or branches into which the stock, either of an individual, or
of a great society, naturally divides itself. In the second, I have endeavoured
to explain the nature and operation of money, considered as a particular
branch of the general stock of the society. The stock which is accumulated
into a capital, may either be employed by the person to whom it belongs, or
it may be lent to some other person. In the third and fourth chapters, I have
endeavoured to examine the manner in which it operates in both these
situations. The fifth and last chapter treats of the different effects which the
different employments of capital immediately produce upon the quantity,
both of national industry, and of the annual produce of land and labour.
CHAPTER I.
OF THE DIVISION OF STOCK.
When the stock which a man possesses is no more than sufficient to
maintain him for a few days or a few weeks, he seldom thinks of deriving
any revenue from it. He consumes it as sparingly as he can, and endeavours,
by his labour, to acquire something which may supply its place before it be
consumed altogether. His revenue is, in this case, derived from his labour
only. This is the state of the greater part of the labouring poor in all
countries.
But when he possesses stock sufficient to maintain him for months or
years, he naturally endeavours to derive a revenue from the greater part of
it, reserving only so much for his immediate consumption as may maintain
him till this revenue begins to come in. His whole stock, therefore, is
distinguished into two parts. That part which he expects is to afford him this
revenue is called his capital. The other is that which supplies his immediate
consumption, and which consists either, first, in that portion of his whole
stock which was originally reserved for this purpose; or, secondly, in his
revenue, from whatever source derived, as it gradually comes in; or, thirdly,
in such things as had been purchased by either of these in former years, and
which are not yet entirely consumed, such as a stock of clothes, household
furniture, and the like. In one or other, or all of these three articles, consists
the stock which men commonly reserve for their own immediate
consumption.
There are two different ways in which a capital may be employed so as to
yield a revenue or profit to its employer.
First, it maybe employed in raising, manufacturing, or purchasing goods,
and selling them again with a profit. The capital employed in this manner
yields no revenue or profit to its employer, while it either remains in his
possession, or continues in the same shape. The goods of the merchant yield
him no revenue or profit till he sells them for money, and the money yields
him as little till it is again exchanged for goods. His capital is continually
going from him in one shape, and returning to him in another; and it is only
by means of such circulation, or successive changes, that it can yield him
any profit. Such capitals, therefore, may very properly be called circulating
capitals.
Secondly, it may be employed in the improvement of land, in the
purchase of useful machines and instruments of trade, or in such like things
as yield a revenue or profit without changing masters, or circulating any
further. Such capitals, therefore, may very properly be called fixed capitals.
Different occupations require very different proportions between the
fixed and circulating capitals employed in them.
The capital of a merchant, for example, is altogether a circulating capital.
He has occasion for no machines or instruments of trade, unless his shop or
warehouse be considered as such.
Some part of the capital of every master artificer or manufacturer must be
fixed in the instruments of his trade. This part, however, is very small in
some, and very great in others, A master tailor requires no other instruments
of trade but a parcel of needles. Those of the master shoemaker are a little,
though but a very little, more expensive. Those of the weaver rise a good
deal above those of the shoemaker. The far greater part of the capital of all
such master artificers, however, is circulated either in the wages of their
workmen, or in the price of their materials, and repaid, with a profit, by the
price of the work.
In other works a much greater fixed capital is required. In a great iron-
work, for example, the furnace for melting the ore, the forge, the slit-mill,
are instruments of trade which cannot be erected without a very great
expense. In coal works, and mines of every kind, the machinery necessary,
both for drawing out the water, and for other purposes, is frequently still
more expensive.
That part of the capital of the farmer which is employed in the
instruments of agriculture is a fixed, that which is employed in the wages
and maintenance of his labouring servants is a circulating capital. He makes
a profit of the one by keeping it in his own possession, and of the other by
parting with it. The price or value of his labouring cattle is a fixed capital,
in the same manner as that of the instruments of husbandry; their
maintenance is a circulating capital, in the same manner as that of the
labouring servants. The farmer makes his profit by keeping the labouring
cattle, and by parting with their maintenance. Both the price and the
maintenance of the cattle which are bought in and fattened, not for labour,
but for sale, are a circulating capital. The farmer makes his profit by parting
with them. A flock of sheep or a herd of cattle, that, in a breeding country,
is brought in neither for labour nor for sale, but in order to make a profit by
their wool, by their milk, and by their increase, is a fixed capital. The profit
is made by keeping them. Their maintenance is a circulating capital. The
profit is made by parting with it; and it comes back with both its own profit
and the profit upon the whole price of the cattle, in the price of the wool,
the milk, and the increase. The whole value of the seed, too, is properly a
fixed capital. Though it goes backwards and forwards between the ground
and the granary, it never changes masters, and therefore does not properly
circulate. The farmer makes his profit, not by its sale, but by its increase.
The general stock of any country or society is the same with that of all its
inhabitants or members; and, therefore, naturally divides itself into the same
three portions, each of which has a distinct function or office.
The first is that portion which is reserved for immediate consumption,
and of which the characteristic is, that it affords no revenue or profit. It
consists in the stock of food, clothes, household furniture, etc. which have
been purchased by their proper consumers, but which are not yet entirely
consumed. The whole stock of mere dwelling-houses, too, subsisting at
anyone time in the country, make a part of this first portion. The stock that
is laid out in a house, if it is to be the dwelling-house of the proprietor,
ceases from that moment to serve in the function of a capital, or to afford
any revenue to its owner. A dwelling-house, as such, contributes nothing to
the revenue of its inhabitant; and though it is, no doubt, extremely useful to
him, it is as his clothes and household furniture are useful to him, which,
however, make a part of his expense, and not of his revenue. If it is to be let
to a tenant for rent, as the house itself can produce nothing, the tenant must
always pay the rent out of some other revenue, which he derives, either
from labour, or stock, or land. Though a house, therefore, may yield a
revenue to its proprietor, and thereby serve in the function of a capital to
him, it cannot yield any to the public, nor serve in the function of a capital
to it, and the revenue of the whole body of the people can never be in the
smallest degree increased by it. Clothes and household furniture, in the
same manner, sometimes yield a revenue, and thereby serve in the function
of a capital to particular persons. In countries where masquerades are
common, it is a trade to let out masquerade dresses for a night. Upholsterers
frequently let furniture by the month or by the year. Undertakers let the
furniture of funerals by the day and by the week. Many people let furnished
houses, and get a rent, not only for the use of the house, but for that of the
furniture. The revenue, however, which is derived from such things, must
always be ultimately drawn from some other source of revenue. Of all parts
of the stock, either of an individual or of a society, reserved for immediate
consumption, what is laid out in houses is most slowly consumed. A stock
of clothes may last several years; a stock of furniture half a century or a
century; but a stock of houses, well built and properly taken care of, may
last many centuries. Though the period of their total consumption, however,
is more distant, they are still as really a stock reserved for immediate
consumption as either clothes or household furniture.
The second of the three portions into which the general stock of the
society divides itself, is the fixed capital; of which the characteristic is, that
it affords a revenue or profit without circulating or changing masters. It
consists chiefly of the four following articles.
First, of all useful machines and instruments of trade, which facilitate and
abridge labour.
Secondly, of all those profitable buildings which are the means of
procuring a revenue, not only to the proprietor who lets them for a rent, but
to the person who possesses them, and pays that rent for them; such as
shops, warehouses, work-houses, farm-houses, with all their necessary
buildings, stables, granaries, etc. These are very different from mere
dwelling-houses. They are a sort of instruments of trade, and may be
considered in the same light.
Thirdly, of the improvements of land, of what has been profitably laid out
in clearing, draining, inclosing, manuring, and reducing it into the condition
most proper for tillage and culture. An improved farm may very justly be
regarded in the same light as those useful machines which facilitate and
abridge labour, and by means of which an equal circulating capital can
afford a much greater revenue to its employer. An improved farm is equally
advantageous and more durable than any of those machines, frequently
requiring no other repairs than the most profitable application of the
farmer’s capital employed in cultivating it.
Fourthly, of the acquired and useful abilities of all the inhabitants and
members of the society. The acquisition of such talents, by the maintenance
of the acquirer during his education, study, or apprenticeship, always costs a
real expense, which is a capital fixed and realized, as it were, in his person.
Those talents, as they make a part of his fortune, so do they likewise that of
the society to which he belongs. The improved dexterity of a workman may
be considered in the same light as a machine or instrument of trade which
facilitates and abridges labour, and which, though it costs a certain expense,
repays that expense with a profit.
The third and last of the three portions into which the general stock of the
society naturally divides itself, is the circulating capital, of which the
characteristic is, that it affords a revenue only by circulating or changing
masters. It is composed likewise of four parts.
First, of the money, by means of which all the other three are circulated
and distributed to their proper consumers.
Secondly, of the stock of provisions which are in the possession of the
butcher, the grazier, the farmer, the corn-merchant, the brewer, etc. and
from the sale of which they expect to derive a profit.
Thirdly, of the materials, whether altogether rude, or more or less
manufactured, of clothes, furniture, and building which are not yet made up
into any of those three shapes, but which remain in the hands of the
growers, the manufacturers, the mercers, and drapers, the timber-merchants,
the carpenters and joiners, the brick-makers, etc.
Fourthly, and lastly, of the work which is made up and completed, but
which is still in the hands of the merchant and manufacturer, and not yet
disposed of or distributed to the proper consumers; such as the finished
work which we frequently find ready made in the shops of the smith, the
cabinet-maker, the goldsmith, the jeweller, the china-merchant, etc. The
circulating capital consists, in this manner, of the provisions, materials, and
finished work of all kinds that are in the hands of their respective dealers,
and of the money that is necessary for circulating and distributing them to
those who are finally to use or to consume them.
Of these four parts, three—provisions, materials, and finished work, are
either annually or in a longer or shorter period, regularly withdrawn from it,
and placed either in the fixed capital, or in the stock reserved for immediate
consumption.
Every fixed capital is both originally derived from, and requires to be
continually supported by, a circulating capital. All useful machines and
instruments of trade are originally derived from a circulating capital, which
furnishes the materials of which they are made, and the maintenance of the
workmen who make them. They require, too, a capital of the same kind to
keep them in constant repair.
No fixed capital can yield any revenue but by means of a circulating
capital. The most useful machines and instruments of trade will produce
nothing, without the circulating capital, which affords the materials they are
employed upon, and the maintenance of the workmen who employ them.
Land, however improved, will yield no revenue without a circulating
capital, which maintains the labourers who cultivate and collect its produce.
To maintain and augment the stock which maybe reserved for immediate
consumption, is the sole end and purpose both of the fixed and circulating
capitals. It is this stock which feeds, clothes, and lodges the people. Their
riches or poverty depend upon the abundant or sparing supplies which those
two capitals can afford to the stock reserved for immediate consumption.
So great a part of the circulating capital being continually withdrawn
from it, in order to be placed in the other two branches of the general stock
of the society, it must in its turn require continual supplies without which it
would soon cease to exist. These supplies are principally drawn from three
sources; the produce of land, of mines, and of fisheries. These afford
continual supplies of provisions and materials, of which part is afterwards
wrought up into finished work and by which are replaced the provisions,
materials, and finished work, continually withdrawn from the circulating
capital. From mines, too, is drawn what is necessary for maintaining and
augmenting that part of it which consists in money. For though, in the
ordinary course of business, this part is not, like the other three, necessarily
withdrawn from it, in order to be placed in the other two branches of the
general stock of the society, it must, however, like all other things, be
wasted and worn out at last, and sometimes, too, be either lost or sent
abroad, and must, therefore, require continual, though no doubt much
smaller supplies.
Lands, mines, and fisheries, require all both a fixed and circulating
capital to cultivate them; and their produce replaces, with a profit not only
those capitals, but all the others in the society. Thus the farmer annually
replaces to the manufacturer the provisions which he had consumed, and
the materials which he had wrought up the year before; and the
manufacturer replaces to the farmer the finished work which he had wasted
and worn out in the same time. This is the real exchange that is annually
made between those two orders of people, though it seldom happens that
the rude produce of the one, and the manufactured produce of the other, are
directly bartered for one another; because it seldom happens that the farmer
sells his corn and his cattle, his flax and his wool, to the very same person
of whom he chuses to purchase the clothes, furniture, and instruments of
trade, which he wants. He sells, therefore, his rude produce for money, with
which he can purchase, wherever it is to be had, the manufactured produce
he has occasion for. Land even replaces, in part at least, the capitals with
which fisheries and mines are cultivated. It is the produce of land which
draws the fish from the waters; and it is the produce of the surface of the
earth which extracts the minerals from its bowels.
The produce of land, mines, and fisheries, when their natural fertility is
equal, is in proportion to the extent and proper application of the capitals
employed about them. When the capitals are equal, and equally well
applied, it is in proportion to their natural fertility.
In all countries where there is a tolerable security, every man of common
understanding will endeavour to employ whatever stock he can command,
in procuring either present enjoyment or future profit. If it is employed in
procuring present enjoyment, it is a stock reserved for immediate
consumption. If it is employed in procuring future profit, it must procure
this profit either by staying with him, or by going from him. In the one case
it is a fixed, in the other it is a circulating capital. A man must be perfectly
crazy, who, where there is a tolerable security, does not employ all the stock
which he commands, whether it be his own, or borrowed of other people, in
some one or other of those three ways.
In those unfortunate countries, indeed, where men are continually afraid
of the violence of their superiors, they frequently bury or conceal a great
part of their stock, in order to have it always at hand to carry with them to
some place of safety, in case of their being threatened with any of those
disasters to which they consider themselves at all times exposed. This is
said to be a common practice in Turkey, in Indostan, and, I believe, in most
other governments of Asia. It seems to have been a common practice
among our ancestors during the violence of the feudal government.
Treasure-trove was, in these times, considered as no contemptible part of
the revenue of the greatest sovereigns in Europe. It consisted in such
treasure as was found concealed in the earth, and to which no particular
person could prove any right. This was regarded, in those times, as so
important an object, that it was always considered as belonging to the
sovereign, and neither to the finder nor to the proprietor of the land, unless
the right to it had been conveyed to the latter by an express clause in his
charter. It was put upon the same footing with gold and silver mines, which,
without a special clause in the charter, were never supposed to be
comprehended in the general grant of the lands, though mines of lead,
copper, tin, and coal were, as things of smaller consequence.
CHAPTER II.
OF MONEY, CONSIDERED AS A PARTICULAR
BRANCH OF THE GENERAL STOCK OF THE
SOCIETY, OR OF THE EXPENSE OF
MAINTAINING THE NATIONAL CAPITAL.
It has been shown in the First Book, that the price of the greater part of
commodities resolves itself into three parts, of which one pays the wages of
the labour, another the profits of the stock, and a third the rent of the land
which had been employed in producing and bringing them to market: that
there are, indeed, some commodities of which the price is made up of two
of those parts only, the wages of labour, and the profits of stock; and a very
few in which it consists altogether in one, the wages of labour; but that the
price of every commodity necessarily resolves itself into some one or other,
or all, of those three parts; every part of it which goes neither to rent nor to
wages, being necessarily profit to some body.
Since this is the case, it has been observed, with regard to every
particular commodity, taken separately, it must be so with regard to all the
commodities which compose the whole annual produce of the land and
labour of every country, taken complexly. The whole price or exchangeable
value of that annual produce must resolve itself into the same three parts,
and be parcelled out among the different inhabitants of the country, either as
the wages of their labour, the profits of their stock, or the rent of their land.
But though the whole value of the annual produce of the land and labour
of every country, is thus divided among, and constitutes a revenue to, its
different inhabitants; yet, as in the rent of a private estate, we distinguish
between the gross rent and the neat rent, so may we likewise in the revenue
of all the inhabitants of a great country.
The gross rent of a private estate comprehends whatever is paid by the
farmer; the neat rent, what remains free to the landlord, after deducting the
expense of management, of repairs, and all other necessary charges; or
what, without hurting his estate, he can afford to place in his stock reserved
for immediate consumption, or to spend upon his table, equipage, the
ornaments of his house and furniture, his private enjoyments and
amusements. His real wealth is in proportion, not to his gross, but to his
neat rent.
The gross revenue of all the inhabitants of a great country comprehends
the whole annual produce of their land and labour; the neat revenue, what
remains free to them, after deducting the expense of maintaining first, their
fixed, and, secondly, their circulating capital, or what, without encroaching
upon their capital, they can place in their stock reserved for immediate
consumption, or spend upon their subsistence, conveniencies, and
amusements. Their real wealth, too, is in proportion, not to their gross, but
to their neat revenue.
The whole expense of maintaining the fixed capital must evidently be
excluded from the neat revenue of the society. Neither the materials
necessary for supporting their useful machines and instruments of trade,
their profitable buildings, etc. nor the produce of the labour necessary for
fashioning those materials into the proper form, can ever make any part of
it. The price of that labour may indeed make a part of it; as the workmen so
employed may place the whole value of their wages in their stock reserved
for immediate consumption. But in other sorts of labour, both the price and
the produce go to this stock; the price to that of the workmen, the produce
to that of other people, whose subsistence, conveniencies, and amusements,
are augmented by the labour of those workmen.
The intention of the fixed capital is to increase the productive powers of
labour, or to enable the same number of labourers to perform a much
greater quantity of work. In a farm where all the necessary buildings,
fences, drains, communications, etc. are in the most perfect good order, the
same number of labourers and labouring cattle will raise a much greater
produce, than in one of equal extent and equally good ground, but not
furnished with equal conveniencies. In manufactures, the same number of
hands, assisted with the best machinery, will work up a much greater
quantity of goods than with more imperfect instruments of trade. The
expense which is properly laid out upon a fixed capital of any kind, is
always repaid with great profit, and increases the annual produce by a much
greater value than that of the support which such improvements require.
This support, however, still requires a certain portion of that produce. A
certain quantity of materials, and the labour of a certain number of
workmen, both of which might have been immediately employed to
augment the food, clothing, and lodging, the subsistence and conveniencies
of the society, are thus diverted to another employment, highly
advantageous indeed, but still different from this one. It is upon this account
that all such improvements in mechanics, as enable the same number of
workmen to perform an equal quantity of work with cheaper and simpler
machinery than had been usual before, are always regarded as advantageous
to every society. A certain quantity of materials, and the labour of a certain
number of workmen, which had before been employed in supporting a more
complex and expensive machinery, can afterwards be applied to augment
the quantity of work which that or any other machinery is useful only for
performing. The undertaker of some great manufactory, who employs a
thousand a-year in the maintenance of his machinery, if he can reduce this
expense to five hundred, will naturally employ the other five hundred in
purchasing an additional quantity of materials, to be wrought up by an
additional number of workmen. The quantity of that work, therefore, which
his machinery was useful only for performing, will naturally be augmented,
and with it all the advantage and conveniency which the society can derive
from that work.
The expense of maintaining the fixed capital in a great country, may very
properly be compared to that of repairs in a private estate. The expense of
repairs may frequently be necessary for supporting the produce of the
estate, and consequently both the gross and the neat rent of the landlord.
When by a more proper direction, however, it can be diminished without
occasioning any diminution of produce, the gross rent remains at least the
same as before, and the neat rent is necessarily augmented.
But though the whole expense of maintaining the fixed capital is thus
necessarily excluded from the neat revenue of the society, it is not the same
case with that of maintaining the circulating capital. Of the four parts of
which this latter capital is composed, money, provisions, materials, and
finished work, the three last, it has already been observed, are regularly
withdrawn from it, and placed either in the fixed capital of the society, or in
their stock reserved for immediate consumption. Whatever portion of those
consumable goods is not employed in maintaining the former, goes all to
the latter, and makes a part of the neat revenue of the society. The
maintenance of those three parts of the circulating capital, therefore,
withdraws no portion of the annual produce from the neat revenue of the
society, besides what is necessary for maintaining the fixed capital.
The circulating capital of a society is in this respect different from that of
an individual. That of an individual is totally excluded from making any
part of his neat revenue, which must consist altogether in his profits. But
though the circulating capital of every individual makes a part of that of the
society to which he belongs, it is not upon that account totally excluded
from making a part likewise of their neat revenue. Though the whole goods
in a merchant’s shop must by no means be placed in his own stock reserved
for immediate consumption, they may in that of other people, who, from a
revenue derived from other funds, may regularly replace their value to him,
together with its profits, without occasioning any diminution either of his
capital or of theirs.
Money, therefore, is the only part of the circulating capital of a society, of
which the maintenance can occasion any diminution in their neat revenue.
The fixed capital, and that part of the circulating capital which consists in
money, so far as they affect the revenue of the society, bear a very great
resemblance to one another.
First, as those machines and instruments of trade, etc. require a certain
expense, first to erect them, and afterwards to support them, both which
expenses, though they make a part of the gross, are deductions from the
neat revenue of the society; so the stock of money which circulates in any
country must require a certain expense, first to collect it, and afterwards to
support it; both which expenses, though they make a part of the gross, are,
in the same manner, deductions from the neat revenue of the society. A
certain quantity of very valuable materials, gold and silver, and of very
curious labour, instead of augmenting the stock reserved for immediate
consumption, the subsistence, conveniencies, and amusements of
individuals, is employed in supporting that great but expensive instrument
of commerce, by means of which every individual in the society has his
subsistence, conveniencies, and amusements, regularly distributed to him in
their proper proportions.
Secondly, as the machines and instruments of trade, etc. which compose
the fixed capital either of an individual or of a society, make no part either
of the gross or of the neat revenue of either; so money, by means of which
the whole revenue of the society is regularly distributed among all its
different members, makes itself no part of that revenue. The great wheel of
circulation is altogether different from the goods which are circulated by
means of it. The revenue of the society consists altogether in those goods,
and not in the wheel which circulates them. In computing either the gross or
the neat revenue of any society, we must always, from the whole annual
circulation of money and goods, deduct the whole value of the money, of
which not a single farthing can ever make any part of either.
It is the ambiguity of language only which can make this proposition
appear either doubtful or paradoxical. When properly explained and
understood, it is almost self-evident.
When we talk of any particular sum of money, we sometimes mean
nothing but the metal pieces of which it is composed, and sometimes we
include in our meaning some obscure reference to the goods which can be
had in exchange for it, or to the power of purchasing which the possession
of it conveys. Thus, when we say that the circulating money of England has
been computed at eighteen millions, we mean only to express the amount of
the metal pieces, which some writers have computed, or rather have
supposed, to circulate in that country. But when we say that a man is worth
fifty or a hundred pounds a-year, we mean commonly to express, not only
the amount of the metal pieces which are annually paid to him, but the
value of the goods which he can annually purchase or consume; we mean
commonly to ascertain what is or ought to be his way of living, or the
quantity and quality of the necessaries and conveniencies of life in which he
can with propriety indulge himself.
When, by any particular sum of money, we mean not only to express the
amount of the metal pieces of which it is composed, but to include in its
signification some obscure reference to the goods which can be had in
exchange for them, the wealth or revenue which it in this case denotes, is
equal only to one of the two values which are thus intimated somewhat
ambiguously by the same word, and to the latter more properly than to the
former, to the money’s worth more properly than to the money.
Thus, if a guinea be the weekly pension of a particular person, he can in
the course of the week purchase with it a certain quantity of subsistence,
conveniencies, and amusements. In proportion as this quantity is great or
small, so are his real riches, his real weekly revenue. His weekly revenue is
certainly not equal both to the guinea and to what can be purchased with it,
but only to one or other of those two equal values, and to the latter more
properly than to the former, to the guinea’s worth rather than to the guinea.
If the pension of such a person was paid to him, not in gold, but in a
weekly bill for a guinea, his revenue surely would not so properly consist in
the piece of paper, as in what he could get for it. A guinea may be
considered as a bill for a certain quantity of necessaries and conveniencies
upon all the tradesmen in the neighbourhood. The revenue of the person to
whom it is paid, does not so properly consist in the piece of gold, as in what
he can get for it, or in what he can exchange it for. If it could be exchanged
for nothing, it would, like a bill upon a bankrupt, be of no more value than
the most useless piece of paper.
Though the weekly or yearly revenue of all the different inhabitants of
any country, in the same manner, may be, and in reality frequently is, paid
to them in money, their real riches, however, the real weekly or yearly
revenue of all of them taken together, must always be great or small, in
proportion to the quantity of consumable goods which they can all of them
purchase with this money. The whole revenue of all of them taken together
is evidently not equal to both the money and the consumable goods, but
only to one or other of those two values, and to the latter more properly
than to the former.
Though we frequently, therefore, express a person’s revenue by the metal
pieces which are annually paid to him, it is because the amount of those
pieces regulates the extent of his power of purchasing, or the value of the
goods which he can annually afford to consume. We still consider his
revenue as consisting in this power of purchasing or consuming, and not in
the pieces which convey it.
But if this is sufficiently evident, even with regard to an individual, it is
still more so with regard to a society. The amount of the metal pieces which
are annually paid to an individual, is often precisely equal to his revenue,
and is upon that account the shortest and best expression of its value. But
the amount of the metal pieces which circulate in a society, can never be
equal to the revenue of all its members. As the same guinea which pays the
weekly pension of one man to-day, may pay that of another to-morrow, and
that of a third the day thereafter, the amount of the metal pieces which
annually circulate in any country, must always be of much less value than
the whole money pensions annually paid with them. But the power of
purchasing, or the goods which can successively be bought with the whole
of those money pensions, as they are successively paid, must always be
precisely of the same value with those pensions; as must likewise be the
revenue of the different persons to whom they are paid. That revenue,
therefore, cannot consist in those metal pieces, of which the amount is so
much inferior to its value, but in the power of purchasing, in the goods
which can successively be bought with them as they circulate from hand to
hand.
Money, therefore, the great wheel of circulation, the great instrument of
commerce, like all other instruments of trade, though it makes a part, and a
very valuable part, of the capital, makes no part of the revenue of the
society to which it belongs; and though the metal pieces of which it is
composed, in the course of their annual circulation, distribute to every man
the revenue which properly belongs to him, they make themselves no part
of that revenue.
Thirdly, and lastly, the machines and instruments of trade, etc. which
compose the fixed capital, bear this further resemblance to that part of the
circulating capital which consists in money; that as every saving in the
expense of erecting and supporting those machines, which does not
diminish the introductive powers of labour, is an improvement of the neat
revenue of the society; so every saving in the expense of collecting and
supporting that part of the circulating capital which consists in money is an
improvement of exactly the same kind.
It is sufficiently obvious, and it has partly, too, been explained already, in
what manner every saving in the expense of supporting the fixed capital is
an improvement of the neat revenue of the society. The whole capital of the
undertaker of every work is necessarily divided between his fixed and his
circulating capital. While his whole capital remains the same, the smaller
the one part, the greater must necessarily be the other. It is the circulating
capital which furnishes the materials and wages of labour, and puts industry
into motion. Every saving, therefore, in the expense of maintaining the
fixed capital, which does not diminish the productive powers of labour,
must increase the fund which puts industry into motion, and consequently
the annual produce of land and labour, the real revenue of every society.
The substitution of paper in the room of gold and silver money, replaces
a very expensive instrument of commerce with one much less costly, and
sometimes equally convenient. Circulation comes to be carried on by a new
wheel, which it costs less both to erect and to maintain than the old one. But
in what manner this operation is performed, and in what manner it tends to
increase either the gross or the neat revenue of the society, is not altogether
so obvious, and may therefore require some further explication.
There are several different sorts of paper money; but the circulating notes
of banks and bankers are the species which is best known, and which seems
best adapted for this purpose.
When the people of any particular country have such confidence in the
fortune, probity and prudence of a particular banker, as to believe that he is
always ready to pay upon demand such of his promissory notes as are likely
to be at any time presented to him, those notes come to have the same
currency as gold and silver money, from the confidence that such money
can at any time be had for them.
A particular banker lends among his customers his own promissory
notes, to the extent, we shall suppose, of a hundred thousand pounds. As
those notes serve all the purposes of money, his debtors pay him the same
interest as if he had lent them so much money. This interest is the source of
his gain. Though some of those notes are continually coming back upon
him for payment, part of them continue to circulate for months and years
together. Though he has generally in circulation, therefore, notes to the
extent of a hundred thousand pounds, twenty thousand pounds in gold and
silver may, frequently, be a sufficient provision for answering occasional
demands. By this operation, therefore, twenty thousand pounds in gold and
silver perform all the functions which a hundred thousand could otherwise
have performed. The same exchanges may be made, the same quantity of
consumable goods may be circulated and distributed to their proper
consumers, by means of his promissory notes, to the value of a hundred
thousand pounds, as by an equal value of gold and silver money. Eighty
thousand pounds of gold and silver, therefore, can in this manner be spared
from the circulation of the country; and if different operations of the the
same kind should, at the same time, be carried on by many different banks
and bankers, the whole circulation may thus be conducted with a fifth part
only of the gold and silver which would otherwise have been requisite.
Let us suppose, for example, that the whole circulating money of some
particular country amounted, at a particular time, to one million sterling,
that sum being then sufficient for circulating the whole annual produce of
their land and labour; let us suppose, too, that some time thereafter,
different banks and bankers issued promissory notes payable to the bearer,
to the extent of one million, reserving in their different coffers two hundred
thousand pounds for answering occasional demands; there would remain,
therefore, in circulation, eight hundred thousand pounds in gold and silver,
and a million of bank notes, or eighteen hundred thousand pounds of paper
and money together. But the annual produce of the land and labour of the
country had before required only one million to circulate and distribute it to
its proper consumers, and that annual produce cannot be immediately
augmented by those operations of banking. One million, therefore, will be
sufficient to circulate it after them. The goods to be bought and sold being
precisely the same as before, the same quantity of money will be sufficient
for buying and selling them. The channel of circulation, if I may be allowed
such an expression, will remain precisely the same as before. One million
we have supposed sufficient to fill that channel. Whatever, therefore, is
poured into it beyond this sum, cannot run into it, but must overflow. One
million eight hundred thousand pounds are poured into it. Eight hundred
thousand pounds, therefore, must overflow, that sum being over and above
what can be employed in the circulation of the country. But though this sum
cannot be employed at home, it is too valuable to be allowed to lie idle. It
will, therefore, be sent abroad, in order to seek that profitable employment
which it cannot find at home. But the paper cannot go abroad; because at a
distance from the banks which issue it, and from the country in which
payment of it can be exacted by law, it will not be received in common
payments. Gold and silver, therefore, to the amount of eight hundred
thousand pounds, will be sent abroad, and the channel of home circulation
will remain filled with a million of paper instead of a million of those
metals which filled it before.
But though so great a quantity of gold and silver is thus sent abroad, we
must not imagine that it is sent abroad for nothing, or that its proprietors
make a present of it to foreign nations. They will exchange it for foreign
goods of some kind or another, in order to supply the consumption either of
some other foreign country, or of their own.
If they employ it in purchasing goods in one foreign country, in order to
supply the consumption of another, or in what is called the carrying trade,
whatever profit they make will be in addition to the neat revenue of their
own country. It is like a new fund, created for carrying on a new trade;
domestic business being now transacted by paper, and the gold and silver
being converted into a fund for this new trade.
If they employ it in purchasing foreign goods for home consumption,
they may either, first, purchase such goods as are likely to be consumed by
idle people, who produce nothing, such as foreign wines, foreign silks, etc.;
or, secondly, they may purchase an additional stock of materials, tools, and
provisions, in order to maintain and employ an additional number of
industrious people, who reproduce, with a profit, the value of their annual
consumption.
So far as it is employed in the first way, it promotes prodigality, increases
expense and consumption, without increasing production, or establishing
any permanent fund for supporting that expense, and is in every respect
hurtful to the society.
So far as it is employed in the second way, it promotes industry; and
though it increases the consumption of the society, it provides a permanent
fund for supporting that consumption; the people who consume
reproducing, with a profit, the whole value of their annual consumption.
The gross revenue of the society, the annual produce of their land and
labour, is increased by the whole value which the labour of those workmen
adds to the materials upon which they are employed, and their neat revenue
by what remains of this value, after deducting what is necessary for
supporting the tools and instruments of their trade.
That the greater part of the gold and silver which being forced abroad by
those operations of banking, is employed in purchasing foreign goods for
home consumption, is, and must be, employed in purchasing those of this
second kind, seems not only probable, but almost unavoidable. Though
some particular men may sometimes increase their expense very
considerably, though their revenue does not increase at all, we maybe
assured that no class or order of men ever does so; because, though the
principles of common prudence do not always govern the conduct of every
individual, they always influence that of the majority of every class or
order. But the revenue of idle people, considered as a class or order, cannot,
in the smallest degree, be increased by those operations of banking. Their
expense in general, therefore, cannot be much increased by them, though
that of a few individuals among them may, and in reality sometimes is. The
demand of idle people, therefore, for foreign goods, being the same, or very
nearly the same as before, a very small part of the money which, being
forced abroad by those operations of banking, is employed in purchasing
foreign goods for home consumption, is likely to be employed in
purchasing those for their use. The greater part of it will naturally be
destined for the employment of industry, and not for the maintenance of
idleness.
When we compute the quantity of industry which the circulating capital
of any society can employ, we must always have regard to those parts of it
only which consist in provisions, materials, and finished work; the other,
which consists in money, and which serves only to circulate those three,
must always be deducted. In order to put industry into motion, three things
are requisite; materials to work upon, tools to work with, and the wages or
recompence for the sake of which the work is done. Money is neither a
material to work upon, nor a tool to work with; and though the wages of the
workman are commonly paid to him in money, his real revenue, like that of
all other men, consists, not in the money, but in the money’s worth; not in
the metal pieces, but in what can be got for them.
The quantity of industry which any capital can employ, must evidently be
equal to the number of workmen whom it can supply with materials, tools,
and a maintenance suitable to the nature of the work. Money may be
requisite for purchasing the materials and tools of the work, as well as the
maintenance of the workmen; but the quantity of industry which the whole
capital can employ, is certainly not equal both to the money which
purchases, and to the materials, tools, and maintenance, which are
purchased with it, but only to one or other of those two values, and to the
latter more properly than to the former.
When paper is substituted in the room of gold and silver money, the
quantity of the materials, tools, and maintenance, which the whole
circulating capital can supply, may be increased by the whole value of gold
and silver which used to be employed in purchasing them. The whole value
of the great wheel of circulation and distribution is added to the goods
which are circulated and distributed by means of it. The operation, in some
measure, resembles that of the undertaker of some great work, who, in
consequence of some improvement in mechanics, takes down his old
machinery, and adds the difference between its price and that of the new to
his circulating capital, to the fund from which he furnishes materials and
wages to his workmen.
What is the proportion which the circulating money of any country bears
to the whole value of the annual produce circulated by means of it, it is
perhaps impossible to determine. It has been computed by different authors
at a fifth, at a tenth, at a twentieth, and at a thirtieth, part of that value. But
how small soever the proportion which the circulating money may bear to
the whole value of the annual produce, as but a part, and frequently but a
small part, of that produce, is ever destined for the maintenance of industry,
it must always bear a very considerable proportion to that part. When,
therefore, by the substitution of paper, the gold and silver necessary for
circulation is reduced to, perhaps, a fifth part of the former quantity, if the
value of only the greater part of the other four-fifths be added to the funds
which are destined for the maintenance of industry, it must make a very
considerable addition to the quantity of that industry, and, consequently, to
the value of the annual produce of land and labour.
An operation of this kind has, within these five-and-twenty or thirty
years, been performed in Scotland, by the erection of new banking
companies in almost every considerable town, and even in some country
villages. The effects of it have been precisely those above described. The
business of the country is almost entirely carried on by means of the paper
of those different banking companies, with which purchases and payments
of all kinds are commonly made. Silver very seldom appears, except in the
change of a twenty shilling bank note, and gold still seldomer. But though
the conduct of all those different companies has not been unexceptionable,
and has accordingly required an act of parliament to regulate it, the country,
notwithstanding, has evidently derived great benefit from their trade. I have
heard it asserted, that the trade of the city of Glasgow doubled in about
fifteen years after the first erection of the banks there; and that the trade of
Scotland has more than quadrupled since the first erection of the two public
banks at Edinburgh; of which the one, called the Bank of Scotland, was
established by act of parliament in 1695, and the other, called the Royal
Bank, by royal charter in 1727. Whether the trade, either of Scotland in
general, or of the city of Glasgow in particular, has really increased in so
great a proportion, during so short a period, I do not pretend to know. If
either of them has increased in this proportion, it seems to be an effect too
great to be accounted for by the sole operation of this cause. That the trade
and industry of Scotland, however, have increased very considerably during
this period, and that the banks have contributed a good deal to this increase,
cannot be doubted.
The value of the silver money which circulated in Scotland before the
Union in 1707, and which, immediately after it, was brought into the Bank
of Scotland, in order to be recoined, amounted to £411,117: 10: 9 sterling.
No account has been got of the gold coin; but it appears from the ancient
accounts of the mint of Scotland, that the value of the gold annually coined
somewhat exceeded that of the silver. There were a good many people, too,
upon this occasion, who, from a diffidence of repayment, did not bring their
silver into the Bank of Scotland; and there was, besides, some English coin,
which was not called in. The whole value of the gold and silver, therefore,
which circulated in Scotland before the Union, cannot be estimated at less
than a million sterling. It seems to have constituted almost the whole
circulation of that country; for though the circulation of the Bank of
Scotland, which had then no rival, was considerable, it seems to have made
but a very small part of the whole. In the present times, the whole
circulation of Scotland cannot be estimated at less than two millions, of
which that part which consists in gold and silver, most probably, does not
amount to half a million. But though the circulating gold and silver of
Scotland have suffered so great a diminution during this period, its real
riches and prosperity do not appear to have suffered any. Its agriculture,
manufactures, and trade, on the contrary, the annual produce of its land and
labour, have evidently been augmented.
It is chiefly by discounting bills of exchange, that is, by advancing
money upon them before they are due, that the greater part of banks and
bankers issue their promissory notes. They deduct always, upon whatever
sum they advance, the legal interest till the bill shall become due. The
payment of the bill, when it becomes due, replaces to the bank the value of
what had been advanced, together with a clear profit of the interest. The
banker, who advances to the merchant whose bill he discounts, not gold and
silver, but his own promissory notes, has the advantage of being able to
discount to a greater amount by the whole value of his promissory notes,
which he finds, by experience, are commonly in circulation. He is thereby
enabled to make his clear gain of interest on so much a larger sum.
The commerce of Scotland, which at present is not very great, was still
more inconsiderable when the two first banking companies were
established; and those companies would have had but little trade, had they
confined their business to the discounting of bills of exchange. They
invented, therefore, another method of issuing their promissory notes; by
granting what they call cash accounts, that is, by giving credit, to the extent
of a certain sum (two or three thousand pounds for example), to any
individual who could procure two persons of undoubted credit and good
landed estate to become surety for him, that whatever money should be
advanced to him, within the sum for which the credit had been given,
should be repaid upon demand, together with the legal interest. Credits of
this kind are, I believe, commonly granted by banks and bankers in all
different parts of the world. But the easy terms upon which the Scotch
banking companies accept of repayment are, so far as I know, peculiar to
them, and have perhaps been the principal cause, both of the great trade of
those companies, and of the benefit which the country has received from it.
Whoever has a credit of this kind with one of those companies, and
borrows a thousand pounds upon it, for example, may repay this sum piece-
meal, by twenty and thirty pounds at a time, the company discounting a
proportionable part of the interest of the great sum, from the day on which
each of those small sums is paid in, till the whole be in this manner repaid.
All merchants, therefore, and almost all men of business, find it convenient
to keep such cash accounts with them, and are thereby interested to promote
the trade of those companies, by readily receiving their notes in all
payments, and by encouraging all those with whom they have any influence
to do the same. The banks, when their customers apply to them for money,
generally advance it to them in their own promissory notes. These the
merchants pay away to the manufacturers for goods, the manufacturers to
the farmers for materials and provisions, the farmers to their landlords for
rent; the landlords repay them to the merchants for the conveniencies and
luxuries with which they supply them, and the merchants again return them
to the banks, in order to balance their cash accounts, or to replace what they
my have borrowed of them; and thus almost the whole money business of
the country is transacted by means of them. Hence the great trade of those
companies.
By means of those cash accounts, every merchant can, without
imprudence, carry on a greater trade than he otherwise could do. If there are
two merchants, one in London and the other in Edinburgh, who employ
equal stocks in the same branch of trade, the Edinburgh merchant can,
without imprudence, carry on a greater trade, and give employment to a
greater number of people, than the London merchant. The London merchant
must always keep by him a considerable sum of money, either in his own
coffers, or in those of his banker, who gives him no interest for it, in order
to answer the demands continually coming upon him for payment of the
goods which he purchases upon credit. Let the ordinary amount of this sum
be supposed five hundred pounds; the value of the goods in his warehouse
must always be less, by five hundred pounds, than it would have been, had
he not been obliged to keep such a sum unemployed. Let us suppose that he
generally disposes of his whole stock upon hand, or of goods to the value of
his whole stock upon hand, once in the year. By being obliged to keep so
great a sum unemployed, he must sell in a year five hundred pounds worth
less goods than he might otherwise have done. His annual profits must be
less by all that he could have made by the sale of five hundred pounds
worth more goods; and the number of people employed in preparing his
goods for the market must be less by all those that five hundred pounds
more stock could have employed. The merchant in Edinburgh, on the other
hand, keeps no money unemployed for answering such occasional demands.
When they actually come upon him, he satisfies them from his cash account
with the bank, and gradually replaces the sum borrowed with the money or
paper which comes in from the occasional sales of his goods. With the same
stock, therefore, he can, without imprudence, have at all times in his
warehouse a larger quantity of goods than the London merchant; and can
thereby both make a greater profit himself, and give constant employment
to a greater number of industrious people who prepare those goods for the
market. Hence the great benefit which the country has derived from this
trade.
The facility of discounting bills of exchange, it may be thought, indeed,
gives the English merchants a conveniency equivalent to the cash accounts
of the Scotch merchants. But the Scotch merchants, it must be remembered,
can discount their bills of exchange as easily as the English merchants; and
have, besides, the additional conveniency of their cash accounts.
The whole paper money of every kind which can easily circulate in any
country, never can exceed the value of the gold and silver, of which it
supplies the place, or which (the commerce being supposed the same)
would circulate there, if there was no paper money. If twenty shilling notes,
for example, are the lowest paper money current in Scotland, the whole of
that currency which can easily circulate there, cannot exceed the sum of
gold and silver which would be necessary for transacting the annual
exchanges of twenty shillings value and upwards usually transacted within
that country. Should the circulating paper at any time exceed that sum, as
the excess could neither be sent abroad nor be employed in the circulation
of the country, it must immediately return upon the banks, to be exchanged
for gold and silver. Many people would immediately perceive that they had
more of this paper than was necessary for transacting their business at
home; and as they could not send it abroad, they would immediately
demand payment for it from the banks. When this superfluous paper was
converted into gold and silver, they could easily find a use for it, by sending
it abroad; but they could find none while it remained in the shape of paper.
There would immediately, therefore, be a run upon the banks to the whole
extent of this superfluous paper, and if they showed any difficulty or
backwardness in payment, to a much greater extent; the alarm which this
would occasion necessarily increasing the run.
Over and above the expenses which are common to every branch of
trade, such as the expense of house-rent, the wages of servants, clerks,
accountants, etc. the expenses peculiar to a bank consist chiefly in two
articles: first, in the expense of keeping at all times in its coffers, for
answering the occasional demands of the holders of its notes, a large sum of
money, of which it loses the interest; and, secondly, in the expense of
replenishing those coffers as fast as they are emptied by answering such
occasional demands.
A banking company which issues more paper than can be employed in
the circulation of the country, and of which the excess is continually
returning upon them for payment, ought to increase the quantity of gold and
silver which they keep at all times in their coffers, not only in proportion to
this excessive increase of their circulation, but in a much greater proportion;
their notes returning upon them much faster than in proportion to the excess
of their quantity. Such a company, therefore, ought to increase the first
article of their expense, not only in proportion to this forced increase of
their business, but in a much greater proportion.
The coffers of such a company, too, though they ought to be filled much
fuller, yet must empty themselves much faster than if their business was
confined within more reasonable bounds, and must require not only a more
violent, but a more constant and uninterrupted exertion of expense, in order
to replenish them, The coin, too, which is thus continually drawn in such
large quantities from their coffers, cannot be employed in the circulation of
the country. It comes in place of a paper which is over and above what can
be employed in that circulation, and is, therefore, over and above what can
be employed in it too. But as that coin will not be allowed to lie idle, it
must, in one shape or another, be sent abroad, in order to find that profitable
employment which it cannot find at home; and this continual exportation of
gold and silver, by enhancing the difficulty, must necessarily enhance still
farther the expense of the bank, in finding new gold and silver in order to
replenish those coffers, which empty themselves so very rapidly. Such a
company, therefore, must in proportion to this forced increase of their
business, increase the second article of their expense still more than the
first.
Let us suppose that all the paper of a particular bank, which the
circulation of the country can easily absorb and employ, amounts exactly to
forty thousand pounds, and that, for answering occasional demands, this
bank is obliged to keep at all times in its coffers ten thousand pounds in
gold and silver. Should this bank attempt to circulate forty-four thousand
pounds, the four thousand pounds which are over and above what the
circulation can easily absorb and employ, will return upon it almost as fast
as they are issued. For answering occasional demands, therefore, this bank
ought to keep at all times in its coffers, not eleven thousand pounds only,
but fourteen thousand pounds. It will thus gain nothing by the interest of the
four thousand pounds excessive circulation; and it will lose the whole
expense of continually collecting four thousand pounds in gold and silver,
which will be continually going out of its coffers as fast as they are brought
into them.
Had every particular banking company always understood and attended
to its own particular interest, the circulation never could have been
overstocked with paper money. But every particular banking company has
not always understood or attended to its own particular interest, and the
circulation has frequently been overstocked with paper money.
By issuing too great a quantity of paper, of which the excess was
continually returning, in order to be exchanged for gold and silver, the Bank
of England was for many years together obliged to coin gold to the extent
of between eight hundred thousand pounds and a million a-year; or, at an
average, about eight hundred and fifty thousand pounds. For this great
coinage, the bank (inconsequence of the worn and degraded state into
which the gold coin had fallen a few years ago) was frequently obliged to
purchase gold bullion at the high price of four pounds an ounce, which it
soon after issued in coin at £3:17:10 1/2 an ounce, losing in this manner
between two and a half and three per cent. upon the coinage of so very large
a sum. Though the bank, therefore, paid no seignorage, though the
government was properly at the expense of this coinage, this liberality of
government did not prevent altogether the expense of the bank.
The Scotch banks, in consequence of an excess of the same kind, were all
obliged to employ constantly agents at London to collect money for them,
at an expense which was seldom below one and a half or two per cent. This
money was sent down by the waggon, and insured by the carriers at an
additional expense of three quarters per cent. or fifteen shillings on the
hundred pounds. Those agents were not always able to replenish the coffers
of their employers so fast as they were emptied. In this case, the resource of
the banks was, to draw upon their correspondents in London bills of
exchange, to the extent of the sum which they wanted. When those
correspondents afterwards drew upon them for the payment of this sum,
together with the interest and commission, some of those banks, from the
distress into which their excessive circulation had thrown them, had
sometimes no other means of satisfying this draught, but by drawing a
second set of bills, either upon the same, or upon some other
correspondents in London; and the same sum, or rather bills for the same
sum, would in this manner make sometimes more than two or three
journeys; the debtor bank paying always the interest and commission upon
the whole accumulated sum. Even those Scotch banks which never
distinguished themselves by their extreme imprudence, were sometimes
obliged to employ this ruinous resource.
The gold coin which was paid out, either by the Bank of England or by
the Scotch banks, in exchange for that part of their paper which was over
and above what could be employed in the circulation of the country, being
likewise over and above what could be employed in that circulation, was
sometimes sent abroad in the shape of coin, sometimes melted down and
sent abroad in the shape of bullion, and sometimes melted down and sold to
the Bank of England at the high price of four pounds an ounce. It was the
newest, the heaviest, and the best pieces only, which were carefully picked
out of the whole coin, and either sent abroad or melted down. At home, and
while they remained in the shape of coin, those heavy pieces were of no
more value than the light; but they were of more value abroad, or when
melted down into bullion at home. The Bank of England, notwithstanding
their great annual coinage, found, to their astonishment, that there was
every year the same scarcity of coin as there had been the year before; and
that, notwithstanding the great quantity of good and new coin which was
every year issued from the bank, the state of the coin, instead of growing
better and better, became every year worse and worse. Every year they
found themselves under the necessity of coining nearly the same quantity of
gold as they had coined the year before; and from the continual rise in the
price of gold bullion, in consequence of the continual wearing and clipping
of the coin, the expense of this great annual coinage became, every year,
greater and greater. The Bank of England, it is to be observed, by supplying
its own coffers with coin, is indirectly obliged to supply the whole
kingdom, into which coin is continually flowing from those coffers in a
great variety of ways. Whatever coin, therefore, was wanted to support this
excessive circulation both of Scotch and English paper money, whatever
vacuities this excessive circulation occasioned in the necessary coin of the
kingdom, the Bank of England was obliged to supply them. The Scotch
banks, no doubt, paid all of them very dearly for their own imprudence and
inattention: but the Bank of England paid very dearly, not only for its own
imprudence, but for the much greater imprudence of almost all the Scotch
banks.
The over-trading of some bold projectors in both parts of the united
kingdom, was the original cause of this excessive circulation of paper
money.
What a bank can with propriety advance to a merchant or undertaker of
any kind, is not either the whole capital with which he trades, or even any
considerable part of that capital; but that part of it only which he would
otherwise be obliged to keep by him unemployed and in ready money, for
answering occasional demands. If the paper money which the bank
advances never exceeds this value, it can never exceed the value of the gold
and silver which would necessarily circulate in the country if there was no
paper money; it can never exceed the quantity which the circulation of the
country can easily absorb and employ.
When a bank discounts to a merchant a real bill of exchange, drawn by a
real creditor upon a real debtor, and which, as soon as it becomes due, is
really paid by that debtor; it only advances to him a part of the value which
he would otherwise be obliged to keep by him unemployed and in ready
money, for answering occasional demands. The payment of the bill, when it
becomes due, replaces to the bank the value of what it had advanced,
together with the interest. The coffers of the bank, so far as its dealings are
confined to such customers, resemble a water-pond, from which, though a
stream is continually running out, yet another is continually running in,
fully equal to that which runs out; so that, without any further care or
attention, the pond keeps always equally, or very near equally full. Little or
no expense can ever be necessary for replenishing the coffers of such a
bank.
A merchant, without over-trading, may frequently have occasion for a
sum of ready money, even when he has no bills to discount. When a bank,
besides discounting his bills, advances him likewise, upon such occasions,
such sums upon his cash account, and accepts of a piece-meal repayment,
as the money comes in from the occasional sale of his goods, upon the easy
terms of the banking companies of Scotland; it dispenses him entirely from
the necessity of keeping any part of his stock by him unemployed and in
ready money for answering occasional demands. When such demands
actually come upon him, he can answer them sufficiently from his cash
account. The bank, however, in dealing with such customers, ought to
observe with great attention, whether, in the course of some short period (of
four, five, six, or eight months, for example), the sum of the repayments
which it commonly receives from them, is, or is not, fully equal to that of
the advances which it commonly makes to them. If, within the course of
such short periods, the sum of the repayments from certain customers is,
upon most occasions, fully equal to that of the advances, it may safely
continue to deal with such customers. Though the stream which is in this
case continually running out from its coffers may be very large, that which
is continually running into them must be at least equally large, so that,
without any further care or attention, those coffers are likely to be always
equally or very near equally full, and scarce ever to require any
extraordinary expense to replenish them. If, on the contrary, the sum of the
repayments from certain other customers, falls commonly very much short
of the advances which it makes to them, it cannot with any safety continue
to deal with such customers, at least if they continue to deal with it in this
manner. The stream which is in this case continually running out from its
coffers, is necessarily much larger than that which is continually running in;
so that, unless they are replenished by some great and continual effort of
expense, those coffers must soon be exhausted altogether.
The banking companies of Scotland, accordingly, were for a long time
very careful to require frequent and regular repayments from all their
customers, and did not care to deal with any person, whatever might be his
fortune or credit, who did not make, what they called, frequent and regular
operations with them. By this attention, besides saving almost entirely the
extraordinary expense of replenishing their coffers, they gained two other
very considerable advantages.
First, by this attention they were enabled to make some tolerable
judgment concerning the thriving or declining circumstances of their
debtors, without being obliged to look out for any other evidence besides
what their own books afforded them; men being, for the most part, either
regular or irregular in their repayments, according as their circumstances
are either thriving or declining. A private man who lends out his money to
perhaps half a dozen or a dozen of debtors, may, either by himself or his
agents, observe and inquire both constantly and carefully into the conduct
and situation of each of them. But a banking company, which lends money
to perhaps five hundred different people, and of which the attention is
continually occupied by objects of a very different kind, can have no
regular information concerning the conduct and circumstances of the
greater part of its debtors, beyond what its own books afford it. In requiring
frequent and regular repayments from all their customers, the banking
companies of Scotland had probably this advantage in view.
Secondly, by this attention they secured themselves from the possibility
of issuing more paper money than what the circulation of the country could
easily absorb and employ. When they observed, that within moderate
periods of time, the repayments of a particular customer were, upon most
occasions, fully equal to the advances which they had made to him, they
might be assured that the paper money which they had advanced to him had
not, at any time, exceeded the quantity of gold and silver which he would
otherwise have been obliged to keep by him for answering occasional
demands; and that, consequently, the paper money, which they had
circulated by his means, had not at any time exceeded the quantity of gold
and silver which would have circulated in the country, had there been no
paper money. The frequency, regularity, and amount of his repayments,
would sufficiently demonstrate that the amount of their advances had at no
time exceeded that part of his capital which he would otherwise have been
obliged to keep by him unemployed, and in ready money, for answering
occasional demands; that is, for the purpose of keeping the rest of his
capital in constant employment. It is this part of his capital only which,
within moderate periods of time, is continually returning to every dealer in
the shape of money, whether paper or coin, and continually going from him
in the same shape. If the advances of the bank had commonly exceeded this
part of his capital, the ordinary amount of his repayments could not, within
moderate periods of time, have equalled the ordinary amount of its
advances. The stream which, by means of his dealings, was continually
running into the coffers of the bank, could not have been equal to the stream
which, by means of the same dealings was continually running out. The
advances of the bank paper, by exceeding the quantity of gold and silver
which, had there been no such advances, he would have been obliged to
keep by him for answering occasional demands, might soon come to exceed
the whole quantity of gold and silver which ( the commerce being supposed
the same ) would have circulated in the country, had there been no paper
money; and, consequently, to exceed the quantity which the circulation of
the country could easily absorb and employ; and the excess of this paper
money would immediately have returned upon the bank, in order to be
exchanged for gold and silver. This second advantage, though equally real,
was not, perhaps, so well understood by all the different banking companies
in Scotland as the first.
When, partly by the conveniency of discounting bills, and partly by that
of cash accounts, the creditable traders of any country can be dispensed
from the necessity of keeping any part of their stock by them unemployed,
and in ready money, for answering occasional demands, they can
reasonably expect no farther assistance from hanks and bankers, who, when
they have gone thus far, cannot, consistently with their own interest and
safety, go farther. A bank cannot, consistently with its own interest, advance
to a trader the whole, or even the greater part of the circulating capital with
which he trades; because, though that capital is continually returning to him
in the shape of money, and going from him in the same shape, yet the whole
of the returns is too distant from the whole of the outgoings, and the sum of
his repayments could not equal the sum of his advances within such
moderate periods of time as suit the conveniency of a bank. Still less could
a bank afford to advance him any considerable part of his fixed capital; of
the capital which the undertaker of an iron forge, for example, employs in
erecting his forge and smelting-houses, his work-houses, and warehouses,
the dwelling-houses of his workmen, etc.; of the capital which the
undertaker of a mine employs in sinking his shafts, in erecting engines for
drawing out the water, in making roads and waggon-ways, etc.; of the
capital which the person who undertakes to improve land employs in
clearing, draining, inclosing, manuring, and ploughing waste and
uncultivated fields; in building farmhouses, with all their necessary
appendages of stables, granaries, etc. The returns of the fixed capital are, in
almost all cases, much slower than those of the circulating capital: and such
expenses, even when laid out with the greatest prudence and judgment, very
seldom return to the undertaker till after a period of many years, a period by
far too distant to suit the conveniency of a bank. Traders and other
undertakers may, no doubt with great propriety, carry on a very
considerable part of their projects with borrowed money. In justice to their
creditors, however, their own capital ought in this case to be sufficient to
insure, if I may say so, the capital of those creditors; or to render it
extremely improbable that those creditors should incur any loss, even
though the success of the project should fall very much short of the
expectation of the projectors. Even with this precaution, too, the money
which is borrowed, and which it is meant should not be repaid till after a
period of several years, ought not to be borrowed of a bank, but ought to be
borrowed upon bond or mortgage, of such private people as propose to live
upon the interest of their money, without taking the trouble themselves to
employ the capital, and who are, upon that account, willing to lend that
capital to such people of good credit as are likely to keep it for several
years. A bank, indeed, which lends its money without the expense of
stamped paper, or of attorneys’ fees for drawing bonds and mortgages, and
which accepts of repayment upon the easy terms of the banking companies
of Scotland, would, no doubt, be a very convenient creditor to such traders
and undertakers. But such traders and undertakers would surely be most
inconvenient debtors to such a bank.
It is now more than five and twenty years since the paper money issued
by the different banking companies of Scotland was fully equal, or rather
was somewhat more than fully equal, to what the circulation of the country
could easily absorb and employ. Those companies, therefore, had so long
ago given all the assistance to the traders and other undertakers of Scotland
which it is possible for banks and bankers, consistently with their own
interest, to give. They had even done somewhat more. They had over-traded
a little, and had brought upon themselves that loss, or at least that
diminution of profit, which, in this particular business, never fails to attend
the smallest degree of over-trading. Those traders and other undertakers,
having got so much assistance from banks and bankers, wished to get still
more. The banks, they seem to have thought, could extend their credits to
whatever sum might be wanted, without incurring any other expense
besides that of a few reams of paper. They complained of the contracted
views and dastardly spirit of the directors of those banks, which did not,
they said, extend their credits in proportion to the extension of the trade of
the country; meaning, no doubt, by the extension of that trade, the extension
of their own projects beyond what they could carry on either with their own
capital, or with what they had credit to borrow of private people in the usual
way of bond or mortgage. The banks, they seem to have thought, were in
honour bound to supply the deficiency, and to provide them with all the
capital which they wanted to trade with. The banks, however, were of a
different opinion; and upon their refusing to extend their credits, some of
those traders had recourse to an expedient which, for a time, served their
purpose, though at a much greater expense, yet as effectually as the utmost
extension of bank credits could have done. This expedient was no other
than the well known shift of drawing and redrawing; the shift to which
unfortunate traders have sometimes recourse, when they are upon the brink
of bankruptcy. The practice of raising money in this manner had been long
known in England; and, during the course of the late war, when the high
profits of trade afforded a great temptation to over-trading, is said to have
been carried on to a very great extent. From England it was brought into
Scotland, where, in proportion to the very limited commerce, and to the
very moderate capital of the country, it was soon carried on to a much
greater extent than it ever had been in England.
The practice of drawing and redrawing is so well known to all men of
business, that it may, perhaps, be thought unnecessary to give any account
of it. But as this book may come into the hands of many people who are not
men of business, and as the effects of this practice upon the banking trade
are not, perhaps, generally understood, even by men of business
themselves, I shall endeavour to explain it as distinctly as I can.
The customs of merchants, which were established when the barbarous
laws of Europe did not enforce the performance of their contracts, and
which, during the course of the two last centuries, have been adopted into
the laws of all European nations, have given such extraordinary privileges
to bills of exchange, that money is more readily advanced upon them than
upon any other species of obligation; especially when they are made
payable within so short a period as two or three months after their date. If,
when the bill becomes due, the acceptor does not pay it as soon as it is
presented, he becomes from that moment a bankrupt. The bill is protested,
and returns upon the drawer, who, if he does not immediately pay it,
becomes likewise a bankrupt. If, before it came to the person who presents
it to the acceptor for payment, it had passed through the hands of several
other persons, who had successively advanced to one another the contents
of it, either in money or goods, and who, to express that each of them had in
his turn received those contents, had all of them in their order indorsed, that
is, written their names upon the back of the bill; each indorser becomes in
his turn liable to the owner of the bill for those contents, and, if he fails to
pay, he becomes too, from that moment, a bankrupt. Though the drawer,
acceptor, and indorsers of the bill, should all of them be persons of doubtful
credit; yet, still the shortness of the date gives some security to the owner of
the bill. Though all of them may be very likely to become bankrupts, it is a
chance if they all become so in so short a time. The house is crazy, says a
weary traveller to himself, and will not stand very long; but it is a chance if
it falls to-night, and I will venture, therefore, to sleep in it to-night.
The trader A in Edinburgh, we shall suppose, draws a bill upon B in
London, payable two months after date. In reality B in London owes
nothing to A in Edinburgh; but he agrees to accept of A’s bill, upon
condition, that before the term of payment he shall redraw upon A in
Edinburgh for the same sum, together with the interest and a commission,
another bill, payable likewise two months after date. B accordingly, before
the expiration of the first two months, redraws this bill upon A in
Edinburgh; who, again before the expiration of the second two months,
draws a second bill upon B in London, payable likewise two months after
date; and before the expiration of the third two months, B in London
redraws upon A in Edinburgh another bill payable also two months after
date. This practice has sometimes gone on, not only for several months, but
for several years together, the bill always returning upon A in Edinburgh
with the accumulated interest and commission of all the former bills. The
interest was five per cent. in the year, and the commission was never less
than one half per cent. on each draught. This commission being repeated
more than six times in the year, whatever money A might raise by this
expedient might necessarily have cost him something more than eight per
cent. in the year and sometimes a great deal more, when either the price of
the commission happened to rise, or when he was obliged to pay compound
interest upon the interest and commission of former bills. This practice was
called raising money by circulation.
In a country where the ordinary profits of stock, in the greater part of
mercantile projects, are supposed to run between six and ten per cent. it
must have been a very fortunate speculation, of which the returns could not
only repay the enormous expense at which the money was thus borrowed
for carrying it on, but afford, besides, a good surplus profit to the projector.
Many vast and extensive projects, however, were undertaken, and for
several years carried on, without any other fund to support them besides
what was raised at this enormous expense. The projectors, no doubt, had in
their golden dreams the most distinct vision of this great profit. Upon their
awakening, however, either at the end of their projects, or when they were
no longer able to carry them on, they very seldom, I believe, had the good
fortune to find it.
{The method described in the text was by no means either the most
common or the most expensive one in which those adventurers sometimes
raised money by circulation. It frequently happened, that A in Edinburgh
would enable B in London to pay the first bill of exchange, by drawing, a
few days before it became due, a second bill at three months date upon the
same B in London. This bill, being payable to his own order, A sold in
Edinburgh at par; and with its contents purchased bills upon London,
payable at sight to the order of B, to whom he sent them by the post.
Towards the end of the late war, the exchange between Edinburgh and
London was frequently three per cent. against Edinburgh, and those bills at
sight must frequently have cost A that premium. This transaction, therefore,
being repeated at least four times in the year, and being loaded with a
commission of at least one half per cent. upon each repetition, must at that
period have cost A, at least, fourteen per cent. in the year. At other times A
would enable to discharge the first bill of exchange, by drawing, a few days
before it became due, a second bill at two months date, not upon B, but
upon some third person, C, for example, in London. This other bill was
made payable to the order of B, who, upon its being accepted by C,
discounted it with some banker in London; and A enabled C to discharge it,
by drawing, a few day’s before it became due, a third bill likewise at two
months date, sometimes upon his first correspondent B, and sometimes
upon some fourth or fifth person, D or E, for example. This third bill was
made payable to the order of C, who, as soon as it was accepted, discounted
it in the same manner with some banker in London. Such operations being
repeated at least six times in the year, and being loaded with a commission
of at least one half per cent. upon each repetition, together with the legal
interest of five per cent. this method of raising money, in the same manner
as that described in the text, must have cost A something more than eight
per cent. By saving, however, the exchange between Edinburgh and
London, it was less expensive than that mentioned in the foregoing part of
this note; but then it required an established credit with more houses than
one in London, an advantage which many of these adventurers could not
always find it easy to procure.}
The bills which A in Edinburgh drew upon B in London, he regularly
discounted two months before they were due, with some bank or banker in
Edinburgh; and the bills which B in London redrew upon A in Edinburgh,
he as regularly discounted, either with the Bank of England, or with some
other banker in London. Whatever was advanced upon such circulating bills
was in Edinburgh advanced in the paper of the Scotch banks; and in
London, when they were discounted at the Bank of England in the paper of
that bank. Though the bills upon which this paper had been advanced were
all of them repaid in their turn as soon as they became due, yet the value
which had been really advanced upon the first bill was never really returned
to the banks which advanced it; because, before each bill became due,
another bill was always drawn to somewhat a greater amount than the bill
which was soon to be paid: and the discounting of this other bill was
essentially necessary towards the payment of that which was soon to be
due. This payment, therefore, was altogether fictitious. The stream which,
by means of those circulating bills of exchange, had once been made to run
out from the coffers of the banks, was never replaced by any stream which
really ran into them.
The paper which was issued upon those circulating bills of exchange
amounted, upon many occasions, to the whole fund destined for carrying on
some vast and extensive project of agriculture, commerce, or manufactures;
and not merely to that part of it which, had there been no paper money, the
projector would have been obliged to keep by him unemployed, and in
ready money, for answering occasional demands. The greater part of this
paper was, consequently, over and above the value of the gold and silver
which would have circulated in the country, had there been no paper money.
It was over and above, therefore, what the circulation of the country could
easily absorb and employ, and upon that account, immediately returned
upon the banks, in order to be exchanged for gold and silver, which they
were to find as they could. It was a capital which those projectors had very
artfully contrived to draw from those banks, not only without their
knowledge or deliberate consent, but for some time, perhaps, without their
having the most distant suspicion that they had really advanced it.
When two people, who are continually drawing and redrawing upon one
another, discount their bills always with the same banker, he must
immediately discover what they are about, and see clearly that they are
trading, not with any capital of their own, but with the capital which he
advances to them. But this discovery is not altogether so easy when they
discount their bills sometimes with one banker, and sometimes with
another, and when the two same persons do not constantly draw and redraw
upon one another, but occasionally run the round of a great circle of
projectors, who find it for their interest to assist one another in this method
of raising money and to render it, upon that account, as difficult as possible
to distinguish between a real and a fictitious bill of exchange, between a bill
drawn by a real creditor upon a real debtor, and a bill for which there was
properly no real creditor but the bank which discounted it, nor any real
debtor but the projector who made use of the money. When a banker had
even made this discovery, he might sometimes make it too late, and might
find that he had already discounted the bills of those projectors to so great
an extent, that, by refusing to discount any more, he would necessarily
make them all bankrupts; and thus by ruining them, might perhaps ruin
himself. For his own interest and safety, therefore, he might find it
necessary, in this very perilous situation, to go on for some time,
endeavouring, however, to withdraw gradually, and, upon that account,
making every day greater and greater difficulties about discounting, in order
to force these projectors by degrees to have recourse, either to other
bankers, or to other methods of raising money: so as that he himself might,
as soon as possible, get out of the circle. The difficulties, accordingly,
which the Bank of England, which the principal bankers in London, and
which even the more prudent Scotch banks began, after a certain time, and
when all of them had already gone too far, to make about discounting, not
only alarmed, but enraged, in the highest degree, those projectors. Their
own distress, of which this prudent and necessary reserve of the banks was,
no doubt, the immediate occasion, they called the distress of the country;
and this distress of the country, they said, was altogether owing to the
ignorance, pusillanimity, and bad conduct of the banks, which did not give a
sufficiently liberal aid to the spirited undertakings of those who exerted
themselves in order to beautify, improve, and enrich the country. It was the
duty of the banks, they seemed to think, to lend for as long a time, and to as
great an extent, as they might wish to borrow. The banks, however, by
refusing in this manner to give more credit to those to whom they had
already given a great deal too much, took the only method by which it was
now possible to save either their own credit, or the public credit of the
country.
In the midst of this clamour and distress, a new bank was established in
Scotland, for the express purpose of relieving the distress of the country.
The design was generous; but the execution was imprudent, and the nature
and causes of the distress which it meant to relieve, were not, perhaps, well
understood. This bank was more liberal than any other had ever been, both
in granting cash-accounts, and in discounting bills of exchange. With regard
to the latter, it seems to have made scarce any distinction between real and
circulating bills, but to have discounted all equally. It was the avowed
principle of this bank to advance upon any reasonable security, the whole
capital which was to be employed in those improvements of which the
returns are the most slow and distant, such as the improvements of land. To
promote such improvements was even said to be the chief of the public-
spirited purposes for which it was instituted. By its liberality in granting
cash-accounts, and in discounting bills of exchange, it, no doubt, issued
great quantities of its bank notes. But those bank notes being, the greater
part of them, over and above what the circulation of the country could
easily absorb and employ, returned upon it, in order to be exchanged for
gold and silver, as fast as they were issued. Its coffers were never well
filled. The capital which had been subscribed to this bank, at two different
subscriptions, amounted to one hundred and sixty thousand pounds, of
which eighty per cent. only was paid up. This sum ought to have been paid
in at several different instalments. A great part of the proprietors, when they
paid in their first instalment, opened a cash-account with the bank; and the
directors, thinking themselves obliged to treat their own proprietors with the
same liberality with which they treated all other men, allowed many of
them to borrow upon this cash-account what they paid in upon all their
subsequent instalments. Such payments, therefore, only put into one coffer
what had the moment before been taken out of another. But had the coffers
of this bank been filled ever so well, its excessive circulation must have
emptied them faster than they could have been replenished by any other
expedient but the ruinous one of drawing upon London; and when the bill
became due, paying it, together with interest and commission, by another
draught upon the same place. Its coffers having been filled so very ill, it is
said to have been driven to this resource within a very few months after it
began to do business. The estates of the proprietors of this bank were worth
several millions, and, by their subscription to the original bond or contract
of the bank, were really pledged for answering all its engagements. By
means of the great credit which so great a pledge necessarily gave it, it was,
notwithstanding its too liberal conduct, enabled to carry on business for
more than two years. When it was obliged to stop, it had in the circulation
about two hundred thousand pounds in bank notes. In order to support the
circulation of those notes, which were continually returning upon it as fast
as they were issued, it had been constantly in the practice of drawing bills
of exchange upon London, of which the number and value were continually
increasing, and, when it stopt, amounted to upwards of six hundred
thousand pounds. This bank, therefore, had, in little more than the course of
two years, advanced to different people upwards of eight hundred thousand
pounds at five per cent. Upon the two hundred thousand pounds which it
circulated in bank notes, this five per cent. might perhaps be considered as a
clear gain, without any other deduction besides the expense of management.
But upon upwards of six hundred thousand pounds, for which it was
continually drawing bills of exchange upon London, it was paying, in the
way of interest and commission, upwards of eight per cent. and was
consequently losing more than three per cent. upon more than three fourths
of all its dealings.
The operations of this bank seem to have produced effects quite opposite
to those which were intended by the particular persons who planned and
directed it. They seem to have intended to support the spirited undertakings,
for as such they considered them, which were at that time carrying on in
different parts of the country; and, at the same time, by drawing the whole
banking business to themselves, to supplant all the other Scotch banks,
particularly those established at Edinburgh, whose backwardness in
discounting bills of exchange had given some offence. This bank, no doubt,
gave some temporary relief to those projectors, and enabled them to carry
on their projects for about two years longer than they could otherwise have
done. But it thereby only enabled them to get so much deeper into debt; so
that, when ruin came, it fell so much the heavier both upon them and upon
their creditors. The operations of this bank, therefore, instead of relieving,
in reality aggravated in the long-run the distress which those projectors had
brought both upon themselves and upon their country. It would have been
much better for themselves, their creditors, and their country, had the
greater part of them been obliged to stop two years sooner than they
actually did. The temporary relief, however, which this bank afforded to
those projectors, proved a real and permanent relief to the other Scotch
banks. All the dealers in circulating bills of exchange, which those other
banks had become so backward in discounting, had recourse to this new
bank, where they were received with open arms. Those other banks,
therefore, were enabled to get very easily out of that fatal circle, from which
they could not otherwise have disengaged themselves without incurring a
considerable loss, and perhaps, too, even some degree of discredit.
In the long-run, therefore, the operations of this bank increased the real
distress of the country, which it meant to relieve; and effectually relieved,
from a very great distress, those rivals whom it meant to supplant.
At the first setting out of this bank, it was the opinion of some people,
that how fast soever its coffers might be emptied, it might easily replenish
them, by raising money upon the securities of those to whom it had
advanced its paper. Experience, I believe, soon convinced them that this
method of raising money was by much too slow to answer their purpose;
and that coffers which originally were so ill filled, and which emptied
themselves so very fast, could be replenished by no other expedient but the
ruinous one of drawing bills upon London, and when they became due,
paying them by other draughts on the same place, with accumulated interest
and commission. But though they had been able by this method to raise
money as fast as they wanted it, yet, instead of making a profit, they must
have suffered a loss of every such operation; so that in the long-run they
must have ruined themselves as a mercantile company, though perhaps not
so soon as by the more expensive practice of drawing and redrawing. They
could still have made nothing by the interest of the paper, which, being over
and above what the circulation of the country could absorb and employ,
returned upon them in order to be exchanged for gold and silver, as fast as
they issued it; and for the payment of which they were themselves
continually obliged to borrow money. On the contrary, the whole expense of
this borrowing, of employing agents to look out for people who had money
to lend, of negotiating with those people, and of drawing the proper bond or
assignment, must have fallen upon them, and have been so much clear loss
upon the balance of their accounts. The project of replenishing their coffers
in this manner may be compared to that of a man who had a water-pond
from which a stream was continually running out, and into which no stream
was continually running, but who proposed to keep it always equally full,
by employing a number of people to go continually with buckets to a well
at some miles distance, in order to bring water to replenish it.
But though this operation had proved not only practicable, but profitable
to the bank, as a mercantile company; yet the country could have derived no
benefit front it, but, on the contrary, must have suffered a very considerable
loss by it. This operation could not augment, in the smallest degree, the
quantity of money to be lent. It could only have erected this bank into a sort
of general loan office for the whole country. Those who wanted to borrow
must have applied to this bank, instead of applying to the private persons
who had lent it their money. But a bank which lends money, perhaps to five
hundred different people, the greater part of whom its directors can know
very little about, is not likely to be more judicious in the choice of its
debtors than a private person who lends out his money among a few people
whom he knows, and in whose sober and frugal conduct he thinks he has
good reason to confide. The debtors of such a bank as that whose conduct I
have been giving some account of were likely, the greater part of them, to
be chimerical projectors, the drawers and redrawers of circulating bills of
exchange, who would employ the money in extravagant undertakings,
which, with all the assistance that could be given them, they would
probably never be able to complete, and which, if they should be
completed, would never repay the expense which they had really cost,
would never afford a fund capable of maintaining a quantity of labour equal
to that which had been employed about them. The sober and frugal debtors
of private persons, on the contrary, would be more likely to employ the
money borrowed in sober undertakings which were proportioned to their
capitals, and which, though they might have less of the grand and the
marvellous, would have more of the solid and the profitable; which would
repay with a large profit whatever had been laid out upon them, and which
would thus afford a fund capable of maintaining a much greater quantity of
labour than that which had been employed about them. The success of this
operation, therefore, without increasing in the smallest degree the capital of
the country, would only have transferred a great part of it from prudent and
profitable to imprudent and unprofitable undertakings.
That the industry of Scotland languished for want of money to employ it,
was the opinion of the famous Mr Law. By establishing a bank of a
particular kind, which he seems to have imagined might issue paper to the
amount of the whole value of all the lands in the country, he proposed to
remedy this want of money. The parliament of Scotland, when he first
proposed his project, did not think proper to adopt it. It was afterwards
adopted, with some variations, by the Duke of Orleans, at that time regent
of France. The idea of the possibility of multiplying paper money to almost
any extent was the real foundation of what is called the Mississippi scheme,
the most extravagant project, both of banking and stock-jobbing, that
perhaps the world ever saw. The different operations of this scheme are
explained so fully, so clearly, and with so much order and distinctness, by
Mr Du Verney, in his Examination of the Political Reflections upon
commerce and finances of Mr Du Tot, that I shall not give any account of
them. The principles upon which it was founded are explained by Mr Law
himself, in a discourse concerning money and trade, which he published in
Scotland when he first proposed his project. The splendid but visionary
ideas which are set forth in that and some other works upon the same
principles, still continue to make an impression upon many people, and
have, perhaps, in part, contributed to that excess of banking, which has of
late been complained of, both in Scotland and in other places.
The Bank of England is the greatest bank of circulation in Europe. It was
incorporated, in pursuance of an act of parliament, by a charter under the
great seal, dated the 27th of July 1694. It at that time advanced to
government the sum of £1,200,000 for an annuity of £100,000, or for £
96,000 a-year, interest at the rate of eight per cent. and £4,000 year for the
expense of management. The credit of the new government, established by
the Revolution, we may believe, must have been very low, when it was
obliged to borrow at so high an interest.
In 1697, the bank was allowed to enlarge its capital stock, by an
ingraftment of £1,001,171:10s. Its whole capital stock, therefore, amounted
at this time to £2,201,171: 10s. This ingraftment is said to have been for the
support of public credit. In 1696, tallies had been at forty, and fifty, and
sixty, per cent. discount, and bank notes at twenty per cent. {James
Postlethwaite’s History of the Public Revenue, p.301.} During the great re-
coinage of the silver, which was going on at this time, the bank had thought
proper to discontinue the payment of its notes, which necessarily
occasioned their discredit.
In pursuance of the 7th Anne, c. 7, the bank advanced and paid into the
exchequer the sum of £400,000; making in all the sum of £1,600,000,
which it had advanced upon its original annuity of £96,000 interest, and
£4,000 for expense of management. In 1708, therefore, the credit of
government was as good as that of private persons, since it could borrow at
six per cent. interest, the common legal and market rate of those times. In
pursuance of the same act, the bank cancelled exchequer bills to the amount
of £ 1,775,027: 17s: 10½d. at six per cent. interest, and was at the same
time allowed to take in subscriptions for doubling its capital. In 1703,
therefore, the capital of the bank amounted to £4,402,343; and it had
advanced to government the sum of £3,375,027:17:10½d.
By a call of fifteen per cent. in 1709, there was paid in, and made stock, £
656,204:1:9d.; and by another of ten per cent. in 1710, £501,448:12:11d. In
consequence of those two calls, therefore, the bank capital amounted to £
5,559,995:14:8d.
In pursuance of the 3rd George I. c.8, the bank delivered up two millions
of exchequer Bills to be cancelled. It had at this time, therefore, advanced to
government £5,375,027:17 10d. In pursuance of the 8th George I. c.21, the
bank purchased of the South-sea company, stock to the amount of
£4,000,000: and in 1722, in consequence of the subscriptions which it had
taken in for enabling it to make this purchase, its capital stock was
increased by £ 3,400,000. At this time, therefore, the bank had advanced to
the public £ 9,375,027 17s. 10½d.; and its capital stock amounted only to £
8,959,995:14:8d. It was upon this occasion that the sum which the bank had
advanced to the public, and for which it received interest, began first to
exceed its capital stock, or the sum for which it paid a dividend to the
proprietors of bank stock; or, in other words, that the bank began to have an
undivided capital, over and above its divided one. It has continued to have
an undivided capital of the same kind ever since. In 1746, the bank had,
upon different occasions, advanced to the public £11,686,800, and its
divided capital had been raised by different calls and subscriptions to £
10,780,000. The state of those two sums has continued to be the same ever
since. In pursuance of the 4th of George III. c.25, the bank agreed to pay to
government for the renewal of its charter £110,000, without interest or re-
payment. This sum, therefore did not increase either of those two other
sums.
The dividend of the bank has varied according to the variations in the rate
of the interest which it has, at different times, received for the money it had
advanced to the public, as well as according to other circumstances. This
rate of interest has gradually been reduced from eight to three per cent. For
some years past, the bank dividend has been at five and a half per cent.
The stability of the bank of England is equal to that of the British
government. All that it has advanced to the public must be lost before its
creditors can sustain any loss. No other banking company in England can be
established by act of parliament, or can consist of more than six members. It
acts, not only as an ordinary bank, but as a great engine of state. It receives
and pays the greater part of the annuities which are due to the creditors of
the public; it circulates exchequer bills; and it advances to government the
annual amount of the land and malt taxes, which are frequently not paid up
till some years thereafter. In these different operations, its duty to the public
may sometimes have obliged it, without any fault of its directors, to
overstock the circulation with paper money. It likewise discounts
merchants’ bills, and has, upon several different occasions, supported the
credit of the principal houses, not only of England, but of Hamburgh and
Holland. Upon one occasion, in 1763, it is said to have advanced for this
purpose, in one week, about £1,600,000, a great part of it in bullion. I do
not, however, pretend to warrant either the greatness of the sum, or the
shortness of the time. Upon other occasions, this great company has been
reduced to the necessity of paying in sixpences.
It is not by augmenting the capital of the country, but by rendering a
greater part of that capital active and productive than would otherwise be
so, that the most judicious operations of banking can increase the industry
of the country. That part of his capital which a dealer is obliged to keep by
him unemployed and in ready money, for answering occasional demands, is
so much dead stock, which, so long as it remains in this situation, produces
nothing, either to him or to his country. The judicious operations of banking
enable him to convert this dead stock into active and productive stock; into
materials to work upon; into tools to work with; and into provisions and
subsistence to work for; into stock which produces something both to
himself and to his country. The gold and silver money which circulates in
any country, and by means of which, the produce of its land and labour is
annually circulated and distributed to the proper consumers, is, in the same
manner as the ready money of the dealer, all dead stock. It is a very
valuable part of the capital of the country, which produces nothing to the
country. The judicious operations of banking, by substituting paper in the
room of a great part of this gold and silver, enable the country to convert a
great part of this dead stock into active and productive stock; into stock
which produces something to the country. The gold and silver money which
circulates in any country may very properly be compared to a highway,
which, while it circulates and carries to market all the grass and corn of the
country, produces itself not a single pile of either. The judicious operations
of banking, by providing, if I may be allowed so violent a metaphor, a sort
of waggon-way through the air, enable the country to convert, as it were, a
great part of its highways into good pastures, and corn fields, and thereby to
increase, very considerably, the annual produce of its land and labour. The
commerce and industry of the country, however, it must be acknowledged,
though they may be somewhat augmented, cannot be altogether so secure,
when they are thus, as it were, suspended upon the Daedalian wings of
paper money, as when they travel about upon the solid ground of gold and
silver. Over and above the accidents to which they are exposed from the
unskilfulness of the conductors of this paper money, they are liable to
several others, from which no prudence or skill of those conductors can
guard them.
An unsuccessful war, for example, in which the enemy got possession of
the capital, and consequently of that treasure which supported the credit of
the paper money, would occasion a much greater confusion in a country
where the whole circulation was carried on by paper, than in one where the
greater part of it was carried on by gold and silver. The usual instrument of
commerce having lost its value, no exchanges could be made but either by
barter or upon credit. All taxes having been usually paid in paper money,
the prince would not have wherewithal either to pay his troops, or to furnish
his magazines; and the state of the country would be much more
irretrievable than if the greater part of its circulation had consisted in gold
and silver. A prince, anxious to maintain his dominions at all times in the
state in which he can most easily defend them, ought upon this account to
guard not only against that excessive multiplication of paper money which
ruins the very banks which issue it, but even against that multiplication of it
which enables them to fill the greater part of the circulation of the country
with it.
The circulation of every country may be considered as divided into two
different branches; the circulation of the dealers with one another, and the
circulation between the dealers and the consumers. Though the same pieces
of money, whether paper or metal, may be employed sometimes in the one
circulation and sometimes in the other; yet as both are constantly going on
at the same time, each requires a certain stock of money, of one kind or
another, to carry it on. The value of the goods circulated between the
different dealers never can exceed the value of those circulated between the
dealers and the consumers; whatever is bought by the dealers being
ultimately destined to be sold to the consumers. The circulation between the
dealers, as it is carried on by wholesale, requires generally a pretty large
sum for every particular transaction. That between the dealers and the
consumers, on the contrary, as it is generally carried on by retail, frequently
requires but very small ones, a shilling, or even a halfpenny, being often
sufficient. But small sums circulate much faster than large ones. A shilling
changes masters more frequently than a guinea, and a halfpenny more
frequently than a shilling. Though the annual purchases of all the
consumers, therefore, are at least equal in value to those of all the dealers,
they can generally be transacted with a much smaller quantity of money;
the same pieces, by a more rapid circulation, serving as the instrument of
many more purchases of the one kind than of the other.
Paper money may be so regulated as either to confine itself very much to
the circulation between the different dealers, or to extend itself likewise to a
great part of that between the dealers and the consumers. Where no bank
notes are circulated under £10 value, as in London, paper money confines
itself very much to the circulation between the dealers. When a ten pound
bank note comes into the hands of a consumer, he is generally obliged to
change it at the first shop where he has occasion to purchase five shillings
worth of goods; so that it often returns into the hands of a dealer before the
consumer has spent the fortieth part of the money. Where bank notes are
issued for so small sums as 20s. as in Scotland, paper money extends itself
to a considerable part of the circulation between dealers and consumers.
Before the Act of parliament which put a stop to the circulation of ten and
five shilling notes, it filled a still greater part of that circulation. In the
currencies of North America, paper was commonly issued for so small a
sum as a shilling, and filled almost the whole of that circulation. In some
paper currencies of Yorkshire, it was issued even for so small a sum as a
sixpence.
Where the issuing of bank notes for such very small sums is allowed, and
commonly practised, many mean people are both enabled and encouraged
to become bankers. A person whose promissory note for £5, or even for
20s. would be rejected by every body, will get it to be received without
scruple when it is issued for so small a sum as a sixpence. But the frequent
bankruptcies to which such beggarly bankers must be liable, may occasion
a very considerable inconveniency, and sometimes even a very great
calamity, to many poor people who had received their notes in payment.
It were better, perhaps, that no bank notes were issued in any part of the
kingdom for a smaller sum than £5. Paper money would then, probably,
confine itself, in every part of the kingdom, to the circulation between the
different dealers, as much as it does at present in London, where no bank
notes are issued under £10 value; £5 being, in most part of the kingdom, a
sum which, though it will purchase, perhaps, little more than half the
quantity of goods, is as much considered, and is as seldom spent all at once,
as £10 are amidst the profuse expense of London.
Where paper money, it is to be observed, is pretty much confined to the
circulation between dealers and dealers, as at London, there is always
plenty of gold and silver. Where it extends itself to a considerable part of
the circulation between dealers and consumers, as in Scotland, and still
more in North America, it banishes gold and silver almost entirely from the
country; almost all the ordinary transactions of its interior commerce being
thus carried on by paper. The suppression of ten and five shilling bank
notes, somewhat relieved the scarcity of gold and silver in Scotland; and the
suppression of twenty shilling notes will probably relieve it still more.
Those metals are said to have become more abundant in America, since the
suppression of some of their paper currencies. They are said, likewise, to
have been more abundant before the institution of those currencies.
Though paper money should be pretty much confined to the circulation
between dealers and dealers, yet banks and bankers might still be able to
give nearly the same assistance to the industry and commerce of the
country, as they had done when paper money filled almost the whole
circulation. The ready money which a dealer is obliged to keep by him, for
answering occasional demands, is destined altogether for the circulation
between himself and other dealers of whom he buys goods. He has no
occasion to keep any by him for the circulation between himself and the
consumers, who are his customers, and who bring ready money to him,
instead of taking any from him. Though no paper money, therefore, was
allowed to be issued, but for such sums as would confine it pretty much to
the circulation between dealers and dealers; yet partly by discounting real
bills of exchange, and partly by lending upon cash-accounts, banks and
bankers might still be able to relieve the greater part of those dealers from
the necessity of keeping any considerable part of their stock by them
unemployed, and in ready money, for answering occasional demands. They
might still be able to give the utmost assistance which banks and bankers
can with propriety give to traders of every kind.
To restrain private people, it may be said, from receiving in payment the
promissory notes of a banker for any sum, whether great or small, when
they themselves are willing to receive them; or, to restrain a banker from
issuing such notes, when all his neighbours are willing to accept of them, is
a manifest violation of that natural liberty, which it is the proper business of
law not to infringe, but to support. Such regulations may, no doubt, be
considered as in some respect a violation of natural liberty. But those
exertions of the natural liberty of a few individuals, which might endanger
the security of the whole society, are, and ought to be, restrained by the
laws of all governments; of the most free, as well as or the most despotical.
The obligation of building party walls, in order to prevent the
communication of fire, is a violation of natural liberty, exactly of the same
kind with the regulations of the banking trade which are here proposed.
A paper money, consisting in bank notes, issued by people of undoubted
credit, payable upon demand, without any condition, and, in fact, always
readily paid as soon as presented, is, in every respect, equal in value to gold
and silver money, since gold and silver money can at anytime be had for it.
Whatever is either bought or sold for such paper, must necessarily be
bought or sold as cheap as it could have been for gold and silver.
The increase of paper money, it has been said, by augmenting the
quantity, and consequently diminishing the value, of the whole currency,
necessarily augments the money price of commodities. But as the quantity
of gold and silver, which is taken from the currency, is always equal to the
quantity of paper which is added to it, paper money does not necessarily
increase the quantity of the whole currency. From the beginning of the last
century to the present time, provisions never were cheaper in Scotland than
in 1759, though, from the circulation of ten and five shilling bank notes,
there was then more paper money in the country than at present. The
proportion between the price of provisions in Scotland and that in England
is the same now as before the great multiplication of banking companies in
Scotland. Corn is, upon most occasions, fully as cheap in England as in
France, though there is a great deal of paper money in England, and scarce
any in France. In 1751 and 1752, when Mr Hume published his Political
Discourses, and soon after the great multiplication of paper money in
Scotland, there was a very sensible rise in the price of provisions, owing,
probably, to the badness of the seasons, and not to the multiplication of
paper money.
It would be otherwise, indeed, with a paper money, consisting in
promissory notes, of which the immediate payment depended, in any
respect, either upon the good will of those who issued them, or upon a
condition which the holder of the notes might not always have it in his
power to fulfil, or of which the payment was not exigible till after a certain
number of years, and which, in the mean time, bore no interest. Such a
paper money would, no doubt, fall more or less below the value of gold and
silver, according as the difficulty or uncertainty of obtaining immediate
payment was supposed to be greater or less, or according to the greater or
less distance of time at which payment was exigible.
Some years ago the different banking companies of Scotland were in the
practice of inserting into their bank notes, what they called an optional
clause; by which they promised payment to the bearer, either as soon as the
note should be presented, or, in the option of the directors, six months after
such presentment, together with the legal interest for the said six months.
The directors of some of those banks sometimes took advantage of this
optional clause, and sometimes threatened those who demanded gold and
silver in exchange for a considerable number of their notes, that they would
take advantage of it, unless such demanders would content themselves with
a part of what they demanded. The promissory notes of those banking
companies constituted, at that time, the far greater part of the currency of
Scotland, which this uncertainty of payment necessarily degraded below
value of gold and silver money. During the continuance of this abuse
(which prevailed chiefly in 1762, 1763, and 1764), while the exchange
between London and Carlisle was at par, that between London and
Dumfries would sometimes be four per cent. against Dumfries, though this
town is not thirty miles distant from Carlisle. But at Carlisle, bills were paid
in gold and silver; whereas at Dumfries they were paid in Scotch bank
notes; and the uncertainty of getting these bank notes exchanged for gold
and silver coin, had thus degraded them four per cent. below the value of
that coin. The same act of parliament which suppressed ten and five shilling
bank notes, suppressed likewise this optional clause, and thereby restored
the exchange between England and Scotland to its natural rate, or to what
the course of trade and remittances might happen to make it.
In the paper currencies of Yorkshire, the payment of so small a sum as
6d. sometimes depended upon the condition, that the holder of the note
should bring the change of a guinea to the person who issued it; a condition
which the holders of such notes might frequently find it very difficult to
fulfil, and which must have degraded this currency below the value of gold
and silver money. An act of parliament, accordingly, declared all such
clauses unlawful, and suppressed, in the same manner as in Scotland, all
promissory notes, payable to the bearer, under 20s. value.
The paper currencies of North America consisted, not in bank notes
payable to the bearer on demand, but in a government paper, of which the
payment was not exigible till several years after it was issued; and though
the colony governments paid no interest to the holders of this paper, they
declared it to be, and in fact rendered it, a legal tender of payment for the
full value for which it was issued. But allowing the colony security to be
perfectly good, £100, payable fifteen years hence, for example, in a country
where interest is at six per cent., is worth little more than £40 ready money.
To oblige a creditor, therefore, to accept of this as full payment for a debt of
£100, actually paid down in ready money, was an act of such violent
injustice, as has scarce, perhaps, been attempted by the government of any
other country which pretended to be free. It bears the evident marks of
having originally been, what the honest and downright Doctor Douglas
assures us it was, a scheme of fraudulent debtors to cheat their creditors.
The government of Pennsylvania, indeed, pretended, upon their first
emission of paper money, in 1722, to render their paper of equal value with
gold and silver, by enacting penalties against all those who made any
difference in the price of their goods when they sold them for a colony
paper, and when they sold them for gold and silver, a regulation equally
tyrannical, but much less, effectual, than that which it was meant to support.
A positive law may render a shilling a legal tender for a guinea, because it
may direct the courts of justice to discharge the debtor who has made that
tender; but no positive law can oblige a person who sells goods, and who is
at liberty to sell or not to sell as he pleases, to accept of a shilling as
equivalent to a guinea in the price of them. Notwithstanding any regulation
of this kind, it appeared, by the course of exchange with Great Britain, that
£100 sterling was occasionally considered as equivalent, in some of the
colonies, to £130, and in others to so great a sum as £1100 currency; this
difference in the value arising from the difference in the quantity of paper
emitted in the different colonies, and in the distance and probability of the
term of its final discharge and redemption.
No law, therefore, could be more equitable than the act of parliament, so
unjustly complained of in the colonies, which declared, that no paper
currency to be emitted there in time coming, should be a legal tender of
payment.
Pennsylvania was always more moderate in its emissions of paper money
than any other of our colonies. Its paper currency, accordingly, is said never
to have sunk below the value of the gold and silver which was current in the
colony before the first emission of its paper money. Before that emission,
the colony had raised the denomination of its coin, and had, by act of
assembly, ordered 5s. sterling to pass in the colonies for 6s:3d., and
afterwards for 6s:8d. A pound, colony currency, therefore, even when that
currency was gold and silver, was more than thirty per cent. below the value
of £1 sterling; and when that currency was turned into paper, it was seldom
much more than thirty per cent. below that value. The pretence for raising
the denomination of the coin was to prevent the exportation of gold and
silver, by making equal quantities of those metals pass for greater sums in
the colony than they did in the mother country. It was found, however, that
the price of all goods from the mother country rose exactly in proportion as
they raised the denomination of their coin, so that their gold and silver were
exported as fast as ever.
The paper of each colony being received in the payment of the provincial
taxes, for the full value for which it had been issued, it necessarily derived
from this use some additional value, over and above what it would have
had, from the real or supposed distance of the term of its final discharge and
redemption. This additional value was greater or less, according as the
quantity of paper issued was more or less above what could be employed in
the payment of the taxes of the particular colony which issued it. It was in
all the colonies very much above what could be employed in this manner.
A prince, who should enact that a certain proportion of his taxes should
be paid in a paper money of a certain kind, might thereby give a certain
value to this paper money, even though the term of its final discharge and
redemption should depend altogether upon the will of the prince. If the bank
which issued this paper was careful to keep the quantity of it always
somewhat below what could easily be employed in this manner, the demand
for it might be such as to make it even bear a premium, or sell for somewhat
more in the market than the quantity of gold or silver currency for which it
was issued. Some people account in this manner for what is called the agio
of the bank of Amsterdam, or for the superiority of bank money over
current money, though this bank money, as they pretend, cannot be taken
out of the bank at the will of the owner. The greater part of foreign bills of
exchange must be paid in bank money, that is, by a transfer in the books of
the bank; and the directors of the bank, they allege, are careful to keep the
whole quantity of bank money always below what this use occasions a
demand for. It is upon this account, they say, the bank money sells for a
premium, or bears an agio of four or five per cent. above the same nominal
sum of the gold and silver currency of the country. This account of the bank
of Amsterdam, however, it will appear hereafter, is in a great measure
chimerical.
A paper currency which falls below the value of gold and silver coin,
does not thereby sink the value of those metals, or occasion equal quantities
of them to exchange for a smaller quantity of goods of any other kind. The
proportion between the value of gold and silver and that of goods of any
other kind, depends in all cases, not upon the nature and quantity of any
particular paper money, which may be current in any particular country, but
upon the richness or poverty of the mines, which happen at any particular
time to supply the great market of the commercial world with those metals.
It depends upon the proportion between the quantity of labour which is
necessary in order to bring a certain quantity of gold and silver to market,
and that which is necessary in order to bring thither a certain quantity of
any other sort of goods.
If bankers are restrained from issuing any circulating bank notes, or notes
payable to the bearer, for less than a certain sum; and if they are subjected
to the obligation of an immediate and unconditional payment of such bank
notes as soon as presented, their trade may, with safety to the public, be
rendered in all other respects perfectly free. The late multiplication of
banking companies in both parts of the united kingdom, an event by which
many people have been much alarmed, instead of diminishing, increases the
security of the public. It obliges all of them to be more circumspect in their
conduct, and, by not extending their currency beyond its due proportion to
their cash, to guard themselves against those malicious runs, which the
rivalship of so many competitors is always ready to bring upon them. It
restrains the circulation of each particular company within a narrower
circle, and reduces their circulating notes to a smaller number. By dividing
the whole circulation into a greater number of parts, the failure of any one
company, an accident which, in the course of things, must sometimes
happen, becomes of less consequence to the public. This free competition,
too, obliges all bankers to be more liberal in their dealings with their
customers, lest their rivals should carry them away. In general, if any
branch of trade, or any division of labour, be advantageous to the public, the
freer and more general the competition, it will always be the more so.
CHAPTER III.
OF THE ACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL, OR OF
PRODUCTIVE AND UNPRODUCTIVE LABOUR.
There is one sort of labour which adds to the value of the subject upon
which it is bestowed; there is another which has no such effect. The former
as it produces a value, may be called productive, the latter, unproductive
labour. {Some French authors of great learning and ingenuity have used
those words in a different sense. In the last chapter of the fourth book, I
shall endeavour to shew that their sense is an improper one.} Thus the
labour of a manufacturer adds generally to the value of the materials which
he works upon, that of his own maintenance, and of his master’s profit. The
labour of a menial servant, on the contrary, adds to the value of nothing.
Though the manufacturer has his wages advanced to him by his master, he
in reality costs him no expense, the value of those wages being generally
restored, together with a profit, in the improved value of the subject upon
which his labour is bestowed. But the maintenance of a menial servant
never is restored. A man grows rich by employing a multitude of
manufacturers; he grows poor by maintaining a multitude or menial
servants. The labour of the latter, however, has its value, and deserves its
reward as well as that of the former. But the labour of the manufacturer
fixes and realizes itself in some particular subject or vendible commodity,
which lasts for some time at least after that labour is past. It is, as it were, a
certain quantity of labour stocked and stored up, to be employed, if
necessary, upon some other occasion. That subject, or, what is the same
thing, the price of that subject, can afterwards, if necessary, put into motion
a quantity of labour equal to that which had originally produced it. The
labour of the menial servant, on the contrary, does not fix or realize itself in
any particular subject or vendible commodity. His services generally perish
in the very instant of their performance, and seldom leave any trace of value
behind them, for which an equal quantity of service could afterwards be
procured.
The labour of some of the most respectable orders in the society is, like
that of menial servants, unproductive of any value, and does not fix or
realize itself in any permanent subject, or vendible commodity, which
endures after that labour is past, and for which an equal quantity of labour
could afterwards be procured. The sovereign, for example, with all the
officers both of justice and war who serve under him, the whole army and
navy, are unproductive labourers. They are the servants of the public, and
are maintained by a part of the annual produce of the industry of other
people. Their service, how honourable, how useful, or how necessary
soever, produces nothing for which an equal quantity of service can
afterwards be procured. The protection, security, and defence, of the
commonwealth, the effect of their labour this year, will not purchase its
protection, security, and defence, for the year to come. In the same class
must be ranked, some both of the gravest and most important, and some of
the most frivolous professions; churchmen, lawyers, physicians, men of
letters of all kinds; players, buffoons, musicians, opera-singers, opera-
dancers, etc. The labour of the meanest of these has a certain value,
regulated by the very same principles which regulate that of every other sort
of labour; and that of the noblest and most useful, produces nothing which
could afterwards purchase or procure an equal quantity of labour. Like the
declamation of the actor, the harangue of the orator, or the tune of the
musician, the work of all of them perishes in the very instant of its
production.
Both productive and unproductive labourers, and those who do not labour
at all, are all equally maintained by the annual produce of the land and
labour of the country. This produce, how great soever, can never be infinite,
but must have certain limits. According, therefore, as a smaller or greater
proportion of it is in any one year employed in maintaining unproductive
hands, the more in the one case, and the less in the other, will remain for the
productive, and the next year’s produce will be greater or smaller
accordingly; the whole annual produce, if we except the spontaneous
productions of the earth, being the effect of productive labour.
Though the whole annual produce of the land and labour of every
country is no doubt ultimately destined for supplying the consumption of its
inhabitants, and for procuring a revenue to them; yet when it first comes
either from the ground, or from the hands of the productive labourers, it
naturally divides itself into two parts. One of them, and frequently the
largest, is, in the first place, destined for replacing a capital, or for renewing
the provisions, materials, and finished work, which had been withdrawn
from a capital; the other for constituting a revenue either to the owner of
this capital, as the profit of his stock, or to some other person, as the rent of
his land. Thus, of the produce of land, one part replaces the capital of the
farmer; the other pays his profit and the rent of the landlord; and thus
constitutes a revenue both to the owner of this capital, as the profits of his
stock, and to some other person as the rent of his land. Of the produce of a
great manufactory, in the same manner, one part, and that always the
largest, replaces the capital of the undertaker of the work; the other pays his
profit, and thus constitutes a revenue to the owner of this capital.
That part of the annual produce of the land and labour of any country
which replaces a capital, never is immediately employed to maintain any
but productive hands. It pays the wages of productive labour only. That
which is immediately destined for constituting a revenue, either as profit or
as rent, may maintain indifferently either productive or unproductive hands.
Whatever part of his stock a man employs as a capital, he always expects
it to be replaced to him with a profit. He employs it, therefore, in
maintaining productive hands only; and after having served in the function
of a capital to him, it constitutes a revenue to them. Whenever he employs
any part of it in maintaining unproductive hands of any kind, that part is
from that moment withdrawn from his capital, and placed in his stock
reserved for immediate consumption.
Unproductive labourers, and those who do not labour at all, are all
maintained by revenue; either, first, by that part of the annual produce
which is originally destined for constituting a revenue to some particular
persons, either as the rent of land, or as the profits of stock; or, secondly, by
that part which, though originally destined for replacing a capital, and for
maintaining productive labourers only, yet when it comes into their hands,
whatever part of it is over and above their necessary subsistence, may be
employed in maintaining indifferently either productive or unproductive
hands. Thus, not only the great landlord or the rich merchant, but even the
common workman, if his wages are considerable, may maintain a menial
servant; or he may sometimes go to a play or a puppet-show, and so
contribute his share towards maintaining one set of unproductive labourers;
or he may pay some taxes, and thus help to maintain another set, more
honourable and useful, indeed, but equally unproductive. No part of the
annual produce, however, which had been originally destined to replace a
capital, is ever directed towards maintaining unproductive hands, till after it
has put into motion its full complement of productive labour, or all that it
could put into motion in the way in which it was employed. The workman
must have earned his wages by work done, before he can employ any part
of them in this manner. That part, too, is generally but a small one. It is his
spare revenue only, of which productive labourers have seldom a great deal.
They generally have some, however; and in the payment of taxes, the
greatness of their number may compensate, in some measure, the smallness
of their contribution. The rent of land and the profits of stock are
everywhere, therefore, the principal sources from which unproductive
hands derive their subsistence. These are the two sorts of revenue of which
the owners have generally most to spare. They might both maintain
indifferently, either productive or unproductive hands. They seem, however,
to have some predilection for the latter. The expense of a great lord feeds
generally more idle than industrious people. The rich merchant, though with
his capital he maintains industrious people only, yet by his expense, that is,
by the employment of his revenue, he feeds commonly the very same sort
as the great lord.
The proportion, therefore, between the productive and unproductive
hands, depends very much in every country upon the proportion between
that part of the annual produce, which, as soon as it comes either from the
ground, or from the hands of the productive labourers, is destined for
replacing a capital, and that which is destined for constituting a revenue,
either as rent or as profit. This proportion is very different in rich from what
it is in poor countries.
Thus, at present, in the opulent countries of Europe, a very large,
frequently the largest, portion of the produce of the land, is destined for
replacing the capital of the rich and independent farmer; the other for
paying his profits, and the rent of the landlord. But anciently, during the
prevalency of the feudal government, a very small portion of the produce
was sufficient to replace the capital employed in cultivation. It consisted
commonly in a few wretched cattle, maintained altogether by the
spontaneous produce of uncultivated land, and which might, therefore, be
considered as a part of that spontaneous produce. It generally, too, belonged
to the landlord, and was by him advanced to the occupiers of the land. All
the rest of the produce properly belonged to him too, either as rent for his
land, or as profit upon this paltry capital. The occupiers of land were
generally bond-men, whose persons and effects were equally his property.
Those who were not bond-men were tenants at will; and though the rent
which they paid was often nominally little more than a quit-rent, it really
amounted to the whole produce of the land. Their lord could at all times
command their labour in peace and their service in war. Though they lived
at a distance from his house, they were equally dependent upon him as his
retainers who lived in it. But the whole produce of the land undoubtedly
belongs to him, who can dispose of the labour and service of all those
whom it maintains. In the present state of Europe, the share of the landlord
seldom exceeds a third, sometimes not a fourth part of the whole produce of
the land. The rent of land, however, in all the improved parts of the country,
has been tripled and quadrupled since those ancient times; and this third or
fourth part of the annual produce is, it seems, three or four times greater
than the whole had been before. In the progress of improvement, rent,
though it increases in proportion to the extent, diminishes in proportion to
the produce of the land.
In the opulent countries of Europe, great capitals are at present employed
in trade and manufactures. In the ancient state, the little trade that was
stirring, and the few homely and coarse manufactures that were carried on,
required but very small capitals. These, however, must have yielded very
large profits. The rate of interest was nowhere less than ten per cent. and
their profits must have been sufficient to afford this great interest. At
present, the rate of interest, in the improved parts of Europe, is nowhere
higher than six per cent.; and in some of the most improved, it is so low as
four, three, and two per cent. Though that part of the revenue of the
inhabitants which is derived from the profits of stock, is always much
greater in rich than in poor countries, it is because the stock is much greater;
in proportion to the stock, the profits are generally much less.
That part of the annual produce, therefore, which, as soon as it comes
either from the ground, or from the hands of the productive labourers, is
destined for replacing a capital, is not only much greater in rich than in poor
countries, but bears a much greater proportion to that which is immediately
destined for constituting a revenue either as rent or as profit. The funds
destined for the maintenance of productive labour are not only much greater
in the former than in the latter, but bear a much greater proportion to those
which, though they may be employed to maintain either productive or
unproductive hands, have generally a predilection for the latter.
The proportion between those different funds necessarily determines in
every country the general character of the inhabitants as to industry or
idleness. We are more industrious than our forefathers, because, in the
present times, the funds destined for the maintenance of industry are much
greater in proportion to those which are likely to be employed in the
maintenance of idleness, than they were two or three centuries ago. Our
ancestors were idle for want of a sufficient encouragement to industry. It is
better, says the proverb, to play for nothing, than to work for nothing. In
mercantile and manufacturing towns, where the inferior ranks of people are
chiefly maintained by the employment of capital, they are in general
industrious, sober, and thriving; as in many English, and in most Dutch
towns. In those towns which are principally supported by the constant or
occasional residence of a court, and in which the inferior ranks of people
are chiefly maintained by the spending of revenue, they are in general idle,
dissolute, and poor; as at Rome, Versailles, Compeigne, and Fontainbleau.
If you except Rouen and Bourdeaux, there is little trade or industry in any
of the parliament towns of France; and the inferior ranks of people, being
chiefly maintained by the expense of the members of the courts of justice,
and of those who come to plead before them, are in general idle and poor.
The great trade of Rouen and Bourdeaux seems to be altogether the effect
of their situation. Rouen is necessarily the entrepot of almost all the goods
which are brought either from foreign countries, or from the maritime
provinces of France, for the consumption of the great city of Paris.
Bourdeaux is, in the same manner, the entrepot of the wines which grow
upon the banks of the Garronne, and of the rivers which run into it, one of
the richest wine countries in the world, and which seems to produce the
wine fittest for exportation, or best suited to the taste of foreign nations.
Such advantageous situations necessarily attract a great capital by the great
employment which they afford it; and the employment of this capital is the
cause of the industry of those two cities. In the other parliament towns of
France, very little more capital seems to be employed than what is
necessary for supplying their own consumption; that is, little more than the
smallest capital which can be employed in them. The same thing may be
said of Paris, Madrid, and Vienna. Of those three cities, Paris is by far the
most industrious, but Paris itself is the principal market of all the
manufactures established at Paris, and its own consumption is the principal
object of all the trade which it carries on. London, Lisbon, and Copenhagen,
are, perhaps, the only three cities in Europe, which are both the constant
residence of a court, and can at the same time be considered as trading
cities, or as cities which trade not only for their own consumption, but for
that of other cities and countries. The situation of all the three is extremely
advantageous, and naturally fits them to be the entrepots of a great part of
the goods destined for the consumption of distant places. In a city where a
great revenue is spent, to employ with advantage a capital for any other
purpose than for supplying the consumption of that city, is probably more
difficult than in one in which the inferior ranks of people have no other
maintenance but what they derive from the employment of such a capital.
The idleness of the greater part of the people who are maintained by the
expense of revenue, corrupts, it is probable, the industry of those who ought
to be maintained by the employment of capital, and renders it less
advantageous to employ a capital there than in other places. There was little
trade or industry in Edinburgh before the Union. When the Scotch
parliament was no longer to be assembled in it, when it ceased to be the
necessary residence of the principal nobility and gentry of Scotland, it
became a city of some trade and industry. It still continues, however, to be
the residence of the principal courts of justice in Scotland, of the boards of
customs and excise, etc. A considerable revenue, therefore, still continues
to be spent in it. In trade and industry, it is much inferior to Glasgow, of
which the inhabitants are chiefly maintained by the employment of capital.
The inhabitants of a large village, it has sometimes been observed, after
having made considerable progress in manufactures, have become idle and
poor, in consequence of a great lord’s having taken up his residence in their
neighbourhood.
The proportion between capital and revenue, therefore, seems
everywhere to regulate the proportion between industry and idleness
Wherever capital predominates, industry prevails; wherever revenue,
idleness. Every increase or diminution of capital, therefore, naturally tends
to increase or diminish the real quantity of industry, the number of
productive hands, and consequently the exchangeable value of the annual
produce of the land and labour of the country, the real wealth and revenue
of all its inhabitants.
Capitals are increased by parsimony, and diminished by prodigality and
misconduct.
Whatever a person saves from his revenue he adds to his capital, and
either employs it himself in maintaining an additional number of productive
hands, or enables some other person to do so, by lending it to him for an
interest, that is, for a share of the profits. As the capital of an individual can
be increased only by what he saves from his annual revenue or his annual
gains, so the capital of a society, which is the same with that of all the
individuals who compose it, can be increased only in the same manner.
Parsimony, and not industry, is the immediate cause of the increase of
capital. Industry, indeed, provides the subject which parsimony
accumulates; but whatever industry might acquire, if parsimony did not
save and store up, the capital would never be the greater.
Parsimony, by increasing the fund which is destined for the maintenance
of productive hands, tends to increase the number of those hands whose
labour adds to the value of the subject upon which it is bestowed. It tends,
therefore, to increase the exchangeable value of the annual produce of the
land and labour of the country. It puts into motion an additional quantity of
industry, which gives an additional value to the annual produce.
What is annually saved, is as regularly consumed as what is annually
spent, and nearly in the same time too: but it is consumed by a different set
of people. That portion of his revenue which a rich man annually spends, is,
in most cases, consumed by idle guests and menial servants, who leave
nothing behind them in return for their consumption. That portion which he
annually saves, as, for the sake of the profit, it is immediately employed as
a capital, is consumed in the same manner, and nearly in the same time too,
but by a different set of people: by labourers, manufacturers, and artificers,
who reproduce, with a profit, the value of their annual consumption. His
revenue, we shall suppose, is paid him in money. Had he spent the whole,
the food, clothing, and lodging, which the whole could have purchased,
would have been distributed among the former set of people. By saving a
part of it, as that part is, for the sake of the profit, immediately employed as
a capital, either by himself or by some other person, the food, clothing, and
lodging, which may be purchased with it, are necessarily reserved for the
latter. The consumption is the same, but the consumers are different.
By what a frugal man annually saves, he not only affords maintenance to
an additional number of productive hands, for that of the ensuing year, but
like the founder of a public work-house he establishes, as it were, a
perpetual fund for the maintenance of an equal number in all times to come.
The perpetual allotment and destination of this fund, indeed, is not always
guarded by any positive law, by any trust-right or deed of mortmain. It is
always guarded, however, by a very powerful principle, the plain and
evident interest of every individual to whom any share of it shall ever
belong. No part of it can ever afterwards be employed to maintain any but
productive hands, without an evident loss to the person who thus perverts it
from its proper destination.
The prodigal perverts it in this manner: By not confining his expense
within his income, he encroaches upon his capital. Like him who perverts
the revenues of some pious foundation to profane purposes, he pays the
wages of idleness with those funds which the frugality of his forefathers
had, as it were, consecrated to the maintenance of industry. By diminishing
the funds destined for the employment of productive labour, he necessarily
diminishes, so far as it depends upon him, the quantity of that labour which
adds a value to the subject upon which it is bestowed, and, consequently,
the value of the annual produce of the land and labour of the whole country,
the real wealth and revenue of its inhabitants. If the prodigality of some
were not compensated by the frugality of others, the conduct of every
prodigal, by feeding the idle with the bread of the industrious, would tend
not only to beggar himself, but to impoverish his country.
Though the expense of the prodigal should be altogether in home made,
and no part of it in foreign commodities, its effect upon the productive
funds of the society would still be the same. Every year there would still be
a certain quantity of food and clothing, which ought to have maintained
productive, employed in maintaining unproductive hands. Every year,
therefore, there would still be some diminution in what would otherwise
have been the value of the annual produce of the land and labour of the
country.
This expense, it may be said, indeed, not being in foreign goods, and not
occasioning any exportation of gold and silver, the same quantity of money
would remain in the country as before. But if the quantity of food and
clothing which were thus consumed by unproductive, had been distributed
among productive hands, they would have reproduced, together with a
profit, the full value of their consumption. The same quantity of money
would, in this case, equally have remained in the country, and there would,
besides, have been a reproduction of an equal value of consumable goods.
There would have been two values instead of one.
The same quantity of money, besides, can not long remain in any country
in which the value of the annual produce diminishes. The sole use of money
is to circulate consumable goods. By means of it, provisions, materials, and
finished work, are bought and sold, and distributed to their proper
consumers. The quantity of money, therefore, which can be annually
employed in any country, must be determined by the value of the
consumable goods annually circulated within it. These must consist, either
in the immediate produce of the land and labour of the country itself, or in
something which had been purchased with some part of that produce. Their
value, therefore, must diminish as the value of that produce diminishes, and
along with it the quantity of money which can be employed in circulating
them. But the money which, by this annual diminution of produce, is
annually thrown out of domestic circulation, will not be allowed to lie idle.
The interest of whoever possesses it requires that it should be employed;
but having no employment at home, it will, in spite of all laws and
prohibitions, be sent abroad, and employed in purchasing consumable
goods, which may be of some use at home. Its annual exportation will, in
this manner, continue for some time to add something to the annual
consumption of the country beyond the value of its own annual produce.
What in the days of its prosperity had been saved from that annual produce,
and employed in purchasing gold and silver, will contribute, for some little
time, to support its consumption in adversity. The exportation of gold and
silver is, in this case, not the cause, but the effect of its declension, and may
even, for some little time, alleviate the misery of that declension.
The quantity of money, on the contrary, must in every country naturally
increase as the value of the annual produce increases. The value of the
consumable goods annually circulated within the society being greater, will
require a greater quantity of money to circulate them. A part of the
increased produce, therefore, will naturally be employed in purchasing,
wherever it is to be had, the additional quantity of gold and silver necessary
for circulating the rest. The increase of those metals will, in this case, be the
effect, not the cause, of the public prosperity. Gold and silver are purchased
everywhere in the same manner. The food, clothing, and lodging, the
revenue and maintenance, of all those whose labour or stock is employed in
bringing them from the mine to the market, is the price paid for them in
Peru as well as in England. The country which has this price to pay, will
never belong without the quantity of those metals which it has occasion for;
and no country will ever long retain a quantity which it has no occasion for.
Whatever, therefore, we may imagine the real wealth and revenue of a
country to consist in, whether in the value of the annual produce of its land
and labour, as plain reason seems to dictate, or in the quantity of the
precious metals which circulate within it, as vulgar prejudices suppose; in
either view of the matter, every prodigal appears to be a public enemy, and
every frugal man a public benefactor.
The effects of misconduct are often the same as those of prodigality.
Every injudicious and unsuccessful project in agriculture, mines, fisheries,
trade, or manufactures, tends in the same manner to diminish the funds
destined for the maintenance of productive labour. In every such project,
though the capital is consumed by productive hands only, yet as, by the
injudicious manner in which they are employed, they do not reproduce the
full value of their consumption, there must always be some diminution in
what would otherwise have been the productive funds of the society.
It can seldom happen, indeed, that the circumstances of a great nation can
be much affected either by the prodigality or misconduct of individuals; the
profusion or imprudence of some being always more than compensated by
the frugality and good conduct of others.
With regard to profusion, the principle which prompts to expense is the
passion for present enjoyment; which, though sometimes violent and very
difficult to be restrained, is in general only momentary and occasional. But
the principle which prompts to save, is the desire of bettering our condition;
a desire which, though generally calm and dispassionate, comes with us
from the womb, and never leaves us till we go into the grave. In the whole
interval which separates those two moments, there is scarce, perhaps, a
single instance, in which any man is so perfectly and completely satisfied
with his situation, as to be without any wish of alteration or improvement of
any kind. An augmentation of fortune is the means by which the greater
part of men propose and wish to better their condition. It is the means the
most vulgar and the most obvious; and the most likely way of augmenting
their fortune, is to save and accumulate some part of what they acquire,
either regularly and annually, or upon some extraordinary occasion. Though
the principle of expense, therefore, prevails in almost all men upon some
occasions, and in some men upon almost all occasions; yet in the greater
part of men, taking the whole course of their life at an average, the principle
of frugality seems not only to predominate, but to predominate very greatly.
With regard to misconduct, the number of prudent and successful
undertakings is everywhere much greater than that of injudicious and
unsuccessful ones. After all our complaints of the frequency of
bankruptcies, the unhappy men who fall into this misfortune, make but a
very small part of the whole number engaged in trade, and all other sorts of
business; not much more, perhaps, than one in a thousand. Bankruptcy is,
perhaps, the greatest and most humiliating calamity which can befal an
innocent man. The greater part of men, therefore, are sufficiently careful to
avoid it. Some, indeed, do not avoid it; as some do not avoid the gallows.
Great nations are never impoverished by private, though they sometimes
are by public prodigality and misconduct. The whole, or almost the whole
public revenue is, in most countries, employed in maintaining unproductive
hands. Such are the people who compose a numerous and splendid court, a
great ecclesiastical establishment, great fleets and armies, who in time of
peace produce nothing, and in time of war acquire nothing which can
compensate the expense of maintaining them, even while the war lasts.
Such people, as they themselves produce nothing, are all maintained by the
produce of other men’s labour. When multiplied, therefore, to an
unnecessary number, they may in a particular year consume so great a share
of this produce, as not to leave a sufficiency for maintaining the productive
labourers, who should reproduce it next year. The next year’s produce,
therefore, will be less than that of the foregoing; and if the same disorder
should continue, that of the third year will be still less than that of the
second. Those unproductive hands who should be maintained by a part only
of the spare revenue of the people, may consume so great a share of their
whole revenue, and thereby oblige so great a number to encroach upon their
capitals, upon the funds destined for the maintenance of productive labour,
that all the frugality and good conduct of individuals may not be able to
compensate the waste and degradation of produce occasioned by this
violent and forced encroachment.
This frugality and good conduct, however, is, upon most occasions, it
appears from experience, sufficient to compensate, not only the private
prodigality and misconduct of individuals, but the public extravagance of
government. The uniform, constant, and uninterrupted effort of every man
to better his condition, the principle from which public and national, as well
as private opulence is originally derived, is frequently powerful enough to
maintain the natural progress of things towards improvement, in spite both
of the extravagance of government, and of the greatest errors of
administration. Like the unknown principle of animal life, it frequently
restores health and vigour to the constitution, in spite not only of the
disease, but of the absurd prescriptions of the doctor.
The annual produce of the land and labour of any nation can be increased
in its value by no other means, but by increasing either the number of its
productive labourers, or the productive powers of those labourers who had
before been employed. The number of its productive labourers, it is evident,
can never be much increased, but in consequence of an increase of capital,
or of the funds destined for maintaining them. The productive powers of the
same number of labourers cannot be increased, but in consequence either of
some addition and improvement to those machines and instruments which
facilitate and abridge labour, or of more proper division and distribution of
employment. In either case, an additional capital is almost always required.
It is by means of an additional capital only, that the undertaker of any work
can either provide his workmen with better machinery, or make a more
proper distribution of employment among them. When the work to be done
consists of a number of parts, to keep every man constantly employed in
one way, requires a much greater capital than where every man is
occasionally employed in every different part of the work. When we
compare, therefore, the state of a nation at two different periods, and find
that the annual produce of its land and labour is evidently greater at the
latter than at the former, that its lands are better cultivated, its manufactures
more numerous and more flourishing, and its trade more extensive; we may
be assured that its capital must have increased during the interval between
those two periods, and that more must have been added to it by the good
conduct of some, than had been taken from it either by the private
misconduct of others, or by the public extravagance of government. But we
shall find this to have been the case of almost all nations, in all tolerably
quiet and peaceable times, even of those who have not enjoyed the most
prudent and parsimonious governments. To form a right judgment of it,
indeed, we must compare the state of the country at periods somewhat
distant from one another. The progress is frequently so gradual, that, at near
periods, the improvement is not only not sensible, but, from the declension
either of certain branches of industry, or of certain districts of the country,
things which sometimes happen, though the country in general is in great
prosperity, there frequently arises a suspicion, that the riches and industry of
the whole are decaying.
The annual produce of the land and labour of England, for example, is
certainly much greater than it was a little more than a century ago, at the
restoration of Charles II. Though at present few people, I believe, doubt of
this, yet during this period five years have seldom passed away, in which
some book or pamphlet has not been published, written, too, with such
abilities as to gain some authority with the public, and pretending to
demonstrate that the wealth of the nation was fast declining; that the
country was depopulated, agriculture neglected, manufactures decaying,
and trade undone. Nor have these publications been all party pamphlets, the
wretched offspring of falsehood and venality. Many of them have been
written by very candid and very intelligent people, who wrote nothing but
what they believed, and for no other reason but because they believed it.
The annual produce of the land and labour of England, again, was
certainly much greater at the Restoration than we can suppose it to have
been about a hundred years before, at the accession of Elizabeth. At this
period, too, we have all reason to believe, the country was much more
advanced in improvement, than it had been about a century before, towards
the close of the dissensions between the houses of York and Lancaster. Even
then it was, probably, in a better condition than it had been at the Norman
conquest: and at the Norman conquest, than during the confusion of the
Saxon heptarchy. Even at this early period, it was certainly a more
improved country than at the invasion of Julius Caesar, when its inhabitants
were nearly in the same state with the savages in North America.
In each of those periods, however, there was not only much private and
public profusion, many expensive and unnecessary wars, great perversion
of the annual produce from maintaining productive to maintain
unproductive hands; but sometimes, in the confusion of civil discord, such
absolute waste and destruction of stock, as might be supposed, not only to
retard, as it certainly did, the natural accumulation of riches, but to have left
the country, at the end of the period, poorer than at the beginning. Thus, in
the happiest and most fortunate period of them all, that which has passed
since the Restoration, how many disorders and misfortunes have occurred,
which, could they have been foreseen, not only the impoverishment, but the
total ruin of the country would have been expected from them? The fire and
the plague of London, the two Dutch wars, the disorders of the revolution,
the war in Ireland, the four expensive French wars of 1688, 1701, 1742, and
1756, together with the two rebellions of 1715 and 1745. In the course of
the four French wars, the nation has contracted more than £145,000,000 of
debt, over and above all the other extraordinary annual expense which they
occasioned; so that the whole cannot be computed at less than
£200,000,000. So great a share of the annual produce of the land and labour
of the country, has, since the Revolution, been employed upon different
occasions, in maintaining an extraordinary number of unproductive hands.
But had not those wars given this particular direction to so large a capital,
the greater part of it would naturally have been employed in maintaining
productive hands, whose labour would have replaced, with a profit, the
whole value of their consumption. The value of the annual produce of the
land and labour of the country would have been considerably increased by
it every year, and every years increase would have augmented still more
that of the following year. More houses would have been built, more lands
would have been improved, and those which had been improved before
would have been better cultivated; more manufactures would have been
established, and those which had been established before would have been
more extended; and to what height the real wealth and revenue of the
country might by this time have been raised, it is not perhaps very easy
even to imagine.
But though the profusion of government must undoubtedly have retarded
the natural progress of England towards wealth and improvement, it has not
been able to stop it. The annual produce of its land and labour is
undoubtedly much greater at present than it was either at the Restoration or
at the Revolution. The capital, therefore, annually employed in cultivating
this land, and in maintaining this labour, must likewise be much greater. In
the midst of all the exactions of government, this capital has been silently
and gradually accumulated by the private frugality and good conduct of
individuals, by their universal, continual, and uninterrupted effort to better
their own condition. It is this effort, protected by law, and allowed by
liberty to exert itself in the manner that is most advantageous, which has
maintained the progress of England towards opulence and improvement in
almost all former times, and which, it is to be hoped, will do so in all future
times. England, however, as it has never been blessed with a very
parsimonious government, so parsimony has at no time been the
characteristic virtue of its inhabitants. It is the highest impertinence and
presumption, therefore, in kings and ministers to pretend to watch over the
economy of private people, and to restrain their expense, either by
sumptuary laws, or by prohibiting the importation of foreign luxuries. They
are themselves always, and without any exception, the greatest spendthrifts
in the society. Let them look well after their own expense, and they may
safely trust private people with theirs. If their own extravagance does not
ruin the state, that of the subject never will.
As frugality increases, and prodigality diminishes, the public capital, so
the conduct of those whose expense just equals their revenue, without either
accumulating or encroaching, neither increases nor diminishes it. Some
modes of expense, however, seem to contribute more to the growth of
public opulence than others.
The revenue of an individual may be spent, either in things which are
consumed immediately, and in which one day’s expense can neither
alleviate nor support that of another; or it may be spent in things mere
durable, which can therefore be accumulated, and in which every day’s
expense may, as he chooses, either alleviate, or support and heighten, the
effect of that of the following day. A man of fortune, for example, may
either spend his revenue in a profuse and sumptuous table, and in
maintaining a great number of menial servants, and a multitude of dogs and
horses; or, contenting himself with a frugal table, and few attendants, he
may lay out the greater part of it in adorning his house or his country villa,
in useful or ornamental buildings, in useful or ornamental furniture, in
collecting books, statues, pictures; or in things more frivolous, jewels,
baubles, ingenious trinkets of different kinds; or, what is most trifling of all,
in amassing a great wardrobe of fine clothes, like the favourite and minister
of a great prince who died a few years ago. Were two men of equal fortune
to spend their revenue, the one chiefly in the one way, the other in the other,
the magnificence of the person whose expense had been chiefly in durable
commodities, would be continually increasing, every day’s expense
contributing something to support and heighten the effect of that of the
following day; that of the other, on the contrary, would be no greater at the
end of the period than at the beginning. The former too would, at the end of
the period, be the richer man of the two. He would have a stock of goods of
some kind or other, which, though it might not be worth all that it cost,
would always be worth something. No trace or vestige of the expense of the
latter would remain, and the effects of ten or twenty years’ profusion would
be as completely annihilated as if they had never existed.
As the one mode of expense is more favourable than the other to the
opulence of an individual, so is it likewise to that of a nation. The houses,
the furniture, the clothing of the rich, in a little time, become useful to the
inferior and middling ranks of people. They are able to purchase them when
their superiors grow weary of them; and the general accommodation of the
whole people is thus gradually improved, when this mode of expense
becomes universal among men of fortune. In countries which have long
been rich, you will frequently find the inferior ranks of people in possession
both of houses and furniture perfectly good and entire, but of which neither
the one could have been built, nor the other have been made for their use.
What was formerly a seat of the family of Seymour, is now an inn upon the
Bath road. The marriage-bed of James I. of Great Britain, which his queen
brought with her from Denmark, as a present fit for a sovereign to make to
a sovereign, was, a few years ago, the ornament of an alehouse at
Dunfermline. In some ancient cities, which either have been long stationary,
or have gone somewhat to decay, you will sometimes scarce find a single
house which could have been built for its present inhabitants. If you go into
those houses, too, you will frequently find many excellent, though
antiquated pieces of furniture, which are still very fit for use, and which
could as little have been made for them. Noble palaces, magnificent villas,
great collections of books, statues, pictures, and other curiosities, are
frequently both an ornament and an honour, not only to the neighbourhood,
but to the whole country to which they belong. Versailles is an ornament
and an honour to France, Stowe and Wilton to England. Italy still continues
to command some sort of veneration, by the number of monuments of this
kind which it possesses, though the wealth which produced them has
decayed, and though the genius which planned them seems to be
extinguished, perhaps from not having the same employment.
The expense, too, which is laid out in durable commodities, is favourable
not only to accumulation, but to frugality. If a person should at any time
exceed in it, he can easily reform without exposing himself to the censure
of the public. To reduce very much the number of his servants, to reform his
table from great profusion to great frugality, to lay down his equipage after
he has once set it up, are changes which cannot escape the observation of
his neighbours, and which are supposed to imply some acknowledgment of
preceding bad conduct. Few, therefore, of those who have once been so
unfortunate as to launch out too far into this sort of expense, have
afterwards the courage to reform, till ruin and bankruptcy oblige them. But
if a person has, at any time, been at too great an expense in building, in
furniture, in books, or pictures, no imprudence can be inferred from his
changing his conduct. These are things in which further expense is
frequently rendered unnecessary by former expense; and when a person
stops short, he appears to do so, not because he has exceeded his fortune,
but because he has satisfied his fancy.
The expense, besides, that is laid out in durable commodities, gives
maintenance, commonly, to a greater number of people than that which is
employed in the most profuse hospitality. Of two or three hundred weight of
provisions, which may sometimes be served up at a great festival, one half,
perhaps, is thrown to the dunghill, and there is always a great deal wasted
and abused. But if the expense of this entertainment had been employed in
setting to work masons, carpenters, upholsterers, mechanics, etc. a quantity
of provisions of equal value would have been distributed among a still
greater number of people, who would have bought them in pennyworths
and pound weights, and not have lost or thrown away a single ounce of
them. In the one way, besides, this expense maintains productive, in the
other unproductive hands. In the one way, therefore, it increases, in the
other it does not increase the exchangeable value of the annual produce of
the land and labour of the country.
I would not, however, by all this, be understood to mean, that the one
species of expense always betokens a more liberal or generous spirit than
the other. When a man of fortune spends his revenue chiefly in hospitality,
he shares the greater part of it with his friends and companions; but when
he employs it in purchasing such durable commodities, he often spends the
whole upon his own person, and gives nothing to any body without an
equivalent. The latter species of expense, therefore, especially when
directed towards frivolous objects, the little ornaments of dress and
furniture, jewels, trinkets, gew-gaws, frequently indicates, not only a
trifling, but a base and selfish disposition. All that I mean is, that the one
sort of expense, as it always occasions some accumulation of valuable
commodities, as it is more favourable to private frugality, and,
consequently, to the increase of the public capital, and as it maintains
productive rather than unproductive hands, conduces more than the other to
the growth of public opulence.
CHAPTER IV.
OF STOCK LENT AT INTEREST.
The stock which is lent at interest is always considered as a capital by the
lender. He expects that in due time it is to be restored to him, and that, in
the mean time, the borrower is to pay him a certain annual rent for the use
of it. The borrower may use it either as a capital, or as a stock reserved for
immediate consumption. If he uses it as a capital, he employs it in the
maintenance of productive labourers, who reproduce the value, with a
profit. He can, in this case, both restore the capital, and pay the interest,
without alienating or encroaching upon any other source of revenue. If he
uses it as a stock reserved for immediate consumption, he acts the part of a
prodigal, and dissipates, in the maintenance of the idle, what was destined
for the support of the industrious. He can, in this case, neither restore the
capital nor pay the interest, without either alienating or encroaching upon
some other source of revenue, such as the property or the rent of land.
The stock which is lent at interest is, no doubt, occasionally employed in
both these ways, but in the former much more frequently than in the latter.
The man who borrows in order to spend will soon be ruined, and he who
lends to him will generally have occasion to repent of his folly. To borrow
or to lend for such a purpose, therefore, is, in all cases, where gross usury is
out of the question, contrary to the interest of both parties; and though it no
doubt happens sometimes, that people do both the one and the other, yet,
from the regard that all men have for their own interest, we may be assured,
that it cannot happen so very frequently as we are sometimes apt to
imagine. Ask any rich man of common prudence, to which of the two sorts
of people he has lent the greater part of his stock, to those who he thinks
will employ it profitably, or to those who will spend it idly, and he will
laugh at you for proposing the question. Even among borrowers, therefore,
not the people in the world most famous for frugality, the number of the
frugal and industrious surpasses considerably that of the prodigal and idle.
The only people to whom stock is commonly lent, without their being
expected to make any very profitable use of it, are country gentlemen, who
borrow upon mortgage. Even they scarce ever borrow merely to spend.
What they borrow, one may say, is commonly spent before they borrow it.
They have generally consumed so great a quantity of goods, advanced to
them upon credit by shop-keepers and tradesmen, that they find it necessary
to borrow at interest, in order to pay the debt. The capital borrowed replaces
the capitals of those shop-keepers and tradesmen which the country
gentlemen could not have replaced from the rents of their estates. It is not
properly borrowed in order to be spent, but in order to replace a capital
which had been spent before.
Almost all loans at interest are made in money, either of paper, or of gold
and silver; but what the borrower really wants, and what the lender readily
supplies him with, is not the money, but the money’s worth, or the goods
which it can purchase. If he wants it as a stock for immediate consumption,
it is those goods only which he can place in that stock. If he wants it as a
capital for employing industry, it is from those goods only that the
industrious can be furnished with the tools, materials, and maintenance
necessary for carrying on their work. By means of the loan, the lender, as it
were, assigns to the borrower his right to a certain portion of the annual
produce of the land and labour of the country, to be employed as the
borrower pleases.
The quantity of stock, therefore, or, as it is commonly expressed, of
money, which can be lent at interest in any country, is not regulated by the
value of the money, whether paper or coin, which serves as the instrument
of the different loans made in that country, but by the value of that part of
the annual produce, which, as soon as it comes either from the ground, or
from the hands of the productive labourers, is destined, not only for
replacing a capital, but such a capital as the owner does not care to be at the
trouble of employing himself. As such capitals are commonly lent out and
paid back in money, they constitute what is called the monied interest. It is
distinct, not only from the landed, but from the trading and manufacturing
interests, as in these last the owners themselves employ their own capitals.
Even in the monied interest, however, the money is, as it were, but the deed
of assignment, which conveys from one hand to another those capitals
which the owners do not care to employ themselves. Those capitals may be
greater, in almost any proportion, than the amount of the money which
serves as the instrument of their conveyance; the same pieces of money
successively serving for many different loans, as well as for many different
purchases. A, for example, lends to W £1000, with which W immediately
purchases of B £1000 worth of goods. B having no occasion for the money
himself, lends the identical pieces to X, with which X immediately
purchases of C another £1000 worth of goods. C, in the same manner, and
for the same reason, lends them to Y, who again purchases goods with them
of D. In this manner, the same pieces, either of coin or of paper, may, in the
course of a few days, serve as the Instrument of three different loans, and of
three different purchases, each of which is, in value, equal to the whole
amount of those pieces. What the three monied men, A, B, and C, assigned
to the three borrowers, W, X, and Y, is the power of making those
purchases. In this power consist both the value and the use of the loans. The
stock lent by the three monied men is equal to the value of the goods which
can be purchased with it, and is three times greater than that of the money
with which the purchases are made. Those loans, however, may be all
perfectly well secured, the goods purchased by the different debtors being
so employed as, in due time, to bring back, with a profit, an equal value
either of coin or of paper. And as the same pieces of money can thus serve
as the instrument of different loans to three, or, for the same reason, to thirty
times their value, so they may likewise successively serve as the instrument
of repayment.
A capital lent at interest may, in this manner, be considered as an
assignment, from the lender to the borrower, of a certain considerable
portion of the annual produce, upon condition that the burrower in return
shall, during the continuance of the loan, annually assign to the lender a
small portion, called the interest; and, at the end of it, a portion equally
considerable with that which had originally been assigned to him, called the
repayment. Though money, either coin or paper, serves generally as the
deed of assignment, both to the smaller and to the more considerable
portion, it is itself altogether different from what is assigned by it.
In proportion as that share of the annual produce which, as soon as it
comes either from the ground, or from the hands of the productive
labourers, is destined for replacing a capital, increases in any country, what
is called the monied interest naturally increases with it. The increase of
those particular capitals from which the owners wish to derive a revenue,
without being at the trouble of employing them themselves, naturally
accompanies the general increase of capitals; or, in other words, as stock
increases, the quantity of stock to be lent at interest grows gradually greater
and greater.
As the quantity of stock to be lent at interest increases, the interest, or the
price which must be paid for the use of that stock, necessarily diminishes,
not only from those general causes which make the market price of things
commonly diminish as their quantity increases, but from other causes which
are peculiar to this particular case. As capitals increase in any country, the
profits which can be made by employing them necessarily diminish. It
becomes gradually more and more difficult to find within the country a
profitable method of employing any new capital. There arises, in
consequence, a competition between different capitals, the owner of one
endeavouring to get possession of that employment which is occupied by
another; but, upon most occasions, he can hope to justle that other out of
this employment by no other means but by dealing upon more reasonable
terms. He must not only sell what he deals in somewhat cheaper, but, in
order to get it to sell, he must sometimes, too, buy it dearer. The demand for
productive labour, by the increase of the funds which are destined for
maintaining it, grows every day greater and greater. Labourers easily find
employment; but the owners of capitals find it difficult to get labourers to
employ. Their competition raises the wages of labour, and sinks the profits
of stock. But when the profits which can be made by the use of a capital are
in this manner diminished, as it were, at both ends, the price which can be
paid for the use of it, that is, the rate of interest, must necessarily be
diminished with them.
Mr Locke, Mr Lawe, and Mr Montesquieu, as well as many other writers,
seem to have imagined that the increase of the quantity of gold and silver, in
consequence of the discovery of the Spanish West Indies, was the real cause
of the lowering of the rate of interest through the greater part of Europe.
Those metals, they say, having become of less value themselves, the use of
any particular portion of them necessarily became of less value too, and,
consequently, the price which could be paid for it. This notion, which at
first sight seems so plausible, has been so fully exposed by Mr Hume, that it
is, perhaps, unnecessary to say any thing more about it. The following very
short and plain argument, however, may serve to explain more distinctly the
fallacy which seems to have misled those gentlemen.
Before the discovery of the Spanish West Indies, ten per cent. seems to
have been the common rate of interest through the greater part of Europe. It
has since that time, in different countries, sunk to six, five, four, and three
per cent. Let us suppose, that in every particular country the value of silver
has sunk precisely in the same proportion as the rate of interest; and that in
those countries, for example, where interest has been reduced from ten to
five per cent. the same quantity of silver can now purchase just half the
quantity of goods which it could have purchased before. This supposition
will not, I believe, be found anywhere agreeable to the truth; but it is the
most favourable to the opinion which we are going to examine; and, even
upon this supposition, it is utterly impossible that the lowering of the value
of silver could have the smallest tendency to lower the rate of interest. If
£100 are in those countries now of no more value than £50 were then, £10
must now be of no more value than £5 were then. Whatever were the causes
which lowered the value of the capital, the same must necessarily have
lowered that of the interest, and exactly in the same proportion. The
proportion between the value of the capital and that of the interest must
have remained the same, though the rate had never been altered. By altering
the rate, on the contrary, the proportion between those two values is
necessarily altered. If £100 now are worth no more than £50 were then, £5
now can be worth no more than £2:10s. were then. By reducing the rate of
interest, therefore, from ten to five per cent. we give for the use of a capital,
which is supposed to be equal to one half of its former value, an interest
which is equal to one fourth only of the value of the former interest.
An increase in the quantity of silver, while that of the commodities
circulated by means of it remained the same, could have no other effect than
to diminish the value of that metal. The nominal value of all sorts of goods
would be greater, but their real value would be precisely the same as before.
They would be exchanged for a greater number of pieces of silver; but the
quantity of labour which they could command, the number of people whom
they could maintain and employ, would be precisely the same. The capital
of the country would be the same, though a greater number of pieces might
be requisite for conveying any equal portion of it from one hand to another.
The deeds of assignment, like the conveyances of a verbose attorney, would
be more cumbersome; but the thing assigned would be precisely the same
as before, and could produce only the same effects. The funds for
maintaining productive labour being the same, the demand for it would be
the same. Its price or wages, therefore, though nominally greater, would
really be the same. They would be paid in a greater number of pieces of
silver, but they would purchase only the same quantity of goods. The profits
of stock would be the same, both nominally and really. The wages of labour
are commonly computed by the quantity of silver which is paid to the
labourer. When that is increased, therefore, his wages appear to be
increased, though they may sometimes be no greater than before. But the
profits of stock are not computed by the number of pieces of silver with
which they are paid, but by the proportion which those pieces bear to the
whole capital employed. Thus, in a particular country, 5s. a-week are said to
be the common wages of labour, and ten per cent. the common profits of
stock; but the whole capital of the country being the same as before, the
competition between the different capitals of individuals into which it was
divided would likewise be the same. They would all trade with the same
advantages and disadvantages. The common proportion between capital and
profit, therefore, would be the same, and consequently the common interest
of money; what can commonly be given for the use of money being
necessarily regulated by what can commonly be made by the use of it.
Any increase in the quantity of commodities annually circulated within
the country, while that of the money which circulated them remained the
same, would, on the contrary, produce many other important effects, besides
that of raising the value of the money. The capital of the country, though it
might nominally be the same, would really be augmented. It might continue
to be expressed by the same quantity of money, but it would command a
greater quantity of labour. The quantity of productive labour which it could
maintain and employ would be increased, and consequently the demand for
that labour. Its wages would naturally rise with the demand, and yet might
appear to sink. They might be paid with a smaller quantity of money, but
that smaller quantity might purchase a greater quantity of goods than a
greater had done before. The profits of stock would be diminished, both
really and in appearance. The whole capital of the country being
augmented, the competition between the different capitals of which it was
composed would naturally be augmented along with it. The owners of those
particular capitals would be obliged to content themselves with a smaller
proportion of the produce of that labour which their respective capitals
employed. The interest of money, keeping pace always with the profits of
stock, might, in this manner, be greatly diminished, though the value of
money, or the quantity of goods which any particular sum could purchase,
was greatly augmented.
In some countries the interest of money has been prohibited by law. But
as something can everywhere be made by the use of money, something
ought everywhere to be paid for the use of it. This regulation, instead of
preventing, has been found from experience to increase the evil of usury.
The debtor being obliged to pay, not only for the use of the money, but for
the risk which his creditor runs by accepting a compensation for that use, he
is obliged, if one may say so, to insure his creditor from the penalties of
usury.
In countries where interest is permitted, the law in order to prevent the
extortion of usury, generally fixes the highest rate which can be taken
without incurring a penalty. This rate ought always to be somewhat above
the lowest market price, or the price which is commonly paid for the use of
money by those who can give the most undoubted security. If this legal rate
should be fixed below the lowest market rate, the effects of this fixation
must be nearly the same as those of a total prohibition of interest. The
creditor will not lend his money for less than the use of it is worth, and the
debtor must pay him for the risk which he runs by accepting the full value
of that use. If it is fixed precisely at the lowest market price, it ruins, with
honest people who respect the laws of their country, the credit of all those
who cannot give the very best security, and obliges them to have recourse to
exorbitant usurers. In a country such as Great Britain, where money is lent
to government at three per cent. and to private people, upon good security,
at four and four and a-half, the present legal rate, five per cent. is perhaps as
proper as any.
The legal rate, it is to be observed, though it ought to be somewhat
above, ought not to be much above the lowest market rate. If the legal rate
of interest in Great Britain, for example, was fixed so high as eight or ten
per cent. the greater part of the money which was to be lent, would be lent
to prodigals and projectors, who alone would be willing to give this high
interest. Sober people, who will give for the use of money no more than a
part of what they are likely to make by the use of it, would not venture into
the competition. A great part of the capital of the country would thus be
kept out of the hands which were most likely to make a profitable and
advantageous use of it, and thrown into those which were most likely to
waste and destroy it. Where the legal rate of interest, on the contrary, is
fixed but a very little above the lowest market rate, sober people are
universally preferred, as borrowers, to prodigals and projectors. The person
who lends money gets nearly as much interest from the former as he dares
to take from the latter, and his money is much safer in the hands of the one
set of people than in those of the other. A great part of the capital of the
country is thus thrown into the hands in which it is most likely to be
employed with advantage.
No law can reduce the common rate of interest below the lowest ordinary
market rate at the time when that law is made. Notwithstanding the edict of
1766, by which the French king attempted to reduce the rate of interest
from five to four per cent. money continued to be lent in France at five per
cent. the law being evaded in several different ways.
The ordinary market price of land, it is to be observed, depends
everywhere upon the ordinary market rate of interest. The person who has a
capital from which he wishes to derive a revenue, without taking the trouble
to employ it himself, deliberates whether he should buy land with it, or lend
it out at interest. The superior security of land, together with some other
advantages which almost everywhere attend upon this species of property,
will generally dispose him to content himself with a smaller revenue from
land, than what he might have by lending out his money at interest. These
advantages are sufficient to compensate a certain difference of revenue; but
they will compensate a certain difference only; and if the rent of land
should fall short of the interest of money by a greater difference, nobody
would buy land, which would soon reduce its ordinary price. On the
contrary, if the advantages should much more than compensate the
difference, everybody would buy land, which again would soon raise its
ordinary price. When interest was at ten per cent. land was commonly sold
for ten or twelve years purchase. As interest sunk to six, five, and four per
cent. the price of land rose to twenty, five-and-twenty, and thirty years
purchase. The market rate of interest is higher in France than in England,
and the common price of land is lower. In England it commonly sells at
thirty, in France at twenty years purchase.
CHAPTER V.
OF THE DIFFERENT EMPLOYMENTS OF
CAPITALS.
Though all capitals are destined for the maintenance of productive labour
only, yet the quantity of that labour which equal capitals are capable of
putting into motion, varies extremely according to the diversity of their
employment; as does likewise the value which that employment adds to the
annual produce of the land and labour of the country.
A capital may be employed in four different ways; either, first, in
procuring the rude produce annually required for the use and consumption
of the society; or, secondly, in manufacturing and preparing that rude
produce for immediate use and consumption; or, thirdly in transporting
either the rude or manufactured produce from the places where they abound
to those where they are wanted; or, lastly, in dividing particular portions of
either into such small parcels as suit the occasional demands of those who
want them. In the first way are employed the capitals of all those who
undertake improvement or cultivation of lands, mines, or fisheries; in the
second, those of all master manufacturers; in the third, those of all
wholesale merchants; and in the fourth, those of all retailers. It is difficult to
conceive that a capital should be employed in any way which may not be
classed under some one or other of those four.
Each of those four methods of employing a capital is essentially
necessary, either to the existence or extension of the other three, or to the
general conveniency of the society.
Unless a capital was employed in furnishing rude produce to a certain
degree of abundance, neither manufactures nor trade of any kind could
exist.
Unless a capital was employed in manufacturing that part of the rude
produce which requires a good deal of preparation before it can be fit for
use and consumption, it either would never be produced, because there
could be no demand for it; or if it was produced spontaneously, it would be
of no value in exchange, and could add nothing to the wealth of the society.
Unless a capital was employed in transporting either the rude or
manufactured produce from the places where it abounds to those where it is
wanted, no more of either could be produced than was necessary for the
consumption of the neighbourhood. The capital of the merchant exchanges
the surplus produce of one place for that of another, and thus encourages the
industry, and increases the enjoyments of both.
Unless a capital was employed in breaking and dividing certain portions
either of the rude or manufactured produce into such small parcels as suit
the occasional demands of those who want them, every man would be
obliged to purchase a greater quantity of the goods he wanted than his
immediate occasions required. If there was no such trade as a butcher, for
example, every man would be obliged to purchase a whole ox or a whole
sheep at a time. This would generally be inconvenient to the rich, and much
more so to the poor. If a poor workman was obliged to purchase a month’s
or six months’ provisions at a time, a great part of the stock which he
employs as a capital in the instruments of his trade, or in the furniture of his
shop, and which yields him a revenue, he would be forced to place in that
part of his stock which is reserved for immediate consumption, and which
yields him no revenue. Nothing can be more convenient for such a person
than to be able to purchase his subsistence from day to day, or even from
hour to hour, as he wants it. He is thereby enabled to employ almost his
whole stock as a capital. He is thus enabled to furnish work to a greater
value; and the profit which he makes by it in this way much more than
compensates the additional price which the profit of the retailer imposes
upon the goods. The prejudices of some political writers against
shopkeepers and tradesmen are altogether without foundation. So far is it
from being necessary either to tax them, or to restrict their numbers, that
they can never be multiplied so as to hurt the public, though they may so as
to hurt one another. The quantity of grocery goods, for example, which can
be sold in a particular town, is limited by the demand of that town and its
neighbourhood. The capital, therefore, which can be employed in the
grocery trade, cannot exceed what is sufficient to purchase that quantity. If
this capital is divided between two different grocers, their competition will
tend to make both of them sell cheaper than if it were in the hands of one
only; and if it were divided among twenty, their competition would be just
so much the greater, and the chance of their combining together, in order to
raise the price, just so much the less. Their competition might, perhaps, ruin
some of themselves; but to take care of this, is the business of the parties
concerned, and it may safely be trusted to their discretion. It can never hurt
either the consumer or the producer; on the contrary, it must tend to make
the retailers both sell cheaper and buy dearer, than if the whole trade was
monopolized by one or two persons. Some of them, perhaps, may
sometimes decoy a weak customer to buy what he has no occasion for. This
evil, however, is of too little importance to deserve the public attention, nor
would it necessarily be prevented by restricting their numbers. It is not the
multitude of alehouses, to give the must suspicious example, that occasions
a general disposition to drunkenness among the common people; but that
disposition, arising from other causes, necessarily gives employment to a
multitude of alehouses.
The persons whose capitals are employed in any of those four ways, are
themselves productive labourers. Their labour, when properly directed,
fixes and realizes itself in the subject or vendible commodity upon which it
is bestowed, and generally adds to its price the value at least of their own
maintenance and consumption. The profits of the farmer, of the
manufacturer, of the merchant, and retailer, are all drawn from the price of
the goods which the two first produce, and the two last buy and sell. Equal
capitals, however, employed in each of those four different ways, will
immediately put into motion very different quantities of productive labour;
and augment, too, in very different proportions, the value of the annual
produce of the land and labour of the society to which they belong.
The capital of the retailer replaces, together with its profits, that of the
merchant of whom he purchases goods, and thereby enables him to
continue his business. The retailer himself is the only productive labourer
whom it immediately employs. In his profit consists the whole value which
its employment adds to the annual produce of the land and labour of the
society.
The capital of the wholesale merchant replaces, together with their
profits, the capitals of the farmers and manufacturers of whom he purchases
the rude and manufactured produce which he deals in, and thereby enables
them to continue their respective trades. It is by this service chiefly that he
contributes indirectly to support the productive labour of the society, and to
increase the value of its annual produce. His capital employs, too, the
sailors and carriers who transport his goods from one place to another; and
it augments the price of those goods by the value, not only of his profits, but
of their wages. This is all the productive labour which it immediately puts
into motion, and all the value which it immediately adds to the annual
produce. Its operation in both these respects is a good deal superior to that
of the capital of the retailer.
Part of the capital of the master manufacturer is employed as a fixed
capital in the instruments of his trade, and replaces, together with its profits,
that of some other artificer of whom he purchases them. Part of his
circulating capital is employed in purchasing materials, and replaces, with
their profits, the capitals of the farmers and miners of whom he purchases
them. But a great part of it is always, either annually, or in a much shorter
period, distributed among the different workmen whom he employs. It
augments the value of those materials by their wages, and by their masters’
profits upon the whole stock of wages, materials, and instruments of trade
employed in the business. It puts immediately into motion, therefore, a
much greater quantity of productive labour, and adds a much greater value
to the annual produce of the land and labour of the society, than an equal
capital in the hands of any wholesale merchant.
No equal capital puts into motion a greater quantity of productive labour
than that of the farmer. Not only his labouring servants, but his labouring
cattle, are productive labourers. In agriculture, too, Nature labours along
with man; and though her labour costs no expense, its produce has its value,
as well as that of the most expensive workmen. The most important
operations of agriculture seem intended, not so much to increase, though
they do that too, as to direct the fertility of Nature towards the production of
the plants most profitable to man. A field overgrown with briars and
brambles, may frequently produce as great a quantity of vegetables as the
best cultivated vineyard or corn field. Planting and tillage frequently
regulate more than they animate the active fertility of Nature; and after all
their labour, a great part of the work always remains to be done by her. The
labourers and labouring cattle, therefore, employed in agriculture, not only
occasion, like the workmen in manufactures, the reproduction of a value
equal to their own consumption, or to the capital which employs them,
together with its owner’s profits, but of a much greater value. Over and
above the capital of the farmer, and all its profits, they regularly occasion
the reproduction of the rent of the landlord. This rent may be considered as
the produce of those powers of Nature, the use of which the landlord lends
to the farmer. It is greater or smaller, according to the supposed extent of
those powers, or, in other words, according to the supposed natural or
improved fertility of the land. It is the work of Nature which remains, after
deducting or compensating every thing which can be regarded as the work
of man. It is seldom less than a fourth, and frequently more than a third, of
the whole produce. No equal quantity of productive labour employed in
manufactures, can ever occasion so great reproduction. In them Nature does
nothing; man does all; and the reproduction must always be in proportion to
the strength of the agents that occasion it. The capital employed in
agriculture, therefore, not only puts into motion a greater quantity of
productive labour than any equal capital employed in manufactures; but in
proportion, too, to the quantity of productive labour which it employs, it
adds a much greater value to the annual produce of the land and labour of
the country, to the real wealth and revenue of its inhabitants. Of all the ways
in which a capital can be employed, it is by far the most advantageous to
society.
The capitals employed in the agriculture and in the retail trade of any
society, must always reside within that society. Their employment is
confined almost to a precise spot, to the farm, and to the shop of the retailer.
They must generally, too, though there are some exceptions to this, belong
to resident members of the society.
The capital of a wholesale merchant, on the contrary, seems to have no
fixed or necessary residence anywhere, but may wander about from place to
place, according as it can either buy cheap or sell dear.
The capital of the manufacturer must, no doubt, reside where the
manufacture is carried on; but where this shall be, is not always necessarily
determined. It may frequently be at a great distance, both from the place
where the materials grow, and from that where the complete manufacture is
consumed. Lyons is very distant, both from the places which afford the
materials of its manufactures, and from those which consume them. The
people of fashion in Sicily are clothed in silks made in other countries, from
the materials which their own produces. Part of the wool of Spain is
manufactured in Great Britain, and some part of that cloth is afterwards sent
back to Spain.
Whether the merchant whose capital exports the surplus produce of any
society, be a native or a foreigner, is of very little importance. If he is a
foreigner, the number of their productive labourers is necessarily less than if
he had been a native, by one man only; and the value of their annual
produce, by the profits of that one man. The sailors or carriers whom he
employs, may still belong indifferently either to his country, or to their
country, or to some third country, in the same manner as if he had been a
native. The capital of a foreigner gives a value to their surplus produce
equally with that of a native, by exchanging it for something for which
there is a demand at home. It as effectually replaces the capital of the
person who produces that surplus, and as effectually enables him to
continue his business, the service by which the capital of a wholesale
merchant chiefly contributes to support the productive labour, and to
augment the value of the annual produce of the society to which he belongs.
It is of more consequence that the capital of the manufacturer should
reside within the country. It necessarily puts into motion a greater quantity
of productive labour, and adds a greater value to the annual produce of the
land and labour of the society. It may, however, be very useful to the
country, though it should not reside within it. The capitals of the British
manufacturers who work up the flax and hemp annually imported from the
coasts of the Baltic, are surely very useful to the countries which produce
them. Those materials are a part of the surplus produce of those countries,
which, unless it was annually exchanged for something which is in demand
here, would be of no value, and would soon cease to be produced. The
merchants who export it, replace the capitals of the people who produce it,
and thereby encourage them to continue the production; and the British
manufacturers replace the capitals of those merchants.
A particular country, in the same manner as a particular person, may
frequently not have capital sufficient both to improve and cultivate all its
lands, to manufacture and prepare their whole rude produce for immediate
use and consumption, and to transport the surplus part either of the rude or
manufactured produce to those distant markets, where it can be exchanged
for something for which there is a demand at home. The inhabitants of
many different parts of Great Britain have not capital sufficient to improve
and cultivate all their lands. The wool of the southern counties of Scotland
is, a great part of it, after a long land carriage through very bad roads,
manufactured in Yorkshire, for want of a capital to manufacture it at home.
There are many little manufacturing towns in Great Britain, of which the
inhabitants have not capital sufficient to transport the produce of their own
industry to those distant markets where there is demand and consumption
for it. If there are any merchants among them, they are, properly, only the
agents of wealthier merchants who reside in some of the great commercial
cities.
When the capital of any country is not sufficient for all those three
purposes, in proportion as a greater share of it is employed in agriculture,
the greater will be the quantity of productive labour which it puts into
motion within the country; as will likewise be the value which its
employment adds to the annual produce of the land and labour of the
society. After agriculture, the capital employed in manufactures puts into
motion the greatest quantity of productive labour, and adds the greatest
value to the annual produce. That which is employed in the trade of
exportation has the least effect of any of the three.
The country, indeed, which has not capital sufficient for all those three
purposes, has not arrived at that degree of opulence for which it seems
naturally destined. To attempt, however, prematurely, and with an
insufficient capital, to do all the three, is certainly not the shortest way for a
society, no more than it would be for an individual, to acquire a sufficient
one. The capital of all the individuals of a nation has its limits, in the same
manner as that of a single individual, and is capable of executing only
certain purposes. The capital of all the individuals of a nation is increased in
the same manner as that of a single individual, by their continually
accumulating and adding to it whatever they save out of their revenue. It is
likely to increase the fastest, therefore, when it is employed in the way that
affords the greatest revenue to all the inhabitants or the country, as they will
thus be enabled to make the greatest savings. But the revenue of all the
inhabitants of the country is necessarily in proportion to the value of the
annual produce of their land and labour.
It has been the principal cause of the rapid progress of our American
colonies towards wealth and greatness, that almost their whole capitals have
hitherto been employed in agriculture. They have no manufactures, those
household and coarser manufactures excepted, which necessarily
accompany the progress of agriculture, and which are the work of the
women and children in every private family. The greater part, both of the
exportation and coasting trade of America, is carried on by the capitals of
merchants who reside in Great Britain. Even the stores and warehouses
from which goods are retailed in some provinces, particularly in Virginia
and Maryland, belong many of them to merchants who reside in the mother
country, and afford one of the few instances of the retail trade of a society
being carried on by the capitals of those who are not resident members of it.
Were the Americans, either by combination, or by any other sort of
violence, to stop the importation of European manufactures, and, by thus
giving a monopoly to such of their own countrymen as could manufacture
the like goods, divert any considerable part of their capital into this
employment, they would retard, instead of accelerating, the further increase
in the value of their annual produce, and would obstruct, instead of
promoting, the progress of their country towards real wealth and greatness.
This would be still more the case, were they to attempt, in the same manner,
to monopolize to themselves their whole exportation trade.
The course of human prosperity, indeed, seems scarce ever to have been
of so long continuance as to unable any great country to acquire capital
sufficient for all those three purposes; unless, perhaps, we give credit to the
wonderful accounts of the wealth and cultivation of China, of those of
ancient Egypt, and of the ancient state of Indostan. Even those three
countries, the wealthiest, according to all accounts, that ever were in the
world, are chiefly renowned for their superiority in agriculture and
manufactures. They do not appear to have been eminent for foreign trade.
The ancient Egyptians had a superstitious antipathy to the sea; a superstition
nearly of the same kind prevails among the Indians; and the Chinese have
never excelled in foreign commerce. The greater part of the surplus produce
of all those three countries seems to have been always exported by
foreigners, who gave in exchange for it something else, for which they
found a demand there, frequently gold and silver.
It is thus that the same capital will in any country put into motion a
greater or smaller quantity of productive labour, and add a greater or
smaller value to the annual produce of its land and labour, according to the
different proportions in which it is employed in agriculture, manufactures,
and wholesale trade. The difference, too, is very great, according to the
different sorts of wholesale trade in which any part of it is employed.
All wholesale trade, all buying in order to sell again by wholesale, maybe
reduced to three different sorts: the home trade, the foreign trade of
consumption, and the carrying trade. The home trade is employed in
purchasing in one part of the same country, and selling in another, the
produce of the industry of that country. It comprehends both the inland and
the coasting trade. The foreign trade of consumption is employed in
purchasing foreign goods for home consumption. The carrying trade is
employed in transacting the commerce of foreign countries, or in carrying
the surplus produce of one to another.
The capital which is employed in purchasing in one part of the country,
in order to sell in another, the produce of the industry of that country,
generally replaces, by every such operation, two distinct capitals, that had
both been employed in the agriculture or manufactures of that country, and
thereby enables them to continue that employment. When it sends out from
the residence of the merchant a certain value of commodities, it generally
brings hack in return at least an equal value of other commodities. When
both are the produce of domestic industry, it necessarily replaces, by every
such operation, two distinct capitals, which had both been employed in
supporting productive labour, and thereby enables them to continue that
support. The capital which sends Scotch manufactures to London, and
brings back English corn and manufactures to Edinburgh, necessarily
replaces, by every such operation, two British capitals, which had both been
employed in the agriculture or manufactures of Great Britain.
The capital employed in purchasing foreign goods for home
consumption, when this purchase is made with the produce of domestic
industry, replaces, too, by every such operation, two distinct capitals; but
one of them only is employed in supporting domestic industry. The capital
which sends British goods to Portugal, and brings back Portuguese goods to
Great Britain, replaces, by every such operation, only one British capital.
The other is a Portuguese one. Though the returns, therefore, of the foreign
trade of consumption, should be as quick as those of the home trade, the
capital employed in it will give but one half of the encouragement to the
industry or productive labour of the country.
But the returns of the foreign trade of consumption are very seldom so
quick as those of the home trade. The returns of the home trade generally
come in before the end of the year, and sometimes three or four times in the
year. The returns of the foreign trade of consumption seldom come in
before the end of the year, and sometimes not till after two or three years. A
capital, therefore, employed in the home trade, will sometimes make twelve
operations, or be sent out and returned twelve times, before a capital
employed in the foreign trade of consumption has made one. If the capitals
are equal, therefore, the one will give four-and-twenty times more
encouragement and support to the industry of the country than the other.
The foreign goods for home consumption may sometimes be purchased,
not with the produce of domestic industry but with some other foreign
goods. These last, however, must have been purchased, either immediately
with the produce of domestic industry, or with something else that had been
purchased with it; for, the case of war and conquest excepted, foreign goods
can never be acquired, but in exchange for something that had been
produced at home, either immediately, or after two or more different
exchanges. The effects, therefore, of a capital employed in such a round-
about foreign trade of consumption, are, in every respect, the same as those
of one employed in the most direct trade of the same kind, except that the
final returns are likely to be still more distant, as they must depend upon the
returns of two or three distinct foreign trades. If the hemp and flax of Riga
are purchased with the tobacco of Virginia, which had been purchased with
British manufactures, the merchant must wait for the returns of two distinct
foreign trades, before he can employ the same capital in repurchasing a like
quantity of British manufactures. If the tobacco of Virginia had been
purchased, not with British manufactures, but with the sugar and rum of
Jamaica, which had been purchased with those manufactures, he must wait
for the returns of three. If those two or three distinct foreign trades should
happen to be carried on by two or three distinct merchants, of whom the
second buys the goods imported by the first, and the third buys those
imported by the second, in order to export them again, each merchant,
indeed, will, in this case, receive the returns of his own capital more
quickly; but the final returns of the whole capital employed in the trade will
be just as slow as ever. Whether the whole capital employed in such a round
about trade belong to one merchant or to three, can make no difference with
regard to the country, though it may with regard to the particular merchants.
Three times a greater capital must in both cases be employed, in order to
exchange a certain value of British manufactures for a certain quantity of
flax and hemp, than would have been necessary, had the manufactures and
the flax and hemp been directly exchanged for one another. The whole
capital employed, therefore, in such a round-about foreign trade of
consumption, will generally give less encouragement and support to the
productive labour of the country, than an equal capital employed in a more
direct trade of the same kind.
Whatever be the foreign commodity with which the foreign goods for
home consumption are purchased, it can occasion no essential difference,
either in the nature of the trade, or in the encouragement and support which
it can give to the productive labour of the country from which it is carried
on. If they are purchased with the gold of Brazil, for example, or with the
silver of Peru, this gold and silver, like the tobacco of Virginia, must have
been purchased with something that either was the produce of the industry
of the country, or that had been purchased with something else that was so.
So far, therefore, as the productive labour of the country is concerned, the
foreign trade of consumption, which is carried on by means of gold and
silver, has all the advantages and all the inconveniencies of any other
equally round-about foreign trade of consumption; and will replace, just as
fast, or just as slow, the capital which is immediately employed in
supporting that productive labour. It seems even to have one advantage over
any other equally round-about foreign trade. The transportation of those
metals from one place to another, on account of their small bulk and great
value, is less expensive than that of almost any other foreign goods of equal
value. Their freight is much less, and their insurance not greater; and no
goods, besides, are less liable to suffer by the carriage. An equal quantity of
foreign goods, therefore, may frequently be purchased with a smaller
quantity of the produce of domestic industry, by the intervention of gold
and silver, than by that of any other foreign goods. The demand of the
country may frequently, in this manner, be supplied more completely, and at
a smaller expense, than in any other. Whether, by the continual exportation
of those metals, a trade of this kind is likely to impoverish the country from
which it is carried on in any other way, I shall have occasion to examine at
great length hereafter.
That part of the capital of any country which is employed in the carrying
trade, is altogether withdrawn from supporting the productive labour of that
particular country, to support that of some foreign countries. Though it may
replace, by every operation, two distinct capitals, yet neither of them
belongs to that particular country. The capital of the Dutch merchant, which
carries the corn of Poland to Portugal, and brings back the fruits and wines
of Portugal to Poland, replaces by every such operation two capitals, neither
of which had been employed in supporting the productive labour of
Holland; but one of them in supporting that of Poland, and the other that of
Portugal. The profits only return regularly to Holland, and constitute the
whole addition which this trade necessarily makes to the annual produce of
the land and labour of that country. When, indeed, the carrying trade of any
particular country is carried on with the ships and sailors of that country,
that part of the capital employed in it which pays the freight is distributed
among, and puts into motion, a certain number of productive labourers of
that country. Almost all nations that have had any considerable share of the
carrying trade have, in fact, carried it on in this manner. The trade itself has
probably derived its name from it, the people of such countries being the
carriers to other countries. It does not, however, seem essential to the nature
of the trade that it should be so. A Dutch merchant may, for example,
employ his capital in transacting the commerce of Poland and Portugal, by
carrying part of the surplus produce of the one to the other, not in Dutch,
but in British bottoms. It maybe presumed, that he actually does so upon
some particular occasions. It is upon this account, however, that the
carrying trade has been supposed peculiarly advantageous to such a country
as Great Britain, of which the defence and security depend upon the number
of its sailors and shipping. But the same capital may employ as many
sailors and shipping, either in the foreign trade of consumption, or even in
the home trade, when carried on by coasting vessels, as it could in the
carrying trade. The number of sailors and shipping which any particular
capital can employ, does not depend upon the nature of the trade, but partly
upon the bulk of the goods, in proportion to their value, and partly upon the
distance of the ports between which they are to be carried; chiefly upon the
former of those two circumstances. The coal trade from Newcastle to
London, for example, employs more shipping than all the carrying trade of
England, though the ports are at no great distance. To force, therefore, by
extraordinary encouragements, a larger share of the capital of any country
into the carrying trade, than what would naturally go to it, will not always
necessarily increase the shipping of that country.
The capital, therefore, employed in the home trade of any country, will
generally give encouragement and support to a greater quantity of
productive labour in that country, and increase the value of its annual
produce, more than an equal capital employed in the foreign trade of
consumption; and the capital employed in this latter trade has, in both these
respects, a still greater advantage over an equal capital employed in the
carrying trade. The riches, and so far as power depends upon riches, the
power of every country must always be in proportion to the value of its
annual produce, the fund from which all taxes must ultimately be paid. But
the great object of the political economy of every country, is to increase the
riches and power of that country. It ought, therefore, to give no preference
nor superior encouragement to the foreign trade of consumption above the
home trade, nor to the carrying trade above either of the other two. It ought
neither to force nor to allure into either of those two channels a greater
share of the capital of the country, than what would naturally flow into them
of its own accord.
Each of those different branches of trade, however, is not only
advantageous, but necessary and unavoidable, when the course of things,
without any constraint or violence, naturally introduces it.
When the produce of any particular branch of industry exceeds what the
demand of the country requires, the surplus must be sent abroad, and
exchanged for something for which there is a demand at home. Without
such exportation, a part of the productive labour of the country must cease,
and the value of its annual produce diminish. The land and labour of Great
Britain produce generally more corn, woollens, and hardware, than the
demand of the home market requires. The surplus part of them, therefore,
must be sent abroad, and exchanged for something for which there is a
demand at home. It is only by means of such exportation, that this surplus
can acquired value sufficient to compensate the labour and expense of
producing it. The neighbourhood of the sea-coast, and the banks of all
navigable rivers, are advantageous situations for industry, only because they
facilitate the exportation and exchange of such surplus produce for
something else which is more in demand there.
When the foreign goods which are thus purchased with the surplus
produce of domestic industry exceed the demand of the home market, the
surplus part of them must be sent abroad again, and exchanged for
something more in demand at home. About 96,000 hogsheads of tobacco
are annually purchased in Virginia and Maryland with a part of the surplus
produce of British industry. But the demand of Great Britain does not
require, perhaps, more than 14,000. If the remaining 82,000, therefore,
could not be sent abroad, and exchanged for something more in demand at
home, the importation of them must cease immediately, and with it the
productive labour of all those inhabitants of Great Britain who are at
present employed in preparing the goods with which these 82,000
hogsheads are annually purchased. Those goods, which are part of the
produce of the land and labour of Great Britain, having no market at home,
and being deprived of that which they had abroad, must cease to be
produced. The most round-about foreign trade of consumption, therefore,
may, upon some occasions, be as necessary for supporting the productive
labour of the country, and the value of its annual produce, as the most
direct.
When the capital stock of any country is increased to such a degree that it
cannot be all employed in supplying the consumption, and supporting the
productive labour of that particular country, the surplus part of it naturally
disgorges itself into the carrying trade, and is employed in performing the
same offices to other countries. The carrying trade is the natural effect and
symptom of great national wealth; but it does not seem to be the natural
cause of it. Those statesmen who have been disposed to favour it with
particular encouragement, seem to have mistaken the effect and symptom
for the cause. Holland, in proportion to the extent of the land and the
number of its inhabitants, by far the richest country in Europe, has
accordingly the greatest share of the carrying trade of Europe. England,
perhaps the second richest country of Europe, is likewise supposed to have
a considerable share in it; though what commonly passes for the carrying
trade of England will frequently, perhaps, be found to be no more than a
round-about foreign trade of consumption. Such are, in a great measure, the
trades which carry the goods of the East and West Indies and of America to
the different European markets. Those goods are generally purchased, either
immediately with the produce of British industry, or with something else
which had been purchased with that produce, and the final returns of those
trades are generally used or consumed in Great Britain. The trade which is
carried on in British bottoms between the different ports of the
Mediterranean, and some trade of the same kind carried on by British
merchants between the different ports of India, make, perhaps, the principal
branches of what is properly the carrying trade of Great Britain.
The extent of the home trade, and of the capital which can be employed
in it, is necessarily limited by the value of the surplus produce of all those
distant places within the country which have occasion to exchange their
respective productions with one another; that of the foreign trade of
consumption, by the value of the surplus produce of the whole country, and
of what can be purchased with it; that of the carrying trade, by the value of
the surplus produce of all the different countries in the world. Its possible
extent, therefore, is in a manner infinite in comparison of that of the other
two, and is capable of absorbing the greatest capitals.
The consideration of his own private profit is the sole motive which
determines the owner of any capital to employ it either in agriculture, in
manufactures, or in some particular branch of the wholesale or retail trade.
The different quantities of productive labour which it may put into motion,
and the different values which it may add to the annual produce of the land
and labour of the society, according as it is employed in one or other of
those different ways, never enter into his thoughts. In countries, therefore,
where agriculture is the most profitable of all employments, and farming
and improving the most direct roads to a splendid fortune, the capitals of
individuals will naturally be employed in the manner most advantageous to
the whole society. The profits of agriculture, however, seem to have no
superiority over those of other employments in any part of Europe.
Projectors, indeed, in every corner of it, have, within these few years,
amused the public with most magnificent accounts of the profits to be made
by the cultivation and improvement of land. Without entering into any
particular discussion of their calculations, a very simple observation may
satisfy us that the result of them must be false. We see, every day, the most
splendid fortunes, that have been acquired in the course of a single life, by
trade and manufactures, frequently from a very small capital, sometimes
from no capital. A single instance of such a fortune, acquired by agriculture
in the same time, and from such a capital, has not, perhaps, occurred in
Europe, during the course of the present century. In all the great countries of
Europe, however, much good land still remains uncultivated; and the
greater part of what is cultivated, is far from being improved to the degree
of which it is capable. Agriculture, therefore, is almost everywhere capable
of absorbing a much greater capital than has ever yet been employed in it.
What circumstances in the policy of Europe have given the trades which are
carried on in towns so great an advantage over that which is carried on in
the country, that private persons frequently find it more for their advantage
to employ their capitals in the most distant carrying trades of Asia and
America than in the improvement and cultivation of the most fertile fields
in their own neighbourhood, I shall endeavour to explain at full length in
the two following books.
BOOK III.
OF THE DIFFERENT PROGRESS OF OPULENCE
IN DIFFERENT NATIONS
CHAPTER I.
OF THE NATURAL PROGRESS OF OPULENCE.
The great commerce of every civilized society is that carried on between
the inhabitants of the town and those of the country. It consists in the
exchange of rude for manufactured produce, either immediately, or by the
intervention of money, or of some sort of paper which represents money.
The country supplies the town with the means of subsistence and the
materials of manufacture. The town repays this supply, by sending back a
part of the manufactured produce to the inhabitants of the country. The
town, in which there neither is nor can be any reproduction of substances,
may very properly be said to gain its whole wealth and subsistence from the
country. We must not, however, upon this account, imagine that the gain of
the town is the loss of the country. The gains of both are mutual and
reciprocal, and the division of labour is in this, as in all other cases,
advantageous to all the different persons employed in the various
occupations into which it is subdivided. The inhabitants of the country
purchase of the town a greater quantity of manufactured goods with the
produce of a much smaller quantity of their own labour, than they must
have employed had they attempted to prepare them themselves. The town
affords a market for the surplus produce of the country, or what is over and
above the maintenance of the cultivators; and it is there that the inhabitants
of the country exchange it for something else which is in demand among
them. The greater the number and revenue of the inhabitants of the town,
the more extensive is the market which it affords to those of the country;
and the more extensive that market, it is always the more advantageous to a
great number. The corn which grows within a mile of the town, sells there
for the same price with that which comes from twenty miles distance. But
the price of the latter must, generally, not only pay the expense of raising it
and bringing it to market, but afford, too, the ordinary profits of agriculture
to the farmer. The proprietors and cultivators of the country, therefore,
which lies in the neighbourhood of the town, over and above the ordinary
profits of agriculture, gain, in the price of what they sell, the whole value of
the carriage of the like produce that is brought from more distant parts; and
they save, besides, the whole value of this carriage in the price of what they
buy. Compare the cultivation of the lands in the neighbourhood of any
considerable town, with that of those which lie at some distance from it, and
you will easily satisfy yourself bow much the country is benefited by the
commerce of the town. Among all the absurd speculations that have been
propagated concerning the balance of trade, it has never been pretended that
either the country loses by its commerce with the town, or the town by that
with the country which maintains it.
As subsistence is, in the nature of things, prior to conveniency and
luxury, so the industry which procures the former, must necessarily be prior
to that which ministers to the latter. The cultivation and improvement of the
country, therefore, which affords subsistence, must, necessarily, be prior to
the increase of the town, which furnishes only the means of conveniency
and luxury. It is the surplus produce of the country only, or what is over and
above the maintenance of the cultivators, that constitutes the subsistence of
the town, which can therefore increase only with the increase of the surplus
produce. The town, indeed, may not always derive its whole subsistence
from the country in its neighbourhood, or even from the territory to which it
belongs, but from very distant countries; and this, though it forms no
exception from the general rule, has occasioned considerable variations in
the progress of opulence in different ages and nations.
That order of things which necessity imposes, in general, though not in
every particular country, is in every particular country promoted by the
natural inclinations of man. If human institutions had never thwarted those
natural inclinations, the towns could nowhere have increased beyond what
the improvement and cultivation of the territory in which they were situated
could support; till such time, at least, as the whole of that territory was
completely cultivated and improved. Upon equal, or nearly equal profits,
most men will choose to employ their capitals, rather in the improvement
and cultivation of land, than either in manufactures or in foreign trade. The
man who employs his capital in land, has it more under his view and
command; and his fortune is much less liable to accidents than that of the
trader, who is obliged frequently to commit it, not only to the winds and the
waves, but to the more uncertain elements of human folly and injustice, by
giving great credits, in distant countries, to men with whose character and
situation he can seldom be thoroughly acquainted. The capital of the
landlord, on the contrary, which is fixed in the improvement of his land,
seems to be as well secured as the nature of human affairs can admit of. The
beauty of the country, besides, the pleasure of a country life, the tranquillity
of mind which it promises, and, wherever the injustice of human laws does
not disturb it, the independency which it really affords, have charms that,
more or less, attract everybody; and as to cultivate the ground was the
original destination of man, so, in every stage of his existence, he seems to
retain a predilection for this primitive employment.
Without the assistance of some artificers, indeed, the cultivation of land
cannot be carried on, but with great inconveniency and continual
interruption. Smiths, carpenters, wheelwrights and ploughwrights, masons
and bricklayers, tanners, shoemakers, and tailors, are people whose service
the farmer has frequent occasion for. Such artificers, too, stand occasionally
in need of the assistance of one another; and as their residence is not, like
that of the farmer, necessarily tied down to a precise spot, they naturally
settle in the neighbourhood of one another, and thus form a small town or
village. The butcher, the brewer, and the baker, soon join them, together
with many other artificers and retailers, necessary or useful for supplying
their occasional wants, and who contribute still further to augment the town.
The inhabitants of the town, and those of the country, are mutually the
servants of one another. The town is a continual fair or market, to which the
inhabitants of the country resort, in order to exchange their rude for
manufactured produce. It is this commerce which supplies the inhabitants of
the town, both with the materials of their work, and the means of their
subsistence. The quantity of the finished work which they sell to the
inhabitants of the country, necessarily regulates the quantity of the materials
and provisions which they buy. Neither their employment nor subsistence,
therefore, can augment, but in proportion to the augmentation of the
demand from the country for finished work; and this demand can augment
only in proportion to the extension of improvement and cultivation. Had
human institutions, therefore, never disturbed the natural course of things,
the progressive wealth and increase of the towns would, in every political
society, be consequential, and in proportion to the improvement and
cultivation of the territory of country.
In our North American colonies, where uncultivated land is still to be had
upon easy terms, no manufactures for distant sale have ever yet been
established in any of their towns. When an artificer has acquired a little
more stock than is necessary for carrying on his own business in supplying
the neighbouring country, he does not, in North America, attempt to
establish with it a manufacture for more distant sale, but employs it in the
purchase and improvement of uncultivated land. From artificer he becomes
planter; and neither the large wages nor the easy subsistence which that
country affords to artificers, can bribe him rather to work for other people
than for himself. He feels that an artificer is the servant of his customers,
from whom he derives his subsistence; but that a planter who cultivates his
own land, and derives his necessary subsistence from the labour of his own
family, is really a master, and independent of all the world.
In countries, on the contrary, where there is either no uncultivated land,
or none that can be had upon easy terms, every artificer who has acquired
more stock than he can employ in the occasional jobs of the neighbourhood,
endeavours to prepare work for more distant sale. The smith erects some
sort of iron, the weaver some sort of linen or woollen manufactory. Those
different manufactures come, in process of time, to be gradually subdivided,
and thereby improved and refined in a great variety of ways, which may
easily be conceived, and which it is therefore unnecessary to explain any
farther.
In seeking for employment to a capital, manufactures are, upon equal or
nearly equal profits, naturally preferred to foreign commerce, for the same
reason that agriculture is naturally preferred to manufactures. As the capital
of the landlord or farmer is more secure than that of the manufacturer, so
the capital of the manufacturer, being at all times more within his view and
command, is more secure than that of the foreign merchant. In every period,
indeed, of every society, the surplus part both of the rude and manufactured
produce, or that for which there is no demand at home, must be sent abroad,
in order to be exchanged for something for which there is some demand at
home. But whether the capital which carries this surplus produce abroad be
a foreign or a domestic one, is of very little importance. If the society has
not acquired sufficient capital, both to cultivate all its lands, and to
manufacture in the completest manner the whole of its rude produce, there
is even a considerable advantage that the rude produce should be exported
by a foreign capital, in order that the whole stock of the society may be
employed in more useful purposes. The wealth of ancient Egypt, that of
China and Indostan, sufficiently demonstrate that a nation may attain a very
high degree of opulence, though the greater part of its exportation trade be
carried on by foreigners. The progress of our North American and West
Indian colonies, would have been much less rapid, had no capital but what
belonged to themselves been employed in exporting their surplus produce.
According to the natural course of things, therefore, the greater part of
the capital of every growing society is, first, directed to agriculture,
afterwards to manufactures, and, last of all, to foreign commerce. This order
of things is so very natural, that in every society that had any territory, it has
always, I believe, been in some degree observed. Some of their lands must
have been cultivated before any considerable towns could be established,
and some sort of coarse industry of the manufacturing kind must have been
carried on in those towns, before they could well think of employing
themselves in foreign commerce.
But though this natural order of things must have taken place in some
degree in every such society, it has, in all the modern states of Europe, been
in many respects entirely inverted. The foreign commerce of some of their
cities has introduced all their finer manufactures, or such as were fit for
distant sale; and manufactures and foreign commerce together have given
birth to the principal improvements of agriculture. The manners and
customs which the nature of their original government introduced, and
which remained after that government was greatly altered, necessarily
forced them into this unnatural and retrograde order.
CHAPTER II.
OF THE DISCOURAGEMENT OF
AGRICULTURE IN THE ANCIENT STATE OF
EUROPE, AFTER THE FALL OF THE ROMAN
EMPIRE.
When the German and Scythian nations overran the western provinces of
the Roman empire, the confusions which followed so great a revolution
lasted for several centuries. The rapine and violence which the barbarians
exercised against the ancient inhabitants, interrupted the commerce between
the towns and the country. The towns were deserted, and the country was
left uncultivated; and the western provinces of Europe, which had enjoyed a
considerable degree of opulence under the Roman empire, sunk into the
lowest state of poverty and barbarism. During the continuance of those
confusions, the chiefs and principal leaders of those nations acquired, or
usurped to themselves, the greater part of the lands of those countries. A
great part of them was uncultivated; but no part of them, whether cultivated
or uncultivated, was left without a proprietor. All of them were engrossed,
and the greater part by a few great proprietors.
This original engrossing of uncultivated lands, though a great, might
have been but a transitory evil. They might soon have been divided again,
and broke into small parcels, either by succession or by alienation. The law
of primogeniture hindered them from being divided by succession; the
introduction of entails prevented their being broke into small parcels by
alienation.
When land, like moveables, is considered as the means only of
subsistence and enjoyment, the natural law of succession divides it, like
them, among all the children of the family; of all of whom the subsistence
and enjoyment may be supposed equally dear to the father. This natural law
of succession, accordingly, took place among the Romans who made no
more distinction between elder and younger, between male and female, in
the inheritance of lands, than we do in the distribution of moveables. But
when land was considered as the means, not of subsistence merely, but of
power and protection, it was thought better that it should descend undivided
to one. In those disorderly times, every great landlord was a sort of petty
prince. His tenants were his subjects. He was their judge, and in some
respects their legislator in peace and their leader in war. He made war
according to his own discretion, frequently against his neighbours, and
sometimes against his sovereign. The security of a landed estate, therefore,
the protection which its owner could afford to those who dwelt on it,
depended upon its greatness. To divide it was to ruin it, and to expose every
part of it to be oppressed and swallowed up by the incursions of its
neighbours. The law of primogeniture, therefore, came to take place, not
immediately indeed, but in process of time, in the succession of landed
estates, for the same reason that it has generally taken place in that of
monarchies, though not always at their first institution. That the power, and
consequently the security of the monarchy, may not be weakened by
division, it must descend entire to one of the children. To which of them so
important a preference shall be given, must be determined by some general
rule, founded not upon the doubtful distinctions of personal merit, but upon
some plain and evident difference which can admit of no dispute. Among
the children of the same family there can be no indisputable difference but
that of sex, and that of age. The male sex is universally preferred to the
female; and when all other things are equal, the elder everywhere takes
place of the younger. Hence the origin of the right of primogeniture, and of
what is called lineal succession.
Laws frequently continue in force long after the circumstances which
first gave occasion to them, and which could alone render them reasonable,
are no more. In the present state of Europe, the proprietor of a single acre of
land is as perfectly secure in his possession as the proprietor of 100,000.
The right of primogeniture, however, still continues to be respected; and as
of all institutions it is the fittest to support the pride of family distinctions, it
is still likely to endure for many centuries. In every other respect, nothing
can be more contrary to the real interest of a numerous family, than a right
which, in order to enrich one, beggars all the rest of the children.
Entails are the natural consequences of the law of primogeniture. They
were introduced to preserve a certain lineal succession, of which the law of
primogeniture first gave the idea, and to hinder any part of the original
estate from being carried out of the proposed line, either by gift, or device,
or alienation; either by the folly, or by the misfortune of any of its
successive owners. They were altogether unknown to the Romans. Neither
their substitutions, nor fidei commisses, bear any resemblance to entails,
though some French lawyers have thought proper to dress the modern
institution in the language and garb of those ancient ones.
When great landed estates were a sort of principalities, entails might not
be unreasonable. Like what are called the fundamental laws of some
monarchies, they might frequently hinder the security of thousands from
being endangered by the caprice or extravagance of one man. But in the
present state of Europe, when small as well as great estates derive their
security from the laws of their country, nothing can be more completely
absurd. They are founded upon the most absurd of all suppositions, the
supposition that every successive generation of men have not an equal right
to the earth, and to all that it possesses; but that the property of the present
generation should be restrained and regulated according to the fancy of
those who died, perhaps five hundred years ago. Entails, however, are still
respected, through the greater part of Europe; In those countries,
particularly, in which noble birth is a necessary qualification for the
enjoyment either of civil or military honours. Entails are thought necessary
for maintaining this exclusive privilege of the nobility to the great offices
and honours of their country; and that order having usurped one unjust
advantage over the rest of their fellow-citizens, lest their poverty should
render it ridiculous, it is thought reasonable that they should have another.
The common law of England, indeed, is said to abhor perpetuities, and they
are accordingly more restricted there than in any other European monarchy;
though even England is not altogether without them. In Scotland, more than
one fifth, perhaps more than one third part of the whole lands in the
country, are at present supposed to be under strict entail.
Great tracts of uncultivated land were in this manner not only engrossed
by particular families, but the possibility of their being divided again was as
much as possible precluded for ever. It seldom happens, however, that a
great proprietor is a great improver. In the disorderly times which gave birth
to those barbarous institutions, the great proprietor was sufficiently
employed in defending his own territories, or in extending his jurisdiction
and authority over those of his neighbours. He had no leisure to attend to
the cultivation and improvement of land. When the establishment of law
and order afforded him this leisure, he often wanted the inclination, and
almost always the requisite abilities. If the expense of his house and person
either equalled or exceeded his revenue, as it did very frequently, he had no
stock to employ in this manner. If he was an economist, he generally found
it more profitable to employ his annual savings in new purchases than in the
improvement of his old estate. To improve land with profit, like all other
commercial projects, requires an exact attention to small savings and small
gains, of which a man born to a great fortune, even though naturally frugal,
is very seldom capable. The situation of such a person naturally disposes
him to attend rather to ornament, which pleases his fancy, than to profit, for
which he has so little occasion. The elegance of his dress, of his equipage,
of his house and household furniture, are objects which, from his infancy,
he has been accustomed to have some anxiety about. The turn of mind
which this habit naturally forms, follows him when he comes to think of the
improvement of land. He embellishes, perhaps, four or five hundred acres
in the neighbourhood of his house, at ten times the expense which the land
is worth after all his improvements; and finds, that if he was to improve his
whole estate in the same manner, and he has little taste for any other, he
would be a bankrupt before he had finished the tenth part of it. There still
remain, in both parts of the united kingdom, some great estates which have
continued, without interruption, in the hands of the same family since the
times of feudal anarchy. Compare the present condition of those estates
with the possessions of the small proprietors in their neighbourhood, and
you will require no other argument to convince you how unfavourable such
extensive property is to improvement.
If little improvement was to be expected from such great proprietors, still
less was to be hoped for from those who occupied the land under them. In
the ancient state of Europe, the occupiers of land were all tenants at will.
They were all, or almost all, slaves, but their slavery was of a milder kind
than that known among the ancient Greeks and Romans, or even in our
West Indian colonies. They were supposed to belong more directly to the
land than to their master. They could, therefore, be sold with it, but not
separately. They could marry, provided it was with the consent of their
master; and he could not afterwards dissolve the marriage by selling the
man and wife to different persons. If he maimed or murdered any of them,
he was liable to some penalty, though generally but to a small one. They
were not, however, capable of acquiring property. Whatever they acquired
was acquired to their master, and he could take it from them at pleasure.
Whatever cultivation and improvement could be carried on by means of
such slaves, was properly carried on by their master. It was at his expense.
The seed, the cattle, and the instruments of husbandry, were all his. It was
for his benefit. Such slaves could acquire nothing but their daily
maintenance. It was properly the proprietor himself, therefore, that in this
case occupied his own lands, and cultivated them by his own bondmen.
This species of slavery still subsists in Russia, Poland, Hungary, Bohemia,
Moravia, and other parts of Germany. It is only in the western and south-
western provinces of Europe that it has gradually been abolished altogether.
But if great improvements are seldom to be expected from great
proprietors, they are least of all to be expected when they employ slaves for
their workmen. The experience of all ages and nations, I believe,
demonstrates that the work done by slaves, though it appears to cost only
their maintenance, is in the end the dearest of any. A person who can
acquire no property can have no other interest but to eat as much and to
labour as little as possible. Whatever work he does beyond what is
sufficient to purchase his own maintenance, can be squeezed out of him by
violence only, and not by any interest of his own. In ancient Italy, how
much the cultivation of corn degenerated, how unprofitable it became to the
master, when it fell under the management of slaves, is remarked both by
Pliny and Columella. In the time of Aristotle, it had not been much better in
ancient Greece. Speaking of the ideal republic described in the laws of
Plato, to maintain 5000 idle men (the number of warriors supposed
necessary for its defence), together with their women and servants, would
require, he says, a territory of boundless extent and fertility, like the plains
of Babylon.
The pride of man makes him love to domineer, and nothing mortifies him
so much as to be obliged to condescend to persuade his inferiors. Wherever
the law allows it, and the nature of the work can afford it, therefore, he will
generally prefer the service of slaves to that of freemen. The planting of
sugar and tobacco can afford the expense of slave cultivation. The raising of
corn, it seems, in the present times, cannot. In the English colonies, of
which the principal produce is corn, the far greater part of the work is done
by freemen. The late resolution of the Quakers in Pennsylvania, to set at
liberty all their negro slaves, may satisfy us that their number cannot be
very great. Had they made any considerable part of their property, such a
resolution could never have been agreed to. In our sugar colonies., on the
contrary, the whole work is done by slaves, and in our tobacco colonies a
very great part of it. The profits of a sugar plantation in any of our West
Indian colonies, are generally much greater than those of any other
cultivation that is known either in Europe or America; and the profits of a
tobacco plantation, though inferior to those of sugar, are superior to those of
corn, as has already been observed. Both can afford the expense of slave
cultivation but sugar can afford it still better than tobacco. The number of
negroes, accordingly, is much greater, in proportion to that of whites, in our
sugar than in our tobacco colonies.
To the slave cultivators of ancient times gradually succeeded a species of
farmers, known at present in France by the name of metayers. They are
called in Latin Coloni Partiarii. They have been so long in disuse in
England, that at present I know no English name for them. The proprietor
furnished them with the seed, cattle, and instruments of husbandry, the
whole stock, in short, necessary for cultivating the farm. The produce was
divided equally between the proprietor and the farmer, after setting aside
what was judged necessary for keeping up the stock, which was restored to
the proprietor, when the farmer either quitted or was turned out of the farm.
Land occupied by such tenants is properly cultivated at the expense of
the proprietors, as much as that occupied by slaves. There is, however, one
very essential difference between them. Such tenants, being freemen, are
capable of acquiring property; and having a certain proportion of the
produce of the land, they have a plain interest that the whole produce
should be as great as possible, in order that their own proportion may be so.
A slave, on the contrary, who can acquire nothing but his maintenance,
consults his own ease, by making the land produce as little as possible over
and above that maintenance. It is probable that it was partly upon account
of this advantage, and partly upon account of the encroachments which the
sovereigns, always jealous of the great lords, gradually encouraged their
villains to make upon their authority, and which seem, at least, to have been
such as rendered this species of servitude altogether inconvenient, that
tenure in villanage gradually wore out through the greater part of Europe.
The time and manner, however, in which so important a revolution was
brought about, is one of the most obscure points in modern history. The
church of Rome claims great merit in it; and it is certain, that so early as the
twelfth century, Alexander III. published a bull for the general emancipation
of slaves. It seems, however, to have been rather a pious exhortation, than a
law to which exact obedience was required from the faithful. Slavery
continued to take place almost universally for several centuries afterwards,
till it was gradually abolished by the joint operation of the two interests
above mentioned; that of the proprietor on the one hand, and that of the
sovereign on the other. A villain, enfranchised, and at the same time
allowed to continue in possession of the land, having no stock of his own,
could cultivate it only by means of what the landlord advanced to him, and
must therefore have been what the French call a metayer.
It could never, however, be the interest even of this last species of
cultivators, to lay out, in the further improvement of the land, any part of
the little stock which they might save from their own share of the produce;
because the landlord, who laid out nothing, was to get one half of whatever
it produced. The tithe, which is but a tenth of the produce, is found to be a
very great hindrance to improvement. A tax, therefore, which amounted to
one half, must have been an effectual bar to it. It might be the interest of a
metayer to make the land produce as much as could be brought out of it by
means of the stock furnished by the proprietor; but it could never be his
interest to mix any part of his own with it. In France, where five parts out of
six of the whole kingdom are said to be still occupied by this species of
cultivators, the proprietors complain, that their metayers take every
opportunity of employing their master’s cattle rather in carriage than in
cultivation; because, in the one case, they get the whole profits to
themselves, in the other they share them with their landlord. This species of
tenants still subsists in some parts of Scotland. They are called steel-bow
tenants. Those ancient English tenants, who are said by Chief-Baron Gilbert
and Dr Blackstone to have been rather bailiffs of the landlord than farmers,
properly so called, were probably of the same kind.
To this species of tenantry succeeded, though by very slow degrees,
farmers, properly so called, who cultivated the land with their own stock,
paying a rent certain to the landlord. When such farmers have a lease for a
term of years, they may sometimes find it for their interest to lay out part of
their capital in the further improvement of the farm; because they may
sometimes expect to recover it, with a large profit, before the expiration of
the lease. The possession, even of such farmers, however, was long
extremely precarious, and still is so in many parts of Europe. They could,
before the expiration of their term, be legally ousted of their leases by a new
purchaser; in England, even, by the fictitious action of a common recovery.
If they were turned out illegally by the violence of their master, the action
by which they obtained redress was extremely imperfect. It did not always
reinstate them in the possession of the land, but gave them damages, which
never amounted to a real loss. Even in England, the country, perhaps of
Europe, where the yeomanry has always been most respected, it was not till
about the 14th of Henry VII. that the action of ejectment was invented, by
which the tenant recovers, not damages only, but possession, and in which
his claim is not necessarily concluded by the uncertain decision of a single
assize. This action has been found so effectual a remedy, that, in the modern
practice, when the landlord has occasion to sue for the possession of the
land, he seldom makes use of the actions which properly belong to him as a
landlord, the writ of right or the writ of entry, but sues in the name of his
tenant, by the writ of ejectment. In England, therefore the security of the
tenant is equal to that of the proprietor. In England, besides, a lease for life
of forty shillings a-year value is a freehold, and entitles the lessee to a vote
for a member of parliament; and as a great part of the yeomanry have
freeholds of this kind, the whole order becomes respectable to their
landlords, on account of the political consideration which this gives them.
There is, I believe, nowhere in Europe, except in England, any instance of
the tenant building upon the land of which he had no lease, and trusting that
the honour of his landlord would take no advantage of so important an
improvement. Those laws and customs, so favourable to the yeomanry,
have perhaps contributed more to the present grandeur of England, than all
their boasted regulations of commerce taken together.
The law which secures the longest leases against successors of every
kind, is, so far as I know, peculiar to Great Britain. It was introduced into
Scotland so early as 1449, by a law of James II. Its beneficial influence,
however, has been much obstructed by entails; the heirs of entail being
generally restrained from letting leases for any long term of years,
frequently for more than one year. A late act of parliament has, in this
respect, somewhat slackened their fetters, though they are still by much too
strait. In Scotland, besides, as no leasehold gives a vote for a member of
parliament, the yeomanry are upon this account less respectable to their
landlords than in England.
In other parts of Europe, after it was found convenient to secure tenants
both against heirs and purchasers, the term of their security was still limited
to a very short period; in France, for example, to nine years from the
commencement of the lease. It has in that country, indeed, been lately
extended to twentyseven, a period still too short to encourage the tenant to
make the most important improvements. The proprietors of land were
anciently the legislators of every part of Europe. The laws relating to land,
therefore, were all calculated for what they supposed the interest of the
proprietor. It was for his interest, they had imagined, that no lease granted
by any of his predecessors should hinder him from enjoying, during a long
term of years, the full value of his land. Avarice and injustice are always
short-sighted, and they did not foresee how much this regulation must
obstruct improvement, and thereby hurt, in the long-run, the real interest of
the landlord.
The farmers, too, besides paying the rent, were anciently, it was
supposed, bound to perform a great number of services to the landlord,
which were seldom either specified in the lease, or regulated by any precise
rule, but by the use and wont of the manor or barony. These services,
therefore, being almost entirely arbitrary, subjected the tenant to many
vexations. In Scotland the abolition of all services not precisely stipulated
in the lease, has, in the course of a few years, very much altered for the
better the condition of the yeomanry of that country.
The public services to which the yeomanry were bound, were not less
arbitrary than the private ones. To make and maintain the high roads, a
servitude which still subsists, I believe, everywhere, though with different
degrees of oppression in different countries, was not the only one. When the
king’s troops, when his household, or his officers of any kind, passed
through any part of the country, the yeomanry were bound to provide them
with horses, carriages, and provisions, at a price regulated by the purveyor.
Great Britain is, I believe, the only monarchy in Europe where the
oppression of purveyance has been entirely abolished. It still subsists in
France and Germany.
The public taxes, to which they were subject, were as irregular and
oppressive as the services. The ancient lords, though extremely unwilling to
grant, themselves, any pecuniary aid to their sovereign, easily allowed him
to tallage, as they called it, their tenants, and had not knowledge enough to
foresee how much this must, in the end, affect their own revenue. The taille,
as it still subsists in France may serve as an example of those ancient
tallages. It is a tax upon the supposed profits of the farmer, which they
estimate by the stock that he has upon the farm. It is his interest, therefore,
to appear to have as little as possible, and consequently to employ as little
as possible in its cultivation, and none in its improvement. Should any stock
happen to accumulate in the hands of a French farmer, the taille is almost
equal to a prohibition of its ever being employed upon the land. This tax,
besides, is supposed to dishonour whoever is subject to it, and to degrade
him below, not only the rank of a gentleman, but that of a burgher; and
whoever rents the lands of another becomes subject to it. No gentleman, nor
even any burgher, who has stock, will submit to this degradation. This tax,
therefore, not only hinders the stock which accumulates upon the land from
being employed in its improvement, but drives away all other stock from it.
The ancient tenths and fifteenths, so usual in England in former times,
seem, so far as they affected the land, to have been taxes of the same nature
with the taille.
Under all these discouragements, little improvement could be expected
from the occupiers of land. That order of people, with all the liberty and
security which law can give, must always improve under great
disadvantage. The farmer, compared with the proprietor, is as a merchant
who trades with burrowed money, compared with one who trades with his
own. The stock of both may improve; but that of the one, with only equal
good conduct, must always improve more slowly than that of the other, on
account of the large share of the profits which is consumed by the interest
of the loan. The lands cultivated by the farmer must, in the same manner,
with only equal good conduct, be improved more slowly than those
cultivated by the proprietor, on account of the large share of the produce
which is consumed in the rent, and which, had the farmer been proprietor,
he might have employed in the further improvement of the land. The station
of a farmer, besides, is, from the nature of things, inferior to that of a
proprietor. Through the greater part of Europe, the yeomanry are regarded
as an inferior rank of people, even to the better sort of tradesmen and
mechanics, and in all parts of Europe to the great merchants and master
manufacturers. It can seldom happen, therefore, that a man of any
considerable stock should quit the superior, in order to place himself in an
inferior station. Even in the present state of Europe, therefore, little stock is
likely to go from any other profession to the improvement of land in the
way of farming. More does, perhaps, in Great Britain than in any other
country, though even there the great stocks which are in some places
employed in farming, have generally been acquired by fanning, the trade,
perhaps, in which, of all others, stock is commonly acquired most slowly.
After small proprietors, however, rich and great farmers are in every
country the principal improvers. There are more such, perhaps, in England
than in any other European monarchy. In the republican governments of
Holland, and of Berne in Switzerland, the farmers are said to be not inferior
to those of England.
The ancient policy of Europe was, over and above all this, unfavourable
to the improvement and cultivation of land, whether carried on by the
proprietor or by the farmer; first, by the general prohibition of the
exportation of corn, without a special licence, which seems to have been a
very universal regulation; and, secondly, by the restraints which were laid
upon the inland commerce, not only of corn, but of almost every other part
of the produce of the farm, by the absurd laws against engrossers, regraters,
and forestallers, and by the privileges of fairs and markets. It has already
been observed in what manner the prohibition of the exportation of corn,
together with some encouragement given to the importation of foreign corn,
obstructed the cultivation of ancient Italy, naturally the most fertile country
in Europe, and at that time the seat of the greatest empire in the world. To
what degree such restraints upon the inland commerce of this commodity,
joined to the general prohibition of exportation, must have discouraged the
cultivation of countries less fertile, and less favourably circumstanced, it is
not, perhaps, very easy to imagine.
CHAPTER III.
OF THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF CITIES AND
TOWNS, AFTER THE FALL OF THE ROMAN
EMPIRE.
The inhabitants of cities and towns were, after the fall of the Roman
empire, not more favoured than those of the country. They consisted,
indeed, of a very different order of people from the first inhabitants of the
ancient republics of Greece and Italy. These last were composed chiefly of
the proprietors of lands, among whom the public territory was originally
divided, and who found it convenient to build their houses in the
neighbourhood of one another, and to surround them with a wall, for the
sake of common defence. After the fall of the Roman empire, on the
contrary, the proprietors of land seem generally to have lived in fortified
castles on their own estates, and in the midst of their own tenants and
dependants. The towns were chiefly inhabited by tradesmen and mechanics,
who seem, in those days, to have been of servile, or very nearly of servile
condition. The privileges which we find granted by ancient charters to the
inhabitants of some of the principal towns in Europe, sufficiently show
what they were before those grants. The people to whom it is granted as a
privilege, that they might give away their own daughters in marriage
without the consent of their lord, that upon their death their own children,
and not their lord, should succeed to their goods, and that they might
dispose of their own effects by will, must, before those grants, have been
either altogether, or very nearly, in the same state of villanage with the
occupiers of land in the country.
They seem, indeed, to have been a very poor, mean set of people, who
seemed to travel about with their goods from place to place, and from fair to
fair, like the hawkers and pedlars of the present times. In all the different
countries of Europe then, in the same manner as in several of the Tartar
governments of Asia at present, taxes used to be levied upon the persons
and goods of travellers, when they passed through certain manors, when
they went over certain bridges, when they carried about their goods from
place to place in a fair, when they erected in it a booth or stall to sell them
in. These different taxes were known in England by the names of passage,
pontage, lastage, and stallage. Sometimes the king, sometimes a great lord,
who had, it seems, upon some occasions, authority to do this, would grant
to particular traders, to such particularly as lived in their own demesnes, a
general exemption from such taxes. Such traders, though in other respects
of servile, or very nearly of servile condition, were upon this account called
free traders. They, in return, usually paid to their protector a sort of annual
poll-tax. In those days protection was seldom granted without a valuable
consideration, and this tax might perhaps be considered as compensation for
what their patrons might lose by their exemption from other taxes. At first,
both those poll-taxes and those exemptions seem to have been altogether
personal, and to have affected only particular individuals, during either their
lives, or the pleasure of their protectors. In the very imperfect accounts
which have been published from Doomsday-book, of several of the towns
of England, mention is frequently made, sometimes of the tax which
particular burghers paid, each of them, either to the king, or to some other
great lord, for this sort of protection, and sometimes of the general amount
only of all those taxes. {see Brady’s Historical Treatise of Cities and
Boroughs, p. 3. etc.}
But how servile soever may have been originally the condition of the
inhabitants of the towns, it appears evidently, that they arrived at liberty and
independency much earlier than the occupiers of land in the country. That
part of the king’s revenue which arose from such poll-taxes in any
particular town, used commonly to be let in farm, during a term of years,
for a rent certain, sometimes to the sheriff of the county, and sometimes to
other persons. The burghers themselves frequently got credit enough to be
admitted to farm the revenues of this sort which arose out of their own
town, they becoming jointly and severally answerable for the whole rent.
{See Madox, Firma Burgi, p. 18; also History of the Exchequer, chap. 10,
sect. v, p. 223, first edition.} To let a farm in this manner, was quite
agreeable to the usual economy of, I believe, the sovereigns of all the
different countries of Europe, who used frequently to let whole manors to
all the tenants of those manors, they becoming jointly and severally
answerable for the whole rent; but in return being allowed to collect it in
their own way, and to pay it into the king’s exchequer by the hands of their
own bailiff, and being thus altogether freed from the insolence of the king’s
officers; a circumstance in those days regarded as of the greatest
importance.
At first, the farm of the town was probably let to the burghers, in the
same manner as it had been to other farmers, for a term of years only. In
process of time, however, it seems to have become the general practice to
grant it to them in fee, that is for ever, reserving a rent certain, never
afterwards to be augmented. The payment having thus become perpetual,
the exemptions, in return, for which it was made, naturally became
perpetual too. Those exemptions, therefore, ceased to be personal, and
could not afterwards be considered as belonging to individuals, as
individuals, but as burghers of a particular burgh, which, upon this account,
was called a free burgh, for the same reason that they had been called free
burghers or free traders.
Along with this grant, the important privileges, above mentioned, that
they might give away their own daughters in marriage, that their children
should succeed to them, and that they might dispose of their own effects by
will, were generally bestowed upon the burghers of the town to whom it
was given. Whether such privileges had before been usually granted, along
with the freedom of trade, to particular burghers, as individuals, I know not.
I reckon it not improbable that they were, though I cannot produce any
direct evidence of it. But however this may have been, the principal
attributes of villanage and slavery being thus taken away from them, they
now at least became really free, in our present sense of the word freedom.
Nor was this all. They were generally at the same time erected into a
commonalty or corporation, with the privilege of having magistrates and a
town-council of their own, of making bye-laws for their own government,
of building walls for their own defence, and of reducing all their inhabitants
under a sort of military discipline, by obliging them to watch and ward; that
is, as anciently understood, to guard and defend those walls against all
attacks and surprises, by night as well as by day. In England they were
generally exempted from suit to the hundred and county courts: and all such
pleas as should arise among them, the pleas of the crown excepted, were
left to the decision of their own magistrates. In other countries, much
greater and more extensive jurisdictions were frequently granted to them.
{See Madox, Firma Burgi. See also Pfeffel in the Remarkable events under
Frederick II. and his Successors of the House of Suabia.}
It might, probably, be necessary to grant to such towns as were admitted
to farm their own revenues, some sort of compulsive jurisdiction to oblige
their own citizens to make payment. In those disorderly times, it might have
been extremely inconvenient to have left them to seek this sort of justice
from any other tribunal. But it must seem extraordinary, that the sovereigns
of all the different countries of Europe should have exchanged in this
manner for a rent certain, never more to be augmented, that branch of their
revenue, which was, perhaps, of all others, the most likely to be improved
by the natural course of things, without either expense or attention of their
own; and that they should, besides, have in this manner voluntarily erected
a sort of independent republics in the heart of their own dominions.
In order to understand this, it must be remembered, that, in those days,
the sovereign of perhaps no country in Europe was able to protect, through
the whole extent of his dominions, the weaker part of his subjects from the
oppression of the great lords. Those whom the law could not protect, and
who were not strong enough to defend themselves, were obliged either to
have recourse to the protection of some great lord, and in order to obtain it,
to become either his slaves or vassals; or to enter into a league of mutual
defence for the common protection of one another. The inhabitants of cities
and burghs, considered as single individuals, had no power to defend
themselves; but by entering into a league of mutual defence with their
neighbours, they were capable of making no contemptible resistance. The
lords despised the burghers, whom they considered not only as a different
order, but as a parcel of emancipated slaves, almost of a different species
from themselves. The wealth of the burghers never failed to provoke their
envy and indignation, and they plundered them upon every occasion
without mercy or remorse. The burghers naturally hated and feared the
lords. The king hated and feared them too; but though, perhaps, he might
despise, he had no reason either to hate or fear the burghers. Mutual
interest, therefore, disposed them to support the king, and the king to
support them against the lords. They were the enemies of his enemies, and
it was his interest to render them as secure and independent of those
enemies as he could. By granting them magistrates of their own, the
privilege of making bye-laws for their own government, that of building
walls for their own defence, and that of reducing all their inhabitants under
a sort of military discipline, he gave them all the means of security and
independency of the barons which it was in his power to bestow. Without
the establishment of some regular government of this kind, without some
authority to compel their inhabitants to act according to some certain plan
or system, no voluntary league of mutual defence could either have afforded
them any permanent security, or have enabled them to give the king any
considerable support. By granting them the farm of their own town in fee,
he took away from those whom he wished to have for his friends, and, if
one may say so, for his allies, all ground of jealousy and suspicion, that he
was ever afterwards to oppress them, either by raising the farm-rent of their
town, or by granting it to some other farmer.
The princes who lived upon the worst terms with their barons, seem
accordingly to have been the most liberal in grants of this kind to their
burghs. King John of England, for example, appears to have been a most
munificent benefactor to his towns. {See Madox.} Philip I. of France lost
all authority over his barons. Towards the end of his reign, his son Lewis,
known afterwards by the name of Lewis the Fat, consulted, according to
Father Daniel, with the bishops of the royal demesnes, concerning the most
proper means of restraining the violence of the great lords. Their advice
consisted of two different proposals. One was to erect a new order of
jurisdiction, by establishing magistrates and a town-council in every
considerable town of his demesnes. The other was to form a new militia, by
making the inhabitants of those towns, under the command of their own
magistrates, march out upon proper occasions to the assistance of the king.
It is from this period, according to the French antiquarians, that we are to
date the institution of the magistrates and councils of cities in France. It was
during the unprosperous reigns of the princes of the house of Suabia, that
the greater part of the free towns of Germany received the first grants of
their privileges, and that the famous Hanseatic league first became
formidable. {See Pfeffel.}
The militia of the cities seems, in those times, not to have been inferior to
that of the country; and as they could be more readily assembled upon any
sudden occasion, they frequently had the advantage in their disputes with
the neighbouring lords. In countries such as Italy or Switzerland, in which,
on account either of their distance from the principal seat of government, of
the natural strength of the country itself, or of some other reason, the
sovereign came to lose the whole of his authority; the cities generally
became independent republics, and conquered all the nobility in their
neighbourhood; obliging them to pull down their castles in the country, and
to live, like other peaceable inhabitants, in the city. This is the short history
of the republic of Berne, as well as of several other cities in Switzerland. If
you except Venice, for of that city the history is somewhat different, it is the
history of all the considerable Italian republics, of which so great a number
arose and perished between the end of the twelfth and the beginning of the
sixteenth century.
In countries such as France and England, where the authority of the
sovereign, though frequently very low, never was destroyed altogether, the
cities had no opportunity of becoming entirely independent. They became,
however, so considerable, that the sovereign could impose no tax upon
them, besides the stated farm-rent of the town, without their own consent.
They were, therefore, called upon to send deputies to the general assembly
of the states of the kingdom, where they might join with the clergy and the
barons in granting, upon urgent occasions, some extraordinary aid to the
king. Being generally, too, more favourable to his power, their deputies
seem sometimes to have been employed by him as a counterbalance in
those assemblies to the authority of the great lords. Hence the origin of the
representation of burghs in the states-general of all great monarchies in
Europe.
Order and good government, and along with them the liberty and security
of individuals, were in this manner established in cities, at a time when the
occupiers of land in the country, were exposed to every sort of violence. But
men in this defenceless state naturally content themselves with their
necessary subsistence; because, to acquire more, might only tempt the
injustice of their oppressors. On the contrary, when they are secure of
enjoying the fruits of their industry, they naturally exert it to better their
condition, and to acquire not only the necessaries, but the conveniencies
and elegancies of life. That industry, therefore, which aims at something
more than necessary subsistence, was established in cities long before it
was commonly practised by the occupiers of land in the country. If, in the
hands of a poor cultivator, oppressed with the servitude of villanage, some
little stock should accumulate, he would naturally conceal it with great care
from his master, to whom it would otherwise have belonged, and take the
first opportunity of running away to a town. The law was at that time so
indulgent to the inhabitants of towns, and so desirous of diminishing the
authority of the lords over those of the country, that if he could conceal
himself there from the pursuit of his lord for a year, he was free for ever.
Whatever stock, therefore, accumulated in the hands of the industrious part
of the inhabitants of the country, naturally took refuge in cities, as the only
sanctuaries in which it could be secure to the person that acquired it.
The inhabitants of a city, it is true, must always ultimately derive their
subsistence, and the whole materials and means of their industry, from the
country. But those of a city, situated near either the sea-coast or the banks of
a navigable river, are not necessarily confined to derive them from the
country in their neighbourhood. They have a much wider range, and may
draw them from the most remote corners of the world, either in exchange
for the manufactured produce of their own industry, or by performing the
office of carriers between distant countries, and exchanging the produce of
one for that of another. A city might, in this manner, grow up to great
wealth and splendour, while not only the country in its neighbourhood, but
all those to which it traded, were in poverty and wretchedness. Each of
those countries, perhaps, taken singly, could afford it but a small part, either
of its subsistence or of its employment; but all of them taken together, could
afford it both a great subsistence and a great employment. There were,
however, within the narrow circle of the commerce of those times, some
countries that were opulent and industrious. Such was the Greek empire as
long as it subsisted, and that of the Saracens during the reigns of the
Abassides. Such, too, was Egypt till it was conquered by the Turks, some
part of the coast of Barbary, and all those provinces of Spain which were
under the government of the Moors.
The cities of Italy seem to have been the first in Europe which were
raised by commerce to any considerable degree of opulence. Italy lay in the
centre of what was at that time the improved and civilized part of the world.
The crusades, too, though, by the great waste of stock and destruction of
inhabitants which they occasioned, they must necessarily have retarded the
progress of the greater part of Europe, were extremely favourable to that of
some Italian cities. The great armies which marched from all parts to the
conquest of the Holy Land, gave extraordinary encouragement to the
shipping of Venice, Genoa, and Pisa, sometimes in transporting them
thither, and always in supplying them with provisions. They were the
commissaries, if one may say so, of those armies; and the most destructive
frenzy that ever befel the European nations, was a source of opulence to
those republics.
The inhabitants of trading cities, by importing the improved
manufactures and expensive luxuries of richer countries, afforded some
food to the vanity of the great proprietors, who eagerly purchased them with
great quantities of the rude produce of their own lands. The commerce of a
great part of Europe in those times, accordingly, consisted chiefly in the
exchange of their own rude, for the manufactured produce of more civilized
nations. Thus the wool of England used to be exchanged for the wines of
France, and the fine cloths of Flanders, in the same manner as the corn in
Poland is at this day, exchanged for the wines and brandies of France, and
for the silks and velvets of France and Italy.
A taste for the finer and more improved manufactures was, in this
manner, introduced by foreign commerce into countries where no such
works were carried on. But when this taste became so general as to
occasion a considerable demand, the merchants, in order to save the
expense of carriage, naturally endeavoured to establish some manufactures
of the same kind in their own country. Hence the origin of the first
manufactures for distant sale, that seem to have been established in the
western provinces of Europe, after the fall of the Roman empire.
No large country, it must be observed, ever did or could subsist without
some sort of manufactures being carried on in it; and when it is said of any
such country that it has no manufactures, it must always be understood of
the finer and more improved, or of such as are fit for distant sale. In every
large country both the clothing and household furniture or the far greater
part of the people, are the produce of their own industry. This is even more
universally the case in those poor countries which are commonly said to
have no manufactures, than in those rich ones that are said to abound in
them. In the latter you will generally find, both in the clothes and household
furniture of the lowest rank of people, a much greater proportion of foreign
productions than in the former.
Those manufactures which are fit for distant sale, seem to have been
introduced into different countries in two different ways.
Sometimes they have been introduced in the manner above mentioned,
by the violent operation, if one may say so, of the stocks of particular
merchants and undertakers, who established them in imitation of some
foreign manufactures of the same kind. Such manufactures, therefore, are
the offspring of foreign commerce; and such seem to have been the ancient
manufactures of silks, velvets, and brocades, which flourished in Lucca
during the thirteenth century. They were banished from thence by the
tyranny of one of Machiavel’s heroes, Castruccio Castracani. In 1310, nine
hundred families were driven out of Lucca, of whom thirty-one retired to
Venice, and offered to introduce there the silk manufacture. {See Sandi
Istoria civile de Vinezia, part 2 vol. i, page 247 and 256.} Their offer was
accepted, many privileges were conferred upon them, and they began the
manufacture with three hundred workmen. Such, too, seem to have been the
manufactures of fine cloths that anciently flourished in Flanders, and which
were introduced into England in the beginning of the reign of Elizabeth, and
such are the present silk manufactures of Lyons and Spitalfields.
Manufactures introduced in this manner are generally employed upon
foreign materials, being imitations of foreign manufactures. When the
Venetian manufacture was first established, the materials were all brought
from Sicily and the Levant. The more ancient manufacture of Lucca was
likewise carried on with foreign materials. The cultivation of mulberry
trees, and the breeding of silk-worms, seem not to have been common in the
northern parts of Italy before the sixteenth century. Those arts were not
introduced into France till the reign of Charles IX. The manufactures of
Flanders were carried on chiefly with Spanish and English wool. Spanish
wool was the material, not of the first woollen manufacture of England, but
of the first that was fit for distant sale. More than one half the materials of
the Lyons manufacture is at this day foreign silk; when it was first
established, the whole, or very nearly the whole, was so. No part of the
materials of the Spitalfields manufacture is ever likely to be the produce of
England. The seat of such manufactures, as they are generally introduced by
the scheme and project of a few individuals, is sometimes established in a
maritime city, and sometimes in an inland town, according as their interest,
judgment, or caprice, happen to determine.
At other times, manufactures for distant sale grow up naturally, and as it
were of their own accord, by the gradual refinement of those household and
coarser manufactures which must at all times be carried on even in the
poorest and rudest countries. Such manufactures are generally employed
upon the materials which the country produces, and they seem frequently to
have been first refined and improved in such inland countries as were not,
indeed, at a very great, but at a considerable distance from the sea-coast,
and sometimes even from all water carriage. An inland country, naturally
fertile and easily cultivated, produces a great surplus of provisions beyond
what is necessary for maintaining the cultivators; and on account of the
expense of land carriage, and inconveniency of river navigation, it may
frequently be difficult to send this surplus abroad. Abundance, therefore,
renders provisions cheap, and encourages a great number of workmen to
settle in the neighbourhood, who find that their industry can there procure
them more of the necessaries and conveniencies of life than in other places.
They work up the materials of manufacture which the land produces, and
exchange their finished work, or, what is the same thing, the price of it, for
more materials and provisions. They give a new value to the surplus part of
the rude produce, by saving the expense of carrying it to the water-side, or
to some distant market; and they furnish the cultivators with something in
exchange for it that is either useful or agreeable to them, upon easier terms
than they could have obtained it before. The cultivators get a better price for
their surplus produce, and can purchase cheaper other conveniencies which
they have occasion for. They are thus both encouraged and enabled to
increase this surplus produce by a further improvement and better
cultivation of the land; and as the fertility of she land had given birth to the
manufacture, so the progress of the manufacture reacts upon the land, and
increases still further its fertility. The manufacturers first supply the
neighbourhood, and afterwards, as their work improves and refines, more
distant markets. For though neither the rude produce, nor even the coarse
manufacture, could, without the greatest difficulty, support the expense of a
considerable land-carriage, the refined and improved manufacture easily
may. In a small bulk it frequently contains the price of a great quantity of
rude produce. A piece of fine cloth, for example which weighs only eighty
pounds, contains in it the price, not only of eighty pounds weight of wool,
but sometimes of several thousand weight of corn, the maintenance of the
different working people, and of their immediate employers. The corn
which could with difficulty have been carried abroad in its own shape, is in
this manner virtually exported in that of the complete manufacture, and may
easily be sent to the remotest corners of the world. In this manner have
grown up naturally, and, as it were, of their own accord, the manufactures
of Leeds, Halifax, Sheffield, Birmingham, and Wolverhampton. Such
manufactures are the offspring of agriculture. In the modern history of
Europe, their extension and improvement have generally been posterior to
those which were the offspring of foreign commerce. England was noted for
the manufacture of fine cloths made of Spanish wool, more than a century
before any of those which now flourish in the places above mentioned were
fit for foreign sale. The extension and improvement of these last could not
take place but in consequence of the extension and improvement of
agriculture, the last and greatest effect of foreign commerce, and of the
manufactures immediately introduced by it, and which I shall now proceed
to explain.
CHAPTER IV.
HOW THE COMMERCE OF TOWNS
CONTRIBUTED TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF
THE COUNTRY.
The increase and riches of commercial and manufacturing towns
contributed to the improvement and cultivation of the countries to which
they belonged, in three different ways.
First, by affording a great and ready market for the rude produce of the
country, they gave encouragement to its cultivation and further
improvement. This benefit was not even confined to the countries in which
they were situated, but extended more or less to all those with which they
had any dealings. To all of them they afforded a market for some part either
of their rude or manufactured produce, and, consequently, gave some
encouragement to the industry and improvement of all. Their own country,
however, on account of its neighbourhood, necessarily derived the greatest
benefit from this market. Its rude produce being charged with less carriage,
the traders could pay the growers a better price for it, and yet afford it as
cheap to the consumers as that of more distant countries.
Secondly, the wealth acquired by the inhabitants of cities was frequently
employed in purchasing such lands as were to be sold, of which a great part
would frequently be uncultivated. Merchants are commonly ambitious of
becoming country gentlemen, and, when they do, they are generally the best
of all improvers. A merchant is accustomed to employ his money chiefly in
profitable projects; whereas a mere country gentleman is accustomed to
employ it chiefly in expense. The one often sees his money go from him,
and return to him again with a profit; the other, when once he parts with it,
very seldom expects to see any more of it. Those different habits naturally
affect their temper and disposition in every sort of business. The merchant
is commonly a bold, a country gentleman a timid undertaker. The one is not
afraid to lay out at once a large capital upon the improvement of his land,
when he has a probable prospect of raising the value of it in proportion to
the expense; the other, if he has any capital, which is not always the case,
seldom ventures to employ it in this manner. If he improves at all, it is
commonly not with a capital, but with what he can save out or his annual
revenue. Whoever has had the fortune to live in a mercantile town, situated
in an unimproved country, must have frequently observed how much more
spirited the operations of merchants were in this way, than those of mere
country gentlemen. The habits, besides, of order, economy, and attention, to
which mercantile business naturally forms a merchant, render him much
fitter to execute, with profit and success, any project of improvement.
Thirdly, and lastly, commerce and manufactures gradually introduced
order and good government, and with them the liberty and security of
individuals, among the inhabitants of the country, who had before lived
almost in a continual state of war with their neighbours, and of servile
dependency upon their superiors. This, though it has been the least
observed, is by far the most important of all their effects. Mr Hume is the
only writer who, so far as I know, has hitherto taken notice of it.
In a country which has neither foreign commerce nor any of the finer
manufactures, a great proprietor, having nothing for which he can exchange
the greater part of the produce of his lands which is over and above the
maintenance of the cultivators, consumes the whole in rustic hospitality at
home. If this surplus produce is sufficient to maintain a hundred or a
thousand men, he can make use of it in no other way than by maintaining a
hundred or a thousand men. He is at all times, therefore, surrounded with a
multitude of retainers and dependants, who, having no equivalent to give in
return for their maintenance, but being fed entirely by his bounty, must
obey him, for the same reason that soldiers must obey the prince who pays
them. Before the extension of commerce and manufactures in Europe, the
hospitality of the rich and the great, from the sovereign down to the
smallest baron, exceeded every thing which, in the present times, we can
easily form a notion of Westminster-hall was the dining-room of William
Rufus, and might frequently, perhaps, not be too large for his company. It
was reckoned a piece of magnificence in Thomas Becket, that he strewed
the floor of his hall with clean hay or rushes in the season, in order that the
knights and squires, who could not get seats, might not spoil their fine
clothes when they sat down on the floor to eat their dinner. The great Earl
of Warwick is said to have entertained every day, at his different manors,
30,000 people; and though the number here may have been exaggerated, it
must, however, have been very great to admit of such exaggeration. A
hospitality nearly of the same kind was exercised not many years ago in
many different parts of the Highlands of Scotland. It seems to be common
in all nations to whom commerce and manufactures are little known. I have
seen, says Doctor Pocock, an Arabian chief dine in the streets of a town
where he had come to sell his cattle, and invite all passengers, even
common beggars, to sit down with him and partake of his banquet.
The occupiers of land were in every respect as dependent upon the great
proprietor as his retainers. Even such of them as were not in a state of
villanage, were tenants at will, who paid a rent in no respect equivalent to
the subsistence which the land afforded them. A crown, half a crown, a
sheep, a lamb, was some years ago, in the Highlands of Scotland, a
common rent for lands which maintained a family. In some places it is so at
this day; nor will money at present purchase a greater quantity of
commodities there than in other places. In a country where the surplus
produce of a large estate must be consumed upon the estate itself, it will
frequently be more convenient for the proprietor, that part of it be consumed
at a distance from his own house, provided they who consume it are as
dependent upon him as either his retainers or his menial servants. He is
thereby saved from the embarrassment of either too large a company, or too
large a family. A tenant at will, who possesses land sufficient to maintain
his family for little more than a quit-rent, is as dependent upon the
proprietor as any servant or retainer whatever, and must obey him with as
little reserve. Such a proprietor, as he feeds his servants and retainers at his
own house, so he feeds his tenants at their houses. The subsistence of both
is derived from his bounty, and its continuance depends upon his good
pleasure.
Upon the authority which the great proprietors necessarily had, in such a
state of things, over their tenants and retainers, was founded the power of
the ancient barons. They necessarily became the judges in peace, and the
leaders in war, of all who dwelt upon their estates. They could maintain
order, and execute the law, within their respective demesnes, because each
of them could there turn the whole force of all the inhabitants against the
injustice of anyone. No other person had sufficient authority to do this. The
king, in particular, had not. In those ancient times, he was little more than
the greatest proprietor in his dominions, to whom, for the sake of common
defence against their common enemies, the other great proprietors paid
certain respects. To have enforced payment of a small debt within the lands
of a great proprietor, where all the inhabitants were armed, and accustomed
to stand by one another, would have cost the king, had he attempted it by
his own authority, almost the same effort as to extinguish a civil war. He
was, therefore, obliged to abandon the administration of justice, through the
greater part of the country, to those who were capable of administering it;
and, for the same reason, to leave the command of the country militia to
those whom that militia would obey.
It is a mistake to imagine that those territorial jurisdictions took their
origin from the feudal law. Not only the highest jurisdictions, both civil and
criminal, but the power of levying troops, of coining money, and even that
of making bye-laws for the government of their own people, were all rights
possessed allodially by the great proprietors of land, several centuries
before even the name of the feudal law was known in Europe. The authority
and jurisdiction of the Saxon lords in England appear to have been as great
before the Conquest as that of any of the Norman lords after it. But the
feudal law is not supposed to have become the common law of England till
after the Conquest. That the most extensive authority and jurisdictions were
possessed by the great lords in France allodially, long before the feudal law
was introduced into that country, is a matter of fact that admits of no doubt.
That authority, and those jurisdictions, all necessarily flowed from the state
of property and manners just now described. Without remounting to the
remote antiquities of either the French or English monarchies, we may find,
in much later times, many proofs that such effects must always flow from
such causes. It is not thirty years ago since Mr Cameron of Lochiel, a
gentleman of Lochaber in Scotland, without any legal warrant whatever, not
being what was then called a lord of regality, nor even a tenant in chief, but
a vassal of the Duke of Argyll, and with out being so much as a justice of
peace, used, notwithstanding, to exercise the highest criminal jurisdictions
over his own people. He is said to have done so with great equity, though
without any of the formalities of justice; and it is not improbable that the
state of that part of the country at that time made it necessary for him to
assume this authority, in order to maintain the public peace. That
gentleman, whose rent never exceeded £500 a-year, carried, in 1745, 800 of
his own people into the rebellion with him.
The introduction of the feudal law, so far from extending, may be
regarded as an attempt to moderate, the authority of the great allodial lords.
It established a regular subordination, accompanied with a long train of
services and duties, from the king down to the smallest proprietor. During
the minority of the proprietor, the rent, together with the management of his
lands, fell into the hands of his immediate superior; and, consequently,
those of all great proprietors into the hands of the king, who was charged
with the maintenance and education of the pupil, and who, from his
authority as guardian, was supposed to have a right of disposing of him in
marriage, provided it was in a manner not unsuitable to his rank. But though
this institution necessarily tended to strengthen the authority of the king,
and to weaken that of the great proprietors, it could not do either
sufficiently for establishing order and good government among the
inhabitants of the country; because it could not alter sufficiently that state of
property and manners from which the disorders arose. The authority of
government still continued to be, as before, too weak in the head, and too
strong in the inferior members; and the excessive strength of the inferior
members was the cause of the weakness of the head. After the institution of
feudal subordination, the king was as incapable of restraining the violence
of the great lords as before. They still continued to make war according to
their own discretion, almost continually upon one another, and very
frequently upon the king; and the open country still continued to be a scene
of violence, rapine, and disorder.
But what all the violence of the feudal institutions could never have
effected, the silent and insensible operation of foreign commerce and
manufactures gradually brought about. These gradually furnished the great
proprietors with something for which they could exchange the whole
surplus produce of their lands, and which they could consume themselves,
without sharing it either with tenants or retainers. All for ourselves, and
nothing for other people, seems, in every age of the world, to have been the
vile maxim of the masters of mankind. As soon, therefore, as they could
find a method of consuming the whole value of their rents themselves, they
had no disposition to share them with any other persons. For a pair of
diamond buckles, perhaps, or for something as frivolous and useless, they
exchanged the maintenance, or, what is the same thing, the price of the
maintenance of 1000 men for a year, and with it the whole weight and
authority which it could give them. The buckles, however, were to be all
their own, and no other human creature was to have any share of them;
whereas, in the more ancient method of expense, they must have shared
with at least 1000 people. With the judges that were to determine the
preference, this difference was perfectly decisive; and thus, for the
gratification of the most childish, the meanest, and the most sordid of all
vanities they gradually bartered their whole power and authority.
In a country where there is no foreign commerce, nor any of the finer
manufactures, a man of £10,000 a-year cannot well employ his revenue in
any other way than in maintaining, perhaps, 1000 families, who are all of
them necessarily at his command. In the present state of Europe, a man of
£10,000 a-year can spend his whole revenue, and he generally does so,
without directly maintaining twenty people, or being able to command more
than ten footmen, not worth the commanding. Indirectly, perhaps, he
maintains as great, or even a greater number of people, than he could have
done by the ancient method of expense. For though the quantity of precious
productions for which he exchanges his whole revenue be very small, the
number of workmen employed in collecting and preparing it must
necessarily have been very great. Its great price generally arises from the
wages of their labour, and the profits of all their immediate employers. By
paying that price, he indirectly pays all those wages and profits, and thus
indirectly contributes to the maintenance of all the workmen and their
employers. He generally contributes, however, but a very small proportion
to that of each; to a very few, perhaps, not a tenth, to many not a hundredth,
and to some not a thousandth, or even a ten thousandth part of their whole
annual maintenance. Though he contributes, therefore, to the maintenance
of them all, they are all more or less independent of him, because generally
they can all be maintained without him.
When the great proprietors of land spend their rents in maintaining their
tenants and retainers, each of them maintains entirely all his own tenants
and all his own retainers. But when they spend them in maintaining
tradesmen and artificers, they may, all of them taken together, perhaps
maintain as great, or, on account of the waste which attends rustic
hospitality, a greater number of people than before. Each of them, however,
taken singly, contributes often but a very small share to the maintenance of
any individual of this greater number. Each tradesman or artificer derives
his subsistence from the employment, not of one, but of a hundred or a
thousand different customers. Though in some measure obliged to them all,
therefore, he is not absolutely dependent upon any one of them.
The personal expense of the great proprietors having in this manner
gradually increased, it was impossible that the number of their retainers
should not as gradually diminish, till they were at last dismissed altogether.
The same cause gradually led them to dismiss the unnecessary part of their
tenants. Farms were enlarged, and the occupiers of land, notwithstanding
the complaints of depopulation, reduced to the number necessary for
cultivating it, according to the imperfect state of cultivation and
improvement in those times. By the removal of the unnecessary mouths,
and by exacting from the farmer the full value of the farm, a greater surplus,
or, what is the same thing, the price of a greater surplus, was obtained for
the proprietor, which the merchants and manufacturers soon furnished him
with a method of spending upon his own person, in the same manner as he
had done the rest. The cause continuing to operate, he was desirous to raise
his rents above what his lands, in the actual state of their improvement,
could afford. His tenants could agree to this upon one condition only, that
they should be secured in their possession for such a term of years as might
give them time to recover, with profit, whatever they should lay not in the
further improvement of the land. The expensive vanity of the landlord made
him willing to accept of this condition; and hence the origin of long leases.
Even a tenant at will, who pays the full value of the land, is not altogether
dependent upon the landlord. The pecuniary advantages which they receive
from one another are mutual and equal, and such a tenant will expose
neither his life nor his fortune in the service of the proprietor. But if he has a
lease for along term of years, he is altogether independent; and his landlord
must not expect from him even the most trifling service, beyond what is
either expressly stipulated in the lease, or imposed upon him by the
common and known law of the country.
The tenants having in this manner become independent, and the retainers
being dismissed, the great proprietors were no longer capable of
interrupting the regular execution of justice, or of disturbing the peace of
the country. Having sold their birth-right, not like Esau, for a mess of
pottage in time of hunger and necessity, but, in the wantonness of plenty, for
trinkets and baubles, fitter to be the playthings of children than the serious
pursuits of men, they became as insignificant as any substantial burgher or
tradesmen in a city. A regular government was established in the country as
well as in the city, nobody having sufficient power to disturb its operations
in the one, any more than in the other.
It does not, perhaps, relate to the present subject, but I cannot help
remarking it, that very old families, such as have possessed some
considerable estate from father to son for many successive generations, are
very rare in commercial countries. In countries which have little commerce,
on the contrary, such as Wales, or the Highlands of Scotland, they are very
common. The Arabian histories seem to be all full of genealogies; and there
is a history written by a Tartar Khan, which has been translated into several
European languages, and which contains scarce any thing else; a proof that
ancient families are very common among those nations. In countries where
a rich man can spend his revenue in no other way than by maintaining as
many people as it can maintain, he is apt to run out, and his benevolence, it
seems, is seldom so violent as to attempt to maintain more than he can
afford. But where he can spend the greatest revenue upon his own person,
he frequently has no bounds to his expense, because he frequently has no
bounds to his vanity, or to his affection for his own person. In commercial
countries, therefore, riches, in spite of the most violent regulations of law to
prevent their dissipation, very seldom remain long in the same family.
Among simple nations, on the contrary, they frequently do, without any
regulations of law; for among nations of shepherds, such as the Tartars and
Arabs, the consumable nature of their property necessarily renders all such
regulations impossible.
A revolution of the greatest importance to the public happiness, was in
this manner brought about by two different orders of people, who had not
the least intention to serve the public. To gratify the most childish vanity
was the sole motive of the great proprietors. The merchants and artificers,
much less ridiculous, acted merely from a view to their own interest, and in
pursuit of their own pedlar principle of turning a penny wherever a penny
was to be got. Neither of them had either knowledge or foresight of that
great revolution which the folly of the one, and the industry of the other,
was gradually bringing about.
It was thus, that, through the greater part of Europe, the commerce and
manufactures of cities, instead of being the effect, have been the cause and
occasion of the improvement and cultivation of the country.
This order, however, being contrary to the natural course of things, is
necessarily both slow and uncertain. Compare the slow progress of those
European countries of which the wealth depends very much upon their
commerce and manufactures, with the rapid advances of our North
American colonies, of which the wealth is founded altogether in agriculture.
Through the greater part of Europe, the number of inhabitants is not
supposed to double in less than five hundred years. In several of our North
American colonies, it is found to double in twenty or five-and-twenty years.
In Europe, the law of primogeniture, and perpetuities of different kinds,
prevent the division of great estates, and thereby hinder the multiplication
of small proprietors. A small proprietor, however, who knows every part of
his little territory, views it with all the affection which property, especially
small property, naturally inspires, and who upon that account takes
pleasure, not only in cultivating, but in adorning it, is generally of all
improvers the most industrious, the most intelligent, and the most
successful. The same regulations, besides, keep so much land out of the
market, that there are always more capitals to buy than there is land to sell,
so that what is sold always sells at a monopoly price. The rent never pays
the interest of the purchase-money, and is, besides, burdened with repairs
and other occasional charges, to which the interest of money is not liable.
To purchase land, is, everywhere in Europe, a most unprofitable
employment of a small capital. For the sake of the superior security, indeed,
a man of moderate circumstances, when he retires from business, will
sometimes choose to lay out his little capital in land. A man of profession,
too whose revenue is derived from another source often loves to secure his
savings in the same way. But a young man, who, instead of applying to
trade or to some profession, should employ a capital of two or three
thousand pounds in the purchase and cultivation of a small piece of land,
might indeed expect to live very happily and very independently, but must
bid adieu for ever to all hope of either great fortune or great illustration,
which, by a different employment of his stock, he might have had the same
chance of acquiring with other people. Such a person, too, though he cannot
aspire at being a proprietor, will often disdain to be a farmer. The small
quantity of land, therefore, which is brought to market, and the high price of
what is brought thither, prevents a great number of capitals from being
employed in its cultivation and improvement, which would otherwise have
taken that direction. In North America, on the contrary, fifty or sixty pounds
is often found a sufficient stock to begin a plantation with. The purchase
and improvement of uncultivated land is there the most profitable
employment of the smallest as well as of the greatest capitals, and the most
direct road to all the fortune and illustration which can be required in that
country. Such land, indeed, is in North America to be had almost for
nothing, or at a price much below the value of the natural produce; a thing
impossible in Europe, or indeed in any country where all lands have long
been private property. If landed estates, however, were divided equally
among all the children, upon the death of any proprietor who left a
numerous family, the estate would generally be sold. So much land would
come to market, that it could no longer sell at a monopoly price. The free
rent of the land would go no nearer to pay the interest of the purchase-
money, and a small capital might be employed in purchasing land as
profitable as in any other way.
England, on account of the natural fertility of the soil, of the great extent
of the sea-coast in proportion to that of the whole country, and of the many
navigable rivers which run through it, and afford the conveniency of water
carriage to some of the most inland parts of it, is perhaps as well fitted by
nature as any large country in Europe to be the seat of foreign commerce, of
manufactures for distant sale, and of all the improvements which these can
occasion. From the beginning of the reign of Elizabeth, too, the English
legislature has been peculiarly attentive to the interest of commerce and
manufactures, and in reality there is no country in Europe, Holland itself
not excepted, of which the law is, upon the whole, more favourable to this
sort of industry. Commerce and manufactures have accordingly been
continually advancing during all this period. The cultivation and
improvement of the country has, no doubt, been gradually advancing too;
but it seems to have followed slowly, and at a distance, the more rapid
progress of commerce and manufactures. The greater part of the country
must probably have been cultivated before the reign of Elizabeth; and a
very great part of it still remains uncultivated, and the cultivation of the far
greater part much inferior to what it might be, The law of England,
however, favours agriculture, not only indirectly, by the protection of
commerce, but by several direct encouragements. Except in times of
scarcity, the exportation of corn is not only free, but encouraged by a
bounty. In times of moderate plenty, the importation of foreign corn is
loaded with duties that amount to a prohibition. The importation of live
cattle, except from Ireland, is prohibited at all times; and it is but of late that
it was permitted from thence. Those who cultivate the land, therefore, have
a monopoly against their countrymen for the two greatest and most
important articles of land produce, bread and butcher’s meat. These
encouragements, although at bottom, perhaps, as I shall endeavour to show
hereafter, altogether illusory, sufficiently demonstrate at least the good
intention of the legislature to favour agriculture. But what is of much more
importance than all of them, the yeomanry of England are rendered as
secure, as independent, and as respectable, as law can make them. No
country, therefore, which the right of primogeniture takes place, which pays
tithes, and where perpetuities, though contrary to the spirit of the law, are
admitted in some cases, can give more encouragement to agriculture than
England. Such, however, notwithstanding, is the state of its cultivation.
What would it have been, had the law given no direct encouragement to
agriculture besides what arises indirectly from the progress of commerce,
and had left the yeomanry in the same condition as in most other countries
of Europe? It is now more than two hundred years since the beginning of
the reign of Elizabeth, a period as long as the course of human prosperity
usually endures.
France seems to have had a considerable share of foreign commerce, near
a century before England was distinguished as a commercial country. The
marine of France was considerable, according to the notions of the times,
before the expedition of Charles VIII. to Naples. The cultivation and
improvement of France, however, is, upon the whole, inferior to that of
England. The law of the country has never given the same direct
encouragement to agriculture.
The foreign commerce of Spain and Portual to the other parts of Europe,
though chiefly carried on in foreign ships, is very considerable. That to their
colonies is carried on in their own, and is much greater, on account of the
great riches and extent of those colonies. But it has never introduced any
considerable manufactures for distant sale into either of those countries, and
the greater part of both still remains uncultivated. The foreign commerce of
Portugal is of older standing than that of any great country in Europe,
except Italy.
Italy is the only great country of Europe which seems to have been
cultivated and improved in every part, by means of foreign commerce and
manufactures for distant sale. Before the invasion of Charles VIII., Italy,
according to Guicciardini, was cultivated not less in the most mountainous
and barren parts of the country, than in the plainest and most fertile. The
advantageous situation of the country, and the great number of independent
status which at that time subsisted in it, probably contributed not a little to
this general cultivation. It is not impossible, too, notwithstanding this
general expression of one of the most judicious and reserved of modern
historians, that Italy was not at that time better cultivated than England is at
present.
The capital, however, that is acquired to any country by commerce and
manufactures, is always a very precarious and uncertain possession, till
some part of it has been secured and realized in the cultivation and
improvement of its lands. A merchant, it has been said very properly, is not
necessarily the citizen of any particular country. It is in a great measure
indifferent to him from what place he carries on his trade; and a very trifling
disgust will make him remove his capital, and, together with it, all the
industry which it supports, from one country to another. No part of it can be
said to belong to any particular country, till it has been spread, as it were,
over the face of that country, either in buildings, or in the lasting
improvement of lands. No vestige now remains of the great wealth said to
have been possessed by the greater part of the Hanse Towns, except in the
obscure histories of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. It is even
uncertain where some of them were situated, or to what towns in Europe the
Latin names given to some of them belong. But though the misfortunes of
Italy, in the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth centuries,
greatly diminished the commerce and manufactures of the cities of
Lombardy and Tuscany, those countries still continue to be among the most
populous and best cultivated in Europe. The civil wars of Flanders, and the
Spanish government which succeeded them, chased away the great
commerce of Antwerp, Ghent, and Bruges. But Flanders still continues to
be one of the richest, best cultivated, and most populous provinces of
Europe. The ordinary revolutions of war and government easily dry up the
sources of that wealth which arises from commerce only. That which arises
from the more solid improvements of agriculture is much more durable, and
cannot be destroyed but by those more violent convulsions occasioned by
the depredations of hostile and barbarous nations continued for a century or
two together; such as those that happened for some time before and after the
fall of the Roman empire in the western provinces of Europe.
BOOK IV.
OF SYSTEMS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY.
Political economy, considered as a branch of the science of a statesman
or legislator, proposes two distinct objects; first, to provide a plentiful
revenue or subsistence for the people, or, more properly, to enable them to
provide such a revenue or subsistence for themselves; and, secondly, to
supply the state or commonwealth with a revenue sufficient for the public
services. It proposes to enrich both the people and the sovereign.
The different progress of opulence in different ages and nations, has
given occasion to two different systems of political economy, with regard to
enriching the people. The one may be called the system of commerce, the
other that of agriculture. I shall endeavour to explain both as fully and
distinctly as I can, and shall begin with the system of commerce. It is the
modern system, and is best understood in our own country and in our own
times.
CHAPTER I.
OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE COMMERCIAL OR
MERCANTILE SYSTEM.
That wealth consists in money, or in gold and silver, is a popular notion
which naturally arises from the double function of money, as the instrument
of commerce, and as the measure of value. In consequence of its being the
instrument of commerce, when we have money we can more readily obtain
whatever else we have occasion for, than by means of any other commodity.
The great affair, we always find, is to get money. When that is obtained,
there is no difficulty in making any subsequent purchase. In consequence of
its being the measure of value, we estimate that of all other commodities by
the quantity of money which they will exchange for. We say of a rich man,
that he is worth a great deal, and of a poor man, that he is worth very little
money. A frugal man, or a man eager to be rich, is said to love money; and
a careless, a generous, or a profuse man, is said to be indifferent about it. To
grow rich is to get money; and wealth and money, in short, are, in common
language, considered as in every respect synonymous.
A rich country, in the same manner as a rich man, is supposed to be a
country abounding in money; and to heap up gold and silver in any country
is supposed to be the readiest way to enrich it. For some time after the
discovery of America, the first inquiry of the Spaniards, when they arrived
upon any unknown coast, used to be, if there was any gold or silver to be
found in the neighbourhood? By the information which they received, they
judged whether it was worth while to make a settlement there, or if the
country was worth the conquering. Plano Carpino, a monk sent ambassador
from the king of France to one of the sons of the famous Gengis Khan, says,
that the Tartars used frequently to ask him, if there was plenty of sheep and
oxen in the kingdom of France? Their inquiry had the same object with that
of the Spaniards. They wanted to know if the country was rich enough to be
worth the conquering. Among the Tartars, as among all other nations of
shepherds, who are generally ignorant of the use of money, cattle are the
instruments of commerce and the measures of value. Wealth, therefore,
according to them, consisted in cattle, as, according to the Spaniards, it
consisted in gold and silver. Of the two, the Tartar notion, perhaps, was the
nearest to the truth.
Mr Locke remarks a distinction between money and other moveable
goods. All other moveable goods, he says, are of so consumable a nature,
that the wealth which consists in them cannot be much depended on; and a
nation which abounds in them one year may, without any exportation, but
merely by their own waste and extravagance, be in great want of them the
next. Money, on the contrary, is a steady friend, which, though it may travel
about from hand to hand, yet if it can be kept from going out of the country,
is not very liable to be wasted and consumed. Gold and silver, therefore,
are, according to him, the must solid and substantial part of the moveable
wealth of a nation; and to multiply those metals ought, he thinks, upon that
account, to be the great object of its political economy.
Others admit, that if a nation could be separated from all the world, it
would be of no consequence how much or how little money circulated in it.
The consumable goods, which were circulated by means of this money,
would only be exchanged for a greater or a smaller number of pieces; but
the real wealth or poverty of the country, they allow, would depend
altogether upon the abundance or scarcity of those consumable goods. But
it is otherwise, they think, with countries which have connections with
foreign nations, and which are obliged to carry on foreign wars, and to
maintain fleets and armies in distant countries. This, they say, cannot be
done, but by sending abroad money to pay them with; and a nation cannot
send much money abroad, unless it has a good deal at home. Every such
nation, therefore, must endeavour, in time of peace, to accumulate gold and
silver, that when occasion requires, it may have wherewithal to carry on
foreign wars.
In consequence of those popular notions, all the different nations of
Europe have studied, though to little purpose, every possible means of
accumulating gold and silver in their respective countries. Spain and
Portugal, the proprietors of the principal mines which supply Europe with
those metals, have either prohibited their exportation under the severest
penalties, or subjected it to a considerable duty. The like prohibition seems
anciently to have made a part of the policy of most other European nations.
It is even to be found, where we should least of all expect to find it, in some
old Scotch acts of Parliament, which forbid, under heavy penalties, the
carrying gold or silver forth of the kingdom. The like policy anciently took
place both in France and England.
When those countries became commercial, the merchants found this
prohibition, upon many occasions, extremely inconvenient. They could
frequently buy more advantageously with gold and silver, than with any
other commodity, the foreign goods which they wanted, either to import
into their own, or to carry to some other foreign country. They
remonstrated, therefore, against this prohibition as hurtful to trade.
They represented, first, that the exportation of gold and silver, in order to
purchase foreign goods, did not always diminish the quantity of those
metals in the kingdom; that, on the contrary, it might frequently increase the
quantity; because, if the consumption of foreign goods was not thereby
increased in the country, those goods might be re-exported to foreign
countries, and being there sold for a large profit, might bring back much
more treasure than was originally sent out to purchase them. Mr Mun
compares this operation of foreign trade to the seed-time and harvest of
agriculture. “If we only behold,” says he, “the actions of the husbandman in
the seed time, when he casteth away much good corn into the ground, we
shall account him rather a madman than a husbandman. But when we
consider his labours in the harvest, which is the end of his endeavours, we
shall find the worth and plentiful increase of his actions.”
They represented, secondly, that this prohibition could not hinder the
exportation of gold and silver, which, on account of the smallness of their
bulk in proportion to their value, could easily be smuggled abroad. That this
exportation could only be prevented by a proper attention to what they
called the balance of trade. That when the country exported to a greater
value than it imported, a balance became due to it from foreign nations,
which was necessarily paid to it in gold and silver, and thereby increased
the quantity of those metals in the kingdom. But that when it imported to a
greater value than it exported, a contrary balance became due to foreign
nations, which was necessarily paid to them in the same manner, and
thereby diminished that quantity: that in this case, to prohibit the
exportation of those metals, could not prevent it, but only, by making it
more dangerous, render it more expensive: that the exchange was thereby
turned more against the country which owed the balance, than it otherwise
might have been; the merchant who purchased a bill upon the foreign
country being obliged to pay the banker who sold it, not only for the natural
risk, trouble, and expense of sending the money thither, but for the
extraordinary risk arising from the prohibition; but that the more the
exchange was against any country, the more the balance of trade became
necessarily against it; the money of that country becoming necessarily of so
much less value, in comparison with that of the country to which the
balance was due. That if the exchange between England and Holland, for
example, was five per cent. against England, it would require 105 ounces of
silver in England to purchase a bill for 100 ounces of silver in Holland: that
105 ounces of silver in England, therefore, would be worth only 100 ounces
of silver in Holland, and would purchase only a proportionable quantity of
Dutch goods; but that 100 ounces of silver in Holland, on the contrary,
would be worth 105 ounces in England, and would purchase a
proportionable quantity of English goods; that the English goods which
were sold to Holland would be sold so much cheaper, and the Dutch goods
which were sold to England so much dearer, by the difference of the
exchange: that the one would draw so much less Dutch money to England,
and the other so much more English money to Holland, as this difference
amounted to: and that the balance of trade, therefore, would necessarily be
so much more against England, and would require a greater balance of gold
and silver to be exported to Holland.
Those arguments were partly solid and partly sophistical. They were
solid, so far as they asserted that the exportation of gold and silver in trade
might frequently be advantageous to the country. They were solid, too, in
asserting that no prohibition could prevent their exportation, when private
people found any advantage in exporting them. But they were sophistical, in
supposing, that either to preserve or to augment the quantity of those metals
required more the attention of government, than to preserve or to augment
the quantity of any other useful commodities, which the freedom of trade,
without any such attention, never fails to supply in the proper quantity.
They were sophistical, too, perhaps, in asserting that the high price of
exchange necessarily increased what they called the unfavourable balance
of trade, or occasioned the exportation of a greater quantity of gold and
silver. That high price, indeed, was extremely disadvantageous to the
merchants who had any money to pay in foreign countries. They paid so
much dearer for the bills which their bankers granted them upon those
countries. But though the risk arising from the prohibition might occasion
some extraordinary expense to the bankers, it would not necessarily carry
any more money out of the country. This expense would generally be all
laid out in the country, in smuggling the money out of it, and could seldom
occasion the exportation of a single sixpence beyond the precise sum drawn
for. The high price of exchange, too, would naturally dispose the merchants
to endeavour to make their exports nearly balance their imports, in order
that they might have this high exchange to pay upon as small a sum as
possible. The high price of exchange, besides, must necessarily have
operated as a tax, in raising the price of foreign goods, and thereby
diminishing their consumption. It would tend, therefore, not to increase, but
to diminish, what they called the unfavourable balance of trade, and
consequently the exportation of gold and silver.
Such as they were, however, those arguments convinced the people to
whom they were addressed. They were addressed by merchants to
parliaments and to the councils of princes, to nobles, and to country
gentlemen; by those who were supposed to understand trade, to those who
were conscious to them selves that they knew nothing about the matter.
That foreign trade enriched the country, experience demonstrated to the
nobles and country gentlemen, as well as to the merchants; but how, or in
what manner, none of them well knew. The merchants knew perfectly in
what manner it enriched themselves, it was their business to know it. But to
know in what manner it enriched the country, was no part of their business.
The subject never came into their consideration, but when they had
occasion to apply to their country for some change in the laws relating to
foreign trade. It then became necessary to say something about the
beneficial effects of foreign trade, and the manner in which those effects
were obstructed by the laws as they then stood. To the judges who were to
decide the business, it appeared a most satisfactory account of the matter,
when they were told that foreign trade brought money into the country, but
that the laws in question hindered it from bringing so much as it otherwise
would do. Those arguments, therefore, produced the wished-for effect. The
prohibition of exporting gold and silver was, in France and England,
confined to the coin of those respective countries. The exportation of
foreign coin and of bullion was made free. In Holland, and in some other
places, this liberty was extended even to the coin of the country. The
attention of government was turned away from guarding against the
exportation of gold and silver, to watch over the balance of trade, as the
only cause which could occasion any augmentation or diminution of those
metals. From one fruitless care, it was turned away to another care much
more intricate, much more embarrassing, and just equally fruitless. The title
of Mun’s book, England’s Treasure in Foreign Trade, became a fundamental
maxim in the political economy, not of England only, but of all other
commercial countries. The inland or home trade, the most important of all,
the trade in which an equal capital affords the greatest revenue, and creates
the greatest employment to the people of the country, was considered as
subsidiary only to foreign trade. It neither brought money into the country,
it was said, nor carried any out of it. The country, therefore, could never
become either richer or poorer by means of it, except so far as its prosperity
or decay might indirectly influence the state of foreign trade.
A country that has no mines of its own, must undoubtedly draw its gold
and silver from foreign countries, in the same manner as one that has no
vineyards of its own must draw its wines. It does not seem necessary,
however, that the attention of government should be more turned towards
the one than towards the other object. A country that has wherewithal to
buy wine, will always get the wine which it has occasion for; and a country
that has wherewithal to buy gold and silver, will never be in want of those
metals. They are to be bought for a certain price, like all other commodities;
and as they are the price of all other commodities, so all other commodities
are the price of those metals. We trust, with perfect security, that the
freedom of trade, without any attention of government, will always supply
us with the wine which we have occasion for; and we may trust, with equal
security, that it will always supply us with all the gold and silver which we
can afford to purchase or to employ, either in circulating our commodities
or in other uses.
The quantity of every commodity which human industry can either
purchase or produce, naturally regulates itself in every country according to
the effectual demand, or according to the demand of those who are willing
to pay the whole rent, labour, and profits, which must be paid in order to
prepare and bring it to market. But no commodities regulate themselves
more easily or more exactly, according to this effectual demand, than gold
and silver; because, on account of the small bulk and great value of those
metals, no commodities can be more easily transported from one place to
another; from the places where they are cheap, to those where they are dear;
from the places where they exceed, to those where they fall short of this
effectual demand. If there were in England, for example, an effectual
demand for an additional quantity of gold, a packet-boat could bring from
Lisbon, or from wherever else it was to be had, fifty tons of gold, which
could be coined into more than five millions of guineas. But if there were
an effectual demand for grain to the same value, to import it would require,
at five guineas a-ton, a million of tons of shipping, or a thousand ships of a
thousand tons each. The navy of England would not be sufficient.
When the quantity of gold and silver imported into any country exceeds
the effectual demand, no vigilance of government can prevent their
exportation. All the sanguinary laws of Spain and Portugal are not able to
keep their gold and silver at home. The continual importations from Peru
and Brazil exceed the effectual demand of those countries, and sink the
price of those metals there below that in the neighbouring countries. If, on
the contrary, in any particular country, their quantity fell short of the
effectual demand, so as to raise their price above that of the neighbouring
countries, the government would have no occasion to take any pains to
import them. If it were even to take pains to prevent their importation, it
would not be able to effectuate it. Those metals, when the Spartans had got
wherewithal to purchase them, broke through all the barriers which the laws
of Lycurgus opposed to their entrance into Lacedaemon. All the sanguinary
laws of the customs are not able to prevent the importation of the teas of the
Dutch and Gottenburg East India companies; because somewhat cheaper
than those of the British company. A pound of tea, however, is about a
hundred times the bulk of one of the highest prices, sixteen shillings, that is
commonly paid for it in silver, and more than two thousand times the bulk
of the same price in gold, and, consequently, just so many times more
difficult to smuggle.
It is partly owing to the easy transportation of gold and silver, from the
places where they abound to those where they are wanted, that the price of
those metals does not fluctuate continually, like that of the greater part of
other commodities, which are hindered by their bulk from shifting their
situation, when the market happens to be either over or under-stocked with
them. The price of those metals, indeed, is not altogether exempted from
variation; but the changes to which it is liable are generally slow, gradual,
and uniform. In Europe, for example, it is supposed, without much
foundation, perhaps, that during the course of the present and preceding
century, they have been constantly, but gradually, sinking in their value, on
account of the continual importations from the Spanish West Indies. But to
make any sudden change in the price of gold and silver, so as to raise or
lower at once, sensibly and remarkably, the money price of all other
commodities, requires such a revolution in commerce as that occasioned by
the discovery of America.
If, not withstanding all this, gold and silver should at any time fall short
in a country which has wherewithal to purchase them, there are more
expedients for supplying their place, than that of almost any other
commodity. If the materials of manufacture are wanted, industry must stop.
If provisions are wanted, the people must starve. But if money is wanted,
barter will supply its place, though with a good deal of inconveniency.
Buying and selling upon credit, and the different dealers compensating their
credits with one another, once a-month, or once a-year, will supply it with
less inconveniency. A well-regulated paper-money will supply it not only
without any inconveniency, but, in some cases, with some advantages.
Upon every account, therefore, the attention of government never was so
unnecessarily employed, as when directed to watch over the preservation or
increase of the quantity of money in any country.
No complaint, however, is more common than that of a scarcity of
money. Money, like wine, must always be scarce with those who have
neither wherewithal to buy it, nor credit to borrow it. Those who have
either, will seldom be in want either of the money, or of the wine which
they have occasion for. This complaint, however, of the scarcity of money,
is not always confined to improvident spendthrifts. It is sometimes general
through a whole mercantile town and the country in its neighbourhood.
Over-trading is the common cause of it. Sober men, whose projects have
been disproportioned to their capitals, are as likely to have neither
wherewithal to buy money, nor credit to borrow it, as prodigals, whose
expense has been disproportioned to their revenue. Before their projects can
be brought to bear, their stock is gone, and their credit with it. They run
about everywhere to borrow money, and everybody tells them that they
have none to lend. Even such general complaints of the scarcity of money
do not always prove that the usual number of gold and silver pieces are not
circulating in the country, but that many people want those pieces who have
nothing to give for them. When the profits of trade happen to be greater
than ordinary over-trading becomes a general error, both among great and
small dealers. They do not always send more money abroad than usual, but
they buy upon credit, both at home and abroad, an unusual quantity of
goods, which they send to some distant market, in hopes that the returns
will come in before the demand for payment. The demand comes before the
returns, and they have nothing at hand with which they can either purchase
money or give solid security for borrowing. It is not any scarcity of gold
and silver, but the difficulty which such people find in borrowing, and
which their creditor find in getting payment, that occasions the general
complaint of the scarcity of money.
It would be too ridiculous to go about seriously to prove, that wealth does
not consist in money, or in gold and silver; but in what money purchases,
and is valuable only for purchasing. Money, no doubt, makes always a part
of the national capital; but it has already been shown that it generally makes
but a small part, and always the most unprofitable part of it.
It is not because wealth consists more essentially in money than in goods,
that the merchant finds it generally more easy to buy goods with money,
than to buy money with goods; but because money is the known and
established instrument of commerce, for which every thing is readily given
in exchange, but which is not always with equal readiness to be got in
exchange for every thing. The greater part of goods, besides, are more
perishable than money, and he may frequently sustain a much greater loss
by keeping them. When his goods are upon hand, too, he is more liable to
such demands for money as he may not be able to answer, than when he has
got their price in his coffers. Over and above all this, his profit arises more
directly from selling than from buying; and he is, upon all these accounts,
generally much more anxious to exchange his goods for money than his
money for goods. But though a particular merchant, with abundance of
goods in his warehouse, may sometimes be ruined by not being able to sell
them in time, a nation or country is not liable to the same accident, The
whole capital of a merchant frequently consists in perishable goods destined
for purchasing money. But it is but a very small part of the annual produce
of the land and labour of a country, which can ever be destined for
purchasing gold and silver from their neighbours. The far greater part is
circulated and consumed among themselves; and even of the surplus which
is sent abroad, the greater part is generally destined for the purchase of
other foreign goods. Though gold and silver, therefore, could not be had in
exchange for the goods destined to purchase them, the nation would not be
ruined. It might, indeed, suffer some loss and inconveniency, and be forced
upon some of those expedients which are necessary for supplying the place
of money. The annual produce of its land and labour, however, would be the
same, or very nearly the same as usual; because the same, or very nearly the
same consumable capital would be employed in maintaining it. And though
goods do not always draw money so readily as money draws goods, in the
long-run they draw it more necessarily than even it draws them. Goods can
serve many other purposes besides purchasing money, but money can serve
no other purpose besides purchasing goods. Money, therefore, necessarily
runs after goods, but goods do not always or necessarily run after money.
The man who buys, does not always mean to sell again, but frequently to
use or to consume; whereas he who sells always means to buy again. The
one may frequently have done the whole, but the other can never have done
more than the one half of his business. It is not for its own sake that men
desire money, but for the sake of what they can purchase with it.
Consumable commodities, it is said, are soon destroyed; whereas gold
and silver are of a more durable nature, and were it not for this continual
exportation, might be accumulated for ages together, to the incredible
augmentation of the real wealth of the country. Nothing, therefore, it is
pretended, can be more disadvantageous to any country, than the trade
which consists in the exchange of such lasting for such perishable
commodities. We do not, however, reckon that trade disadvantageous,
which consists in the exchange of the hardware of England for the wines of
France, and yet hardware is a very durable commodity, and were it not for
this continual exportation, might too be accumulated for ages together, to
the incredible augmentation of the pots and pans of the country. But it
readily occurs, that the number of such utensils is in every country
necessarily limited by the use which there is for them; that it would be
absurd to have more pots and pans than were necessary for cooking the
victuals usually consumed there; and that, if the quantity of victuals were to
increase, the number of pots and pans would readily increase along with it;
a part of the increased quantity of victuals being employed in purchasing
them, or in maintaining an additional number of workmen whose business it
was to make them. It should as readily occur, that the quantity of gold and
silver is, in every country, limited by the use which there is for those
metals; that their use consists in circulating commodities, as coin, and in
affording a species of household furniture, as plate; that the quantity of coin
in every country is regulated by the value of the commodities which are to
be circulated by it; increase that value, and immediately a part of it will be
sent abroad to purchase, wherever it is to be had, the additional quantity of
coin requisite for circulating them: that the quantity of plate is regulated by
the number and wealth of those private families who choose to indulge
themselves in that sort of magnificence; increase the number and wealth of
such families, and a part of this increased wealth will most probably be
employed in purchasing, wherever it is to be found, an additional quantity
of plate; that to attempt to increase the wealth of any country, either by
introducing or by detaining in it an unnecessary quantity of gold and silver,
is as absurd as it would be to attempt to increase the good cheer of private
families, by obliging them to keep an unnecessary number of kitchen
utensils. As the expense of purchasing those unnecessary utensils would
diminish, instead of increasing, either the quantity or goodness of the family
provisions; so the expense of purchasing an unnecessary quantity of gold
and silver must, in every country, as necessarily diminish the wealth which
feeds, clothes, and lodges, which maintains and employs the people. Gold
and silver, whether in the shape of coin or of plate, are utensils, it must be
remembered, as much as the furniture of the kitchen. Increase the use of
them, increase the consumable commodities which are to be circulated,
managed, and prepared by means of them, and you will infallibly increase
the quantity; but if you attempt by extraordinary means to increase the
quantity, you will as infallibly diminish the use, and even the quantity too,
which in those metals can never be greater than what the use requires. Were
they ever to be accumulated beyond this quantity, their transportation is so
easy, and the loss which attends their lying idle and unemployed so great,
that no law could prevent their being immediately sent out of the country.
It is not always necessary to accumulate gold and silver, in order to
enable a country to carry on foreign wars, and to maintain fleets and armies
in distant countries. Fleets and armies are maintained, not with gold and
silver, but with consumable goods. The nation which, from the annual
produce of its domestic industry, from the annual revenue arising out of its
lands, and labour, and consumable stock, has wherewithal to purchase those
consumable goods in distant countries, can maintain foreign wars there.
A nation may purchase the pay and provisions of an army in a distant
country three different ways; by sending abroad either, first, some part of its
accumulated gold and silver; or, secondly, some part of the annual produce
of its manufactures; or, last of all, some part of its annual rude produce.
The gold and silver which can properly be considered as accumulated, or
stored up in any country, may be distinguished into three parts; first, the
circulating money; secondly, the plate of private families; and, last of all,
the money which may have been collected by many years parsimony, and
laid up in the treasury of the prince.
It can seldom happen that much can be spared from the circulating
money of the country; because in that there can seldom be much
redundancy. The value of goods annually bought and sold in any country
requires a certain quantity of money to circulate and distribute them to their
proper consumers, and can give employment to no more. The channel of
circulation necessarily draws to itself a sum sufficient to fill it, and never
admits any more. Something, however, is generally withdrawn from this
channel in the case of foreign war. By the great number of people who are
maintained abroad, fewer are maintained at home. Fewer goods are
circulated there, and less money becomes necessary to circulate them. An
extraordinary quantity of paper money of some sort or other, too, such as
exchequer notes, navy bills, and bank bills, in England, is generally issued
upon such occasions, and, by supplying the place of circulating gold and
silver, gives an opportunity of sending a greater quantity of it abroad. All
this, however, could afford but a poor resource for maintaining a foreign
war, of great expense, and several years duration.
The melting down of the plate of private families has, upon every
occasion, been found a still more insignificant one. The French, in the
beginning of the last war, did not derive so much advantage from this
expedient as to compensate the loss of the fashion.
The accumulated treasures of the prince have in former times afforded a
much greater and more lasting resource. In the present times, if you except
the king of Prussia, to accumulate treasure seems to be no part of the policy
of European princes.
The funds which maintained the foreign wars of the present century, the
most expensive perhaps which history records, seem to have had little
dependency upon the exportation either of the circulating money, or of the
plate of private families, or of the treasure of the prince. The last French
war cost Great Britain upwards of £90,000,000, including not only the
£75,000,000 of new debt that was contracted, but the additional 2s. in the
pound land-tax, and what was annually borrowed of the sinking fund. More
than two-thirds of this expense were laid out in distant countries; in
Germany, Portugal, America, in the ports of the Mediterranean, in the East
and West Indies. The kings of England had no accumulated treasure. We
never heard of any extraordinary quantity of plate being melted down. The
circulating gold and silver of the country had not been supposed to exceed
£18,000,000. Since the late recoinage of the gold, however, it is believed to
have been a good deal under-rated. Let us suppose, therefore, according to
the most exaggerated computation which I remember to have either seen or
heard of, that, gold and silver together, it amounted to £30,000,000. Had the
war been carried on by means of our money, the whole of it must, even
according to this computation, have been sent out and returned again, at
least twice in a period of between six and seven years. Should this be
supposed, it would afford the most decisive argument, to demonstrate how
unnecessary it is for government to watch over the preservation of money,
since, upon this supposition, the whole money of the country must have
gone from it, and returned to it again, two different times in so short a
period, without any body’s knowing any thing of the matter. The channel of
circulation, however, never appeared more empty than usual during any part
of this period. Few people wanted money who had wherewithal to pay for
it. The profits of foreign trade, indeed, were greater than usual during the
whole war, but especially towards the end of it. This occasioned, what it
always occasions, a general over-trading in all the ports of Great Britain;
and this again occasioned the usual complaint of the scarcity of money,
which always follows over-trading. Many people wanted it, who had neither
wherewithal to buy it, nor credit to borrow it; and because the debtors found
it difficult to borrow, the creditors found it difficult to get payment. Gold
and silver, however, were generally to be had for their value, by those who
had that value to give for them.
The enormous expense of the late war, therefore, must have been chiefly
defrayed, not by the exportation of gold and silver, but by that of British
commodities of some kind or other. When the government, or those who
acted under them, contracted with a merchant for a remittance to some
foreign country, he would naturally endeavour to pay his foreign
correspondent, upon whom he granted a bill, by sending abroad rather
commodities than gold and silver. If the commodities of Great Britain were
not in demand in that country, he would endeavour to send them to some
other country in which he could purchase a bill upon that country. The
transportation of commodities, when properly suited to the market, is
always attended with a considerable profit; whereas that of gold and silver
is scarce ever attended with any. When those metals are sent abroad in order
to purchase foreign commodities, the merchant’s profit arises, not from the
purchase, but from the sale of the returns. But when they are sent abroad
merely to pay a debt, he gets no returns, and consequently no profit. He
naturally, therefore, exerts his invention to find out a way of paying his
foreign debts, rather by the exportation of commodities, than by that of gold
and silver. The great quantity of British goods, exported during the course
of the late war, without bringing back any returns, is accordingly remarked
by the author of the Present State of the Nation.
Besides the three sorts of gold and silver above mentioned, there is in all
great commercial countries a good deal of bullion alternately imported and
exported, for the purposes of foreign trade. This bullion, as it circulates
among different commercial countries, in the same manner as the national
coin circulates in every country, may be considered as the money of the
great mercantile republic. The national coin receives its movement and
direction from the commodities circulated within the precincts of each
particular country; the money in the mercantile republic, from those
circulated between different countries. Both are employed in facilitating
exchanges, the one between different individuals of the same, the other
between those of different nations. Part of this money of the great
mercantile republic may have been, and probably was, employed in
carrying on the late war. In time of a general war, it is natural to suppose
that a movement and direction should be impressed upon it, different from
what it usually follows in profound peace, that it should circulate more
about the seat of the war, and be more employed in purchasing there, and in
the neighbouring countries, the pay and provisions of the different armies.
But whatever part of this money of the mercantile republic Great Britain
may have annually employed in this manner, it must have been annually
purchased, either with British commodities, or with something else that had
been purchased with them; which still brings us back to commodities, to the
annual produce of the land and labour of the country, as the ultimate
resources which enabled us to carry on the war. It is natural, indeed, to
suppose, that so great an annual expense must have been defrayed from a
great annual produce. The expense of 1761, for example, amounted to more
than £19,000,000. No accumulation could have supported so great an
annual profusion. There is no annual produce, even of gold and silver,
which could have supported it. The whole gold and silver annually
imported into both Spain and Portugal, according to the best accounts, does
not commonly much exceed £6,000,000 sterling, which, in some years,
would scarce have paid four months expense of the late war.
The commodities most proper for being transported to distant countries,
in order to purchase there either the pay and provisions of an army, or some
part of the money of the mercantile republic to be employed in purchasing
them, seem to be the finer and more improved manufactures; such as
contain a great value in a small bulk, and can therefore be exported to a
great distance at little expense. A country whose industry produces a great
annual surplus of such manufactures, which are usually exported to foreign
countries, may carry on for many years a very expensive foreign war,
without either exporting any considerable quantity of gold and silver, or
even having any such quantity to export. A considerable part of the annual
surplus of its manufactures must, indeed, in this case, be exported without
bringing back any returns to the country, though it does to the merchant; the
government purchasing of the merchant his bills upon foreign countries, in
order to purchase there the pay and provisions of an army. Some part of this
surplus, however, may still continue to bring back a return. The
manufacturers during; the war will have a double demand upon them, and
be called upon first to work up goods to be sent abroad, for paying the bills
drawn upon foreign countries for the pay and provisions of the army: and,
secondly, to work up such as are necessary for purchasing the common
returns that had usually been consumed in the country. In the midst of the
most destructive foreign war, therefore, the greater part of manufactures
may frequently flourish greatly; and, on the contrary, they may decline on
the return of peace. They may flourish amidst the ruin of their country, and
begin to decay upon the return of its prosperity. The different state of many
different branches of the British manufactures during the late war, and for
some time after the peace, may serve as an illustration of what has been just
now said.
No foreign war, of great expense or duration, could conveniently be
carried on by the exportation of the rude produce of the soil. The expense of
sending such a quantity of it into a foreign country as might purchase the
pay and provisions of an army would be too great. Few countries, too,
produce much more rude produce than what is sufficient for the subsistence
of their own inhabitants. To send abroad any great quantity of it, therefore,
would be to send abroad a part of the necessary subsistence of the people. It
is otherwise with the exportation of manufactures. The maintenance of the
people employed in them is kept at home, and only the surplus part of their
work is exported. Mr Hume frequently takes notice of the inability of the
ancient kings of England to carry on, without interruption, any foreign war
of long duration. The English in those days had nothing wherewithal to
purchase the pay and provisions of their armies in foreign countries, but
either the rude produce of the soil, of which no considerable part could be
spared from the home consumption, or a few manufactures of the coarsest
kind, of which, as well as of the rude produce, the transportation was too
expensive. This inability did not arise from the want of money, but of the
finer and more improved manufactures. Buying and selling was transacted
by means of money in England then as well as now. The quantity of
circulating money must have borne the same proportion, to the number and
value of purchases and sales usually transacted at that time, which it does to
those transacted at present; or, rather, it must have borne a greater
proportion, because there was then no paper, which now occupies a great
part of the employment of gold and silver. Among nations to whom
commerce and manufactures are little known, the sovereign, upon
extraordinary occasions, can seldom draw any considerable aid from his
subjects, for reasons which shall be explained hereafter. It is in such
countries, therefore, that he generally endeavours to accumulate a treasure,
as the only resource against such emergencies. Independent of this
necessity, he is, in such a situation, naturally disposed to the parsimony
requisite for accumulation. In that simple state, the expense even of a
sovereign is not directed by the vanity which delights in the gaudy finery of
a court, but is employed in bounty to his tenants, and hospitality to his
retainers. But bounty and hospitality very seldom lead to extravagance;
though vanity almost always does. Every Tartar chief, accordingly, has a
treasure. The treasures of Mazepa, chief of the Cossacks in the Ukraine, the
famous ally of Charles XII., are said to have been very great. The French
kings of the Merovingian race had all treasures. When they divided their
kingdom among their different children, they divided their treasures too.
The Saxon princes, and the first kings after the Conquest, seem likewise to
have accumulated treasures. The first exploit of every new reign was
commonly to seize the treasure of the preceding king, as the most essential
measure for securing the succession. The sovereigns of improved and
commercial countries are not under the same necessity of accumulating
treasures, because they can generally draw from their subjects extraordinary
aids upon extraordinary occasions. They are likewise less disposed to do so.
They naturally, perhaps necessarily, follow the mode of the times; and their
expense comes to be regulated by the same extravagant vanity which directs
that of all the other great proprietors in their dominions. The insignificant
pageantry of their court becomes every day more brilliant; and the expense
of it not only prevents accumulation, but frequently encroaches upon the
funds destined for more necessary expenses. What Dercyllidas said of the
court of Persia, may be applied to that of several European princes, that he
saw there much splendour, but little strength, and many servants, but few
soldiers.
The importation of gold and silver is not the principal, much less the sole
benefit, which a nation derives from its foreign trade. Between whatever
places foreign trade is carried on, they all of them derive two distinct
benefits from it. It carries out that surplus part of the produce of their land
and labour for which there is no demand among them, and brings back in
return for it something else for which there is a demand. It gives a value to
their superfluities, by exchanging them for something else, which may
satisfy a part of their wants and increase their enjoyments. By means of it,
the narrowness of the home market does not hinder the division of labour in
any particular branch of art or manufacture from being carried to the
highest perfection. By opening a more extensive market for whatever part
of the produce of their labour may exceed the home consumption, it
encourages them to improve its productive power, and to augment its
annual produce to the utmost, and thereby to increase the real revenue and
wealth of the society. These great and important services foreign trade is
continually occupied in performing to all the different countries between
which it is carried on. They all derive great benefit from it, though that in
which the merchant resides generally derives the greatest, as he is generally
more employed in supplying the wants, and carrying out the superfluities of
his own, than of any other particular country. To import the gold and silver
which may be wanted into the countries which have no mines, is, no doubt
a part of the business of foreign commerce. It is, however, a most
insignificant part of it. A country which carried on foreign trade merely
upon this account, could scarce have occasion to freight a ship in a century.
It is not by the importation of gold and silver that the discovery of
America has enriched Europe. By the abundance of the American mines,
those metals have become cheaper. A service of plate can now be purchased
for about a third part of the corn, or a third part of the labour, which it
would have cost in the fifteenth century. With the same annual expense of
labour and commodities, Europe can annually purchase about three times
the quantity of plate which it could have purchased at that time. But when a
commodity comes to be sold for a third part of what bad been its usual
price, not only those who purchased it before can purchase three times their
former quantity, but it is brought down to the level of a much greater
number of purchasers, perhaps to more than ten, perhaps to more than
twenty times the former number. So that there may be in Europe at present,
not only more than three times, but more than twenty or thirty times the
quantity of plate which would have been in it, even in its present state of
improvement, had the discovery of the American mines never been made.
So far Europe has, no doubt, gained a real conveniency, though surely a
very trifling one. The cheapness of gold and silver renders those metals
rather less fit for the purposes of money than they were before. In order to
make the same purchases, we must load ourselves with a greater quantity of
them, and carry about a shilling in our pocket, where a groat would have
done before. It is difficult to say which is most trifling, this inconveniency,
or the opposite conveniency. Neither the one nor the other could have made
any very essential change in the state of Europe. The discovery of America,
however, certainly made a most essential one. By opening a new and
inexhaustible market to all the commodities of Europe, it gave occasion to
new divisions of labour and improvements of art, which in the narrow circle
of the ancient commerce could never have taken place, for want of a market
to take off the greater part of their produce. The productive powers of
labour were improved, and its produce increased in all the different
countries of Europe, and together with it the real revenue and wealth of the
inhabitants. The commodities of Europe were almost all new to America,
and many of those of America were new to Europe. A new set of
exchanges, therefore, began to take place, which had never been thought of
before, and which should naturally have proved as advantageous to the new,
as it certainly did to the old continent. The savage injustice of the
Europeans rendered an event, which ought to have been beneficial to all,
ruinous and destructive to several of those unfortunate countries.
The discovery of a passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope,
which happened much about the same time, opened perhaps a still more
extensive range to foreign commerce, than even that of America,
notwithstanding the greater distance. There were but two nations in
America, in any respect, superior to the savages, and these were destroyed
almost as soon as discovered. The rest were mere savages. But the empires
of China, Indostan, Japan, as well as several others in the East Indies,
without having richer mines of gold or silver, were, in every other respect,
much richer, better cultivated, and more advanced in all arts and
manufactures, than either Mexico or Peru, even though we should credit,
what plainly deserves no credit, the exaggerated accounts of the Spanish
writers concerning the ancient state of those empires. But rich and civilized
nations can always exchange to a much greater value with one another, than
with savages and barbarians. Europe, however, has hitherto derived much
less advantage from its commerce with the East Indies, than from that with
America. The Portuguese monopolized the East India trade to themselves
for about a century; and it was only indirectly, and through them, that the
other nations of Europe could either send out or receive any goods from that
country. When the Dutch, in the beginning of the last century, began to
encroach upon them, they vested their whole East India commerce in an
exclusive company. The English, French, Swedes, and Danes, have all
followed their example; so that no great nation of Europe has ever yet had
the benefit of a free commerce to the East Indies. No other reason need be
assigned why it has never been so advantageous as the trade to America,
which, between almost every nation of Europe and its own colonies, is free
to all its subjects. The exclusive privileges of those East India companies,
their great riches, the great favour and protection which these have procured
them from their respective governments, have excited much envy against
them. This envy has frequently represented their trade as altogether
pernicious, on account of the great quantities of silver which it every year
exports from the countries from which it is carried on. The parties
concerned have replied, that their trade by this continual exportation of
silver, might indeed tend to impoverish Europe in general, but not the
particular country from which it was carried on; because, by the exportation
of a part of the returns to other European countries, it annually brought
home a much greater quantity of that metal than it carried out. Both the
objection and the reply are founded in the popular notion which I have been
just now examining. It is therefore unnecessary to say any thing further
about either. By the annual exportation of silver to the East Indies, plate is
probably somewhat dearer in Europe than it otherwise might have been; and
coined silver probably purchases a larger quantity both of labour and
commodities. The former of these two effects is a very small loss, the latter
a very small advantage; both too insignificant to deserve any part of the
public attention. The trade to the East Indies, by opening a market to the
commodities of Europe, or, what comes nearly to the same thing, to the
gold and silver which is purchased with those commodities, must
necessarily tend to increase the annual production of European
commodities, and consequently the real wealth and revenue of Europe. That
it has hitherto increased them so little, is probably owing to the restraints
which it everywhere labours under.
I thought it necessary, though at the hazard of being tedious, to examine
at full length this popular notion, that wealth consists in money or in gold
and silver. Money, in common language, as I have already observed,
frequently signifies wealth; and this ambiguity of expression has rendered
this popular notion so familiar to us, that even they who are convinced of its
absurdity, are very apt to forget their own principles, and, in the course of
their reasonings, to take it for granted as a certain and undeniable truth.
Some of the best English writers upon commerce set out with observing,
that the wealth of a country consists, not in its gold and silver only, but in
its lands, houses, and consumable goods of all different kinds. In the course
of their reasonings, however, the lands, houses, and consumable goods,
seem to slip out of their memory; and the strain of their argument frequently
supposes that all wealth consists in gold and silver, and that to multiply
those metals is the great object of national industry and commerce.
The two principles being established, however, that wealth consisted in
gold and silver, and that those metals could be brought into a country which
had no mines, only by the balance of trade, or by exporting to a greater
value than it imported; it necessarily became the great object of political
economy to diminish as much as possible the importation of foreign goods
for home consumption, and to increase as much as possible the exportation
of the produce of domestic industry. Its two great engines for enriching the
country, therefore, were restraints upon importation, and encouragement to
exportation.
The restraints upon importation were of two kinds.
First, restraints upon the importation of such foreign goods for home
consumption as could be produced at home, from whatever country they
were imported.
Secondly, restraints upon the importation of goods of almost all kinds,
from those particular countries with which the balance of trade was
supposed to be disadvantageous.
Those different restraints consisted sometimes in high duties, and
sometimes in absolute prohibitions.
Exportation was encouraged sometimes by drawbacks, sometimes by
bounties, sometimes by advantageous treaties of commerce with foreign
states, and sometimes by the establishment of colonies in distant countries.
Drawbacks were given upon two different occasions. When the home
manufactures were subject to any duty or excise, either the whole or a part
of it was frequently drawn back upon their exportation; and when foreign
goods liable to a duty were imported, in order to be exported again, either
the whole or a part of this duty was sometimes given back upon such
exportation.
Bounties were given for the encouragement, either of some beginning
manufactures, or of such sorts of industry of other kinds as were supposed
to deserve particular favour.
By advantageous treaties of commerce, particular privileges were
procured in some foreign state for the goods and merchants of the country,
beyond what were granted to those of other countries.
By the establishment of colonies in distant countries, not only particular
privileges, but a monopoly was frequently procured for the goods and
merchants of the country which established them.
The two sorts of restraints upon importation above mentioned, together
with these four encouragements to exportation, constitute the six principal
means by which the commercial system proposes to increase the quantity of
gold and silver in any country, by turning the balance of trade in its favour. I
shall consider each of them in a particular chapter, and, without taking
much farther notice of their supposed tendency to bring money into the
country, I shall examine chiefly what are likely to be the effects of each of
them upon the annual produce of its industry. According as they tend either
to increase or diminish the value of this annual produce, they must
evidently tend either to increase or diminish the real wealth and revenue of
the country.
CHAPTER II.
OF RESTRAINTS UPON IMPORTATION FROM
FOREIGN COUNTRIES OF SUCH GOODS AS
CAN BE PRODUCED AT HOME.
By restraining, either by high duties, or by absolute prohibitions, the
importation of such goods from foreign countries as can be produced at
home, the monopoly of the home market is more or less secured to the
domestic industry employed in producing them. Thus the prohibition of
importing either live cattle or salt provisions from foreign countries, secures
to the graziers of Great Britain the monopoly of the home market for
butcher’s meat. The high duties upon the importation of corn, which, in
times of moderate plenty, amount to a prohibition, give a like advantage to
the growers of that commodity. The prohibition of the importation of
foreign woollen is equally favourable to the woollen manufacturers. The
silk manufacture, though altogether employed upon foreign materials, has
lately obtained the same advantage. The linen manufacture has not yet
obtained it, but is making great strides towards it. Many other sorts of
manufactures have, in the same manner obtained in Great Britain, either
altogether, or very nearly, a monopoly against their countrymen. The variety
of goods, of which the importation into Great Britain is prohibited, either
absolutely, or under certain circumstances, greatly exceeds what can easily
be suspected by those who are not well acquainted with the laws of the
customs.
That this monopoly of the home market frequently gives great
encouragement to that particular species of industry which enjoys it, and
frequently turns towards that employment a greater share of both the labour
and stock of the society than would otherwise have gone to it, cannot be
doubted. But whether it tends either to increase the general industry of the
society, or to give it the most advantageous direction, is not, perhaps,
altogether so evident.
The general industry of the society can never exceed what the capital of
the society can employ. As the number of workmen that can be kept in
employment by any particular person must bear a certain proportion to his
capital, so the number of those that can be continually employed by all the
members of a great society must bear a certain proportion to the whole
capital of the society, and never can exceed that proportion. No regulation
of commerce can increase the quantity of industry in any society beyond
what its capital can maintain. It can only divert a part of it into a direction
into which it might not otherwise have gone; and it is by no means certain
that this artificial direction is likely to be more advantageous to the society,
than that into which it would have gone of its own accord.
Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most
advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his
own advantage, indeed, and not that of the society, which he has in view.
But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily, leads
him to prefer that employment which is most advantageous to the society.
First, every individual endeavours to employ his capital as near home as
he can, and consequently as much as he can in the support of domestic
industry, provided always that he can thereby obtain the ordinary, or not a
great deal less than the ordinary profits of stock.
Thus, upon equal, or nearly equal profits, every wholesale merchant
naturally prefers the home trade to the foreign trade of consumption, and
the foreign trade of consumption to the carrying trade. In the home trade,
his capital is never so long out of his sight as it frequently is in the foreign
trade of consumption. He can know better the character and situation of the
persons whom he trusts; and if he should happen to be deceived, he knows
better the laws of the country from which he must seek redress. In the
carrying trade, the capital of the merchant is, as it were, divided between
two foreign countries, and no part of it is ever necessarily brought home, or
placed under his own immediate view and command. The capital which an
Amsterdam merchant employs in carrying corn from Koningsberg to
Lisbon, and fruit and wine from Lisbon to Koningsberg, must generally be
the one half of it at Koningsberg, and the other half at Lisbon. No part of it
need ever come to Amsterdam. The natural residence of such a merchant
should either be at Koningsberg or Lisbon; and it can only be some very
particular circumstances which can make him prefer the residence of
Amsterdam. The uneasiness, however, which he feels at being separated so
far from his capital, generally determines him to bring part both of the
Koningsberg goods which he destines for the market of Lisbon, and of the
Lisbon goods which he destines for that of Koningsberg, to Amsterdam;
and though this necessarily subjects him to a double charge of loading and
unloading as well as to the payment of some duties and customs, yet, for the
sake of having some part of his capital always under his own view and
command, he willingly submits to this extraordinary charge; and it is in this
manner that every country which has any considerable share of the carrying
trade, becomes always the emporium, or general market, for the goods of all
the different countries whose trade it carries on. The merchant, in order to
save a second loading and unloading, endeavours always to sell in the home
market, as much of the goods of all those different countries as he can; and
thus, so far as he can, to convert his carrying trade into a foreign trade of
consumption. A merchant, in the same manner, who is engaged in the
foreign trade of consumption, when he collects goods for foreign markets,
will always be glad, upon equal or nearly equal profits, to sell as great a part
of them at home as he can. He saves himself the risk and trouble of
exportation, when, so far as he can, he thus converts his foreign trade of
consumption into a home trade. Home is in this manner the centre, if I may
say so, round which the capitals of the inhabitants of every country are
continually circulating, and towards which they are always tending, though,
by particular causes, they may sometimes be driven off and repelled from it
towards more distant employments. But a capital employed in the home
trade, it has already been shown, necessarily puts into motion a greater
quantity of domestic industry, and gives revenue and employment to a
greater number of the inhabitants of the country, than an equal capital
employed in the foreign trade of consumption; and one employed in the
foreign trade of consumption has the same advantage over an equal capital
employed in the carrying trade. Upon equal, or only nearly equal profits,
therefore, every individual naturally inclines to employ his capital in the
manner in which it is likely to afford the greatest support to domestic
industry, and to give revenue and employment to the greatest number of
people of his own country.
Secondly, every individual who employs his capital in the support of
domestic industry, necessarily endeavours so to direct that industry, that its
produce may be of the greatest possible value.
The produce of industry is what it adds to the subject or materials upon
which it is employed. In proportion as the value of this produce is great or
small, so will likewise be the profits of the employer. But it is only for the
sake of profit that any man employs a capital in the support of industry; and
he will always, therefore, endeavour to employ it in the support of that
industry of which the produce is likely to be of the greatest value, or to
exchange for the greatest quantity either of money or of other goods.
But the annual revenue of every society is always precisely equal to the
exchangeable value of the whole annual produce of its industry, or rather is
precisely the same thing with that exchangeable value. As every individual,
therefore, endeavours as much as he can, both to employ his capital in the
support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry that its produce
maybe of the greatest value; every individual necessarily labours to render
the annual revenue of the society as great as he can. He generally, indeed,
neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how much he is
promoting it. By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign
industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in
such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only
his own gain; and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible
hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always
the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own
interest, he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than
when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done
by those who affected to trade for the public good. It is an affectation,
indeed, not very common among merchants, and very few words need be
employed in dissuading them from it.
What is the species of domestic industry which his capital can employ,
and of which the produce is likely to be of the greatest value, every
individual, it is evident, can in his local situation judge much better than
any statesman or lawgiver can do for him. The statesman, who should
attempt to direct private people in what manner they ought to employ their
capitals, would not only load himself with a most unnecessary attention, but
assume an authority which could safely be trusted, not only to no single
person, but to no council or senate whatever, and which would nowhere be
so dangerous as in the hands of a man who had folly and presumption
enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it.
To give the monopoly of the home market to the produce of domestic
industry, in any particular art or manufacture, is in some measure to direct
private people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals, and must
in almost all cases be either a useless or a hurtful regulation. If the produce
of domestic can be brought there as cheap as that of foreign industry, the
regulation is evidently useless. If it cannot, it must generally be hurtful. It is
the maxim of every prudent master of a family, never to attempt to make at
home what it will cost him more to make than to buy. The tailor does not
attempt to make his own shoes, but buys them of the shoemaker. The
shoemaker does not attempt to make his own clothes, but employs a tailor.
The farmer attempts to make neither the one nor the other, but employs
those different artificers. All of them find it for their interest to employ their
whole industry in a way in which they have some advantage over their
neighbours, and to purchase with a part of its produce, or, what is the same
thing, with the price of a part of it, whatever else they have occasion for.
What is prudence in the conduct of every private family, can scarce be
folly in that of a great kingdom. If a foreign country can supply us with a
commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them
with some part of the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in
which we have some advantage. The general industry of the country being
always in proportion to the capital which employs it, will not thereby be
diminished, no more than that of the abovementioned artificers; but only
left to find out the way in which it can be employed with the greatest
advantage. It is certainly not employed to the greatest advantage, when it is
thus directed towards an object which it can buy cheaper than it can make.
The value of its annual produce is certainly more or less diminished, when
it is thus turned away from producing commodities evidently of more value
than the commodity which it is directed to produce. According to the
supposition, that commodity could be purchased from foreign countries
cheaper than it can be made at home; it could therefore have been
purchased with a part only of the commodities, or, what is the same thing,
with a part only of the price of the commodities, which the industry
employed by an equal capital would have produced at home, had it been left
to follow its natural course. The industry of the country, therefore, is thus
turned away from a more to a less advantageous employment; and the
exchangeable value of its annual produce, instead of being increased,
according to the intention of the lawgiver, must necessarily be diminished
by every such regulation.
By means of such regulations, indeed, a particular manufacture may
sometimes be acquired sooner than it could have been otherwise, and after a
certain time may be made at home as cheap, or cheaper, than in the foreign
country. But though the industry of the society may be thus carried with
advantage into a particular channel sooner than it could have been
otherwise, it will by no means follow that the sum-total, either of its
industry, or of its revenue, can ever be augmented by any such regulation.
The industry of the society can augment only in proportion as its capital
augments, and its capital can augment only in proportion to what can be
gradually saved out of its revenue. But the immediate effect of every such
regulation is to diminish its revenue; and what diminishes its revenue is
certainly not very likely to augment its capital faster than it would have
augmented of its own accord, had both capital and industry been left to find
out their natural employments.
Though, for want of such regulations, the society should never acquire
the proposed manufacture, it would not upon that account necessarily be the
poorer in anyone period of its duration. In every period of its duration its
whole capital and industry might still have been employed, though upon
different objects, in the manner that was most advantageous at the time. In
every period its revenue might have been the greatest which its capital
could afford, and both capital and revenue might have been augmented with
the greatest possible rapidity.
The natural advantages which one country has over another, in producing
particular commodities, are sometimes so great, that it is acknowledged by
all the world to be in vain to struggle with them. By means of glasses, hot-
beds, and hot-walls, very good grapes can be raised in Scotland, and very
good wine, too, can be made of them, at about thirty times the expense for
which at least equally good can be brought from foreign countries. Would it
be a reasonable law to prohibit the importation of all foreign wines, merely
to encourage the making of claret and Burgundy in Scotland? But if there
would be a manifest absurdity in turning towards any employment thirty
times more of the capital and industry of the country than would be
necessary to purchase from foreign countries an equal quantity of the
commodities wanted, there must be an absurdity, though not altogether so
glaring, yet exactly of the same kind, in turning towards any such
employment a thirtieth, or even a three hundredth part more of either.
Whether the advantages which one country has over another be natural or
acquired, is in this respect of no consequence. As long as the one country
has those advantages, and the other wants them, it will always be more
advantageous for the latter rather to buy of the former than to make. It is an
acquired advantage only, which one artificer has over his neighbour, who
exercises another trade; and yet they both find it more advantageous to buy
of one another, than to make what does not belong to their particular trades.
Merchants and manufacturers are the people who derive the greatest
advantage from this monopoly of the home market. The prohibition of the
importation of foreign cattle and of salt provisions, together with the high
duties upon foreign corn, which in times of moderate plenty amount to a
prohibition, are not near so advantageous to the graziers and farmers of
Great Britain, as other regulations of the same kind are to its merchants and
manufacturers. Manufactures, those of the finer kind especially, are more
easily transported from one country to another than corn or cattle. It is in
the fetching and carrying manufactures, accordingly, that foreign trade is
chiefly employed. In manufactures, a very small advantage will enable
foreigners to undersell our own workmen, even in the home market. It will
require a very great one to enable them to do so in the rude produce of the
soil. If the free importation of foreign manufactures were permitted, several
of the home manufactures would probably suffer, and some of them perhaps
go to ruin altogether, and a considerable part of the stock and industry at
present employed in them, would be forced to find out some other
employment. But the freest importation of the rude produce of the soil
could have no such effect upon the agriculture of the country.
If the importation of foreign cattle, for example, were made ever so free,
so few could be imported, that the grazing trade of Great Britain could be
little affected by it. Live cattle are, perhaps, the only commodity of which
the transportation is more expensive by sea than by land. By land they carry
themselves to market. By sea, not only the cattle, but their food and their
water too, must be carried at no small expense and inconveniency. The
short sea between Ireland and Great Britain, indeed, renders the importation
of Irish cattle more easy. But though the free importation of them, which
was lately permitted only for a limited time, were rendered perpetual, it
could have no considerable effect upon the interest of the graziers of Great
Britain. Those parts of Great Britain which border upon the Irish sea are all
grazing countries. Irish cattle could never be imported for their use, but
must be drove through those very extensive countries, at no small expense
and inconveniency, before they could arrive at their proper market. Fat
cattle could not be drove so far. Lean cattle, therefore, could only be
imported; and such importation could interfere not with the interest of the
feeding or fattening countries, to which, by reducing the price of lean cattle
it would rather be advantageous, but with that of the breeding countries
only. The small number of Irish cattle imported since their importation was
permitted, together with the good price at which lean cattle still continue to
sell, seem to demonstrate, that even the breeding countries of Great Britain
are never likely to be much affected by the free importation of Irish cattle.
The common people of Ireland, indeed, are said to have sometimes opposed
with violence the exportation of their cattle. But if the exporters had found
any great advantage in continuing the trade, they could easily, when the law
was on their side, have conquered this mobbish opposition.
Feeding and fattening countries, besides, must always be highly
improved, whereas breeding countries are generally uncultivated. The high
price of lean cattle, by augmenting the value of uncultivated land, is like a
bounty against improvement. To any country which was highly improved
throughout, it would be more advantageous to import its lean cattle than to
breed them. The province of Holland, accordingly, is said to follow this
maxim at present. The mountains of Scotland, Wales, and Northumberland,
indeed, are countries not capable of much improvement, and seem destined
by nature to be the breeding countries of Great Britain. The freest
importation of foreign cattle could have no other effect than to hinder those
breeding countries from taking advantage of the increasing population and
improvement of the rest of the kingdom, from raising their price to an
exorbitant height, and from laying a real tax upon all the more improved
and cultivated parts of the country.
The freest importation of salt provisions, in the same manner, could have
as little effect upon the interest of the graziers of Great Britain as that of
live cattle. Salt provisions are not only a very bulky commodity, but when
compared with fresh meat they are a commodity both of worse quality, and,
as they cost more labour and expense, of higher price. They could never,
therefore, come into competition with the fresh meat, though they might
with the salt provisions of the country. They might be used for victualling
ships for distant voyages, and such like uses, but could never make any
considerable part of the food of the people. The small quantity of salt
provisions imported from Ireland since their importation was rendered free,
is an experimental proof that our graziers have nothing to apprehend from
it. It does not appear that the price of butcher’s meat has ever been sensibly
affected by it.
Even the free importation of foreign corn could very little affect the
interest of the farmers of Great Britain. Corn is a much more bulky
commodity than butcher’s meat. A pound of wheat at a penny is as dear as a
pound of butcher’s meat at fourpence. The small quantity of foreign corn
imported even in times of the greatest scarcity, may satisfy our farmers that
they can have nothing to fear from the freest importation. The average
quantity imported, one year with another, amounts only, according to the
very well informed author of the Tracts upon the Corn Trade, to 23,728
quarters of all sorts of grain, and does not exceed the five hundredth and
seventy-one part of the annual consumption. But as the bounty upon corn
occasions a greater exportation in years of plenty, so it must, of
consequence, occasion a greater importation in years of scarcity, than in the
actual state of tillage would otherwise take place. By means of it, the plenty
of one year does not compensate the scarcity of another; and as the average
quantity exported is necessarily augmented by it, so must likewise, in the
actual state of tillage, the average quantity imported. If there were no
bounty, as less corn would be exported, suit is probable that, one year with
another, less would be imported than at present. The corn-merchants, the
fetchers and carriers of corn between Great Britain and foreign countries,
would have much less employment, and might suffer considerably; but the
country gentlemen and farmers could suffer very little. It is in the corn-
merchants, accordingly, rather than the country gentlemen and farmers, that
I have observed the greatest anxiety for the renewal and continuation of the
bounty.
Country gentlemen and farmers are, to their great honour, of all people,
the least subject to the wretched spirit of monopoly. The undertaker of a
great manufactory is sometimes alarmed if another work of the same kind is
established within twenty miles of him; the Dutch undertaker of the woollen
manufacture at Abbeville, stipulated that no work of the same kind should
be established within thirty leagues of that city. Farmers and country
gentlemen, on the contrary, are generally disposed rather to promote, than to
obstruct, the cultivation and improvement of their neighbours farms and
estates. They have no secrets, such as those of the greater part of
manufacturers, but are generally rather fond of communicating to their
neighbours, and of extending as far as possible any new practice which they
may have found to be advantageous. “Pius quaestus”, says old Cato,
“stabilissimusque, minimeque invidiosus; minimeque male cogitantes sunt,
qui in eo studio occupati sunt.” Country gentlemen and farmers, dispersed
in different parts of the country, cannot so easily combine as merchants and
manufacturers, who being collected into towns, and accustomed to that
exclusive corporation spirit which prevails in them, naturally endeavour to
obtain, against all their countrymen, the same exclusive privilege which
they generally possess against the inhabitants of their respective towns.
They accordingly seem to have been the original inventors of those
restraints upon the importation of foreign goods, which secure to them the
monopoly of the home market. It was probably in imitation of them, and to
put themselves upon a level with those who, they found, were disposed to
oppress them, that the country gentlemen and farmers of Great Britain so
far forgot the generosity which is natural to their station, as to demand the
exclusive privilege of supplying their countrymen with corn and butcher’s
meat. They did not, perhaps, take time to consider how much less their
interest could be affected by the freedom of trade, than that of the people
whose example they followed.
To prohibit, by a perpetual law, the importation of foreign corn and cattle,
is in reality to enact, that the population and industry of the country shall, at
no time, exceed what the rude produce of its own soil can maintain.
There seem, however, to be two cases, in which it will generally be
advantageous to lay some burden upon foreign, for the encouragement of
domestic industry.
The first is, when some particular sort of industry is necessary for the
defence of the country. The defence of Great Britain, for example, depends
very much upon the number of its sailors and shipping. The act of
navigation, therefore, very properly endeavours to give the sailors and
shipping of Great Britain the monopoly of the trade of their own country, in
some cases, by absolute prohibitions, and in others, by heavy burdens upon
the shipping of foreign countries. The following are the principal
dispositions of this act.
First, All ships, of which the owners, masters, and three-fourths of the
mariners, are not British subjects, are prohibited, upon pain of forfeiting
ship and cargo, from trading to the British settlements and plantations, or
from being employed in the coasting trade of Great Britain.
Secondly, A great variety of the most bulky articles of importation can be
brought into Great Britain only, either in such ships as are above described,
or in ships of the country where those goods are produced, and of which the
owners, masters, and three-fourths of the mariners, are of that particular
country; and when imported even in ships of this latter kind, they are
subject to double aliens duty. If imported in ships of any other country, the
penalty is forfeiture of ship and goods. When this act was made, the Dutch
were, what they still are, the great carriers of Europe; and by this regulation
they were entirely excluded from being the carriers to Great Britain, or from
importing to us the goods of any other European country.
Thirdly, A great variety of the most bulky articles of importation are
prohibited from being imported, even in British ships, from any country but
that in which they are produced, under pain of forfeiting ship and cargo.
This regulation, too, was probably intended against the Dutch. Holland was
then, as now, the great emporium for all European goods; and by this
regulation, British ships were hindered from loading in Holland the goods
of any other European country.
Fourthly, Salt fish of all kinds, whale fins, whalebone, oil, and blubber,
not caught by and cured on board British vessels, when imported into Great
Britain, are subject to double aliens duty. The Dutch, as they are still the
principal, were then the only fishers in Europe that attempted to supply
foreign nations with fish. By this regulation, a very heavy burden was laid
upon their supplying Great Britain.
When the act of navigation was made, though England and Holland were
not actually at war, the most violent animosity subsisted between the two
nations. It had begun during the government of the long parliament, which
first framed this act, and it broke out soon after in the Dutch wars, during
that of the Protector and of Charles II. It is not impossible, therefore, that
some of the regulations of this famous act may have proceeded from
national animosity. They are as wise, however, as if they had all been
dictated by the most deliberate wisdom. National animosity, at that
particular time, aimed at the very same object which the most deliberate
wisdom would have recommended, the diminution of the naval power of
Holland, the only naval power which could endanger the security of
England.
The act of navigation is not favourable to foreign commerce, or to the
growth of that opulence which can arise from it. The interest of a nation, in
its commercial relations to foreign nations, is, like that of a merchant with
regard to the different people with whom he deals, to buy as cheap, and to
sell as dear as possible. But it will be most likely to buy cheap, when, by the
most perfect freedom of trade, it encourages all nations to bring to it the
goods which it has occasion to purchase; and, for the same reason, it will be
most likely to sell dear, when its markets are thus filled with the greatest
number of buyers. The act of navigation, it is true, lays no burden upon
foreign ships that come to export the produce of British industry. Even the
ancient aliens duty, which used to be paid upon all goods, exported as well
as imported, has, by several subsequent acts, been taken off from the greater
part of the articles of exportation. But if foreigners, either by prohibitions or
high duties, are hindered from coming to sell, they cannot always afford to
come to buy; because, coming without a cargo, they must lose the freight
from their own country to Great Britain. By diminishing the number of
sellers, therefore, we necessarily diminish that of buyers, and are thus likely
not only to buy foreign goods dearer, but to sell our own cheaper, than if
there was a more perfect freedom of trade. As defence, however, is of much
more importance than opulence, the act of navigation is, perhaps, the wisest
of all the commercial regulations of England.
The second case, in which it will generally be advantageous to lay some
burden upon foreign for the encouragement of domestic industry, is when
some tax is imposed at home upon the produce of the latter. In this case, it
seems reasonable that an equal tax should be imposed upon the like produce
of the former. This would not give the monopoly of the borne market to
domestic industry, nor turn towards a particular employment a greater share
of the stock and labour of the country, than what would naturally go to it. It
would only hinder any part of what would naturally go to it from being
turned away by the tax into a less natural direction, and would leave the
competition between foreign and domestic industry, after the tax, as nearly
as possible upon the same footing as before it. In Great Britain, when any
such tax is laid upon the produce of domestic industry, it is usual, at the
same time, in order to stop the clamorous complaints of our merchants and
manufacturers, that they will be undersold at home, to lay a much heavier
duty upon the importation of all foreign goods of the same kind.
This second limitation of the freedom of trade, according to some people,
should, upon most occasions, be extended much farther than to the precise
foreign commodities which could come into competition with those which
had been taxed at home. When the necessaries of life have been taxed in
any country, it becomes proper, they pretend, to tax not only the like
necessaries of life imported from other countries, but all sorts of foreign
goods which can come into competition with any thing that is the produce
of domestic industry. Subsistence, they say, becomes necessarily dearer in
consequence of such taxes; and the price of labour must always rise with
the price of the labourer’s subsistence. Every commodity, therefore, which
is the produce of domestic industry, though not immediately taxed itself,
becomes dearer in consequence of such taxes, because the labour which
produces it becomes so. Such taxes, therefore, are really equivalent, they
say, to a tax upon every particular commodity produced at home. In order to
put domestic upon the same footing with foreign industry, therefore, it
becomes necessary, they think, to lay some duty upon every foreign
commodity, equal to this enhancement of the price of the home
commodities with which it can come into competition.
Whether taxes upon the necessaries of life, such as those in Great Britain
upon soap, salt, leather, candles, etc. necessarily raise the price of labour,
and consequently that of all other commodities, I shall consider hereafter,
when I come to treat of taxes. Supposing, however, in the mean time, that
they have this effect, and they have it undoubtedly, this general
enhancement of the price of all commodities, in consequence of that labour,
is a case which differs in the two following respects from that of a particular
commodity, of which the price was enhanced by a particular tax
immediately imposed upon it.
First, It might always be known with great exactness, how far the price of
such a commodity could be enhanced by such a tax; but how far the general
enhancement of the price of labour might affect that of every different
commodity about which labour was employed, could never be known with
any tolerable exactness. It would be impossible, therefore, to proportion,
with any tolerable exactness, the tax of every foreign, to the enhancement
of the price of every home commodity.
Secondly, Taxes upon the necessaries of life have nearly the same effect
upon the circumstances of the people as a poor soil and a bad climate.
Provisions are thereby rendered dearer, in the same manner as if it required
extraordinary labour and expense to raise them. As, in the natural scarcity
arising from soil and climate, it would be absurd to direct the people in
what manner they ought to employ their capitals and industry, so is it
likewise in the artificial scarcity arising from such taxes. To be left to
accommodate, as well as they could, their industry to their situation, and to
find out those employments in which, notwithstanding their unfavourable
circumstances, they might have some advantage either in the home or in the
foreign market, is what, in both cases, would evidently be most for their
advantage. To lay a new-tax upon them, because they are already
overburdened with taxes, and because they already pay too dear for the
necessaries of life, to make them likewise pay too dear for the greater part
of other commodities, is certainly a most absurd way of making amends.
Such taxes, when they have grown up to a certain height, are a curse
equal to the barrenness of the earth, and the inclemency of the heavens, and
yet it is in the richest and most industrious countries that they have been
most generally imposed. No other countries could support so great a
disorder. As the strongest bodies only can live and enjoy health under an
unwholesome regimen, so the nations only, that in every sort of industry
have the greatest natural and acquired advantages, can subsist and prosper
under such taxes. Holland is the country in Europe in which they abound
most, and which, from peculiar circumstances, continues to prosper, not by
means of them, as has been most absurdly supposed, but in spite of them.
As there are two cases in which it will generally be advantageous to lay
some burden upon foreign for the encouragement of domestic industry, so
there are two others in which it may sometimes be a matter of deliberation,
in the one, how far it is proper to continue the free importation of certain
foreign goods; and, in the other, how far, or in what manner, it may be
proper to restore that free importation, after it has been for some time
interrupted.
The case in which it may sometimes be a matter of deliberation how far it
is proper to continue the free importation of certain foreign goods, is when
some foreign nation restrains, by high duties or prohibitions, the
importation of some of our manufactures into their country. Revenge, in this
case, naturally dictates retaliation, and that we should impose the like duties
and prohibitions upon the importation of some or all of their manufactures
into ours. Nations, accordingly, seldom fail to retaliate in this manner. The
French have been particularly forward to favour their own manufactures, by
restraining the importation of such foreign goods as could come into
competition with them. In this consisted a great part of the policy of Mr
Colbert, who, notwithstanding his great abilities, seems in this case to have
been imposed upon by the sophistry of merchants and manufacturers, who
are always demanding a monopoly against their countrymen. It is at present
the opinion of the most intelligent men in France, that his operations of this
kind have not been beneficial to his country. That minister, by the tariff of
1667, imposed very high duties upon a great number of foreign
manufactures. Upon his refusing to moderate them in favour of the Dutch,
they, in 1671, prohibited the importation of the wines, brandies, and
manufactures of France. The war of 1672 seems to have been in part
occasioned by this commercial dispute. The peace of Nimeguen put an end
to it in 1678, by moderating some of those duties in favour of the Dutch,
who in consequence took off their prohibition. It was about the same time
that the French and English began mutually to oppress each other’s
industry, by the like duties and prohibitions, of which the French, however,
seem to have set the first example, The spirit of hostility which has
subsisted between the two nations ever since, has hitherto hindered them
from being moderated on either side. In 1697, the Ehglish prohibited the
importation of bone lace, the manufacture of Flanders. The government of
that country, at that time under the dominion of Spain, prohibited, in return,
the importation of English woollens. In 1700, the prohibition of importing
bone lace into England was taken oft; upon condition that the importation
of English woollens into Flanders should be put on the same footing as
before.
There may be good policy in retaliations of this kind, when there is a
probability that they will procure the repeal of the high duties or
prohibitions complained of. The recovery of a great foreign market will
generally more than compensate the transitory inconveniency of paying
dearer during a short time for some sorts of goods. To judge whether such
retaliations are likely to produce such an effect, does not, perhaps, belong
so much to the science of a legislator, whose deliberations ought to be
governed by general principles, which are always the same, as to the skill of
that insidious and crafty animal vulgarly called a statesman or politician,
whose councils are directed by the momentary fluctuations of affairs. When
there is no probability that any such repeal can be procured, it seems a bad
method of compensating the injury done to certain classes of our people, to
do another injury ourselves, not only to those classes, but to almost all the
other classes of them. When our neighbours prohibit some manufacture of
ours, we generally prohibit, not only the same, for that alone would seldom
affect them considerably, but some other manufacture of theirs. This may,
no doubt, give encouragement to some particular class of workmen among
ourselves, and, by excluding some of their rivals, may enable them to raise
their price in the home market. Those workmen however, who suffered by
our neighbours prohibition, will not be benefited by ours. On the contrary,
they, and almost all the other classes of our citizens, will thereby be obliged
to pay dearer than before for certain goods. Every such law, therefore,
imposes a real tax upon the whole country, not in favour of that particular
class of workmen who were injured by our neighbours prohibitions, but of
some other class.
The case in which it may sometimes be a matter of deliberation, how far,
or in what manner, it is proper to restore the free importation of foreign
goods, after it has been for some time interrupted, is when particular
manufactures, by means of high duties or prohibitions upon all foreign
goods which can come into competition with them, have been so far
extended as to employ a great multitude of hands. Humanity may in this
case require that the freedom of trade should be restored only by slow
gradations, and with a good deal of reserve and circumspection. Were those
high duties and prohibitions taken away all at once, cheaper foreign goods
of the same kind might be poured so fast into the home market, as to
deprive all at once many thousands of our people of their ordinary
employment and means of subsistence. The disorder which this would
occasion might no doubt be very considerable. It would in all probability,
however, be much less than is commonly imagined, for the two following
reasons.
First, All those manufactures of which any part is commonly exported to
other European countries without a bounty, could be very little affected by
the freest importation of foreign goods. Such manufactures must be sold as
cheap abroad as any other foreign goods of the same quality and kind, and
consequently must be sold cheaper at home. They would still, therefore,
keep possession of the home market; and though a capricious man of
fashion might sometimes prefer foreign wares, merely because they were
foreign, to cheaper and better goods of the same kind that were made at
home, this folly could, from the nature of things, extend to so few, that it
could make no sensible impression upon the general employment of the
people. But a great part of all the different branches of our woollen
manufacture, of our tanned leather, and of our hardware, are annually
exported to other European countries without any bounty, and these are the
manufactures which employ the greatest number of hands. The silk,
perhaps, is the manufacture which would suffer the most by this freedom of
trade, and after it the linen, though the latter much less than the former.
Secondly, Though a great number of people should, by thus restoring the
freedom of trade, be thrown all at once out of their ordinary employment
and common method of subsistence, it would by no means follow that they
would thereby be deprived either of employment or subsistence. By the
reduction of the army and navy at the end of the late war, more than
100,000 soldiers and seamen, a number equal to what is employed in the
greatest manufactures, were all at once thrown out of their ordinary
employment: but though they no doubt suffered some inconveniency, they
were not thereby deprived of all employment and subsistence. The greater
part of the seamen, it is probable, gradually betook themselves to the
merchant service as they could find occasion, and in the mean time both
they and the soldiers were absorbed in the great mass of the people, and
employed in a great variety of occupations. Not only no great convulsion,
but no sensible disorder, arose from so great a change in the situation of
more than 100,000 men, all accustomed to the use of arms, and many of
them to rapine and plunder. The number of vagrants was scarce anywhere
sensibly increased by it; even the wages of labour were not reduced by it in
any occupation, so far as I have been able to learn, except in that of seamen
in the merchant service. But if we compare together the habits of a soldier
and of any sort of manufacturer, we shall find that those of the latter do not
tend so much to disqualify him from being employed in a new trade, as
those of the former from being employed in any. The manufacturer has
always been accustomed to look for his subsistence from his labour only;
the soldier to expect it from his pay. Application and industry have been
familiar to the one; idleness and dissipation to the other. But it is surely
much easier to change the direction of industry from one sort of labour to
another, than to turn idleness and dissipation to any. To the greater part of
manufactures, besides, it has already been observed, there are other
collateral manufactures of so similar a nature, that a workman can easily
transfer his industry from one of them to another. The greater part of such
workmen, too, are occasionally employed in country labour. The stock
which employed them in a particular manufacture before, will still remain
in the country, to employ an equal number of people in some other way. The
capital of the country remaining the same, the demand for labour will
likewise be the same, or very nearly the same, though it may be exerted in
different places, and for different occupations. Soldiers and seamen, indeed,
when discharged from the king’s service, are at liberty to exercise any trade
within any town or place of Great Britain or Ireland. Let the same natural
liberty of exercising what species of industry they please, be restored to all
his Majesty’s subjects, in the same manner as to soldiers and seamen; that
is, break down the exclusive privileges of corporations, and repeal the
statute of apprenticeship, both which are really encroachments upon natural
Liberty, and add to those the repeal of the law of settlements, so that a poor
workman, when thrown out of employment, either in one trade or in one
place, may seek for it in another trade or in another place, without the fear
either of a prosecution or of a removal; and neither the public nor the
individuals will suffer much more from the occasional disbanding some
particular classes of manufacturers, than from that of the soldiers. Our
manufacturers have no doubt great merit with their country, but they cannot
have more than those who defend it with their blood, nor deserve to be
treated with more delicacy.
To expect, indeed, that the freedom of trade should ever be entirely
restored in Great Britain, is as absurd as to expect that an Oceana or Utopia
should ever be established in it. Not only the prejudices of the public, but,
what is much more unconquerable, the private interests of many
individuals, irresistibly oppose it. Were the officers of the army to oppose,
with the same zeal and unanimity, any reduction in the number of forces,
with which master manufacturers set themselves against every law that is
likely to increase the number of their rivals in the home market; were the
former to animate their soldiers. In the same manner as the latter inflame
their workmen, to attack with violence and outrage the proposers of any
such regulation; to attempt to reduce the army would be as dangerous as it
has now become to attempt to diminish, in any respect, the monopoly which
our manufacturers have obtained against us. This monopoly has so much
increased the number of some particular tribes of them, that, like an
overgrown standing army, they have become formidable to the government,
and, upon many occasions, intimidate the legislature. The member of
parliament who supports every proposal for strengthening this monopoly, is
sure to acquire not only the reputation of understanding trade, but great
popularity and influence with an order of men whose numbers and wealth
render them of great importance. If he opposes them, on the contrary, and
still more, if he has authority enough to be able to thwart them, neither the
most acknowledged probity, nor the highest rank, nor the greatest public
services, can protect him from the most infamous abuse and detraction,
from personal insults, nor sometimes from real danger, arising from the
insolent outrage of furious and disappointed monopolists.
The undertaker of a great manufacture, who, by the home markets being
suddenly laid open to the competition of foreigners, should be obliged to
abandon his trade, would no doubt suffer very considerably. That part of his
capital which had usually been employed in purchasing materials, and in
paying his workmen, might, without much difficulty, perhaps, find another
employment; but that part of it which was fixed in workhouses, and in the
instruments of trade, could scarce be disposed of without considerable loss.
The equitable regard, therefore, to his interest, requires that changes of this
kind should never be introduced suddenly, but slowly, gradually, and after a
very long warning. The legislature, were it possible that its deliberations
could be always directed, not by the clamorous importunity of partial
interests, but by an extensive view of the general good, ought, upon this
very account, perhaps, to be particularly careful, neither to establish any
new monopolies of this kind, nor to extend further those which are already
established. Every such regulation introduces some degree of real disorder
into the constitution of the state, which it will be difficult afterwards to cure
without occasioning another disorder.
How far it may be proper to impose taxes upon the importation of foreign
goods, in order not to prevent their importation, but to raise a revenue for
government, I shall consider hereafter when I come to treat of taxes. Taxes
imposed with a view to prevent, or even to diminish importation, are
evidently as destructive of the revenue of the customs as of the freedom of
trade.
CHAPTER III.
OF THE EXTRAORDINARY RESTRAINTS UPON
THE IMPORTATION OF GOODS OF ALMOST
ALL KINDS, FROM THOSE COUNTRIES WITH
WHICH THE BALANCE IS SUPPOSED TO BE
DISADVANTAGEOUS.
Part I—Of the Unreasonableness of those Restraints, even upon the
Principles of the Commercial System.
To lay extraordinary restraints upon the importation of goods of almost
all kinds, from those particular countries with which the balance of trade is
supposed to be disadvantageous, is the second expedient by which the
commercial system proposes to increase the quantity of gold and silver.
Thus, in Great Britain, Silesia lawns may be imported for home
consumption, upon paying certain duties; but French cambrics and lawns
are prohibited to be imported, except into the port of London, there to be
warehoused for exportation. Higher duties are imposed upon the wines of
France than upon those of Portugal, or indeed of any other country. By what
is called the impost 1692, a duty of five and-twenty per cent. of the rate or
value, was laid upon all French goods; while the goods of other nations
were, the greater part of them, subjected to much lighter duties, seldom
exceeding five per cent. The wine, brandy, salt, and vinegar of France, were
indeed excepted; these commodities being subjected to other heavy duties,
either by other laws, or by particular clauses of the same law. In 1696, a
second duty of twenty-five per cent. the first not having been thought a
sufficient discouragement, was imposed upon all French goods, except
brandy; together with a new duty of five-and-twenty pounds upon the ton of
French wine, and another of fifteen pounds upon the ton of French vinegar.
French goods have never been omitted in any of those general subsidies or
duties of five per cent. which have been imposed upon all, or the greater
part, of the goods enumerated in the book of rates. If we count the one-third
and two-third subsidies as making a complete subsidy between them, there
have been five of these general subsidies; so that, before the
commencement of the present war, seventy-five per cent. may be
considered as the lowest duty to which the greater part of the goods of the
growth, produce, or manufacture of France, were liable. But upon the
greater part of goods, those duties are equivalent to a prohibition. The
French, in their turn, have, I believe, treated our goods and manufactures
just as hardly; though I am not so well acquainted with the particular
hardships which they have imposed upon them. Those mutual restraints
have put an end to almost all fair commerce between the two nations; and
smugglers are now the principal importers, either of British goods into
France, or of French goods into Great Britain. The principles which I have
been examining, in the foregoing chapter, took their origin from private
interest and the spirit of monopoly; those which I am going te examine in
this, from national prejudice and animosity. They are, accordingly, as might
well be expected, still more unreasonable. They are so, even upon the
principles of the commercial system.
First, Though it were certain that in the case of a free trade between
France and England, for example, the balance would be in favour of France,
it would by no means follow that such a trade would be disadvantageous to
England, or that the general balance of its whole trade would thereby be
turned more against it. If the wines of France are better and cheaper than
those of Portugal, or its linens than those of Germany, it would be more
advantageous for Great Britain to purchase both the wine and the foreign
linen which it had occasion for of France, than of Portugal and Germany.
Though the value of the annual importations from France would thereby be
greatly augmented, the value of the whole annual importations would be
diminished, in proportion as the French goods of the same quality were
cheaper than those of the other two countries. This would be the case, even
upon the supposition that the whole French goods imported were to be
consumed in Great Britain.
But, Secondly, A great part of them might be re-exported to other
countries, where, being sold with profit, they might bring back a return,
equal in value, perhaps, to the prime cost of the whole French goods
imported. What has frequently been said of the East India trade, might
possibly be true of the French; that though the greater part of East India
goods were bought with gold and silver, the re-exportation of a part of them
to other countries brought back more gold and silver to that which carried
on the trade, than the prime cost of the whole amounted to. One of the most
important branches of the Dutch trade at present, consists in the carriage of
French goods to other European countries. Some part even of the French
wine drank in Great Britain, is clandestinely imported from Holland and
Zealand. If there was either a free trade between France and England, or if
French goods could be imported upon paying only the same duties as those
of other European nations, to be drawn back upon exportation, England
might have some share of a trade which is found so advantageous to
Holland.
Thirdly, and lastly, There is no certain criterion by which we can
determine on which side what is called the balance between any two
countries lies, or which of them exports to the greatest value. National
prejudice and animosity, prompted always by the private interest of
particular traders, are the principles which generally direct our judgment
upon all questions concerning it. There are two criterions, however, which
have frequently been appealed to upon such occasions, the custom-house
books and the course of exchange. The custom-house books, I think, it is
now generally acknowledged, are a very uncertain criterion, on account of
the inaccuracy of the valuation at which the greater part of goods are rated
in them. The course of exchange is, perhaps, almost equally so.
When the exchange between two places, such as London and Paris, is at
par, it is said to be a sign that the debts due from London to Paris are
compensated by those due from Paris to London. On the contrary, when a
premium is paid at London for a bill upon Paris, it is said to be a sign that
the debts due from London to Paris are not compensated by those due from
Paris to London, but that a balance in money must be sent out from the
latter place; for the risk, trouble, and expense, of exporting which, the
premium is both demanded and given. But the ordinary state of debt and
credit between those two cities must necessarily be regulated, it is said, by
the ordinary course of their dealings with one another. When neither of
them imports from from other to a greater amount than it exports to that
other, the debts and credits of each may compensate one another. But when
one of them imports from the other to a greater value than it exports to that
other, the former necessarily becomes indebted to the latter in a greater sum
than the latter becomes indebted to it: the debts and credits of each do not
compensate one another, and money must be sent out from that place of
which the debts overbalance the credits. The ordinary course of exchange,
therefore, being an indication of the ordinary state of debt and credit
between two places, must likewise be an indication of the ordinary course
of their exports and imports, as these necessarily regulate that state.
But though the ordinary course of exchange shall be allowed to be a
sufficient indication of the ordinary state of debt and credit between any
two places, it would not from thence follow, that the balance of trade was in
favour of that place which had the ordinary state of debt and credit in its
favour. The ordinary state of debt and credit between any two places is not
always entirely regulated by the ordinary course of their dealings with one
another, but is often influenced by that of the dealings of either with many
other places. If it is usual, for example, for the merchants of England to pay
for the goods which they buy of Hamburg, Dantzic, Riga, etc. by bills upon
Holland, the ordinary state of debt and credit between England and Holland
will not be regulated entirely by the ordinary course of the dealings of those
two countries with one another, but will be influenced by that of the
dealings in England with those other places. England may be obliged to
send out every year money to Holland, though its annual exports to that
country may exceed very much the annual value of its imports from thence,
and though what is called the balance of trade may be very much in favour
of England.
In the way, besides, in which the par of exchange has hitherto been
computed, the ordinary course of exchange can afford no sufficient
indication that the ordinary state of debt and credit is in favour of that
country which seems to have, or which is supposed to have, the ordinary
course of exchange in its favour; or, in other words, the real exchange may
be, and in fact often is, so very different from the computed one, that, from
the course of the latter, no certain conclusion can, upon many occasions, be
drawn concerning that of the former.
When for a sum or money paid in England, containing, according to the
standard of the English mint, a certain number of ounces of pure silver, you
receive a bill for a sum of money to be paid in France, containing,
according to the standard of the French mint, an equal number of ounces of
pure silver, exchange is said to be at par between England and France.
When you pay more, you are supposed to give a premium, and exchange is
said to be against England, and in favour of France. When you pay less, you
are supposed to get a premium, and exchange is said to be against France,
and in favour of England.
But, first, We cannot always judge of the value of the current money of
different countries by the standard of their respective mints. In some it is
more, in others it is less worn, clipt, and otherwise degenerated from that
standard. But the value of the current coin of every country, compared with
that of any other country, is in proportion, not to the quantity of pure silver
which it ought to contain, but to that which it actually does contain. Before
the reformation of the silver coin in King William’s time, exchange between
England and Holland, computed in the usual manner, according to the
standard of their respective mints, was five-and twenty per cent. against
England. But the value of the current coin of England, as we learn from Mr
Lowndes, was at that time rather more than five-and-twenty per cent. below
its standard value. The real exchange, therefore, may even at that time have
been in favour of England, notwithstanding the computed exchange was so
much against it; a smaller number or ounces of pure silver, actually paid in
England, may have purchased a bill for a greater number of ounces of pure
silver to be paid in Holland, and the man who was supposed to give, may in
reality have got the premium. The French coin was, before the late
reformation of the English gold coin, much less wore than the English, and
was perhaps two or three per cent. nearer its standard. If the computed
exchange with France, therefore, was not more than two or three per cent.
against England, the real exchange might have been in its favour. Since the
reformation of the gold coin, the exchange has been constantly in favour of
England, and against France.
Secondly, In some countries the expense of coinage is defrayed by the
government; in others, it is defrayed by the private people, who carry their
bullion to the mint, and the government even derives some revenue from
the coinage. In England it is defrayed by the government; and if you carry a
pound weight of standard silver to the mint, you get back sixty-two
shillings, containing a pound weight of the like standard silver. In France a
duty of eight per cent. is deducted for the coinage, which not only defrays
the expense of it, but affords a small revenue to the government. In
England, as the coinage costs nothing, the current coin can never be much
more valuable than the quantity of bullion which it actually contains. In
France, the workmanship, as you pay for it, adds to the value, in the same
manner as to that of wrought plate. A sum of French money, therefore,
containing an equal weight of pure silver, is more valuable than a sum of
English money containing an equal weight of pure silver, and must require
more bullion, or other commodities, to purchase it. Though the current coin
of the two countries, therefore, were equally near the standards of their
respective mints, a sum of English money could not well purchase a sum of
French money containing an equal number of ounces of pure silver, nor,
consequently, a bill upon France for such a sum. If, for such a bill, no more
additional money was paid than what was sufficient to compensate the
expense of the French coinage, the real exchange might be at par between
the two countries; their debts and credits might mutually compensate one
another, while the computed exchange was considerably in favour of
France. If less than this was paid, the real exchange might be in favour of
England, while the computed was in favour of France.
Thirdly, and lastly, In some places, as at Amsterdam, Hamburg, Venice,
etc. foreign bills of exchange are paid in what they call bank money; while
in others, as at London, Lisbon, Antwerp, Leghorn, etc. they are paid in the
common currency of the country. What is called bank money, is always of
more value than the same nominal sum of common currency. A thousand
guilders in the bank of Amsterdam, for example, are of more value than a
thousand guilders of Amsterdam currency. The difference between them is
called the agio of the bank, which at Amsterdam is generally about five per
cent. Supposing the current money of the two countries equally near to the
standard of their respective mints, and that the one pays foreign bills in this
common currency, while the other pays them in bank money, it is evident
that the computed exchange may be in favour of that which pays in bank
money, though the real exchange should be in favour of that which pays in
current money; for the same reason that the computed exchange may be in
favour of that which pays in better money, or in money nearer to its own
standard, though the real exchange should be in favour of that which pays
in worse. The computed exchange, before the late reformation of the gold
coin, was generally against London with Amsterdam, Hamburg, Venice,
and, I believe, with all other places which pay in what is called bank money.
It will by no means follow, however, that the real exchange was against it.
Since the reformation of the gold coin, it has been in favour of London,
even with those places. The computed exchange has generally been in
favour of London with Lisbon, Antwerp, Leghorn, and, if you except
France, I believe with most other parts of Europe that pay in common
currency; and it is not improbable that the real exchange was so too.
Digression concerning Banks of Deposit, particularly concerning that of
Amsterdam.
The currency of a great state, such as France or England, generally
consists almost entirely of its own coin. Should this currency, therefore, be
at any time worn, clipt, or otherwise degraded below its standard value, the
state, by a reformation of its coin, can effectually re-establish its currency.
But the currency of a small state, such as Genoa or Hamburg, can seldom
consist altogether in its own coin, but must be made up, in a great measure,
of the coins of all the neighbouring states with which its inhabitants have a
continual intercourse. Such a state, therefore, by reforming its coin, will not
always be able to reform its currency. If foreign bills of exchange are paid
in this currency, the uncertain value of any sum, of what is in its own nature
so uncertain, must render the exchange always very much against such a
state, its currency being in all foreign states necessarily valued even below
what it is worth.
In order to remedy the inconvenience to which this disadvantageous
exchange must have subjected their merchants, such small states, when they
began to attend to the interest of trade, have frequently enacted that foreign
bills of exchange of a certain value should be paid, not in common
currency, but by an order upon, or by a transfer in the books of a certain
bank, established upon the credit, and under the protection of the state, this
bank being always obliged to pay, in good and true money, exactly
according to the standard of the state. The banks of Venice, Genoa,
Amsterdam, Hamburg, and Nuremberg, seem to have been all originally
established with this view, though some of them may have afterwards been
made subservient to other purposes. The money of such banks, being better
than the common currency of the country, necessarily bore an agio, which
was greater or smaller, according as the currency was supposed to be more
or less degraded below the standard of the state. The agio of the bank of
Hamburg, for example, which is said to be commonly about fourteen per
cent. is the supposed difference between the good standard money of the
state, and the clipt, worn, and diminished currency, poured into it from all
the neighbouring states.
Before 1609, the great quantity of clipt and worn foreign coin which the
extensive trade of Amsterdam brought from all parts of Europe, reduced the
value of its currency about nine per cent. below that of good money fresh
from the mint. Such money no sooner appeared, than it was melted down or
carried away, as it always is in such circumstances. The merchants, with
plenty of currency, could not always find a sufficient quantity of good
money to pay their bills of exchange; and the value of those bills, in spite of
several regulations which were made to prevent it, became in a great
measure uncertain.
In order to remedy these inconveniencies, a bank was established in
1609, under the guarantee of the city. This bank received both foreign coin,
and the light and worn coin of the country, at its real intrinsic value in the
good standard money of the country, deducting only so much as was
necessary for defraying the expense of coinage and the other necessary
expense of management. For the value which remained after this small
deduction was made, it gave a credit in its books. This credit was called
bank money, which, as it represented money exactly according to the
standard of the mint, was always of the same real value, and intrinsically
worth more than current money. It was at the same time enacted, that all
bills drawn upon or negotiated at Amsterdam, of the value of 600 guilders
and upwards, should be paid in bank money, which at once took away all
uncertainty in the value of those bills. Every merchant, in consequence of
this regulation, was obliged to keep an account with the bank, in order to
pay his foreign bills of exchange, which necessarily occasioned a certain
demand for bank money.
Bank money, over and above both its intrinsic superiority to currency,
and the additional value which this demand necessarily gives it, has
likewise some other advantages, It is secure from fire, robbery, and other
accidents; the city of Amsterdam is bound for it; it can be paid away by a
simple transfer, without the trouble of counting, or the risk of transporting it
from one place to another. In consequence of those different advantages, it
seems from the beginning to have borne an agio; and it is generally believed
that all the money originally deposited in the bank, was allowed to remain
there, nobody caring to demand payment of a debt which he could sell for a
premium in the market. By demanding payment of the bank, the owner of a
bank credit would lose this premium. As a shilling fresh from the mint will
buy no more goods in the market than one of our common worn shillings,
so the good and true money which might be brought from the coffers of the
bank into those of a private person, being mixed and confounded with the
common currency of the country, would be of no more value than that
currency, from which it could no longer be readily distinguished. While it
remained in the coffers of the bank, its superiority was known and
ascertained. When it had come into those of a private person, its superiority
could not well be ascertained without more trouble than perhaps the
difference was worth. By being brought from the coffers of the bank,
besides, it lost all the other advantages of bank money; its security, its easy
and safe transferability, its use in paying foreign bills of exchange. Over
and above all this, it could not be brought from those coffers, as will appear
by and by, without previously paying for the keeping.
Those deposits of coin, or those deposits which the bank was bound to
restore in coin, constituted the original capital of the bank, or the whole
value of what was represented by what is called bank money. At present
they are supposed to constitute but a very small part of it. In order to
facilitate the trade in bullion, the bank has been for these many years in the
practice of giving credit in its books, upon deposits of gold and silver
bullion. This credit is generally about five per cent. below the mint price of
such bullion. The bank grants at the same time what is called a recipice or
receipt, entitling the person who makes the deposit, or the bearer, to take
out the bullion again at any time within six months, upon transferring to the
bank a quantity of bank money equal to that for which credit had been
given in its books when the deposit was made, and upon paying one-fourth
per cent. for the keeping, if the deposit was in silver; and one-half per cent.
if it was in gold; but at the same time declaring, that in default of such
payment, and upon the expiration of this term, the deposit should belong to
the bank, at the price at which it had been received, or for which credit had
been given in the transfer books. What is thus paid for the keeping of the
deposit may be considered as a sort of warehouse rent; and why this
warehouse rent should be so much dearer for gold than for silver, several
different reasons have been assigned. The fineness of gold, it has been said,
is more difficult to be ascertained than that of silver. Frauds are more easily
practised, and occasion a greater loss in the most precious metal. Silver,
besides, being the standard metal, the state, it has been said, wishes to
encourage more the making of deposits of silver than those of gold.
Deposits of bullion are most commonly made when the price is
somewhat lower than ordinary, and they are taken out again when it
happens to rise. In Holland the market price of bullion is generally above
the mint price, for the same reason that it was so in England before the late
reformation of the gold coin. The difference is said to be commonly from
about six to sixteen stivers upon the mark, or eight ounces of silver, of
eleven parts of fine and one part alloy. The bank price, or the credit which
the bank gives for the deposits of such silver (when made in foreign coin, of
which the fineness is well known and ascertained, such as Mexico dollars),
is twenty-two guilders the mark: the mint price is about twenty-three
guilders, and the market price is from twenty-three guilders six, to twenty-
three guilders sixteen stivers, or from two to three per cent. above the mint
price.
The following are the prices at which the bank of Amsterdam at present
{September 1775} receives bullion and coin of different kinds:
                              SILVER
     Mexico dollars .................  22  Guilders / mark
     French crowns ..................  22
     English silver coin.............  22
     Mexico dollars, new coin........  21  10
     Ducatoons.......................   3   0
     Rix-dollars.....................   2   8
Bar silver, containing 11-12ths fine silver, 21 Guilders / mark, and in this
proportion down to 1-4th fine, on which 5 guilders are given. Fine
bars,................. 28 Guilders / mark.
                              GOLD
     Portugal coin.................  310  Guilders / mark
     Guineas.......................  310
     Louis d’ors, new..............  310
     Ditto        old..............  300
     New ducats....................    4  19  8  per ducat
Bar or ingot gold is received in proportion to its fineness, compared with
the above foreign gold coin. Upon fine bars the bank gives 340 per mark. In
general, however, something more is given upon coin of a known fineness,
than upon gold and silver bars, of which the fineness cannot be ascertained
but by a process of melting and assaying.
The proportions between the bank price, the mint price, and the market
price of gold bullion, are nearly the same. A person can generally sell his
receipt for the difference between the mint price of bullion and the market
price. A receipt for bullion is almost always worth something, and it very
seldom happens, therefore, that anybody suffers his receipts to expire, or
allows his bullion to fall to the bank at the price at which it had been
received, either by not taking it out before the end of the six months, or by
neglecting to pay one fourth or one half per cent. in order to obtain a new
receipt for another six months. This, however, though it happens seldom, is
said to happen sometimes, and more frequently with regard to gold than
with regard to silver, on account of the higher warehouse rent which is paid
for the keeping of the more precious metal.
The person who, by making a deposit of bullion, obtains both a bank
credit and a receipt, pays his bills of exchange as they become due, with his
bank credit; and either sells or keeps his receipt, according as he judges that
the price of bullion is likely to rise or to fall. The receipt and the bank credit
seldom keep long together, and there is no occasion that they should. The
person who has a receipt, and who wants to take out bullion, finds always
plenty of bank credits, or bank money, to buy at the ordinary price, and the
person who has bank money, and wants to take out bullion, finds receipts
always in equal abundance.
The owners of bank credits, and the holders of receipts, constitute two
different sorts of creditors against the bank. The holder of a receipt cannot
draw out the bullion for which it is granted, without re-assigning to the
bank a sum of bank money equal to the price at which the bullion had been
received. If he has no bank money of his own, he must purchase it of those
who have it. The owner of bank money cannot draw out bullion, without
producing to the bank receipts for the quantity which he wants. If he has
none of his own, he must buy them of those who have them. The holder of a
receipt, when he purchases bank money, purchases the power of taking out
a quantity of bullion, of which the mint price is five per cent. above the
bank price. The agio of five per cent. therefore, which he commonly pays
for it, is paid, not for an imaginary, but for a real value. The owner of bank
money, when he purchases a receipt, purchases the power of taking out a
quantity of bullion, of which the market price is commonly from two to
three per cent. above the mint price. The price which he pays for it,
therefore, is paid likewise for a real value. The price of the receipt, and the
price of the bank money, compound or make up between them the full value
or price of the bullion.
Upon deposits of the coin current in the country, the bank grant receipts
likewise, as well as bank credits; but those receipts are frequently of no
value and will bring no price in the market. Upon ducatoons, for example,
which in the currency pass for three guilders three stivers each, the bank
gives a credit of three guilders only, or five per cent. below their current
value. It grants a receipt likewise, entitling the bearer to take out the number
of ducatoons deposited at any time within six months, upon paying one
fourth per cent. for the keeping. This receipt will frequently bring no price
in the market. Three guilders, bank money, generally sell in the market for
three guilders three stivers, the full value of the ducatoons, if they were
taken out of the bank; and before they can be taken out, one-fourth per cent.
must be paid for the keeping, which would be mere loss to the holder of the
receipt. If the agio of the bank, however, should at any time fall to three per
cent. such receipts might bring some price in the market, and might sell for
one and three-fourths per cent. But the agio of the bank being now
generally about five per cent. such receipts are frequently allowed to expire,
or, as they express it, to fall to the bank. The receipts which are given for
deposits of gold ducats fall to it yet more frequently, because a higher
warehouse rent, or one half per cent. must be paid for the keeping of them,
before they can be taken out again. The five per cent. which the bank gains,
when deposits either of coin or bullion are allowed to fall to it, maybe
considered as the warehouse rent for the perpetual keeping of such deposits.
The sum of bank money, for which the receipts are expired, must be very
considerable. It must comprehend the whole original capital of the bank,
which, it is generally supposed, has been allowed to remain there from the
time it was first deposited, nobody caring either to renew his receipt, or to
take out his deposit, as, for the reasons already assigned, neither the one nor
the other could be done without loss. But whatever may be the amount of
this sum, the proportion which it bears to the whole mass of bank money is
supposed to be very small. The bank of Amsterdam has, for these many
years past, been the great warehouse of Europe for bullion, for which the
receipts are very seldom allowed to expire, or, as they express it, to fall to
the bank. The far greater part of the bank money, or of the credits upon the
books of the bank, is supposed to have been created, for these many years
past, by such deposits, which the dealers in bullion are continually both
making and withdrawing.
No demand can be made upon the bank, but by means of a recipice or
receipt. The smaller mass of bank money, for which the receipts are
expired, is mixed and confounded with the much greater mass for which
they are still in force; so that, though there may be a considerable sum of
bank money, for which there are no receipts, there is no specific sum or
portion of it which may not at any time be demanded by one. The bank
cannot be debtor to two persons for the same thing; and the owner of bank
money who has no receipt, cannot demand payment of the bank till he buys
one. In ordinary and quiet times, he can find no difficulty in getting one to
buy at the market price, which generally corresponds with the price at
which he can sell the coin or bullion it entitles him to take out of the bank.
It might be otherwise during a public calamity; an invasion, for example,
such as that of the French in 1672. The owners of bank money being then
all eager to draw it out of the bank, in order to have it in their own keeping,
the demand for receipts might raise their price to an exorbitant height. The
holders of them might form extravagant expectations, and, instead of two or
three per cent. demand half the bank money for which credit had been given
upon the deposits that the receipts had respectively been granted for. The
enemy, informed of the constitution of the bank, might even buy them up,
in order to prevent the carrying away of the treasure. In such emergencies,
the bank, it is supposed, would break through its ordinary rule of making
payment only to the holders of receipts. The holders of receipts, who had no
bank money, must have received within two or three per cent. of the value
of the deposit for which their respective receipts had been granted. The
bank, therefore, it is said, would in this case make no scruple of paying,
either with money or bullion, the full value of what the owners of bank
money, who could get no receipts, were credited for in its books; paying, at
the same time, two or three per cent. to such holders of receipts as had no
bank money, that being the whole value which, in this state of things, could
justly be supposed due to them.
Even in ordinary and quiet times, it is the interest of the holders of
receipts to depress the agio, in order either to buy bank money (and
consequently the bullion which their receipts would then enable them to
take out of the bank ) so much cheaper, or to sell their receipts to those who
have bank money, and who want to take out bullion, so much dearer; the
price of a receipt being generally equal to the difference between the market
price of bank money and that of the coin or bullion for which the receipt
had been granted. It is the interest of the owners of bank money, on the
contrary, to raise the agio, in order either to sell their bank money so much
dearer, or to buy a receipt so much cheaper. To prevent the stock-jobbing
tricks which those opposite interests might sometimes occasion, the bank
has of late years come to the resolution, to sell at all times bank money for
currency at five per cent. agio, and to buy it in again at four per cent. agio.
In consequence of this resolution, the agio can never either rise above five,
or sink below four per cent.; and the proportion between the market price of
bank and that of current money is kept at all times very near the proportion
between their intrinsic values. Before this resolution was taken, the market
price of bank money used sometimes to rise so high as nine per cent. agio,
and sometimes to sink so low as par, according as opposite interests
happened to influence the market.
The bank of Amsterdam professes to lend out no part of what is
deposited with it, but for every guilder for which it gives credit in its books,
to keep in its repositories the value of a guilder either in money or bullion.
That it keeps in its repositories all the money or bullion for which there are
receipts in force for which it is at all times liable to be called upon, and
which in reality is continually going from it, and returning to it again,
cannot well be doubted. But whether it does so likewise with regard to that
part of its capital for which the receipts are long ago expired, for which, in
ordinary and quiet times, it cannot be called upon, and which, in reality, is
very likely to remain with it for ever, or as long as the states of the United
Provinces subsist, may perhaps appear more uncertain. At Amsterdam,
however, no point of faith is better established than that, for every guilder
circulated as bank money, there is a correspondent guilder in gold or silver
to be found in the treasures of the bank. The city is guarantee that it should
be so. The bank is under the direction of the four reigning burgomasters
who are changed every year. Each new set of burgomasters visits the
treasure, compares it with the books, receives it upon oath, and delivers it
over, with the same awful solemnity to the set which succeeds; and in that
sober and religious country, oaths are not yet disregarded. A rotation of this
kind seems alone a sufficient security against any practices which cannot be
avowed. Amidst all the revolutions which faction has ever occasioned in the
government of Amsterdam, the prevailing party has at no time accused their
predecessors of infidelity in the administration of the bank. No accusation
could have affected more deeply the reputation and fortune of the disgraced
party; and if such an accusation could have been supported, we may be
assured that it would have been brought. In 1672, when the French king was
at Utrecht, the bank of Amsterdam paid so readily, as left no doubt of the
fidelity with which it had observed its engagements. Some of the pieces
which were then brought from its repositories, appeared to have been
scorched with the fire which happened in the town-house soon after the
bank was established. Those pieces, therefore, must have lain there from
that time.
What may be the amount of the treasure in the bank, is a question which
has long employed the speculations of the curious. Nothing but conjecture
can be offered concerning it. It is generally reckoned, that there are about
2000 people who keep accounts with the bank; and allowing them to have,
one with another, the value of £1500 sterling lying upon their respective
accounts (a very large allowance), the whole quantity of bank money, and
consequently of treasure in the bank, will amount to about £3,000,000
sterling, or, at eleven guilders the pound sterling, 33,000,000 of guilders; a
great sum, and sufficient to carry on a very extensive circulation, but vastly
below the extravagant ideas which some people have formed of this
treasure.
The city of Amsterdam derives a considerable revenue from the bank.
Besides what may be called the warehouse rent above mentioned, each
person, upon first opening an account with the bank, pays a fee of ten
guilders; and for every new account, three guilders three stivers; for every
transfer, two stivers; and if the transfer is for less than 300 guilders, six
stivers, in order to discourage the multiplicity of small transactions. The
person who neglects to balance his account twice in the year, forfeits
twenty-five guilders. The person who orders a transfer for more than is
upon his account, is obliged to pay three per cent. for the sum overdrawn,
and his order is set aside into the bargain. The bank is supposed, too, to
make a considerable profit by the sale of the foreign coin or bullion which
sometimes falls to it by the expiring of receipts, and which is always kept
till it can be sold with advantage. It makes a profit, likewise, by selling bank
money at five per cent. agio, and buying it in at four. These different
emoluments amount to a good deal more than what is necessary for paying
the salaries of officers, and defraying the expense of management. What is
paid for the keeping of bullion upon receipts, is alone supposed to amount
to a neat annual revenue of between 150,000 and 200,000 guilders. Public
utility, however, and not revenue, was the original object of this institution.
Its object was to relieve the merchants from the inconvenience of a
disadvantageous exchange. The revenue which has arisen from it was
unforeseen, and may be considered as accidental. But it is now time to
return from this long digression, into which I have been insensibly led, in
endeavouring to explain the reasons why the exchange between the
countries which pay in what is called bank money, and those which pay in
common currency, should generally appear to be in favour of the former,
and against the latter. The former pay in a species of money, of which the
intrinsic value is always the same, and exactly agreeable to the standard of
their respective mints; the latter is a species of money, of which the intrinsic
value is continually varying, and is almost always more or less below that
standard.
PART II.—Of the Unreasonableness of those extraordinary
Restraints, upon other Principles.
In the foregoing part of this chapter, I have endeavoured to show, even
upon the principles of the commercial system, how unnecessary it is to lay
extraordinary restraints upon the importation of goods from those countries
with which the balance of trade is supposed to be disadvantageous.
Nothing, however, can be more absurd than this whole doctrine of the
balance of trade, upon which, not only these restraints, but almost all the
other regulations of commerce, are founded. When two places trade with
one another, this doctrine supposes that, if the balance be even, neither of
them either loses or gains; but if it leans in any degree to one side, that one
of them loses, and the other gains, in proportion to its declension from the
exact equilibrium. Both suppositions are false. A trade, which is forced by
means of bounties and monopolies, may be, and commonly is,
disadvantageous to the country in whose favour it is meant to be
established, as I shall endeavour to show hereafter. But that trade which,
without force or constraint, is naturally and regularly carried on between
any two places, is always advantageous, though not always equally so, to
both.
By advantage or gain, I understand, not the increase of the quantity of
gold and silver, but that of the exchangeable value of the annual produce of
the land and labour of the country, or the increase of the annual revenue of
its inhabitants.
If the balance be even, and if the trade between the two places consist
altogether in the exchange of their native commodities, they will, upon most
occasions, not only both gain, but they will gain equally, or very nearly
equally; each will, in this case, afford a market for a part of the surplus
produce of the other; each will replace a capital which had been employed
in raising and preparing for the market this part of the surplus produce of
the other, and which had been distributed among, and given revenue and
maintenance to, a certain number of its inhabitants. Some part of the
inhabitants of each, therefore, will directly derive their revenue and
maintenance from the other. As the commodities exchanged, too, are
supposed to be of equal value, so the two capitals employed in the trade
will, upon most occasions, be equal, or very nearly equal; and both being
employed in raising the native commodities of the two countries, the
revenue and maintenance which their distribution will afford to the
inhabitants of each will be equal, or very nearly equal. This revenue and
maintenance, thus mutually afforded, will be greater or smaller, in
proportion to the extent of their dealings. If these should annually amount to
£100,000, for example, or to £1,000,000, on each side, each of them will
afford an annual revenue, in the one case, of £100,000, and, in the other, of
£1,000,000, to the inhabitants of the other.
If their trade should be of such a nature, that one of them exported to the
other nothing but native commodities, while the returns of that other
consisted altogether in foreign goods; the balance, in this case, would still
be supposed even, commodities being paid for with commodities. They
would, in this case too, both gain, but they would not gain equally; and the
inhabitants of the country which exported nothing but native commodities,
would derive the greatest revenue from the trade. If England, for example,
should import from France nothing but the native commodities of that
country, and not having such commodities of its own as were in demand
there, should annually repay them by sending thither a large quantity of
foreign goods, tobacco, we shall suppose, and East India goods; this trade,
though it would give some revenue to the inhabitants of both countries,
would give more to those of France than to those of England. The whole
French capital annually employed in it would annually be distributed
among the people of France; but that part of the English capital only, which
was employed in producing the English commodities with which those
foreign goods were purchased, would be annually distributed among the
people of England. The greater part of it would replace the capitals which
had been employed in Virginia, Indostan, and China, and which had given
revenue and maintenance to the inhabitants of those distant countries. If the
capitals were equal, or nearly equal, therefore, this employment of the
French capital would augment much more the revenue of the people of
France, than that of the English capital would the revenue of the people of
England. France would, in this case, carry on a direct foreign trade of
consumption with England; whereas England would carry on a round-about
trade of the same kind with France. The different effects of a capital
employed in the direct, and of one employed in the round-about foreign
trade of consumption, have already been fully explained.
There is not, probably, between any two countries, a trade which consists
altogether in the exchange, either of native commodities on both sides, or of
native commodities on one side, and of foreign goods on the other. Almost
all countries exchange with one another, partly native and partly foreign
goods. That country, however, in whose cargoes there is the greatest
proportion of native, and the least of foreign goods, will always be the
principal gainer.
If it was not with tobacco and East India goods, but with gold and silver,
that England paid for the commodities annually imported from France, the
balance, in this case, would be supposed uneven, commodities not being
paid for with commodities, but with gold and silver. The trade, however,
would in this case, as in the foregoing, give some revenue to the inhabitants
of both countries, but more to those of France than to those of England. It
would give some revenue to those of England. The capital which had been
employed in producing the English goods that purchased this gold and
silver, the capital which had been distributed among, and given revenue to,
certain inhabitants of England, would thereby be replaced, and enabled to
continue that employment. The whole capital of England would no more be
diminished by this exportation of gold and silver, than by the exportation of
an equal value of any other goods. On the contrary, it would, in most cases,
be augmented. No goods are sent abroad but those for which the demand is
supposed to be greater abroad than at home, and of which the returns,
consequently, it is expected, will be of more value at home than the
commodities exported. If the tobacco which in England is worth only
£100,000, when sent to France, will purchase wine which is in England
worth £110,000, the exchange will augment the capital of England by
£10,000. If £100,000 of English gold, in the same manner, purchase French
wine, which in England is worth £110,000, this exchange will equally
augment the capital of England by £10,000. As a merchant, who has
£110,000 worth of wine in his cellar, is a richer man than he who has only
£100,000 worth of tobacco in his warehouse, so is he likewise a richer man
than he who has only £100,000 worth of gold in his coffers. He can put into
motion a greater quantity of industry, and give revenue, maintenance, and
employment, to a greater number of people, than either of the other two.
But the capital of the country is equal to the capital of all its different
inhabitants; and the quantity of industry which can be annually maintained
in it is equal to what all those different capitals can maintain. Both the
capital of the country, therefore, and the quantity of industry which can be
annually maintained in it, must generally be augmented by this exchange. It
would, indeed, be more advantageous for England that it could purchase the
wines of France with its own hardware and broad cloth, than with either the
tobacco of Virginia, or the gold and silver of Brazil and Peru. A direct
foreign trade of consumption is always more advantageous than a round-
about one. But a round-about foreign trade of consumption, which is carried
on with gold and silver, does not seem to be less advantageous than any
other equally round-about one. Neither is a country which has no mines,
more likely to be exhausted of gold and silver by this annual exportation of
those metals, than one which does not grow tobacco by the like annual
exportation of that plant. As a country which has wherewithal to buy
tobacco will never be long in want of it, so neither will one be long in want
of gold and silver which has wherewithal to purchase those metals.
It is a losing trade, it is said, which a workman carries on with the
alehouse; and the trade which a manufacturing nation would naturally carry
on with a wine country, may be considered as a trade of the same nature. I
answer, that the trade with the alehouse is not necessarily a losing trade. In
its own nature it is just as advantageous as any other, though, perhaps,
somewhat more liable to be abused. The employment of a brewer, and even
that of a retailer of fermented liquors, are as necessary divisions of labour
as any other. It will generally be more advantageous for a workman to buy
of the brewer the quantity he has occasion for, than to brew it himself; and
if he is a poor workman, it will generally be more advantageous for him to
buy it by little and little of the retailer, than a large quantity of the brewer.
He may no doubt buy too much of either, as he may of any other dealers in
his neighbourhood; of the butcher, if he is a glutton; or of the draper, if he
affects to be a beau among his companions. It is advantageous to the great
body of workmen, notwithstanding, that all these trades should be free,
though this freedom may be abused in all of them, and is more likely to be
so, perhaps, in some than in others. Though individuals, besides, may
sometimes ruin their fortunes by an excessive consumption of fermented
liquors, there seems to be no risk that a nation should do so. Though in
every country there are many people who spend upon such liquors more
than they can afford, there are always many more who spend less. It
deserves to be remarked, too, that if we consult experience, the cheapness
of wine seems to be a cause, not of drunkenness, but of sobriety. The
inhabitants of the wine countries are in general the soberest people of
Europe; witness the Spaniards, the Italians, and the inhabitants of the
southern provinces of France. People are seldom guilty of excess in what is
their daily fare. Nobody affects the character of liberality and good
fellowship, by being profuse of a liquor which is as cheap as small beer. On
the contrary, in the countries which, either from excessive heat or cold,
produce no grapes, and where wine consequently is dear and a rarity,
drunkenness is a common vice, as among the northern nations, and all those
who live between the tropics, the negroes, for example on the coast of
Guinea. When a French regiment comes from some of the northern
provinces of France, where wine is somewhat dear, to be quartered in the
southern, where it is very cheap, the soldiers, I have frequently heard it
observed, are at first debauched by the cheapness and novelty of good wine;
but after a few months residence, the greater part of them become as sober
as the rest of the inhabitants. Were the duties upon foreign wines, and the
excises upon malt, beer, and ale, to be taken away all at once, it might, in
the same manner, occasion in Great Britain a pretty general and temporary
drunkenness among the middling and inferior ranks of people, which would
probably be soon followed by a permanent and almost universal sobriety.
At present, drunkenness is by no means the vice of people of fashion, or of
those who can easily afford the most expensive liquors. A gentleman drunk
with ale has scarce ever been seen among us. The restraints upon the wine
trade in Great Britain, besides, do not so much seem calculated to hinder the
people from going, if I may say so, to the alehouse, as from going where
they can buy the best and cheapest liquor. They favour the wine trade of
Portugal, and discourage that of France. The Portuguese, it is said, indeed,
are better customers for our manufactures than the French, and should
therefore be encouraged in preference to them. As they give us their
custom, it is pretended we should give them ours. The sneaking arts of
underling tradesmen are thus erected into political maxims for the conduct
of a great empire; for it is the most underling tradesmen only who make it a
rule to employ chiefly their own customers. A great trader purchases his
goods always where they are cheapest and best, without regard to any little
interest of this kind.
By such maxims as these, however, nations have been taught that their
interest consisted in beggaring all their neighbours. Each nation has been
made to look with an invidious eye upon the prosperity of all the nations
with which it trades, and to consider their gain as its own loss. Commerce,
which ought naturally to be, among nations as among individuals, a bond of
union and friendship, has become the most fertile source of discord and
animosity. The capricious ambition of kings and ministers has not, during
the present and the preceding century, been more fatal to the repose of
Europe, than the impertinent jealousy of merchants and manufacturers. The
violence and injustice of the rulers of mankind is an ancient evil, for which,
I am afraid, the nature of human affairs can scarce admit of a remedy: but
the mean rapacity, the monopolizing spirit, of merchants and manufacturers,
who neither are, nor ought to be, the rulers of mankind, though it cannot,
perhaps, be corrected, may very easily be prevented from disturbing the
tranquillity of anybody but themselves.
That it was the spirit of monopoly which originally both invented and
propagated this doctrine, cannot be doubted and they who first taught it,
were by no means such fools as they who believed it. In every country it
always is, and must be, the interest of the great body of the people, to buy
whatever they want of those who sell it cheapest. The proposition is so very
manifest, that it seems ridiculous to take any pains to prove it; nor could it
ever have been called in question, had not the interested sophistry of
merchants and manufacturers confounded the common sense of mankind.
Their interest is, in this respect, directly opposite to that of the great body of
the people. As it is the interest of the freemen of a corporation to hinder the
rest of the inhabitants from employing any workmen but themselves; so it is
the interest of the merchants and manufacturers of every country to secure
to themselves the monopoly of the home market. Hence, in Great Britain,
and in most other European countries, the extraordinary duties upon almost
all goods imported by alien merchants. Hence the high duties and
prohibitions upon all those foreign manufactures which can come into
competition with our own. Hence, too, the extraordinary restraints upon the
importation of almost all sorts of goods from those countries with which the
balance of trade is supposed to be disadvantageous; that is, from those
against whom national animosity happens ta be most violently inflamed.
The wealth of neighbouring nations, however, though dangerous in war
and politics, is certainly advantageous in trade. In a state of hostility, it may
enable our enemies to maintain fleets and armies superior to our own; but in
a state of peace and commerce it must likewise enable them to exchange
with us to a greater value, and to afford a better market, either for the
immediate produce of our own industry, or for whatever is purchased with
that produce. As a rich man is likely to be a better customer to the
industrious people in his neighbourhood, than a poor, so is likewise a rich
nation. A rich man, indeed, who is himself a manufacturer, is a very
dangerous neighbour to all those who deal in the same way. All the rest of
the neighbourhood, however, by far the greatest number, profit by the good
market which his expense affords them. They even profit by his
underselling the poorer workmen who deal in the same way with him. The
manufacturers of a rich nation, in the same manner, may no doubt be very
dangerous rivals to those of their neighbours. This very competition,
however, is advantageous to the great body of the people, who profit
greatly, besides, by the good market which the great expense of such a
nation affords them in every other way. Private people, who want to make a
fortune, never think of retiring to the remote and poor provinces of the
country, but resort either to the capital, or to some of the great commercial
towns. They know, that where little wealth circulates, there is little to be
got; but that where a great deal is in motion, some share of it may fall to
them. The same maxim which would in this manner direct the common
sense of one, or ten, or twenty individuals, should regulate the judgment of
one, or ten, or twenty millions, and should make a whole nation regard the
riches of its neighbours, as a probable cause and occasion for itself to
acquire riches. A nation that would enrich itself by foreign trade, is
certainly most likely to do so, when its neighbours are all rich, industrious
and commercial nations. A great nation, surrounded on all sides by
wandering savages and poor barbarians, might, no doubt, acquire riches by
the cultivation of its own lands, and by its own interior commerce, but not
by foreign trade. It seems to have been in this manner that the ancient
Egyptians and the modern Chinese acquired their great wealth. The ancient
Egyptians, it is said, neglected foreign commerce, and the modern Chinese,
it is known, hold it in the utmost contempt, and scarce deign to afford it the
decent protection of the laws. The modern maxims of foreign commerce, by
aiming at the impoverishment of all our neighbours, so far as they are
capable of producing their intended effect, tend to render that very
commerce insignificant and contemptible.
It is in consequence of these maxims, that the commerce between France
and England has, in both countries, been subjected to so many
discouragements and restraints. If those two countries, however, were to
consider their real interest, without either mercantile jealousy or national
animosity, the commerce of France might be more advantageous to Great
Britain than that of any other country, and, for the same reason, that of
Great Britain to France. France is the nearest neighbour to Great Britain. In
the trade between the southern coast of England and the northern and north-
western coast of France, the returns might be expected, in the same manner
as in the inland trade, four, five, or six times in the year. The capital,
therefore, employed in this trade could, in each of the two countries, keep in
motion four, five, or six times the quantity of industry, and afford
employment and subsistence to four, five, or six times the number of
people, which all equal capital could do in the greater part of the other
branches of foreign trade. Between the parts of France and Great Britain
most remote from one another, the returns might be expected, at least, once
in the year; and even this trade would so far be at least equally
advantageous, as the greater part of the other branches of our foreign
European trade. It would be, at least, three times more advantageous than
the boasted trade with our North American colonies, in which the returns
were seldom made in less than three years, frequently not in less than four
or five years. France, besides, is supposed to contain 24,000,000 of
inhabitants. Our North American colonies were never supposed to contain
more than 3,000,000; and France is a much richer country than North
America; though, on account of the more unequal distribution of riches,
there is much more poverty and beggary in the one country than in the
other. France, therefore, could afford a market at least eight times more
extensive, and, on account of the superior frequency of the returns, four-
and-twenty times more advantageous than that which our North American
colonies ever afforded. The trade of Great Britain would be just as
advantageous to France, and, in proportion to the wealth, population, and
proximity of the respective countries, would have the same superiority over
that which France carries on with her own colonies. Such is the very great
difference between that trade which the wisdom of both nations has thought
proper to discourage, and that which it has favoured the most.
But the very same circumstances which would have rendered an open
and free commerce between the two countries so advantageous to both,
have occasioned the principal obstructions to that commerce. Being
neighbours, they are necessarily enemies, and the wealth and power of each
becomes, upon that account, more formidable to the other; and what would
increase the advantage of national friendship, serves only to inflame the
violence of national animosity. They are both rich and industrious nations;
and the merchants and manufacturers of each dread the competition of the
skill and activity of those of the other. Mercantile jealousy is excited, and
both inflames, and is itself inflamed, by the violence of national animosity,
and the traders of both countries have announced, with all the passionate
confidence of interested falsehood, the certain ruin of each, in consequence
of that unfavourable balance of trade, which, they pretend, would be the
infallible effect of an unrestrained commerce with the other.
There is no commercial country in Europe, of which the approaching ruin
has not frequently been foretold by the pretended doctors of this system,
from all unfavourably balance of trade. After all the anxiety, however,
which they have excited about this, after all the vain attempts of almost all
trading nations to turn that balance in their own favour, and against their
neighbours, it does not appear that any one nation in Europe has been, in
any respect, impoverished by this cause. Every town and country, on the
contrary, in proportion as they have opened their ports to all nations, instead
of being ruined by this free trade, as the principles of the commercial
system would lead us to expect, have been enriched by it. Though there are
in Europe indeed, a few towns which, in same respects, deserve the name of
free ports, there is no country which does so. Holland, perhaps, approaches
the nearest to this character of any, though still very remote from it; and
Holland, it is acknowledged, not only derives its whole wealth, but a great
part of its necessary subsistence, from foreign trade.
There is another balance, indeed, which has already been explained, very
different from the balance of trade, and which, according as it happens to be
either favourable or unfavourable, necessarily occasions the prosperity or
decay of every nation. This is the balance of the annual produce and
consumption. If the exchangeable value of the annual produce, it has
already been observed, exceeds that of the annual consumption, the capital
of the society must annually increase in proportion to this excess. The
society in this case lives within its revenue; and what is annually saved out
of its revenue, is naturally added to its capital, and employed so as to
increase still further the annual produce. If the exchangeable value of the
annual produce, on the contrary, fall short of the annual consumption, the
capital of the society must annually decay in proportion to this deficiency.
The expense of the society, in this case, exceeds its revenue, and necessarily
encroaches upon its capital. Its capital, therefore, must necessarily decay,
and, together with it, the exchangeable value of the annual produce of its
industry.
This balance of produce and consumption is entirely different from what
is called the balance of trade. It might take place in a nation which had no
foreign trade, but which was entirely separated from all the world. It may
take place in the whole globe of the earth, of which the wealth, population,
and improvement, may be either gradually increasing or gradually
decaying.
The balance of produce and consumption may be constantly in favour of
a nation, though what is called the balance of trade be generally against it.
A nation may import to a greater value than it exports for half a century,
perhaps, together; the gold and silver which comes into it during all this
time, may be all immediately sent out of it; its circulating coin may
gradually decay, different sorts of paper money being substituted in its
place, and even the debts, too, which it contracts in the principal nations
with whom it deals, may be gradually increasing; and yet its real wealth, the
exchangeable value of the annual produce of its lands and labour, may,
during the same period, have been increasing in a much greater proportion.
The state of our North American colonies, and of the trade which they
carried on with Great Britain, before the commencement of the present
disturbances, {This paragraph was written in the year 1775.} may serve as a
proof that this is by no means an impossible supposition.
CHAPTER IV.
OF DRAWBACKS.
Merchants and manufacturers are not contented with the monopoly of the
home market, but desire likewise the most extensive foreign sale for their
goods. Their country has no jurisdiction in foreign nations, and therefore
can seldom procure them any monopoly there. They are generally obliged,
therefore, to content themselves with petitioning for certain encouragements
to exportation.
Of these encouragements, what are called drawbacks seem to be the most
reasonable. To allow the merchant to draw back upon exportation, either the
whole, or a part of whatever excise or inland duty is imposed upon
domestic industry, can never occasion the exportation of a greater quantity
of goods than what would have been exported had no duty been imposed.
Such encouragements do not tend to turn towards any particular
employment a greater share of the capital of the country, than what would
go to that employment of its own accord, but only to hinder the duty from
driving away any part of that share to other employments. They tend not to
overturn that balance which naturally establishes itself among all the
various employments of the society, but to hinder it from being overturned
by the duty. They tend not to destroy, but to preserve, what it is in most
cases advantageous to preserve, the natural division and distribution of
labour in the society.
The same thing may be said of the drawbacks upon the re-exportation of
foreign goods imported, which, in Great Britain, generally amount to by
much the largest part of the duty upon importation. By the second of the
rules, annexed to the act of parliament, which imposed what is now called
the old subsidy, every merchant, whether English or alien. was allowed to
draw back half that duty upon exportation; the English merchant, provided
the exportation took place within twelve months; the alien, provided it took
place within nine months. Wines, currants, and wrought silks, were the only
goods which did not fall within this rule, having other and more
advantageous allowances. The duties imposed by this act of parliament
were, at that time, the only duties upon the importation of foreign goods.
The term within which this, and all other drawbacks could be claimed, was
afterwards (by 7 Geo. I. chap. 21. sect. 10.) extended to three years.
The duties which have been imposed since the old subsidy, are, the
greater part of them, wholly drawn back upon exportation. This general
rule, however, is liable to a great number of exceptions; and the doctrine of
drawbacks has become a much less simple matter than it was at their first
institution.
Upon the exportation of some foreign goods, of which it was expected
that the importation would greatly exceed what was necessary for the home
consumption, the whole duties are drawn back, without retaining even half
the old subsidy. Before the revolt of our North American colonies, we had
the monopoly of the tobacco of Maryland and Virginia. We imported about
ninety-six thousand hogsheads, and the home consumption was not
supposed to exceed fourteen thousand. To facilitate the great exportation
which was necessary, in order to rid us of the rest, the whole duties were
drawn back, provided the exportation took place within three years.
We still have, though not altogether, yet very nearly, the monopoly of the
sugars of our West Indian islands. If sugars are exported within a year,
therefore, all the duties upon importation are drawn back; and if exported
within three years, all the duties, except half the old subsidy, which still
continues to be retained upon the exportation of the greater part of goods.
Though the importation of sugar exceeds a good deal what is necessary for
the home consumption, the excess is inconsiderable, in comparison of what
it used to be in tobacco.
Some goods, the particular objects of the jealousy of our own
manufacturers, are prohibited to be imported for home consumption. They
may, however, upon paying certain duties, be imported and warehoused for
exportation. But upon such exportation no part of these duties is drawn
back. Our manufacturers are unwilling, it seems, that even this restricted
importation should be encouraged, and are afraid lest some part of these
goods should be stolen out of the warehouse, and thus come into
competition with their own. It is under these regulations only that we can
import wrought silks, French cambrics and lawns, calicoes, painted, printed,
stained, or dyed, etc.
We are unwilling even to be the carriers of French goods, and choose
rather to forego a profit to ourselves than to suffer those whom we consider
as our enemies to make any profit by our means. Not only half the old
subsidy, but the second twenty-five per cent. is retained upon the
exportation of all French goods.
By the fourth of the rules annexed to the old subsidy, the drawback
allowed upon the exportation of all wines amounted to a great deal more
than half the duties which were at that time paid upon their importation; and
it seems at that time to have been the object of the legislature to give
somewhat more than ordinary encouragement to the carrying trade in wine.
Several of the other duties, too which were imposed either at the same time
or subsequent to the old subsidy, what is called the additional duty, the new
subsidy, the one-third and two-thirds subsidies, the impost 1692, the
tonnage on wine, were allowed to be wholly drawn back upon exportation.
All those duties, however, except the additional duty and impost 1692,
being paid down in ready money upon importation, the interest of so large a
sum occasioned an expense, which made it unreasonable to expect any
profitable carrying trade in this article. Only a part, therefore of the duty
called the impost on wine, and no part of the twenty-five pounds the ton
upon French wines, or of the duties imposed in 1745, in 1763, and in 1778,
were allowed to be drawn back upon exportation. The two imposts of five
per cent. imposed in 1779 and 1781, upon all the former duties of customs,
being allowed to be wholly drawn back upon the exportation of all other
goods, were likewise allowed to be drawn back upon that of wine. The last
duty that has been particularly imposed upon wine, that of 1780, is allowed
to be wholly drawn back; an indulgence which, when so many heavy duties
are retained, most probably could never occasion the exportation of a single
ton of wine. These rules took place with regard to all places of lawful
exportation, except the British colonies in America.
The 15th Charles II, chap. 7, called an act for the encouragement of trade,
had given Great Britain the monopoly of supplying the colonies with all the
commodities of the growth or manufacture of Europe, and consequently
with wines. In a country of so extensive a coast as our North American and
West Indian colonies, where our authority was always so very slender, and
where the inhabitants were allowed to carry out in their own ships their
non-enumerated commodities, at first to all parts of Europe, and afterwards
to all parts of Europe south of Cape Finisterre, it is not very probable that
this monopoly could ever be much respected; and they probably at all times
found means of bringing back some cargo from the countries to which they
were allowed to carry out one. They seem, however, to have found some
difficulty in importing European wines from the places of their growth; and
they could not well import them from Great Britain, where they were
loaded with many heavy duties, of which a considerable part was not drawn
back upon exportation. Madeira wine, not being an European commodity,
could be imported directly into America and the West Indies, countries
which, in all their non-enumerated commodities, enjoyed a free trade to the
island of Madeira. These circumstances had probably introduced that
general taste for Madeira wine, which our officers found established in all
our colonies at the commencement of the war which began in 1755, and
which they brought back with them to the mother country, where that wine
had not been much in fashion before. Upon the conclusion of that war, in
1763 (by the 4th Geo. III, chap. 15, sect. 12), all the duties except £3, 10s.
were allowed to be drawn back upon the exportation to the colonies of all
wines, except French wines, to the commerce and consumption of which
national prejudice would allow no sort of encouragement. The period
between the granting of this indulgence and the revolt of our North
American colonies, was probably too short to admit of any considerable
change in the customs of those countries.
The same act which, in the drawbacks upon all wines, except French
wines, thus favoured the colonies so much more than other countries, in
those upon the greater part of other commodities, favoured them much less.
Upon the exportation of the greater part of commodities to other countries,
half the old subsidy was drawn back. But this law enacted, that no part of
that duty should be drawn back upon the exportation to the colonies of any
commodities of the growth or manufacture either of Europe or the East
Indies, except wines, white calicoes, and muslins.
Drawbacks were, perhaps, originally granted for the encouragement of
the carrying trade, which, as the freight of the ship is frequently paid by
foreigners in money, was supposed to be peculiarly fitted for bringing gold
and silver into the country. But though the carrying trade certainly deserves
no peculiar encouragement, though the motive of the institution was,
perhaps, abundantly foolish, the institution itself seems reasonable enough.
Such drawbacks cannot force into this trade a greater share of the capital of
the country than what would have gone to it of its own accord, had there
been no duties upon importation; they only prevent its being excluded
altogether by those duties. The carrying trade, though it deserves no
preference, ought not to be precluded, but to be left free, like all other
trades. It is a necessary resource to those capitals which cannot find
employment, either in the agriculture or in the manufactures of the country,
either in its home trade, or in its foreign trade of consumption.
The revenue of the customs, instead of suffering, profits from such
drawbacks, by that part of the duty which is retained. If the whole duties
had been retained, the foreign goods upon which they are paid could seldom
have been exported, nor consequently imported, for want of a market. The
duties, therefore, of which a part is retained, would never have been paid.
These reasons seem sufficiently to justify drawbacks, and would justify
them, though the whole duties, whether upon the produce of domestic
industry or upon foreign goods, were always drawn back upon exportation.
The revenue of excise would, in this case indeed, suffer a little, and that of
the customs a good deal more; but the natural balance of industry, the
natural division and distribution of labour, which is always more or less
disturbed by such duties, would be more nearly re-established by such a
regulation.
These reasons, however, will justify drawbacks only upon exporting
goods to those countries which are altogether foreign and independent, not
to those in which our merchants and manufacturers enjoy a monopoly. A
drawback, for example, upon the exportation of European goods to our
American colonies, will not always occasion a greater exportation than
what would have taken place without it. By means of the monopoly which
our merchants and manufacturers enjoy there, the same quantity might
frequently, perhaps, be sent thither, though the whole duties were retained.
The drawback, therefore, may frequently be pure loss to the revenue of
excise and customs, without altering the state of the trade, or rendering it in
any respect more extensive. How far such drawbacks can be justified as a
proper encouragement to the industry of our colonies, or how far it is
advantageous to the mother country that they should be exempted from
taxes which are paid by all the rest of their fellow-subjects, will appear
hereafter, when I come to treat of colonies.
Drawbacks, however, it must always be understood, are useful only in
those cases in which the goods, for the exportation of which they are given,
are really exported to some foreign country, and not clandestinely re-
imported into our own. That some drawbacks, particularly those upon
tobacco, have frequently been abused in this manner, and have given
occasion to many frauds, equally hurtful both to the revenue and to the fair
trader, is well known.
CHAPTER V.
OF BOUNTIES.
Bounties upon exportation are, in Great Britain, frequently petitioned for,
and sometimes granted, to the produce of particular branches of domestic
industry. By means of them, our merchants and manufacturers, it is
pretended, will be enabled to sell their goods as cheap or cheaper than their
rivals in the foreign market. A greater quantity, it is said, will thus be
exported, and the balance of trade consequently turned more in favour of
our own country. We cannot give our workmen a monopoly in the foreign,
as we have done in the home market. We cannot force foreigners to buy
their goods, as we have done our own countrymen. The next best expedient,
it has been thought, therefore, is to pay them for buying. It is in this manner
that the mercantile system proposes to enrich the whole country, and to put
money into all our pockets, by means of the balance of trade.
Bounties, it is allowed, ought to be given to those branches of trade only
which cannot be carried on without them. But every branch of trade in
which the merchant can sell his goods for a price which replaces to him,
with the ordinary profits of stock, the whole capital employed in preparing
and sending them to market, can be carried on without a bounty. Every such
branch is evidently upon a level with all the other branches of trade which
are carried on without bounties, and cannot, therefore, require one more
than they. Those trades only require bounties, in which the merchant is
obliged to sell his goods for a price which does not replace to him his
capital, together with the ordinary profit, or in which he is obliged to sell
them for less than it really cost him to send them to market. The bounty is
given in order to make up this loss, and to encourage him to continue, or,
perhaps, to begin a trade, of which the expense is supposed to be greater
than the returns, of which every operation eats up a part of the capital
employed in it, and which is of such a nature, that if all other trades
resembled it, there would soon be no capital left in the country.
The trades, it is to be observed, which are carried on by means of
bounties, are the only ones which can be carried on between two nations for
any considerable time together, in such a manner as that one of them shall
always and regularly lose, or sell its goods for less than it really cost to send
them to market. But if the bounty did not repay to the merchant what he
would otherwise lose upon the price of his goods, his own interest would
soon oblige him to employ his stock in another way, or to find out a trade in
which the price of the goods would replace to him, with the ordinary profit,
the capital employed in sending them to market. The effect of bounties, like
that of all the other expedients of the mercantile system, can only be to
force the trade of a country into a channel much less advantageous than that
in which it would naturally run of its own accord.
The ingenious and well-informed author of the Tracts upon the Corn
Trade has shown very clearly, that since the bounty upon the exportation of
corn was first established, the price of the corn exported, valued moderately
enough, has exceeded that of the corn imported, valued very high, by a
much greater sum than the amount of the whole bounties which have been
paid during that period. This, he imagines, upon the true principles of the
mercantile system, is a clear proof that this forced corn trade is beneficial to
the nation, the value of the exportation exceeding that of the importation by
a much greater sum than the whole extraordinary expense which the public
has been at in order to get it exported. He does not consider that this
extraordinary expense, or the bounty, is the smallest part of the expense
which the exportation of corn really costs the society. The capital which the
farmer employed in raising it must likewise be taken into the account.
Unless the price of the corn, when sold in the foreign markets, replaces not
only the bounty, but this capital, together with the ordinary profits of stock,
the society is a loser by the difference, or the national stock is so much
diminished. But the very reason for which it has been thought necessary to
grant a bounty, is the supposed insufficiency of the price to do this.
The average price of corn, it has been said, has fallen considerably since
the establishment of the bounty. That the average price of corn began to fall
somewhat towards the end of the last century, and has continued to do so
during the course of the sixty-four first years of the present, I have already
endeavoured to show. But this event, supposing it to be real, as I believe it
to be, must have happened in spite of the bounty, and cannot possibly have
happened in consequence of it. It has happened in France, as well as in
England, though in France there was not only no bounty, but, till 1764, the
exportation of corn was subjected to a general prohibition. This gradual fall
in the average price of grain, it is probable, therefore, is ultimately owing
neither to the one regulation nor to the other, but to that gradual and
insensible rise in the real value of silver, which, in the first book of this
discourse, I have endeavoured to show, has taken place in the general
market of Europe during the course of the present century. It seems to be
altogether impossible that the bounty could ever contribute to lower the
price of grain.
In years of plenty, it has already been observed, the bounty, by
occasioning an extraordinary exportation, necessarily keeps up the price of
corn in the home market above what it would naturally fall to. To do so was
the avowed purpose of the institution. In years of scarcity, though the
bounty is frequently suspended, yet the great exportation which it occasions
in years of plenty, must frequently hinder, more or less, the plenty of one
year from relieving the scarcity of another. Both in years of plenty and in
years of scarcity, therefore, the bounty necessarily tends to raise the money
price of corn somewhat higher than it otherwise would be in the home
market.
That in the actual state of tillage the bounty must necessarily have this
tendency, will not, I apprehend, be disputed by any reasonable person. But
it has been thought by many people, that it tends to encourage tillage, and
that in two different ways; first, by opening a more extensive foreign
market to the corn of the farmer, it tends, they imagine, to increase the
demand for, and consequently the production of, that commodity; and,
secondly by securing to him a better price than he could otherwise expect in
the actual state of tillage, it tends, they suppose, to encourage tillage. This
double encouragement must they imagine, in a long period of years,
occasion such an increase in the production of corn, as may lower its price
in the home market, much more than the bounty can raise it in the actual
state which tillage may, at the end of that period, happen to be in.
I answer, that whatever extension of the foreign market can be
occasioned by the bounty must, in every particular year, be altogether at the
expense of the home market; as every bushel of corn, which is exported by
means of the bounty, and which would not have been exported without the
bounty, would have remained in the home market to increase the
consumption, and to lower the price of that commodity. The corn bounty, it
is to be observed, as well as every other bounty upon exportation, imposes
two different taxes upon the people; first, the tax which they are obliged to
contribute, in order to pay the bounty; and, secondly, the tax which arises
from the advanced price of the commodity in the home market, and which,
as the whole body of the people are purchasers of corn, must, in this
particular commodity, be paid by the whole body of the people. In this
particular commodity, therefore, this second tax is by much the heaviest of
the two. Let us suppose that, taking one year with another, the bounty of 5s.
upon the exportation of the quarter of wheat raises the price of that
commodity in the home market only 6d. the bushel, or 4s. the quarter higher
than it otherwise would have been in the actual state of the crop. Even upon
this very moderate supposition, the great body of the people, over and
above contributing the tax which pays the bounty of 5s. upon every quarter
of wheat exported, must pay another of 4s. upon every quarter which they
themselves consume. But according to the very well informed author of the
Tracts upon the Corn Trade, the average proportion of the corn exported to
that consumed at home, is not more than that of one to thirty-one. For every
5s. therefore, which they contribute to the payment of the first tax, they
must contribute £6:4s. to the payment of the second. So very heavy a tax
upon the first necessary of life-must either reduce the subsistence of the
labouring poor, or it must occasion some augmentation in their pecuniary
wages, proportionable to that in the pecuniary price of their subsistence. So
far as it operates in the one way, it must reduce the ability of the labouring
poor to educate and bring up their children, and must, so far, tend to restrain
the population of the country. So far as it operates in the other, it must
reduce the ability of the employers of the poor, to employ so great a number
as they otherwise might do, and must so far tend to restrain the industry of
the country. The extraordinary exportation of corn, therefore occasioned by
the bounty, not only in every particular year diminishes the home, just as
much as it extends the foreign market and consumption, but, by restraining
the population and industry of the country, its final tendency is to stint and
restrain the gradual extension of the home market; and thereby, in the long-
run, rather to diminish than to augment the whole market and consumption
of corn.
This enhancement of the money price of corn, however, it has been
thought, by rendering that commodity more profitable to the farmer, must
necessarily encourage its production.
I answer, that this might be the case, if the effect of the bounty was to
raise the real price of corn, or to enable the farmer, with an equal quantity of
it, to maintain a greater number of labourers in the same manner, whether
liberal, moderate, or scanty, than other labourers are commonly maintained
in his neighbourhood. But neither the bounty, it is evident, nor any other
human institution, can have any such effect. It is not the real, but the
nominal price of corn, which can in any considerable degree be affected by
the bounty. And though the tax, which that institution imposes upon the
whole body of the people, may be very burdensome to those who pay it, it
is of very little advantage to those who receive it.
The real effect of the bounty is not so much to raise the real value of
corn, as to degrade the real value of silver; or to make an equal quantity of
it exchange for a smaller quantity, not only of corn, but of all other home
made commodities; for the money price of corn regulates that of all other
home made commodities.
It regulates the money price of labour, which must always be such as to
enable the labourer to purchase a quantity of corn sufficient to maintain him
and his family, either in the liberal, moderate, or scanty manner, in which
the advancing, stationary, or declining, circumstances of the society, oblige
his employers to maintain him.
It regulates the money price of all the other parts of the rude produce of
land, which, in every period of improvement, must bear a certain proportion
to that of corn, though this proportion is different in different periods. It
regulates, for example, the money price of grass and hay, of butcher’s meat,
of horses, and the maintenance of horses, of land carriage consequently, or
of the greater part of the inland commerce of the country.
By regulating the money price of all the other parts of the rude produce
of land, it regulates that of the materials of almost all manufactures; by
regulating the money price of labour, it regulates that of manufacturing art
and industry; and by regulating both, it regulates that of the complete
manufacture. The money price of labour, and of every thing that is the
produce, either of land or labour, must necessarily either rise or fall in
proportion to the money price of corn.
Though in consequence of the bounty, therefore, the farmer should be
enabled to sell his corn for 4s. the bushel, instead of 3s:6d. and to pay his
landlord a money rent proportionable to this rise in the money price of his
produce; yet if, in consequence of this rise in the price of corn, 4s. will
purchase no more home made goods of any other kind than 3s. 6d. would
have done before, neither the circumstances of the farmer, nor those of the
landlord, will be much mended by this change. The farmer will not be able
to cultivate much better; the landlord will not be able to live much better. In
the purchase of foreign commodities, this enhancement in the price of corn
may give them some little advantage. In that of home made commodities, it
can give them none at all. And almost the whole expense of the farmer, and
the far greater part even of that of the landlord, is in home made
commodities.
That degradation in the value of silver, which is the effect of the fertility
of the mines, and which operates equally, or very nearly equally, through
the greater part of the commercial world, is a matter of very little
consequence to any particular country. The consequent rise of all money
prices, though it does not make those who receive them really richer, does
not make them really poorer. A service of plate becomes really cheaper, and
every thing else remains precisely of the same real value as before.
But that degradation in the value of silver, which, being the effect either
of the peculiar situation or of the political institutions of a particular
country, takes place only in that country, is a matter of very great
consequence, which, far from tending to make anybody really richer, tends
to make every body really poorer. The rise in the money price of all
commodities, which is in this case peculiar to that country, tends to
discourage more or less every sort of industry which is carried on within it,
and to enable foreign nations, by furnishing almost all sorts of goods for a
smaller quantity of silver than its own workmen can afford to do, to
undersell them, not only in the foreign, but even in the home market.
It is the peculiar situation of Spain and Portugal, as proprietors of the
mines, to be the distributers of gold and silver to all the other countries of
Europe. Those metals ought naturally, therefore, to be somewhat cheaper in
Spain and Portugal than in any other part of Europe. The difference,
however, should be no more than the amount of the freight and insurance;
and, on account of the great value and small bulk of those metals, their
freight is no great matter, and their insurance is the same as that of any
other goods of equal value. Spain and Portugal, therefore, could suffer very
little from their peculiar situation, if they did not aggravate its
disadvantages by their political institutions.
Spain by taxing, and Portugal by prohibiting, the exportation of gold and
silver, load that exportation with the expense of smuggling, and raise the
value of those metals in other countries so much more above what it is in
their own, by the whole amount of this expense. When you dam up a stream
of water, as soon as the dam is full, as much water must run over the dam-
head as if there was no dam at all. The prohibition of exportation cannot
detain a greater quantity of gold and silver in Spain and Portugal, than what
they can afford to employ, than what the annual produce of their land and
labour will allow them to employ, in coin, plate, gilding, and other
ornaments of gold and silver. When they have got this quantity, the dam is
full, and the whole stream which flows in afterwards must run over. The
annual exportation of gold and silver from Spain and Portugal, accordingly,
is, by all accounts, notwithstanding these restraints, very near equal to the
whole annual importation. As the water, however, must always be deeper
behind the dam-head than before it, so the quantity of gold and silver which
these restraints detain in Spain and Portugal, must, in proportion to the
annual produce of their land and labour, be greater than what is to be found
in other countries. The higher and stronger the dam-head, the greater must
be the difference in the depth of water behind and before it. The higher the
tax, the higher the penalties with which the prohibition is guarded, the more
vigilant and severe the police which looks after the execution of the law, the
greater must be the difference in the proportion of gold and silver to the
annual produce of the land and labour of Spain and Portugal, and to that of
other countries. It is said, accordingly, to be very considerable, and that you
frequently find there a profusion of plate in houses, where there is nothing
else which would in other countries be thought suitable or correspondent to
this sort of magnificence. The cheapness of gold and silver, or, what is the
same thing, the dearness of all commodities, which is the necessary effect
of this redundancy of the precious metals, discourages both the agriculture
and manufactures of Spain and Portugal, and enables foreign nations to
supply them with many sorts of rude, and with almost all sorts of
manufactured produce, for a smaller quantity of gold and silver than what
they themselves can either raise or make them for at home. The tax and
prohibition operate in two different ways. They not only lower very much
the value of the precious metals in Spain and Portugal, but by detaining
there a certain quantity of those metals which would otherwise flow over
other countries, they keep up their value in those other countries somewhat
above what it otherwise would be, and thereby give those countries a
double advantage in their commerce with Spain and Portugal. Open the
flood-gates, and there will presently be less water above, and more below
the dam-head, and it will soon come to a level in both places. Remove the
tax and the prohibition, and as the quantity of gold and silver will diminish
considerably in Spain and Portugal, so it will increase somewhat in other
countries; and the value of those metals, their proportion to the annual
produce of land and labour, will soon come to a level, or very near to a
level, in all. The loss which Spain and Portugal could sustain by this
exportation of their gold and silver, would be altogether nominal and
imaginary. The nominal value of their goods, and of the annual produce of
their land and labour, would fall, and would be expressed or represented by
a smaller quantity of silver than before; but their real value would be the
same as before, and would be sufficient to maintain, command, and employ
the same quantity of labour. As the nominal value of their goods would fall,
the real value of what remained of their gold and silver would rise, and a
smaller quantity of those metals would answer all the same purposes of
commerce and circulation which had employed a greater quantity before.
The gold and silver which would go abroad would not go abroad for
nothing, but would bring back an equal value of goods of some kind or
other. Those goods, too, would not be all matters of mere luxury and
expense, to be consumed by idle people, who produce nothing in return for
their consumption. As the real wealth and revenue of idle people would not
be augmented by this extraordinary exportation of gold and silver, so
neither would their consumption be much augmented by it. Those goods
would probably, the greater part of them, and certainly some part of them,
consist in materials, tools, and provisions, for the employment and
maintenance of industrious people, who would reproduce, with a profit, the
full value of their consumption. A part of the dead stock of the society
would thus be turned into active stock, and would put into motion a greater
quantity of industry than had been employed before. The annual produce of
their land and labour would immediately be augmented a little, and in a few
years would probably be augmented a great deal; their industry being thus
relieved from one of the most oppressive burdens which it at present
labours under.
The bounty upon the exportation of corn necessarily operates exactly in
the same way as this absurd policy of Spain and Portugal. Whatever be the
actual state of tillage, it renders our corn somewhat dearer in the home
market than it otherwise would be in that state, and somewhat cheaper in
the foreign; and as the average money price of corn regulates, more or less,
that of all other commodities, it lowers the value of silver considerably in
the one, and tends to raise it a little in the other. It enables foreigners, the
Dutch in particular, not only to eat our corn cheaper than they otherwise
could do, but sometimes to eat it cheaper than even our own people can do
upon the same occasions; as we are assured by an excellent authority, that
of Sir Matthew Decker. It hinders our own workmen from furnishing their
goods for so small a quantity of silver as they otherwise might do, and
enables the Dutch to furnish theirs for a smaller. It tends to render our
manufactures somewhat dearer in every market, and theirs somewhat
cheaper, than they otherwise would be, and consequently to give their
industry a double advantage over our own.
The bounty, as it raises in the home market, not so much the real, as the
nominal price of our corn; as it augments, not the quantity of labour which a
certain quantity of corn can maintain and employ, but only the quantity of
silver which it will exchange for; it discourages our manufactures, without
rendering any considerable service, either to our farmers or country
gentlemen. It puts, indeed, a little more money into the pockets of both, and
it will perhaps be somewhat difficult to persuade the greater part of them
that this is not rendering them a very considerable service. But if this
money sinks in its value, in the quantity of labour, provisions, and home-
made commodities of all different kinds which it is capable of purchasing,
as much as it rises in its quantity, the service will be little more than
nominal and imaginary.
There is, perhaps, but one set of men in the whole commonwealth to
whom the bounty either was or could be essentially serviceable. These were
the corn merchants, the exporters and importers of corn. In years of plenty,
the bounty necessarily occasioned a greater exportation than would
otherwise have taken place; and by hindering the plenty of the one year
from relieving the scarcity of another, it occasioned in years of scarcity a
greater importation than would otherwise have been necessary. It increased
the business of the corn merchant in both; and in the years of scarcity, it not
only enabled him to import a greater quantity, but to sell it for a better price,
and consequently with a greater profit, than he could otherwise have made,
if the plenty of one year had not been more or less hindered from relieving
the scarcity of another. It is in this set of men, accordingly, that I have
observed the greatest zeal for the continuance or renewal of the bounty.
Our country gentlemen, when they imposed the high duties upon the
exportation of foreign corn, which in times of moderate plenty amount to a
prohibition, and when they established the bounty, seem to have imitated
the conduct of our manufacturers. By the one institution, they secured to
themselves the monopoly of the home market, and by the other they
endeavoured to prevent that market from ever being overstocked with their
commodity. By both they endeavoured to raise its real value, in the same
manner as our manufacturers had, by the like institutions, raised the real
value of many different sorts of manufactured goods. They did not, perhaps,
attend to the great and essential difference which nature has established
between corn and almost every other sort of goods. When, either by the
monopoly of the home market, or by a bounty upon exportation, you enable
our woollen or linen manufacturers to sell their goods for somewhat a better
price than they otherwise could get for them, you raise, not only the
nominal, but the real price of those goods; you render them equivalent to a
greater quantity of labour and subsistence; you increase not only the
nominal, but the real profit, the real wealth and revenue of those
manufacturers; and you enable them, either to live better themselves, or to
employ a greater quantity of labour in those particular manufactures. You
really encourage those manufactures, and direct towards them a greater
quantity of the industry of the country than what would properly go to them
of its own accord. But when, by the like institutions, you raise the nominal
or money price of corn, you do not raise its real value; you do not increase
the real wealth, the real revenue, either of our farmers or country
gentlemen; you do not encourage the growth of corn, because you do not
enable them to maintain and employ more labourers in raising it. The nature
of things has stamped upon corn a real value, which cannot be altered by
merely altering its money price. No bounty upon exportation, no monopoly
of the home market, can raise that value. The freest competition cannot
lower it, Through the world in general, that value is equal to the quantity of
labour which it can maintain, and in every particular place it is equal to the
quantity of labour which it can maintain in the way, whether liberal,
moderate, or scanty, in which labour is commonly maintained in that place.
Woollen or linen cloth are not the regulating commodities by which the real
value of all other commodities must be finally measured and determined;
corn is. The real value of every other commodity is finally measured and
determined by the proportion which its average money price bears to the
average money price of corn. The real value of corn does not vary with
those variations in its average money price, which sometimes occur from
one century to another; it is the real value of silver which varies with them.
Bounties upon the exportation of any homemade commodity are liable,
first, to that general objection which may be made to all the different
expedients of the mercantile system; the objection of forcing some part of
the industry of the country into a channel less advantageous than that in
which it would run of its own accord; and, secondly, to the particular
objection of forcing it not only into a channel that is less advantageous, but
into one that is actually disadvantageous; the trade which cannot be carried
on but by means of a bounty being necessarily a losing trade. The bounty
upon the exportation of corn is liable to this further objection, that it can in
no respect promote the raising of that particular commodity of which it was
meant to encourage the production. When our country gentlemen, therefore,
demanded the establishment of the bounty, though they acted in imitation of
our merchants and manufacturers, they did not act with that complete
comprehension of their own interest, which commonly directs the conduct
of those two other orders of people. They loaded the public revenue with a
very considerable expense: they imposed a very heavy tax upon the whole
body of the people; but they did not, in any sensible degree, increase the
real value of their own commodity; and by lowering somewhat the real
value of silver, they discouraged, in some degree, the general industry of the
country, and, instead of advancing, retarded more or less the improvement
of their own lands, which necessarily depend upon the general industry of
the country.
To encourage the production of any commodity, a bounty upon
production, one should imagine, would have a more direct operation than
one upon exportation. It would, besides, impose only one tax upon the
people, that which they must contribute in order to pay the bounty. Instead
of raising, it would tend to lower the price of the commodity in the home
market; and thereby, instead of imposing a second tax upon the people, it
might, at least in part, repay them for what they had contributed to the first.
Bounties upon production, however, have been very rarely granted. The
prejudices established by the commercial system have taught us to believe,
that national wealth arises more immediately from exportation than from
production. It has been more favoured, accordingly, as the more immediate
means of bringing money into the country. Bounties upon production, it has
been said too, have been found by experience more liable to frauds than
those upon exportation. How far this is true, I know not. That bounties upon
exportation have been abused, to many fraudulent purposes, is very well
known. But it is not the interest of merchants and manufacturers, the great
inventors of all these expedients, that the home market should be
overstocked with their goods; an event which a bounty upon production
might sometimes occasion. A bounty upon exportation, by enabling them to
send abroad their surplus part, and to keep up the price of what remains in
the home market, effectually prevents this. Of all the expedients of the
mercantile system, accordingly, it is the one of which they are the fondest. I
have known the different undertakers of some particular works agree
privately among themselves to give a bounty out of their own pockets upon
the exportation of a certain proportion of the goods which they dealt in.
This expedient succeeded so well, that it more than doubled the price of
their goods in the home market, notwithstanding a very considerable
increase in the produce. The operation of the bounty upon corn must have
been wonderfully different, if it has lowered the money price of that
commodity.
Something like a bounty upon production, however, has been granted
upon some particular occasions. The tonnage bounties given to the white
herring and whale fisheries may, perhaps, be considered as somewhat of
this nature. They tend directly, it may be supposed, to render the goods
cheaper in the home market than they otherwise would be. In other respects,
their effects, it must be acknowledged, are the same as those of bounties
upon exportation. By means of them, a part of the capital of the country is
employed in bringing goods to market, of which the price does not repay
the cost, together with the ordinary profits of stock.
But though the tonnage bounties to those fisheries do not contribute to
the opulence of the nation, it may, perhaps, be thought that they contribute
to its defence, by augmenting the number of its sailors and shipping. This, it
may be alleged, may sometimes be done by means of such bounties, at a
much smaller expense than by keeping up a great standing navy, if I may
use such an expression, in the same way as a standing army.
Notwithstanding these favourable allegations, however, the following
considerations dispose me to believe, that in granting at least one of these
bounties, the legislature has been very grossly imposed upon:
First, The herring-buss bounty seems too large.
From the commencement of the winter fishing 1771, to the end of the
winter fishing 1781, the tonnage bounty upon the herring-buss fishery has
been at thirty shillings the ton. During these eleven years, the whole number
of barrels caught by the herring-buss fishery of Scotland amounted to
378,347. The herrings caught and cured at sea are called sea-sticks. In order
to render them what are called merchantable herrings, it is necessary to
repack them with an additional quantity of salt; and in this case, it is
reckoned, that three barrels of sea-sticks are usually repacked into two
barrels of merchantable herrings. The number of barrels of merchantable
herrings, therefore, caught during these eleven years, will amount only,
according to this account, to 252,231¼. During these eleven years, the
tonnage bounties paid amounted to £155,463:11s. or 8s:2¼d. upon every
barrel of sea-sticks, and to 12s:3¾d. upon every barrel of merchantable
herrings.
The salt with which these herrings are cured is sometimes Scotch, and
sometimes foreign salt; both which are delivered, free of all excise duty, to
the fish-curers. The excise duty upon Scotch salt is at present 1s:6d., that
upon foreign salt 10s. the bushel. A barrel of herrings is supposed to require
about one bushel and one-fourth of a bushel foreign salt. Two bushels are
the supposed average of Scotch salt. If the herrings are entered for
exportation, no part of this duty is paid up; if entered for home
consumption, whether the herrings were cured with foreign or with Scotch
salt, only one shilling the barrel is paid up. It was the old Scotch duty upon
a bushel of salt, the quantity which, at a low estimation, had been supposed
necessary for curing a barrel of herrings. In Scotland, foreign salt is very
little used for any other purpose but the curing of fish. But from the 5th
April 1771 to the 5th April 1782, the quantity of foreign salt imported
amounted to 936,974 bushels, at eighty-four pounds the bushel; the quantity
of Scotch salt delivered from the works to the fish-curers, to no more than
168,226, at fifty-six pounds the bushel only. It would appear, therefore, that
it is principally foreign salt that is used in the fisheries. Upon every barrel
of herrings exported, there is, besides, a bounty of 2s:8d. and more than
two-thirds of the buss-caught herrings are exported. Put all these things
together, and you will find that, during these eleven years, every barrel of
buss-caught herrings, cured with Scotch salt, when exported, has cost
government 17s:11¾d.; and, when entered for home consumption,
14s:3¾d.; and that every barrel cured with foreign salt, when exported, has
cost government £1:7:5¾d.; and, when entered for home consumption,
£1:3:9¾d. The price of a barrel of good merchantable herrings runs from
seventeen and eighteen to four and five-and-twenty shillings; about a
guinea at an average. {See the accounts at the end of this Book.}
Secondly, The bounty to the white-herring fishery is a tonnage bounty,
and is proportioned to the burden of the ship, not to her diligence or success
in the fishery; and it has, I am afraid, been too common for the vessels to fit
out for the sole purpose of catching, not the fish but the bounty. In the year
1759, when the bounty was at fifty shillings the ton, the whole buss fishery
of Scotland brought in only four barrels of sea-sticks. In that year, each
barrel of sea-sticks cost government, in bounties alone, £113:15s.; each
barrel of merchantable herrings £159:7:6.
Thirdly, The mode of fishing, for which this tonnage bounty in the white
herring fishery has been given (by busses or decked vessels from twenty to
eighty tons burden ), seems not so well adapted to the situation of Scotland,
as to that of Holland, from the practice of which country it appears to have
been borrowed. Holland lies at a great distance from the seas to which
herrings are known principally to resort, and can, therefore, carry on that
fishery only in decked vessels, which can carry water and provisions
sufficient for a voyage to a distant sea; but the Hebrides, or Western Islands,
the islands of Shetland, and the northern and north-western coasts of
Scotland, the countries in whose neighbourhood the herring fishery is
principally carried on, are everywhere intersected by arms of the sea, which
run up a considerable way into the land, and which, in the language of the
country, are called sea-lochs. It is to these sea-lochs that the herrings
principally resort during the seasons in which they visit these seas; for the
visits of this, and, I am assured, of many other sorts of fish, are not quite
regular and constant. A boat-fishery, therefore, seems to be the mode of
fishing best adapted to the peculiar situation of Scotland, the fishers
carrying the herrings on shore as fast as they are taken, to be either cured or
consumed fresh. But the great encouragement which a bounty of 30s. the
ton gives to the buss-fishery, is necessarily a discouragement to the boat-
fishery, which, having no such bounty, cannot bring its cured fish to market
upon the same terms as the buss-fishery. The boat-fishery; accordingly,
which, before the establishment of the buss-bounty, was very considerable,
and is said to have employed a number of seamen, not inferior to what the
buss-fishery employs at present, is now gone almost entirely to decay. Of
the former extent, however, of this now ruined and abandoned fishery, I
must acknowledge that I cannot pretend to speak with much precision. As
no bounty was-paid upon the outfit of the boat-fishery, no account was
taken of it by the officers of the customs or salt duties.
Fourthly, In many parts of Scotland, during certain seasons of the year,
herrings make no inconsiderable part of the food of the common people. A
bounty which tended to lower their price in the home market, might
contribute a good deal to the relief of a great number of our fellow-subjects,
whose circumstances are by no means affluent. But the herring-bus bounty
contributes to no such good purpose. It has ruined the boat fishery, which is
by far the best adapted for the supply of the home market; and the
additional bounty of 2s:8d. the barrel upon exportation, carries the greater
part, more than two-thirds, of the produce of the buss-fishery abroad.
Between thirty and forty years ago, before the establishment of the buss-
bounty, 16s. the barrel, I have been assured, was the common price of white
herrings. Between ten and fifteen years ago, before the boat-fishery was
entirely ruined, the price was said to have run from seventeen to twenty
shillings the barrel. For these last five years, it has, at an average, been at
twenty-five shillings the barrel. This high price, however, may have been
owing to the real scarcity of the herrings upon the coast of Scotland. I must
observe, too, that the cask or barrel, which is usually sold with the herrings,
and of which the price is included in all the foregoing prices, has, since the
commencement of the American war, risen to about double its former price,
or from about 3s. to about 6s. I must likewise observe, that the accounts I
have received of the prices of former times, have been by no means quite
uniform and consistent, and an old man of great accuracy and experience
has assured me, that, more than fifty years ago, a guinea was the usual price
of a barrel of good merchantable herrings; and this, I imagine, may still be
looked upon as the average price. All accounts, however, I think, agree that
the price has not been lowered in the home market in consequence of the
buss-bounty.
When the undertakers of fisheries, after such liberal bounties have been
bestowed upon them, continue to sell their commodity at the same, or even
at a higher price than they were accustomed to do before, it might be
expected that their profits should be very great; and it is not improbable that
those of some individuals may have been so. In general, however, I have
every reason to believe they have been quite otherwise. The usual effect of
such bounties is, to encourage rash undertakers to adventure in a business
which they do not understand; and what they lose by their own negligence
and ignorance, more than compensates all that they can gain by the utmost
liberality of government. In 1750, by the same act which first gave the
bounty of 30s. the ton for the encouragement of the white herring fishery
(the 23d Geo. II. chap. 24), a joint stock company was erected, with a
capital of £500,000, to which the subscribers (over and above all other
encouragements, the tonnage bounty just now mentioned, the exportation
bounty of 2s:8d. the barrel, the delivery of both British and foreign salt duty
free) were, during the space of fourteen years, for every hundred pounds
which they subscribed and paid into the stock of the society, entitled to
three pounds a-year, to be paid by the receiver-general of the customs in
equal half-yearly payments. Besides this great company, the residence of
whose governor and directors was to be in London, it was declared lawful
to erect different fishing chambers in all the different out-ports of the
kingdom, provided a sum not less than £10,000 was subscribed into the
capital of each, to be managed at its own risk, and for its own profit and
loss. The same annuity, and the same encouragements of all kinds, were
given to the trade of those inferior chambers as to that of the great company.
The subscription of the great company was soon filled up, and several
different fishing chambers were erected in the different out-ports of the
kingdom. In spite of all these encouragements, almost all those different
companies, both great and small, lost either the whole or the greater part of
their capitals; scarce a vestige now remains of any of them, and the white-
herring fishery is now entirely, or almost entirely, carried on by private
adventurers.
If any particular manufacture was necessary, indeed, for the defence of
the society, it might not always be prudent to depend upon our neighbours
for the supply; and if such manufacture could not otherwise be supported at
home, it might not be unreasonable that all the other branches of industry
should be taxed in order to support it. The bounties upon the exportation of
British made sail-cloth, and British made gunpowder, may, perhaps, both be
vindicated upon this principle.
But though it can very seldom be reasonable to tax the industry of the
great body of the people, in order to support that of some particular class of
manufacturers; yet, in the wantonness of great prosperity, when the public
enjoys a greater revenue than it knows well what to do with, to give such
bounties to favourite manufactures, may, perhaps, be as natural as to incur
any other idle expense. In public, as well as in private expenses, great
wealth, may, perhaps, frequently be admitted as an apology for great folly.
But there must surely be something more than ordinary absurdity in
continuing such profusion in times of general difficulty and distress.
What is called a bounty, is sometimes no more than a drawback, and,
consequently, is not liable to the same objections as what is properly a
bounty. The bounty, for example, upon refined sugar exported, may be
considered as a drawback of the duties upon the brown and Muscovado
sugars, from which it is made; the bounty upon wrought silk exported, a
drawback of the duties upon raw and thrown silk imported; the bounty upon
gunpowder exported, a drawback of the duties upon brimstone and saltpetre
imported. In the language of the customs, those allowances only are called
drawbacks which are given upon goods exported in the same form in which
they are imported. When that form has been so altered by manufacture of
any kind as to come under a new denomination, they are called bounties.
Premiums given by the public to artists and manufacturers, who excel in
their particular occupations, are not liable to the same objections as
bounties. By encouraging extraordinary dexterity and ingenuity, they serve
to keep up the emulation of the workmen actually employed in those
respective occupations, and are not considerable enough to turn towards any
one of them a greater share of the capital of the country than what would go
to it of its own accord. Their tendency is not to overturn the natural balance
of employments, but to render the work which is done in each as perfect
and complete as possible. The expense of premiums, besides, is very
trifling, that of bounties very great. The bounty upon corn alone has
sometimes cost the public, in one year, more than £300,000.
Bounties are sometimes called premiums, as drawbacks are sometimes
called bounties. But we must, in all cases, attend to the nature of the thing,
without paying any regard to the word.
Digression concerning the Corn Trade and Corn Laws.
I cannot conclude this chapter concerning bounties, without observing,
that the praises which have been bestowed upon the law which establishes
the bounty upon the exportation of corn, and upon that system of
regulations which is connected with it, are altogether unmerited. A
particular examination of the nature of the corn trade, and of the principal
British laws which relate to it, will sufficiently demonstrate the truth of this
assertion. The great importance of this subject must justify the length of the
digression.
The trade of the corn merchant is composed of four different branches,
which, though they may sometimes be all carried on by the same person,
are, in their own nature, four separate and distinct trades. These are, first,
the trade of the inland dealer; secondly, that of the merchant-importer for
home consumption; thirdly, that of the merchant-exporter of home produce
for foreign consumption; and, fourthly, that of the merchant-carrier, or of
the importer of corn, in order to export it again.
I. The interest of the inland dealer, and that of the great body of the
people, how opposite soever they may at first appear, are, even in years of
the greatest scarcity, exactly the same. It is his interest to raise the price of
his corn as high as the real scarcity of the season requires, and it can never
be his interest to raise it higher. By raising the price, he discourages the
consumption, and puts every body more or less, but particularly the inferior
ranks of people, upon thrift and good management If, by raising it too high,
he discourages the consumption so much that the supply of the season is
likely to go beyond the consumption of the season, and to last for some time
after the next crop begins to come in, he runs the hazard, not only of losing
a considerable part of his corn by natural causes, but of being obliged to sell
what remains of it for much less than what he might have had for it several
months before. If, by not raising the price high enough, he discourages the
consumption so little, that the supply of the season is likely to fall short of
the consumption of the season, he not only loses a part of the profit which
he might otherwise have made, but he exposes the people to suffer before
the end of the season, instead of the hardships of a dearth, the dreadful
horrors of a famine. It is the interest of the people that their daily, weekly,
and monthly consumption should be proportioned as exactly as possible to
the supply of the season. The interest of the inland corn dealer is the same.
By supplying them, as nearly as he can judge, in this proportion, he is likely
to sell all his corn for the highest price, and with the greatest profit; and his
knowledge of the state of the crop, and of his daily, weekly, and monthly
sales, enables him to judge, with more or less accuracy, how far they really
are supplied in this manner. Without intending the interest of the people, he
is necessarily led, by a regard to his own interest, to treat them, even in
years of scarcity, pretty much in the same manner as the prudent master of a
vessel is sometimes obliged to treat his crew. When he foresees that
provisions are likely to run short, he puts them upon short allowance.
Though from excess of caution he should sometimes do this without any
real necessity, yet all the inconveniencies which his crew can thereby suffer
are inconsiderable, in comparison of the danger, misery, and ruin, to which
they might sometimes be exposed by a less provident conduct. Though,
from excess of avarice, in the same manner, the inland corn merchant
should sometimes raise the price of his corn somewhat higher than the
scarcity of the season requires, yet all the inconveniencies which the people
can suffer from this conduct, which effectually secures them from a famine
in the end of the season, are inconsiderable, in comparison of what they
might have been exposed to by a more liberal way of dealing in the
beginning of it the corn merchant himself is likely to suffer the most by this
excess of avarice; not only from the indignation which it generally excites
against him, but, though he should escape the effects of this indignation,
from the quantity of corn which it necessarily leaves upon his hands in the
end of the season, and which, if the next season happens to prove
favourable, he must always sell for a much lower price than he might
otherwise have had.
Were it possible, indeed, for one great company of merchants to possess
themselves of the whole crop of an extensive country, it might perhaps be
their interest to deal with it, as the Dutch are said to do with the spiceries of
the Moluccas, to destroy or throw away a considerable part of it, in order to
keep up the price of the rest. But it is scarce possible, even by the violence
of law, to establish such an extensive monopoly with regard to corn; and
wherever the law leaves the trade free, it is of all commodities the least
liable to be engrossed or monopolized by the forced a few large capitals,
which buy up the greater part of it. Not only its value far exceeds what the
capitals of a few private men are capable of purchasing; but, supposing they
were capable of purchasing it, the manner in which it is produced renders
this purchase altogether impracticable. As, in every civilized country, it is
the commodity of which the annual consumption is the greatest; so a greater
quantity of industry is annually employed in producing corn than in
producing any other commodity. When it first comes from the ground, too,
it is necessarily divided among a greater number of owners than any other
commodity; and these owners can never be collected into one place, like a
number of independent manufacturers, but are necessarily scattered through
all the different corners of the country. These first owners either
immediately supply the consumers in their own neighbourhood, or they
supply other inland dealers, who supply those consumers. The inland
dealers in corn, therefore, including both the farmer and the baker, are
necessarily more numerous than the dealers in any other commodity; and
their dispersed situation renders it altogether impossible for them to enter
into any general combination. If, in a year of scarcity, therefore, any of
them should find that he had a good deal more corn upon hand than, at the
current price, he could hope to dispose of before the end of the season, he
would never think of keeping up this price to his own loss, and to the sole
benefit of his rivals and competitors, but would immediately lower it, in
order to get rid of his corn before the new crop began to come in. The same
motives, the same interests, which would thus regulate the conduct of any
one dealer, would regulate that of every other, and oblige them all in
general to sell their corn at the price which, according to the best of their
judgment, was most suitable to the scarcity or plenty of the season.
Whoever examines, with attention, the history of the dearths and famines
which have afflicted any part of Europe during either the course of the
present or that of the two preceding centuries, of several of which we have
pretty exact accounts, will find, I believe, that a dearth never has arisen
from any combination among the inland dealers in corn, nor from any other
cause but a real scarcity, occasioned sometimes, perhaps, and in some
particular places, by the waste of war, but in by far the greatest number of
cases by the fault of the seasons; and that a famine has never arisen from
any other cause but the violence of government attempting, by improper
means, to remedy the inconveniencies of a dearth.
In an extensive corn country, between all the different parts of which
there is a free commerce and communication, the scarcity occasioned by the
most unfavourable seasons can never be so great as to produce a famine;
and the scantiest crop, if managed with frugality and economy, will
maintain, through the year, the same number of people that are commonly
fed in a more affluent manner by one of moderate plenty. The seasons most
unfavourable to the crop are those of excessive drought or excessive rain.
But as corn grows equally upon high and low lands, upon grounds that are
disposed to be too wet, and upon those that are disposed to be too dry, either
the drought or the rain, which is hurtful to one part of the country, is
favourable to another; and though, both in the wet and in the dry season, the
crop is a good deal less than in one more properly tempered; yet, in both,
what is lost in one part of the country is in some measure compensated by
what is gained in the other. In rice countries, where the crop not only
requires a very moist soil, but where, in a certain period of its growing, it
must be laid under water, the effects of a drought are much more dismal.
Even in such countries, however, the drought is, perhaps, scarce ever so
universal as necessarily to occasion a famine, if the government would
allow a free trade. The drought in Bengal, a few years ago, might probably
have occasioned a very great dearth. Some improper regulations, some
injudicious restraints, imposed by the servants of the East India Company
upon the rice trade, contributed, perhaps, to turn that dearth into a famine.
When the government, in order to remedy the inconveniencies of a
dearth, orders all the dealers to sell their corn at what it supposes a
reasonable price, it either hinders them from bringing it to market, which
may sometimes produce a famine even in the beginning of the season; or, if
they bring it thither, it enables the people, and thereby encourages them to
consume it so fast as must necessarily produce a famine before the end of
the season. The unlimited, unrestrained freedom of the corn trade, as it is
the only effectual preventive of the miseries of a famine, so it is the best
palliative of the inconveniencies of a dearth; for the inconveniencies of a
real scarcity cannot be remedied; they can only be palliated. No trade
deserves more the full protection of the law, and no trade requires it so
much; because no trade is so much exposed to popular odium.
In years of scarcity, the inferior ranks of people impute their distress to
the avarice of the corn merchant, who becomes the object of their hatred
and indignation. Instead of making profit upon such occasions, therefore, he
is often in danger of being utterly ruined, and of having his magazines
plundered and destroyed by their violence. It is in years of scarcity,
however, when prices are high, that the corn merchant expects to make his
principal profit. He is generally in contract with some farmers to furnish
him, for a certain number of years, with a certain quantity of corn, at a
certain price. This contract price is settled according to what is supposed to
be the moderate and reasonable, that is, the ordinary or average price,
which, before the late years of scarcity, was commonly about 28s. for the
quarter of wheat, and for that of other grain in proportion. In years of
scarcity, therefore, the corn merchant buys a great part of his corn for the
ordinary price, and sells it for a much higher. That this extraordinary profit,
however, is no more than sufficient to put his trade upon a fair level with
other trades, and to compensate the many losses which he sustains upon
other occasions, both from the perishable nature of the commodity itself,
and from the frequent and unforeseen fluctuations of its price, seems
evident enough, from this single circumstance, that great fortunes are as
seldom made in this as in any other trade. The popular odium, however,
which attends it in years of scarcity, the only years in which it can be very
profitable, renders people of character and fortune averse to enter into it. It
is abandoned to an inferior set of dealers; and millers, bakers, meal-men,
and meal-factors, together with a number of wretched hucksters, are almost
the only middle people that, in the home market, come between the grower
and the consumer.
The ancient policy of Europe, instead of discountenancing this popular
odium against a trade so beneficial to the public, seems, on the contrary, to
have authorised and encouraged it.
By the 5th and 6th of Edward VI cap. 14, it was enacted, that whoever
should buy any corn or grain, with intent to sell it again, should be reputed
an unlawful engrosser, and should, for the first fault, suffer two months
imprisonment, and forfeit the value of the corn; for the second, suffer six
months imprisonment, and forfeit double the value; and, for the third, be set
in the pillory, suffer imprisonment during the king’s pleasure, and forfeit all
his goods and chattels. The ancient policy of most other parts of Europe
was no better than that of England.
Our ancestors seem to have imagined, that the people would buy their
corn cheaper of the farmer than of the corn merchant, who, they were
afraid, would require, over and above the price which he paid to the farmer,
an exorbitant profit to himself. They endeavoured, therefore, to annihilate
his trade altogether. They even endeavoured to hinder, as much as possible,
any middle man of any kind from coming in between the grower and the
consumer; and this was the meaning of the many restraints which they
imposed upon the trade of those whom they called kidders, or carriers of
corn; a trade which nobody was allowed to exercise without a licence,
ascertaining his qualifications as a man of probity and fair dealing. The
authority of three justices of the peace was, by the statute of Edward VI.
necessary in order to grant this licence. But even this restraint was
afterwards thought insufficient, and, by a statute of Elizabeth, the privilege
of granting it was confined to the quarter-sessions.
The ancient policy of Europe endeavoured, in this manner, to regulate
agriculture, the great trade of the country, by maxims quite different from
those which it established with regard to manufactures, the great trade of
the towns. By leaving a farmer no other customers but either the consumers
or their immediate factors, the kidders and carriers of corn, it endeavoured
to force him to exercise the trade, not only of a farmer, but of a corn
merchant, or corn retailer. On the contrary, it, in many cases, prohibited the
manufacturer from exercising the trade of a shopkeeper, or from selling his
own goods by retail. It meant, by the one law, to promote the general
interest of the country, or to render corn cheap, without, perhaps, its being
well understood how this was to be done. By the other, it meant to promote
that of a particular order of men, the shopkeepers, who would be so much
undersold by the manufacturer, it was supposed, that their trade would be
ruined, if he was allowed to retail at all.
The manufacturer, however, though he had been allowed to keep a shop,
and to sell his own goods by retail, could not have undersold the common
shopkeeper. Whatever part of his capital he might have placed in his shop,
he must have withdrawn it from his manufacture. In order to carry on his
business on a level with that of other people, as he must have had the profit
of a manufacturer on the one part, so he must have had that of a shopkeeper
upon the other. Let us suppose, for example, that in the particular town
where he lived, ten per cent. was the ordinary profit both of manufacturing
and shopkeeping stock; he must in this case have charged upon every piece
of his own goods, which he sold in his shop, a profit of twenty per cent.
When he carried them from his workhouse to his shop, he must have valued
them at the price for which he could have sold them to a dealer or
shopkeeper, who would have bought them by wholesale. If he valued them
lower, he lost a part of the profit of his manufacturing capital. When, again,
he sold them from his shop, unless he got the same price at which a
shopkeeper would have sold them, he lost a part of the profit of his shop-
keeping capital. Though he might appear, therefore, to make a double profit
upon the same piece of goods, yet, as these goods made successively a part
of two distinct capitals, he made but a single profit upon the whole capital
employed about them; and if he made less than his profit, he was a loser,
and did not employ his whole capital with the same advantage as the greater
part of his neighbours.
What the manufacturer was prohibited to do, the farmer was in some
measure enjoined to do; to divide his capital between two different
employments; to keep one part of it in his granaries and stack-yard, for
supplying the occasional demands of the market, and to employ the other in
the cultivation of his land. But as he could not afford to employ the latter
for less than the ordinary profits of farming stock, so he could as little
afford to employ the former for less than the ordinary profits of mercantile
stock. Whether the stock which really carried on the business of a corn
merchant belonged to the person who was called a farmer, or to the person
who was called a corn merchant, an equal profit was in both cases requisite,
in order to indemnify its owner for employing it in this manner, in order to
put his business on a level with other trades, and in order to hinder him
from having an interest to change it as soon as possible for some other. The
farmer, therefore, who was thus forced to exercise the trade of a corn
merchant, could not afford to sell his corn cheaper than any other corn
merchant would have been obliged to do in the case of a free competition.
The dealer who can employ his whole stock in one single branch of
business, has an advantage of the same kind with the workman who can
employ his whole labour in one single operation. As the latter acquires a
dexterity which enables him, with the same two hands, to perform a much
greater quantity of work, so the former acquires so easy and ready a method
of transacting his business, of buying and disposing of his goods, that with
the same capital he can transact a much greater quantity of business. As the
one can commonly afford his work a good deal cheaper, so the other can
commonly afford his goods somewhat cheaper, than if his stock and
attention were both employed about a greater variety of objects. The greater
part of manufacturers could not afford to retail their own goods so cheap as
a vigilant and active shopkeeper, whose sole business it was to buy them by
wholesale and to retail them again. The greater part of farmers could still
less afford to retail their own corn, to supply the inhabitants of a town, at
perhaps four or five miles distance from the greater part of them, so cheap
as a vigilant and active corn merchant, whose sole business it was to
purchase corn by wholesale, to collect it into a great magazine, and to retail
it again.
The law which prohibited the manufacturer from exercising the trade of a
shopkeeper, endeavoured to force this division in the employment of stock
to go on faster than it might otherwise have done. The law which obliged
the farmer to exercise the trade of a corn merchant, endeavoured to hinder it
from going on so fast. Both laws were evident violations of natural liberty,
and therefore unjust; and they were both, too, as impolitic as they were
unjust. It is the interest of every society, that things of this kind should
never either he forced or obstructed. The man who employs either his
labour or his stock in a greater variety of ways than his situation renders
necessary, can never hurt his neighbour by underselling him. He may hurt
himself, and he generally does so. Jack-of-all-trades will never be rich, says
the proverb. But the law ought always to trust people with the care of their
own interest, as in their local situations they must generally be able to judge
better of it than the legislature can do. The law, however, which obliged the
farmer to exercise the trade of a corn merchant was by far the most
pernicious of the two.
It obstructed not only that division in the employment of stock which is
so advantageous to every society, but it obstructed likewise the
improvement and cultivation of the land. By obliging the farmer to carry on
two trades instead of one, it forced him to divide his capital into two parts,
of which one only could be employed in cultivation. But if he had been at
liberty to sell his whole crop to a corn merchant as fast as he could thresh it
out, his whole capital might have returned immediately to the land, and
have been employed in buying more cattle, and hiring more servants, in
order to improve and cultivate it better. But by being obliged to sell his corn
by retail, he was obliged to keep a great part of his capital in his granaries
and stack-yard through the year, and could not therefore cultivate so well as
with the same capital he might otherwise have done. This law, therefore,
necessarily obstructed the improvement of the land, and, instead of tending
to render corn cheaper, must have tended to render it scarcer, and therefore
dearer, than it would otherwise have been.
After the business of the farmer, that of the corn merchant is in reality the
trade which, if properly protected and encouraged, would contribute the
most to the raising of corn. It would support the trade of the farmer, in the
same manner as the trade of the wholesale dealer supports that of the
manufacturer.
The wholesale dealer, by affording a ready market to the manufacturer,
by taking his goods off his hand as fast as he can make them, and by
sometimes even advancing their price to him before he has made them,
enables him to keep his whole capital, and sometimes even more than his
whole capital, constantly employed in manufacturing, and consequently to
manufacture a much greater quantity of goods than if he was obliged to
dispose of them himself to the immediate consumers, or even to the
retailers. As the capital of the wholesale merchant, too, is generally
sufficient to replace that of many manufacturers, this intercourse between
him and them interests the owner of a large capital to support the owners of
a great number of small ones, and to assist them in those losses and
misfortunes which might otherwise prove ruinous to them.
An intercourse of the same kind universally established between the
farmers and the corn merchants, would be attended with effects equally
beneficial to the farmers. They would be enabled to keep their whole
capitals, and even more than their whole capitals constantly employed in
cultivation. In case of any of those accidents to which no trade is more
liable than theirs, they would find in their ordinary customer, the wealthy
corn merchant, a person who had both an interest to support them, and the
ability to do it; and they would not, as at present, be entirely dependent
upon the forbearance of their landlord, or the mercy of his steward. Were it
possible, as perhaps it is not, to establish this intercourse universally, and all
at once; were it possible to turn all at once the whole farming stock of the
kingdom to its proper business, the cultivation of land, withdrawing it from
every other employment into which any part of it may be at present
diverted; and were it possible, in order to support and assist, upon occasion,
the operations of this great stock, to provide all at once another stock almost
equally great; it is not, perhaps, very easy to imagine how great, how
extensive, and how sudden, would be the improvement which this change
of circumstances would alone produce upon the whole face of the country.
The statute of Edward VI. therefore, by prohibiting as much as possible
any middle man from coming in between the grower and the consumer,
endeavoured to annihilate a trade, of which the free exercise is not only the
best palliative of the inconveniencies of a dearth, but the best preventive of
that calamity; after the trade of the farmer, no trade contributing so much to
the growing of corn as that of the corn merchant.
The rigour of this law was afterwards softened by several subsequent
statutes, which successively permitted the engrossing of corn when the
price of wheat should not exceed 20s. and 24s. 32s. and 40s. the quarter. At
last, by the 15th of Charles II. c.7, the engrossing or buying of corn, in
order to sell it again, as long as the price of wheat did not exceed 48s. the
quarter, and that of other grain in proportion, was declared lawful to all
persons not being forestallers, that is, not selling again in the same market
within three months. All the freedom which the trade of the inland corn
dealer has ever yet enjoyed was bestowed upon it by this statute. The statute
of the twelfth of the present king, which repeals almost all the other ancient
laws against engrossers and forestallers, does not repeal the restrictions of
this particular statute, which therefore still continue in force.
This statute, however, authorises in some measure two very absurd
popular prejudices.
First, It supposes, that when the price of wheat has risen so high as 48s.
the quarter, and that of other grain in proportion, corn is likely to be so
engrossed as to hurt the people. But, from what has been already said, it
seems evident enough, that corn can at no price be so engrossed by the
inland dealers as to hurt the people; and 48s. the quarter, besides, though it
may be considered as a very high price, yet, in years of scarcity, it is a price
which frequently takes place immediately after harvest, when scarce any
part of the new crop can be sold off, and when it is impossible even for
ignorance to suppose that any part of it can be so engrossed as to hurt the
people.
Secondly, It supposes that there is a certain price at which corn is likely
to be forestalled, that is, bought up in order to be sold again soon after in
the same market, so as to hurt the people. But if a merchant ever buys up
corn, either going to a particular market, or in a particular market, in order
to sell it again soon after in the same market, it must be because he judges
that the market cannot be so liberally supplied through the whole season as
upon that particular occasion, and that the price, therefore, must soon rise.
If he judges wrong in this, and if the price does not rise, he not only loses
the whole profit of the stock which he employs in this manner, but a part of
the stock itself, by the expense and loss which necessarily attend the storing
and keeping of corn. He hurts himself, therefore, much more essentially
than he can hurt even the particular people whom he may hinder from
supplying themselves upon that particular market day, because they may
afterwards supply themselves just as cheap upon any other market day. If he
judges right, instead of hurting the great body of the people, he renders
them a most important service. By making them feel the inconveniencies of
a dearth somewhat earlier than they otherwise might do, he prevents their
feeling them afterwards so severely as they certainly would do, if the
cheapness of price encouraged them to consume faster than suited the real
scarcity of the season. When the scarcity is real, the best thing that can be
done for the people is, to divide the inconvenience of it as equally as
possible, through all the different months and weeks and days of the year.
The interest of the corn merchant makes him study to do this as exactly as
he can; and as no other person can have either the same interest, or the same
knowledge, or the same abilities, to do it so exactly as he, this most
important operation of commerce ought to be trusted entirely to him; or, in
other words, the corn trade, so far at least as concerns the supply of the
home market, ought to be left perfectly free.
The popular fear of engrossing and forestalling may be compared to the
popular terrors and suspicions of witchcraft. The unfortunate wretches
accused of this latter crime were not more innocent of the misfortunes
imputed to them, than those who have been accused of the former. The law
which put an end to all prosecutions against witchcraft, which put it out of
any man’s power to gratify his own malice by accusing his neighbour of
that imaginary crime, seems effectually to have put an end to those fears
and suspicions, by taking away the great cause which encouraged and
supported them. The law which would restore entire freedom to the inland
trade of corn, would probably prove as effectual to put an end to the popular
fears of engrossing and forestalling.
The 15th of Charles II. c. 7, however, with all its imperfections, has,
perhaps, contributed more, both to the plentiful supply of the home market,
and to the increase of tillage, than any other law in the statute book. It is
from this law that the inland corn trade has derived all the liberty and
protection which it has ever yet enjoyed; and both the supply of the home
market and the interest of tillage are much more effectually promoted by the
inland, than either by the importation or exportation trade.
The proportion of the average quantity of all sorts of grain imported into
Great Britain to that of all sorts of grain consumed, it has been computed by
the author of the Tracts upon the Corn Trade, does not exceed that of one to
five hundred and seventy. For supplying the home market, therefore, the
importance of the inland trade must be to that of the importation trade as
five hundred and seventy to one.
The average quantity of all sorts of grain exported from Great Britain
does not, according to the same author, exceed the one-and-thirtieth part of
the annual produce. For the encouragement of tillage, therefore, by
providing a market for the home produce, the importance of the inland trade
must be to that of the exportation trade as thirty to one.
I have no great faith in political arithmetic, and I mean not to warrant the
exactness of either of these computations. I mention them only in order to
show of how much less consequence, in the opinion of the most judicious
and experienced persons, the foreign trade of corn is than the home trade.
The great cheapness of corn in the years immediately preceding the
establishment of the bounty may, perhaps with reason, he ascribed in some
measure to the operation of this statute of Charles II. which had been
enacted about five-and-twenty years before, and which had, therefore, full
time to produce its effect.
A very few words will sufficiently explain all that I have to say
concerning the other three branches of the corn trade.
II. The trade of the merchant-importer of foreign corn for home
consumption, evidently contributes to the immediate supply of the home
market, and must so far be immediately beneficial to the great body of the
people. It tends, indeed, to lower somewhat the average money price of
corn, but not to diminish its real value, or the quantity of labour which it is
capable of maintaining. If importation was at all times free, our farmers and
country gentlemen would probably, one year with another, get less money
for their corn than they do at present, when importation is at most times in
effect prohibited; but the money which they got would be of more value,
would buy more goods of all other kinds, and would employ more labour.
Their real wealth, their real revenue, therefore, would be the same as at
present, though it might be expressed by a smaller quantity of silver, and
they would neither be disabled nor discouraged from cultivating corn as
much as they do at present. On the contrary, as the rise in the real value of
silver, in consequence of lowering the money price of corn, lowers
somewhat the money price of all other commodities, it gives the industry of
the country where it takes place some advantage in all foreign markets and
thereby tends to encourage and increase that industry. But the extent of the
home market for corn must be in proportion to the general industry of the
country where it grows, or to the number of those who produce something
else, and therefore, have something else, or, what comes to the same thing,
the price of something else, to give in exchange for corn. But in every
country, the home market, as it is the nearest and most convenient, so is it
likewise the greatest and most important market for corn. That rise in the
real value of silver, therefore, which is the effect of lowering the average
money price of corn, tends to enlarge the greatest and most important
market for corn, and thereby to encourage, instead of discouraging its
growth.
By the 22d of Charles II. c. 13, the importation of wheat, whenever the
price in the home market did not exceed 53s:4d. the quarter, was subjected
to a duty of 16s. the quarter; and to a duty of 8s. whenever the price did not
exceed £4. The former of these two prices has, for more than a century past,
taken place only in times of very great scarcity; and the latter has, so far as I
know, not taken place at all. Yet, till wheat has risen above this latter price,
it was, by this statute, subjected to a very high duty; and, till it had risen
above the former, to a duty which amounted to a prohibition. The
importation of other sorts of grain was restrained at rates and by duties, in
proportion to the value of the grain, almost equally high. Before the 13th of
the present king, the following were the duties payable upon the
importation of the different sorts of grain:
     Grain.                     Duties.          Duties       Duties.
Beans to 28s. per qr.  19s:10d. after till 40s. 16s:8d. then 12d.
Barley to 28s.   -     19s:10d.         -  32s. 16s.     -   12d.
Malt is prohibited by the annual malt-tax bill.
Oats   to 16s.   -      5s:10d. after   -                    9½d.
Pease   to 40s.  -     16s: 0d. after   -                    9¾d.
Rye     to 36s.  -     19s:10d. till 40s.       16s:8d   -   12d.
Wheat to 44s.    -     21s: 9d. till 53s:4d.    17s.     -    8s.
                          till £4, and after that about       1s:4d.
Buck-wheat to 32s. per qr.     to pay 16s.
These different duties were imposed, partly by the 22d of Charles II. in
place of the old subsidy, partly by the new subsidy, by the one-third and
two-thirds subsidy, and by the subsidy 1747. Subsequent laws still further
increased those duties.
The distress which, in years of scarcity, the strict execution of those laws
might have brought upon the people, would probably have been very great;
but, upon such occasions, its execution was generally suspended by
temporary statutes, which permitted, for a limited time, the importation of
foreign corn. The necessity of these temporary statutes sufficiently
demonstrates the impropriety of this general one.
These restraints upon importation, though prior to the establishment of
the bounty, were dictated by the same spirit, by the same principles, which
afterwards enacted that regulation. How hurtful soever in themselves, these,
or some other restraints upon importation, became necessary in
consequence of that regulation. If, when wheat was either below 48s. the
quarter, or not much above it, foreign corn could have been imported, either
duty free, or upon paying only a small duty, it might have been exported
again, with the benefit of the bounty, to the great loss of the public revenue,
and to the entire perversion of the institution, of which the object was to
extend the market for the home growth, not that for the growth of foreign
countries.
III. The trade of the merchant-exporter of corn for foreign consumption,
certainly does not contribute directly to the plentiful supply of the home
market. It does so, however, indirectly. From whatever source this supply
maybe usually drawn, whether from home growth, or from foreign
importation, unless more corn is either usually grown, or usually imported
into the country, than what is usually consumed in it, the supply of the
home market can never be very plentiful. But unless the surplus can, in all
ordinary cases, be exported, the growers will be careful never to grow more,
and the importers never to import more, than what the bare consumption of
the home market requires. That market will very seldom be overstocked;
but it will generally be understocked; the people, whose business it is to
supply it, being generally afraid lest their goods should be left upon their
hands. The prohibition of exportation limits the improvement and
cultivation of the country to what the supply of its own inhabitants require.
The freedom of exportation enables it to extend cultivation for the supply of
foreign nations.
By the 12th of Charles II. c.4, the exportation of corn was permitted
whenever the price of wheat did not exceed 40s. the quarter, and that of
other grain in proportion. By the 15th of the same prince, this liberty was
extended till the price of wheat exceeded 48s. the quarter; and by the 22d,
to all higher prices. A poundage, indeed, was to be paid to the king upon
such exportation; but all grain was rated so low in the book of rates, that
this poundage amounted only, upon wheat to 1s., upon oats to 4d., and upon
all other grain to 6d. the quarter. By the 1st of William and Mary, the act
which established this bounty, this small duty was virtually taken off
whenever the price of wheat did not exceed 48s. the quarter; and by the 11th
and 12th of William III. c. 20, it was expressly taken off at all higher prices.
The trade of the merchant-exporter was, in this manner, not only
encouraged by a bounty, but rendered much more free than that of the
inland dealer. By the last of these statutes, corn could be engrossed at any
price for exportation; but it could not be engrossed for inland sale, except
when the price did not exceed 48s. the quarter. The interest of the inland
dealer, however, it has already been shown, can never be opposite to that of
the great body of the people. That of the merchant-exporter may, and in fact
sometimes is. If, while his own country labours under a dearth, a
neighbouring country should be afflicted with a famine, it might be his
interest to carry corn to the latter country, in such quantities as might very
much aggravate the calamities of the dearth. The plentiful supply of the
home market was not the direct object of those statutes; but, under the
pretence of encouraging agriculture, to raise the money price of corn as
high as possible, and thereby to occasion, as much as possible, a constant
dearth in the home market. By the discouragement of importation, the
supply of that market; even in times of great scarcity, was confined to the
home growth; and by the encouragement of exportation, when the price was
so high as 48s. the quarter, that market was not, even in times of
considerable scarcity, allowed to enjoy the whole of that growth. The
temporary laws, prohibiting, for a limited time, the exportation of corn, and
taking off, for a limited time, the duties upon its importation, expedients to
which Great Britain has been obliged so frequently to have recourse,
sufficiently demonstrate the impropriety of her general system. Had that
system been good, she would not so frequently have been reduced to the
necessity of departing from it.
Were all nations to follow the liberal system of free exportation and free
importation, the different states into which a great continent was divided,
would so far resemble the different provinces of a great empire. As among
the different provinces of a great empire, the freedom of the inland trade
appears, both from reason and experience, not only the best palliative of a
dearth, but the most effectual preventive of a famine; so would the freedom
of the exportation and importation trade be among the different states into
which a great continent was divided. The larger the continent, the easier the
communication through all the different parts of it, both by land and by
water, the less would any one particular part of it ever be exposed to either
of these calamities, the scarcity of any one country being more likely to be
relieved by the plenty of some other. But very few countries have entirely
adopted this liberal system. The freedom of the corn trade is almost
everywhere more or less restrained, and in many countries is confined by
such absurd regulations, as frequently aggravate the unavoidable misfortune
of a dearth into the dreadful calamity of a famine. The demand of such
countries for corn may frequently become so great and so urgent, that a
small state in their neighbourhood, which happened at the same time to be
labouring under some degree of dearth, could not venture to supply them
without exposing itself to the like dreadful calamity. The very bad policy of
one country may thus render it, in some measure, dangerous and imprudent
to establish what would otherwise be the best policy in another. The
unlimited freedom of exportation, however, would be much less dangerous
in great states, in which the growth being much greater, the supply could
seldom be much affected by any quantity or corn that was likely to be
exported. In a Swiss canton, or in some of the little states in Italy, it may,
perhaps, sometimes be necessary to restrain the exportation of corn. In such
great countries as France or England, it scarce ever can. To hinder, besides,
the farmer from sending his goods at all times to the best market, is
evidently to sacrifice the ordinary laws of justice to an idea of public utility,
to a sort of reasons of state; an act or legislative authority which ought to be
exercised only, which can be pardoned only, in cases of the most urgent
necessity. The price at which exportation of corn is prohibited, if it is ever
to be prohibited, ought always to be a very high price.
The laws concerning corn may everywhere be compared to the laws
concerning religion. The people feel themselves so much interested in what
relates either to their subsistence in this life, or to their happiness in a life to
come, that government must yield to their prejudices, and, in order to
preserve the public tranquillity, establish that system which they approve of.
It is upon this account, perhaps, that we so seldom find a reasonable system
established with regard to either of those two capital objects.
IV. The trade of the merchant-carrier, or of the importer of foreign corn,
in order to export it again, contributes to the plentiful supply of the home
market. It is not, indeed, the direct purpose of his trade to sell his corn
there; but he will generally be willing to do so, and even for a good deal
less money than he might expect in a foreign market; because he saves in
this manner the expense of loading and unloading, of freight and insurance.
The inhabitants of the country which, by means of the carrying trade,
becomes the magazine and storehouse for the supply of other countries, can
very seldom be in want themselves. Though the carrying trade must thus
contribute to reduce the average money price of corn in the home market, it
would not thereby lower its real value; it would only raise somewhat the
real value of silver.
The carrying trade was in effect prohibited in Great Britain, upon all
ordinary occasions, by the high duties upon the importation of foreign corn,
of the greater part of which there was no drawback; and upon extraordinary
occasions, when a scarcity made it necessary to suspend those duties by
temporary statutes, exportation was always prohibited. By this system of
laws, therefore, the carrying trade was in effect prohibited.
That system of laws, therefore, which is connected with the
establishment of the bounty, seems to deserve no part of the praise which
has been bestowed upon it. The improvement and prosperity of Great
Britain, which has been so often ascribed to those laws, may very easily be
accounted for by other causes. That security which the laws in Great Britain
give to every man, that he shall enjoy the fruits of his own labour, is alone
sufficient to make any country flourish, notwithstanding these and twenty
other absurd regulations of commerce; and this security was perfected by
the Revolution, much about the same time that the bounty was established.
The natural effort of every individual to better his own condition, when
suffered to exert itself with freedom and security, is so powerful a principle,
that it is alone, and without any assistance, not only capable of carrying on
the society to wealth and prosperity, but of surmounting a hundred
impertinent obstructions, with which the folly of human laws too often
encumbers its operations: though the effect of those obstructions is always,
more or less, either to encroach upon its freedom, or to diminish its security.
In Great Britain industry is perfectly secure; and though it is far from being
perfectly free, it is as free or freer than in any other part of Europe.
Though the period of the greatest prosperity and improvement of Great
Britain has been posterior to that system of laws which is connected with
the bounty, we must not upon that account, impute it to those laws. It has
been posterior likewise to the national debt; but the national debt has most
assuredly not been the cause of it.
Though the system of laws which is connected with the bounty, has
exactly the same tendency with the practice of Spain and Portugal, to lower
somewhat the value of the precious metals in the country where it takes
place; yet Great Britain is certainly one of the richest countries in Europe,
while Spain and Portugal are perhaps amongst the most beggarly. This
difference of situation, however, may easily be accounted for from two
different causes. First, the tax in Spain, the prohibition in Portugal of
exporting gold and silver, and the vigilant police which watches over the
execution of those laws, must, in two very poor countries, which between
them import annually upwards of six millions sterling, operate not only
more directly, but much more forcibly, in reducing the value of those metals
there, than the corn laws can do in Great Britain. And, secondly, this bad
policy is not in those countries counterbalanced by the general liberty and
security of the people. Industry is there neither free nor secure; and the civil
and ecclesiastical governments of both Spain and Portugal are such as
would alone be sufficient to perpetuate their present state of poverty, even
though their regulations of commerce were as wise as the greatest part of
them are absurd and foolish.
The 13th of the present king, c. 43, seems to have established a new
system with regard to the corn laws, in many respects better than the
ancient one, but in one or two respects perhaps not quite so good.
By this statute, the high duties upon importation for home consumption
are taken off, so soon as the price of middling wheat rises to 48s. the
quarter; that of middling rye, pease, or beans, to 32s.; that of barley to 24s.;
and that of oats to 16s.; and instead of them, a small duty is imposed of only
6d upon the quarter of wheat, and upon that or other grain in proportion.
With regard to all those different sorts of grain, but particularly with regard
to wheat, the home market is thus opened to foreign supplies, at prices
considerably lower than before.
By the same statute, the old bounty of 5s. upon the exportation of wheat,
ceases so soon as the price rises to 44s. the quarter, instead of 48s. the price
at which it ceased before; that of 2s:6d. upon the exportation of barley,
ceases so soon as the price rises to 22s. instead of 24s. the price at which it
ceased before; that of 2s:6d. upon the exportation of oatmeal, ceases so
soon as the price rises to 14s. instead of 15s. the price at which it ceased
before. The bounty upon rye is reduced from 3s:6d. to 3s. and it ceases so
soon as the price rises to 28s. instead of 32s. the price at which it ceased
before. If bounties are as improper as I have endeavoured to prove them to
be, the sooner they cease, and the lower they are, so much the better.
The same statute permits, at the lowest prices, the importation of corn in
order to be exported again, duty free, provided it is in the mean time lodged
in a warehouse under the joint locks of the king and the importer. This
liberty, indeed, extends to no more than twenty-five of the different ports of
Great Britain. They are, however, the principal ones; and there may not,
perhaps, be warehouses proper for this purpose in the greater part of the
others.
So far this law seems evidently an improvement upon the ancient system.
But by the same law, a bounty of 2s. the quarter is given for the
exportation of oats, whenever the price does not exceed fourteen shillings.
No bounty had ever been given before for the exportation of this grain, no
more than for that of pease or beans.
By the same law, too, the exportation of wheat is prohibited so soon as
the price rises to forty-four shillings the quarter; that of rye so soon as it
rises to twenty-eight shillings; that of barley so soon as it rises to twenty-
two shillings; and that of oats so soon as they rise to fourteen shillings.
Those several prices seem all of them a good deal too low; and there seems
to be an impropriety, besides, in prohibiting exportation altogether at those
precise prices at which that bounty, which was given in order to force it, is
withdrawn. The bounty ought certainly either to have been withdrawn at a
much lower price, or exportation ought to have been allowed at a much
higher.
So far, therefore, this law seems to be inferior to the ancient system. With
all its imperfections, however, we may perhaps say of it what was said of
the laws of Solon, that though not the best in itself, it is the best which the
interest, prejudices, and temper of the times, would admit of. It may
perhaps in due time prepare the way for a better.
CHAPTER VI.
OF TREATIES OF COMMERCE.
When a nation binds itself by treaty, either to permit the entry of certain
goods from one foreign country which it prohibits from all others, or to
exempt the goods of one country from duties to which it subjects those of
all others, the country, or at least the merchants and manufacturers of the
country, whose commerce is so favoured, must necessarily derive great
advantage from the treaty. Those merchants and manufacturers enjoy a sort
of monopoly in the country which is so indulgent to them. That country
becomes a market, both more extensive and more advantageous for their
goods: more extensive, because the goods of other nations being either
excluded or subjected to heavier duties, it takes off a greater quantity of
theirs; more advantageous, because the merchants of the favoured country,
enjoying a sort of monopoly there, will often sell their goods for a better
price than if exposed to the free competition of all other nations.
Such treaties, however, though they may be advantageous to the
merchants and manufacturers of the favoured, are necessarily
disadvantageous to those of the favouring country. A monopoly is thus
granted against them to a foreign nation; and they must frequently buy the
foreign goods they have occasion for, dearer than if the free competition of
other nations was admitted. That part of its own produce with which such a
nation purchases foreign goods, must consequently be sold cheaper;
because, when two things are exchanged for one another, the cheapness of
the one is a necessary consequence, or rather is the same thing, with the
dearness of the other. The exchangeable value of its annual produce,
therefore, is likely to be diminished by every such treaty. This diminution,
however, can scarce amount to any positive loss, but only to a lessening of
the gain which it might otherwise make. Though it sells its goods cheaper
than it otherwise might do, it will not probably sell them for less than they
cost; nor, as in the case of bounties, for a price which will not replace the
capital employed in bringing them to market, together with the ordinary
profits of stock. The trade could not go on long if it did. Even the favouring
country, therefore, may still gain by the trade, though less than if there was
a free competition.
Some treaties of commerce, however, have been supposed advantageous,
upon principles very different from these; and a commercial country has
sometimes granted a monopoly of this kind, against itself, to certain goods
of a foreign nation, because it expected, that in the whole commerce
between them, it would annually sell more than it would buy, and that a
balance in gold and silver would be annually returned to it. It is upon this
principle that the treaty of commerce between England and Portugal,
concluded in 1703 by Mr Methuen, has been so much commended. The
following is a literal translation of that treaty, which consists of three
articles only.
ART. I. His sacred royal majesty of Portugal promises, both in his own
name and that of his successors, to admit for ever hereafter, into Portugal,
the woollen cloths, and the rest of the woollen manufactures of the British,
as was accustomed, till they were prohibited by the law; nevertheless upon
this condition:
ART. II. That is to say, that her sacred royal majesty of Great Britain
shall, in her own name, and that of her successors, be obliged, for ever
hereafter, to admit the wines of the growth of Portugal into Britain; so that
at no time, whether there shall be peace or war between the kingdoms of
Britain and France, any thing more shall be demanded for these wines by
the name of custom or duty, or by whatsoever other title, directly or
indirectly, whether they shall be imported into Great Britain in pipes or
hogsheads, or other casks, than what shall be demanded for the like quantity
or measure of French wine, deducting or abating a third part of the custom
or duty. But if, at any time, this deduction or abatement of customs, which
is to be made as aforesaid, shall in any manner be attempted and prejudiced,
it shall be just and lawful for his sacred royal majesty of Portugal, again to
prohibit the woollen cloths, and the rest of the British woollen
manufactures.
ART. III. The most excellent lords the plenipotentiaries promise and take
upon themselves, that their above named masters shall ratify this treaty; and
within the space of two months the ratification shall be exchanged.
By this treaty, the crown of Portugal becomes bound to admit the English
woollens upon the same footing as before the prohibition; that is, not to
raise the duties which had been paid before that time. But it does not
become bound to admit them upon any better terms than those of any other
nation, of France or Holland, for example. The crown of Great Britain, on
the contrary, becomes bound to admit the wines of Portugal, upon paying
only two-thirds of the duty which is paid for those of France, the wines
most likely to come into competition with them. So far this treaty, therefore,
is evidently advantageous to Portugal, and disadvantageous to Great
Britain.
It has been celebrated, however, as a masterpiece of the commercial
policy of England. Portugal receives annually from the Brazils a greater
quantity of gold than can be employed in its domestic commerce, whether
in the shape of coin or of plate. The surplus is too valuable to be allowed to
lie idle and locked up in coffers; and as it can find no advantageous market
at home, it must, notwithstanding; any prohibition, be sent abroad, and
exchanged for something for which there is a more advantageous market at
home. A large share of it comes annually to England, in return either for
English goods, or for those of other European nations that receive their
returns through England. Mr Barretti was informed, that the weekly packet-
boat from Lisbon brings, one week with another, more than £50,000 in gold
to England. The sum had probably been exaggerated. It would amount to
more than £2,600,000 a year, which is more than the Brazils are supposed
to afford.
Our merchants were, some years ago, out of humour with the crown of
Portugal. Some privileges which had been granted them, not by treaty, but
by the free grace of that crown, at the solicitation, indeed, it is probable, and
in return for much greater favours, defence and protection from the crown
of Great Britain, had been either infringed or revoked. The people,
therefore, usually most interested in celebrating the Portugal trade, were
then rather disposed to represent it as less advantageous than it had
commonly been imagined. The far greater part, almost the whole, they
pretended, of this annual importation of gold, was not on account of Great
Britain, but of other European nations; the fruits and wines of Portugal
annually imported into Great Britain nearly compensating the value of the
British goods sent thither.
Let us suppose, however, that the whole was on account of Great Britain,
and that it amounted to a still greater sum than Mr Barretti seems to
imagine; this trade would not, upon that account, be more advantageous
than any other, in which, for the same value sent out, we received an equal
value of consumable goods in return.
It is but a very small part of this importation which, it can be supposed, is
employed as an annual addition, either to the plate or to the coin of the
kingdom. The rest must all be sent abroad, and exchanged for consumable
goods of some kind or other. But if those consumable goods were purchased
directly with the produce of English industry, it would be more for the
advantage of England, than first to purchase with that produce the gold of
Portugal, and afterwards to purchase with that gold those consumable
goods. A direct foreign trade of consumption is always more advantageous
than a round-about one; and to bring the same value of foreign goods to the
home market requires a much smaller capital in the one way than in the
ether. If a smaller share of its industry, therefore, had been employed in
producing goods fit for the Portugal market, and a greater in producing
those lit for the other markets, where those consumable goods for which
there is a demand in Great Britain are to be had, it would have been more
for the advantage of England. To procure both the gold which it wants for
its own use, and the consumable goods, would, in this way, employ a much
smaller capital than at present. There would be a spare capital, therefore, to
be employed for other purposes, in exciting an additional quantity of
industry, and in raising a greater annual produce.
Though Britain were entirely excluded from the Portugal trade, it could
find very little difficulty in procuring all the annual supplies of gold which
it wants, either for the purposes of plate, or of coin, or of foreign trade.
Gold, like every other commodity, is always somewhere or another to be
got for its value by those who have that value to give for it. The annual
surplus of gold in Portugal, besides, would still be sent abroad, and though
not carried away by Great Britain, would be carried away by some other
nation, which would be glad to sell it again for its price, in the same manner
as Great Britain does at present. In buying gold of Portugal, indeed, we buy
it at the first hand; whereas, in buying it of any other nation, except Spain,
we should buy it at the second, and might pay somewhat dearer. This
difference, however, would surely be too insignificant to deserve the public
attention.
Almost all our gold, it is said, comes from Portugal. With other nations,
the balance of trade is either against as, or not much in our favour. But we
should remember, that the more gold we import from one country, the less
we must necessarily import from all others. The effectual demand for gold,
like that for every other commodity, is in every country limited to a certain
quantity. If nine-tenths of this quantity are imported from one country, there
remains a tenth only to be imported from all others. The more gold, besides,
that is annually imported from some particular countries, over and above
what is requisite for plate and for coin, the more must necessarily be
exported to some others: and the more that most insignificant object of
modern policy, the balance of trade, appears to be in our favour with some
particular countries, the more it must necessarily appear to be against us
with many others.
It was upon this silly notion, however, that England could not subsist
without the Portugal trade, that, towards the end of the late war, France and
Spain, without pretending either offence or provocation, required the king
of Portugal to exclude all British ships from his ports, and, for the security
of this exclusion, to receive into them French or Spanish garrisons. Had the
king of Portugal submitted to those ignominious terms which his brother-in-
law the king of Spain proposed to him, Britain would have been freed from
a much greater inconveniency than the loss of the Portugal trade, the burden
of supporting a very weak ally, so unprovided of every thing for his own
defence, that the whole power of England, had it been directed to that single
purpose, could scarce, perhaps, have defended him for another campaign.
The loss of the Portugal trade would, no doubt, have occasioned a
considerable embarrassment to the merchants at that time engaged in it,
who might not, perhaps, have found out, for a year or two, any other
equally advantageous method of employing their capitals; and in this would
probably have consisted all the inconveniency which England could have
suffered from this notable piece of commercial policy.
The great annual importation of gold and silver is neither for the purpose
of plate nor of coin, but of foreign trade. A round-about foreign trade of
consumption can be carried on more advantageously by means of these
metals than of almost any other goods. As they are the universal
instruments of commerce, they are more readily received in return for all
commodities than any other goods; and, on account of their small bulk and
great value, it costs less to transport them backward and forward from one
place to another than almost any other sort of merchandize, and they lose
less of their value by being so transported. Of all the commodities,
therefore, which are bought in one foreign country, for no other purpose but
to be sold or exchanged again for some other goods in another, there are
none so convenient as gold and silver. In facilitating all the different round-
about foreign trades of consumption which are carried on in Great Britain,
consists the principal advantage of the Portugal trade; and though it is not a
capital advantage, it is, no doubt, a considerable one.
That any annual addition which, it can reasonably be supposed, is made
either to the plate or to the coin of the kingdom, could require but a very
small annual importation of gold and silver, seems evident enough; and
though we had no direct trade with Portugal, this small quantity could
always, somewhere or another, be very easily got.
Though the goldsmiths trade be very considerable in Great Britain, the
far greater part of the new plate which they annually sell, is made from
other old plate melted down; so that the addition annually made to the
whole plate of the kingdom cannot be very great, and could require but a
very small annual importation.
It is the same case with the coin. Nobody imagines, I believe, that even
the greater part of the annual coinage, amounting, for ten years together,
before the late reformation of the gold coin, to upwards of £800,000 a-year
in gold, was an annual addition to the money before current in the kingdom.
In a country where the expense of the coinage is defrayed by the
government, the value of the coin, even when it contains its full standard
weight of gold and silver, can never be much greater than that of an equal
quantity of those metals uncoined, because it requires only the trouble of
going to the mint, and the delay, perhaps, of a few weeks, to procure for any
quantity of uncoined gold and silver an equal quantity of those metals in
coin; but in every country the greater part of the current coin is almost
always more or less worn, or otherwise degenerated from its standard. In
Great Britain it was, before the late reformation, a good deal so, the gold
being more than two per cent., and the silver more than eight per cent.
below its standard weight. But if forty-four guineas and a-half, containing
their full standard weight, a pound weight of gold, could purchase very little
more than a pound weight of uncoined gold; forty-four guineas and a-half,
wanting a part of their weight, could not purchase a pound weight, and
something was to be added, in order to make up the deficiency. The current
price of gold bullion at market, therefore, instead of being the same with the
mint price, or £46:14:6, was then about £47:14s., and sometimes about £48.
When the greater part of the coin, however, was in this degenerate
condition, forty four guineas and a-half, fresh from the mint, would
purchase no more goods in the market than any other ordinary guineas;
because, when they came into the coffers of the merchant, being
confounded with other money, they could not afterwards be distinguished
without more trouble than the difference was worth. Like other guineas,
they were worth no more than £46:14:6. If thrown into the melting pot,
however, they produced, without any sensible loss, a pound weight of
standard gold, which could be sold at any time for between £47:14s. and
£48, either in gold or silver, as fit for all the purposes of coin as that which
had been melted down. There was an evident profit, therefore, in melting
down new-coined money; and it was done so instantaneously, that no
precaution of government could prevent it. The operations of the mint were,
upon this account, somewhat like the web of Penelope; the work that was
done in the day was undone in the night. The mint was employed, not so
much in making daily additions to the coin, as in replacing the very best
part of it, which was daily melted down.
Were the private people who carry their gold and silver to the mint to pay
themselves for the coinage, it would add to the value of those metals, in the
same manner as the fashion does to that of plate. Coined gold and silver
would be more valuable than uncoined. The seignorage, if it was not
exorbitant, would add to the bullion the whole value of the duty; because,
the government having everywhere the exclusive privilege of coining, no
coin can come to market cheaper than they think proper to afford it. If the
duty was exorbitant, indeed, that is, if it was very much above the real value
of the labour and expense requisite for coinage, false coiners, both at home
and abroad, might be encouraged, by the great difference between the value
of bullion and that of coin, to pour in so great a quantity of counterfeit
money as might reduce the value of the government money. In France,
however, though the seignorage is eight per cent., no sensible
inconveniency of this kind is found to arise from it. The dangers to which a
false coiner is everywhere exposed, if he lives in the country of which he
counterfeits the coin, and to which his agents or correspondents are
exposed, if he lives in a foreign country, are by far too great to be incurred
for the sake of a profit of six or seven per cent.
The seignorage in France raises the value of the coin higher than in
proportion to the quantity of pure gold which it contains. Thus, by the edict
of January 1726, the mint price of fine gold of twenty-four carats was fixed
at seven hundred and forty livres nine sous and one denier one-eleventh the
mark of eight Paris ounces. {See Dictionnaire des Monnoies, tom. ii. article
Seigneurage, p. 439, par 81. Abbot de Bazinghen, Conseiller-Commissaire
en la Cour des Monnoies à Paris.} The gold coin of France, making an
allowance for the remedy of the mint, contains twenty-one carats and three-
fourths of fine gold, and two carats one-fourth of alloy. The mark of
standard gold, therefore, is worth no more than about six hundred and
seventy-one livres ten deniers. But in France this mark of standard gold is
coined into thirty louis d’ors of twenty-four livres each, or into seven
hundred and twenty livres. The coinage, therefore, increases the value of a
mark of standard gold bullion, by the difference between six hundred and
seventy-one livres ten deniers and seven hundred and twenty livres, or by
forty-eight livres nineteen sous and two deniers.
A seignorage will, in many cases, take away altogether, and will in all
cases diminish, the profit of melting down the new coin. This profit always
arises from the difference between the quantity of bullion which the
common currency ought to contain and that which it actually does contain.
If this difference is less than the seignorage, there will be loss instead of
profit. If it is equal to the seignorage, there will be neither profit nor loss. If
it is greater than the seignorage, there will, indeed, be some profit, but less
than if there was no seignorage. If, before the late reformation of the gold
coin, for example, there had been a seignorage of five per cent. upon the
coinage, there would have been a loss of three per cent. upon the melting
down of the gold coin. If the seignorage had been two per cent., there would
have been neither profit nor loss. If the seignorage had been one per cent.,
there would have been a profit but of one per cent. only, instead of two per
cent. Wherever money is received by tale, therefore, and not by weight, a
seignorage is the most effectual preventive of the melting down of the coin,
and, for the same reason, of its exportation. It is the best and heaviest pieces
that are commonly either melted down or exported, because it is upon such
that the largest profits are made.
The law for the encouragement of the coinage, by rendering it duty-free,
was first enacted during the reign of Charles II. for a limited time, and
afterwards continued, by different prolongations, till 1769, when it was
rendered perpetual. The bank of England, in order to replenish their coffers
with money, are frequently obliged to carry bullion to the mint; and it was
more for their interest, they probably imagined, that the coinage should be
at the expense of the government than at their own. It was probably out of
complaisance to this great company, that the government agreed to render
this law perpetual. Should the custom of weighing gold, however, come to
be disused, as it is very likely to be on account of its inconveniency; should
the gold coin of England come to be received by tale, as it was before the
late recoinage this great company may, perhaps, find that they have, upon
this, as upon some other occasions, mistaken their own interest not a little.
Before the late recoinage, when the gold currency of England was two
per cent. below its standard weight, as there was no seignorage, it was two
per cent. below the value of that quantity of standard gold bullion which it
ought to have contained. When this great company, therefore, bought gold
bullion in order to have it coined, they were obliged to pay for it two per
cent. more than it was worth after the coinage. But if there had been a
seignorage of two per cent. upon the coinage, the common gold currency,
though two per cent. below its standard weight, would, notwithstanding,
have been equal in value to the quantity of standard gold which it ought to
have contained; the value of the fashion compensating in this case the
diminution of the weight. They would, indeed, have had the seignorage to
pay, which being two per cent., their loss upon the whole transaction would
have been two per cent., exactly the same, but no greater than it actually
was.
If the seignorage had been five per cent. and the gold currency only two
per cent. below its standard weight, the bank would, in this case, have
gained three per cent. upon the price of the bullion; but as they would have
had a seignorage of five per cent. to pay upon the coinage, their loss upon
the whole transaction would, in the same manner, have been exactly two per
cent.
If the seignorage had been only one per cent., and the gold currency two
per cent. below its standard weight, the bank would, in this case, have lost
only one per cent. upon the price of the bullion; but as they would likewise
have had a seignorage of one per cent. to pay, their loss upon the whole
transaction would have been exactly two per cent., in the same manner as in
all other cases.
If there was a reasonable seignorage, while at the same time the coin
contained its full standard weight, as it has done very nearly since the late
recoinage, whatever the bank might lose by the seignorage, they would gain
upon the price of the bullion; and whatever they might gain upon the price
of the bullion, they would lose by the seignorage. They would neither lose
nor gain, therefore, upon the whole transaction, and they would in this, as in
all the foregoing cases, be exactly in the same situation as if there was no
seignorage.
When the tax upon a commodity is so moderate as not to encourage
smuggling, the merchant who deals in it, though he advances, does not
properly pay the tax, as he gets it back in the price of the commodity. The
tax is finally paid by the last purchaser or consumer. But money is a
commodity, with regard to which every man is a merchant. Nobody buys it
but in order to sell it again; and with regard to it there is, in ordinary cases,
no last purchaser or consumer. When the tax upon coinage, therefore, is so
moderate as not to encourage false coining, though every body advances the
tax, nobody finally pays it; because every body gets it back in the advanced
value of the coin.
A moderate seignorage, therefore, would not, in any case, augment the
expense of the bank, or of any other private persons who carry their bullion
to the mint in order to be coined; and the want of a moderate seignorage
does not in any case diminish it. Whether there is or is not a seignorage, if
the currency contains its full standard weight, the coinage costs nothing to
anybody; and if it is short of that weight, the coinage must always cost the
difference between the quantity of bullion which ought to be contained in it,
and that which actually is contained in it.
The government, therefore, when it defrays the expense of coinage, not
only incurs some small expense, but loses some small revenue which it
might get by a proper duty; and neither the bank, nor any other private
persons, are in the smallest degree benefited by this useless piece of public
generosity.
The directors of the bank, however, would probably be unwilling to agree
to the imposition of a seignorage upon the authority of a speculation which
promises them no gain, but only pretends to insure them from any loss. In
the present state of the gold coin, and as long as it continues to be received
by weight, they certainly would gain nothing by such a change. But if the
custom of weighing the gold coin should ever go into disuse, as it is very
likely to do, and if the gold coin should ever fall into the same state of
degradation in which it was before the late recoinage, the gain, or more
properly the savings, of the bank, inconsequence of the imposition of a
seignorage, would probably be very considerable. The bank of England is
the only company which sends any considerable quantity of bullion to the
mint, and the burden of the annual coinage falls entirely, or almost entirely,
upon it. If this annual coinage had nothing to do but to repair the
unavoidable losses and necessary wear and tear of the coin, it could seldom
exceed fifty thousand, or at most a hundred thousand pounds. But when the
coin is degraded below its standard weight, the annual coinage must,
besides this, fill up the large vacuities which exportation and the melting
pot are continually making in the current coin. It was upon this account, that
during the ten or twelve years immediately preceding the late reformation
of the gold coin, the annual coinage amounted, at an average, to more than
£850,000. But if there had been a seignorage of four or five per cent. upon
the gold coin, it would probably, even in the state in which things then
were, have put an effectual stop to the business both of exportation and of
the melting pot. The bank, instead of losing every year about two and a half
per cent. upon the bullion which was to be coined into more than eight
hundred and fifty thousand pounds, or incurring an annual loss of more than
£21,250 pounds, would not probably have incurred the tenth part of that
loss.
The revenue allotted by parliament for defraying the expense of the
coinage is but fourteen thousand pounds a-year; and the real expense which
it costs the government, or the fees of the officers of the mint, do not, upon
ordinary occasions, I am assured, exceed the half of that sum. The saving of
so very small a sum, or even the gaining of another, which could not well be
much larger, are objects too inconsiderable, it may be thought, to deserve
the serious attention of government. But the saving of eighteen or twenty
thousand pounds a-year, in case of an event which is not improbable, which
has frequently happened before, and which is very likely to happen again, is
surely an object which well deserves the serious attention, even of so great
a company as the bank of England.
Some of the foregoing reasonings and observations might, perhaps, have
been more properly placed in those chapters of the first book which treat of
the origin and use of money, and of the difference between the real and the
nominal price of commodities. But as the law for the encouragement of
coinage derives its origin from those vulgar prejudices which have been
introduced by the mercantile system, I judged it more proper to reserve
them for this chapter. Nothing could be more agreeable to the spirit of that
system than a sort of bounty upon the production of money, the very thing
which, it supposes, constitutes the wealth of every nation. It is one of its
many admirable expedients for enriching the country.
CHAPTER VII.
OF COLONIES.
PART I. Of the Motives for Establishing New Colonies.
The interest which occasioned the first settlement of the different
European colonies in America and the West Indies, was not altogether so
plain and distinct as that which directed the establishment of those of
ancient Greece and Rome.
All the different states of ancient Greece possessed, each of them, but a
very small territory; and when the people in anyone of them multiplied
beyond what that territory could easily maintain, a part of them were sent in
quest of a new habitation, in some remote and distant part of the world; the
warlike neighbours who surrounded them on all sides, rendering it difficult
for any of them to enlarge very much its territory at home. The colonies of
the Dorians resorted chiefly to Italy and Sicily, which, in the times
preceding the foundation of Rome, were inhabited by barbarous and
uncivilized nations; those of the Ionians and Aeolians, the two other great
tribes of the Greeks, to Asia Minor and the islands of the Aegean sea, of
which the inhabitants sewn at that time to have been pretty much in the
same state as those of Sicily and Italy. The mother city, though she
considered the colony as a child, at all times entitled to great favour and
assistance, and owing in return much gratitude and respect, yet considered it
as an emancipated child, over whom she pretended to claim no direct
authority or jurisdiction. The colony settled its own form of government,
enacted its own laws, elected its own magistrates, and made peace or war
with its neighbours, as an independent state, which had no occasion to wait
for the approbation or consent of the mother city. Nothing can be more
plain and distinct than the interest which directed every such establishment.
Rome, like most of the other ancient republics, was originally founded
upon an agrarian law, which divided the public territory, in a certain
proportion, among the different citizens who composed the state. The
course of human affairs, by marriage, by succession, and by alienation,
necessarily deranged this original division, and frequently threw the lands
which had been allotted for the maintenance of many different families, into
the possession of a single person. To remedy this disorder, for such it was
supposed to be, a law was made, restricting the quantity of land which any
citizen could possess to five hundred jugera; about 350 English acres. This
law, however, though we read of its having been executed upon one or two
occasions, was either neglected or evaded, and the inequality of fortunes
went on continually increasing. The greater part of the citizens had no land;
and without it the manners and customs of those times rendered it difficult
for a freeman to maintain his independency. In the present times, though a
poor man has no land of his own, if he has a little stock, he may either farm
the lands of another, or he may carry on some little retail trade; and if he has
no stock, he may find employment either as a country labourer, or as an
artificer. But among the ancient Romans, the lands of the rich were all
cultivated by slaves, who wrought under an overseer, who was likewise a
slave; so that a poor freeman had little chance of being employed either as a
farmer or as a labourer. All trades and manufactures, too, even the retail
trade, were carried on by the slaves of the rich for the benefit of their
masters, whose wealth, authority, and protection, made it difficult for a poor
freeman to maintain the competition against them. The citizens, therefore,
who had no land, had scarce any other means of subsistence but the
bounties of the candidates at the annual elections. The tribunes, when they
had a mind to animate the people against the rich and the great, put them in
mind of the ancient divisions of lands, and represented that law which
restricted this sort of private property as the fundamental law of the
republic. The people became clamorous to get land, and the rich and the
great, we may believe, were perfectly determined not to give them any part
of theirs. To satisfy them in some measure, therefore, they frequently
proposed to send out a new colony. But conquering Rome was, even upon
such occasions, under no necessity of turning out her citizens to seek their
fortune, if one may so, through the wide world, without knowing where
they were to settle. She assigned them lands generally in the conquered
provinces of Italy, where, being within the dominions of the republic, they
could never form any independent state, but were at best but a sort of
corporation, which, though it had the power of enacting bye-laws for its
own government, was at all times subject to the correction, jurisdiction, and
legislative authority of the mother city. The sending out a colony of this
kind not only gave some satisfaction to the people, but often established a
sort of garrison, too, in a newly conquered province, of which the obedience
might otherwise have been doubtful. A Roman colony, therefore, whether
we consider the nature of the establishment itself, or the motives for making
it, was altogether different from a Greek one. The words, accordingly,
which in the original languages denote those different establishments, have
very different meanings. The Latin word (colonia) signifies simply a
plantation. The Greek word (apoixia), on the contrary, signifies a separation
of dwelling, a departure from home, a going out of the house. But though
the Roman colonies were, in many respects, different from the Greek ones,
the interest which prompted to establish them was equally plain and
distinct. Both institutions derived their origin, either from irresistible
necessity, or from clear and evident utility.
The establishment of the European colonies in America and the West
Indies arose from no necessity; and though the utility which has resulted
from them has been very great, it is not altogether so clear and evident. It
was not understood at their first establishment, and was not the motive,
either of that establishment, or of the discoveries which gave occasion to it;
and the nature, extent, and limits of that utility, are not, perhaps, well
understood at this day.
The Venetians, during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, carried on a
very advantageous commerce in spiceries and other East India goods, which
they distributed among the other nations of Europe. They purchased them
chiefly in Egypt, at that time under the dominion of the Mamelukes, the
enemies of the Turks, of whom the Venetians were the enemies; and this
union of interest, assisted by the money of Venice, formed such a connexion
as gave the Venetians almost a monopoly of the trade.
The great profits of the Venetians tempted the avidity of the Portuguese.
They had been endeavouring, during the course of the fifteenth century, to
find out by sea a way to the countries from which the Moors brought them
ivory and gold dust across the desert. They discovered the Madeiras, the
Canaries, the Azores, the Cape de Verd islands, the coast of Guinea, that of
Loango, Congo, Angola, and Benguela, and, finally, the Cape of Good
Hope. They had long wished to share in the profitable traffic of the
Venetians, and this last discovery opened to them a probable prospect of
doing so. In 1497, Vasco de Gamo sailed from the port of Lisbon with a
fleet of four ships, and, after a navigation of eleven months, arrived upon
the coast of Indostan; and thus completed a course of discoveries which had
been pursued with great steadiness, and with very little interruption, for
near a century together.
Some years before this, while the expectations of Europe were in
suspense about the projects of the Portuguese, of which the success
appeared yet to be doubtful, a Genoese pilot formed the yet more daring
project of sailing to the East Indies by the west. The situation of those
countries was at that time very imperfectly known in Europe. The few
European travellers who had been there, had magnified the distance,
perhaps through simplicity and ignorance; what was really very great,
appearing almost infinite to those who could not measure it; or, perhaps, in
order to increase somewhat more the marvellous of their own adventures in
visiting regions so immensely remote from Europe. The longer the way was
by the east, Columbus very justly concluded, the shorter it would be by the
west. He proposed, therefore, to take that way, as both the shortest and the
surest, and he had the good fortune to convince Isabella of Castile of the
probability of his project. He sailed from the port of Palos in August 1492,
near five years before the expedition of Vasco de Gamo set out from
Portugal; and, after a voyage of between two and three months, discovered
first some of the small Bahama or Lucyan islands, and afterwards the great
island of St. Domingo.
But the countries which Columbus discovered, either in this or in any of
his subsequent voyages, had no resemblance to those which he had gone in
quest of. Instead of the wealth, cultivation, and populousness of China and
Indostan, he found, in St. Domingo, and in all the other parts of the new
world which he ever visited, nothing but a country quite covered with
wood, uncultivated, and inhabited only by some tribes of naked and
miserable savages. He was not very willing, however, to believe that they
were not the same with some of the countries described by Marco Polo, the
first European who had visited, or at least had left behind him any
description of China or the East Indies; and a very slight resemblance, such
as that which he found between the name of Cibao, a mountain in St.
Domingo, and that of Cipange, mentioned by Marco Polo, was frequently
sufficient to make him return to this favourite prepossession, though
contrary to the clearest evidence. In his letters to Ferdinand and Isabella, he
called the countries which he had discovered the Indies. He entertained no
doubt but that they were the extremity of those which had been described
by Marco Polo, and that they were not very distant from the Ganges, or
from the countries which had been conquered by Alexander. Even when at
last convinced that they were different, he still flattered himself that those
rich countries were at no great distance; and in a subsequent voyage,
accordingly, went in quest of them along the coast of Terra Firma, and
towards the Isthmus of Darien.
In consequence of this mistake of Columbus, the name of the Indies has
stuck to those unfortunate countries ever since; and when it was at last
clearly discovered that the new were altogether different from the old
Indies, the former were called the West, in contradistinction to the latter,
which were called the East Indies.
It was of importance to Columbus, however, that the countries which he
had discovered, whatever they were, should be represented to the court of
Spain as of very great consequence; and, in what constitutes the real riches
of every country, the animal and vegetable productions of the soil, there
was at that time nothing which could well justify such a representation of
them.
The cori, something between a rat and a rabbit, and supposed by Mr
Buffon to be the same with the aperea of Brazil, was the largest viviparous
quadruped in St. Domingo. This species seems never to have been very
numerous; and the dogs and cats of the Spaniards are said to have long ago
almost entirely extirpated it, as well as some other tribes of a still smaller
size. These, however, together with a pretty large lizard, called the ivana or
iguana, constituted the principal part of the animal food which the land
afforded.
The vegetable food of the inhabitants, though, from their want of
industry, not very abundant, was not altogether so scanty. It consisted in
Indian corn, yams, potatoes, bananas, etc., plants which were then
altogether unknown in Europe, and which have never since been very much
esteemed in it, or supposed to yield a sustenance equal to what is drawn
from the common sorts of grain and pulse, which have been cultivated in
this part of the world time out of mind.
The cotton plant, indeed, afforded the material of a very important
manufacture, and was at that time, to Europeans, undoubtedly the most
valuable of all the vegetable productions of those islands. But though, in the
end of the fifteenth century, the muslins and other cotton goods of the East
Indies were much esteemed in every part of Europe, the cotton manufacture
itself was not cultivated in any part of it. Even this production, therefore,
could not at that time appear in the eyes of Europeans to be of very great
consequence.
Finding nothing, either in the animals or vegetables of the newly
discovered countries which could justify a very advantageous
representation of them, Columbus turned his view towards their minerals;
and in the richness of their productions of this third kingdom, he flattered
himself he had found a full compensation for the insignificancy of those of
the other two. The little bits of gold with which the inhabitants ornamented
their dress, and which, he was informed, they frequently found in the
rivulets and torrents which fell from the mountains, were sufficient to
satisfy him that those mountains abounded with the richest gold mines. St.
Domingo, therefore, was represented as a country abounding with gold, and
upon that account (according to the prejudices not only of the present times,
but of those times), an inexhaustible source of real wealth to the crown and
kingdom of Spain. When Columbus, upon his return from his first voyage,
was introduced with a sort of triumphal honours to the sovereigns of Castile
and Arragon, the principal productions of the countries which he had
discovered were carried in solemn procession before him. The only
valuable part of them consisted in some little fillets, bracelets, and other
ornaments of gold, and in some bales of cotton. The rest were mere objects
of vulgar wonder and curiosity; some reeds of an extraordinary size, some
birds of a very beautiful plumage, and some stuffed skins of the huge
alligator and manati; all of which were preceded by six or seven of the
wretched natives, whose singular colour and appearance added greatly to
the novelty of the show.
In consequence of the representations of Columbus, the council of Castile
determined to take possession of the countries of which the inhabitants were
plainly incapable of defending themselves. The pious purpose of converting
them to Christianity sanctified the injustice of the project. But the hope of
finding treasures of gold there was the sole motive which prompted to
undertake it; and to give this motive the greater weight, it was proposed by
Columbus, that the half of all the gold and silver that should be found there,
should belong to the crown. This proposal was approved of by the council.
As long as the whole, or the greater part of the gold which the first
adventurers imported into Europe was got by so very easy a method as the
plundering of the defenceless natives, it was not perhaps very difficult to
pay even this heavy tax; but when the natives were once fairly stript of all
that they had, which, in St. Domingo, and in all the other countries
discovered by Columbus, was done completely in six or eight years, and
when, in order to find more, it had become necessary to dig for it in the
mines, there was no longer any possibility of paying this tax. The rigorous
exaction of it, accordingly, first occasioned, it is said, the total abandoning
of the mines of St. Domingo, which have never been wrought since. It was
soon reduced, therefore, to a third; then to a fifth; afterwards to a tenth; and
at last to a twentieth part of the gross produce of the gold mines. The tax
upon silver continued for a long time to be a fifth of the gross produce. It
was reduced to a tenth only in the course of the present century. But the first
adventurers do not appear to have been much interested about silver.
Nothing less precious than gold seemed worthy of their attention.
All the other enterprizes of the Spaniards in the New World, subsequent
to those of Columbus, seem to have been prompted by the same motive. It
was the sacred thirst of gold that carried Ovieda, Nicuessa, and Vasco
Nugnes de Balboa, to the Isthmus of Darien; that carried Cortes to Mexico,
Almagro and Pizarro to Chili and Peru. When those adventurers arrived
upon any unknown coast, their first inquiry was always if there was any
gold to be found there; and according to the information which they
received concerning this particular, they determined either to quit the
country or to settle in it.
Of all those expensive and uncertain projects, however, which bring
bankruptcy upon the greater part of the people who engage in them, there is
none, perhaps, more perfectly ruinous than the search after new silver and
gold mines. It is, perhaps, the most disadvantageous lottery in the world, or
the one in which the gain of those who draw the prizes bears the least
proportion to the loss of those who draw the blanks; for though the prizes
are few, and the blanks many, the common price of a ticket is the whole
fortune of a very rich man. Projects of mining, instead of replacing the
capital employed in them, together with the ordinary profits of stock,
commonly absorb both capital and profit. They are the projects, therefore,
to which, of all others, a prudent lawgiver, who desired to increase the
capital of his nation, would least choose to give any extraordinary
encouragement, or to turn towards them a greater share of that capital than
what would go to them of its own accord. Such, in reality, is the absurd
confidence which almost all men have in their own good fortune, that
wherever there is the least probability of success, too great a share of it is
apt to go to them of its own accord.
But though the judgment of sober reason and experience concerning such
projects has always been extremely unfavourable, that of human avidity has
commonly been quite otherwise. The same passion which has suggested to
so many people the absurd idea of the philosopher’s stone, has suggested to
others the equally absurd one of immense rich mines of gold and silver.
They did not consider that the value of those metals has, in all ages and
nations, arisen chiefly from their scarcity, and that their scarcity has arisen
from the very small quantities of them which nature has anywhere
deposited in one place, from the hard and intractable substances with which
she has almost everywhere surrounded those small quantities, and
consequently from the labour and expense which are everywhere necessary
in order to penetrate, and get at them. They flattered themselves that veins
of those metals might in many places be found, as large and as abundant as
those which are commonly found of lead, or copper, or tin, or iron. The
dream of Sir Waiter Raleigh, concerning the golden city and country of El
Dorado, may satisfy us, that even wise men are not always exempt from
such strange delusions. More than a hundred years after the death of that
great man, the Jesuit Gumila was still convinced of the reality of that
wonderful country, and expressed, with great warmth, and, I dare say, with
great sincerity, how happy he should be to carry the light of the gospel to a
people who could so well reward the pious labours of their missionary.
In the countries first discovered by the Spaniards, no gold and silver
mines are at present known which are supposed to be worth the working.
The quantities of those metals which the first adventurers are said to have
found there, had probably been very much magnified, as well as the fertility
of the mines which were wrought immediately after the first discovery.
What those adventurers were reported to have found, however, was
sufficient to inflame the avidity of all their countrymen. Every Spaniard
who sailed to America expected to find an El Dorado. Fortune, too, did
upon this what she has done upon very few other occasions. She realized in
some measure the extravagant hopes of her votaries; and in the discovery
and conquest of Mexico and Peru (of which the one happened about thirty,
and the other about forty, years after the first expedition of Columbus), she
presented them with something not very unlike that profusion of the
precious metals which they sought for.
A project of commerce to the East Indies, therefore, gave occasion to the
first discovery of the West. A project of conquest gave occasion to all the
establishments of the Spaniards in those newly discovered countries. The
motive which excited them to this conquest was a project of gold and silver
mines; and a course of accidents which no human wisdom could foresee,
rendered this project much more successful than the undertakers had any
reasonable grounds for expecting.
The first adventurers of all the other nations of Europe who attempted to
make settlements in America, were animated by the like chimerical views;
but they were not equally successful. It was more than a hundred years after
the first settlement of the Brazils, before any silver, gold, or diamond mines,
were discovered there. In the English, French, Dutch, and Danish colonies,
none have ever yet been discovered, at least none that are at present
supposed to be worth the working. The first English settlers in North
America, however, offered a fifth of all the gold and silver which should be
found there to the king, as a motive for granting them their patents. In the
patents of Sir Waiter Raleigh, to the London and Plymouth companies, to
the council of Plymouth, etc. this fifth was accordingly reserved to the
crown. To the expectation of finding gold and silver mines, those first
settlers, too, joined that of discovering a north-west passage to the East
Indies. They have hitherto been disappointed in both.
PART II. Causes of the Prosperity of New Colonies.
The colony of a civilized nation which takes possession either of a waste
country, or of one so thinly inhabited that the natives easily give place to the
new settlers, advances more rapidly to wealth and greatness than any other
human society.
The colonies carry out with them a knowledge of agriculture and of other
useful arts, superior to what can grow up of its own accord, in the course of
many centuries, among savage and barbarous nations. They carry out with
them, too, the habit of subordination, some notion of the regular
government which takes place in their own country, of the system of laws
which support it, and of a regular administration of justice; and they
naturally establish something of the same kind in the new settlement. But
among savage and barbarous nations, the natural progress of law and
government is still slower than the natural progress of arts, after law and
government have been so far established as is necessary for their protection.
Every colonist gets more land than he can possibly cultivate. He has no
rent, and scarce any taxes, to pay. No landlord shares with him in its
produce, and, the share of the sovereign is commonly but a trifle. He has
every motive to render as great as possible a produce which is thus to be
almost entirely his own. But his land is commonly so extensive, that, with
all his own industry, and with all the industry of other people whom he can
get to employ, he can seldom make it produce the tenth part of what it is
capable of producing. He is eager, therefore, to collect labourers from all
quarters, and to reward them with the most liberal wages. But those liberal
wages, joined to the plenty and cheapness of land, soon make those
labourers leave him, in order to become landlords themselves, and to
reward with equal liberality other labourers, who soon leave them for the
same reason that they left their first master. The liberal reward of labour
encourages marriage. The children, during the tender years of infancy, are
well fed and properly taken care of; and when they are grown up, the value
of their labour greatly overpays their maintenance. When arrived at
maturity, the high price of labour, and the low price of land, enable them to
establish themselves in the same manner as their fathers did before them.
In other countries, rent and profit eat up wages, and the two superior
orders of people oppress the inferior one; but in new colonies, the interest
of the two superior orders obliges them to treat the inferior one with more
generosity and humanity, at least where that inferior one is not in a state of
slavery. Waste lands, of the greatest natural fertility, are to be had for a
trifle. The increase of revenue which the proprietor, who is always the
undertaker, expects from their improvement, constitutes his profit, which, in
these circumstances, is commonly very great; but this great profit cannot be
made, without employing the labour of other people in clearing and
cultivating the land; and the disproportion between the great extent of the
land and the small number of the people, which commonly takes place in
new colonies, makes it difficult for him to get this labour. He does not,
therefore, dispute about wages, but is willing to employ labour at any price.
The high wages of labour encourage population. The cheapness and plenty
of good land encourage improvement, and enable the proprietor to pay
those high wages. In those wages consists almost the whole price of the
land; and though they are high, considered as the wages of labour, they are
low, considered as the price of what is so very valuable. What encourages
the progress of population and improvement, encourages that of real wealth
and greatness.
The progress of many of the ancient Greek colonies towards wealth and
greatness seems accordingly to have been very rapid. In the course of a
century or two, several of them appear to have rivalled, and even to have
surpassed, their mother cities. Syracuse and Agrigentum in Sicily, Tarentum
and Locri in Italy, Ephesus and Miletus in Lesser Asia, appear, by all
accounts, to have been at least equal to any of the cities of ancient Greece.
Though posterior in their establishment, yet all the arts of refinement,
philosophy, poetry, and eloquence, seem to have been cultivated as early,
and to have been improved as highly in them as in any part of the mother
country. The schools of the two oldest Greek philosophers, those of Thales
and Pythagoras, were established, it is remarkable, not in ancient Greece,
but the one in an Asiatic, the other in an Italian colony. All those colonies
had established themselves in countries inhabited by savage and barbarous
nations, who easily gave place to the new settlers. They had plenty of good
land; and as they were altogether independent of the mother city, they were
at liberty to manage their own affairs in the way that they judged was most
suitable to their own interest.
The history of the Roman colonies is by no means so brilliant. Some of
them, indeed, such as Florence, have, in the course of many ages, and after
the fall of the mother city, grown up to be considerable states. But the
progress of no one of them seems ever to have been very rapid. They were
all established in conquered provinces, which in most cases had been fully
inhabited before. The quantity of land assigned to each colonist was seldom
very considerable, and, as the colony was not independent, they were not
always at liberty to manage their own affairs in the way that they judged
was most suitable to their own interest.
In the plenty of good land, the European colonies established in America
and the West Indies resemble, and even greatly surpass, those of ancient
Greece. In their dependency upon the mother state, they resemble those of
ancient Rome; but their great distance from Europe has in all of them
alleviated more or less the effects of this dependency. Their situation has
placed them less in the view, and less in the power of their mother country.
In pursuing their interest their own way, their conduct has upon many
occasions been overlooked, either because not known or not understood in
Europe; and upon some occasions it has been fairly suffered and submitted
to, because their distance rendered it difficult to restrain it. Even the violent
and arbitrary government of Spain has, upon many occasions, been obliged
to recall or soften the orders which had been given for the government of
her colonies, for fear of a general insurrection. The progress of all the
European colonies in wealth, population, and improvement, has accordingly
been very great.
The crown of Spain, by its share of the gold and silver, derived some
revenue from its colonies from the moment of their first establishment. It
was a revenue, too, of a nature to excite in human avidity the most
extravagant expectation of still greater riches. The Spanish colonies,
therefore, from the moment of their first establishment, attracted very much
the attention of their mother country; while those of the other European
nations were for a long time in a great measure neglected. The former did
not, perhaps, thrive the better in consequence of this attention, nor the latter
the worse in consequence of this neglect. In proportion to the extent of the
country which they in some measure possess, the Spanish colonies are
considered as less populous and thriving than those of almost any other
European nation. The progress even of the Spanish colonies, however, in
population and improvement, has certainly been very rapid and very great.
The city of Lima, founded since the conquest, is represented by Ulloa as
containing fifty thousand inhabitants near thirty years ago. Quito, which
had been but a miserable hamlet of Indians, is represented by the same
author as in his time equally populous. Gemel i Carreri, a pretended
traveller, it is said, indeed, but who seems everywhere to have written upon
extreme good information, represents the city of Mexico as containing a
hundred thousand inhabitants; a number which, in spite of all the
exaggerations of the Spanish writers, is probably more than five times
greater than what it contained in the time of Montezuma. These numbers
exceed greatly those of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, the three
greatest cities of the English colonies. Before the conquest of the Spaniards,
there were no cattle fit for draught, either in Mexico or Peru. The lama was
their only beast of burden, and its strength seems to have been a good deal
inferior to that of a common ass. The plough was unknown among them.
They were ignorant of the use of iron. They had no coined money, nor any
established instrument of commerce of any kind. Their commerce was
carried on by barter. A sort of wooden spade was their principal instrument
of agriculture. Sharp stones served them for knives and hatchets to cut with;
fish bones, and the hard sinews of certain animals, served them with
needles to sew with; and these seem to have been their principal
instruments of trade. In this state of things, it seems impossible that either
of those empires could have been so much improved or so well cultivated as
at present, when they are plentifully furnished with all sorts of European
cattle, and when the use of iron, of the plough, and of many of the arts of
Europe, have been introduced among them. But the populousness of every
country must be in proportion to the degree of its improvement and
cultivation. In spite of the cruel destruction of the natives which followed
the conquest, these two great empires are probably more populous now than
they ever were before; and the people are surely very different; for we must
acknowledge, I apprehend, that the Spanish creoles are in many respects
superior to the ancient Indians.
After the settlements of the Spaniards, that of the Portuguese in Brazil is
the oldest of any European nation in America. But as for a long time after
the first discovery neither gold nor silver mines were found in it, and as it
afforded upon that account little or no revenue to the crown, it was for a
long time in a great measure neglected; and during this state of neglect, it
grew up to be a great and powerful colony. While Portugal was under the
dominion of Spain, Brazil was attacked by the Dutch, who got possession
of seven of the fourteen provinces into which it is divided. They expected
soon to conquer the other seven, when Portugal recovered its independency
by the elevation of the family of Braganza to the throne. The Dutch, then, as
enemies to the Spaniards, became friends to the Portuguese, who were
likewise the enemies of the Spaniards. They agreed, therefore, to leave that
part of Brazil which they had not conquered to the king of Portugal, who
agreed to leave that part which they had conquered to them, as a matter not
worth disputing about, with such good allies. But the Dutch government
soon began to oppress the Portuguese colonists, who, instead of amusing
themselves with complaints, took arms against their new masters, and by
their own valour and resolution, with the connivance, indeed, but without
any avowed assistance from the mother country, drove them out of Brazil.
The Dutch, therefore, finding it impossible to keep any part of the country
to themselves, were contented that it should be entirely restored to the
crown of Portugal. In this colony there are said to be more than six hundred
thousand people, either Portuguese or descended from Portuguese, creoles,
mulattoes, and a mixed race between Portuguese and Brazilians. No one
colony in America is supposed to contain so great a number of people of
European extraction.
Towards the end of the fifteenth, and during the greater part of the
sixteenth century, Spain and Portugal were the two great naval powers upon
the ocean; for though the commerce of Venice extended to every part of
Europe, its fleet had scarce ever sailed beyond the Mediterranean. The
Spaniards, in virtue of the first discovery, claimed all America as their own;
and though they could not hinder so great a naval power as that of Portugal
from settling in Brazil, such was at that time the terror of their name, that
the greater part of the other nations of Europe were afraid to establish
themselves in any other part of that great continent. The French, who
attempted to settle in Florida, were all murdered by the Spaniards. But the
declension of the naval power of this latter nation, in consequence of the
defeat or miscarriage of what they called their invincible armada, which
happened towards the end of the sixteenth century, put it out of their power
to obstruct any longer the settlements of the other European nations. In the
course of the seventeenth century, therefore, the English, French, Dutch,
Danes, and Swedes, all the great nations who had any ports upon the ocean,
attempted to make some settlements in the new world.
The Swedes established themselves in New Jersey; and the number of
Swedish families still to be found there sufficiently demonstrates, that this
colony was very likely to prosper, had it been protected by the mother
country. But being neglected by Sweden, it was soon swallowed up by the
Dutch colony of New York, which again, in 1674, fell under the dominion
of the English.
The small islands of St. Thomas and Santa Cruz, are the only countries in
the new world that have ever been possessed by the Danes. These little
settlements, too, were under the government of an exclusive company,
which had the sole right, both of purchasing the surplus produce of the
colonies, and of supplying them with such goods of other countries as they
wanted, and which, therefore, both in its purchases and sales, had not only
the power of oppressing them, but the greatest temptation to do so. The
government of an exclusive company of merchants is, perhaps, the worst of
all governments for any country whatever. It was not, however, able to stop
altogether the progress of these colonies, though it rendered it more slow
and languid. The late king of Denmark dissolved this company, and since
that time the prosperity of these colonies has been very great.
The Dutch settlements in the West, as well as those in the East Indies,
were originally put under the government of an exclusive company. The
progress of some of them, therefore, though it has been considerable in
comparison with that of almost any country that has been long peopled and
established, has been languid and slow in comparison with that of the
greater part of new colonies. The colony of Surinam, though very
considerable, is still inferior to the greater part of the sugar colonies of the
other European nations. The colony of Nova Belgia, now divided into the
two provinces of New York and New Jersey, would probably have soon
become considerable too, even though it had remained under the
government of the Dutch. The plenty and cheapness of good land are such
powerful causes of prosperity, that the very worst government is scarce
capable of checking altogether the efficacy of their operation. The great
distance, too, from the mother country, would enable the colonists to evade
more or less, by smuggling, the monopoly which the company enjoyed
against them. At present, the company allows all Dutch ships to trade to
Surinam, upon paying two and a-half per cent. upon the value of their cargo
for a license; and only reserves to itself exclusively, the direct trade from
Africa to America, which consists almost entirely in the slave trade. This
relaxation in the exclusive privileges of the company, is probably the
principal cause of that degree of prosperity which that colony at present
enjoys. Curacoa and Eustatia, the two principal islands belonging to the
Dutch, are free ports, open to the ships of all nations; and this freedom, in
the midst of better colonies, whose ports are open to those of one nation
only, has been the great cause of the prosperity of those two barren islands.
The French colony of Canada was, during the greater part of the last
century, and some part of the present, under the government of an exclusive
company. Under so unfavourable an administration, its progress was
necessarily very slow, in comparison with that of other new colonies; but it
became much more rapid when this company was dissolved, after the fall of
what is called the Mississippi scheme. When the English got possession of
this country, they found in it near double the number of inhabitants which
father Charlevoix had assigned to it between twenty and thirty years before.
That jesuit had travelled over the whole country, and had no inclination to
represent it as less inconsiderable than it really was.
The French colony of St. Domingo was established by pirates and
freebooters, who, for a long time, neither required the protection, nor
acknowledged the authority of France; and when that race of banditti
became so far citizens as to acknowledge this authority, it was for a long
time necessary to exercise it with very great gentleness. During this period,
the population and improvement of this colony increased very fast. Even
the oppression of the exclusive company, to which it was for some time
subjected with all the other colonies of France, though it no doubt retarded,
had not been able to stop its progress altogether. The course of its prosperity
returned as soon as it was relieved from that oppression. It is now the most
important of the sugar colonies of the West Indies, and its produce is said to
be greater than that of all the English sugar colonies put together. The other
sugar colonies of France are in general all very thriving.
But there are no colonies of which the progress has been more rapid than
that of the English in North America.
Plenty of good land, and liberty to manage their own affairs their own
way, seem to be the two great causes of the prosperity of all new colonies.
In the plenty of good land, the English colonies of North America,
though no doubt very abundantly provided, are, however, inferior to those
of the Spaniards and Portuguese, and not superior to some of those
possessed by the French before the late war. But the political institutions of
the English colonies have been more favourable to the improvement and
cultivation of this land, than those of the other three nations.
First, The engrossing of uncultivated land, though it has by no means
been prevented altogether, has been more restrained in the English colonies
than in any other. The colony law, which imposes upon every proprietor the
obligation of improving and cultivating, within a limited time, a certain
proportion of his lands, and which, in case of failure, declares those
neglected lands grantable to any other person; though it has not perhaps
been very strictly executed, has, however, had some effect.
Secondly, In Pennsylvania there is no right of primogeniture, and lands,
like moveables, are divided equally among all the children of the family. In
three of the provinces of New England, the oldest has only a double share,
as in the Mosaical law. Though in those provinces, therefore, too great a
quantity of land should sometimes be engrossed by a particular individual,
it is likely, in the course of a generation or two, to be sufficiently divided
again. In the other English colonies, indeed, the right of primogeniture takes
place, as in the law of England: But in all the English colonies, the tenure of
the lands, which are all held by free soccage, facilitates alienation; and the
grantee of an extensive tract of land generally finds it for his interest to
alienate, as fast as he can, the greater part of it, reserving only a small quit-
rent. In the Spanish and Portuguese colonies, what is called the right of
majorazzo takes place in the succession of all those great estates to which
any title of honour is annexed. Such estates go all to one person, and are in
effect entailed and unalienable. The French colonies, indeed, are subject to
the custom of Paris, which, in the inheritance of land, is much more
favourable to the younger children than the law of England. But, in the
French colonies, if any part of an estate, held by the noble tenure of
chivalry and homage, is alienated, it is, for a limited time, subject to the
right of redemption, either by the heir of the superior, or by the heir of the
family; and all the largest estates of the country are held by such noble
tenures, which necessarily embarrass alienation. But, in a new colony, a
great uncultivated estate is likely to be much more speedily divided by
alienation than by succession. The plenty and cheapness of good land, it has
already been observed, are the principal causes of the rapid prosperity of
new colonies. The engrossing of land, in effect, destroys this plenty and
cheapness. The engrossing of uncultivated land, besides, is the greatest
obstruction to its improvement; but the labour that is employed in the
improvement and cultivation of land affords the greatest and most valuable
produce to the society. The produce of labour, in this case, pays not only its
own wages and the profit of the stock which employs it, but the rent of the
land too upon which it is employed. The labour of the English colonies,
therefore, being more employed in the improvement and cultivation of land,
is likely to afford a greater and more valuable produce than that of any of
the other three nations, which, by the engrossing of land, is more or less
diverted towards other employments.
Thirdly, The labour of the English colonists is not only likely to afford a
greater and more valuable produce, but, in consequence of the moderation
of their taxes, a greater proportion of this produce belongs to themselves,
which they may store up and employ in putting into motion a still greater
quantity of labour. The English colonists have never yet contributed any
thing towards the defence of the mother country, or towards the support of
its civil government. They themselves, on the contrary, have hitherto been
defended almost entirely at the expense of the mother country; but the
expense of fleets and armies is out of all proportion greater than the
necessary expense of civil government. The expense of their own civil
government has always been very moderate. It has generally been confined
to what was necessary for paying competent salaries to the governor, to the
judges, and to some other officers of police, and for maintaining a few of
the most useful public works. The expense of the civil establishment of
Massachusetts Bay, before the commencement of the present disturbances,
used to be but about £18;000 a-year; that of New Hampshire and Rhode
Island, £3500 each; that of Connecticut, £4000; that of New York and
Pennsylvania, £4500 each; that of New Jersey, £1200; that of Virginia and
South Carolina, £8000 each. The civil establishments of Nova Scotia and
Georgia are partly supported by an annual grant of parliament; but Nova
Scotia pays, besides, about £7000 a-year towards the public expenses of the
colony, and Georgia about £2500 a-year. All the different civil
establishments in North America, in short, exclusive of those of Maryland
and North Carolina, of which no exact account has been got, did not, before
the commencement of the present disturbances, cost the inhabitants about
£64,700 a-year; an ever memorable example, at how small an expense three
millions of people may not only be governed but well governed. The most
important part of the expense of government, indeed, that of defence and
protection, has constantly fallen upon the mother country. The ceremonial,
too, of the civil government in the colonies, upon the reception of a new
governor, upon the opening of a new assembly, etc. though sufficiently
decent, is not accompanied with any expensive pomp or parade. Their
ecclesiastical government is conducted upon a plan equally frugal. Tithes
are unknown among them; and their clergy, who are far from being
numerous, are maintained either by moderate stipends, or by the voluntary
contributions of the people. The power of Spain and Portugal, on the
contrary, derives some support from the taxes levied upon their colonies.
France, indeed, has never drawn any considerable revenue from its
colonies, the taxes which it levies upon them being generally spent among
them. But the colony government of all these three nations is conducted
upon a much more extensive plan, and is accompanied with a much more
expensive ceremonial. The sums spent upon the reception of a new viceroy
of Peru, for example, have frequently been enormous. Such ceremonials are
not only real taxes paid by the rich colonists upon those particular
occasions, but they serve to introduce among them the habit of vanity and
expense upon all other occasions. They are not only very grievous
occasional taxes, but they contribute to establish perpetual taxes, of the
same kind, still more grievous; the ruinous taxes of private luxury and
extravagance. In the colonies of all those three nations, too, the
ecclesiastical government is extremely oppressive. Tithes take place in all
of them, and are levied with the utmost rigour in those of Spain and
Portugal. All of them, besides, are oppressed with a numerous race of
mendicant friars, whose beggary being not only licensed but consecrated by
religion, is a most grievous tax upon the poor people, who are most
carefully taught that it is a duty to give, and a very great sin to refuse them
their charity. Over and above all this, the clergy are, in all of them, the
greatest engrossers of land.
Fourthly, In the disposal of their surplus produce, or of what is over and
above their own consumption, the English colonies have been more
favoured, and have been allowed a more extensive market, than those of
any other European nation. Every European nation has endeavoured, more
or less, to monopolize to itself the commerce of its colonies, and, upon that
account, has prohibited the ships of foreign nations from trading to them,
and has prohibited them from importing European goods from any foreign
nation. But the manner in which this monopoly has been exercised in
different nations, has been very different.
Some nations have given up the whole commerce of their colonies to an
exclusive company, of whom the colonists were obliged to buy all such
European goods as they wanted, and to whom they were obliged to sell the
whole of their surplus produce. It was the interest of the company,
therefore, not only to sell the former as dear, and to buy the latter as cheap
as possible, but to buy no more of the latter, even at this low price, than
what they could dispose of for a very high price in Europe. It was their
interest not only to degrade in all cases the value of the surplus produce of
the colony, but in many cases to discourage and keep down the natural
increase of its quantity. Of all the expedients that can well be contrived to
stunt the natural growth of a new colony, that of an exclusive company is
undoubtedly the most effectual. This, however, has been the policy of
Holland, though their company, in the course of the present century, has
given up in many respects the exertion of their exclusive privilege. This,
too, was the policy of Denmark, till the reign of the late king. It has
occasionally been the policy of France; and of late, since 1755, after it had
been abandoned by all other nations on account of its absurdity, it has
become the policy of Portugal, with regard at least to two of the principal
provinces of Brazil, Pernambucco, and Marannon.
Other nations, without establishing an exclusive company, have confined
the whole commerce of their colonies to a particular port of the mother
country, from whence no ship was allowed to sail, but either in a fleet and at
a particular season, or, if single, in consequence of a particular license,
which in most cases was very well paid for. This policy opened, indeed, the
trade of the colonies to all the natives of the mother country, provided they
traded from the proper port, at the proper season, and in the proper vessels.
But as all the different merchants, who joined their stocks in order to fit out
those licensed vessels, would find it for their interest to act in concert, the
trade which was carried on in this manner would necessarily be conducted
very nearly upon the same principles as that of an exclusive company. The
profit of those merchants would be almost equally exorbitant and
oppressive. The colonies would be ill supplied, and would be obliged both
to buy very dear, and to sell very cheap. This, however, till within these few
years, had always been the policy of Spain; and the price of all European
goods, accordingly, is said to have been enormous in the Spanish West
Indies. At Quito, we are told by Ulloa, a pound of iron sold for about 4s:6d.,
and a pound of steel for about 6s:9d. sterling. But it is chiefly in order to
purchase European goods that the colonies part with their own produce. The
more, therefore, they pay for the one, the less they really get for the other,
and the dearness of the one is the same thing with the cheapness of the
other. The policy of Portugal is, in this respect, the same as the ancient
policy of Spain, with regard to all its colonies, except Pernambucco and
Marannon; and with regard to these it has lately adopted a still worse.
Other nations leave the trade of their colonies free to all their subjects,
who may carry it on from all the different ports of the mother country, and
who have occasion for no other license than the common despatches of the
custom-house. In this case the number and dispersed situation of the
different traders renders it impossible for them to enter into any general
combination, and their competition is sufficient to hinder them from making
very exorbitant profits. Under so liberal a policy, the colonies are enabled
both to sell their own produce, and to buy the goods of Europe at a
reasonable price; but since the dissolution of the Plymouth company, when
our colonies were but in their infancy, this has always been the policy of
England. It has generally, too, been that of France, and has been uniformly
so since the dissolution of what in England is commonly called their
Mississippi company. The profits of the trade, therefore, which France and
England carry on with their colonies, though no doubt somewhat higher
than if the competition were free to all other nations, are, however, by no
means exorbitant; and the price of European goods, accordingly, is not
extravagantly high in the greater past of the colonies of either of those
nations.
In the exportation of their own surplus produce, too, it is only with regard
to certain commodities that the colonies of Great Britain are confined to the
market of the mother country. These commodities having been enumerated
in the act of navigation, and in some other subsequent acts, have upon that
account been called enumerated commodities. The rest are called non-
enumerated, and may be exported directly to other countries, provided it is
in British or plantation ships, of which the owners and three fourths of the
mariners are British subjects.
Among the non-enumerated commodities are some of the most important
productions of America and the West Indies, grain of all sorts, lumber, salt
provisions, fish, sugar, and rum.
Grain is naturally the first and principal object of the culture of all new
colonies. By allowing them a very extensive market for it, the law
encourages them to extend this culture much beyond the consumption of a
thinly inhabited country, and thus to provide beforehand an ample
subsistence for a continually increasing population.
In a country quite covered with wood, where timber consequently is of
little or no value, the expense of clearing the ground is the principal
obstacle to improvement. By allowing the colonies a very extensive market
for their lumber, the law endeavours to facilitate improvement by raising
the price of a commodity which would otherwise be of little value, and
thereby enabling them to make some profit of what would otherwise be
mere expense.
In a country neither half peopled nor half cultivated, cattle naturally
multiply beyond the consumption of the inhabitants, and are often, upon
that account, of little or no value. But it is necessary, it has already been
shown, that the price of cattle should bear a certain proportion to that of
corn, before the greater part of the lands of any country can be improved.
By allowing to American cattle, in all shapes, dead and alive, a very
extensive market, the law endeavours to raise the value of a commodity, of
which the high price is so very essential to improvement. The good effects
of this liberty, however, must be somewhat diminished by the 4th of Geo.
III. c. 15, which puts hides and skins among the enumerated commodities,
and thereby tends to reduce the value of American cattle.
To increase the shipping and naval power of Great Britain by the
extension of the fisheries of our colonies, is an object which the legislature
seems to have had almost constantly in view. Those fisheries, upon this
account, have had all the encouragement which freedom can give them, and
they have flourished accordingly. The New England fishery, in particular,
was, before the late disturbances, one of the most important, perhaps, in the
world. The whale fishery which, notwithstanding an extravagant bounty, is
in Great Britain carried on to so little purpose, that in the opinion of many
people ( which I do not, however, pretend to warrant), the whole produce
does not much exceed the value of the bounties which are annually paid for
it, is in New England carried on, without any bounty, to a very great extent.
Fish is one of the principal articles with which the North Americans trade to
Spain, Portugal, and the Mediterranean.
Sugar was originally an enumerated commodity, which could only be
exported to Great Britain; but in 1751, upon a representation of the sugar-
planters, its exportation was permitted to all parts of the world. The
restrictions, however, with which this liberty was granted, joined to the high
price of sugar in Great Britain, have rendered it in a great measure
ineffectual. Great Britain and her colonies still continue to be almost the
sole market for all sugar produced in the British plantations. Their
consumption increases so fast, that, though in consequence of the increasing
improvement of Jamaica, as well as of the ceded islands, the importation of
sugar has increased very greatly within these twenty years, the exportation
to foreign countries is said to be not much greater than before.
Rum is a very important article in the trade which the Americans carry on
to the coast of Africa, from which they bring back negro slaves in return.
If the whole surplus produce of America, in grain of all sorts, in salt
provisions, and in fish, had been put into the enumeration, and thereby
forced into the market of Great Britain, it would have interfered too much
with the produce of the industry of our own people. It was probably not so
much from any regard to the interest of America, as from a jealousy of this
interference, that those important commodities have not only been kept out
of the enumeration, but that the importation into Great Britain of all grain,
except rice, and of all salt provisions, has, in the ordinary state of the law,
been prohibited.
The non-enumerated commodities could originally be exported to all
parts of the world. Lumber and rice having been once put into the
enumeration, when they were afterwards taken out of it, were confined, as
to the European market, to the countries that lie south of Cape Finisterre.
By the 6th of George III. c. 52, all non-enumerated commodities were
subjected to the like restriction. The parts of Europe which lie south of
Cape Finisterre are not manufacturing countries, and we are less jealous of
the colony ships carrying home from them any manufactures which could
interfere with our own.
The enumerated commodities are of two sorts; first, such as are either the
peculiar produce of America, or as cannot be produced, or at least are not
produced in the mother country. Of this kind are molasses, coffee, cocoa-
nuts, tobacco, pimento, ginger, whalefins, raw silk, cotton, wool, beaver,
and other peltry of America, indigo, fustick, and other dyeing woods;
secondly, such as are not the peculiar produce of America, but which are,
and may be produced in the mother country, though not in such quantities
as to supply the greater part of her demand, which is principally supplied
from foreign countries. Of this kind are all naval stores, masts, yards, and
bowsprits, tar, pitch, and turpentine, pig and bar iron, copper ore, hides and
skins, pot and pearl ashes. The largest importation of commodities of the
first kind could not discourage the growth, or interfere with the sale, of any
part of the produce of the mother country. By confining them to the home
market, our merchants, it was expected, would not only be enabled to buy
them cheaper in the plantations, and consequently to sell them with a better
profit at home, but to establish between the plantations and foreign
countries an advantageous carrying trade, of which Great Britain was
necessarily to be the centre or emporium, as the European country into
which those commodities were first to be imported. The importation of
commodities of the second kind might be so managed too, it was supposed,
as to interfere, not with the sale of those of the same kind which were
produced at home, but with that of those which were imported from foreign
countries; because, by means of proper duties, they might be rendered
always somewhat dearer than the former, and yet a good deal cheaper than
the latter. By confining such commodities to the home market, therefore, it
was proposed to discourage the produce, not of Great Britain, but of some
foreign countries with which the balance of trade was believed to be
unfavourable to Great Britain.
The prohibition of exporting from the colonies to any other country but
Great Britain, masts, yards, and bowsprits, tar, pitch, and turpentine,
naturally tended to lower the price of timber in the colonies, and
consequently to increase the expense of clearing their lands, the principal
obstacle to their improvement. But about the beginning of the present
century, in 1703, the pitch and tar company of Sweden endeavoured to raise
the price of their commodities to Great Britain, by prohibiting their
exportation, except in their own ships, at their own price, and in such
quantities as they thought proper. In order to counteract this notable piece of
mercantile policy, and to render herself as much as possible independent,
not only of Sweden, but of all the other northern powers, Great Britain gave
a bounty upon the importation of naval stores from America; and the effect
of this bounty was to raise the price of timber in America much more than
the confinement to the home market could lower it; and as both regulations
were enacted at the same time, their joint effect was rather to encourage
than to discourage the clearing of land in America.
Though pig and bar iron, too, have been put among the enumerated
commodities, yet as, when imported from America, they are exempted from
considerable duties to which they are subject when imported front any other
country, the one part of the regulation contributes more to encourage the
erection of furnaces in America than the other to discourage it. There is no
manufacture which occasions so great a consumption of wood as a furnace,
or which can contribute so much to the clearing of a country overgrown
with it.
The tendency of some of these regulations to raise the value of timber in
America, and thereby to facilitate the clearing of the land, was neither,
perhaps, intended nor understood by the legislature. Though their beneficial
effects, however, have been in this respect accidental, they have not upon
that account been less real.
The most perfect freedom of trade is permitted between the British
colonies of America and the West Indies, both in the enumerated and in the
non-enumerated commodities Those colonies are now become so populous
and thriving, that each of them finds in some of the others a great and
extensive market for every part of its produce. All of them taken together,
they make a great internal market for the produce of one another.
The liberality of England, however, towards the trade of her colonies, has
been confined chiefly to what concerns the market for their produce, either
in its rude state, or in what may be called the very first stage of
manufacture. The more advanced or more refined manufactures, even of the
colony produce, the merchants and manufacturers of Great Britain chuse to
reserve to themselves, and have prevailed upon the legislature to prevent
their establishment in the colonies, sometimes by high duties, and
sometimes by absolute prohibitions.
While, for example, Muscovado sugars from the British plantations pay,
upon importation, only 6s:4d. the hundred weight, white sugars pay £1:1:1;
and refined, either double or single, in loaves, £4:2:5 8/20ths. When those
high duties were imposed, Great Britain was the sole, and she still continues
to be, the principal market, to which the sugars of the British colonies could
be exported. They amounted, therefore, to a prohibition, at first of claying
or refining sugar for any foreign market, and at present of claying or
refining it for the market which takes off, perhaps, more than nine-tenths of
the whole produce. The manufacture of claying or refining sugar,
accordingly, though it has flourished in all the sugar colonies of France, has
been little cultivated in any of those of England, except for the market of
the colonies themselves. While Grenada was in the hands of the French,
there was a refinery of sugar, by claying, at least upon almost every
plantation. Since it fell into those of the English, almost all works of this
kind have been given up; and there are at present (October 1773), I am
assured, not above two or three remaining in the island. At present,
however, by an indulgence of the custom-house, clayed or refined sugar, if
reduced from loaves into powder, is commonly imported as Muscovado.
While Great Britain encourages in America the manufacturing of pig and
bar iron, by exempting them from duties to which the like commodities are
subject when imported from any other country, she imposes an absolute
prohibition upon the erection of steel furnaces and slit-mills in any of her
American plantations. She will not suffer her colonies to work in those
more refined manufactures, even for their own consumption; but insists
upon their purchasing of her merchants and manufacturers all goods of this
kind which they have occasion for.
She prohibits the exportation from one province to another by water, and
even the carriage by land upon horseback, or in a cart, of hats, of wools, and
woollen goods, of the produce of America; a regulation which effectually
prevents the establishment of any manufacture of such commodities for
distant sale, and confines the industry of her colonists in this way to such
coarse and household manufactures as a private family commonly makes
for its own use, or for that of some of its neighbours in the same province.
To prohibit a great people, however, from making all that they can of
every part of their own produce, or from employing their stock and industry
in the way that they judge most advantageous to themselves, is a manifest
violation of the most sacred rights of mankind. Unjust, however, as such
prohibitions may be, they have not hitherto been very hurtful to the
colonies. Land is still so cheap, and, consequently, labour so dear among
them, that they can import from the mother country almost all the more
refined or more advanced manufactures cheaper than they could make them
for themselves. Though they had not, therefore, been prohibited from
establishing such manufactures, yet, in their present state of improvement, a
regard to their own interest would probably have prevented them from
doing so. In their present state of improvement, those prohibitions, perhaps,
without cramping their industry, or restraining it from any employment to
which it would have gone of its own accord, are only impertinent badges of
slavery imposed upon them, without any sufficient reason, by the
groundless jealousy of the merchants and manufacturers of the mother
country. In a more advanced state, they might be really oppressive and
insupportable.
Great Britain, too, as she confines to her own market some of the most
important productions of the colonies, so, in compensation, she gives to
some of them an advantage in that market, sometimes by imposing higher
duties upon the like productions when imported from other countries, and
sometimes by giving bounties upon their importation from the colonies. In
the first way, she gives an advantage in the home market to the sugar,
tobacco, and iron of her own colonies; and, in the second, to their raw silk,
to their hemp and flax, to their indigo, to their naval stores, and to their
building timber. This second way of encouraging the colony produce, by
bounties upon importation, is, so far as I have been able to learn, peculiar to
Great Britain: the first is not. Portugal does not content herself with
imposing higher duties upon the importation of tobacco from any other
country, but prohibits it under the severest penalties.
With regard to the importation of goods from Europe, England has
likewise dealt more liberally with her colonies than any other nation.
Great Britain allows a part, almost always the half, generally a larger
portion, and sometimes the whole, of the duty which is paid upon the
importation of foreign goods, to be drawn back upon their exportation to
any foreign country. No independent foreign country, it was easy to foresee,
would receive them, if they came to it loaded with the heavy duties to
which almost all foreign goods are subjected on their importation into Great
Britain. Unless, therefore, some part of those duties was drawn back upon
exportation, there was an end of the carrying trade; a trade so much
favoured by the mercantile system.
Our colonies, however, are by no means independent foreign countries;
and Great Britain having assumed to herself the exclusive right of supplying
them with all goods from Europe, might have forced them (in the same
manner as other countries have done their colonies) to receive such goods
loaded with all the same duties which they paid in the mother country. But,
on the contrary, till 1763, the same drawbacks were paid upon the
exportation of the greater part of foreign goods to our colonies, as to any
independent foreign country. In 1763, indeed, by the 4th of Geo. III. c. 15,
this indulgence was a good deal abated, and it was enacted, “That no part of
the duty called the old subsidy should be drawn back for any goods of the
growth, production, or manufacture of Europe or the East Indies, which
should be exported from this kingdom to any British colony or plantation in
America; wines, white calicoes, and muslins, excepted.” Before this law,
many different sorts of foreign goods might have been bought cheaper in
the plantations than in the mother country, and some may still.
Of the greater part of the regulations concerning the colony trade, the
merchants who carry it on, it must be observed, have been the principal
advisers. We must not wonder, therefore, if, in a great part of them, their
interest has been more considered than either that of the colonies or that of
the mother country. In their exclusive privilege of supplying the colonies
with all the goods which they wanted from Europe, and of purchasing all
such parts of their surplus produce as could not interfere with any of the
trades which they themselves carried on at home, the interest of the colonies
was sacrificed to the interest of those merchants. In allowing the same
drawbacks upon the re-exportation of the greater part of European and East
India goods to the colonies, as upon their re-exportation to any independent
country, the interest of the mother country was sacrificed to it, even
according to the mercantile ideas of that interest. It was for the interest of
the merchants to pay as little as possible for the foreign goods which they
sent to the colonies, and, consequently, to get back as much as possible of
the duties which they advanced upon their importation into Great Britain.
They might thereby be enabled to sell in the colonies, either the same
quantity of goods with a greater profit, or a greater quantity with the same
profit, and, consequently, to gain something either in the one way or the
other. It was likewise for the interest of the colonies to get all such goods as
cheap, and in as great abundance as possible. But this might not always be
for the interest of the mother country. She might frequently suffer, both in
her revenue, by giving back a great part of the duties which had been paid
upon the importation of such goods; and in her manufactures, by being
undersold in the colony market, in consequence of the easy terms upon
which foreign manufactures could be carried thither by means of those
drawbacks. The progress of the linen manufacture of Great Britain, it is
commonly said, has been a good deal retarded by the drawbacks upon the
re-exportation of German linen to the American colonies.
But though the policy of Great Britain, with regard to the trade of her
colonies, has been dictated by the same mercantile spirit as that of other
nations, it has, however, upon the whole, been less illiberal and oppressive
than that of any of them.
In every thing except their foreign trade, the liberty of the English
colonists to manage their own affairs their own way, is complete. It is in
every respect equal to that of their fellow-citizens at home, and is secured in
the same manner, by an assembly of the representatives of the people, who
claim the sole right of imposing taxes for the support of the colony
government. The authority of this assembly overawes the executive power;
and neither the meanest nor the most obnoxious colonist, as long as he
obeys the law, has any thing to fear from the resentment, either of the
governor, or of any other civil or military officer in the province. The
colony assemblies, though, like the house of commons in England, they are
not always a very equal representation of the people, yet they approach
more nearly to that character; and as the executive power either has not the
means to corrupt them, or, on account of the support which it receives from
the mother country, is not under the necessity of doing so, they are, perhaps,
in general more influenced by the inclinations of their constituents. The
councils, which, in the colony legislatures, correspond to the house of lords
in Great Britain, are not composed of a hereditary nobility. In some of the
colonies, as in three of the governments of New England, those councils are
not appointed by the king, but chosen by the representatives of the people.
In none of the English colonies is there any hereditary nobility. In all of
them, indeed, as in all other free countries, the descendant of an old colony
family is more respected than an upstart of equal merit and fortune; but he
is only more respected, and he has no privileges by which he can be
troublesome to his neighbours. Before the commencement of the present
disturbances, the colony assemblies had not only the legislative, but a part
of the executive power. In Connecticut and Rhode Island, they elected the
governor. In the other colonies, they appointed the revenue officers, who
collected the taxes imposed by those respective assemblies, to whom those
officers were immediately responsible. There is more equality, therefore,
among the English colonists than among the inhabitants of the mother
country. Their manners are more re publican; and their governments, those
of three of the provinces of New England in particular, have hitherto been
more republican too.
The absolute governments of Spain, Portugal, and France, on the
contrary, take place in their colonies; and the discretionary powers which
such governments commonly delegate to all their inferior officers are, on
account of the great distance, naturally exercised there with more than
ordinary violence. Under all absolute governments, there is more liberty in
the capital than in any other part of the country. The sovereign himself can
never have either interest or inclination to pervert the order of justice, or to
oppress the great body of the people. In the capital, his presence overawes,
more or less, all his inferior officers, who, in the remoter provinces, from
whence the complaints of the people are less likely to reach him, can
exercise their tyranny with much more safety. But the European colonies in
America are more remote than the most distant provinces of the greatest
empires which had ever been known before. The government of the English
colonies is, perhaps, the only one which, since the world began, could give
perfect security to the inhabitants of so very distant a province. The
administration of the French colonies, however, has always been conducted
with much more gentleness and moderation than that of the Spanish and
Portuguese. This superiority of conduct is suitable both to the character of
the French nation, and to what forms the character of every nation, the
nature of their government, which, though arbitrary and violent in
comparison with that of Great Britain, is legal and free in comparison with
those of Spain and Portugal.
It is in the progress of the North American colonies, however, that the
superiority of the English policy chiefly appears. The progress of the sugar
colonies of France has been at least equal, perhaps superior, to that of the
greater part of those of England; and yet the sugar colonies of England
enjoy a free government, nearly of the same kind with that which takes
place in her colonies of North America. But the sugar colonies of France
are not discouraged, like those of England, from refining their own sugar;
and what is still of greater importance, the genius of their government
naturally introduces a better management of their negro slaves.
In all European colonies, the culture of the sugar-cane is carried on by
negro slaves. The constitution of those who have been born in the temperate
climate of Europe could not, it is supposed, support the labour of digging
the ground under the burning sun of the West Indies; and the culture of the
sugar-cane, as it is managed at present, is all hand labour; though, in the
opinion of many, the drill plough might be introduced into it with great
advantage. But, as the profit and success of the cultivation which is carried
on by means of cattle, depend very much upon the good management of
those cattle; so the profit and success of that which is carried on by slaves
must depend equally upon the good management of those slaves; and in the
good management of their slaves the French planters, I think it is generally
allowed, are superior to the English. The law, so far as it gives some weak
protection to the slave against the violence of his master, is likely to be
better executed in a colony where the government is in a great measure
arbitrary, than in one where it is altogether free. In ever country where the
unfortunate law of slavery is established, the magistrate, when he protects
the slave, intermeddles in some measure in the management of the private
property of the master; and, in a free country, where the master is, perhaps,
either a member of the colony assembly, or an elector of such a member, he
dares not do this but with the greatest caution and circumspection. The
respect which he is obliged to pay to the master, renders it more difficult for
him to protect the slave. But in a country where the government is in a great
measure arbitrary, where it is usual for the magistrate to intermeddle even in
the management of the private property of individuals, and to send them,
perhaps, a lettre de cachet, if they do not manage it according to his liking,
it is much easier for him to give some protection to the slave; and common
humanity naturally disposes him to do so. The protection of the magistrate
renders the slave less contemptible in the eyes of his master, who is thereby
induced to consider him with more regard, and to treat him with more
gentleness. Gentle usage renders the slave not only more faithful, but more
intelligent, and, therefore, upon a double account, more useful. He
approaches more to the condition of a free servant, and may possess some
degree of integrity and attachment to his master’s interest; virtues which
frequently belong to free servants, but which never can belong to a slave,
who is treated as slaves commonly are in countries where the master is
perfectly free and secure.
That the condition of a slave is better under an arbitrary than under a free
government, is, I believe, supported by the history of all ages and nations.
In the Roman history, the first time we read of the magistrate interposing to
protect the slave from the violence of his master, is under the emperors.
When Vidius Pollio, in the presence of Augustus, ordered one of his slaves,
who had committed a slight fault, to be cut into pieces and thrown into his
fish-pond, in order to feed his fishes, the emperor commanded him, with
indignation, to emancipate immediately, not only that slave, but all the
others that belonged to him. Under the republic no magistrate could have
had authority enough to protect the slave, much less to punish the master.
The stock, it is to be observed, which has improved the sugar colonies of
France, particularly the great colony of St Domingo, has been raised almost
entirely from the gradual improvement and cultivation of those colonies. It
has been almost altogether the produce of the soil and of the industry of the
colonists, or, what comes to the same thing, the price of that produce,
gradually accumulated by good management, and employed in raising a still
greater produce. But the stock which has improved and cultivated the sugar
colonies of England, has, a great part of it, been sent out from England, and
has by no means been altogether the produce of the soil and industry of the
colonists. The prosperity of the English sugar colonies has been in a great
measure owing to the great riches of England, of which a part has
overflowed, if one may say so, upon these colonies. But the prosperity of
the sugar colonies of France has been entirely owing to the good conduct of
the colonists, which must therefore have had some superiority over that of
the English; and this superiority has been remarked in nothing so much as
in the good management of their slaves.
Such have been the general outlines of the policy of the different
European nations with regard to their colonies.
The policy of Europe, therefore, has very little to boast of, either in the
original establishment, or, so far as concerns their internal government, in
the subsequent prosperity of the colonies of America.
Folly and injustice seem to have been the principles which presided over
and directed the first project of establishing those colonies; the folly of
hunting after gold and silver mines, and the injustice of coveting the
possession of a country whose harmless natives, far from having ever
injured the people of Europe, had received the first adventurers with every
mark of kindness and hospitality.
The adventurers, indeed, who formed some of the latter establishments,
joined to the chimerical project of finding gold and silver mines, other
motives more reasonable and more laudable; but even these motives do
very little honour to the policy of Europe.
The English puritans, restrained at home, fled for freedom to America,
and established there the four governments of New England. The English
catholics, treated with much greater injustice, established that of Maryland;
the quakers, that of Pennsylvania. The Portuguese Jews, persecuted by the
inquisition, stript of their fortunes, and banished to Brazil, introduced, by
their example, some sort of order and industry among the transported felons
and strumpets by whom that colony was originally peopled, and taught
them the culture of the sugar-cane. Upon all these different occasions, it
was not the wisdom and policy, but the disorder and injustice of the
European governments, which peopled and cultivated America.
In effectuation some of the most important of these establishments, the
different governments of Europe had as little merit as in projecting them.
The conquest of Mexico was the project, not of the council of Spain, but of
a governor of Cuba; and it was effectuated by the spirit of the bold
adventurer to whom it was entrusted, in spite of every thing which that
governor, who soon repented of having trusted such a person, could do to
thwart it. The conquerors of Chili and Peru, and of almost all the other
Spanish settlements upon the continent of America, carried out with them
no other public encouragement, but a general permission to make
settlements and conquests in the name of the king of Spain. Those
adventures were all at the private risk and expense of the adventurers. The
government of Spain contributed scarce any thing to any of them. That of
England contributed as little towards effectuating the establishment of some
of its most important colonies in North America.
When those establishments were effectuated, and had become so
considerable as to attract the attention of the mother country, the first
regulations which she made with regard to them, had always in view to
secure to herself the monopoly of their commerce; to confine their market,
and to enlarge her own at their expense, and, consequently, rather to damp
and discourage, than to quicken and forward the course of their prosperity.
In the different ways in which this monopoly has been exercised, consists
one of the most essential differences in the policy of the different European
nations with regard to their colonies. The best of them all, that of England,
is only somewhat less illiberal and oppressive than that of any of the rest.
In what way, therefore, has the policy of Europe contributed either to the
first establishment, or to the present grandeur of the colonies of America?
In one way, and in one way only, it has contributed a good deal. Magna
virum mater! It bred and formed the men who were capable of achieving
such great actions, and of laying the foundation of so great an empire; and
there is no other quarter of the world; of which the policy is capable of
forming, or has ever actually, and in fact, formed such men. The colonies
owe to the policy of Europe the education and great views of their active
and enterprizing founders; and some of the greatest and most important of
them, so far as concerns their internal government, owe to it scarce
anything else.
PART III. Of the Advantages which Europe has derived From the
Discovery of America, and from that of a Passage to the East Indies
by the Cape of Good Hope.
Such are the advantages which the colonies of America have derived
from the policy of Europe.
What are those which Europe has derived from the discovery and
colonization of America?
Those advantages may be divided, first, into the general advantages
which Europe, considered as one great country, has derived from those
great events; and, secondly, into the particular advantages which each
colonizing country has derived from the colonies which particularly belong
to it, in consequence of the authority or dominion which it exercises over
them.
The general advantages which Europe, considered as one great country,
has derived from the discovery and colonization of America, consist, first,
in the increase of its enjoyments; and, secondly, in the augmentation of its
industry.
The surplus produce of America imported into Europe, furnishes the
inhabitants of this great continent with a variety of commodities which they
could not otherwise have possessed; some for conveniency and use, some
for pleasure, and some for ornament; and thereby contributes to increase
their enjoyments.
The discovery and colonization of America, it will readily be allowed,
have contributed to augment the industry, first, of all the countries which
trade to it directly, such as Spain, Portugal, France, and England; and,
secondly, of all those which, without trading to it directly, send, through the
medium of other countries, goods to it of their own produce, such as
Austrian Flanders, and some provinces of Germany, which, through the
medium of the countries before mentioned, send to it a considerable
quantity of linen and other goods. All such countries have evidently gained
a more extensive market for their surplus produce, and must consequently
have been encouraged to increase its quantity.
But that those great events should likewise have contributed to encourage
the industry of countries such as Hungary and Poland, which may never,
perhaps, have sent a single commodity of their own produce to America, is
not, perhaps, altogether so evident. That those events have done so,
however, cannot be doubted. Some part of the produce of America is
consumed in Hungary and Poland, and there is some demand there for the
sugar, chocolate, and tobacco, of that new quarter of the world. But those
commodities must be purchased with something which is either the produce
of the industry of Hungary and Poland, or with something which had been
purchased with some part of that produce. Those commodities of America
are new values, new equivalents, introduced into Hungary and Poland, to be
exchanged there for the surplus produce of these countries. By being carried
thither, they create a new and more extensive market for that surplus
produce. They raise its value, and thereby contribute to encourage its
increase. Though no part of it may ever be carried to America, it may be
carried to other countries, which purchase it with a part of their share of the
surplus produce of America, and it may find a market by means of the
circulation of that trade which was originally put into motion by the surplus
produce of America.
Those great events may even have contributed to increase the
enjoyments, and to augment the industry, of countries which not only never
sent any commodities to America, but never received any from it. Even
such countries may have received a greater abundance of other
commodities from countries, of which the surplus produce had been
augmented by means of the American trade. This greater abundance, as it
must necessarily have increased their enjoyments, so it must likewise have
augmented their industry. A greater number of new equivalents, of some
kind or other, must have been presented to them to be exchanged for the
surplus produce of that industry. A more extensive market must have been
created for that surplus produce, so as to raise its value, and thereby
encourage its increase. The mass of commodities annually thrown into the
great circle of European commerce, and by its various revolutions annually
distributed among all the different nations comprehended within it, must
have been augmented by the whole surplus produce of America. A greater
share of this greater mass, therefore, is likely to have fallen to each of those
nations, to have increased their enjoyments, and augmented their industry.
The exclusive trade of the mother countries tends to diminish, or at least
to keep down below what they would otherwise rise to, both the enjoyments
and industry of all those nations in general, and of the American colonies in
particular. It is a dead weight upon the action of one of the great springs
which puts into motion a great part of the business of mankind. By
rendering the colony produce dearer in all other countries, it lessens its
consumption, and thereby cramps the industry of the colonies, and both the
enjoyments and the industry of all other countries, which both enjoy less
when they pay more for what they enjoy, and produce less when they get
less for what they produce. By rendering the produce of all other countries
dearer in the colonies, it cramps in the same manner the industry of all other
colonies, and both the enjoyments and the industry of the colonies. It is a
clog which, for the supposed benefit of some particular countries,
embarrasses the pleasures and encumbers the industry of all other countries,
but of the colonies more than of any other. It not only excludes as much as
possible all other countries from one particular market, but it confines as
much as possible the colonies to one particular market; and the difference is
very great between being excluded from one particular market when all
others are open, and being confined to one particular market when all others
are shut up. The surplus produce of the colonies, however, is the original
source of all that increase of enjoyments and industry which Europe derives
from the discovery and colonization of America, and the exclusive trade of
the mother countries tends to render this source much less abundant than it
otherwise would be.
The particular advantages which each colonizing country derives from
the colonies which particularly belong to it, are of two different kinds; first,
those common advantages which every empire derives from the provinces
subject to its dominion; and, secondly, those peculiar advantages which are
supposed to result from provinces of so very peculiar a nature as the
European colonies of America.
The common advantages which every empire derives from the provinces
subject to its dominion consist, first, in the military force which they furnish
for its defence; and, secondly, in the revenue which they furnish for the
support of its civil government. The Roman colonies furnished occasionally
both the one and the other. The Greek colonies sometimes furnished a
military force, but seldom any revenue. They seldom acknowledged
themselves subject to the dominion of the mother city. They were generally
her allies in war, but very seldom her subjects in peace.
The European colonies of America have never yet furnished any military
force for the defence of the mother country. The military force has never yet
been sufficient for their own defence; and in the different wars in which the
mother countries have been engaged, the defence of their colonies has
generally occasioned a very considerable distraction of the military force of
those countries. In this respect, therefore, all the European colonies have,
without exception, been a cause rather of weakness than of strength to their
respective mother countries.
The colonies of Spain and Portugal only have contributed any revenue
towards the defence of the mother country, or the support of her civil
government. The taxes which have been levied upon those of other
European nations, upon those of England in particular, have seldom been
equal to the expense laid out upon them in time of peace, and never
sufficient to defray that which they occasioned in time of war. Such
colonies, therefore, have been a source of expense, and not of revenue, to
their respective mother countries.
The advantages of such colonies to their respective mother countries,
consist altogether in those peculiar advantages which are supposed to result
from provinces of so very peculiar a nature as the European colonies of
America; and the exclusive trade, it is acknowledged, is the sole source of
all those peculiar advantages.
In consequence of this exclusive trade, all that part of the surplus produce
of the English colonies, for example, which consists in what are called
enumerated commodities, can be sent to no other country but England.
Other countries must afterwards buy it of her. It must be cheaper, therefore,
in England than it can be in any other country, and must contribute more to
increase the enjoyments of England than those of any other country. It must
likewise contribute more to encourage her industry. For all those parts of
her own surplus produce which England exchanges for those enumerated
commodities, she must get a better price than any other countries can get
for the like parts of theirs, when they exchange them for the same
commodities. The manufactures of England, for example, will purchase a
greater quantity of the sugar and tobacco of her own colonies than the like
manufactures of other countries can purchase of that sugar and tobacco. So
far, therefore, as the manufactures of England and those of other countries
are both to be exchanged for the sugar and tobacco of the English colonies,
this superiority of price gives an encouragement to the former beyond what
the latter can, in these circumstances, enjoy. The exclusive trade of the
colonies, therefore, as it diminishes, or at least keeps down below what they
would otherwise rise to, both the enjoyments and the industry of the
countries which do not possess it, so it gives an evident advantage to the
countries which do possess it over those other countries.
This advantage, however, will, perhaps, be found to be rather what may
be called a relative than an absolute advantage, and to give a superiority to
the country which enjoys it, rather by depressing the industry and produce
of other countries, than by raising those of that particular country above
what they would naturally rise to in the case of a free trade.
The tobacco of Maryland and Virginia, for example, by means of the
monopoly which England enjoys of it, certainly comes cheaper to England
than it can do to France to whom England commonly sells a considerable
part of it. But had France and all other European countries been at all times
allowed a free trade to Maryland and Virginia, the tobacco of those colonies
might by this time have come cheaper than it actually does, not only to all
those other countries, but likewise to England. The produce of tobacco, in
consequence of a market so much more extensive than any which it has
hitherto enjoyed, might, and probably would, by this time have been so
much increased as to reduce the profits of a tobacco plantation to their
natural level with those of a corn plantation, which it is supposed they are
still somewhat above. The price of tobacco might, and probably would, by
this time have fallen somewhat lower than it is at present. An equal quantity
of the commodities, either of England or of those other countries, might
have purchased in Maryland and Virginia a greater quantity of tobacco than
it can do at present, and consequently have been sold there for so much a
better price. So far as that weed, therefore, can, by its cheapness and
abundance, increase the enjoyments, or augment the industry, either of
England or of any other country, it would probably, in the case of a free
trade, have produced both these effects in somewhat a greater degree than it
can do at present. England, indeed, would not, in this case, have had any
advantage over other countries. She might have bought the tobacco of her
colonies somewhat cheaper, and consequently have sold some of her own
commodities somewhat dearer, than she actually does; but she could neither
have bought the one cheaper, nor sold the other dearer, than any other
country might have done. She might, perhaps, have gained an absolute, but
she would certainly have lost a relative advantage.
In order, however, to obtain this relative advantage in the colony trade, in
order to execute the invidious and malignant project of excluding, as much
as possible, other nations from any share in it, England, there are very
probable reasons for believing, has not only sacrificed a part of the absolute
advantage which she, as well as every other nation, might have derived
from that trade, but has subjected herself both to an absolute and to a
relative disadvantage in almost every other branch of trade.
When, by the act of navigation, England assumed to herself the
monopoly of the colony trade, the foreign capitals which had before been
employed in it, were necessarily withdrawn from it. The English capital,
which had before carried on but a part of it, was now to carry on the whole.
The capital which had before supplied the colonies with but a part of the
goods which they wanted from Europe, was now all that was employed to
supply them with the whole. But it could not supply them with the whole;
and the goods with which it did supply them were necessarily sold very
dear. The capital which had before bought but a part of the surplus produce
of the colonies, was now all that was employed to buy the whole. But it
could not buy the whole at any thing near the old price; and therefore,
whatever it did buy, it necessarily bought very cheap. But in an employment
of capital, in which the merchant sold very dear, and bought very cheap, the
profit must have been very great, and much above the ordinary level of
profit in other branches of trade. This superiority of profit in the colony
trade could not fail to draw from other branches of trade a part of the capital
which had before been employed in them. But this revulsion of capital, as it
must have gradually increased the competition of capitals in the colony
trade, so it must have gradually diminished that competition in all those
other branches of trade; as it must have gradually lowered the profits of the
one, so it must have gradually raised those of the other, till the profits of all
came to a new level, different from, and somewhat higher, than that at
which they had been before.
This double effect of drawing capital from all other trades, and of raising
the rate of profit somewhat higher than it otherwise would have been in all
trades, was not only produced by this monopoly upon its first establishment,
but has continued to be produced by it ever since.
First, This monopoly has been continually drawing capital from all other
trades, to be employed in that of the colonies.
Though the wealth of Great Britain has increased very much since the
establishment of the act of navigation, it certainly has not increased in the
same proportion as that or the colonies. But the foreign trade of every
country naturally increases in proportion to its wealth, its surplus produce in
proportion to its whole produce; and Great Britain having engrossed to
herself almost the whole of what may be called the foreign trade of the
colonies, and her capital not having increased in the same proportion as the
extent of that trade, she could not carry it on without continually
withdrawing from other branches of trade some part of the capital which
had before been employed in them, as well as withholding from them a
great deal more which would otherwise have gone to them. Since the
establishment of the act of navigation, accordingly, the colony trade has
been continually increasing, while many other branches of foreign trade,
particularly of that to other parts of Europe, have been continually
decaying. Our manufactures for foreign sale, instead of being suited, as
before the act of navigation, to the neighbouring market of Europe, or to the
more distant one of the countries which lie round the Mediterranean sea,
have the greater part of them, been accommodated to the still more distant
one of the colonies; to the market in which they have the monopoly, rather
than to that in which they have many competitors. The causes of decay in
other branches of foreign trade, which, by Sir Matthew Decker and other
writers, have been sought for in the excess and improper mode of taxation,
in the high price of labour, in the increase of luxury, etc. may all be found in
the overgrowth of the colony trade. The mercantile capital of Great Britain,
though very great, yet not being infinite, and though greatly increased since
the act of navigation, yet not being increased in the same proportion as the
colony trade, that trade could not possibly be carried on without
withdrawing some part of that capital from other branches of trade, nor
consequently without some decay of those other branches.
England, it must be observed, was a great trading country, her mercantile
capital was very great, and likely to become still greater and greater every
day, not only before the act of navigation had established the monopoly of
the corn trade, but before that trade was very considerable. In the Dutch
war, during the government of Cromwell, her navy was superior to that of
Holland; and in that which broke out in the beginning of the reign of
Charles II., it was at least equal, perhaps superior to the united navies of
France and Holland. Its superiority, perhaps, would scarce appear greater in
the present times, at least if the Dutch navy were to bear the same
proportion to the Dutch commerce now which it did then. But this great
naval power could not, in either of those wars, be owing to the act of
navigation. During the first of them, the plan of that act had been but just
formed; and though, before the breaking out of the second, it had been fully
enacted by legal authority, yet no part of it could have had time to produce
any considerable effect, and least of all that part which established the
exclusive trade to the colonies. Both the colonies and their trade were
inconsiderable then, in comparison of what they are how. The island of
Jamaica was an unwholesome desert, little inhabited, and less cultivated.
New York and New Jersey were in the possession of the Dutch, the half of
St. Christopher’s in that of the French. The island of Antigua, the two
Carolinas, Pennsylvania, Georgia, and Nova Scotia, were not planted.
Virginia, Maryland, and New England were planted; and though they were
very thriving colonies, yet there was not perhaps at that time, either in
Europe or America, a single person who foresaw, or even suspected, the
rapid progress which they have since made in wealth, population, and
improvement. The island of Barbadoes, in short, was the only British
colony of any consequence, of which the condition at that time bore any
resemblance to what it is at present. The trade of the colonies, of which
England, even for some time after the act of navigation, enjoyed but a part
(for the act of navigation was not very strictly executed till several years
after it was enacted), could not at that time be the cause of the great trade of
England, nor of the great naval power which was supported by that trade.
The trade which at that time supported that great naval power was the trade
of Europe, and of the countries which lie round the Mediterranean sea. But
the share which Great Britain at present enjoys of that trade could not
support any such great naval power. Had the growing trade of the colonies
been left free to all nations, whatever share of it might have fallen to Great
Britain, and a very considerable share would probably have fallen to her,
must have been all an addition to this great trade of which she was before in
possession. In consequence of the monopoly, the increase of the colony
trade has not so much occasioned an addition to the trade which Great
Britain had before, as a total change in its direction.
Secondly, This monopoly has necessarily contributed to keep up the rate
of profit, in all the different branches of British trade, higher than it
naturally would have been, had all nations been allowed a free trade to the
British colonies.
The monopoly of the colony trade, as it necessarily drew towards that
trade a greater proportion of the capital of Great Britain than what would
have gone to it of its own accord, so, by the expulsion of all foreign
capitals, it necessarily reduced the whole quantity of capital employed in
that trade below what it naturally would have been in the case of a free
trade. But, by lessening the competition of capitals in that branch of trade, it
necessarily raised the rate of profit in that branch. By lessening, too, the
competition of British capitals in all other branches of trade, it necessarily
raised the rate of British profit in all those other branches. Whatever may
have been, at any particular period since the establishment of the act of
navigation, the state or extent of the mercantile capital of Great Britain, the
monopoly of the colony trade must, during the continuance of that state,
have raised the ordinary rate of British profit higher than it otherwise would
have been, both in that and in all the other branches of British trade. If,
since the establishment of the act of navigation, the ordinary rate of British
profit has fallen considerably, as it certainly has, it must have fallen still
lower, had not the monopoly established by that act contributed to keep it
up.
But whatever raises, in any country, the ordinary rate of profit higher
than it otherwise would be, necessarily subjects that country both to an
absolute, and to a relative disadvantage in every branch of trade of which
she has not the monopoly.
It subjects her to an absolute disadvantage; because, in such branches of
trade, her merchants cannot get this greater profit without selling dearer
than they otherwise would do, both the goods of foreign countries which
they import into their own, and the goods of their own country which they
export to foreign countries. Their own country must both buy dearer and
sell dearer; must both buy less, and sell less; must both enjoy less and
produce less, than she otherwise would do.
It subjects her to a relative disadvantage; because, in such branches of
trade, it sets other countries, which are not subject to the same absolute
disadvantage, either more above her or less below her, than they otherwise
would be. It enables them both to enjoy more and to produce more, in
proportion to what she enjoys and produces. It renders their superiority
greater, or their inferiority less, than it otherwise would be. By raising the
price of her produce above what it otherwise would be, it enables the
merchants of other countries to undersell her in foreign markets, and
thereby to justle her out of almost all those branches of trade, of which she
has not the monopoly.
Our merchants frequently complain of the high wages of British labour,
as the cause of their manufactures being undersold in foreign markets; but
they are silent about the high profits of stock. They complain of the
extravagant gain of other people; but they say nothing of their own. The
high profits of British stock, however, may contribute towards raising the
price of British manufactures, in many cases, as much, and in some perhaps
more, than the high wages of British labour.
It is in this manner that the capital of Great Britain, one may justly say,
has partly been drawn and partly been driven from the greater part of the
different branches of trade of which she has not the monopoly; from the
trade of Europe, in particular, and from that of the countries which lie round
the Mediterranean sea.
It has partly been drawn from those branches of trade, by the attraction of
superior profit in the colony trade, in consequence of the continual increase
of that trade, and of the continual insufficiency of the capital which had
carried it on one year to carry it on the next.
It has partly been driven from them, by the advantage which the high rate
of profit established in Great Britain gives to other countries, in all the
different branches of trade of which Great Britain has not the monopoly.
As the monopoly of the colony trade has drawn from those other
branches a part of the British capital, which would otherwise have been
employed in them, so it has forced into them many foreign capitals which
would never have gone to them, had they not been expelled from the colony
trade. In those other branches of trade, it has diminished the competition of
British capitals, and thereby raised the rate of British profit higher than it
otherwise would have been. On the contrary, it has increased the
competition of foreign capitals, and thereby sunk the rate of foreign profit
lower than it otherwise would have been. Both in the one way and in the
other, it must evidently have subjected Great Britain to a relative
disadvantage in all those other branches of trade.
The colony trade, however, it may perhaps be said, is more advantageous
to Great Britain than any other; and the monopoly, by forcing into that trade
a greater proportion of the capital of Great Britain than what would
otherwise have gone to it, has turned that capital into an employment, more
advantageous to the country than any other which it could have found.
The most advantageous employment of any capital to the country to
which it belongs, is that which maintains there the greatest quantity of
productive labour, and increases the most the annual produce of the land
and labour of that country. But the quantity of productive labour which any
capital employed in the foreign trade of consumption can maintain, is
exactly in proportion, it has been shown in the second book, to the
frequency of its returns. A capital of a thousand pounds, for example,
employed in a foreign trade of consumption, of which the returns are made
regularly once in the year, can keep in constant employment, in the country
to which it belongs, a quantity of productive labour, equal to what a
thousand pounds can maintain there for a year. If the returns are made twice
or thrice in the year, it can keep in constant employment a quantity of
productive labour, equal to what two or three thousand pounds can maintain
there for a year. A foreign trade of consumption carried on with a
neighbouring, is, upon that account, in general, more advantageous than one
carried on with a distant country; and, for the same reason, a direct foreign
trade of consumption, as it has likewise been shown in the second book, is
in general more advantageous than a round-about one.
But the monopoly of the colony trade, so far as it has operated upon the
employment of the capital of Great Britain, has, in all cases, forced some
part of it from a foreign trade of consumption carried on with a
neighbouring, to one carried on with a more distant country, and in many
cases from a direct foreign trade of consumption to a round-about one.
First, The monopoly of the colony trade has, in all cases, forced some
part of the capital of Great Britain from a foreign trade of consumption
carried on with a neighbouring, to one carried on with a more distant
country.
It has, in all cases, forced some part of that capital from the trade with
Europe, and with the countries which lie round the Mediterranean sea, to
that with the more distant regions of America and the West Indies; from
which the returns are necessarily less frequent, not only on account of the
greater distance, but on account of the peculiar circumstances of those
countries. New colonies, it has already been observed, are always
understocked. Their capital is always much less than what they could
employ with great profit and advantage in the improvement and cultivation
of their land. They have a constant demand, therefore, for more capital than
they have of their own; and, in order to supply the deficiency of their own,
they endeavour to borrow as much as they can of the mother country, to
whom they are, therefore, always in debt. The most common way in which
the colonies contract this debt, is not by borrowing upon bond of the rich
people of the mother country, though they sometimes do this too, but by
running as much in arrear to their correspondents, who supply them with
goods from Europe, as those correspondents will allow them. Their annual
returns frequently do not amount to more than a third, and sometimes not to
so great a proportion of what they owe. The whole capital, therefore, which
their correspondents advance to them, is seldom returned to Britain in less
than three, and sometimes not in less than four or five years. But a British
capital of a thousand pounds, for example, which is returned to Great
Britain only once in five years, can keep in constant employment only one-
fifth part of the British industry which it could maintain, if the whole was
returned once in the year; and, instead of the quantity of industry which a
thousand pounds could maintain for a year, can keep in constant
employment the quantity only which two hundred pounds can maintain for
a year. The planter, no doubt, by the high price which he pays for the goods
from Europe, by the interest upon the bills which he grants at distant dates,
and by the commission upon the renewal of those which he grants at near
dates, makes up, and probably more than makes up, all the loss which his
correspondent can sustain by this delay. But, though he make up the loss of
his correspondent, he cannot make up that of Great Britain. In a trade of
which the returns are very distant, the profit of the merchant may be as
great or greater than in one in which they are very frequent and near; but the
advantage of the country in which he resides, the quantity of productive
labour constantly maintained there, the annual produce of the land and
labour, must always be much less. That the returns of the trade to America,
and still more those of that to the West Indies, are, in general, not only more
distant, but more irregular and more uncertain, too, than those of the trade
to any part of Europe, or even of the countries which lie round the
Mediterranean sea, will readily be allowed, I imagine, by everybody who
has any experience of those different branches of trade.
Secondly, The monopoly of the colony trade, has, in many cases, forced
some part of the capital of Great Britain from a direct foreign trade of
consumption, into a round-about one.
Among the enumerated commodities which can be sent to no other
market but Great Britain, there are several of which the quantity exceeds
very much the consumption of Great Britain, and of which, a part,
therefore, must be exported to other countries. But this cannot be done
without forcing some part of the capital of Great Britain into a round-about
foreign trade of consumption. Maryland, and Virginia, for example, send
annually to Great Britain upwards of ninety-six thousand hogsheads of
tobacco, and the consumption of Great Britain is said not to exceed fourteen
thousand. Upwards of eighty-two thousand hogsheads, therefore, must be
exported to other countries, to France, to Holland, and, to the countries
which lie round the Baltic and Mediterranean seas. But that part of the
capital of Great Britain which brings those eighty-two thousand hogsheads
to Great Britain, which re-exports them from thence to those other
countries, and which brings back from those other countries to Great Britain
either goods or money in return, is employed in a round-about foreign trade
of consumption; and is necessarily forced into this employment, in order to
dispose of this great surplus. If we would compute in how many years the
whole of this capital is likely to come back to Great Britain, we must add to
the distance of the American returns that of the returns from those other
countries. If, in the direct foreign trade of consumption which we carry on
with America, the whole capital employed frequently does not come back
in less than three or four years, the whole capital employed in this round-
about one is not likely to come back in less than four or five. If the one can
keep in constant employment but a third or a fourth part of the domestic
industry which could be maintained by a capital returned once in the year,
the other can keep in constant employment but a fourth or a fifth part of that
industry. At some of the outports a credit is commonly given to those
foreign correspondents to whom they export them tobacco. At the port of
London, indeed, it is commonly sold for ready money: the rule is Weigh
and pay. At the port of London, therefore, the final returns of the whole
round-about trade are more distant than the returns from America, by the
time only which the goods may lie unsold in the warehouse; where,
however, they may sometimes lie long enough. But, had not the colonies
been confined to the market of Great Britain for the sale of their tobacco,
very little more of it would probably have come to us than what was
necessary for the home consumption. The goods which Great Britain
purchases at present for her own consumption with the great surplus of
tobacco which she exports to other countries, she would, in this case,
probably have purchased with the immediate produce of her own industry,
or with some part of her own manufactures. That produce, those
manufactures, instead of being almost entirely suited to one great market, as
at present, would probably have been fitted to a great number of smaller
markets. Instead of one great round-about foreign trade of consumption,
Great Britain would probably have carried on a great number of small direct
foreign trades of the same kind. On account of the frequency of the returns,
a part, and probably but a small part, perhaps not above a third or a fourth
of the capital which at present carries on this great round-about trade, might
have been sufficient to carry on all those small direct ones; might have kept
inconstant employment an equal quantity of British industry; and have
equally supported the annual produce of the land and labour of Great
Britain. All the purposes of this trade being, in this manner, answered by a
much smaller capital, there would have been a large spare capital to apply
to other purposes; to improve the lands, to increase the manufactures, and to
extend the commerce of Great Britain; to come into competition at least
with the other British capitals employed in all those different ways, to
reduce the rate of profit in them all, and thereby to give to Great Britain, in
all of them, a superiority over other countries, still greater than what she at
present enjoys.
The monopoly of the colony trade, too, has forced some part of the
capital of Great Britain from all foreign trade of consumption to a carrying
trade; and, consequently from supporting more or less the industry of Great
Britain, to be employed altogether in supporting partly that of the colonies,
and partly that of some other countries.
The goods, for example, which are annually purchased with the great
surplus of eighty-two thousand hogsheads of tobacco annually re-exported
from Great Britain, are not all consumed in Great Britain. Part of them,
linen from Germany and Holland, for example, is returned to the colonies
for their particular consumption. But that part of the capital of Great Britain
which buys the tobacco with which this linen is afterwards bought, is
necessarily withdrawn from supporting the industry of Great Britain, to be
employed altogether in supporting, partly that of the colonies, and partly
that of the particular countries who pay for this tobacco with the produce of
their own industry.
The monopoly of the colony trade, besides, by forcing towards it a much
greater proportion of the capital of Great Britain than what would naturally
have gone to it, seems to have broken altogether that natural balance which
would otherwise have taken place among all the different branches of
British industry. The industry of Great Britain, instead of being
accommodated to a great number of small markets, has been principally
suited to one great market. Her commerce, instead of running in a great
number of small channels, has been taught to run principally in one great
channel. But the whole system of her industry and commerce has thereby
been rendered less secure; the whole state of her body politic less healthful
than it otherwise would have been. In her present condition, Great Britain
resembles one of those unwholesome bodies in which some of the vital
parts are overgrown, and which, upon that account, are liable to many
dangerous disorders, scarce incident to those in which all the parts are more
properly proportioned. A small stop in that great blood-vessel, which has
been artificially swelled beyond its natural dimensions, and through which
an unnatural proportion of the industry and commerce of the country has
been forced to circulate, is very likely to bring on the most dangerous
disorders upon the whole body politic. The expectation of a rupture with the
colonies, accordingly, has struck the people of Great Britain with more
terror than they ever felt for a Spanish armada, or a French invasion. It was
this terror, whether well or ill grounded, which rendered the repeal of the
stamp act, among the merchants at least, a popular measure. In the total
exclusion from the colony market, was it to last only for a few years, the
greater part of our merchants used to fancy that they foresaw an entire stop
to their trade; the greater part of our master manufacturers, the entire ruin of
their business; and the greater part of our workmen, an end of their
employment. A rupture with any of our neighbours upon the continent,
though likely, too, to occasion some stop or interruption in the employments
of some of all these different orders of people, is foreseen, however, without
any such general emotion. The blood, of which the circulation is stopt in
some of the smaller vessels, easily disgorges itself into the greater, without
occasioning any dangerous disorder; but, when it is stopt in any of the
greater vessels, convulsions, apoplexy, or death, are the immediate and
unavoidable consequences. If but one of those overgrown manufactures,
which, by means either of bounties or of the monopoly of the home and
colony markets, have been artificially raised up to any unnatural height,
finds some small stop or interruption in its employment, it frequently
occasions a mutiny and disorder alarming to government, and embarrassing
even to the deliberations of the legislature. How great, therefore, would be
the disorder and confusion, it was thought, which must necessarily be
occasioned by a sudden and entire stop in the employment of so great a
proportion of our principal manufacturers?
Some moderate and gradual relaxation of the laws which give to Great
Britain the exclusive trade to the colonies, till it is rendered in a great
measure free, seems to be the only expedient which can, in all future times,
deliver her from this danger; which can enable her, or even force her, to
withdraw some part of her capital from this overgrown employment, and to
turn it, though with less profit, towards other employments; and which, by
gradually diminishing one branch of her industry, and gradually increasing
all the rest, can, by degrees, restore all the different branches of it to that
natural, healthful, and proper proportion, which perfect liberty necessarily
establishes, and which perfect liberty can alone preserve. To open the
colony trade all at once to all nations, might not only occasion some
transitory inconveniency, but a great permanent loss, to the greater part of
those whose industry or capital is at present engaged in it. The sudden loss
of the employment, even of the ships which import the eighty-two thousand
hogsheads of tobacco, which are over and above the consumption of Great
Britain, might alone be felt very sensibly. Such are the unfortunate effects
of all the regulations of the mercantile system. They not only introduce very
dangerous disorders into the state of the body politic, but disorders which it
is often difficult to remedy, without occasioning, for a time at least, still
greater disorders. In what manner, therefore, the colony trade ought
gradually to be opened; what are the restraints which ought first, and what
are those which ought last, to be taken away; or in what manner the natural
system of perfect liberty and justice ought gradually to be restored, we must
leave to the wisdom of future statesmen and legislators to determine.
Five different events, unforeseen and unthought of, have very fortunately
concurred to hinder Great Britain from feeling, so sensibly as it was
generally expected she would, the total exclusion which has now taken
place for more than a year (from the first of December 1774) from a very
important branch of the colony trade, that of the twelve associated
provinces of North America. First, those colonies, in preparing themselves
for their non-importation agreement, drained Great Britain completely of all
the commodities which were fit for their market; secondly, the extra
ordinary demand of the Spanish flota has, this year, drained Germany and
the north of many commodities, linen in particular, which used to come into
competition, even in the British market, with the manufactures of Great
Britain; thirdly, the peace between Russia and Turkey has occasioned an
extraordinary demand from the Turkey market, which, during the distress of
the country, and while a Russian fleet was cruizing in the Archipelago, had
been very poorly supplied; fourthly, the demand of the north of Europe for
the manufactures of Great Britain has been increasing from year to year, for
some time past; and, fifthly, the late partition, and consequential
pacification of Poland, by opening the market of that great country, have,
this year, added an extraordinary demand from thence to the increasing
demand of the north. These events are all, except the fourth, in their nature
transitory and accidental; and the exclusion from so important a branch of
the colony trade, if unfortunately it should continue much longer, may still
occasion some degree of distress. This distress, however, as it will come on
gradually, will be felt much less severely than if it had come on all at once;
and, in the mean time, the industry and capital of the country may find a
new employment and direction, so as to prevent this distress from ever
rising to any considerable height.
The monopoly of the colony trade, therefore, so far as it has turned
towards that trade a greater proportion of the capital of Great Britain than
what would otherwise have gone to it, has in all cases turned it, from a
foreign trade of consumption with a neighbouring, into one with a more
distant country; in many cases from a direct foreign trade of consumption
into a round-about one; and, in some cases, from all foreign trade of
consumption into a carrying trade. It has, in all cases, therefore, turned it
from a direction in which it would have maintained a greater quantity of
productive labour, into one in which it can maintain a much smaller
quantity. By suiting, besides, to one particular market only, so great a part
of the industry and commerce of Great Britain, it has rendered the whole
state of that industry and commerce more precarious and less secure, than if
their produce had been accommodated to a greater variety of markets.
We must carefully distinguish between the effects of the colony trade and
those of the monopoly of that trade. The former are always and necessarily
beneficial; the latter always and necessarily hurtful. But the former are so
beneficial, that the colony trade, though subject to a monopoly, and,
notwithstanding the hurtful effects of that monopoly, is still, upon the
whole, beneficial, and greatly beneficial, though a good deal less so than it
otherwise would be.
The effect of the colony trade, in its natural and free state, is to open a
great though distant market, for such parts of the produce of British industry
as may exceed the demand of the markets nearer home, of those of Europe,
and of the countries which lie round the Mediterranean sea. In its natural
and free state, the colony trade, without drawing from those markets any
part of the produce which had ever been sent to them, encourages Great
Britain to increase the surplus continually, by continually presenting new
equivalents to be exchanged for it. In its natural and free state, the colony
trade tends to increase the quantity of productive labour in Great Britain,
but without altering in any respect the direction of that which had been
employed there before. In the natural and free state of the colony trade, the
competition of all other nations would hinder the rate of profit from rising
above the common level, either in the new market, or in the new
employment. The new market, without drawing any thing from the old one,
would create, if one may say so, a new produce for its own supply; and that
new produce would constitute a new capital for carrying on the new
employment, which, in the same manner, would draw nothing from the old
one.
The monopoly of the colony trade, on the contrary, by excluding the
competition of other nations, and thereby raising the rate of profit, both in
the new market and in the new employment, draws produce from the old
market, and capital from the old employment. To augment our share of the
colony trade beyond what it otherwise would be, is the avowed purpose of
the monopoly. If our share of that trade were to be no greater with, than it
would have been without the monopoly, there could have been no reason
for establishing the monopoly. But whatever forces into a branch of trade,
of which the returns are slower and more distant than those of the greater
part of other trades, a greater proportion of the capital of any country, than
what of its own accord would go to that branch, necessarily renders the
whole quantity of productive labour annually maintained there, the whole
annual produce of the land and labour of that country, less than they
otherwise would be. It keeps down the revenue of the inhabitants of that
country below what it would naturally rise to, and thereby diminishes their
power of accumulation. It not only hinders, at all times, their capital from
maintaining so great a quantity of productive labour as it would otherwise
maintain, but it hinders it from increasing so fast as it would otherwise
increase, and, consequently, from maintaining a still greater quantity of
productive labour.
The natural good effects of the colony trade, however, more than
counterbalance to Great Britain the bad effects of the monopoly; so that,
monopoly and altogether, that trade, even as it is carried on at present, is not
only advantageous, but greatly advantageous. The new market and the new
employment which are opened by the colony trade, are of much greater
extent than that portion of the old market and of the old employment which
is lost by the monopoly. The new produce and the new capital which has
been created, if one may say so, by the colony trade, maintain in Great
Britain a greater quantity of productive labour than what can have been
thrown out of employment by the revulsion of capital from other trades of
which the returns are more frequent. If the colony trade, however, even as it
is carried on at present, is advantageous to Great Britain, it is not by means
of the monopoly, but in spite of the monopoly.
It is rather for the manufactured than for the rude produce of Europe, that
the colony trade opens a new market. Agriculture is the proper business of
all new colonies; a business which the cheapness of land renders more
advantageous than any other. They abound, therefore, in the rude produce
of land; and instead of importing it from other countries, they have
generally a large surplus to export. In new colonies, agriculture either draws
hands from all other employments, or keeps them from going to any other
employment. There are few hands to spare for the necessary, and none for
the ornamental manufactures. The greater part of the manufactures of both
kinds they find it cheaper to purchase of other countries than to make for
themselves. It is chiefly by encouraging the manufactures of Europe, that
the colony trade indirectly encourages its agriculture. The manufacturers of
Europe, to whom that trade gives employment, constitute a new market for
the produce of the land, and the most advantageous of all markets; the home
market for the corn and cattle, for the bread and butcher’s meat of Europe,
is thus greatly extended by means of the trade to America.
But that the monopoly of the trade of populous and thriving colonies is
not alone sufficient to establish, or even to maintain, manufactures in any
country, the examples of Spain and Portugal sufficiently demonstrate. Spain
and Portugal were manufacturing countries before they had any
considerable colonies. Since they had the richest and most fertile in the
world, they have both ceased to be so.
In Spain and Portugal, the bad effects of the monopoly, aggravated by
other causes, have, perhaps, nearly overbalanced the natural good effects of
the colony trade. These causes seem to be other monopolies of different
kinds: the degradation of the value of gold and silver below what it is in
most other countries; the exclusion from foreign markets by improper taxes
upon exportation, and the narrowing of the home market, by still more
improper taxes upon the transportation of goods from one part of the
country to another; but above all, that irregular and partial administration of
justice which often protects the rich and powerful debtor from the pursuit of
his injured creditor, and which makes the industrious part of the nation
afraid to prepare goods for the consumption of those haughty and great
men, to whom they dare not refuse to sell upon credit, and from whom they
are altogether uncertain of repayment.
In England, on the contrary, the natural good effects of the colony trade,
assisted by other causes, have in a great measure conquered the bad effects
of the monopoly. These causes seem to be, the general liberty of trade,
which, notwithstanding some restraints, is at least equal, perhaps superior,
to what it is in any other country; the liberty of exporting, duty free, almost
all sorts of goods which are the produce of domestic industry, to almost any
foreign country; and what, perhaps, is of still greater importance, the
unbounded liberty of transporting them from one part of our own country to
any other, without being obliged to give any account to any public office,
without being liable to question or examination of any kind; but, above all,
that equal and impartial administration of justice, which renders the rights
of the meanest British subject respectable to the greatest, and which, by
securing to every man the fruits of his own industry, gives the greatest and
most effectual encouragement to every sort of industry.
If the manufactures of Great Britain, however, have been advanced, as
they certainly have, by the colony trade, it has not been by means of the
monopoly of that trade, but in spite of the monopoly. The effect of the
monopoly has been, not to augment the quantity, but to alter the quality and
shape of a part of the manufactures of Great Britain, and to accommodate to
a market, from which the returns are slow and distant, what would
otherwise have been accommodated to one from which the returns are
frequent and near. Its effect has consequently been, to turn a part of the
capital of Great Britain from an employment in which it would have
maintained a greater quantity of manufacturing industry, to one in which it
maintains a much smaller, and thereby to diminish, instead of increasing,
the whole quantity of manufacturing industry maintained in Great Britain.
The monopoly of the colony trade, therefore, like all the other mean and
malignant expedients of the mercantile system, depresses the industry of all
other countries, but chiefly that of the colonies, without in the least
increasing, but on the contrary diminishing, that of the country in whose
favour it is established.
The monopoly hinders the capital of that country, whatever may, at any
particular time, be the extent of that capital, from maintaining so great a
quantity of productive labour as it would otherwise maintain, and from
affording so great a revenue to the industrious inhabitants as it would
otherwise afford. But as capital can be increased only by savings from
revenue, the monopoly, by hindering it from affording so great a revenue as
it would otherwise afford, necessarily hinders it from increasing so fast as it
would otherwise increase, and consequently from maintaining a still greater
quantity of productive labour, and affording a still greater revenue to the
industrious inhabitants of that country. One great original source of
revenue, therefore, the wages of labour, the monopoly must necessarily
have rendered, at all times, less abundant than it otherwise would have
been.
By raising the rate of mercantile profit, the monopoly discourages the
improvement of land. The profit of improvement depends upon the
difference between what the land actually produces, and what, by the
application of a certain capital, it can be made to produce. If this difference
affords a greater profit than what can be drawn from an equal capital in any
mercantile employment, the improvement of land will draw capital from all
mercantile employments. If the profit is less, mercantile employments will
draw capital from the improvement of land. Whatever, therefore, raises the
rate of mercantile profit, either lessens the superiority, or increases the
inferiority of the profit of improvement: and, in the one case, hinders capital
from going to improvement, and in the other draws capital from it; but by
discouraging improvement, the monopoly necessarily retards the natural
increase of another great original source of revenue, the rent of land. By
raising the rate of profit, too, the monopoly necessarily keeps up the market
rate of interest higher than it otherwise would be. But the price of land, in
proportion to the rent which it affords, the number of years purchase which
is commonly paid for it, necessarily falls as the rate of interest rises, and
rises as the rate of interest falls. The monopoly, therefore, hurts the interest
of the landlord two different ways, by retarding the natural increase, first, of
his rent, and, secondly, of the price which he would get for his land, in
proportion to the rent which it affords.
The monopoly, indeed, raises the rate of mercantile profit and thereby
augments somewhat the gain of our merchants. But as it obstructs the
natural increase of capital, it tends rather to diminish than to increase the
sum total of the revenue which the inhabitants of the country derive from
the profits of stock; a small profit upon a great capital generally affording a
greater revenue than a great profit upon a small one. The monopoly raises
the rate of profit, but it hinders the sum of profit from rising so high as it
otherwise would do.
All the original sources of revenue, the wages of labour, the rent of land,
and the profits of stock, the monopoly renders much less abundant than they
otherwise would be. To promote the little interest of one little order of men
in one country, it hurts the interest of all other orders of men in that country,
and of all the men in all other countries.
It is solely by raising the ordinary rate of profit, that the monopoly either
has proved, or could prove, advantageous to any one particular order of
men. But besides all the bad effects to the country in general, which have
already been mentioned as necessarily resulting from a higher rate of profit,
there is one more fatal, perhaps, than all these put together, but which, if we
may judge from experience, is inseparably connected with it. The high rate
of profit seems everywhere to destroy that parsimony which, in other
circumstances, is natural to the character of the merchant. When profits are
high, that sober virtue seems to be superfluous, and expensive luxury to suit
better the affluence of his situation. But the owners of the great mercantile
capitals are necessarily the leaders and conductors of the whole industry of
every nation; and their example has a much greater influence upon the
manners of the whole industrious part of it than that of any other order of
men. If his employer is attentive and parsimonious, the workman is very
likely to be so too; but if the master is dissolute and disorderly, the servant,
who shapes his work according to the pattern which his master prescribes to
him, will shape his life, too, according to the example which he sets him.
Accumulation is thus prevented in the hands of all those who are naturally
the most disposed to accumulate; and the funds destined for the
maintenance of productive labour, receive no augmentation from the
revenue of those who ought naturally to augment them the most. The capital
of the country, instead of increasing, gradually dwindles away, and the
quantity of productive labour maintained in it grows every day less and less.
Have the exorbitant profits of the merchants of Cadiz and Lisbon
augmented the capital of Spain and Portugal? Have they alleviated the
poverty, have they promoted the industry, of those two beggarly countries?
Such has been the tone of mercantile expense in those two trading cities,
that those exorbitant profits, far from augmenting the general capital of the
country, seem scarce to have been sufficient to keep up the capitals upon
which they were made. Foreign capitals are every day intruding themselves,
if I may say so, more and more into the trade of Cadiz and Lisbon. It is to
expel those foreign capitals from a trade which their own grows every day
more and more insufficient for carrying on, that the Spaniards and
Portuguese endeavour every day to straiten more and more the galling
bands of their absurd monopoly. Compare the mercantile manners of Cadiz
and Lisbon with those of Amsterdam, and you will be sensible how
differently the conduct and character of merchants are affected by the high
and by the low profits of stock. The merchants of London, indeed, have not
yet generally become such magnificent lords as those of Cadiz and Lisbon;
but neither are they in general such attetitive and parsimonious burghers as
those of Amsterdam. They are supposed, however, many of them, to be a
good deal richer than the greater part of the former, and not quire so rich as
many of the latter: but the rate of their profit is commonly much lower than
that of the former, and a good deal higher than that of the latter. Light come,
light go, says the proverb; and the ordinary tone of expense seems
everywhere to be regulated, not so much according to the real ability of
spending, as to the supposed facility of getting money to spend.
It is thus that the single advantage which the monopoly procures to a
single order of men, is in many different ways hurtful to the general interest
of the country.
To found a great empire for the sole purpose of raising up a people of
customers, may at first sight, appear a project fit only for a nation of
shopkeepers. It is, however, a project altogether unfit for a nation of
shopkeepers, but extremely fit for a nation whose government is influenced
by shopkeepers. Such statesmen, and such statesmen only, are capable of
fancying that they will find some advantage in employing the blood and
treasure of their fellow-citizens, to found and maintain such an empire. Say
to a shopkeeper, Buy me a good estate, and I shall always buy my clothes at
your shop, even though I should pay somewhat dearer than what I can have
them for at other shops; and you will not find him very forward to embrace
your proposal. But should any other person buy you such an estate, the
shopkeeper will be much obliged to your benefactor if he would enjoin you
to buy all your clothes at his shop. England purchased for some of her
subjects, who found themselves uneasy at home, a great estate in a distant
country. The price, indeed, was very small, and instead of thirty years
purchase, the ordinary price of land in the present times, it amounted to
little more than the expense of the different equipments which made the
first discovery, reconnoitered the coast, and took a fictitious possession of
the country. The land was good, and of great extent; and the cultivators
having plenty of good ground to work upon, and being for some time at
liberty to sell their produce where they pleased, became, in the course of
little more than thirty or forty years (between 1620 and 1660), so numerous
and thriving a people, that the shopkeepers and other traders of England
wished to secure to themselves the monopoly of their custom. Without
pretending, therefore, that they had paid any part, either of the original
purchase money, or of the subsequent expense of improvement, they
petitioned the parliament, that the cultivators of America might for the
future be confined to their shop; first, for buying all the goods which they
wanted from Europe; and, secondly, for selling all such parts of their own
produce as those traders might find it convenient to buy. For they did not
find it convenient to buy every part of it. Some parts of it imported into
England, might have interfered with some of the trades which they
themselves carried on at home. Those particular parts of it, therefore, they
were willing that the colonists should sell where they could; the farther off
the better; and upon that account proposed that their market should be
confined to the countries south of Cape Finisterre. A clause in the famous
act of navigation established this truly shopkeeper proposal into a law.
The maintenance of this monopoly has hitherto been the principal, or
more properly, perhaps, the sole end and purpose of the dominion which
Great Britain assumes over her colonies. In the exclusive trade, it is
supposed, consists the great advantage of provinces, which have never yet
afforded either revenue or military force for the support of the civil
government, or the defence of the mother country. The monopoly is the
principal badge of their dependency, and it is the sole fruit which has
hitherto been gathered from that dependency. Whatever expense Great
Britain has hitherto laid out in maintaining this dependency, has really been
laid out in order to support this monopoly. The expense of the ordinary
peace establishment of the colonies amounted, before the commencement
of the present disturbances to the pay of twenty regiments of foot; to the
expense of the artillery, stores, and extraordinary provisions, with which it
was necessary to supply them; and to the expense of a very considerable
naval force, which was constantly kept up, in order to guard from the
smuggling vessels of other nations, the immense coast of North America,
and that of our West Indian islands. The whole expense of this peace
establishment was a charge upon the revenue of Great Britain, and was, at
the same time, the smallest part of what the dominion of the colonies has
cost the mother country. If we would know the amount of the whole, we
must add to the annual expense of this peace establishment, the interest of
the sums which, in consequence of their considering her colonies as
provinces subject to her dominion, Great Britain has, upon different
occasions, laid out upon their defence. We must add to it, in particular, the
whole expense of the late war, and a great part of that of the war which
preceded it. The late war was altogether a colony quarrel; and the whole
expense of it, in whatever part of the world it might have been laid out,
whether in Germany or the East Indies, ought justly to be stated to the
account of the colonies. It amounted to more than ninety millions sterling,
including not only the new debt which was contracted, but the two shillings
in the pound additional land tax, and the sums which were every year
borrowed from the sinking fund. The Spanish war which began in 1739 was
principally a colony quarrel. Its principal object was to prevent the search of
the colony ships, which carried on a contraband trade with the Spanish
Main. This whole expense is, in reality, a bounty which has been given in
order to support a monopoly. The pretended purpose of it was to encourage
the manufactures, and to increase the commerce of Great Britain. But its
real effect has been to raise the rate of mercantile profit, and to enable our
merchants to turn into a branch of trade, of which the returns are more slow
and distant than those of the greater part of other trades, a greater
proportion of their capital than they otherwise would have done; two events
which, if a bounty could have prevented, it might perhaps have been very
well worth while to give such a bounty.
Under the present system of management, therefore, Great Britain
derives nothing but loss from the dominion which she assumes over her
colonies.
To propose that Great Britain should voluntarily give up all authority
over her colonies, and leave them to elect their own magistrates, to enact
their own laws, and to make peace and war, as they might think proper,
would be to propose such a measure as never was, and never will be,
adopted by any nation in the world. No nation ever voluntarily gave up the
dominion of any province, how troublesome soever it might be to govern it,
and how small soever the revenue which it afforded might be in proportion
to the expense which it occasioned. Such sacrifices, though they might
frequently be agreeable to the interest, are always mortifying to the pride of
every nation; and, what is perhaps of still greater consequence, they are
always contrary to the private interest of the governing part of it, who
would thereby be deprived of the disposal of many places of trust and
profit, of many opportunities of acquiring wealth and distinction, which the
possession of the most turbulent, and, to the great body of the people, the
most unprofitable province, seldom fails to afford. The most visionary
enthusiasts would scarce be capable of proposing such a measure, with any
serious hopes at least of its ever being adopted. If it was adopted, however,
Great Britain would not only be immediately freed from the whole annual
expense of the peace establishment of the colonies, but might settle with
them such a treaty of commerce as would effectually secure to her a free
trade, more advantageous to the great body of the people, though less so to
the merchants, than the monopoly which she at present enjoys. By thus
parting good friends, the natural affection of the colonies to the mother
country, which, perhaps, our late dissensions have well nigh extinguished,
would quickly revive. It might dispose them not only to respect, for whole
centuries together, that treaty of commerce which they had concluded with
us at parting, but to favour us in war as well as in trade, and instead of
turbulent and factious subjects, to become our most faithful, affectionate,
and generous allies; and the same sort of parental affection on the one side,
and filial respect on the other, might revive between Great Britain and her
colonies, which used to subsist between those of ancient Greece and the
mother city from which they descended.
In order to render any province advantageous to the empire to which it
belongs, it ought to afford, in time of peace, a revenue to the public,
sufficient not only for defraying the whole expense of its own peace
establishment, but for contributing its proportion to the support of the
general government of the empire. Every province necessarily contributes,
more or less, to increase the expense of that general government. If any
particular province, therefore, does not contribute its share towards
defraying this expense, an unequal burden must be thrown upon some other
part of the empire. The extraordinary revenue, too, which every province
affords to the public in time of war, ought, from parity of reason, to bear the
same proportion to the extraordinary revenue of the whole empire, which its
ordinary revenue does in time of peace. That neither the ordinary nor
extraordinary revenue which Great Britain derives from her colonies, bears
this proportion to the whole revenue of the British empire, will readily be
allowed. The monopoly, it has been supposed, indeed, by increasing the
private revenue of the people of Great Britain, and thereby enabling them to
pay greater taxes, compensates the deficiency of the public revenue of the
colonies. But this monopoly, I have endeavoured to show, though a very
grievous tax upon the colonies, and though it may increase the revenue of a
particular order of men in Great Britain, diminishes, instead of increasing,
that of the great body of the people, and consequently diminishes, instead of
increasing, the ability of the great body of the people to pay taxes. The men,
too, whose revenue the monopoly increases, constitute a particular order,
which it is both absolutely impossible to tax beyond the proportion of other
orders, and extremely impolitic even to attempt to tax beyond that
proportion, as I shall endeavour to show in the following book. No
particular resource, therefore, can be drawn from this particular order.
The colonies may be taxed either by their own assemblies, or by the
parliament of Great Britain.
That the colony assemblies can never be so managed as to levy upon
their constituents a public revenue, sufficient, not only to maintain at all
times their own civil and military establishment, but to pay their proper
proportion of the expense of the general government of the British empire,
seems not very probable. It was a long time before even the parliament of
England, though placed immediately under the eye of the sovereign, could
be brought under such a system of management, or could be rendered
sufficiently liberal in their grants for supporting the civil and military
establishments even of their own country. It was only by distributing among
the particular members of parliament a great part either of the offices, or of
the disposal of the offices arising from this civil and military establishment,
that such a system of management could be established, even with regard to
the parliament of England. But the distance of the colony assemblies from
the eye of the sovereign, their number, their dispersed situation, and their
various constitutions, would render it very difficult to manage them in the
same manner, even though the sovereign had the same means of doing it;
and those means are wanting. It would be absolutely impossible to
distribute among all the leading members of all the colony assemblies such
a share, either of the offices, or of the disposal of the offices, arising from
the general government of the British empire, as to dispose them to give up
their popularity at home, and to tax their constituents for the support of that
general government, of which almost the whole emoluments were to be
divided among people who were strangers to them. The unavoidable
ignorance of administration, besides, concerning the relative importance of
the different members of those different assemblies, the offences which
must frequently be given, the blunders which must constantly be
committed, in attempting to manage them in this manner, seems to render
such a system of management altogether impracticable with regard to them.
The colony assemblies, besides, cannot be supposed the proper judges of
what is necessary for the defence and support of the whole empire. The care
of that defence and support is not entrusted to them. It is not their business,
and they have no regular means of information concerning it. The assembly
of a province, like the vestry of a parish, may judge very properly
concerning the affairs of its own particular district, but can have no proper
means of judging concerning those of the whole empire. It cannot even
judge properly concerning the proportion which its own province bears to
the whole empire, or concerning the relative degree of its wealth and
importance, compared with the other provinces; because those other
provinces are not under the inspection and superintendency of the assembly
of a particular province. What is necessary for the defence and support of
the whole empire, and in what proportion each part ought to contribute, can
be judged of only by that assembly which inspects and super-intends the
affairs of the whole empire.
It has been proposed, accordingly, that the colonies should be taxed by
requisition, the parliament of Great Britain determining the sum which each
colony ought to pay, and the provincial assembly assessing and levying it in
the way that suited best the circumstances of the province. What concerned
the whole empire would in this way be determined by the assembly which
inspects and superintends the affairs of the whole empire; and the provincial
affairs of each colony might still be regulated by its own assembly. Though
the colonies should, in this case, have no representatives in the British
parliament, yet, if we may judge by experience, there is no probability that
the parliamentary requisition would be unreasonable. The parliament of
England has not, upon any occasion, shewn the smallest disposition to
overburden those parts of the empire which are not represented in
parliament. The islands of Guernsey and Jersey, without any means of
resisting the authority of parliament, are more lightly taxed than any part of
Great Britain. Parliament, in attempting to exercise its supposed right,
whether well or ill grounded, of taxing the colonies, has never hitherto
demanded of them anything which even approached to a just proportion to
what was paid by their fellow subjects at home. If the contribution of the
colonies, besides, was to rise or fall in proportion to the rise or fall of the
land-tax, parliament could not tax them without taxing, at the same time, its
own constituents, and the colonies might, in this case, be considered as
virtually represented in parliament.
Examples are not wanting of empires in which all the different provinces
are not taxed, if I may be allowed the expression, in one mass; but in which
the sovereign regulates the sum which each province ought to pay, and in
some provinces assesses and levies it as he thinks proper; while in others he
leaves it to be assessed and levied as the respective states of each province
shall determine. In some provinces of France, the king not only imposes
what taxes he thinks proper, but assesses and levies them in the way he
thinks proper. From others he demands a certain sum, but leaves it to the
states of each province to assess and levy that sum as they think proper.
According to the scheme of taxing by requisition, the parliament of Great
Britain would stand nearly in the same situation towards the colony
assemblies, as the king of France does towards the states of those provinces
which still enjoy the privilege of having states of their own, the provinces
of France which are supposed to be the best governed.
But though, according to this scheme, the colonies could have no just
reason to fear that their share of the public burdens should ever exceed the
proper proportion to that of their fellow-citizens at home, Great Britain
might have just reason to fear that it never would amount to that proper
proportion. The parliament of Great Britain has not, for some time past, had
the same established authority in the colonies, which the French king has in
those provinces of France which still enjoy the privilege of having states of
their own. The colony assemblies, if they were not very favourably
disposed (and unless more skilfully managed than they ever have been
hitherto, they are not very likely to be so), might still find many pretences
for evading or rejecting the most reasonable requisitions of parliament. A
French war breaks out, we shall suppose; ten millions must immediately be
raised, in order to defend the seat of the empire. This sum must be
borrowed upon the credit of some parliamentary fund mortgaged for paying
the interest. Part of this fund parliament proposes to raise by a tax to be
levied in Great Britain; and part of it by a requisition to all the different
colony assemblies of America and the West Indies. Would people readily
advance their money upon the credit of a fund which partly depended upon
the good humour of all those assemblies, far distant from the seat of the
war, and sometimes, perhaps, thinking themselves not much concerned in
the event of it? Upon such a fund, no more money would probably be
advanced than what the tax to be levied in Great Britain might be supposed
to answer for. The whole burden of the debt contracted on account of the
war would in this manner fall, as it always has done hitherto, upon Great
Britain; upon a part of the empire, and not upon the whole empire. Great
Britain is, perhaps, since the world began, the only state which, as it has
extended its empire, has only increased its expense, without once
augmenting its resources. Other states have generally disburdened
themselves, upon their subject and subordinate provinces, of the most
considerable part of the expense of defending the empire. Great Britain has
hitherto suffered her subject and subordinate provinces to disburden
themselves upon her of almost this whole expense. In order to put Great
Britain upon a footing of equality with her own colonies, which the law has
hitherto supposed to be subject and subordinate, it seems necessary, upon
the scheme of taxing them by parliamentary requisition, that parliament
should have some means of rendering its requisitions immediately effectual,
in case the colony assemblies should attempt to evade or reject them; and
what those means are, it is not very easy to conceive, and it has not yet been
explained.
Should the parliament of Great Britain, at the same time, be ever fully
established in the right of taxing the colonies, even independent of the
consent of their own assemblies, the importance of those assemblies would,
from that moment, be at an end, and with it, that of all the leading men of
British America. Men desire to have some share in the management of
public affairs, chiefly on account of the importance which it gives them.
Upon the power which the greater part of the leading men, the natural
aristocracy of every country, have of preserving or defending their
respective importance, depends the stability and duration of every system of
free government. In the attacks which those leading men are continually
making upon the importance of one another, and in the defence of their
own, consists the whole play of domestic faction and ambition. The leading
men of America, like those of all other countries, desire to preserve their
own importance. They feel, or imagine, that if their assemblies, which they
are fond of calling parliaments, and of considering as equal in authority to
the parliament of Great Britain, should be so far degraded as to become the
humble ministers and executive officers of that parliament, the greater part
of their own importance would be at an end. They have rejected, therefore,
the proposal of being taxed by parliamentary requisition, and, like other
ambitious and high-spirited men, have rather chosen to draw the sword in
defence of their own importance.
Towards the declension of the Roman republic, the allies of Rome, who
had borne the principal burden of defending the state and extending the
empire, demanded to be admitted to all the privileges of Roman citizens.
Upon being refused, the social war broke out. During the course of that war,
Rome granted those privileges to the greater part of them, one by one, and
in proportion as they detached themselves from the general confederacy.
The parliament of Great Britain insists upon taxing the colonies; and they
refuse to be taxed by a parliament in which they are not represented. If to
each colony which should detach itself from the general confederacy, Great
Britain should allow such a number of representatives as suited the
proportion of what it contributed to the public revenue of the empire, in
consequence of its being subjected to the same taxes, and in compensation
admitted to the same freedom of trade with its fellow-subjects at home; the
number of its representatives to be augmented as the proportion of its
contribution might afterwards augment; a new method of acquiring
importance, a new and more dazzling object of ambition, would be
presented to the leading men of each colony. Instead of piddling for the
little prizes which are to be found in what may be called the paltry raffle of
colony faction, they might then hope, from the presumption which men
naturally have in their own ability and good fortune, to draw some of the
great prizes which sometimes come from the wheel of the great state lottery
of British politics. Unless this or some other method is fallen upon, and
there seems to be none more obvious than this, of preserving the importance
and of gratifying the ambition of the leading men of America, it is not very
probable that they will ever voluntarily submit to us; and we ought to
consider, that the blood which must be shed in forcing them to do so, is,
every drop of it, the blood either of those who are, or of those whom we
wish to have for our fellow citizens. They are very weak who flatter
themselves that, in the state to which things have come, our colonies will be
easily conquered by force alone. The persons who now govern the
resolutions of what they call their continental congress, feel in themselves
at this moment a degree of importance which, perhaps, the greatest subjects
in Europe scarce feel. From shopkeepers, trades men, and attorneys, they
are become statesmen and legislators, and are employed in contriving a new
form of government for an extensive empire, which, they flatter themselves,
will become, and which, indeed, seems very likely to become, one of the
greatest and most formidable that ever was in the world. Five hundred
different people, perhaps, who, in different ways, act immediately under the
continental congress, and five hundred thousand, perhaps, who act under
those five hundred, all feel, in the same manner, a proportionable rise in
their own importance. Almost every individual of the governing party in
America fills, at present, in his own fancy, a station superior, not only to
what he had ever filled before, but to what he had ever expected to fill; and
unless some new object of ambition is presented either to him or to his
leaders, if he has the ordinary spirit of a man, he will die in defence of that
station.
It is a remark of the President Heynaut, that we now read with pleasure
the account of many little transactions of the Ligue, which, when they
happened, were not, perhaps, considered as very important pieces of news.
But everyman then, says he, fancied himself of some importance; and the
innumerable memoirs which have come down to us from those times, were
the greater part of them written by people who took pleasure in recording
and magnifying events, in which they flattered themselves they had been
considerable actors. How obstinately the city of Paris, upon that occasion,
defended itself, what a dreadful famine it supported, rather than submit to
the best, and afterwards the most beloved of all the French kings, is well
known. The greater part of the citizens, or those who governed the greater
part of them, fought in defence of their own importance, which, they
foresaw, was to be at an end whenever the ancient government should be re-
established. Our colonies, unless they can be induced to consent to a union,
are very likely to defend themselves, against the best of all mother
countries, as obstinately as the city of Paris did against one of the best of
kings.
The idea of representation was unknown in ancient times. When the
people of one state were admitted to the right of citizenship in another, they
had no other means of exercising that right, but by coming in a body to vote
and deliberate with the people of that other state. The admission of the
greater part of the inhabitants of Italy to the privileges of Roman citizens,
completely ruined the Roman republic. It was no longer possible to
distinguish between who was, and who was not, a Roman citizen. No tribe
could know its own members. A rabble of any kind could be introduced
into the assemblies of the people, could drive out the real citizens, and
decide upon the affairs of the republic, as if they themselves had been such.
But though America were to send fifty or sixty new representatives to
parliament, the door-keeper of the house of commons could not find any
great difficulty in distinguishing between who was and who was not a
member. Though the Roman constitution, therefore, was necessarily ruined
by the union of Rome with the allied states of Italy, there is not the least
probability that the British constitution would be hurt by the union of Great
Britain with her colonies. That constitution, on the contrary, would be
completed by it, and seems to be imperfect without it. The assembly which
deliberates and decides concerning the affairs of every part of the empire, in
order to be properly informed, ought certainly to have representatives from
every part of it. That this union, however, could be easily effectuated, or
that difficulties, and great difficulties, might not occur in the execution, I do
not pretend. I have yet heard of none, however, which appear
insurmountable. The principal, perhaps, arise, not from the nature of things,
but from the prejudices and opinions of the people, both on this and on the
other side of the Atlantic.
We on this side the water are afraid lest the multitude of American
representatives should overturn the balance of the constitution, and increase
too much either the influence of the crown on the one hand, or the force of
the democracy on the other. But if the number of American representatives
were to be in proportion to the produce of American taxation, the number of
people to be managed would increase exactly in proportion to the means of
managing them, and the means of managing to the number of people to be
managed. The monarchical and democratical parts of the constitution
would, after the union, stand exactly in the same degree of relative force
with regard to one another as they had done before.
The people on the other side of the water are afraid lest their distance
from the seat of government might expose them to many oppressions; but
their representatives in parliament, of which the number ought from the first
to be considerable, would easily be able to protect them from all
oppression. The distance could not much weaken the dependency of the
representative upon the constituent, and the former would still feel that he
owed his seat in parliament, and all the consequence which he derived from
it, to the good-will of the latter. It would be the interest of the former,
therefore, to cultivate that good-will, by complaining, with all the authority
of a member of the legislature, of every outrage which any civil or military
officer might be guilty of in those remote parts of the empire. The distance
of America from the seat of government, besides, the natives of that country
might flatter themselves, with some appearance of reason too, would not be
of very long continuance. Such has hitherto been the rapid progress of that
country in wealth, population, and improvement, that in the course of little
more than a century, perhaps, the produce of the American might exceed
that of the British taxation. The seat of the empire would then naturally
remove itself to that part of the empire which contributed most to the
general defence and support of the whole.
The discovery of America, and that of a passage to the East Indies by the
Cape of Good Hope, are the two greatest and most important events
recorded in the history of mankind. Their consequences have already been
great; but, in the short period of between two and three centuries which has
elapsed since these discoveries were made, it is impossible that the whole
extent of their consequences can have been seen. What benefits or what
misfortunes to mankind may hereafter result from those great events, no
human wisdom can foresee. By uniting in some measure the most distant
parts of the world, by enabling them to relieve one another’s wants, to
increase one another’s enjoyments, and to encourage one another’s industry,
their general tendency would seem to be beneficial. To the natives,
however, both of the East and West Indies, all the commercial benefits
which can have resulted from those events have been sunk and lost in the
dreadful misfortunes which they have occasioned. These misfortunes,
however, seem to have arisen rather from accident than from any thing in
the nature of those events themselves. At the particular time when these
discoveries were made, the superiority of force happened to be so great on
the side of the Europeans, that they were enabled to commit with impunity
every sort of injustice in those remote countries. Hereafter, perhaps, the
natives of those countries may grow stronger, or those of Europe may grow
weaker; and the inhabitants of all the different quarters of the world may
arrive at that equality of courage and force which, by inspiring mutual fear,
can alone overawe the injustice of independent nations into some sort of
respect for the rights of one another. But nothing seems more likely to
establish this equality of force, than that mutual communication of
knowledge, and of all sorts of improvements, which an extensive commerce
from all countries to all countries naturally, or rather necessarily, carries
along with it.
In the mean time, one of the principal effects of those discoveries has
been, to raise the mercantile system to a degree of splendour and glory
which it could never otherwise have attained to. It is the object of that
system to enrich a great nation, rather by trade and manufactures than by
the improvement and cultivation of land, rather by the industry of the towns
than by that of the country. But in consequence of those discoveries, the
commercial towns of Europe, instead of being the manufacturers and
carriers for but a very small part of the world (that part of Europe which is
washed by the Atlantic ocean, and the countries which lie round the Baltic
and Mediterranean seas), have now become the manufacturers for the
numerous and thriving cultivators of America, and the carriers, and in some
respects the manufacturers too, for almost all the different nations of Asia,
Africa, and America. Two new worlds have been opened to their industry,
each of them much greater and more extensive than the old one, and the
market of one of them growing still greater and greater every day.
The countries which possess the colonies of America, and which trade
directly to the East Indies, enjoy indeed the whole show and splendour of
this great commerce. Other countries, however, notwithstanding all the
invidious restraints by which it is meant to exclude them, frequently enjoy a
greater share of the real benefit of it. The colonies of Spain and Portugal,
for example, give more real encouragement to the industry of other
countries than to that of Spain and Portugal. In the single article of linen
alone, the consumption of those colonies amounts, it is said (but I do not
pretend to warrant the quantity ), to more than three millions sterling a-year.
But this great consumption is almost entirely supplied by France, Flanders,
Holland, and Germany. Spain and Portugal furnish but a small part of it.
The capital which supplies the colonies with this great quantity of linen, is
annually distributed among, and furnishes a revenue to, the inhabitants of
those other countries. The profits of it only are spent in Spain and Portugal,
where they help to support the sumptuous profusion of the merchants of
Cadiz and Lisbon.
Even the regulations by which each nation endeavours to secure to itself
the exclusive trade of its own colonies, are frequently more hurtful to the
countries in favour of which they are established, than to those against
which they are established. The unjust oppression of the industry of other
countries falls back, if I may say so, upon the heads of the oppressors, and
crushes their industry more than it does that of those other countries. By
those regulations, for example, the merchant of Hamburg must send the
linen which he destines for the American market to London, and he must
bring back from thence the tobacco which he destines for the German
market; because he can neither send the one directly to America, nor bring
the other directly from thence. By this restraint he is probably obliged to
sell the one somewhat cheaper, and to buy the other somewhat dearer, than
he otherwise might have done; and his profits are probably somewhat
abridged by means of it. In this trade, however, between Hamburg and
London, he certainly receives the returns of his capital much more quickly
than he could possibly have done in the direct trade to America, even
though we should suppose, what is by no means the case, that the payments
of America were as punctual as those of London. In the trade, therefore, to
which those regulations confine the merchant of Hamburg, his capital can
keep in constant employment a much greater quantity of German industry
than he possibly could have done in the trade from which he is excluded.
Though the one employment, therefore, may to him perhaps be less
profitable than the other, it cannot be less advantageous to his country. It is
quite otherwise with the employment into which the monopoly naturally
attracts, if I may say so, the capital of the London merchant. That
employment may, perhaps, be more profitable to him than the greater part
of other employments; but on account of the slowness of the returns, it
cannot be more advantageous to his country.
After all the unjust attempts, therefore, of every country in Europe to
engross to itself the whole advantage of the trade of its own colonies, no
country has yet been able to engross to itself any thing but the expense of
supporting in time of peace, and of defending in time of war, the oppressive
authority which it assumes over them. The inconveniencies resulting from
the possession of its colonies, every country has engrossed to itself
completely. The advantages resulting from their trade, it has been obliged to
share with many other countries.
At first sight, no doubt, the monopoly of the great commerce of America
naturally seems to be an acquisition of the highest value. To the
undiscerning eye of giddy ambition it naturally presents itself, amidst the
confused scramble of politics and war, as a very dazzling object to fight for.
The dazzling splendour of the object, however, the immense greatness of
the commerce, is the very quality which renders the monopoly of it hurtful,
or which makes one employment, in its own nature necessarily less
advantageous to the country than the greater part of other employments,
absorb a much greater proportion of the capital of the country than what
would otherwise have gone to it.
The mercantile stock of every country, it has been shown in the second
book, naturally seeks, if one may say so, the employment most
advantageous to that country. If it is employed in the carrying trade, the
country to which it belongs becomes the emporium of the goods of all the
countries whose trade that stock carries on. But the owner of that stock
necessarily wishes to dispose of as great a part of those goods as he can at
home. He thereby saves himself the trouble, risk, and expense of
exportation; and he will upon that account be glad to sell them at home, not
only for a much smaller price, but with somewhat a smaller profit, than he
might expect to make by sending them abroad. He naturally, therefore,
endeavours as much as he can to turn his carrying trade into a foreign trade
of consumption, If his stock, again, is employed in a foreign trade of
consumption, he will, for the same reason, be glad to dispose of, at home, as
great a part as he can of the home goods which he collects in order to export
to some foreign market, and he will thus endeavour, as much as he can, to
turn his foreign trade of consumption into a home trade. The mercantile
stock of every country naturally courts in this manner the near, and shuns
the distant employment: naturally courts the employment in which the
returns are frequent, and shuns that in which they are distant and slow;
naturally courts the employment in which it can maintain the greatest
quantity of productive labour in the country to which it belongs, or in which
its owner resides, and shuns that in which it can maintain there the smallest
quantity. It naturally courts the employment which in ordinary cases is most
advantageous, and shuns that which in ordinary cases is least advantageous
to that country.
But if, in any one of those distant employments, which in ordinary cases
are less advantageous to the country, the profit should happen to rise
somewhat higher than what is sufficient to balance the natural preference
which is given to nearer employments, this superiority of profit will draw
stock from those nearer employments, till the profits of all return to their
proper level. This superiority of profit, however, is a proof that, in the actual
circumstances of the society, those distant employments are somewhat
understocked in proportion to other employments, and that the stock of the
society is not distributed in the properest manner among all the different
employments carried on in it. It is a proof that something is either bought
cheaper or sold dearer than it ought to be, and that some particular class of
citizens is more or less oppressed, either by paying more, or by getting less
than what is suitable to that equality which ought to take place, and which
naturally does take place, among all the different classes of them. Though
the same capital never will maintain the same quantity of productive labour
in a distant as in a near employment, yet a distant employment maybe as
necessary for the welfare of the society as a near one; the goods which the
distant employment deals in being necessary, perhaps, for carrying on many
of the nearer employments. But if the profits of those who deal in such
goods are above their proper level, those goods will be sold dearer than they
ought to be, or somewhat above their natural price, and all those engaged in
the nearer employments will be more or less oppressed by this high price.
Their interest, therefore, in this case, requires, that some stock should be
withdrawn from those nearer employments, and turned towards that distant
one, in order to reduce its profits to their proper level, and the price of the
goods which it deals in to their natural price. In this extraordinary case, the
public interest requires that some stock should be withdrawn from those
employments which, in ordinary cases, are more advantageous, and turned
towards one which, in ordinary cases, is less advantageous to the public;
and, in this extraordinary case, the natural interests and inclinations of men
coincide as exactly with the public interests as in all other ordinary cases,
and lead them to withdraw stock from the near, and to turn it towards the
distant employments.
It is thus that the private interests and passions of individuals naturally
dispose them to turn their stock towards the employments which in ordinary
cases, are most advantageous to the society. But if from this natural
preference they should turn too much of it towards those employments, the
fall of profit in them, and the rise of it in all others, immediately dispose
them to alter this faulty distribution. Without any intervention of law,
therefore, the private interests and passions of men naturally lead them to
divide and distribute the stock of every society among all the different
employments carried on in it; as nearly as possible in the proportion which
is most agreeable to the interest of the whole society.
All the different regulations of the mercantile system necessarily derange
more or less this natural and most advantageous distribution of stock. But
those which concern the trade to America and the East Indies derange it,
perhaps, more than any other; because the trade to those two great
continents absorbs a greater quantity of stock than any two other branches
of trade. The regulations, however, by which this derangement is effected in
those two different branches of trade, are not altogether the same.
Monopoly is the great engine of both; but it is a different sort of monopoly.
Monopoly of one kind or another, indeed, seems to be the sole engine of the
mercantile system.
In the trade to America, every nation endeavours to engross as much as
possible the whole market of its own colonies, by fairly excluding all other
nations from any direct trade to them. During the greater part of the
sixteenth century, the Portuguese endeavoured to manage the trade to the
East Indies in the same manner, by claiming the sole right of sailing in the
Indian seas, on account of the merit of having first found out the road to
them. The Dutch still continue to exclude all other European nations from
any direct trade to their spice islands. Monopolies of this kind are evidently
established against all other European nations, who are thereby not only
excluded from a trade to which it might be convenient for them to turn
some part of their stock, but are obliged to buy the goods which that trade
deals in, somewhat dearer than if they could import them themselves
directly from the countries which produced them.
But since the fall of the power of Portugal, no European nation has
claimed the exclusive right of sailing in the Indian seas, of which the
principal ports are now open to the ships of all European nations. Except in
Portugal, however, and within these few years in France, the trade to the
East Indies has, in every European country, been subjected to an exclusive
company. Monopolies of this kind are properly established against the very
nation which erects them. The greater part of that nation are thereby not
only excluded from a trade to which it might be convenient for them to turn
some part of their stock, but are obliged to buy the goods which that trade
deals in somewhat dearer than if it was open and free to all their
countrymen. Since the establishment of the English East India company, for
example, the other inhabitants of England, over and above being excluded
from the trade, must have paid, in the price of the East India goods which
they have consumed, not only for all the extraordinary profits which the
company may have made upon those goods in consequence of their
monopoly, but for all the extraordinary waste which the fraud and abuse
inseparable from the management of the affairs of so great a company must
necessarily have occasioned. The absurdity of this second kind of
monopoly, therefore, is much more manifest than that of the first.
Both these kinds of monopolies derange more or less the natural
distribution of the stock of the society; but they do not always derange it in
the same way.
Monopolies of the first kind always attract to the particular trade in
which they are established a greater proportion of the stock of the society
than what would go to that trade of its own accord.
Monopolies of the second kind may sometimes attract stock towards the
particular trade in which they are established, and sometimes repel it from
that trade, according to different circumstances. In poor countries, they
naturally attract towards that trade more stock than would otherwise go to
it. In rich countries, they naturally repel from it a good deal of stock which
would otherwise go to it.
Such poor countries as Sweden and Denmark, for example, would
probably have never sent a single ship to the East Indies, had not the trade
been subjected to an exclusive company. The establishment of such a
company necessarily encourages adventurers. Their monopoly secures them
against all competitors in the home market, and they have the same chance
for foreign markets with the traders of other nations. Their monopoly shows
them the certainty of a great profit upon a considerable quantity of goods,
and the chance of a considerable profit upon a great quantity. Without such
extraordinary encouragement, the poor traders of such poor countries would
probably never have thought of hazarding their small capitals in so very
distant and uncertain an adventure as the trade to the East Indies must
naturally have appeared to them.
Such a rich country as Holland, on the contrary, would probably, in the
case of a free trade, send many more ships to the East Indies than it actually
does. The limited stock of the Dutch East India company probably repels
from that trade many great mercantile capitals which would otherwise go to
it. The mercantile capital of Holland is so great, that it is, as it were,
continually overflowing, sometimes into the public funds of foreign
countries, sometimes into loans to private traders and adventurers of foreign
countries, sometimes into the most round-about foreign trades of
consumption, and sometimes into the carrying trade. All near employments
being completely filled up, all the capital which can be placed in them with
any tolerable profit being already placed in them, the capital of Holland
necessarily flows towards the most distant employments. The trade to the
East Indies, if it were altogether free, would probably absorb the greater
part of this redundant capital. The East Indies offer a market both for the
manufactures of Europe, and for the gold and silver, as well as for the
several other productions of America, greater and more extensive than both
Europe and America put together.
Every derangement of the natural distribution of stock is necessarily
hurtful to the society in which it takes place; whether it be by repelling from
a particular trade the stock which would otherwise go to it, or by attracting
towards a particular trade that which would not otherwise come to it. If,
without any exclusive company, the trade of Holland to the East Indies
would be greater than it actually is, that country must suffer a considerable
loss, by part of its capital being excluded from the employment most
convenient for that port. And, in the same manner, if, without an exclusive
company, the trade of Sweden and Denmark to the East Indies would be
less than it actually is, or, what perhaps is more probable, would not exist at
all, those two countries must likewise suffer a considerable loss, by part of
their capital being drawn into an employment which must be more or less
unsuitable to their present circumstances. Better for them, perhaps, in the
present circumstances, to buy East India goods of other nations, even
though they should pay somewhat dearer, than to turn so great a part of their
small capital to so very distant a trade, in which the returns are so very
slow, in which that capital can maintain so small a quantity of productive
labour at home, where productive labour is so much wanted, where so little
is done, and where so much is to do.
Though without an exclusive company, therefore, a particular country
should not be able to carry on any direct trade to the East Indies, it will not
from thence follow, that such a company ought to be established there, but
only that such a country ought not, in these circumstances, to trade directly
to the East Indies. That such companies are not in general necessary for
carrying on the East India trade, is sufficiently demonstrated by the
experience of the Portuguese, who enjoyed almost the whole of it for more
than a century together, without any exclusive company.
No private merchant, it has been said, could well have capital sufficient
to maintain factors and agents in the different ports of the East Indies, in
order to provide goods for the ships which he might occasionally send
thither; and yet, unless he was able to do this, the difficulty of finding a
cargo might frequently make his ships lose the season for returning; and the
expense of so long a delay would not only eat up the whole profit of the
adventure, but frequently occasion a very considerable loss. This argument,
however, if it proved any thing at all, would prove that no one great branch
of trade could be carried on without an exclusive company, which is
contrary to the experience of all nations. There is no great branch of trade,
in which the capital of any one private merchant is sufficient for carrying on
all the subordinate branches which must be carried on, in order to carry on
the principal one. But when a nation is ripe for any great branch of trade,
some merchants naturally turn their capitals towards the principal, and some
towards the subordinate branches of it; and though all the different branches
of it are in this manner carried on, yet it very seldom happens that they are
all carried on by the capital of one private merchant. If a nation, therefore,
is ripe for the East India trade, a certain portion of its capital will naturally
divide itself among all the different branches of that trade. Some of its
merchants will find it for their interest to reside in the East Indies, and to
employ their capitals there in providing goods for the ships which are to be
sent out by other merchants who reside in Europe. The settlements which
different European nations have obtained in the East Indies, if they were
taken from the exclusive companies to which they at present belong, and
put under the immediate protection of the sovereign, would render this
residence both safe and easy, at least to the merchants of the particular
nations to whom those settlements belong. If, at any particular time, that
part of the capital of any country which of its own accord tended and
inclined, if I may say so, towards the East India trade, was not sufficient for
carrying on all those different branches of it, it would be a proof that, at that
particular time, that country was not ripe for that trade, and that it would do
better to buy for some time, even at a higher price, from other European
nations, the East India goods it had occasion for, than to import them itself
directly from the East Indies. What it might lose by the high price of those
goods, could seldom be equal to the loss which it would sustain by the
distraction of a large portion of its capital from other employments more
necessary, or more useful, or more suitable to its circumstances and
situation, than a direct trade to the East Indies.
Though the Europeans possess many considerable settlements both upon
the coast of Africa and in the East Indies, they have not yet established, in
either of those countries, such numerous and thriving colonies as those in
the islands and continent of America. Africa, however, as well as several of
the countries comprehended under the general name of the East Indies, is
inhabited by barbarous nations. But those nations were by no means so
weak and defenceless as the miserable and helpless Americans; and in
proportion to the natural fertility of the countries which they inhabited, they
were, besides, much more populous. The most barbarous nations either of
Africa or of the East Indies, were shepherds; even the Hottentots were so.
But the natives of every part of America, except Mexico and Peru, were
only hunters and the difference is very great between the number of
shepherds and that of hunters whom the same extent of equally fertile
territory can maintain. In Africa and the East Indies, therefore, it was more
difficult to displace the natives, and to extend the European plantations over
the greater part of the lands of the original inhabitants. The genius of
exclusive companies, besides, is unfavourable, it has already been observed,
to the growth of new colonies, and has probably been the principal cause of
the little progress which they have made in the East Indies. The Portuguese
carried on the trade both to Africa and the East Indies, without any
exclusive companies; and their settlements at Congo, Angola, and
Benguela, on the coast of Africa, and at Goa in the East Indies though much
depressed by superstition and every sort of bad government, yet bear some
resemblance to the colonies of America, and are partly inhabited by
Portuguese who have been established there for several generations. The
Dutch settlements at the Cape of Good Hope and at Batavia, are at present
the most considerable colonies which the Europeans have established,
either in Africa or in the East Indies; and both those settlements an
peculiarly fortunate in their situation. The Cape of Good Hope was
inhabited by a race of people almost as barbarous, and quite as incapable of
defending themselves, as the natives of America. It is, besides, the half-way
house, if one may say so, between Europe and the East Indies, at which
almost every European ship makes some stay, both in going and returning.
The supplying of those ships with every sort of fresh provisions, with fruit,
and sometimes with wine, affords alone a very extensive market for the
surplus produce of the colonies. What the Cape of Good Hope is between
Europe and every part of the East Indies, Batavia is between the principal
countries of the East Indies. It lies upon the most frequented road from
Indostan to China and Japan, and is nearly about mid-way upon that road.
Almost all the ships too, that sail between Europe and China, touch at
Batavia; and it is, over and above all this, the centre and principal mart of
what is called the country trade of the East Indies; not only of that part of it
which is carried on by Europeans, but of that which is carried on by the
native Indians; and vessels navigated by the inhabitants of China and Japan,
of Tonquin, Malacca, Cochin-China, and the island of Celebes, are
frequently to be seen in its port. Such advantageous situations have enabled
those two colonies to surmount all the obstacles which the oppressive
genius of an exclusive company may have occasionally opposed to their
growth. They have enabled Batavia to surmount the additional disadvantage
of perhaps the most unwholesome climate in the world.
The English and Dutch companies, though they have established no
considerable colonies, except the two above mentioned, have both made
considerable conquests in the East Indies. But in the manner in which they
both govern their new subjects, the natural genius of an exclusive company
has shewn itself most distinctly. In the spice islands, the Dutch are said to
burn all the spiceries which a fertile season produces, beyond what they
expect to dispose of in Europe with such a profit as they think sufficient. In
the islands where they have no settlements, they give a premium to those
who collect the young blossoms and green leaves of the clove and nutmeg
trees, which naturally grow there, but which this savage policy has now, it
is said, almost completely extirpated. Even in the islands where they have
settlements, they have very much reduced, it is said, the number of those
trees. If the produce even of their own islands was much greater than what
suited their market, the natives, they suspect, might find means to convey
some part of it to other nations; and the best way, they imagine, to secure
their own monopoly, is to take care that no more shall grow than what they
themselves carry to market. By different arts of oppression, they have
reduced the population of several of the Moluccas nearly to the number
which is sufficient to supply with fresh provisions, and other necessaries of
life, their own insignificant garrisons, and such of their ships as
occasionally come there for a cargo of spices. Under the government even
of the Portuguese, however, those islands are said to have been tolerably
well inhabited. The English company have not yet had time to establish in
Bengal so perfectly destructive a system. The plan of their government,
however, has had exactly the same tendency. It has not been uncommon, I
am well assured, for the chief, that is, the first clerk or a factory, to order a
peasant to plough up a rich field of poppies, and sow it with rice, or some
other grain. The pretence was, to prevent a scarcity of provisions; but the
real reason, to give the chief an opportunity of selling at a better price a
large quantity of opium which he happened then to have upon hand. Upon
other occasions, the order has been reversed; and a rich field of rice or other
grain has been ploughed up, in order to make room for a plantation of
poppies, when the chief foresaw that extraordinary profit was likely to be
made by opium. The servants of the company have, upon several occasions,
attempted to establish in their own favour the monopoly of some of the
most important branches, not only of the foreign, but of the inland trade of
the country. Had they been allowed to go on, it is impossible that they
should not, at some time or another, have attempted to restrain the
production of the particular articles of which they had thus usurped the
monopoly, not only to the quantity which they themselves could purchase,
but to that which they could expect to sell with such a profit as they might
think sufficient. In the course of a century or two, the policy of the English
company would, in this manner, have probably proved as completely
destructive as that of the Dutch.
Nothing, however, can be more directly contrary to the real interest of
those companies, considered as the sovereigns of the countries which they
have conquered, than this destructive plan. In almost all countries, the
revenue of the sovereign is drawn from that of the people. The greater the
revenue of the people, therefore, the greater the annual produce of their land
and labour, the more they can afford to the sovereign. It is his interest,
therefore, to increase as much as possible that annual produce. But if this is
the interest of every sovereign, it is peculiarly so of one whose revenue, like
that of the sovereign of Bengal, arises chiefly from a land-rent. That rent
must necessarily be in proportion to the quantity and value of the produce;
and both the one and the other must depend upon the extent of the market.
The quantity will always be suited, with more or less exactness, to the
consumption of those who can afford to pay for it; and the price which they
will pay will always be in proportion to the eagerness of their competition.
It is the interest of such a sovereign, therefore, to open the most extensive
market for the produce of his country, to allow the most perfect freedom of
commerce, in order to increase as much as possible the number and
competition of buyers; and upon this account to abolish, not only all
monopolies, but all restraints upon the transportation of the home produce
from one part of the country to mother, upon its exportation to foreign
countries, or upon the importation of goods of any kind for which it can be
exchanged. He is in this manner most likely to increase both the quantity
and value of that produce, and consequently of his own share of it, or of his
own revenue.
But a company of merchants, are, it seems, incapable of considering
themselves as sovereigns, even after they have become such. Trade, or
buying in order to sell again, they still consider as their principal business,
and by a strange absurdity, regard the character of the sovereign as but an
appendix to that of the merchant; as something which ought to be made
subservient to it, or by means of which they may be enabled to buy cheaper
in India, and thereby to sell with a better profit in Europe. They endeavour,
for this purpose, to keep out as much as possible all competitors from the
market of the countries which are subject to their government, and
consequently to reduce, at least, some part of the surplus produce of those
countries to what is barely sufficient for supplying their own demand, or to
what they can expect to sell in Europe, with such a profit as they may think
reasonable. Their mercantile habits draw them in this manner, almost
necessarily, though perhaps insensibly, to prefer, upon all ordinary
occasions, the little and transitory profit of the monopolist to the great and
permanent revenue of the sovereign; and would gradually lead them to treat
the countries subject to their government nearly as the Dutch treat the
Moluccas. It is the interest of the East India company, considered as
sovereigns, that the European goods which are carried to their Indian
dominions should be sold there as cheap as possible; and that the Indian
goods which are brought from thence should bring there as good a price, or
should be sold there as dear as possible. But the reverse of this is their
interest as merchants. As sovereigns, their interest is exactly the same with
that of the country which they govern. As merchants, their interest is
directly opposite to that interest.
But if the genius of such a government, even as to what concerns its
direction in Europe, is in this manner essentially, and perhaps incurably
faulty, that of its administration in India is still more so. That administration
is necessarily composed of a council of merchants, a profession no doubt
extremely respectable, but which in no country in the world carries along
with it that sort of authority which naturally overawes the people, and
without force commands their willing obedience. Such a council can
command obedience only by the military force with which they are
accompanied; and their government is, therefore, necessarily military and
despotical. Their proper business, however, is that of merchants. It is to sell,
upon their master’s account, the European goods consigned to them, and to
buy, in return, Indian goods for the European market. It is to sell the one as
dear, and to buy the other as cheap as possible, and consequently to
exclude, as much as possible, all rivals from the particular market where
they keep their shop. The genius of the administration, therefore, so far as
concerns the trade of the company, is the same as that of the direction. It
tends to make government subservient to the interest of monopoly, and
consequently to stunt the natural growth of some parts, at least, of the
surplus produce of the country, to what is barely sufficient for answering
the demand of the company.
All the members of the administration besides, trade more or less upon
their own account; and it is in vain to prohibit them from doing so. Nothing
can be more completely foolish than to expect that the clerk of a great
counting-house, at ten thousand miles distance, and consequently almost
quite out of sight, should, upon a simple order from their master, give up at
once doing any sort of business upon their own account abandon for ever all
hopes of making a fortune, of which they have the means in their hands;
and content themselves with the moderate salaries which those masters
allow them, and which, moderate as they are, can seldom be augmented,
being commonly as large as the real profits of the company trade can afford.
In such circumstances, to prohibit the servants of the company from trading
upon their own account, can have scarce any other effect than to enable its
superior servants, under pretence of executing their master’s order, to
oppress such of the inferior ones as have had the misfortune to fall under
their displeasure. The servants naturally endeavour to establish the same
monopoly in favour of their own private trade as of the public trade of the
company. If they are suffered to act as they could wish, they will establish
this monopoly openly and directly, by fairly prohibiting all other people
from trading in the articles in which they choose to deal; and this, perhaps,
is the best and least oppressive way of establishing it. But if, by an order
from Europe, they are prohibited from doing this, they will,
notwithstanding, endeavour to establish a monopoly of the same kind
secretly and indirectly, in a way that is much more destructive to the
country. They will employ the whole authority of government, and pervert
the administration of Justice, in order to harass and ruin those who interfere
with them in any branch of commerce, which by means of agents, either
concealed, or at least not publicly avowed, they may choose to carry on.
But the private trade of the servants will naturally extend to a much greater
variety of articles than the public trade of the company. The public trade of
the company extends no further than the trade with Europe, and
comprehends a part only of the foreign trade of the country. But the private
trade of the servants may extend to all the different branches both of its
inland and foreign trade. The monopoly of the company can tend only to
stunt the natural growth of that part of the surplus produce which, in the
case of a free trade, would be exported to Europe. That of the servants tends
to stunt the natural growth of every part of the produce in which they
choose to deal; of what is destined for home consumption, as well as of
what is destined for exportation; and consequently to degrade the
cultivation of the whole country, and to reduce the number of its
inhabitants. It tends to reduce the quantity of every sort of produce, even
that of the necessaries of life, whenever the servants of the country choose
to deal in them, to what those servants can both afford to buy and expect to
sell with such a profit as pleases them.
From the nature of their situation, too, the servants must be more
disposed to support with rigourous severity their own interest, against that
of the country which they govern, than their masters can be to support
theirs. The country belongs to their masters, who cannot avoid having some
regard for the interest of what belongs to them; but it does not belong to the
servants. The real interest of their masters, if they were capable of
understanding it, is the same with that of the country; {The interest of every
proprietor of India stock, however, is by no means the same with that of the
country in the government of which his vote gives him some influence.—
See book v, chap. 1, part ii.}and it is from ignorance chiefly, and the
meanness of mercantile prejudice, that they ever oppress it. But the real
interest of the servants is by no means the same with that of the country,
and the most perfect information would not necessarily put an end to their
oppressions. The regulations, accordingly, which have been sent out from
Europe, though they have been frequently weak, have upon most occasions
been well meaning. More intelligence, and perhaps less good meaning, has
sometimes appeared in those established by the servants in India. It is a
very singular government in which every member of the administration
wishes to get out of the country, and consequently to have done with the
government, as soon as he can, and to whose interest, the day after he has
left it, and carried his whole fortune with him, it is perfectly indifferent
though the whole country was swallowed up by an earthquake.
I mean not, however, by any thing which I have here said, to throw any
odious imputation upon the general character of the servants of the East
India company, and touch less upon that of any particular persons. It is the
system of government, the situation in which they are placed, that I mean to
censure, not the character of those who have acted in it. They acted as their
situation naturally directed, and they who have clamoured the loudest
against them would probably not have acted better themselves. In war and
negotiation, the councils of Madras and Calcutta, have upon several
occasions, conducted themselves with a resolution and decisive wisdom,
which would have done honour to the senate of Rome in the best days of
that republic. The members of those councils, however, had been bred to
professions very different from war and politics. But their situation alone,
without education, experience, or even example, seems to have formed in
them all at once the great qualities which it required, and to have inspired
them both with abilities and virtues which they themselves could not well
know that they possessed. If upon some occasions, therefore, it has
animated them to actions of magnanimity which could not well have been
expected from them, we should not wonder if, upon others, it has prompted
them to exploits of somewhat a different nature.
Such exclusive companies, therefore, are nuisances in every respect;
always more or less inconvenient to the countries in which they are
established, and destructive to those which have the misfortune to fall under
their government.
CHAPTER VIII.
CONCLUSION OF THE MERCANTILE SYSTEM.
Though the encouragement of exportation, and the discouragement of
importation, are the two great engines by which the mercantile system
proposes to enrich every country, yet, with regard to some particular
commodities, it seems to follow an opposite plan: to discourage
exportation, and to encourage importation. Its ultimate object, however, it
pretends, is always the same, to enrich the country by an advantageous
balance of trade. It discourages the exportation of the materials of
manufacture, and of the instruments of trade, in order to give our own
workmen an advantage, and to enable them to undersell those of other
nations in all foreign markets; and by restraining, in this manner, the
exportation of a few commodities, of no great price, it proposes to occasion
a much greater and more valuable exportation of others. It encourages the
importation of the materials of manufacture, in order that our own people
may be enabled to work them up more cheaply, and thereby prevent a
greater and more valuable importation of the manufactured commodities. I
do not observe, at least in our statute book, any encouragement given to the
importation of the instruments of trade. When manufactures have advanced
to a certain pitch of greatness, the fabrication of the instruments of trade
becomes itself the object of a great number of very important manufactures.
To give any particular encouragement to the importation of such
instruments, would interfere too much with the interest of those
manufactures. Such importation, therefore, instead of being encouraged, has
frequently been prohibited. Thus the importation of wool cards, except from
Ireland, or when brought in as wreck or prize goods, was prohibited by the
3rd of Edward IV.; which prohibition was renewed by the 39th of Elizabeth,
and has been continued and rendered perpetual by subsequent laws.
The importation of the materials of manufacture has sometimes been
encouraged by an exemption from the duties to which other goods are
subject, and sometimes by bounties.
The importation of sheep’s wool from several different countries, of
cotton wool from all countries, of undressed flax, of the greater part of
dyeing drugs, of the greater part of undressed hides from Ireland, or the
British colonies, of seal skins from the British Greenland fishery, of pig and
bar iron from the British colonies, as well as of several other materials of
manufacture, has been encouraged by an exemption from all duties, if
properly entered at the custom-house. The private interest of our merchants
and manufacturers may, perhaps, have extorted from the legislature these
exemptions, as well as the greater part of our other commercial regulations.
They are, however, perfectly just and reasonable; and if, consistently with
the necessities of the state, they could be extended to all the other materials
of manufacture, the public would certainly be a gainer.
The avidity of our great manufacturers, however, has in some cases
extended these exemptions a good deal beyond what can justly be
considered as the rude materials of their work. By the 24th Geo. II. chap.
46, a small duty of only 1d. the pound was imposed upon the importation of
foreign brown linen yarn, instead of much higher duties, to which it had
been subjected before, viz. of 6d. the pound upon sail yarn, of 1s. the pound
upon all French and Dutch yarn, and of £2:13:4 upon the hundred weight of
all spruce or Muscovia yarn. But our manufacturers were not long satisfied
with this reduction: by the 29th of the same king, chap. 15, the same law
which gave a bounty upon the exportation of British and Irish linen, of
which the price did not exceed 18d. the yard, even this small duty upon the
importation of brown linen yarn was taken away. In the different operations,
however, which are necessary for the preparation of linen yarn, a good deal
more industry is employed, than in the subsequent operation of preparing
linen cloth from linen yarn. To say nothing of the industry of the flax-
growers and flaxdressers, three or four spinners at least are necessary in
order to keep one weaver in constant employment; and more than four-
fifths of the whole quantity of labour necessary for the preparation of linen
cloth, is employed in that of linen yarn; but our spinners are poor people;
women commonly scattered about in all different parts of the country,
without support or protection. It is not by the sale of their work, but by that
of the complete work of the weavers, that our great master manufacturers
make their profits. As it is their interest to sell the complete manufacture as
dear, so it is to buy the materials as cheap as possible. By extorting from the
legislature bounties upon the exportation of their own linen, high duties
upon the importation of all foreign linen, and a total prohibition of the home
consumption of some sorts of French linen, they endeavour to sell their own
goods as dear as possible. By encouraging the importation of foreign linen
yarn, and thereby bringing it into competition with that which is made by
our own people, they endeavour to buy the work of the poor spinners as
cheap as possible. They are as intent to keep down the wages of their own
weavers, as the earnings of the poor spinners; and it is by no means for the
benefit of the workmen that they endeavour either to raise the price of the
complete work, or to lower that of the rude materials. It is the industry
which is carried on for the benefit of the rich and the powerful, that is
principally encouraged by our mercantile system. That which is carried on
for the benefit of the poor and the indigent is too often either neglected or
oppressed.
Both the bounty upon the exportation of linen, and the exemption from
the duty upon the importation of foreign yarn, which were granted only for
fifteen years, but continued by two different prolongations, expire with the
end of the session of parliament which shall immediately follow the 24th of
June 1786.
The encouragement given to the importation of the materials of
manufacture by bounties, has been principally confined to such as were
imported from our American plantations.
The first bounties of this kind were those granted about the beginning of
the present century, upon the importation of naval stores from America.
Under this denomination were comprehended timber fit for masts, yards,
and bowsprits; hemp, tar, pitch, and turpentine. The bounty, however, of £1
the ton upon masting-timber, and that of £6 the ton upon hemp, were
extended to such as should be imported into England from Scotland. Both
these bounties continued, without any variation, at the same rate, till they
were severally allowed to expire; that upon hemp on the 1st of January
1741, and that upon masting-timber at the end of the session of parliament
immediately following the 24th June 1781.
The bounties upon the importation of tar, pitch, and turpentine,
underwent, during their continuance, several alterations. Originally, that
upon tar was £4 the ton; that upon pitch the same; and that upon turpentine
£3 the ton. The bounty of £4 the ton upon tar was afterwards confined to
such as had been prepared in a particular manner; that upon other good,
clean, and merchantable tar was reduced to £2:4s. the ton. The bounty upon
pitch was likewise reduced to £1, and that upon turpentine to £1:10s. the
ton.
The second bounty upon the importation of any of the materials of
manufacture, according to the order of time, was that granted by the 21st
Geo. II. chap.30, upon the importation of indigo from the British
plantations. When the plantation indigo was worth three-fourths of the price
of the best French indigo, it was, by this act, entitled to a bounty of 6d. the
pound. This bounty, which, like most others, was granted only for a limited
time, was continued by several prolongations, but was reduced to 4d. the
pound. It was allowed to expire with the end of the session of parliament
which followed the 25th March 1781.
The third bounty of this kind was that granted (much about the time that
we were beginning sometimes to court, and sometimes to quarrel with our
American colonies), by the 4th. Geo. III. chap. 26, upon the importation of
hemp, or undressed flax, from the British plantations. This bounty was
granted for twenty-one years, from the 24th June 1764 to the 24th June
1785. For the first seven years, it was to be at the rate of £8 the ton; for the
second at £6; and for the third at £4. It was not extended to Scotland, of
which the climate (although hemp is sometimes raised there in small
quantities, and of an inferior quality) is not very fit for that produce. Such a
bounty upon the importation of Scotch flax in England would have been too
great a discouragement to the native produce of the southern part of the
united kingdom.
The fourth bounty of this kind was that granted by the 5th Geo. III. chap.
45, upon the importation of wood from America. It was granted for nine
years from the 1st January 1766 to the 1st January 1775. During the first
three years, it was to be for every hundred-and-twenty good deals, at the
rate of £1, and for every load containing fifty cubic feet of other square
timber, at the rate of 12s. For the second three years, it was for deals, to be
at the rate of 15s., and for other squared timber at the rate of 8s.; and for the
third three years, it was for deals, to be at the rate of 10s.; and for every
other squared timber at the rate of 5s.
The fifth bounty of this kind was that granted by the 9th Geo. III. chap.
38, upon the importation of raw silk from the British plantations. It was
granted for twenty-one years, from the 1st January 1770, to the 1st January
1791. For the first seven years, it was to be at the rate of £25 for every
hundred pounds value; for the second, at £20; and for the third, at £15. The
management of the silk-worm, and the preparation of silk, requires so much
hand-labour, and labour is so very dear in America, that even this great
bounty, I have been informed, was not likely to produce any considerable
effect.
The sixth Bounty of this kind was that granted by 11th Geo. III. chap. 50,
for the importation of pipe, hogshead, and barrelstaves and leading from the
British plantations. It was granted for nine years, from 1st January 1772 to
the 1st January 1781. For the first three years, it was, for a certain quantity
of each, to be at the rate of £6; for the second three years at £4; and for the
third three years at £2.
The seventh and last bounty of this kind was that granted by the 19th
Geo. III chap. 37, upon the importation of hemp from Ireland. It was
granted in the same manner as that for the importation of hemp and
undressed flax from America, for twenty-one years, from the 24th June
1779 to the 24th June 1800. The term is divided likewise into three periods,
of seven years each; and in each of those periods, the rate of the Irish
bounty is the same with that of the American. It does not, however, like the
American bounty, extend to the importation of undressed flax. It would
have been too great a discouragement to the cultivation of that plant in
Great Britain. When this last bounty was granted, the British and Irish
legislatures were not in much better humour with one another, than the
British and American had been before. But this boon to Ireland, it is to be
hoped, has been granted under more fortunate auspices than all those to
America. The same commodities, upon which we thus gave bounties, when
imported from America, were subjected to considerable duties when
imported from any other country. The interest of our American colonies
was regarded as the same with that of the mother country. Their wealth was
considered as our wealth. Whatever money was sent out to them, it was
said, came all back to us by the balance of trade, and we could never
become a farthing the poorer by any expense which we could lay out upon
them. They were our own in every respect, and it was an expense laid out
upon the improvement of our own property, and for the profitable
employment of our own people. It is unnecessary, I apprehend, at present to
say anything further, in order to expose the folly of a system which fatal
experience has now sufficiently exposed. Had our American colonies really
been a part of Great Britain, those bounties might have been considered as
bounties upon production, and would still have been liable to all the
objections to which such bounties are liable, but to no other.
The exportation of the materials of manufacture is sometimes
discouraged by absolute prohibitions, and sometimes by high duties.
Our woollen manufacturers have been more successful than any other
class of workmen, in persuading the legislature that the prosperity of the
nation depended upon the success and extension of their particular business.
They have not only obtained a monopoly against the consumers, by an
absolute prohibition of importing woollen cloths from any foreign country;
but they have likewise obtained another monopoly against the sheep
farmers and growers of wool, by a similar prohibition of the exportation of
live sheep and wool. The severity of many of the laws which have been
enacted for the security of the revenue is very justly complained of, as
imposing heavy penalties upon actions which, antecedent to the statutes that
declared them to be crimes, had always been understood to be innocent. But
the cruellest of our revenue laws, I will venture to affirm, are mild and
gentle, in comparison to some of those which the clamour of our merchants
and manufacturers has extorted from the legislature, for the support of their
own absurd and oppressive monopolies. Like the laws of Draco, these laws
may be said to be all written in blood.
By the 8th of Elizabeth, chap. 3, the exporter of sheep, lambs, or rams,
was for the first offence, to forfeit all his goods for ever, to suffer a year’s
imprisonment, and then to have his left hand cut off in a market town, upon
a market day, to be there nailed up; and for the second offence, to be
adjudged a felon, and to suffer death accordingly. To prevent the breed of
our sheep from being propagated in foreign countries, seems to have been
the object of this law. By the 13th and 14th of Charles II. chap. 18, the
exportation of wool was made felony, and the exporter subjected to the
same penalties and forfeitures as a felon.
For the honour of the national humanity, it is to be hoped that neither of
these statutes was ever executed. The first of them, however, so far as I
know, has never been directly repealed, and serjeant Hawkins seems to
consider it as still in force. It may, however, perhaps be considered as
virtually repealed by the 12th of Charles II. chap. 32, sect. 3, which, without
expressly taking away the penalties imposed by former statutes, imposes a
new penalty, viz. that of 20s. for every sheep exported, or attempted to be
exported, together with the forfeiture of the sheep, and of the owner’s share
of the sheep. The second of them was expressly repealed by the 7th and 8th
of William III. chap. 28, sect. 4, by which it is declared that “Whereas the
statute of the 13th and 14th of king Charles II. made against the exportation
of wool, among other things in the said act mentioned, doth enact the same
to be deemed felony, by the severity of which penalty the prosecution of
offenders hath not been so effectually put in execution; be it therefore
enacted, by the authority aforesaid, that so much of the said act, which
relates to the making the said offence felony, be repealed and made void.”
The penalties, however, which are either imposed by this milder statute,
or which, though imposed by former statutes, are not repealed by this one,
are still sufficiently severe. Besides the forfeiture of the goods, the exporter
incurs the penalty of 3s. for every pound weight of wool, either exported or
attempted to be exported, that is, about four or five times the value. Any
merchant, or other person convicted of this offence, is disabled from
requiring any debt or account belonging to him from any factor or other
person. Let his fortune be what it will, whether he is or is not able to pay
those heavy penalties, the law means to ruin him completely. But, as the
morals of the great body of the people are not yet so corrupt as those of the
contrivers of this statute, I have not heard that any advantage has ever been
taken of this clause. If the person convicted of this offence is not able to pay
the penalties within three months after judgment, he is to be transported for
seven years; and if he returns before the expiration of that term, he is liable
to the pains of felony, without benefit of clergy. The owner of the ship,
knowing this offence, forfeits all his interest in the ship and furniture. The
master and mariners, knowing this offence, forfeit all their goods and
chattels, and suffer three months imprisonment. By a subsequent statute, the
master suffers six months imprisonment.
In order to prevent exportation, the whole inland commerce of wool is
laid under very burdensome and oppressive restrictions. It cannot be packed
in any box, barrel, cask, case, chest, or any other package, but only in packs
of leather or pack-cloth, on which must be marked on the outside the words
WOOL or YARN, in large letters, not less than three inches long, on pain of
forfeiting the same and the package, and 8s. for every pound weight, to be
paid by the owner or packer. It cannot be loaden on any horse or cart, or
carried by land within five miles of the coast, but between sun-rising, and
sun-setting, on pain of forfeiting the same, the horses and carriages. The
hundred next adjoining to the sea coast, out of, or through which the wool is
carried or exported, forfeits £20, if the wool is under the value of £10; and
if of greater value, then treble that value, together with treble costs, to be
sued for within the year. The execution to be against any two of the
inhabitants, whom the sessions must reimburse, by an assessment on the
other inhabitants, as in the cases of robbery. And if any person compounds
with the hundred for less than this penalty, he is to be imprisoned for five
years; and any other person may prosecute. These regulations take place
through the whole kingdom.
But in the particular counties of Kent and Sussex, the restrictions are still
more troublesome. Every owner of wool within ten miles of the sea coast
must give an account in writing, three days after shearing, to the next
officer of the customs, of the number of his fleeces, and of the places where
they are lodged. And before he removes any part of them, he must give the
like notice of the number and weight of the fleeces, and of the name and
abode of the person to whom they are sold, and of the place to which it is
intended they should be carried. No person within fifteen miles of the sea,
in the said counties, can buy any wool, before he enters into bond to the
king, that no part of the wool which he shall so buy shall be sold by him to
any other person within fifteen miles of the sea. If any wool is found
carrying towards the sea side in the said counties, unless it has been entered
and security given as aforesaid, it is forfeited, and the offender also forfeits
3s. for every pound weight, if any person lay any wool, not entered as
aforesaid, within fifteen miles of the sea, it must be seized and forfeited;
and if, after such seizure, any person shall claim the same, he must give
security to the exchequer, that if he is cast upon trial he shall pay treble
costs, besides all other penalties.
When such restrictions are imposed upon the inland trade, the coasting
trade, we may believe, cannot be left very free. Every owner of wool, who
carrieth, or causeth to be carried, any wool to any port or place on the sea
coast, in order to be from thence transported by sea to any other place or
port on the coast, must first cause an entry thereof to be made at the port
from whence it is intended to be conveyed, containing the weight, marks,
and number, of the packages, before he brings the same within five miles of
that port, on pain of forfeiting the same, and also the horses, carts, and other
carriages; and also of suffering and forfeiting, as by the other laws in force
against the exportation of wool. This law, however (1st of William III. chap.
32), is so very indulgent as to declare, that this shall not hinder any person
from carrying his wool home from the place of shearing, though it be within
five miles of the sea, provided that in ten days after shearing, and before he
remove the wool, he do under his hand certify to the next officer of the
customs the true number of fleeces, and where it is housed; and do not
remove the same, without certifying to such officer, under his hand, his
intention so to do, three days before. Bond must be given that the wool to
be carried coast-ways is to be landed at the particular port for which it is
entered outwards; and if my part of it is landed without the presence of an
officer, not only the forfeiture of the wool is incurred, as in other goods, but
the usual additional penalty of 3s. for every pound weight is likewise
incurred.
Our woollen manufacturers, in order to justify their demand of such
extraordinary restrictions and regulations, confidently asserted, that English
wool was of a peculiar quality, superior to that of any other country; that the
wool of other countries could not, without some mixture of it, be wrought
up into any tolerable manufacture; that fine cloth could not be made without
it; that England, therefore, if the exportation of it could be totally prevented,
could monopolize to herself almost the whole woollen trade of the world;
and thus, having no rivals, could sell at what price she pleased, and in a
short time acquire the most incredible degree of wealth by the most
advantageous balance of trade. This doctrine, like most other doctrines
which are confidently asserted by any considerable number of people, was,
and still continues to be, most implicitly believed by a much greater
number: by almost all those who are either unacquainted with the woollen
trade, or who have not made particular inquiries. It is, however, so perfectly
false, that English wool is in any respect necessary for the making of fine
cloth, that it is altogether unfit for it. Fine cloth is made altogether of
Spanish wool. English wool, cannot be even so mixed with Spanish wool,
as to enter into the composition without spoiling and degrading, in some
degree, the fabric of the cloth.
It has been shown in the foregoing part of this work, that the effect of
these regulations has been to depress the price of English wool, not only
below what it naturally would be in the present times, but very much below
what it actually was in the time of Edward III. The price of Scotch wool,
when, in consequence of the Union, it became subject to the same
regulations, is said to have fallen about one half. It is observed by the very
accurate and intelligent author of the Memoirs of Wool, the Reverend Mr.
John Smith, that the price of the best English wool in England, is generally
below what wool of a very inferior quality commonly sells for in the market
of Amsterdam. To depress the price of this commodity below what may be
called its natural and proper price, was the avowed purpose of those
regulations; and there seems to be no doubt of their having produced the
effect that was expected from them.
This reduction of price, it may perhaps be thought, by discouraging the
growing of wool, must have reduced very much the annual produce of that
commodity, though not below what it formerly was, yet below what, in the
present state of things, it would probably have been, had it, in consequence
of an open and free market, been allowed to rise to the natural and proper
price. I am, however, disposed to believe, that the quantity of the annual
produce cannot have been much, though it may, perhaps, have been a little
affected by these regulations. The growing of wool is not the chief purpose
for which the sheep farmer employs his industry and stock. He expects his
profit, not so much from the price of the fleece, as from that of the carcase;
and the average or ordinary price of the latter must even, in many cases,
make up to him whatever deficiency there may be in the average or
ordinary price of the former. It has been observed, in the foregoing part of
this work, that ‘whatever regulations tend to sink the price, either of wool or
of raw hides, below what it naturally would be, must, in an improved and
cultivated country, have some tendency to raise the price of butcher’s meat.
The price, both of the great and small cattle which are fed on improved and
cultivated land, must be sufficient to pay the rent which the landlord, and
the profit which the farmer, has reason to expect from improved and
cultivated land. If it is not, they will soon cease to feed them. Whatever part
of this price, therefore, is not paid by the wool and the hide, must be paid by
the carcase. The less there is paid for the one, the more must be paid for the
other. In what manner this price is to be divided upon the different parts of
the beast, is indifferent to the landlords and farmers, provided it is all paid
to them. In an improved and cultivated country, therefore, their interest as
landlords and farmers cannot be much affected by such regulations, though
their interest as consumers may, by the rise in the price of provisions.’
According to this reasoning, therefore, this degradation in the price of wool
is not likely, in an improved and cultivated country, to occasion any
diminution in the annual produce of that commodity; except so far as, by
raising the price of mutton, it may somewhat diminish the demand for, and
consequently the production of, that particular species of butcher’s meat, Its
effect, however, even in this way, it is probable, is not very considerable.
But though its effect upon the quantity of the annual produce may not
have been very considerable, its effect upon the quality, it may perhaps be
thought, must necessarily have been very great. The degradation in the
quality of English wool, if not below what it was in former times, yet below
what it naturally would have been in the present state of improvement and
cultivation, must have been, it may perhaps be supposed, very nearly in
proportion to the degradation of price. As the quality depends upon the
breed, upon the pasture, and upon the management and cleanliness of the
sheep, during the whole progress of the growth of the fleece, the attention to
these circumstances, it may naturally enough be imagined, can never be
greater than in proportion to the recompence which the price of the fleece is
likely to make for the labour and expense which that attention requires. It
happens, however, that the goodness of the fleece depends, in a great
measure, upon the health, growth, and bulk of the animal: the same
attention which is necessary for the improvement of the carcase is, in some
respect, sufficient for that of the fleece. Notwithstanding the degradation of
price, English wool is said to have been improved considerably during the
course even of the present century. The improvement, might, perhaps, have
been greater if the price had been better; but the lowness of price, though it
may have obstructed, yet certainly it has not altogether prevented that
improvement.
The violence of these regulations, therefore, seems to have affected
neither the quantity nor the quality of the annual produce of wool, so much
as it might have been expected to do (though I think it probable that it may
have affected the latter a good deal more than the former); and the interest
of the growers of wool, though it must have been hurt in some degree,
seems upon the whole, to have been much less hurt than could well have
been imagined.
These considerations, however, will not justify the absolute prohibition
of the exportation of wool; but they will fully justify the imposition of a
considerable tax upon that exportation.
To hurt, in any degree, the interest of any one order of citizens, for no
other purpose but to promote that of some other, is evidently contrary to
that justice and equality of treatment which the sovereign owes to all the
different orders of his subjects. But the prohibition certainly hurts, in some
degree, the interest of the growers of wool, for no other purpose but to
promote that of the manufacturers.
Every different order of citizens is bound to contribute to the support of
the sovereign or commonwealth. A tax of five, or even of ten shillings,
upon the exportation of every tod of wool, would produce a very
considerable revenue to the sovereign. It would hurt the interest of the
growers somewhat less than the prohibition, because it would not probably
lower the price of wool quite so much. It would afford a sufficient
advantage to the manufacturer, because, though he might not buy his wool
altogether so cheap as under the prohibition, he would still buy it at least
five or ten shillings cheaper than any foreign manufacturer could buy it,
besides saving the freight and insurance which the other would be obliged
to pay. It is scarce possible to devise a tax which could produce any
considerable revenue to the sovereign, and at the same time occasion so
little inconveniency to anybody.
The prohibition, notwithstanding all the penalties which guard it, does
not prevent the exportation of wool. It is exported, it is well known, in great
quantities. The great difference between the price in the home and that in
the foreign market, presents such a temptation to smuggling, that all the
rigour of the law cannot prevent it. This illegal exportation is advantageous
to nobody but the smuggler. A legal exportation, subject to a tax, by
affording a revenue to the sovereign, and thereby saving the imposition of
some other, perhaps more burdensome and inconvenient taxes, might prove
advantageous to all the different subjects of the state.
The exportation of fuller’s earth, or fuller’s clay, supposed to be
necessary for preparing and cleansing the woollen manufactures, has been
subjected to nearly the same penalties as the exportation of wool. Even
tobacco-pipe clay, though acknowledged to be different from fuller’s clay,
yet, on account of their resemblance, and because fuller’s clay might
sometimes be exported as tobacco-pipe clay, has been laid under the same
prohibitions and penalties.
By the 13th and 14th of Charles II. chap, 7, the exportation, not only of
raw hides, but of tanned leather, except in the shape of boots, shoes, or
slippers, was prohibited; and the law gave a monopoly to our boot-makers
and shoe-makers, not only against our graziers, but against our tanners. By
subsequent statutes, our tanners have got themselves exempted from this
monopoly, upon paying a small tax of only one shilling on the hundred
weight of tanned leather, weighing one hundred and twelve pounds. They
have obtained likewise the drawback of two-thirds of the excise duties
imposed upon their commodity, even when exported without further
manufacture. All manufactures of leather may be exported duty free; and
the exporter is besides entitled to the drawback of the whole duties of
excise. Our graziers still continue subject to the old monopoly. Graziers,
separated from one another, and dispersed through all the different corners
of the country, cannot, without great difficulty, combine together for the
purpose either of imposing monopolies upon their fellow-citizens, or of
exempting themselves from such as may have been imposed upon them by
other people. Manufacturers of all kinds, collected together in numerous
bodies in all great cities, easily can. Even the horns of cattle are prohibited
to be exported; and the two insignificant trades of the horner and comb-
maker enjoy, in this respect, a monopoly against the graziers.
Restraints, either by prohibitions, or by taxes, upon the exportation of
goods which are partially, but not completely manufactured, are not peculiar
to the manufacture of leather. As long as anything remains to be done, in
order to fit any commodity for immediate use and consumption, our
manufacturers think that they themselves ought to have the doing of it.
Woollen yarn and worsted are prohibited to be exported, under the same
penalties as wool even white cloths we subject to a duty upon exportation;
and our dyers have so far obtained a monopoly against our clothiers. Our
clothiers would probably have been able to defend themselves against it;
but it happens that the greater part of our principal clothiers are themselves
likewise dyers. Watch-cases, clock-cases, and dial-plates for clocks and
watches, have been prohibited to be exported. Our clock-makers and watch-
makers are, it seems, unwilling that the price of this sort of workmanship
should be raised upon them by the competition of foreigners.
By some old statutes of Edward III, Henry VIII. and Edward VI. the
exportation of all metals was prohibited. Lead and tin were alone excepted,
probably on account of the great abundance of those metals; in the
exportation of which a considerable part of the trade of the kingdom in
those days consisted. For the encouragement of the mining trade, the 5th of
William and Mary, chap.17, exempted from this prohibition iron, copper,
and mundic metal made from British ore. The exportation of all sorts of
copper bars, foreign as well as British, was afterwards permitted by the 9th
and 10th of William III. chap 26. The exportation of unmanufactured brass,
of what is called gun-metal, bell-metal, and shroff metal, still continues to
be prohibited. Brass manufactures of all sorts may be exported duty free.
The exportation of the materials of manufacture, where it is not
altogether prohibited, is, in many cases, subjected to considerable duties.
By the 8th Geo. I. chap.15, the exportation of all goods, the produce of
manufacture of Great Britain, upon which any duties had been imposed by
former statutes, was rendered duty free. The following goods, however,
were excepted: alum, lead, lead-ore, tin, tanned leather, copperas, coals,
wool, cards, white woollen cloths, lapis calaminaris, skins of all sorts, glue,
coney hair or wool, hares wool, hair of all sorts, horses, and litharge of lead.
If you except horses, all these are either materials of manufacture, or
incomplete manufactures (which may be considered as materials for still
further manufacture), or instruments of trade. This statute leaves them
subject to all the old duties which had ever been imposed upon them, the
old subsidy, and one per cent. outwards.
By the same statute, a great number of foreign drugs for dyers use are
exempted from all duties upon importation. Each of them, however, is
afterwards subjected to a certain duty, not indeed a very heavy one, upon
exportation. Our dyers, it seems, while they thought it for their interest to
encourage the importation of those drugs, by an exemption from all duties,
thought it likewise for their own interest to throw some small
discouragement upon their exportation. The avidity, however, which
suggested this notable piece of mercantile ingenuity, most probably
disappointed itself of its object. It necessarily taught the importers to be
more careful than they might otherwise have been, that their importation
should not exceed what was necessary for the supply of the home market.
The home market was at all times likely to be more scantily supplied; the
commodities were at all times likely to be somewhat dearer there than they
would have been, had the exportation been rendered as free as the
importation.
By the above-mentioned statute, gum senega, or gum arabic, being
among the enumerated dyeing drugs, might be imported duty free. They
were subjected, indeed, to a small poundage duty, amounting only to
threepence in the hundred weight, upon their re-exportation. France
enjoyed, at that time, an exclusive trade to the country most productive of
those drugs, that which lies in the neighbourhood of the Senegal; and the
British market could not be easily supplied by the immediate importation of
them from the place of growth. By the 25th Geo. II. therefore, gum senega
was allowed to be imported (contrary to the general dispositions of the act
of navigation) from any part of Europe. As the law, however, did not mean
to encourage this species of trade, so contrary to the general principles of
the mercantile policy of England, it imposed a duty of ten shillings the
hundred weight upon such importation, and no part of this duty was to be
afterwards drawn back upon its exportation. The successful war which
began in 1755 gave Great Britain the same exclusive trade to those
countries which France had enjoyed before. Our manufactures, as soon as
the peace was made, endeavoured to avail themselves of this advantage, and
to establish a monopoly in their own favour both against the growers and
against the importers of this commodity. By the 5th of Geo. III. therefore,
chap. 37, the exportation of gum senega, from his majesty’s dominions in
Africa, was confined to Great Britain, and was subjected to all the same
restrictions, regulations, forfeitures, and penalties, as that of the enumerated
commodities of the British colonies in America and the West Indies. Its
importation, indeed, was subjected to a small duty of sixpence the hundred
weight; but its re-exportation was subjected to the enormous duty of one
pound ten shillings the hundred weight. It was the intention of our
manufacturers, that the whole produce of those countries should be
imported into Great Britain; and in order that they themselves might be
enabled to buy it at their own price, that no part of it should be exported
again, but at such an expense as would sufficiently discourage that
exportation. Their avidity, however, upon this, as well as upon many other
occasions, disappointed itself of its object. This enormous duty presented
such a temptation to smuggling, that great quantities of this commodity
were clandestinely exported, probably to all the manufacturing countries of
Europe, but particularly to Holland, not only from Great Britain, but from
Africa. Upon this account, by the 14th Geo. III. chap.10, this duty upon
exportation was reduced to five shillings the hundred weight.
In the book of rates, according to which the old subsidy was levied,
beaver skins were estimated at six shillings and eight pence a piece; and the
different subsidies and imposts which, before the year 1722, had been laid
upon their importation, amounted to one-fifth part of the rate, or to sixteen
pence upon each skin; all of which, except half the old subsidy, amounting
only to twopence, was drawn back upon exportation. This duty, upon the
importation of so important a material of manufacture, had been thought too
high; and, in the year 1722, the rate was reduced to two shillings and
sixpence, which reduced the duty upon importation to sixpence, and of this
only one-half was to be drawn back upon exportation. The same successful
war put the country most productive of beaver under the dominion of Great
Britain; and beaver skins being among the enumerated commodities, the
exportation from America was consequently confined to the market of
Great Britain. Our manufacturers soon bethought themselves of the
advantage which they might make of this circumstance; and in the year
1764, the duty upon the importation of beaver skin was reduced to one
penny, but the duty upon exportation was raised to sevenpence each skin,
without any drawback of the duty upon importation. By the same law, a
duty of eighteen pence the pound was imposed upon the exportation of
beaver wool or woumbs, without making any alteration in the duty upon the
importation of that commodity, which, when imported by British, and in
British shipping, amounted at that time to between fourpence and fivepence
the piece.
Coals may be considered both as a material of manufacture, and as an
instrument of trade. Heavy duties, accordingly, have been imposed upon
their exportation, amounting at present (1783) to more than five shillings
the ton, or more than fifteen shillings the chaldron, Newcastle measure;
which is, in most cases, more than the original value of the commodity at
the coal-pit, or even at the shipping port for exportation.
The exportation, however, of the instruments of trade, properly so called,
is commonly restrained, not by high duties, but by absolute prohibitions.
Thus, by the 7th and 8th of William III chap.20, sect.8, the exportation of
frames or engines for knitting gloves or stockings, is prohibited, under the
penalty, not only of the forfeiture of such frames or engines, so exported, or
attempted to be exported, but of forty pounds, one half to the king, the other
to the person who shall inform or sue for the same. In the same manner, by
the 14th Geo. III. chap. 71, the exportation to foreign parts, of any utensils
made use of in the cotton, linen, woollen, and silk manufactures, is
prohibited under the penalty, not only of the forfeiture of such utensils, but
of two hundred pounds, to be paid by the person who shall offend in this
manner; and likewise of two hundred pounds, to be paid by the master of
the ship, who shall knowingly suffer such utensils to be loaded on board his
ship.
When such heavy penalties were imposed upon the exportation of the
dead instruments of trade, it could not well be expected that the living
instrument, the artificer, should be allowed to go free. Accordingly, by the
5th Geo. I. chap. 27, the person who shall be convicted of enticing any
artificer, of or in any of the manufactures of Great Britain, to go into any
foreign parts, in order to practise or teach his trade, is liable, for the first
offence, to be fined in any sum not exceeding one hundred pounds, and to
three months imprisonment, and until the fine shall be paid; and for the
second offence, to be fined in any sum, at the discretion of the court, and to
imprisonment for twelve months, and until the fine shall be paid. By the
23d Geo. II. chap. 13, this penalty is increased, for the first offence, to five
hundred pounds for every artificer so enticed, and to twelve months
imprisonment, and until the fine shall be paid; and for the second offence,
to one thousand pounds, and to two years imprisonment, and until the fine
shall be paid.
By the former of these two statutes, upon proof that any person has been
enticing any artificer, or that any artificer has promised or contracted to go
into foreign parts, for the purposes aforesaid, such artificer may be obliged
to give security, at the discretion of the court, that he shall not go beyond
the seas, and may be committed to prison until he give such security.
If any artificer has gone beyond the seas, and is exercising or teaching his
trade in any foreign country, upon warning being given to him by any of his
majesty’s ministers or consuls abroad, or by one of his majesty’s secretaries
of state, for the time being, if he does not, within six months after such
warning, return into this realm, and from henceforth abide and inhabit
continually within the same, he is from thenceforth declared incapable of
taking any legacy devised to him within this kingdom, or of being executor
or administrator to any person, or of taking any lands within this kingdom,
by descent, devise, or purchase. He likewise forfeits to the king all his
lands, goods, and chattels; is declared an alien in every respect; and is put
out of the king’s protection.
It is unnecessary, I imagine, to observe how contrary such regulations are
to the boasted liberty of the subject, of which we affect to be so very
jealous; but which, in this case, is so plainly sacrificed to the futile interests
of our merchants and manufacturers.
The laudable motive of all these regulations, is to extend our own
manufactures, not by their own improvement, but by the depression of those
of all our neighbours, and by putting an end, as much as possible, to the
troublesome competition of such odious and disagreeable rivals. Our master
manufacturers think it reasonable that they themselves should have the
monopoly of the ingenuity of all their countrymen. Though by restraining,
in some trades, the number of apprentices which can be employed at one
time, and by imposing the necessity of a long apprenticeship in all trades,
they endeavour, all of them, to confine the knowledge of their respective
employments to as small a number as possible; they are unwilling, however,
that any part of this small number should go abroad to instruct foreigners.
Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the
interest of the producer ought to be attended to, only so far as it may be
necessary for promoting that of the consumer.
The maxim is so perfectly self-evident, that it would be absurd to attempt
to prove it. But in the mercantile system, the interest of the consumer is
almost constantly sacrificed to that of the producer; and it seems to consider
production, and not consumption, as the ultimate end and object of all
industry and commerce.
In the restraints upon the importation of all foreign commodities which
can come into competition with those of our own growth or manufacture,
the interest of the home consumer is evidently sacrificed to that of the
producer. It is altogether for the benefit of the latter, that the former is
obliged to pay that enhancement of price which this monopoly almost
always occasions.
It is altogether for the benefit of the producer, that bounties are granted
upon the exportation of some of his productions. The home consumer is
obliged to pay, first the tax which is necessary for paying the bounty; and,
secondly, the still greater tax which necessarily arises from the
enhancement of the price of the commodity in the home market.
By the famous treaty of commerce with Portugal, the consumer is
prevented by duties from purchasing of a neighbouring country, a
commodity which our own climate does not produce; but is obliged to
purchase it of a distant country, though it is acknowledged, that the
commodity of the distant country is of a worse quality than that of the near
one. The home consumer is obliged to submit to this inconvenience, in
order that the producer may import into the distant country some of his
productions, upon more advantageous terms than he otherwise would have
been allowed to do. The consumer, too, is obliged to pay whatever
enhancement in the price of those very productions this forced exportation
may occasion in the home market.
But in the system of laws which has been established for the management
of our American and West Indian colonies, the interest of the home
consumer has been sacrificed to that of the producer, with a more
extravagant profusion than in all our other commercial regulations. A great
empire has been established for the sole purpose of raising up a nation of
customers, who should be obliged to buy, from the shops of our different
producers, all the goods with which these could supply them. For the sake
of that little enhancement of price which this monopoly might afford our
producers, the home consumers have been burdened with the whole
expense of maintaining and defending that empire. For this purpose, and for
this purpose only, in the two last wars, more than two hundred millions
have been spent, and a new debt of more than a hundred and seventy
millions has been contracted, over and above all that had been expended for
the same purpose in former wars. The interest of this debt alone is not only
greater than the whole extraordinary profit which, it never could be
pretended, was made by the monopoly of the colony trade, but than the
whole value of that trade, or than the whole value of the goods which, at an
average, have been annually exported to the colonies.
It cannot be very difficult to determine who have been the contrivers of
this whole mercantile system; not the consumers, we may believe, whose
interest has been entirely neglected; but the producers, whose interest has
been so carefully attended to; and among this latter class, our merchants and
manufacturers have been by far the principal architects. In the mercantile
regulations which have been taken notice of in this chapter, the interest of
our manufacturers has been most peculiarly attended to; and the interest,
not so much of the consumers, as that of some other sets of producers, has
been sacrificed to it.
CHAPTER IX.
OF THE AGRICULTURAL SYSTEMS, OR OF
THOSE SYSTEMS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
WHICH REPRESENT THE PRODUCE OF LAND,
AS EITHER THE SOLE OR THE PRINCIPAL
SOURCE OF THE REVENUE AND WEALTH OF
EVERY COUNTRY.
The agricultural systems of political economy will not require so long an
explanation as that which I have thought it necessary to bestow upon the
mercantile or commercial system.
That system which represents the produce of land as the sole source of
the revenue and wealth of every country, has so far as I know, never been
adopted by any nation, and it at present exists only in the speculations of a
few men of great learning and ingenuity in France. It would not, surely, be
worth while to examine at great length the errors of a system which never
has done, and probably never will do, any harm in any part of the world. I
shall endeavour to explain, however, as distinctly as I can, the great outlines
of this very ingenious system.
Mr. Colbert, the famous minister of Lewis XIV. was a man of probity, of
great industry, and knowledge of detail; of great experience and acuteness
in the examination of public accounts; and of abilities, in short, every way
fitted for introducing method and good order into the collection and
expenditure of the public revenue. That minister had unfortunately
embraced all the prejudices of the mercantile system, in its nature and
essence a system of restraint and regulation, and such as could scarce fail to
be agreeable to a laborious and plodding man of business, who had been
accustomed to regulate the different departments of public offices, and to
establish the necessary checks and controls for confining each to its proper
sphere. The industry and commerce of a great country, he endeavoured to
regulate upon the same model as the departments of a public office; and
instead of allowing every man to pursue his own interest his own way, upon
the liberal plan of equality, liberty, and justice, he bestowed upon certain
branches of industry extraordinary privileges, while he laid others under as
extraordinary restraints. He was not only disposed, like other European
ministers, to encourage more the industry of the towns than that of the
country; but, in order to support the industry of the towns, he was willing
even to depress and keep down that of the country. In order to render
provisions cheap to the inhabitants of the towns, and thereby to encourage
manufactures and foreign commerce, he prohibited altogether the
exportation of corn, and thus excluded the inhabitants of the country from
every foreign market, for by far the most important part of the produce of
their industry. This prohibition, joined to the restraints imposed by the
ancient provincial laws of France upon the transportation of corn from one
province to another, and to the arbitrary and degrading taxes which are
levied upon the cultivators in almost all the provinces, discouraged and kept
down the agriculture of that country very much below the state to which it
would naturally have risen in so very fertile a soil, and so very happy a
climate. This state of discouragement and depression was felt more or less
in every different part of the country, and many different inquiries were set
on foot concerning the causes of it. One of those causes appeared to be the
preference given, by the institutions of Mr. Colbert, to the industry of the
towns above that of the country.
If the rod be bent too much one way, says the proverb, in order to make it
straight, you must bend it as much the other. The French philosophers, who
have proposed the system which represents agriculture as the sole source of
the revenue and wealth of every country, seem to have adopted this
proverbial maxim; and, as in the plan of Mr. Colbert, the industry of the
towns was certainly overvalued in comparison with that of the country, so
in their system it seems to be as certainly under-valued.
The different orders of people, who have ever been supposed to
contribute in any respect towards the annual produce of the land and labour
of the country, they divide into three classes. The first is the class of the
proprietors of land. The second is the class of the cultivators, of farmers and
country labourers, whom they honour with the peculiar appellation of the
productive class. The third is the class of artificers, manufacturers, and
merchants, whom they endeavour to degrade by the humiliating appellation
of the barren or unproductive class.
The class of proprietors contributes to the annual produce, by the expense
which they may occasionally lay out upon the improvement of the land,
upon the buildings, drains, inclosures, and other ameliorations, which they
may either make or maintain upon it, and by means of which the cultivators
are enabled, with the same capital, to raise a greater produce, and
consequently to pay a greater rent. This advanced rent may be considered as
the interest or profit due to the proprietor, upon the expense or capital which
he thus employs in the improvement of his land. Such expenses are in this
system called ground expenses (depenses foncieres).
The cultivators or farmers contribute to the annual produce, by what are
in this system called the original and annual expenses (depenses primitives,
et depenses annuelles), which they lay out upon the cultivation of the land.
The original expenses consist in the instruments of husbandry, in the stock
of cattle, in the seed, and in the maintenance of the farmer’s family,
servants, and cattle, during at least a great part of the first year of his
occupancy, or till he can receive some return from the land. The annual
expenses consist in the seed, in the wear and tear of instruments of
husbandry, and in the annual maintenance of the farmer’s servants and
cattle, and of his family too, so far as any part of them can be considered as
servants employed in cultivation. That part of the produce of the land which
remains to him after paying the rent, ought to be sufficient, first, to replace
to him, within a reasonable time, at least during the term of his occupancy,
the whole of his original expenses, together with the ordinary profits of
stock; and, secondly, to replace to him annually the whole of his annual
expenses, together likewise with the ordinary profits of stock. Those two
sorts of expenses are two capitals which the farmer employs in cultivation;
and unless they are regularly restored to him, together with a reasonable
profit, he cannot carry on his employment upon a level with other
employments; but, from a regard to his own interest, must desert it as soon
as possible, and seek some other. That part of the produce of the land which
is thus necessary for enabling the farmer to continue his business, ought to
be considered as a fund sacred to cultivation, which, if the landlord violates,
he necessarily reduces the produce of his own land, and, in a few years, not
only disables the farmer from paying this racked rent, but from paying the
reasonable rent which he might otherwise have got for his land. The rent
which properly belongs to the landlord, is no more than the neat produce
which remains after paying, in the completest manner, all the necessary
expenses which must be previously laid out, in order to raise the gross or
the whole produce. It is because the labour of the cultivators, over and
above paying completely all those necessary expenses, affords a neat
produce of this kind, that this class of people are in this system peculiarly
distinguished by the honourable appellation of the productive class. Their
original and annual expenses are for the same reason called, In this system,
productive expenses, because, over and above replacing their own value,
they occasion the annual reproduction of this neat produce.
The ground expenses, as they are called, or what the landlord lays out
upon the improvement of his land, are, in this system, too, honoured with
the appellation of productive expenses. Till the whole of those expenses,
together with the ordinary profits of stock, have been completely repaid to
him by the advanced rent which he gets from his land, that advanced rent
ought to be regarded as sacred and inviolable, both by the church and by the
king; ought to be subject neither to tithe nor to taxation. If it is otherwise,
by discouraging the improvement of land, the church discourages the future
increase of her own tithes, and the king the future increase of his own taxes.
As in a well ordered state of things, therefore, those ground expenses, over
and above reproducing in the completest manner their own value, occasion
likewise, after a certain time, a reproduction of a neat produce, they are in
this system considered as productive expenses.
The ground expenses of the landlord, however, together with the original
and the annual expenses of the farmer, are the only three sorts of expenses
which in this system are considered as productive. All other expenses, and
all other orders of people, even those who, in the common apprehensions of
men, are regarded as the most productive, are, in this account of things,
represented as altogether barren and unproductive.
Artificers and manufacturers, in particular, whose industry, in the
common apprehensions of men, increases so much the value of the rude
produce of land, are in this system represented as a class of people
altogether barren and unproductive. Their labour, it is said, replaces only
the stock which employs them, together with its ordinary profits. That stock
consists in the materials, tools, and wages, advanced to them by their
employer; and is the fund destined for their employment and maintenance.
Its profits are the fund destined for the maintenance of their employer. Their
employer, as he advances to them the stock of materials, tools, and wages,
necessary for their employment, so he advances to himself what is
necessary for his own maintenance; and this maintenance he generally
proportions to the profit which he expects to make by the price of their
work. Unless its price repays to him the maintenance which he advances to
himself, as well as the materials, tools, and wages, which he advances to his
workmen, it evidently does not repay to him the whole expense which he
lays out upon it. The profits of manufacturing stock, therefore, are not, like
the rent of land, a neat produce which remains after completely repaying the
whole expense which must be laid out in order to obtain them. The stock of
the farmer yields him a profit, as well as that of the master manufacturer;
and it yields a rent likewise to another person, which that of the master
manufacturer does not. The expense, therefore, laid out in employing and
maintaining artificers and manufacturers, does no more than continue, if
one may say so, the existence of its own value, and does not produce any
new value. It is, therefore, altogether a barren and unproductive expense.
The expense, on the contrary, laid out in employing farmers and country
labourers, over and above continuing the existence of its own value,
produces a new value the rent of the landlord. It is, therefore, a productive
expense.
Mercantile stock is equally barren and unproductive with manufacturing
stock. It only continues the existence of its own value, without producing
any new value. Its profits are only the repayment of the maintenance which
its employer advances to himself during the time that he employs it, or till
he receives the returns of it. They are only the repayment of a part of the
expense which must be laid out in employing it.
The labour of artificers and manufacturers never adds any thing to the
value of the whole annual amount of the rude produce of the land. It adds,
indeed, greatly to the value of some particular parts of it. But the
consumption which, in the mean time, it occasions of other parts, is
precisely equal to the value which it adds to those parts; so that the value of
the whole amount is not, at any one moment of time, in the least augmented
by it. The person who works the lace of a pair of fine ruffles for example,
will sometimes raise the value of, perhaps, a pennyworth of flax to £30
sterling. But though, at first sight, he appears thereby to multiply the value
of a part of the rude produce about seven thousand and two hundred times,
he in reality adds nothing to the value of the whole annual amount of the
rude produce. The working of that lace costs him, perhaps, two years
labour. The £30 which he gets for it when it is finished, is no more than the
repayment of the subsistence which he advances to himself during the two
years that he is employed about it. The value which, by every day’s,
month’s, or year’s labour, he adds to the flax, does no more than replace the
value of his own consumption during that day, month, or year. At no
moment of time, therefore, does he add any thing to the value of the whole
annual amount of the rude produce of the land: the portion of that produce
which he is continually consuming, being always equal to the value which
he is continually producing. The extreme poverty of the greater part of the
persons employed in this expensive, though trifling manufacture, may
satisfy us that the price of their work does not, in ordinary cases, exceed the
value of their subsistence. It is otherwise with the work of farmers and
country labourers. The rent of the landlord is a value which, in ordinary
cases, it is continually producing over and above replacing, in the most
complete manner, the whole consumption, the whole expense laid out upon
the employment and maintenance both of the workmen and of their
employer.
Artificers, manufacturers, and merchants, can augment the revenue and
wealth of their society by parsimony only; or, as it is expressed in this
system, by privation, that is, by depriving themselves of a part of the funds
destined for their own subsistence. They annually reproduce nothing but
those funds. Unless, therefore, they annually save some part of them, unless
they annually deprive themselves of the enjoyment of some part of them,
the revenue and wealth of their society can never be, in the smallest degree,
augmented by means of their industry. Farmers and country labourers, on
the contrary, may enjoy completely the whole funds destined for their own
subsistence, and yet augment, at the same time, the revenue and wealth of
their society. Over and above what is destined for their own subsistence,
their industry annually affords a neat produce, of which the augmentation
necessarily augments the revenue and wealth of their society. Nations,
therefore, which, like France or England, consist in a great measure, of
proprietors and cultivators, can be enriched by industry and enjoyment.
Nations, on the contrary, which, like Holland and Hamburgh, are composed
chiefly of merchants, artificers, and manufacturers, can grow rich only
through parsimony and privation. As the interest of nations so differently
circumstanced is very different, so is likewise the common character of the
people. In those of the former kind, liberality, frankness, and good
fellowship, naturally make a part of their common character; in the latter,
narrowness, meanness, and a selfish disposition, averse to all social
pleasure and enjoyment.
The unproductive class, that of merchants, artificers, and manufacturers,
is maintained and employed altogether at the expense of the two other
classes, of that of proprietors, and of that of cultivators. They furnish it both
with the materials of its work, and with the fund of its subsistence, with the
corn and cattle which it consumes while it is employed about that work.
The proprietors and cultivators finally pay both the wages of all the
workmen of the unproductive class, and the profits of all their employers.
Those workmen and their employers are properly the servants of the
proprietors and cultivators. They are only servants who work without doors,
as menial servants work within. Both the one and the other, however, are
equally maintained at the expense of the same masters. The labour of both
is equally unproductive. It adds nothing to the value of the sum total of the
rude produce of the land. Instead of increasing the value of that sum total, it
is a charge and expense which must be paid out of it.
The unproductive class, however, is not only useful, but greatly useful, to
the other two classes. By means of the industry of merchants, artificers, and
manufacturers, the proprietors and cultivators can purchase both the foreign
goods and the manufactured produce of their own country, which they have
occasion for, with the produce of a much smaller quantity of their own
labour, than what they would be obliged to employ, if they were to attempt,
in an awkward and unskilful manner, either to import the one, or to make
the other, for their own use. By means of the unproductive class, the
cultivators are delivered from many cares, which would otherwise distract
their attention from the cultivation of land. The superiority of produce,
which in consequence of this undivided attention, they are enabled to raise,
is fully sufficient to pay the whole expense which the maintenance and
employment of the unproductive class costs either the proprietors or
themselves. The industry of merchants, artificers, and manufacturers,
though in its own nature altogether unproductive, yet contributes in this
manner indirectly to increase the produce of the land. It increases the
productive powers of productive labour, by leaving it at liberty to confine
itself to its proper employment, the cultivation of land; and the plough goes
frequently the easier and the better, by means of the labour of the man
whose business is most remote from the plough.
It can never be the interest of the proprietors and cultivators, to restrain
or to discourage, in any respect, the industry of merchants, artificers, and
manufacturers. The greater the liberty which this unproductive class enjoys,
the greater will be the competition in all the different trades which compose
it, and the cheaper will the other two classes be supplied, both with foreign
goods and with the manufactured produce of their own country.
It can never be the interest of the unproductive class to oppress the other
two classes. It is the surplus produce of the land, or what remains after
deducting the maintenance, first of the cultivators, and afterwards of the
proprietors, that maintains and employs the unproductive class. The greater
this surplus, the greater must likewise be the maintenance and employment
of that class. The establishment of perfect justice, of perfect liberty, and of
perfect equality, is the very simple secret which most effectually secures the
highest degree of prosperity to all the three classes.
The merchants, artificers, and manufacturers of those mercantile states,
which, like Holland and Hamburgh, consist chiefly of this unproductive
class, are in the same manner maintained and employed altogether at the
expense of the proprietors and cultivators of land. The only difference is,
that those proprietors and cultivators are, the greater part of them, placed at
a most inconvenient distance from the merchants, artificers, and
manufacturers, whom they supply with the materials of their work and the
fund of their subsistence; are the inhabitants of other countries, and the
subjects of other governments.
Such mercantile states, however, are not only useful, but greatly useful,
to the inhabitants of those other countries. They fill up, in some measure, a
very important void; and supply the place of the merchants, artificers, and
manufacturers, whom the inhabitants of those countries ought to find at
home, but whom, from some defect in their policy, they do not find at
home.
It can never be the interest of those landed nations, if I may call them so,
to discourage or distress the industry of such mercantile states, by imposing
high duties upon their trade, or upon the commodities which they furnish.
Such duties, by rendering those commodities dearer, could serve only to
sink the real value of the surplus produce of their own land, with which, or,
what comes to the same thing, with the price of which those commodities
are purchased. Such duties could only serve to discourage the increase of
that surplus produce, and consequently the improvement and cultivation of
their own land. The most effectual expedient, on the contrary, for raising the
value of that surplus produce, for encouraging its increase, and
consequently the improvement and cultivation of their own land, would be
to allow the most perfect freedom to the trade of all such mercantile
nations.
This perfect freedom of trade would even be the most effectual expedient
for supplying them, in due time, with all the artificers, manufacturers, and
merchants, whom they wanted at home; and for filling up, in the properest
and most advantageous manner, that very important void which they felt
there.
The continual increase of the surplus produce of their land would, in due
time, create a greater capital than what would be employed with the
ordinary rate of profit in the improvement and cultivation of land; and the
surplus part of it would naturally turn itself to the employment of artificers
and manufacturers, at home. But these artificers and manufacturers, finding
at home both the materials of their work and the fund of their subsistence,
might immediately, even with much less art and skill be able to work as
cheap as the little artificers and manufacturers of such mercantile states,
who had both to bring from a greater distance. Even though, from want of
art and skill, they might not for some time be able to work as cheap, yet,
finding a market at home, they might be able to sell their work there as
cheap as that of the artificers and manufacturers of such mercantile states,
which could not be brought to that market but from so great a distance; and
as their art and skill improved, they would soon be able to sell it cheaper.
The artificers and manufacturers of such mercantile states, therefore, would
immediately be rivalled in the market of those landed nations, and soon
after undersold and justled out of it altogether. The cheapness of the
manufactures of those landed nations, in consequence of the gradual
improvements of art and skill, would, in due time, extend their sale beyond
the home market, and carry them to many foreign markets, from which they
would, in the same manner, gradually justle out many of the manufacturers
of such mercantile nations.
This continual increase, both of the rude and manufactured produce of
those landed nations, would, in due time, create a greater capital than could,
with the ordinary rate of profit, be employed either in agriculture or in
manufactures. The surplus of this capital would naturally turn itself to
foreign trade and be employed in exporting, to foreign countries, such parts
of the rude and manufactured produce of its own country, as exceeded the
demand of the home market. In the exportation of the produce of their own
country, the merchants of a landed nation would have an advantage of the
same kind over those of mercantile nations, which its artificers and
manufacturers had over the artificers and manufacturers of such nations; the
advantage of finding at home that cargo, and those stores and provisions,
which the others were obliged to seek for at a distance. With inferior art and
skill in navigation, therefore, they would be able to sell that cargo as cheap
in foreign markets as the merchants of such mercantile nations; and with
equal art and skill they would be able to sell it cheaper. They would soon,
therefore, rival those mercantile nations in this branch of foreign trade, and,
in due time, would justle them out of it altogether.
According to this liberal and generous system, therefore, the most
advantageous method in which a landed nation can raise up artificers,
manufacturers, and merchants of its own, is to grant the most perfect
freedom of trade to the artificers, manufacturers, and merchants of all other
nations. It thereby raises the value of the surplus produce of its own land, of
which the continual increase gradually establishes a fund, which, in due
time, necessarily raises up all the artificers, manufacturers, and merchants,
whom it has occasion for.
When a landed nation on the contrary, oppresses, either by high duties or
by prohibitions, the trade of foreign nations, it necessarily hurts its own
interest in two different ways. First, by raising the price of all foreign
goods, and of all sorts of manufactures, it necessarily sinks the real value of
the surplus produce of its own land, with which, or, what comes to the same
thing, with the price of which, it purchases those foreign goods and
manufactures. Secondly, by giving a sort of monopoly of the home market
to its own merchants, artificers, and manufacturers, it raises the rate of
mercantile and manufacturing profit, in proportion to that of agricultural
profit; and, consequently, either draws from agriculture a part of the capital
which had before been employed in it, or hinders from going to it a part of
what would otherwise have gone to it. This policy, therefore, discourages
agriculture in two different ways; first, by sinking the real value of its
produce, and thereby lowering the rate of its profits; and, secondly, by
raising the rate of profit in all other employments. Agriculture is rendered
less advantageous, and trade and manufactures more advantageous, than
they otherwise would be; and every man is tempted by his own interest to
turn, as much as he can, both his capital and his industry from the former to
the latter employments.
Though, by this oppressive policy, a landed nation should be able to raise
up artificers, manufacturers, and merchants of its own, somewhat sooner
than it could do by the freedom of trade; a matter, however, which is not a
little doubtful; yet it would raise them up, if one may say so, prematurely,
and before it was perfectly ripe for them. By raising up too hastily one
species of industry, it would depress another more valuable species of
industry. By raising up too hastily a species of industry which duly replaces
the stock which employs it, together with the ordinary profit, it would
depress a species of industry which, over and above replacing that stock,
with its profit, affords likewise a neat produce, a free rent to the landlord. It
would depress productive labour, by encouraging too hastily that labour
which is altogether barren and unproductive.
In what manner, according to this system, the sum total of the annual
produce of the land is distributed among the three classes above mentioned,
and in what manner the labour of the unproductive class does no more than
replace the value of its own consumption, without increasing in any respect
the value of that sum total, is represented by Mr Quesnai, the very
ingenious and profound author of this system, in some arithmetical
formularies. The first of these formularies, which, by way of eminence, he
peculiarly distinguishes by the name of the Economical Table, represents
the manner in which he supposes this distribution takes place, in a state of
the most perfect liberty, and, therefore, of the highest prosperity; in a state
where the annual produce is such as to afford the greatest possible neat
produce, and where each class enjoys its proper share of the whole annual
produce. Some subsequent formularies represent the manner in which he
supposes this distribution is made in different states of restraint and
regulation; in which, either the class of proprietors, or the barren and
unproductive class, is more favoured than the class of cultivators; and in
which either the one or the other encroaches, more or less, upon the share
which ought properly to belong to this productive class. Every such
encroachment, every violation of that natural distribution, which the most
perfect liberty would establish, must, according to this system, necessarily
degrade, more or less, from one year to another, the value and sum total of
the annual produce, and must necessarily occasion a gradual declension in
the real wealth and revenue of the society; a declension, of which the
progress must be quicker or slower, according to the degree of this
encroachment, according as that natural distribution, which the most perfect
liberty would establish, is more or less violated. Those subsequent
formularies represent the different degrees of declension which, according
to this system, correspond to the different degrees in which this natural
distribution of things is violated.
Some speculative physicians seem to have imagined that the health of the
human body could be preserved only by a certain precise regimen of diet
and exercise, of which every, the smallest violation, necessarily occasioned
some degree of disease or disorder proportionate to the degree of the
violation. Experience, however, would seem to shew, that the human body
frequently preserves, to all appearance at least, the most perfect state of
health under a vast variety of different regimens; even under some which
are generally believed to be very far from being perfectly wholesome. But
the healthful state of the human body, it would seem, contains in itself some
unknown principle of preservation, capable either of preventing or of
correcting, in many respects, the bad effects even of a very faulty regimen.
Mr Quesnai, who was himself a physician, and a very speculative
physician, seems to have entertained a notion of the same kind concerning
the political body, and to have imagined that it would thrive and prosper
only under a certain precise regimen, the exact regimen of perfect liberty
and perfect justice. He seems not to have considered, that in the political
body, the natural effort which every man is continually making to better his
own condition, is a principle of preservation capable of preventing and
correcting, in many respects, the bad effects of a political economy, in some
degree both partial and oppressive. Such a political economy, though it no
doubt retards more or less, is not always capable of stopping altogether, the
natural progress of a nation towards wealth and prosperity, and still less of
making it go backwards. If a nation could not prosper without the
enjoyment of perfect liberty and perfect justice, there is not in the world a
nation which could ever have prospered. In the political body, however, the
wisdom of nature has fortunately made ample provision for remedying
many of the bad effects of the folly and injustice of man; it the same
manner as it has done in the natural body, for remedying those of his sloth
and intemperance.
The capital error of this system, however, seems to lie in its representing
the class of artificers, manufacturers, and merchants, as altogether barren
and unproductive. The following observations may serve to shew the
impropriety of this representation:—
First, this class, it is acknowledged, reproduces annually the value of its
own annual consmnption, and continues, at least, the existence of the stock
or capital which maintains and employs it. But, upon this account alone, the
denomination of barren or unproductive should seem to be very improperly
applied to it. We should not call a marriage barren or unproductive, though
it produced only a son and a daughter, to replace the father and mother, and
though it did not increase the number of the human species, but only
continued it as it was before. Farmers and country labourers, indeed, over
and above the stock which maintains and employs them, reproduce annually
a neat produce, a free rent to the landlord. As a marriage which affords
three children is certainly more productive than one which affords only two,
so the labour of farmers and country labourers is certainly more productive
than that of merchants, artificers, and manufacturers. The superior produce
of the one class, however, does not, render the other barren or unproductive.
Secondly, it seems, on this account, altogether improper to consider
artificers, manufacturers, and merchants, in the same light as menial
servants. The labour of menial servants does not continue the existence of
the fund which maintains and employs them. Their maintenance and
employment is altogether at the expense of their masters, and the work
which they perform is not of a nature to repay that expense. That work
consists in services which perish generally in the very instant of their
performance, and does not fix or realize itself in any vendible commodity,
which can replace the value of their wages and maintenance. The labour, on
the contrary, of artificers, manufacturers, and merchants, naturally does fix
and realize itself in some such vendible commodity. It is upon this account
that, in the chapter in which I treat of productive and unproductive labour, I
have classed artificers, manufacturers, and merchants among the productive
labourers, and menial servants among the barren or unproductive.
Thirdly, it seems, upon every supposition, improper to say, that the labour
of artificers, manufacturers, and merchants, does not increase the real
revenue of the society. Though we should suppose, for example, as it seems
to be supposed in this system, that the value of the daily, monthly, and
yearly consumption of this class was exactly equal to that of its daily,
monthly, and yearly production; yet it would not from thence follow, that its
labour added nothing to the real revenue, to the real value of the annual
produce of the land and labour of the society. An artificer, for example,
who, in the first six months after harvest, executes ten pounds worth of
work, though he should, in the same time, consume ten pounds worth of
corn and other necessaries, yet really adds the value of ten pounds to the
annual produce of the land and labour of the society. While he has been
consuming a half-yearly revenue of ten pounds worth of corn and other
necessaries, he has produced an equal value of work, capable of purchasing,
either to himself, or to some other person, an equal half-yearly revenue. The
value, therefore, of what has been consumed and produced during these six
months, is equal, not to ten, but to twenty pounds. It is possible, indeed, that
no more than ten pounds worth of this value may ever have existed at any
one moment of time. But if the ten pounds worth of corn and other
necessaries which were consumed by the artificer, had been consumed by a
soldier, or by a menial servant, the value of that part of the annual produce
which existed at the end of the six months, would have been ten pounds less
than it actually is in consequence of the labour of the artificer. Though the
value of what the artificer produces, therefore, should not, at any one
moment of time, be supposed greater than the value he consumes, yet, at
every moment of time, the actually existing value of goods in the market is,
in consequence of what he produces, greater than it otherwise would be.
When the patrons of this system assert, that the consumption of artificers,
manufacturers, and merchants, is equal to the value of what they produce,
they probably mean no more than that their revenue, or the fund destined
for their consumption, is equal to it. But if they had expressed themselves
more accurately, and only asserted, that the revenue of this class was equal
to the value of what they produced, it might readily have occurred to the
reader, that what would naturally be saved out of this revenue, must
necessarily increase more or less the real wealth of the society. In order,
therefore, to make out something like an argument, it was necessary that
they should express themselves as they have done; and this argument, even
supposing things actually were as it seems to presume them to be, turns out
to be a very inconclusive one.
Fourthly, farmers and country labourers can no more augment, without
parsimony, the real revenue, the annual produce of the land and labour of
their society, than artificers, manufacturers, and merchants. The annual
produce of the land and labour of any society can be augmented only in two
ways; either, first, by some improvement in the productive powers of the
useful labour actually maintained within it; or, secondly, by some increase
in the quantity of that labour.
The improvement in the productive powers of useful labour depends,
first, upon the improvement in the ability of the workman; and, secondly,
upon that of the machinery with which he works. But the labour of artificers
and manufacturers, as it is capable of being more subdivided, and the labour
of each workman reduced to a greater simplicity of operation, than that of
farmers and country labourers; so it is likewise capable of both these sorts
of improvement in a much higher degree {See book i chap. 1.} In this
respect, therefore, the class of cultivators can have no sort of advantage
over that of artificers and manufacturers.
The increase in the quantity of useful labour actually employed within
any society must depend altogether upon the increase of the capital which
employs it; and the increase of that capital, again, must be exactly equal to
the amount of the savings from the revenue, either of the particular persons
who manage and direct the employment of that capital, or of some other
persons, who lend it to them. If merchants, artificers, and manufacturers
are, as this system seems to suppose, naturally more inclined to parsimony
and saving than proprietors and cultivators, they are, so far, more likely to
augment the quantity of useful labour employed within their society, and
consequently to increase its real revenue, the annual produce of its land and
labour.
Fifthly and lastly, though the revenue of the inhabitants of every country
was supposed to consist altogether, as this system seems to suppose, in the
quantity of subsistence which their industry could procure to them; yet,
even upon this supposition, the revenue of a trading and manufacturing
country must, other things being equal, always be much greater than that of
one without trade or manufactures. By means of trade and manufactures, a
greater quantity of subsistence can be annually imported into a particular
country, than what its own lands, in the actual state of their cultivation,
could afford. The inhabitants of a town, though they frequently possess no
lands of their own, yet draw to themselves, by their industry, such a
quantity of the rude produce of the lands of other people, as supplies them,
not only with the materials of their work, but with the fund of their
subsistence. What a town always is with regard to the country in its
neighbourhood, one independent state or country may frequently be with
regard to other independent states or countries. It is thus that Holland draws
a great part of its subsistence from other countries; live cattle from Holstein
and Jutland, and corn from almost all the different countries of Europe. A
small quantity of manufactured produce, purchases a great quantity of rude
produce. A trading and manufacturing country, therefore, naturally
purchases, with a small part of its manufactured produce, a great part of the
rude produce of other countries; while, on the contrary, a country without
trade and manufactures is generally obliged to purchase, at the expense of a
great part of its rude produce, a very small part of the manufactured
produce of other countries. The one exports what can subsist and
accommodate but a very few, and imports the subsistence and
accommodation of a great number. The other exports the accommodation
and subsistence of a great number, and imports that of a very few only. The
inhabitants of the one must always enjoy a much greater quantity of
subsistence than what their own lands, in the actual state of their
cultivation, could afford. The inhabitants of the other must always enjoy a
much smaller quantity.
This system, however, with all its imperfections, is perhaps the nearest
approximation to the truth that has yet been published upon the subject of
political economy; and is upon that account, well worth the consideration of
every man who wishes to examine with attention the principles of that very
important science. Though in representing the labour which is employed
upon land as the only productive labour, the notions which it inculcates are,
perhaps, too narrow and confined; yet in representing the wealth of nations
as consisting, not in the unconsumable riches of money, but in the
consumable goods annually reproduced by the labour of the society, and in
representing perfect liberty as the only effectual expedient for rendering this
annual reproduction the greatest possible, its doctrine seems to be in every
respect as just as it is generous and liberal. Its followers are very numerous;
and as men are fond of paradoxes, and of appearing to understand what
surpasses the comprehensions of ordinary people, the paradox which it
maintains, concerning the unproductive nature of manufacturing labour, has
not, perhaps, contributed a little to increase the number of its admirers.
They have for some years past made a pretty considerable sect,
distinguished in the French republic of letters by the name of the
Economists. Their works have certainly been of some service to their
country; not only by bringing into general discussion, many subjects which
had never been well examined before, but by influencing, in some measure,
the public administration in favour of agriculture. It has been in
consequence of their representations, accordingly, that the agriculture of
France has been delivered from several of the oppressions which it before
laboured under. The term, during which such a lease can be granted, as will
be valid against every future purchaser or proprietor of the land, has been
prolonged from nine to twenty-seven years. The ancient provincial
restraints upon the transportation of corn from one province of the kingdom
to another, have been entirely taken away; and the liberty of exporting it to
all foreign countries, has been established as the common law of the
kingdom in all ordinary cases. This sect, in their works, which are very
numerous, and which treat not only of what is properly called Political
Economy, or of the nature and causes or the wealth of nations, but of every
other branch of the system of civil government, all follow implicitly, and
without any sensible variation, the doctrine of Mr. Qttesnai. There is, upon
this account, little variety in the greater part of their works. The most
distinct and best connected account of this doctrine is to be found in a little
book written by Mr. Mercier de la Riviere, some time intendant of
Martinico, entitled, The natural and essential Order of Political Societies.
The admiration of this whole sect for their master, who was himself a man
of the greatest modesty and simplicity, is not inferior to that of any of the
ancient philosophers for the founders of their respective systems. ‘There
have been since the world began,’ says a very diligent and respectable
author, the Marquis de Mirabeau, ‘three great inventions which have
principally given stability to political societies, independent of many other
inventions which have enriched and adorned them. The first is the invention
of writing, which alone gives human nature the power of transmitting,
without alteration, its laws, its contracts, its annals, and its discoveries. The
second is the invention of money, which binds together all the relations
between civilized societies. The third is the economical table, the result of
the other two, which completes them both by perfecting their object; the
great discovery of our age, but of which our posterity will reap the benefit.’
As the political economy of the nations of modern Europe has been more
favourable to manufactures and foreign trade, the industry of the towns,
than to agriculture, the industry of the country; so that of other nations has
followed a different plan, and has been more favourable to agriculture than
to manufactures and foreign trade.
The policy of China favours agriculture more than all other
employments. In China, the condition of a labourer is said to be as much
superior to that of an artificer, as in most parts of Europe that of an artificer
is to that of a labourer. In China, the great ambition of every man is to get
possession of a little bit of land, either in property or in lease; and leases are
there said to be granted upon very moderate terms, and to be sufficiently
secured to the lessees. The Chinese have little respect for foreign trade.
Your beggarly commerce! was the language in which the mandarins of
Pekin used to talk to Mr. De Lange, the Russian envoy, concerning it {See
the Journal of Mr. De Lange, in Bell’s Travels, vol. ii. p. 258, 276, 293.}.
Except with Japan, the Chinese carry on, themselves, and in their own
bottoms, little or no foreign trade; and it is only into one or two ports of
their kingdom that they even admit the ships of foreign nations. Foreign
trade, therefore, is, in China, every way confined within a much narrower
circle than that to which it would naturally extend itself, if more freedom
was allowed to it, either in their own ships, or in those of foreign nations.
Manufactures, as in a small bulk they frequently contain a great value,
and can upon that account be transported at less expense from one country
to another than most parts of rude produce, are, in almost all countries, the
principal support of foreign trade. In countries, besides, less extensive, and
less favourably circumstanced for inferior commerce than China, they
generally require the support of foreign trade. Without an extensive foreign
market, they could not well flourish, either in countries so moderately
extensive as to afford but a narrow home market, or in countries where the
communication between one province and another was so difficult, as to
render it impossible for the goods of any particular place to enjoy the whole
of that home market which the country could afford. The perfection of
manufacturing industry, it must be remembered, depends altogether upon
the division of labour; and the degree to which the division of labour can be
introduced into any manufacture, is necessarily regulated, it has already
been shewn, by the extent of the market. But the great extent of the empire
of China, the vast multitude of its inhabitants, the variety of climate, and
consequently of productions in its different provinces, and the easy
communication by means of water-carriage between the greater part of
them, render the home market of that country of so great extent, as to be
alone sufficient to support very great manufactures, and to admit of very
considerable subdivisions of labour. The home market of China is, perhaps,
in extent, not much inferior to the market of all the different countries of
Europe put together. A more extensive foreign trade, however, which to this
great home market added the foreign market of all the rest of the world,
especially if any considerable part of this trade was carried on in Chinese
ships, could scarce fail to increase very much the manufactures of China,
and to improve very much the productive powers of its manufacturing
industry. By a more extensive navigation, the Chinese would naturally learn
the art of using and constructing, themselves, all the different machines
made use of in other countries, as well as the other improvements of art and
industry which are practised in all the different parts of the world. Upon
their present plan, they have little opportunity of improving themselves by
the example of any other nation, except that of the Japanese.
The policy of ancient Egypt, too, and that of the Gentoo government of
Indostan, seem to have favoured agriculture more than all other
employments.
Both in ancient Egypt and Indostan, the whole body of the people was
divided into different casts or tribes each of which was confined, from
father to son, to a particular employment, or class of employments. The son
of a priest was necessarily a priest; the son of a soldier, a soldier; the son of
a labourer, a labourer; the son of a weaver, a weaver; the son of a tailor, a
tailor, etc. In both countries, the cast of the priests holds the highest rank,
and that of the soldiers the next; and in both countries the cast of the
farmers and labourers was superior to the casts of merchants and
manufacturers.
The government of both countries was particularly attentive to the
interest of agriculture. The works constructed by the ancient sovereigns of
Egypt, for the proper distribution of the waters of the Nile, were famous in
antiquity, and the ruined remains of some of them are still the admiration of
travellers. Those of the same kind which were constructed by the ancient
sovereigns of Indostan, for the proper distribution of the waters of the
Ganges, as well as of many other rivers, though they have been less
celebrated, seem to have been equally great. Both countries, accordingly,
though subject occasionally to dearths, have been famous for their great
fertility. Though both were extremely populous, yet, in years of moderate
plenty, they were both able to export great quantities of grain to their
neighbours.
The ancient Egyptians had a superstitious aversion to the sea; and as the
Gentoo religion does not permit its followers to light a fire, nor
consequently to dress any victuals, upon the water, it, in effect, prohibits
them from all distant sea voyages. Both the Egyptians and Indians must
have depended almost altogether upon the navigation of other nations for
the exportation of their surplus produce; and this dependency, as it must
have confined the market, so it must have discouraged the increase of this
surplus produce. It must have discouraged, too, the increase of the
manufactured produce, more than that of the rude produce. Manufactures
require a much more extensive market than the most important parts of the
rude produce of the land. A single shoemaker will make more than 300
pairs of shoes in the year; and his own family will not, perhaps, wear out six
pairs. Unless, therefore, he has the custom of, at least, 50 such families as
his own, he cannot dispose of the whole product of his own labour. The
most numerous class of artificers will seldom, in a large country, make
more than one in 50, or one in a 100, of the whole number of families
contained in it. But in such large countries, as France and England, the
number of people employed in agriculture has, by some authors been
computed at a half, by others at a third and by no author that I know of, at
less that a fifth of the whole inhabitants of the country. But as the produce
of the agriculture of both France and England is, the far greater part of it,
consumed at home, each person employed in it must, according to these
computations, require little more than the custom of one, two, or, at most, of
four such families as his own, in order to dispose of the whole produce of
his own labour. Agriculture, therefore, can support itself under the
discouragement of a confined market much better than manufactures. In
both ancient Egypt and Indostan, indeed, the confinement of the foreign
market was in some measure compensated by the conveniency of many
inland navigations, which opened, in the most advantageous manner, the
whole extent of the home market to every part of the produce of every
different district of those countries. The great extent of Indostan, too,
rendered the home market of that country very great, and sufficient to
support a great variety of manufactures. But the small extent of ancient
Egypt, which was never equal to England, must at all times, have rendered
the home market of that country too narrow for supporting any great variety
of manufactures. Bengal accordingly, the province of Indostan which
commonly exports the greatest quantity of rice, has always been more
remarkable for the exportation of a great variety of manufactures, than for
that of its grain. Ancient Egypt, on the contrary, though it exported some
manufactures, fine linen in particular, as well as some other goods, was
always most distinguished for its great exportation of grain. It was long the
granary of the Roman empire.
The sovereigns of China, of ancient Egypt, and of the different kingdoms
into which Indostan has, at different times, been divided, have always
derived the whole, or by far the most considerable part, of their revenue,
from some sort of land tax or land rent. This land tax, or land rent, like the
tithe in Europe, consisted in a certain proportion, a fifth, it is said, of the
produce of the land, which was either delivered in kind, or paid in money,
according to a certain valuation, and which, therefore, varied from year to
year, according to all the variations of the produce. It was natural, therefore,
that the sovereigns of those countries should be particularly attentive to the
interests of agriculture, upon the prosperity or declension of which
immediately depended the yearly increase or diminution of their own
revenue.
The policy of the ancient republics of Greece, and that of Rome, though
it honoured agriculture more than manufactures or foreign trade, yet seems
rather to have discouraged the latter employments, than to have given any
direct or intentional encouragement to the former. In several of the ancient
states of Greece, foreign trade was prohibited altogether; and in several
others, the employments of artificers and manufacturers were considered as
hurtful to the strength and agility of the human body, as rendering it
incapable of those habits which their military and gymnastic exercises
endeavoured to form in it, and as thereby disqualifying it, more or less, for
undergoing the fatigues and encountering the dangers of war. Such
occupations were considered as fit only for slaves, and the free citizens of
the states were prohibited from exercising them. Even in those states where
no such prohibition took place, as in Rome and Athens, the great body of
the people were in effect excluded from all the trades which are now
commonly exercised by the lower sort of the inhabitants of towns. Such
trades were, at Athens and Rome, all occupied by the slaves of the rich,
who exercised them for the benefit of their masters, whose wealth, power,
and protection, made it almost impossible for a poor freeman to find a
market for his work, when it came into competition with that of the slaves
of the rich. Slaves, however, are very seldom inventive; and all the most
important improvements, either in machinery, or in the arrangement and
distribution of work, which facilitate and abridge labour have been the
discoveries of freemen. Should a slave propose any improvement of this
kind, his master would be very apt to consider the proposal as the
suggestion of laziness, and of a desire to save his own labour at the master’s
expense. The poor slave, instead of reward would probably meet with much
abuse, perhaps with some punishment. In the manufactures carried on by
slaves, therefore, more labour must generally have been employed to
execute the same quantity of work, than in those carried on by freemen. The
work of the farmer must, upon that account, generally have been dearer
than that of the latter. The Hungarian mines, it is remarked by Mr.
Montesquieu, though not richer, have always been wrought with less
expense, and therefore with more profit, than the Turkish mines in their
neighbourhood. The Turkish mines are wrought by slaves; and the arms of
those slaves are the only machines which the Turks have ever thought of
employing. The Hungarian mines are wrought by freemen, who employ a
great deal of machinery, by which they facilitate and abridge their own
labour. From the very little that is known about the price of manufactures in
the times of the Greeks and Romans, it would appear that those of the finer
sort were excessively dear. Silk sold for its weight in gold. It was not,
indeed, in those times an European manufacture; and as it was all brought
from the East Indies, the distance of the carriage may in some measure
account for the greatness of the price. The price, however, which a lady, it is
said, would sometimes pay for a piece of very fine linen, seems to have
been equally extravagant; and as linen was always either an European, or at
farthest, an Egyptian manufacture, this high price can be accounted for only
by the great expense of the labour which must have been employed about It,
and the expense of this labour again could arise from nothing but the
awkwardness of the machinery which is made use of. The price of fine
woollens, too, though not quite so extravagant, seems, however, to have
been much above that of the present times. Some cloths, we are told by
Pliny {Plin. 1. ix.c.39.}, dyed in a particular manner, cost a hundred denarii,
or £3:6s:8d. the pound weight. Others, dyed in another manner, cost a
thousand denarii the pound weight, or £33:6s:8d. The Roman pound, it
must be remembered, contained only twelve of our avoirdupois ounces.
This high price, indeed, seems to have been principally owing to the dye.
But had not the cloths themselves been much dearer than any which are
made in the present times, so very expensive a dye would not probably have
been bestowed upon them. The disproportion would have been too great
between the value of the accessory and that of the principal. The price
mentioned by the same author {Plin. 1. viii.c.48.}, of some triclinaria, a sort
of woollen pillows or cushions made use of to lean upon as they reclined
upon their couches at table, passes all credibility; some of them being said
to have cost more than £30,000, others more than £300,000. This high
price, too, is not said to have arisen from the dye. In the dress of the people
of fashion of both sexes, there seems to have been much less variety, it is
observed by Dr. Arbuthnot, in ancient than in modern times; and the very
little variety which we find in that of the ancient statues, confirms his
observation. He infers from this, that their dress must, upon the whole, have
been cheaper than ours; but the conclusion does not seem to follow. When
the expense of fashionable dress is very great, the variety must be very
small. But when, by the improvements in the productive powers of
manufacturing art and industry, the expense of any one dress comes to be
very moderate, the variety will naturally be very great. The rich, not being
able to distinguish themselves by the expense of any one dress, will
naturally endeavour to do so by the multitude and variety of their dresses.
The greatest and most important branch of the commerce of every nation,
it has already been observed, is that which is carried on between the
inhabitants of the town and those of the country. The inhabitants of the
town draw from the country the rude produce, which constitutes both the
materials of their work and the fund of their subsistence; and they pay for
this rude produce, by sending back to the country a certain portion of it
manufactured and prepared for immediate use. The trade which is carried
on between these two different sets of people, consists ultimately in a
certain quantity of rude produce exchanged for a certain quantity of
manufactured produce. The dearer the latter, therefore, the cheaper the
former; and whatever tends in any country to raise the price of
manufactured produce, tends to lower that of the rude produce of the land,
and thereby to discourage agriculture. The smaller the quantity of
manufactured produce, which any given quantity of rude produce, or, what
comes to the same thing, which the price of any given quantity of rude
produce, is capable of purchasing, the smaller the exchangeable value of
that given quantity of rude produce; the smaller the encouragement which
either the landlord has to increase its quantity by improving, or the farmer
by cultivating the land. Whatever, besides, tends to diminish in any country
the number of artificers and manufacturers, tends to diminish the home
market, the most important of all markets, for the rude produce of the land,
and thereby still further to discourage agriculture.
Those systems, therefore, which preferring agriculture to all other
employments, in order to promote it, impose restraints upon manufactures
and foreign trade, act contrary to the very end which they propose, and
indirectly discourage that very species of industry which they mean to
promote. They are so far, perhaps, more inconsistent than even the
mercantile system. That system, by encouraging manufactures and foreign
trade more than agriculture, turns a certain portion of the capital of the
society, from supporting a more advantageous, to support a less
advantageous species of industry. But still it really, and in the end,
encourages that species of industry which it means to promote. Those
agricultural systems, on the contrary, really, and in the end, discourage their
own favourite species of industry.
It is thus that every system which endeavours, either, by extraordinary
encouragements to draw towards a particular species of industry a greater
share of the capital of the society than what would naturally go to it, or, by
extraordinary restraints, to force from a particular species of industry some
share of the capital which would otherwise be employed in it, is, in reality,
subversive of the great purpose which it means to promote. It retards,
instead of accelerating the progress of the society towards real wealth and
greatness; and diminishes, instead of increasing, the real value of the annual
produce of its land and labour.
All systems, either of preference or of restraint, therefore, being thus
completely taken away, the obvious and simple system of natural liberty
establishes itself of its own accord. Every man, as long as he does not
violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his own interest his
own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competition with
those of any other man, or order of men. The sovereign is completely
discharged from a duty, in the attempting to perform which he must always
be exposed to innumerable delusions, and for the proper performance of
which, no human wisdom or knowledge could ever be sufficient; the duty
of superintending the industry of private people, and of directing it towards
the employments most suitable to the interests of the society. According to
the system of natural liberty, the sovereign has only three duties to attend
to; three duties of great importance, indeed, but plain and intelligible to
common understandings: first, the duty of protecting the society from the
violence and invasion of other independent societies; secondly, the duty of
protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the
injustice or oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of
establishing an exact administration of justice; and, thirdly, the duty of
erecting and maintaining certain public works, and certain public
institutions, which it can never be for the interest of any individual, or small
number of individuals to erect and maintain; because the profit could never
repay the expense to any individual, or small number of individuals, though
it may frequently do much more than repay it to a great society.
The proper performance of those several duties of the sovereign
necessarily supposes a certain expense; and this expense again necessarily
requires a certain revenue to support it. In the following book, therefore, I
shall endeavour to explain, first, what are the necessary expenses of the
sovereign or commonwealth; and which of those expenses ought to be
defrayed by the general contribution of the whole society; and which of
them, by that of some particular part only, or of some particular members of
the society: secondly, what are the different methods in which the whole
society may be made to contribute towards defraying the expenses
incumbent on the whole society; and what are the principal advantages and
inconveniencies of each of those methods: and thirdly, what are the reasons
and causes which have induced almost all modern governments to mortgage
some part of this revenue, or to contract debts; and what have been the
effects of those debts upon the real wealth, the annual produce of the land
and labour of the society. The following book, therefore, will naturally be
divided into three chapters.
APPENDIX TO BOOK IV
The two following accounts are subjoined, in order to illustrate and
confirm what is said in the fifth chapter of the fourth book, concerning the
Tonnage Bounty to the Whit-herring Fishery. The reader, I believe, may
depend upon the accuracy of both accounts.
An account of Busses fitted out in Scotland for eleven Years, with the
Number of empty Barrels carried out, and the Number of Barrels of
Herrings caught; also the Bounty, at a Medium, on each Barrel of Sea-
sricks, and on each Barrel when fully packed.
  Years   Number of  Empty Barrels  Barrels of Her-  Bounty paid on
           Busses     carried out    rings caught      the Busses
                                                          £.  s.  d.
  1771          29        5,948        2,832          2,885   0   0
  1772         168       41,316       22,237         11,055   7   6
  1773         190       42,333       42,055         12,510   8   6
  1774         240       59,303       56,365         26,932   2   6
  1775         275       69,144       52,879         19,315  15   0
  1776         294       76,329       51,863         21,290   7   6
  1777         240       62,679       43,313         17,592   2   6
  1778         220       56,390       40,958         16,316   2   6
  1779         206       55,194       29,367         15,287   0   0
  1780         181       48,315       19,885         13,445  12   6
  1781         135       33,992       16,593          9,613  15   6
      Totals 2,186      550,943      378,347       £165,463  14   0
  Sea-sticks     378,347  Bounty, at a medium, for each
                          barrel of sea-sticks,         £ 0   8   2¼
                          But a barrel of sea-sticks
                          being only reckoned two thirds
                          of a barrel fully packed, one
                          third to be deducted, which
  ¹/³deducted    126,115  brings the bounty to          £ 0  12   3¾
  Barrels fully
  packed         252,231
  And if the herrings are exported, there is besides a
                                           premium of   £ 0   2   8
  So the bounty paid by government in money for each
                                           barrel is    £ 0  14  11¾
  But if to this, the duty of the salt usually taken
  credit for as expended in curing each barrel, which
  at a medium, is, of foreign, one bushel and one-
  fourth of a bushel, at 10s. a-bushel, be added, viz     0  12   6
  the bounty on each barrel would amount to             £ 1   7   5¾
  If the herrings are cured with British salt, it will
  stand thus, viz.
  Bounty as before                                      £ 0  14  11¾
  But if to this bounty, the duty on two bushels of
  Scotch salt, at 1s.6d. per bushel, supposed to be
  the quantity, at a medium, used in curing each
  barrel is added, viz.                                   0   3   0
  The bounty on each barrel will amount to              £ 0  17  11¾
  And when buss herrings are entered for home
  consumption in Scotland, and pay the shilling a
  barrel of duty, the bounty stands thus, to wit,
                                           as before    £ 0  12   3¾
  From which the shilling a barrel is to be deducted      0   1   0
                                                        £ 0  11   3¾
  But to that there is to be added again, the duty of
  the foreign salt used curing a barrel of herring viz    0  12   6
  So that the premium allowed for each barrel of her-
  rings entered for home consumption is                 £ 1   3   9¾
  If the herrings are cured in British salt, it will
  stand as follows viz.
  Bounty on each barrel brought in by the busses, as
  above                                                 £ 0  12   3¾
  From which deduct 1s. a-barrel, paid at the time
  they are entered for home consumption                   0   1   0
                                                        £ 0  11   3¾
  But if to the bounty, the the duty on two bushel
  of Scotch salt, at 1s.6d. per bushel supposed to
  be the quantity, at a medium, used in curing each
  barrel, is added, viz                                   0   3   0
  the premium for each barrel entered for home
  consumption will be                                   £ 1  14   3¾
Though the loss of duties upon herrings exported cannot, perhaps,
properly be considered as bounty, that upon herrings entered for home
consumption certainly may.
An account of the Quantity of Foreign Salt imported into Scotland, and
of Scotch Salt delivered Duty-free from the Works there, for the Fishery,
from the 5th. of April 1771 to the 5th. of April 1782 with the Medium of
both for one Year.
                                Foreign Salt      Scotch Salt delivered
           PERIOD                 imported        from the Works
                                  Bushels              Bushels
  From 5th. April 1771 to
      5th. April 1782             936,974              168,226
  Medium for one year              85,159½              15,293¼
It is to be observed, that the bushel of foreign salt weighs 48lbs., that of
British weighs 56lbs. only.
BOOK V.
OF THE REVENUE OF THE SOVEREIGN OR
COMMONWEALTH
CHAPTER I.
OF THE EXPENSES OF THE SOVEREIGN OR
COMMONWEALTH.
PART I. Of the Expense of Defence.
The first duty of the sovereign, that of protecting the society from the
violence and invasion of other independent societies, can be performed only
by means of a military force. But the expense both of preparing this military
force in time of peace, and of employing it in time of war, is very different
in the different states of society, in the different periods of improvement.
Among nations of hunters, the lowest and rudest state of society, such as
we find it among the native tribes of North America, every man is a warrior,
as well as a hunter. When he goes to war, either to defend his society, or to
revenge the injuries which have been done to it by other societies, he
maintains himself by his own labour, in the same manner as when he lives
at home. His society (for in this state of things there is properly neither
sovereign nor commonwealth) is at no sort of expense, either to prepare him
for the field, or to maintain him while he is in it.
Among nations of shepherds, a more advanced state of society, such as
we find it among the Tartars and Arabs, every man is, in the same manner, a
warrior. Such nations have commonly no fixed habitation, but live either in
tents, or in a sort of covered waggons, which are easily transported from
place to place. The whole tribe, or nation, changes its situation according to
the different seasons of the year, as well as according to other accidents.
When its herds and flocks have consumed the forage of one part of the
country, it removes to another, and from that to a third. In the dry season, it
comes down to the banks of the rivers; in the wet season, it retires to the
upper country. When such a nation goes to war, the warriors will not trust
their herds and flocks to the feeble defence of their old men, their women
and children; and their old men, their women and children, will not be left
behind without defence, and without subsistence. The whole nation,
besides, being accustomed to a wandering life, even in time of peace, easily
takes the field in time of war. Whether it marches as an army, or moves
about as a company of herdsmen, the way of life is nearly the same, though
the object proposed by it be very different. They all go to war together,
therefore, and everyone does as well as he can. Among the Tartars, even the
women have been frequently known to engage in battle. If they conquer,
whatever belongs to the hostile tribe is the recompence of the victory; but if
they are vanquished, all is lost; and not only their herds and flocks, but their
women and children become the booty of the conqueror. Even the greater
part of those who survive the action are obliged to submit to him for the
sake of immediate subsistence. The rest are commonly dissipated and
dispersed in the desert.
The ordinary life, the ordinary exercise of a Tartar or Arab, prepares him
sufficiently for war. Running, wrestling, cudgel-playing, throwing the
javelin, drawing the bow, etc. are the common pastimes of those who live in
the open air, and are all of them the images of war. When a Tartar or Arab
actually goes to war, he is maintained by his own herds and flocks, which
he carries with him, in the same manner as in peace. His chief or sovereign
(for those nations have all chiefs or sovereigns) is at no sort of expense in
preparing him for the field; and when he is in it, the chance of plunder is the
only pay which he either expects or requires.
An army of hunters can seldom exceed two or three hundred men. The
precarious subsistence which the chace affords, could seldom allow a
greater number to keep together for any considerable time. An army of
shepherds, on the contrary, may sometimes amount to two or three hundred
thousand. As long as nothing stops their progress, as long as they can go on
from one district, of which they have consumed the forage, to another,
which is yet entire; there seems to be scarce any limit to the number who
can march on together. A nation of hunters can never be formidable to the
civilized nations in their neighbourhood; a nation of shepherds may.
Nothing can be more contemptible than an Indian war in North America;
nothing, on the contrary, can be more dreadful than a Tartar invasion has
frequently been in Asia. The judgment of Thucydides, that both Europe and
Asia could not resist the Scythians united, has been verified by the
experience of all ages. The inhabitants of the extensive, but defenceless
plains of Scythia or Tartary, have been frequently united under the
dominion of the chief of some conquering horde or clan; and the havock
and devastation of Asia have always signalized their union. The inhabitants
of the inhospitable deserts of Arabia, the other great nation of shepherds,
have never been united but once, under Mahomet and his immediate
successors. Their union, which was more the effect of religious enthusiasm
than of conquest, was signalized in the same manner. If the hunting nations
of America should ever become shepherds, their neighbourhood would be
much more dangerous to the European colonies than it is at present.
In a yet more advanced state of society, among those nations of
husbandmen who have little foreign commerce, and no other manufactures
but those coarse and household ones, which almost every private family
prepares for its own use, every man, in the same manner, either is a warrior,
or easily becomes such. Those who live by agriculture generally pass the
whole day in the open air, exposed to all the inclemencies of the seasons.
The hardiness of their ordinary life prepares them for the fatigues of war, to
some of which their necessary occupations bear a great analogy. The
necessary occupation of a ditcher prepares him to work in the trenches, and
to fortify a camp, as well as to inclose a field. The ordinary pastimes of
such husbandmen are the same as those of shepherds, and are in the same
manner the images of war. But as husbandmen have less leisure than
shepherds, they are not so frequently employed in those pastimes. They are
soldiers but soldiers not quite so much masters of their exercise. Such as
they are, however, it seldom costs the sovereign or commonwealth any
expense to prepare them for the field.
Agriculture, even in its rudest and lowest state, supposes a settlement,
some sort of fixed habitation, which cannot be abandoned without great
loss. When a nation of mere husbandmen, therefore, goes to war, the whole
people cannot take the field together. The old men, the women and children,
at least, must remain at home, to take care of the habitation. All the men of
the military age, however, may take the field, and in small nations of this
kind, have frequently done so. In every nation, the men of the military age
are supposed to amount to about a fourth or a fifth part of the whole body of
the people. If the campaign, too, should begin after seedtime, and end
before harvest, both the husbandman and his principal labourers can be
spared from the farm without much loss. He trusts that the work which must
be done in the mean time, can be well enough executed by the old men, the
women, and the children. He is not unwilling, therefore, to serve without
pay during a short campaign; and it frequently costs the sovereign or
commonwealth as little to maintain him in the field as to prepare him for it.
The citizens of all the different states of ancient Greece seem to have served
in this manner till after the second Persian war; and the people of
Peloponnesus till after the Peloponnesian war. The Peloponnesians,
Thucydides observes, generally left the field in the summer, and returned
home to reap the harvest. The Roman people, under their kings, and during
the first ages of the republic, served in the same manner. It was not till the
seige of Veii, that they who staid at home began to contribute something
towards maintaining those who went to war. In the European monarchies,
which were founded upon the ruins of the Roman empire, both before, and
for some time after, the establishment of what is properly called the feudal
law, the great lords, with all their immediate dependents, used to serve the
crown at their own expense. In the field, in the same manner as at home,
they maintained themselves by their own revenue, and not by any stipend or
pay which they received from the king upon that particular occasion.
In a more advanced state of society, two different causes contribute to
render it altogether impossible that they who take the field should maintain
themselves at their own expense. Those two causes are, the progress of
manufactures, and the improvement in the art of war.
Though a husbandman should be employed in an expedition, provided it
begins after seedtime, and ends before harvest, the interruption of his
business will not always occasion any considerable diminution of his
revenue. Without the intervention of his labour, Nature does herself the
greater part of the work which remains to be done. But the moment that an
artificer, a smith, a carpenter, or a weaver, for example, quits his
workhouse, the sole source of his revenue is completely dried up. Nature
does nothing for him; he does all for himself. When he takes the field,
therefore, in defence of the public, as he has no revenue to maintain
himself, he must necessarily be maintained by the public. But in a country,
of which a great part of the inhabitants are artificers and manufacturers, a
great part of the people who go to war must be drawn from those classes,
and must, therefore, be maintained by the public as long as they are
employed in its service.
When the art of war, too, has gradually grown up to be a very intricate
and complicated science; when the event of war ceases to be determined, as
in the first ages of society, by a single irregular skirmish or battle; but when
the contest is generally spun out through several different campaigns, each
of which lasts during the greater part of the year; it becomes universally
necessary that the public should maintain those who serve the public in war,
at least while they are employed in that service. Whatever, in time of peace,
might be the ordinary occupation of those who go to war, so very tedious
and expensive a service would otherwise be by far too heavy a burden upon
them. After the second Persian war, accordingly, the armies of Athens seem
to have been generally composed of mercenary troops, consisting, indeed,
partly of citizens, but partly, too, of foreigners; and all of them equally hired
and paid at the expense of the state. From the time of the siege of Veii, the
armies of Rome received pay for their service during the time which they
remained in the field. Under the feudal governments, the military service,
both of the great lords, and of their immediate dependents, was, after a
certain period, universally exchanged for a payment in money, which was
employed to maintain those who served in their stead.
The number of those who can go to war, in proportion to the whole
number of the people, is necessarily much smaller in a civilized than in a
rude state of society. In a civilized society, as the soldiers are maintained
altogether by the labour of those who are not soldiers, the number of the
former can never exceed what the latter can maintain, over and above
maintaining, in a manner suitable to their respective stations, both
themselves and the other officers of government and law, whom they are
obliged to maintain. In the little agrarian states of ancient Greece, a fourth
or a fifth part of the whole body of the people considered the themselves as
soldiers, and would sometimes, it is said, take the field. Among the
civilized nations of modern Europe, it is commonly computed, that not
more than the one hundredth part of the inhabitants of any country can be
employed as soldiers, without ruin to the country which pays the expense of
their service.
The expense of preparing the army for the field seems not to have
become considerable in any nation, till long after that of maintaining it in
the field had devolved entirely upon the sovereign or commonwealth. In all
the different republics of ancient Greece, to learn his military exercises, was
a necessary part of education imposed by the state upon every free citizen.
In every city there seems to have been a public field, in which, under the
protection of the public magistrate, the young people were taught their
different exercises by different masters. In this very simple institution
consisted the whole expense which any Grecian state seems ever to have
been at, in preparing its citizens for war. In ancient Rome, the exercises of
the Campus Martius answered the same purpose with those of the
Gymnasium in ancient Greece. Under the feudal governments, the many
public ordinances, that the citizens of every district should practise archery,
as well as several other military exercises, were intended for promoting the
same purpose, but do not seem to have promoted it so well. Either from
want of interest in the officers entrusted with the execution of those
ordinances, or from some other cause, they appear to have been universally
neglected; and in the progress of all those governments, military exercises
seem to have gone gradually into disuse among the great body of the
people.
In the republics of ancient Greece and Rome, during the whole period of
their existence, and under the feudal governments, for a considerable time
after their first establishment, the trade of a soldier was not a separate,
distinct trade, which constituted the sole or principal occupation of a
particular class of citizens; every subject of the state, whatever might be the
ordinary trade or occupation by which he gained his livelihood, considered
himself, upon all ordinary occasions, as fit likewise to exercise the trade of
a soldier, and, upon many extraordinary occasions, as bound to exercise it.
The art of war, however, as it is certainly the noblest of all arts, so, in the
progress of improvement, it necessarily becomes one of the most
complicated among them. The state of the mechanical, as well as some
other arts, with which it is necessarily connected, determines the degree of
perfection to which it is capable of being carried at any particular time. But
in order to carry it to this degree of perfection, it is necessary that it should
become the sole or principal occupation of a particular class of citizens; and
the division of labour is as necessary for the improvement of this, as of
every other art. Into other arts, the division of labour is naturally introduced
by the prudence of individuals, who find that they promote their private
interest better by confining themselves to a particular trade, than by
exercising a great number. But it is the wisdom of the state only, which can
render the trade of a soldier a particular trade, separate and distinct from all
others. A private citizen, who, in time of profound peace, and without any
particular encouragement from the public, should spend the greater part of
his time in military exercises, might, no doubt, both improve himself very
much in them, and amuse himself very well; but he certainly would not
promote his own interest. It is the wisdom of the state only, which can
render it for his interest to give up the greater part of his time to this
peculiar occupation; and states have not always had this wisdom, even
when their circumstances had become such, that the preservation of their
existence required that they should have it.
A shepherd has a great deal of leisure; a husbandman, in the rude state of
husbandry, has some; an artificer or manufacturer has none at all. The first
may, without any loss, employ a great deal of his time in martial exercises;
the second may employ some part of it; but the last cannot employ a single
hour in them without some loss, and his attention to his own interest
naturally leads him to neglect them altogether. Those improvements in
husbandry, too, which the progress of arts and manufactures necessarily
introduces, leave the husbandman as little leisure as the artificer. Military
exercises come to be as much neglected by the inhabitants of the country as
by those of the town, and the great body of the people becomes altogether
unwarlike. That wealth, at the same time, which always follows the
improvements of agriculture and manufactures, and which, in reality, is no
more than the accumulated produce of those improvements, provokes the
invasion of all their neighbours. An industrious, and, upon that account, a
wealthy nation, is of all nations the most likely to be attacked; and unless
the state takes some new measure for the public defence, the natural habits
of the people render them altogether incapable of defending themselves.
In these circumstances, there seem to be but two methods by which the
state can make any tolerable provision for the public defence.
It may either, first, by means of a very rigorous police, and in spite of the
whole bent of the interest, genius, and inclinations of the people, enforce
the practice of military exercises, and oblige either all the citizens of the
military age, or a certain number of them, to join in some measure the trade
of a soldier to whatever other trade or profession they may happen to carry
on.
Or, secondly, by maintaining and employing a certain number of citizens
in the constant practice of military exercises, it may render the trade of a
soldier a particular trade, separate and distinct from all others.
If the state has recourse to the first of those two expedients, its military
force is said to consist in a militia; if to the second, it is said to consist in a
standing army. The practice of military exercises is the sole or principal
occupation of the soldiers of a standing army, and the maintenance or pay
which the state affords them is the principal and ordinary fund of their
subsistence. The practice of military exercises is only the occasional
occupation of the soldiers of a militia, and they derive the principal and
ordinary fund of their subsistence from some other occupation. In a militia,
the character of the labourer, artificer, or tradesman, predominates over that
of the soldier; in a standing army, that of the soldier predominates over
every other character; and in this distinction seems to consist the essential
difference between those two different species of military force.
Militias have been of several different kinds. In some countries, the
citizens destined for defending the state seem to have been exercised only,
without being, if I may say so, regimented; that is, without being divided
into separate and distinct bodies of troops, each of which performed its
exercises under its own proper and permanent officers. In the republics of
ancient Greece and Rome, each citizen, as long as he remained at home,
seems to have practised his exercises, either separately and independently,
or with such of his equals as he liked best; and not to have been attached to
any particular body of troops, till he was actually called upon to take the
field. In other countries, the militia has not only been exercised, but
regimented. In England, in Switzerland, and, I believe, in every other
country of modern Europe, where any imperfect military force of this kind
has been established, every militiaman is, even in time of peace, attached to
a particular body of troops, which performs its exercises under its own
proper and permanent officers.
Before the invention of fire-arms, that army was superior in which the
soldiers had, each individually, the greatest skill and dexterity in the use of
their arms. Strength and agility of body were of the highest consequence,
and commonly determined the fate of battles. But this skill and dexterity in
the use of their arms could be acquired only, in the same manner as fencing
is at present, by practising, not in great bodies, but each man separately, in a
particular school, under a particular master, or with his own particular
equals and companions. Since the invention of fire-arms, strength and
agility of body, or even extraordinary dexterity and skill in the use of arms,
though they are far from being of no consequence, are, however, of less
consequence. The nature of the weapon, though it by no means puts the
awkward upon a level with the skilful, puts him more nearly so than he ever
was before. All the dexterity and skill, it is supposed, which are necessary
for using it, can be well enough acquired by practising in great bodies.
Regularity, order, and prompt obedience to command, are qualities
which, in modern armies, are of more importance towards determining the
fate of battles, than the dexterity and skill of the soldiers in the use of their
arms. But the noise of fire-arms, the smoke, and the invisible death to
which every man feels himself every moment exposed, as soon as he comes
within cannon-shot, and frequently a long time before the battle can be well
said to be engaged, must render it very difficult to maintain any
considerable degree of this regularity, order, and prompt obedience, even in
the beginning of a modern battle. In an ancient battle, there was no noise
but what arose from the human voice; there was no smoke, there was no
invisible cause of wounds or death. Every man, till some mortal weapon
actually did approach him, saw clearly that no such weapon was near him.
In these circumstances, and among troops who had some confidence in their
own skill and dexterity in the use of their arms, it must have been a good
deal less difficult to preserve some degree of regularity and order, not only
in the beginning, but through the whole progress of an ancient battle, and
till one of the two armies was fairly defeated. But the habits of regularity,
order, and prompt obedience to command, can be acquired only by troops
which are exercised in great bodies.
A militia, however, in whatever manner it may be either disciplined or
exercised, must always be much inferior to a well disciplined and well
exercised standing army.
The soldiers who are exercised only once a week, or once a-month, can
never be so expert in the use of their arms, as those who are exercised every
day, or every other day; and though this circumstance may not be of so
much consequence in modern, as it was in ancient times, yet the
acknowledged superiority of the Prussian troops, owing, it is said, very
much to their superior expertness in their exercise, may satisfy us that it is,
even at this day, of very considerable consequence.
The soldiers, who are bound to obey their officer only once a-week, or
once a-month, and who are at all other times at liberty to manage their own
affairs their own way, without being, in any respect, accountable to him, can
never be under the same awe in his presence, can never have the same
disposition to ready obedience, with those whose whole life and conduct are
every day directed by him, and who every day even rise and go to bed, or at
least retire to their quarters, according to his orders. In what is called
discipline, or in the habit of ready obedience, a militia must always be still
more inferior to a standing army, than it may sometimes be in what is called
the manual exercise, or in the management and use of its arms. But, in
modern war, the habit of ready and instant obedience is of much greater
consequence than a considerable superiority in the management of arms.
Those militias which, like the Tartar or Arab militia, go to war under the
same chieftains whom they are accustomed to obey in peace, are by far the
best. In respect for their officers, in the habit of ready obedience, they
approach nearest to standing armies. The Highland militia, when it served
under its own chieftains, had some advantage of the same kind. As the
Highlanders, however, were not wandering, but stationary shepherds, as
they had all a fixed habitation, and were not, in peaceable times,
accustomed to follow their chieftain from place to place; so, in time of war,
they were less willing to follow him to any considerable distance, or to
continue for any long time in the field. When they had acquired any booty,
they were eager to return home, and his authority was seldom sufficient to
detain them. In point of obedience, they were always much inferior to what
is reported of the Tartars and Arabs. As the Highlanders, too, from their
stationary life, spend less of their time in the open air, they were always less
accustomed to military exercises, and were less expert in the use of their
arms than the Tartars and Arabs are said to be.
A militia of any kind, it must be observed, however, which has served for
several successive campaigns in the field, becomes in every respect a
standing army. The soldiers are every day exercised in the use of their arms,
and, being constantly under the command of their officers, are habituated to
the same prompt obedience which takes place in standing armies. What
they were before they took the field, is of little importance. They
necessarily become in every respect a standing army, after they have passed
a few campaigns in it. Should the war in America drag out through another
campaign, the American militia may become, in every respect, a match for
that standing army, of which the valour appeared, in the last war at least, not
inferior to that of the hardiest veterans of France and Spain.
This distinction being well understood, the history of all ages, it will be
found, hears testimony to the irresistible superiority which a well regulated
standing army has over a militia.
One of the first standing armies, of which we have any distinct account in
any well authenticated history, is that of Philip of Macedon. His frequent
wars with the Thracians, Illyrians, Thessalians, and some of the Greek cities
in the neighbourhood of Macedon, gradually formed his troops, which in
the beginning were probably militia, to the exact discipline of a standing
army. When he was at peace, which he was very seldom, and never for any
long time together, he was careful not to disband that army. It vanquished
and subdued, after a long and violent struggle, indeed, the gallant and well
exercised militias of the principal republics of ancient Greece; and
afterwards, with very little struggle, the effeminate and ill exercised militia
of the great Persian empire. The fall of the Greek republics, and of the
Persian empire was the effect of the irresistible superiority which a standing
arm has over every other sort of militia. It is the first great revolution in the
affairs of mankind of which history has preserved any distinct and
circumstantial account.
The fall of Carthage, and the consequent elevation of Rome, is the
second. All the varieties in the fortune of those two famous republics may
very well be accounted for from the same cause.
From the end of the first to the beginning of the second Carthaginian war,
the armies of Carthage were continually in the field, and employed under
three great generals, who succeeded one another in the command; Amilcar,
his son-in-law Asdrubal, and his son Annibal: first in chastising their own
rebellious slaves, afterwards in subduing the revolted nations of Africa; and
lastly, in conquering the great kingdom of Spain. The army which Annibal
led from Spain into Italy must necessarily, in those different wars, have
been gradually formed to the exact discipline of a standing army. The
Romans, in the meantime, though they had not been altogether at peace, yet
they had not, during this period, been engaged in any war of very great
consequence; and their military discipline, it is generally said, was a good
deal relaxed. The Roman armies which Annibal encountered at Trebi,
Thrasymenus, and Cannae, were militia opposed to a standing army. This
circumstance, it is probable, contributed more than any other to determine
the fate of those battles.
The standing army which Annibal left behind him in Spain had the like
superiority over the militia which the Romans sent to oppose it; and, in a
few years, under the command of his brother, the younger Asdrubal,
expelled them almost entirely from that country.
Annibal was ill supplied from home. The Roman militia, being
continually in the field, became, in the progress of the war, a well
disciplined and well exercised standing army; and the superiority of
Annibal grew every day less and less. Asdrubal judged it necessary to lead
the whole, or almost the whole, of the standing army which he commanded
in Spain, to the assistance of his brother in Italy. In this march, he is said to
have been misled by his guides; and in a country which he did not know,
was surprised and attacked, by another standing army, in every respect
equal or superior to his own, and was entirely defeated.
When Asdrubal had left Spain, the great Scipio found nothing to oppose
him but a militia inferior to his own. He conquered and subdued that militia,
and, in the course of the war, his own militia necessarily became a well
disciplined and well exercised standing army. That standing army was
afterwards carried to Africa, where it found nothing but a militia to oppose
it. In order to defend Carthage, it became necessary to recal the standing
army of Annibal. The disheartened and frequently defeated African militia
joined it, and, at the battle of Zama, composed the greater part of the troops
of Annibal. The event of that day determined the fate of the two rival
republics.
From the end of the second Carthaginian war till the fall of the Roman
republic, the armies of Rome were in every respect standing armies. The
standing army of Macedon made some resistance to their arms. In the
height of their grandeur, it cost them two great wars, and three great battles,
to subdue that little kingdom, of which the conquest would probably have
been still more difficult, had it not been for the cowardice of its last king.
The militias of all the civilized nations of the ancient world, of Greece, of
Syria, and of Egypt, made but a feeble resistance to the standing armies of
Rome. The militias of some barbarous nations defended themselves much
better. The Scythian or Tartar militia, which Mithridates drew from the
countries north of the Euxine and Caspian seas, were the most formidable
enemies whom the Romans had to encounter after the second Carthaginian
war. The Parthian and German militias, too, were always respectable, and
upon several occasions, gained very considerable advantages over the
Roman armies. In general, however, and when the Roman armies were well
commanded, they appear to have been very much superior; and if the
Romans did not pursue the final conquest either of Parthia or Germany, it
was probably because they judged that it was not worth while to add those
two barbarous countries to an empire which was already too large. The
ancient Parthians appear to have been a nation of Scythian or Tartar
extraction, and to have always retained a good deal of the manners of their
ancestors. The ancient Germans were, like the Scythians or Tartars, a nation
of wandering shepherds, who went to war under the same chiefs whom they
were accustomed to follow in peace. ‘Their militia was exactly of the same
kind with that of the Scythians or Tartars, from whom, too, they were
probably descended.
Many different causes contributed to relax the discipline of the Roman
armies. Its extreme severity was, perhaps, one of those causes. In the days
of their grandeur, when no enemy appeared capable of opposing them, their
heavy armour was laid aside as unnecessarily burdensome, their laborious
exercises were neglected, as unnecessarily toilsome. Under the Roman
emperors, besides, the standing armies of Rome, those particularly which
guarded the German and Pannonian frontiers, became dangerous to their
masters, against whom they used frequently to set up their own generals. In
order to render them less formidable, according to some authors,
Dioclesian, according to others, Constantine, first withdrew them from the
frontier, where they had always before been encamped in great bodies,
generally of two or three legions each, and dispersed them in small bodies
through the different provincial towns, from whence they were scarce ever
removed, but when it became necessary to repel an invasion. Small bodies
of soldiers, quartered in trading and manufacturing towns, and seldom
removed from those quarters, became themselves trades men, artificers, and
manufacturers. The civil came to predominate over the military character;
and the standing armies of Rome gradually degenerated into a corrupt,
neglected, and undisciplined militia, incapable of resisting the attack of the
German and Scythian militias, which soon afterwards invaded the western
empire. It was only by hiring the militia of some of those nations to oppose
to that of others, that the emperors were for some time able to defend
themselves. The fall of the western empire is the third great revolution in
the affairs of mankind, of which ancient history has preserved any distinct
or circumstantial account. It was brought about by the irresistible
superiority which the militia of a barbarous has over that of a civilized
nation; which the militia of a nation of shepherds has over that of a nation
of husbandmen, artificers, and manufacturers. The victories which have
been gained by militias have generally been, not over standing armies, but
over other militias, in exercise and discipline inferior to themselves. Such
were the victories which the Greek militia gained over that of the Persian
empire; and such, too, were those which, in later times, the Swiss militia
gained over that of the Austrians and Burgundians.
The military force of the German and Scythian nations, who established
themselves upon ruins of the western empire, continued for some time to be
of the same kind in their new settlements, as it had been in their original
country. It was a militia of shepherds and husbandmen, which, in time of
war, took the field under the command of the same chieftains whom it was
accustomed to obey in peace. It was, therefore, tolerably well exercised, and
tolerably well disciplined. As arts and industry advanced, however, the
authority of the chieftains gradually decayed, and the great body of the
people had less time to spare for military exercises. Both the discipline and
the exercise of the feudal militia, therefore, went gradually to ruin, and
standing armies were gradually introduced to supply the place of it. When
the expedient of a standing army, besides, had once been adopted by one
civilized nation, it became necessary that all its neighbours should follow
the example. They soon found that their safety depended upon their doing
so, and that their own militia was altogether incapable of resisting the attack
of such an army.
The soldiers of a standing army, though they may never have seen an
enemy, yet have frequently appeared to possess all the courage of veteran
troops, and, the very moment that they took the field, to have been fit to
face the hardiest and most experienced veterans. In 1756, when the Russian
army marched into Poland, the valour of the Russian soldiers did not appear
inferior to that of the Prussians, at that time supposed to be the hardiest and
most experienced veterans in Europe. The Russian empire, however, had
enjoyed a profound peace for near twenty years before, and could at that
time have very few soldiers who had ever seen an enemy. When the
Spanish war broke out in 1739, England had enjoyed a profound peace for
about eight-and-twenty years. The valour of her soldiers, however, far from
being corrupted by that long peace, was never more distinguished than in
the attempt upon Carthagena, the first unfortunate exploit of that
unfortunate war. In a long peace, the generals, perhaps, may sometimes
forget their skill; but where a well regulated standing army has been kept
up, the soldiers seem never to forget their valour.
When a civilized nation depends for its defence upon a militia, it is at all
times exposed to be conquered by any barbarous nation which happens to
be in its neighbourhood. The frequent conquests of all the civilized
countries in Asia by the Tartars, sufficiently demonstrates the natural
superiority which the militia of a barbarous has over that of a civilized
nation. A well regulated standing army is superior to every militia. Such an
army, as it can best be maintained by an opulent and civilized nation, so it
can alone defend such a nation against the invasion of a poor and barbarous
neighbour. It is only by means of a standing army, therefore, that the
civilization of any country can be perpetuated, or even preserved, for any
considerable time.
As it is only by means of a well regulated standing army, that a civilized
country can be defended, so it is only by means of it that a barbarous
country can be suddenly and tolerably civilized. A standing army
establishes, with an irresistible force, the law of the sovereign through the
remotest provinces of the empire, and maintains some degree of regular
government in countries which could not otherwise admit of any. Whoever
examines with attention, the improvements which Peter the Great
introduced into the Russian empire, will find that they almost all resolve
themselves into the establishment of a well regulated standing army. It is
the instrument which executes and maintains all his other regulations. That
degree of order and internal peace, which that empire has ever since
enjoyed, is altogether owing to the influence of that army.
Men of republican principles have been jealous of a standing army, as
dangerous to liberty. It certainly is so, wherever the interest of the general,
and that of the principal officers, are not necessarily connected with the
support of the constitution of the state. The standing army of Caesar
destroyed the Roman republic. The standing army of Cromwell turned the
long parliament out of doors. But where the sovereign is himself the
general, and the principal nobility and gentry of the country the chief
officers of the army; where the military force is placed under the command
of those who have the greatest interest in the support of the civil authority,
because they have themselves the greatest share of that authority, a standing
army can never be dangerous to liberty. On the contrary, it may, in some
cases, be favourable to liberty. The security which it gives to the sovereign
renders unnecessary that troublesome jealousy, which, in some modern
republics, seems to watch over the minutest actions, and to be at all times
ready to disturb the peace of every citizen. Where the security of the
magistrate, though supported by the principal people of the country, is
endangered by every popular discontent; where a small tumult is capable of
bringing about in a few hours a great revolution, the whole authority of
government must be employed to suppress and punish every murmur and
complaint against it. To a sovereign, on the contrary, who feels himself
supported, not only by the natural aristocracy of the country, but by a well
regulated standing army, the rudest, the most groundless, and the most
licentious remonstrances, can give little disturbance. He can safely pardon
or neglect them, and his consciousness of his own superiority naturally
disposes him to do so. That degree of liberty which approaches to
licentiousness, can be tolerated only in countries where the sovereign is
secured by a well regulated standing army. It is in such countries only, that
the public safety does not require that the sovereign should be trusted with
any discretionary power, for suppressing even the impertinent wantonness
of this licentious liberty.
The first duty of the sovereign, therefore, that of defending the society
from the violence and injustice of other independent societies, grows
gradually more and more expensive, as the society advances in civilization.
The military force of the society, which originally cost the sovereign no
expense, either in time of peace, or in time of war, must, in the progress of
improvement, first be maintained by him in time of war, and afterwards
even in time of peace.
The great change introduced into the art of war by the invention of fire-
arms, has enhanced still further both the expense of exercising and
disciplining any particular number of soldiers in time of peace, and that of
employing them in time of war. Both their arms and their ammunition are
become more expensive. A musket is a more expensive machine than a
javelin or a bow and arrows; a cannon or a mortar, than a balista or a
catapulta. The powder which is spent in a modern review is lost
irrecoverably, and occasions a very considerable expense. The javelins and
arrows which were thrown or shot in an ancient one, could easily be picked
up again, and were, besides, of very little value. The cannon and the mortar
are not only much dearer, but much heavier machines than the balista or
catapulta; and require a greater expense, not only to prepare them for the
field, but to carry them to it. As the superiority of the modern artillery, too,
over that of the ancients, is very great; it has become much more difficult,
and consequently much more expensive, to fortify a town, so as to resist,
even for a few weeks, the attack of that superior artillery. In modern times,
many different causes contribute to render the defence of the society more
expensive. The unavoidable effects of the natural progress of improvement
have, in this respect, been a good deal enhanced by a great revolution in the
art of war, to which a mere accident, the invention of gunpowder, seems to
have given occasion.
In modern war, the great expense of firearms gives an evident advantage
to the nation which can best afford that expense; and, consequently, to an
opulent and civilized, over a poor and barbarous nation. In ancient times,
the opulent and civilized found it difficult to defend themselves against the
poor and barbarous nations. In modern times, the poor and barbarous find it
difficult to defend themselves against the opulent and civilized. The
invention of fire-arms, an invention which at first sight appears to be so
pernicious, is certainly favourable, both to the permanency and to the
extension of civilization.
PART II. Of the Expense of Justice
The second duty of the sovereign, that of protecting, as far as possible,
every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other
member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice,
requires two very different degrees of expense in the different periods of
society.
Among nations of hunters, as there is scarce any property, or at least none
that exceeds the value of two or three days labour; so there is seldom any
established magistrate, or any regular administration of justice. Men who
have no property, can injure one another only in their persons or
reputations. But when one man kills, wounds, beats, or defames another,
though he to whom the injury is done suffers, he who does it receives no
benefit. It is otherwise with the injuries to property. The benefit of the
person who does the injury is often equal to the loss of him who suffers it.
Envy, malice, or resentment, are the only passions which can prompt one
man to injure another in his person or reputation. But the greater part of
men are not very frequently under the influence of those passions; and the
very worst men are so only occasionally. As their gratification, too, how
agreeable soever it may be to certain characters, is not attended with any
real or permanent advantage, it is, in the greater part of men, commonly
restrained by prudential considerations. Men may live together in society
with some tolerable degree of security, though there is no civil magistrate to
protect them from the injustice of those passions. But avarice and ambition
in the rich, in the poor the hatred of labour and the love of present ease and
enjoyment, are the passions which prompt to invade property; passions
much more steady in their operation, and much more universal in their
influence. Wherever there is a great property, there is great inequality. For
one very rich man, there must be at least five hundred poor, and the
affluence of the few supposes the indigence of the many. The affluence of
the rich excites the indignation of the poor, who are often both driven by
want, and prompted by envy to invade his possessions. It is only under the
shelter of the civil magistrate, that the owner of that valuable property,
which is acquired by the labour of many years, or perhaps of many
successive generations, can sleep a single night in security. He is at all times
surrounded by unknown enemies, whom, though he never provoked, he can
never appease, and from whose injustice he can be protected only by the
powerful arm of the civil magistrate, continually held up to chastise it. The
acquisition of valuable and extensive property, therefore, necessarily
requires the establishment of civil government. Where there is no property,
or at least none that exceeds the value of two or three days labour, civil
government is not so necessary.
Civil government supposes a certain subordination. But as the necessity
of civil government gradually grows up with the acquisition of valuable
property; so the principal causes, which naturally introduce subordination,
gradually grow up with the growth of that valuable property.
The causes or circumstances which naturally introduce subordination, or
which naturally and antecedent to any civil institution, give some men some
superiority over the greater part of their brethren, seem to be four in
number.
The first of those causes or circumstances, is the superiority of personal
qualifications, of strength, beauty, and agility of body; of wisdom and
virtue; of prudence, justice, fortitude, and moderation of mind. The
qualifications of the body, unless supported by those of the mind, can give
little authority in any period of society. He is a very strong man, who, by
mere strength of body, can force two weak ones to obey him. The
qualifications of the mind can alone give very great authority. They are
however, invisible qualities; always disputable, and generally disputed. No
society, whether barbarous or civilized, has ever found it convenient to
settle the rules of precedency of rank and subordination, according to those
invisible qualities; but according to something that is more plain and
palpable.
The second of those causes or circumstances, is the superiority of age.
An old man, provided his age is not so far advanced as to give suspicion of
dotage, is everywhere more respected than a young man of equal rank,
fortune, and abilities. Among nations of hunters, such as the native tribes of
North America, age is the sole foundation of rank and precedency. Among
them, father is the appellation of a superior; brother, of an equal; and son, of
an inferior. In the most opulent and civilized nations, age regulates rank
among those who are in every other respect equal; and among whom,
therefore, there is nothing else to regulate it. Among brothers and among
sisters, the eldest always takes place; and in the succession of the paternal
estate, every thing which cannot be divided, but must go entire to one
person, such as a title of honour, is in most cases given to the eldest. Age is
a plain and palpable quality, which admits of no dispute.
The third of those causes or circumstances, is the superiority of fortune.
The authority of riches, however, though great in every age of society, is,
perhaps, greatest in the rudest ages of society, which admits of any
considerable inequality of fortune. A Tartar chief, the increase of whose
flocks and herds is sufficient to maintain a thousand men, cannot well
employ that increase in any other way than in maintaining a thousand men.
The rude state of his society does not afford him any manufactured produce
any trinkets or baubles of any kind, for which he can exchange that part of
his rude produce which is over and above his own consumption. The
thousand men whom he thus maintains, depending entirely upon him for
their subsistence, must both obey his orders in war, and submit to his
jurisdiction in peace. He is necessarily both their general and their judge,
and his chieftainship is the necessary effect of the superiority of his fortune.
In an opulent and civilized society, a man may possess a much greater
fortune, and yet not be able to command a dozen of people. Though the
produce of his estate may be sufficient to maintain, and may, perhaps,
actually maintain, more than a thousand people, yet, as those people pay for
every thing which they get from him, as he gives scarce any thing to any
body but in exchange for an equivalent, there is scarce anybody who
considers himself as entirely dependent upon him, and his authority extends
only over a few menial servants. The authority of fortune, however, is very
great, even in an opulent and civilized society. That it is much greater than
that either of age or of personal qualities, has been the constant complaint
of every period of society which admitted of any considerable inequality of
fortune. The first period of society, that of hunters, admits of no such
inequality. Universal poverty establishes their universal equality; and the
superiority, either of age or of personal qualities, are the feeble, but the sole
foundations of authority and subordination. There is, therefore, little or no
authority or subordination in this period of society. The second period of
society, that of shepherds, admits of very great inequalities of fortune, and
there is no period in which the superiority of fortune gives so great
authority to those who possess it. There is no period, accordingly, in which
authority and subordination are more perfectly established. The authority of
an Arabian scherif is very great; that of a Tartar khan altogether despotical.
The fourth of those causes or circumstances, is the superiority of birth.
Superiority of birth supposes an ancient superiority of fortune in the family
of the person who claims it. All families are equally ancient; and the
ancestors of the prince, though they may be better known, cannot well be
more numerous than those of the beggar. Antiquity of family means
everywhere the antiquity either of wealth, or of that greatness which is
commonly either founded upon wealth, or accompanied with it. Upstart
greatness is everywhere less respected than ancient greatness. The hatred of
usurpers, the love of the family of an ancient monarch, are in a great
measure founded upon the contempt which men naturally have for the
former, and upon their veneration for the latter. As a military officer
submits, without reluctance, to the authority of a superior by whom he has
always been commanded, but cannot bear that his inferior should be set
over his head; so men easily submit to a family to whom they and their
ancestors have always submitted; but are fired with indignation when
another family, in whom they had never acknowledged any such superiority,
assumes a dominion over them.
The distinction of birth, being subsequent to the inequality of fortune, can
have no place in nations of hunters, among whom all men, being equal in
fortune, must likewise be very nearly equal in birth. The son of a wise and
brave man may, indeed, even among them, be somewhat more respected
than a man of equal merit, who has the misfortune to be the son of a fool or
a coward. The difference, however will not be very great; and there never
was, I believe, a great family in the world, whose illustration was entirely
derived from the inheritance of wisdom and virtue.
The distinction of birth not only may, but always does, take place among
nations of shepherds. Such nations are always strangers to every sort of
luxury, and great wealth can scarce ever be dissipated among them by
improvident profusion. There are no nations, accordingly, who abound
more in families revered and honoured on account of their descent from a
long race of great and illustrious ancestors; because there are no nations
among whom wealth is likely to continue longer in the same families.
Birth and fortune are evidently the two circumstances which principally
set one man above another. They are the two great sources of personal
distinction, and are, therefore, the principal causes which naturally establish
authority and subordination among men. Among nations of shepherds, both
those causes operate with their full force. The great shepherd or herdsman,
respected on account of his great wealth, and of the great number of those
who depend upon him for subsistence, and revered on account of the
nobleness of his birth, and of the immemorial antiquity or his illustrious
family, has a natural authority over all the inferior shepherds or herdsmen of
his horde or clan. He can command the united force of a greater number of
people than any of them. His military power is greater than that of any of
them. In time of war, they are all of them naturally disposed to muster
themselves under his banner, rather than under that of any other person; and
his birth and fortune thus naturally procure to him some sort of executive
power. By commanding, too, the united force of a greater number of people
than any of them, he is best able to compel any one of them, who may have
injured another, to compensate the wrong. He is the person, therefore, to
whom all those who are too weak to defend themselves naturally look up
for protection. It is to him that they naturally complain of the injuries which
they imagine have been done to them; and his interposition, in such cases, is
more easily submitted to, even by the person complained of, than that of
any other person would be. His birth and fortune thus naturally procure him
some sort of judicial authority.
It is in the age of shepherds, in the second period of society, that the
inequality of fortune first begins to take place, and introduces among men a
degree of authority and subordination, which could not possibly exist
before. It thereby introduces some degree of that civil government which is
indispensably necessary for its own preservation; and it seems to do this
naturally, and even independent of the consideration of that necessity. The
consideration of that necessity comes, no doubt, afterwards, to contribute
very much to maintain and secure that authority and subordination. The
rich, in particular, are necessarily interested to support that order of things,
which can alone secure them in the possession of their own advantages.
Men of inferior wealth combine to defend those of superior wealth in the
possession of their property, in order that men of superior wealth may
combine to defend them in the possession of theirs. All the inferior
shepherds and herdsmen feel, that the security of their own herds and flocks
depends upon the security of those of the great shepherd or herdsman; that
the maintenance of their lesser authority depends upon that of his greater
authority; and that upon their subordination to him depends his power of
keeping their inferiors in subordination to them. They constitute a sort of
little nobility, who feel themselves interested to defend the property, and to
support the authority, of their own little sovereign, in order that he may be
able to defend their property, and to support their authority. Civil
government, so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is, in
reality, instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of those
who have some property against those who have none at all.
The judicial authority of such a sovereign, however, far from being a
cause of expense, was, for a long time, a source of revenue to him. The
persons who applied to him for justice were always willing to pay for it, and
a present never failed to accompany a petition. After the authority of the
sovereign, too, was thoroughly established, the person found guilty, over
and above the satisfaction which he was obliged to make to the party, was
like-wise forced to pay an amercement to the sovereign. He had given
trouble, he had disturbed, he had broke the peace of his lord the king, and
for those offences an amercement was thought due. In the Tartar
governments of Asia, in the governments of Europe which were founded by
the German and Scythian nations who overturned the Roman empire, the
administration of justice was a considerable source of revenue, both to the
sovereign, and to all the lesser chiefs or lords who exercised under him any
particular jurisdiction, either over some particular tribe or clan, or over
some particular territory or district. Originally, both the sovereign and the
inferior chiefs used to exercise this jurisdiction in their own persons.
Afterwards, they universally found it convenient to delegate it to some
substitute, bailiff, or judge. This substitute, however, was still obliged to
account to his principal or constituent for the profits of the jurisdiction.
Whoever reads the instructions (They are to be found in Tyrol’s History of
England) which were given to the judges of the circuit in the time of Henry
II will see clearly that those judges were a sort of itinerant factors, sent
round the country for the purpose of levying certain branches of the king’s
revenue. In those days, the administration of justice not only afforded a
certain revenue to the sovereign, but, to procure this revenue, seems to have
been one of the principal advantages which he proposed to obtain by the
administration of justice.
This scheme of making the administration of justice subservient to the
purposes of revenue, could scarce fail to be productive of several very gross
abuses. The person who applied for justice with a large present in his hand,
was likely to get something more than justice; while he who applied for it
with a small one was likely to get something less. Justice, too, might
frequently be delayed, in order that this present might be repeated. The
amercement, besides, of the person complained of, might frequently suggest
a very strong reason for finding him in the wrong, even when he had not
really been so. That such abuses were far from being uncommon, the
ancient history of every country in Europe bears witness.
When the sovereign or chief exercises his judicial authority in his own
person, how much soever he might abuse it, it must have been scarce
possible to get any redress; because there could seldom be any body
powerful enough to call him to account. When he exercised it by a bailiff,
indeed, redress might sometimes be had. If it was for his own benefit only,
that the bailiff had been guilty of an act of injustice, the sovereign himself
might not always be unwilling to punish him, or to oblige him to repair the
wrong. But if it was for the benefit of his sovereign; if it was in order to
make court to the person who appointed him, and who might prefer him,
that he had committed any act of oppression; redress would, upon most
occasions, be as impossible as if the sovereign had committed it himself. In
all barbarous governments, accordingly, in all those ancient governments of
Europe in particular, which were founded upon the ruins of the Roman
empire, the administration of justice appears for a long time to have been
extremely corrupt; far from being quite equal and impartial, even under the
best monarchs, and altogether profligate under the worst.
Among nations of shepherds, where the sovereign or chief is only the
greatest shepherd or herdsman of the horde or clan, he is maintained in the
same manner as any of his vassals or subjects, by the increase of his own
herds or flocks. Among those nations of husbandmen, who are but just
come out of the shepherd state, and who are not much advanced beyond
that state, such as the Greek tribes appear to have been about the time of the
Trojan war, and our German and Scythian ancestors, when they first settled
upon the ruins of the western empire; the sovereign or chief is, in the same
manner, only the greatest landlord of the country, and is maintained in the
same manner as any other landlord, by a revenue derived from his own
private estate, or from what, in modern Europe, was called the demesne of
the crown. His subjects, upon ordinary occasions, contribute nothing to his
support, except when, in order to protect them from the oppression of some
of their fellow-subjects, they stand in need of his authority. The presents
which they make him upon such occasions constitute the whole ordinary
revenue, the whole of the emoluments which, except, perhaps, upon some
very extraordinary emergencies, he derives from his dominion over them.
When Agamemnon, in Homer, offers to Achilles, for his friendship, the
sovereignty of seven Greek cities, the sole advantage which he mentions as
likely to be derived from it was, that the people would honour him with
presents. As long as such presents, as long as the emoluments of justice, or
what may be called the fees of court, constituted, in this manner, the whole
ordinary revenue which the sovereign derived from his sovereignty, it could
not well be expected, it could not even decently be proposed, that he should
give them up altogether. It might, and it frequently was proposed, that he
should regulate and ascertain them. But after they had been so regulated and
ascertained, how to hinder a person who was all-powerful from extending
them beyond those regulations, was still very difficult, not to say
impossible. During the continuance of this state of things, therefore, the
corruption of justice, naturally resulting from the arbitrary and uncertain
nature of those presents, scarce admitted of any effectual remedy.
But when, from different causes, chiefly from the continually increasing
expense of defending the nation against the invasion of other nations, the
private estate of the sovereign had become altogether insufficient for
defraying the expense of the sovereignty; and when it had become
necessary that the people should, for their own security, contribute towards
this expense by taxes of different kinds; it seems to have been very
commonly stipulated, that no present for the administration of justice
should, under any pretence, be accepted either by the sovereign, or by his
bailiffs and substitutes, the judges. Those presents, it seems to have been
supposed, could more easily be abolished altogether, than effectually
regulated and ascertained. Fixed salaries were appointed to the judges,
which were supposed to compensate to them the loss of whatever might
have been their share of the ancient emoluments of justice; as the taxes
more than compensated to the sovereign the loss of his. Justice was then
said to be administered gratis.
Justice, however, never was in reality administered gratis in any country.
Lawyers and attorneys, at least, must always be paid by the parties; and if
they were not, they would perform their duty still worse than they actually
perform it. The fees annually paid to lawyers and attorneys, amount, in
every court, to a much greater sum than the salaries of the judges. The
circumstance of those salaries being paid by the crown, can nowhere much
diminish the necessary expense of a law-suit. But it was not so much to
diminish the expense, as to prevent the corruption of justice, that the judges
were prohibited from receiving my present or fee from the parties.
The office of judge is in itself so very honourable, that men are willing to
accept of it, though accompanied with very small emoluments. The inferior
office of justice of peace, though attended with a good deal of trouble, and
in most cases with no emoluments at all, is an object of ambition to the
greater part of our country gentlemen. The salaries of all the different
judges, high and low, together with the whole expense of the administration
and execution of justice, even where it is not managed with very good
economy, makes, in any civilized country, but a very inconsiderable part of
the whole expense of government.
The whole expense of justice, too, might easily be defrayed by the fees of
court; and, without exposing the administration of justice to any real hazard
of corruption, the public revenue might thus be entirely discharged from a
certain, though perhaps but a small incumbrance. It is difficult to regulate
the fees of court effectually, where a person so powerful as the sovereign is
to share in them and to derive any considerable part of his revenue from
them. It is very easy, where the judge is the principal person who can reap
any benefit from them. The law can very easily oblige the judge to respect
the regulation though it might not always be able to make the sovereign
respect it. Where the fees of court are precisely regulated and ascertained
where they are paid all at once, at a certain period of every process, into the
hands of a cashier or receiver, to be by him distributed in certain known
proportions among the different judges after the process is decided and not
till it is decided; there seems to be no more danger of corruption than when
such fees are prohibited altogether. Those fees, without occasioning any
considerable increase in the expense of a law-suit, might be rendered fully
sufficient for defraying the whole expense of justice. But not being paid to
the judges till the process was determined, they might be some incitement
to the diligence of the court in examining and deciding it. In courts which
consisted of a considerable number of judges, by proportioning the share of
each judge to the number of hours and days which he had employed in
examining the process, either in the court, or in a committee, by order of the
court, those fees might give some encouragement to the diligence of each
particular judge. Public services are never better performed, than when their
reward comes only in consequence of their being performed, and is
proportioned to the diligence employed in performing them. In the different
parliaments of France, the fees of court (called epices and vacations)
constitute the far greater part of the emoluments of the judges. After all
deductions are made, the neat salary paid by the crown to a counsellor or
judge in the parliament of Thoulouse, in rank and dignity the second
parliament of the kingdom, amounts only to 150 livres, about £6:11s.
sterling a-year. About seven years ago, that sum was in the same place the
ordinary yearly wages of a common footman. The distribution of these
epices, too, is according to the diligence of the judges. A diligent judge
gains a comfortable, though moderate revenue, by his office; an idle one
gets little more than his salary. Those parliaments are, perhaps, in many
respects, not very convenient courts of justice; but they have never been
accused; they seem never even to have been suspected of corruption.
The fees of court seem originally to have been the principal support of
the different courts of justice in England. Each court endeavoured to draw
to itself as much business as it could, and was, upon that account, willing to
take cognizance of many suits which were not originally intended to fall
under its jurisdiction. The court of king’s bench, instituted for the trial of
criminal causes only, took cognizance of civil suits; the plaintiff pretending
that the defendant, in not doing him justice, had been guilty of some
trespass or misdemeanour. The court of exchequer, instituted for the levying
of the king’s revenue, and for enforcing the payment of such debts only as
were due to the king, took cognizance of all other contract debts; the
planitiff alleging that he could not pay the king, because the defendant
would not pay him. In consequence of such fictions, it came, in many cases,
to depend altogether upon the parties, before what court they would choose
to have their cause tried, and each court endeavoured, by superior dispatch
and impartiality, to draw to itself as many causes as it could. The present
admirable constitution of the courts of justice in England was, perhaps,
originally, in a great measure, formed by this emulation, which anciently
took place between their respective judges: each judge endeavouring to
give, in his own court, the speediest and most effectual remedy which the
law would admit, for every sort of injustice. Originally, the courts of law
gave damages only for breach of contract. The court of chancery, as a court
of conscience, first took upon it to enforce the specific performance of
agreements. When the breach of contract consisted in the non-payment of
money, the damage sustained could be compensated in no other way than
by ordering payment, which was equivalent to a specific performance of the
agreement. In such cases, therefore, the remedy of the courts of law was
sufficient. It was not so in others. When the tenant sued his lord for having
unjustly outed him of his lease, the damages which he recovered were by no
means equivalent to the possession of the land. Such causes, therefore, for
some time, went all to the court of chancery, to the no small loss of the
courts of law. It was to draw back such causes to themselves, that the courts
of law are said to have invented the artificial and fictitious writ of
ejectment, the most effectual remedy for an unjust outer or dispossession of
land.
A stamp-duty upon the law proceedings of each particular court, to be
levied by that court, and applied towards the maintenance of the judges, and
other officers belonging to it, might in the same manner, afford a revenue
sufficient for defraying the expense of the administration of justice, without
bringing any burden upon the general revenue of the society. The judges,
indeed, might in this case, be under the temptation of multiplying
unnecessarily the proceedings upon every cause, in order to increase, as
much as possible, the produce of such a stamp-duty. It has been the custom
in modern Europe to regulate, upon most occasions, the payment of the
attorneys and clerks of court according to the number of pages which they
had occasion to write; the court, however, requiring that each page should
contain so many lines, and each line so many words. In order to increase
their payment, the attorneys and clerks have contrived to multiply words
beyond all necessity, to the corruption of the law language of, I believe,
every court of justice in Europe. A like temptation might, perhaps, occasion
a like corruption in the form of law proceedings.
But whether the administration of justice be so contrived as to defray its
own expense, or whether the judges be maintained by fixed salaries paid to
them from some other fund, it does not seen necessary that the person or
persons entrusted with the executive power should be charged with the
management of that fund, or with the payment of those salaries. That fund
might arise from the rent of landed estates, the management of each estate
being entrusted to the particular court which was to be maintained by it.
That fund might arise even from the interest of a sum of money, the lending
out of which might, in the same manner, be entrusted to the court which
was to be maintained by it. A part, though indeed but a small part of the
salary of the judges of the court of session in Scotland, arises from the
interest of a sum of money. The necessary instability of such a fund seems,
however, to render it an improper one for the maintenance of an institution
which ought to last for ever.
The separation of the judicial from the executive power, seems originally
to have arisen from the increasing business of the society, in consequence of
its increasing improvement. The administration of justice became so
laborious and so complicated a duty, as to require the undivided attention of
the person to whom it was entrusted. The person entrusted with the
executive power, not having leisure to attend to the decision of private
causes himself, a deputy was appointed to decide them in his stead. In the
progress of the Roman greatness, the consul was too much occupied with
the political affairs of the state, to attend to the administration of justice. A
praetor, therefore, was appointed to administer it in his stead. In the
progress of the European monarchies, which were founded upon the ruins
of the Roman empire, the sovereigns and the great lords came universally to
consider the administration of justice as an office both too laborious and too
ignoble for them to execute in their own persons. They universally,
therefore, discharged themselves of it, by appointing a deputy, bailiff or
judge.
When the judicial is united to the executive power, it is scarce possible
that justice should not frequently be sacrificed to what is vulgarly called
politics. The persons entrusted with the great interests of the state may even
without any corrupt views, sometimes imagine it necessary to sacrifice to
those interests the rights of a private man. But upon the impartial
administration of justice depends the liberty of every individual, the sense
which he has of his own security. In order to make every individual feel
himself perfectly secure in the possession of every right which belongs to
him, it is not only necessary that the judicial should be separated from the
executive power, but that it should be rendered as much as possible
independent of that power. The judge should not be liable to be removed
from his office according to the caprice of that power. The regular payment
of his salary should not depend upon the good will, or even upon the good
economy of that power.
PART III. Of the Expense of public Works and public Institutions.
The third and last duty of the sovereign or commonwealth, is that of
erecting and maintaining those public institutions and those public works,
which though they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great
society, are, however, of such a nature, that the profit could never repay the
expense to any individual, or small number of individuals; and which it,
therefore, cannot be expected that any individual, or small number of
individuals, should erect or maintain. The performance of this duty requires,
too, very different degrees of expense in the different periods of society.
After the public institutions and public works necessary for the defence
of the society, and for the administration of justice, both of which have
already been mentioned, the other works and institutions of this kind are
chiefly for facilitating the commerce of the society, and those for promoting
the instruction of the people. The institutions for instruction are of two
kinds: those for the education of the youth, and those for the instruction of
people of all ages. The consideration of the manner in which the expense of
those different sorts of public works and institutions may be most properly
defrayed will divide this third part of the present chapter into three different
articles.
ARTICLE I.—Of the public Works and Institutions for facilitating the
Commerce of the Society.
And, first, of those which are necessary for facilitating Commerce in
general.
That the erection and maintenance of the public works which facilitate
the commerce of any country, such as good roads, bridges, navigable
canals, harbours, etc. must require very different degrees of expense in the
different periods of society, is evident without any proof. The expense of
making and maintaining the public roads of any country must evidently
increase with the annual produce of the land and labour of that country, or
with the quantity and weight of the goods which it becomes necessary to
fetch and carry upon those roads. The strength of a bridge must be suited to
the number and weight of the carriages which are likely to pass over it. The
depth and the supply of water for a navigable canal must be proportioned to
the number and tonnage of the lighters which are likely to carry goods upon
it; the extent of a harbour, to the number of the shipping which are likely to
take shelter in it.
It does not seem necessary that the expense of those public works should
be defrayed from that public revenue, as it is commonly called, of which the
collection and application are in most countries, assigned to the executive
power. The greater part of such public works may easily be so managed, as
to afford a particular revenue, sufficient for defraying their own expense
without bringing any burden upon the general revenue of the society.
A highway, a bridge, a navigable canal, for example, may, in most cases,
be both made add maintained by a small toll upon the carriages which make
use of them; a harbour, by a moderate port-duty upon the tonnage of the
shipping which load or unload in it. The coinage, another institution for
facilitating commerce, in many countries, not only defrays its own expense,
but affords a small revenue or a seignorage to the sovereign. The post-
office, another institution for the same purpose, over and above defraying
its own expense, affords, in almost all countries, a very considerable
revenue to the sovereign.
When the carriages which pass over a highway or a bridge, and the
lighters which sail upon a navigable canal, pay toll in proportion to their
weight or their tonnage, they pay for the maintenance of those public works
exactly in proportion to the wear and tear which they occasion of them. It
seems scarce possible to invent a more equitable way of maintaining such
works. This tax or toll, too, though it is advanced by the carrier, is finally
paid by the consumer, to whom it must always be charged in the price of the
goods. As the expense of carriage, however, is very much reduced by means
of such public works, the goods, notwithstanding the toll, come cheaper to
the consumer than they could otherwise have done, their price not being so
much raised by the toll, as it is lowered by the cheapness of the carriage.
The person who finally pays this tax, therefore, gains by the application
more than he loses by the payment of it. His payment is exactly in
proportion to his gain. It is, in reality, no more than a part of that gain which
he is obliged to give up, in order to get the rest. It seems impossible to
imagine a more equitable method of raising a tax. When the toll upon
carriages of luxury, upon coaches, post-chaises, etc. is made somewhat
higher in proportion to their weight, than upon carriages of necessary use,
such as carts, waggons, etc. the indolence and vanity of the rich is made to
contribute, in a very easy manner, to the relief of the poor, by rendering
cheaper the transportation of heavy goods to all the different parts of the
country.
When high-roads, bridges, canals, etc. are in this manner made and
supported by the commerce which is carried on by means of them, they can
be made only where that commerce requires them, and, consequently,
where it is proper to make them. Their expense, too, their grandeur and
magnificence, must be suited to what that commerce can afford to pay.
They must be made, consequently, as it is proper to make them. A
magnificent high-road cannot be made through a desert country, where
there is little or no commerce, or merely because it happens to lead to the
country villa of the intendant of the province, or to that of some great lord,
to whom the intendant finds it convenient to make his court. A great bridge
cannot be thrown over a river at a place where nobody passes, or merely to
embellish the view from the windows of a neighbouring palace; things
which sometimes happen in countries, where works of this kind are carried
on by any other revenue than that which they themselves are capable of
affording.
In several different parts of Europe, the toll or lock-duty upon a canal is
the property of private persons, whose private interest obliges them to keep
up the canal. If it is not kept in tolerable order, the navigation necessarily
ceases altogether, and, along with it, the whole profit which they can make
by the tolls. If those tolls were put under the management of
commissioners, who had themselves no interest in them, they might be less
attentive to the maintenance of the works which produced them. The canal
of Languedoc cost the king of France and the province upwards of thirteen
millions of livres, which (at twenty-eight livres the mark of silver, the value
of French money in the end of the last century) amounted to upwards of
nine hundred thousand pounds sterling. When that great work was finished,
the most likely method, it was found, of keeping it in constant repair, was to
make a present of the tolls to Riquet, the engineer who planned and
conducted the work. Those tolls constitute, at present, a very large estate to
the different branches of the family of that gentleman, who have, therefore,
a great interest to keep the work in constant repair. But had those tolls been
put under the management of commissioners, who had no such interest,
they might perhaps, have been dissipated in ornamental and unnecessary
expenses, while the most essential parts of the works were allowed to go to
ruin.
The tolls for the maintenance of a highroad cannot, with any safety, be
made the property of private persons. A high-road, though entirely
neglected, does not become altogether impassable, though a canal does. The
proprietors of the tolls upon a high-road, therefore, might neglect altogether
the repair of the road, and yet continue to levy very nearly the same tolls. It
is proper, therefore, that the tolls for the maintenance of such a work should
be put under the management of commissioners or trustees.
In Great Britain, the abuses which the trustees have committed in the
management of those tolls, have, in many cases, been very justly
complained of. At many turnpikes, it has been said, the money levied is
more than double of what is necessary for executing, in the completest
manner, the work, which is often executed in a very slovenly manner, and
sometimes not executed at all. The system of repairing the high-roads by
tolls of this kind, it must be observed, is not of very long standing. We
should not wonder, therefore, if it has not yet been brought to that degree of
perfection of which it seems capable. If mean and improper persons are
frequently appointed trustees; and if proper courts of inspection and account
have not yet been established for controlling their conduct, and for reducing
the tolls to what is barely sufficient for executing the work to be done by
them; the recency of the institution both accounts and apologizes for those
defects, of which, by the wisdom of parliament, the greater part may, in due
time, be gradually remedied.
The money levied at the different turnpikes in Great Britain, is supposed
to exceed so much what is necessary for repairing the roads, that the
savings which, with proper economy, might be made from it, have been
considered, even by some ministers, as a very great resource, which might,
at some time or another, be applied to the exigencies of the state.
Government, it has been said, by taking the management of the turnpikes
into its own hands, and by employing the soldiers, who would work for a
very small addition to their pay, could keep the roads in good order, at a
much less expense than it can be done by trustees, who have no other
workmen to employ, but such as derive their whole subsistence from their
wages. A great revenue, half a million, perhaps {Since publishing the two
first editions of this book, I have got good reasons to believe that all the
turnpike tolls levied in Great Britain do not produce a neat revenue that
amounts to half a million; a sum which, under the management of
government, would not be sufficient to keep, in repair five of the principal
roads in the kingdom}, it has been pretended, might in this manner be
gained, without laying any new burden upon the people; and the turnpike
roads might be made to contribute to the general expense of the state, in the
same manner as the post-office does at present.
That a considerable revenue might be gained in this manner, I have no
doubt, though probably not near so much as the projectors of this plan have
supposed. The plan itself, however, seems liable to several very important
objections.
First, If the tolls which are levied at the turnpikes should ever be
considered as one of the resources for supplying the exigencies of the state,
they would certainly be augmented as those exigencies were supposed to
require. According to the policy of Great Britain, therefore, they would
probably he augmented very fast. The facility with which a great revenue
could be drawn from them, would probably encourage administration to
recur very frequently te this resource. Though it may, perhaps, be more than
doubtful whether half a million could by any economy be saved out of the
present tolls, it can scarcely be doubted, but that a million might be saved
out of them, if they were doubled; and perhaps two millions, if they were
tripled {I have now good reason to believe that all these conjectural sums
are by much too large.}. This great revenue, too, might be levied without
the appointment of a single new officer to collect and receive it. But the
turnpike tolls, being continually augmented in this manner, instead of
facilitating the inland commerce of the country, as at present, would soon
become a very great incumbrance upon it. The expense of transporting all
heavy goods from one part of the country to another, would soon be so
much increased, the market for all such goods, consequently, would soon be
so much narrowed, that their production would be in a great measure
discouraged, and the most important branches of the domestic industry of
the country annihilated altogether.
Secondly, A tax upon carriages, in proportion to their weight, though a
very equal tax when applied to the sole purpose of repairing the roads, is a
very unequal one when applied to any other purpose, or to supply the
common exigencies of the state. When it is applied to the sole purpose
above mentioned, each carriage is supposed to pay exactly for the wear and
tear which that carriage occasions of the roads. But when it is applied to any
other purpose, each carriage is supposed to pay for more than that wear and
tear, and contributes to the supply of some other exigency of the state. But
as the turnpike toll raises the price of goods in proportion to their weight
and not to their value, it is chiefly paid by the consumers of coarse and
bulky, not by those of precious and light commodities. Whatever exigency
of the state, therefore, this tax might be intended to supply, that exigency
would be chiefly supplied at the expense of the poor, not of the rich; at the
expense of those who are least able to supply it, not of those who are most
able.
Thirdly, If government should at any time neglect the reparation of the
high-roads, it would be still more difficult, than it is at present, to compel
the proper application of any part of the turnpike tolls. A large revenue
might thus be levied upon the people, without any part of it being applied to
the only purpose to which a revenue levied in this manner ought ever to be
applied. If the meanness and poverty of the trustees of turnpike roads render
it sometimes difficult, at present, to oblige them to repair their wrong; their
wealth and greatness would render it ten times more so in the case which is
here supposed.
In France, the funds destined for the reparation of the high-roads are
under the immediate direction of the executive power. Those funds consist,
partly in a certain number of days labour, which the country people are in
most parts of Europe obliged to give to the reparation of the highways; and
partly in such a portion of the general revenue of the state as the king
chooses to spare from his other expenses.
By the ancient law of France, as well as by that of most other parts of
Europe, the labour of the country people was under the direction of a local
or provincial magistracy, which had no immediate dependency upon the
king’s council. But, by the present practice, both the labour of the country
people, and whatever other fund the king may choose to assign for the
reparation of the high-roads in any particular province or generality, are
entirely under the management of the intendant; an officer who is appointed
and removed by the king’s council who receives his orders from it, and is in
constant correspondence with it. In the progress of despotism, the authority
of the executive power gradually absorbs that of every other power in the
state, and assumes to itself the management of every branch of revenue
which is destined for any public purpose. In France, however, the great
post-roads, the roads which make the communication between the principal
towns of the kingdom, are in general kept in good order; and, in some
provinces, are even a good deal superior to the greater part of the turnpike
roads of England. But what we call the cross roads, that is, the far greater
part of the roads in the country, are entirely neglected, and are in many
places absolutely impassable for any heavy carriage. In some places it is
even dangerous to travel on horseback, and mules are the only conveyance
which can safely be trusted. The proud minister of an ostentatious court,
may frequently take pleasure in executing a work of splendour and
magnificence, such as a great highway, which is frequently seen by the
principal nobility, whose applauses not only flatter his vanity, but even
contribute to support his interest at court. But to execute a great number of
little works, in which nothing that can be done can make any great
appearance, or excite the smallest degree of admiration in any traveller, and
which, in short, have nothing to recommend them but their extreme utility,
is a business which appears, in every respect, too mean and paltry to merit
the attention of so great a magistrate. Under such an administration
therefore, such works are almost always entirely neglected.
In China, and in several other governments of Asia, the executive power
charges itself both with the reparation of the high-roads, and with the
maintenance of the navigable canals. In the instructions which are given to
the governor of each province, those objects, it is said, are constantly
recommended to him, and the judgment which the court forms of his
conduct is very much regulated by the attention which he appears to have
paid to this part of his instructions. This branch of public police,
accordingly, is said to be very much attended to in all those countries, but
particularly in China, where the high-roads, and still more the navigable
canals, it is pretended, exceed very much every thing of the same kind
which is known in Europe. The accounts of those works, however, which
have been transmitted to Europe, have generally been drawn up by weak
and wondering travellers; frequently by stupid and lying missionaries. If
they had been examined by more intelligent eyes, and if the accounts of
them had been reported by more faithful witnesses, they would not,
perhaps, appear to be so wonderful. The account which Bernier gives of
some works of this kind in Indostan, falls very short of what had been
reported of them by other travellers, more disposed to the marvellous than
he was. It may too, perhaps, be in those countries, as it is in France, where
the great roads, the great communications, which are likely to be the
subjects of conversation at the court and in the capital, are attended to, and
all the rest neglected. In China, besides, in Indostan, and in several other
governments of Asia, the revenue of the sovereign arises almost altogether
from a land tax or land rent, which rises or falls with the rise and fall of the
annual produce of the land. The great interest of the sovereign, therefore,
his revenue, is in such countries necessarily and immediately connected
with the cultivation of the land, with the greatness of its produce, and with
the value of its produce. But in order to render that produce both as great
and as valuable as possible, it is necessary to procure to it as extensive a
market as possible, and consequently to establish the freest, the easiest, and
the least expensive communication between all the different parts of the
country; which can be done only by means of the best roads and the best
navigable canals. But the revenue of the sovereign does not, in any part of
Europe, arise chiefly from a land tax or land rent. In all the great kingdoms
of Europe, perhaps, the greater part of it may ultimately depend upon the
produce of the land: but that dependency is neither so immediate nor so
evident. In Europe, therefore, the sovereign does not feel himself so directly
called upon to promote the increase, both in quantity and value of the
produce of the land, or, by maintaining good roads and canals, to provide
the most extensive market for that produce. Though it should be true,
therefore, what I apprehend is not a little doubtful, that in some parts of
Asia this department of the public police is very properly managed by the
executive power, there is not the least probability that, during the present
state of things, it could be tolerably managed by that power in any part of
Europe.
Even those public works, which are of such a nature that they cannot
afford any revenue for maintaining themselves, but of which the
conveniency is nearly confined to some particular place or district, are
always better maintained by a local or provincial revenue, under the
management of a local and provincial administration, than by the general
revenue of the state, of which the executive power must always have the
management. Were the streets of London to be lighted and paved at the
expense of the treasury, is there any probability that they would be so well
lighted and paved as they are at present, or even at so small an expense?
The expense, besides, instead of being raised by a local tax upon the
inhabitants of each particular street, parish, or district in London, would, in
this case, be defrayed out of the general revenue of the state, and would
consequently be raised by a tax upon all the inhabitants of the kingdom, of
whom the greater part derive no sort of benefit from the lighting and paving
of the streets of London.
The abuses which sometimes creep into the local and provincial
administration of a local and provincial revenue, how enormous soever they
may appear, are in reality, however, almost always very trifling in
comparison of those which commonly take place in the administration and
expenditure of the revenue of a great empire. They are, besides, much more
easily corrected. Under the local or provincial administration of the justices
of the peace in Great Britain, the six days labour which the country people
are obliged to give to the reparation of the highways, is not always, perhaps,
very judiciously applied, but it is scarce ever exacted with any circumstance
of cruelty or oppression. In France, under the administration of the
intendants, the application is not always more judicious, and the exaction is
frequently the most cruel and oppressive. Such corvees, as they are called,
make one of the principal instruments of tyranny by which those officers
chastise any parish or communeaute, which has had the misfortune to fall
under their displeasure.
Of the public Works and Institution which are necessary for facilitating
particular Branches of Commerce.
The object of the public works and institutions above mentioned, is to
facilitate commerce in general. But in order to facilitate some particular
branches of it, particular institutions are necessary, which again require a
particular and extraordinary expense.
Some particular branches of commerce which are carried on with
barbarous and uncivilized nations, require extraordinary protection. An
ordinary store or counting-house could give little security to the goods of
the merchants who trade to the western coast of Africa. To defend them
from the barbarous natives, it is necessary that the place where they are
deposited should be in some measure fortified. The disorders in the
government of Indostan have been supposed to render a like precaution
necessary, even among that mild and gentle people; and it was under
pretence of securing their persons and property from violence, that both the
English and French East India companies were allowed to erect the first
forts which they possessed in that country. Among other nations, whose
vigorous government will suffer no strangers to possess any fortified place
within their territory, it may be necessary to maintain some ambassador,
minister, or consul, who may both decide, according to their own customs,
the differences arising among his own countrymen, and, in their disputes
with the natives, may by means of his public character, interfere with more
authority and afford them a more powerful protection than they could
expect from any private man. The interests of commerce have frequently
made it necessary to maintain ministers in foreign countries, where the
purposes either of war or alliance would not have required any. The
commerce of the Turkey company first occasioned the establishment of an
ordinary ambassador at Constantinople. The first English embassies to
Russia arose altogether from commercial interests. The constant
interference with those interests, necessarily occasioned between the
subjects of the different states of Europe, has probably introduced the
custom of keeping, in all neighbouring countries, ambassadors or ministers
constantly resident, even in the time of peace. This custom, unknown to
ancient times, seems not to be older than the end of the fifteenth, or
beginning of the sixteenth century; that is, than the time when commerce
first began to extend itself to the greater part of the nations of Europe, and
when they first began to attend to its interests.
It seems not unreasonable, that the extraordinary expense which the
protection of any particular branch of commerce may occasion, should be
defrayed by a moderate tax upon that particular branch; by a moderate fine,
for example, to be paid by the traders when they first enter into it; or, what
is more equal, by a particular duty of so much per cent. upon the goods
which they either import into, or export out of, the particular countries with
which it is carried on. The protection of trade, in general, from pirates and
freebooters, is said to have given occasion to the first institution of the
duties of customs. But, if it was thought reasonable to lay a general tax
upon trade, in order to defray the expense of protecting trade in general, it
should seem equally reasonable to lay a particular tax upon a particular
branch of trade, in order to defray the extraordinary expense of protecting
that branch.
The protection of trade, in general, has always been considered as
essential to the defence of the commonwealth, and, upon that account, a
necessary part of the duty of the executive power. The collection and
application of the general duties of customs, therefore, have always been
left to that power. But the protection of any particular branch of trade is a
part of the general protection of trade; a part, therefore, of the duty of that
power; and if nations always acted consistently, the particular duties levied
for the purposes of such particular protection, should always have been left
equally to its disposal. But in this respect, as well as in many others, nations
have not always acted consistently; and in the greater part of the
commercial states of Europe, particular companies of merchants have had
the address to persuade the legislature to entrust to them the performance of
this part of the duty of the sovereign, together with all the powers which are
necessarily connected with it.
These companies, though they may, perhaps, have been useful for the
first introduction of some branches of commerce, by making, at their own
expense, an experiment which the state might not think it prudent to make,
have in the long-run proved, universally, either burdensome or useless, and
have either mismanaged or confined the trade.
When those companies do not trade upon a joint stock, but are obliged to
admit any person, properly qualified, upon paying a certain fine, and
agreeing to submit to the regulations of the company, each member trading
upon his own stock, and at his own risk, they are called regulated
companies. When they trade upon a joint stock, each member sharing in the
common profit or loss, in proportion to his share in this stock, they are
called joint-stock companies. Such companies, whether regulated or joint-
stock, sometimes have, and sometimes have not, exclusive privileges.
Regulated companies resemble, in every respect, the corporation of
trades, so common in the cities and towns of all the different countries of
Europe; and are a sort of enlarged monopolies of the same kind. As no
inhabitant of a town can exercise an incorporated trade, without first
obtaining his freedom in the incorporation, so, in most cases, no subject of
the state can lawfully carry on any branch of foreign trade, for which a
regulated company is established, without first becoming a member of that
company. The monopoly is more or less strict, according as the terms of
admission are more or less difficult, and according as the directors of the
company have more or less authority, or have it more or less in their power
to manage in such a manner as to confine the greater part of the trade to
themselves and their particular friends. In the most ancient regulated
companies, the privileges of apprenticeship were the same as in other
corporations, and entitled the person who had served his time to a member
of the company, to become himself a member, either without paying any
fine, or upon paying a much smaller one than what was exacted of other
people. The usual corporation spirit, wherever the law does not restrain it,
prevails in all regulated companies. When they have been allowed to act
according to their natural genius, they have always, in order to confine the
competition to as small a number of persons as possible, endeavoured to
subject the trade to many burdensome regulations. When the law has
restrained them from doing this, they have become altogether useless and
insignificant.
The regulated companies for foreign commerce which at present subsist
in Great Britain, are the ancient merchant-adventurers company, now
commonly called the Hamburgh company, the Russia company, the
Eastland company, the Turkey company, and the African company.
The terms of admission into the Hamburgh company are now said to be
quite easy; and the directors either have it not in their power to subject the
trade to any troublesome restraint or regulations, or, at least, have not of late
exercised that power. It has not always been so. About the middle of the last
century, the fine for admission was fifty, and at one time one hundred
pounds, and the conduct of the company was said to be extremely
oppressive. In 1643, in 1645, and in 1661, the clothiers and free traders of
the west of England complained of them to parliament, as of monopolists,
who confined the trade, and oppressed the manufactures of the country.
Though those complaints produced no act of parliament, they had probably
intimidated the company so far, as to oblige them to reform their conduct.
Since that time, at least, there have been no complaints against them. By the
10th and 11th of William III. c.6, the fine for admission into the Russia
company was reduced to five pounds; and by the 25th of Charles II. c.7,
that for admission into the Eastland company to forty shillings; while, at the
same time, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, all the countries on the north
side of the Baltic, were exempted from their exclusive charter. The conduct
of those companies had probably given occasion to those two acts of
parliament. Before that time, Sir Josiah Child had represented both these
and the Hamburgh company as extremely oppressive, and imputed to their
bad management the low state of the trade, which we at that time carried on
to the countries comprehended within their respective charters. But though
such companies may not, in the present times, be very oppressive, they are
certainly altogether useless. To be merely useless, indeed, is perhaps, the
highest eulogy which can ever justly be bestowed upon a regulated
company; and all the three companies above mentioned seem, in their
present state, to deserve this eulogy.
The fine for admission into the Turkey company was formerly twenty-
five pounds for all persons under twenty-six years of age, and fifty pounds
for all persons above that age. Nobody but mere merchants could be
admitted; a restriction which excluded all shop-keepers and retailers. By a
bye-law, no British manufactures could be exported to Turkey but in the
general ships of the company; and as those ships sailed always from the
port of London, this restriction confined the trade to that expensive port,
and the traders to those who lived in London and in its neighbourhood. By
another bye-law, no person living within twenty miles of London, and not
free of the city, could be admitted a member; another restriction which,
joined to the foregoing, necessarily excluded all but the freemen of London.
As the time for the loading and sailing of those general ships depended
altogether upon the directors, they could easily fill them with their own
goods, and those of their particular friends, to the exclusion of others, who,
they might pretend, had made their proposals too late. In this state of things,
therefore, this company was, in every respect, a strict and oppressive
monopoly. Those abuses gave occasion to the act of the 26th of George II.
c. 18, reducing the fine for admission to twenty pounds for all persons,
without any distinction of ages, or any restriction, either to mere merchants,
or to the freemen of London; and granting to all such persons the liberty of
exporting, from all the ports of Great Britain, to any port in Turkey, all
British goods, of which the exportation was not prohibited, upon paying
both the general duties of customs, and the particular duties assessed for
defraying the necessary expenses of the company; and submitting, at the
same time, to the lawful authority of the British ambassador and consuls
resident in Turkey, and to the bye-laws of the company duly enacted. To
prevent any oppression by those bye-laws, it was by the same act ordained,
that if any seven members of the company conceived themselves aggrieved
by any bye-law which should be enacted after the passing of this act, they
might appeal to the board of trade and plantations (to the authority of which
a committee of the privy council has now succeeded), provided such appeal
was brought within twelve months after the bye-law was enacted; and that,
if any seven members conceived themselves aggrieved by any bye-law
which had been enacted before the passing of this act, they might bring a
like appeal, provided it was within twelve months after the day on which
this act was to take place. The experience of one year, however, may not
always be sufficient to discover to all the members of a great company the
pernicious tendency of a particular bye-law; and if several of them should
afterwards discover it, neither the board of trade, nor the committee of
council, can afford them any redress. The object, besides, of the greater part
of the bye-laws of all regulated companies, as well as of all other
corporations, is not so much to oppress those who are already members, as
to discourage others from becoming so; which may be done, not only by a
high fine, but by many other contrivances. The constant view of such
companies is always to raise the rate of their own profit as high as they can;
to keep the market, both for the goods which they export, and for those
which they import, as much understocked as they can; which can be done
only by restraining the competition, or by discouraging new adventurers
from entering into the trade. A fine, even of twenty pounds, besides, though
it may not, perhaps, be sufficient to discourage any man from entering into
the Turkey trade, with an intention to continue in it, may be enough to
discourage a speculative merchant from hazarding a single adventure in it.
In all trades, the regular established traders, even though not incorporated,
naturally combine to raise profits, which are noway so likely to be kept, at
all times, down to their proper level, as by the occasional competition of
speculative adventurers. The Turkey trade, though in some measure laid
open by this act of parliament, is still considered by many people as very far
from being altogether free. The Turkey company contribute to maintain an
ambassador and two or three consuls, who, like other public ministers,
ought to be maintained altogether by the state, and the trade laid open to all
his majesty’s subjects. The different taxes levied by the company, for this
and other corporation purposes, might afford a revenue much more than
sufficient to enable a state to maintain such ministers.
Regulated companies, it was observed by Sir Josiah Child, though they
had frequently supported public ministers, had never maintained any forts
or garrisons in the countries to which they traded; whereas joint-stock
companies frequently had. And, in reality, the former seem to be much
more unfit for this sort of service than the latter. First, the directors of a
regulated company have no particular interest in the prosperity of the
general trade of the company, for the sake of which such forts and garrisons
are maintained. The decay of that general trade may even frequently
contribute to the advantage of their own private trade; as, by diminishing
the number of their competitors, it may enable them both to buy cheaper,
and to sell dearer. The directors of a joint-stock company, on the contrary,
having only their share in the profits which are made upon the common
stock committed to their management, have no private trade of their own, of
which the interest can be separated from that of the general trade of the
company. Their private interest is connected with the prosperity of the
general trade of the company, and with the maintenance of the forts and
garrisons which are necessary for its defence. They are more likely,
therefore, to have that continual and careful attention which that
maintenance necessarily requires. Secondly, The directors of a joint-stock
company have always the management of a large capital, the joint stock of
the company, a part of which they may frequently employ, with propriety, in
building, repairing, and maintaining such necessary forts and garrisons. But
the directors of a regulated company, having the management of no
common capital, have no other fund to employ in this way, but the casual
revenue arising from the admission fines, and from the corporation duties
imposed upon the trade of the company. Though they had the same interest,
therefore, to attend to the maintenance of such forts and garrisons, they can
seldom have the same ability to render that attention effectual. The
maintenance of a public minister, requiring scarce any attention, and but a
moderate and limited expense, is a business much more suitable both to the
temper and abilities of a regulated company.
Long after the time of Sir Josiah Child, however, in 1750, a regulated
company was established, the present company of merchants trading to
Africa; which was expressly charged at first with the maintenance of all the
British forts and garrisons that lie between Cape Blanc and the Cape of
Good Hope, and afterwards with that of those only which lie between Cape
Rouge and the Cape of Good Hope. The act which establishes this company
(the 23rd of George II. c.51 ), seems to have had two distinct objects in
view; first, to restrain effectually the oppressive and monopolizing spirit
which is natural to the directors of a regulated company; and, secondly, to
force them, as much as possible, to give an attention, which is not natural to
them, towards the maintenance of forts and garrisons.
For the first of these purposes, the fine for admission is limited to forty
shillings. The company is prohibited from trading in their corporate
capacity, or upon a joint stock; from borrowing money upon common seal,
or from laying any restraints upon the trade, which may be carried on freely
from all places, and by all persons being British subjects, and paying the
fine. The government is in a committee of nine persons, who meet at
London, but who are chosen annually by the freemen of the company at
London, Bristol, and Liverpool; three from each place. No committeeman
can be continued in office for more than three years together. Any
committee-man might be removed by the board of trade and plantations,
now by a committee of council, after being heard in his own defence. The
committee are forbid to export negroes from Africa, or to import any
African goods into Great Britain. But as they are charged with the
maintenance of forts and garrisons, they may, for that purpose export from
Great Britain to Africa goods and stores of different kinds. Out of the
moneys which they shall receive from the company, they are allowed a
sum, not exceeding eight hundred pounds, for the salaries of their clerks
and agents at London, Bristol, and Liverpool, the house-rent of their offices
at London, and all other expenses of management, commission, and agency,
in England. What remains of this sum, after defraying these different
expenses, they may divide among themselves, as compensation for their
trouble, in what manner they think proper. By this constitution, it might
have been expected, that the spirit of monopoly would have been effectually
restrained, and the first of these purposes sufficiently answered. It would
seem, however, that it had not. Though by the 4th of George III. c.20, the
fort of Senegal, with all its dependencies, had been invested in the company
of merchants trading to Africa, yet, in the year following (by the 5th of
George III. c.44), not only Senegal and its dependencies, but the whole
coast, from the port of Sallee, in South Barbary, to Cape Rouge, was
exempted from the jurisdiction of that company, was vested in the crown,
and the trade to it declared free to all his majesty’s subjects. The company
had been suspected of restraining the trade and of establishing some sort of
improper monopoly. It is not, however, very easy to conceive how, under
the regulations of the 23d George II. they could do so. In the printed debates
of the house of commons, not always the most authentic records of truth, I
observe, however, that they have been accused of this. The members of the
committee of nine being all merchants, and the governors and factors in
their different forts and settlements being all dependent upon them, it is not
unlikely that the latter might have given peculiar attention to the
consignments and commissions of the former, which would establish a real
monopoly.
For the second of these purposes, the maintenance of the forts and
garrisons, an annual sum has been allotted to them by parliament, generally
about £13,000. For the proper application of this sum, the committee is
obliged to account annually to the cursitor baron of exchequer; which
account is afterwards to be laid before parliament. But parliament, which
gives so little attention to the application of millions, is not likely to give
much to that of £13,000 a-year; and the cursitor baron of exchequer, from
his profession and education, is not likely to be profoundly skilled in the
proper expense of forts and garrisons. The captains of his majesty’s navy,
indeed, or any other commissioned officers, appointed by the board of
admiralty, may inquire into the condition of the forts and garrisons, and
report their observations to that board. But that board seems to have no
direct jurisdiction over the committee, nor any authority to correct those
whose conduct it may thus inquire into; and the captains of his majesty’s
navy, besides, are not supposed to be always deeply learned in the science
of fortification. Removal from an office, which can be enjoyed only for the
term of three years, and of which the lawful emoluments, even during that
term, are so very small, seems to be the utmost punishment to which any
committee-man is liable, for any fault, except direct malversation, or
embezzlement, either of the public money, or of that of the company; and
the fear of the punishment can never be a motive of sufficient weight to
force a continual and careful attention to a business to which he has no
other interest to attend. The committee are accused of having sent out bricks
and stones from England for the reparation of Cape Coast Castle, on the
coast of Guinea; a business for which parliament had several times granted
an extraordinary sum of money. These bricks and stones, too, which had
thus been sent upon so long a voyage, were said to have been of so bad a
quality, that it was necessary to rebuild, from the foundation, the walls
which had been repaired with them. The forts and garrisons which lie north
of Cape Rouge, are not only maintained at the expense of the state, but are
under the immediate government of the executive power; and why those
which lie south of that cape, and which, too, are, in part at least, maintained
at the expense of the state, should be under a different government, it seems
not very easy even to imagine a good reason. The protection of the
Mediterranean trade was the original purpose or pretence of the garrisons of
Gibraltar and Minorca; and the maintenance and government of those
garrisons have always been, very properly, committed, not to the Turkey
company, but to the executive power. In the extent of its dominion consists,
in a great measure, the pride and dignity of that power; and it is not very
likely to fail in attention to what is necessary for the defence of that
dominion. The garrisons at Gibraltar and Minorca, accordingly, have never
been neglected. Though Minorca has been twice taken, and is now probably
lost for ever, that disaster has never been imputed to any neglect in the
executive power. I would not, however, be understood to insinuate, that
either of those expensive garrisons was ever, even in the smallest degree,
necessary for the purpose for which they were originally dismembered from
the Spanish monarchy. That dismemberment, perhaps, never served any
other real purpose than to alienate from England her natural ally the king of
Spain, and to unite the two principal branches of the house of Bourbon in a
much stricter and more permanent alliance than the ties of blood could ever
have united them.
Joint-stock companies, established either by royal charter, or by act of
parliament, are different in several respects, not only from regulated
companies, but from private copartneries.
First, In a private copartnery, no partner without the consent of the
company, can transfer his share to another person, or introduce a new
member into the company. Each member, however, may, upon proper
warning, withdraw from the copartnery, and demand payment from them of
his share of the common stock. In a joint-stock company, on the contrary,
no member can demand payment of his share from the company; but each
member can, without their consent, transfer his share to another person, and
thereby introduce a new member. The value of a share in a joint stock is
always the price which it will bring in the market; and this may be either
greater or less in any proportion, than the sum which its owner stands
credited for in the stock of the company.
Secondly, In a private copartnery, each partner is bound for the debts
contracted by the company, to the whole extent of his fortune. In a joint-
stock company, on the contrary, each partner is bound only to the extent of
his share.
The trade of a joint-stock company is always managed by a court of
directors. This court, indeed, is frequently subject, in many respects, to the
control of a general court of proprietors. But the greater part of these
proprietors seldom pretend to understand any thing of the business of the
company; and when the spirit of faction happens not to prevail among them,
give themselves no trouble about it, but receive contentedly such halfyearly
or yearly dividend as the directors think proper to make to them. This total
exemption front trouble and front risk, beyond a limited sum, encourages
many people to become adventurers in joint-stock companies, who would,
upon no account, hazard their fortunes in any private copartnery. Such
companies, therefore, commonly draw to themselves much greater stocks,
than any private copartnery can boast of. The trading stock of the South Sea
company at one time amounted to upwards of thirty-three millions eight
hundred thousand pounds. The divided capital of the Bank of England
amounts, at present, to ten millions seven hundred and eighty thousand
pounds. The directors of such companies, however, being the managers
rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected
that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which
the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like
the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small
matters as not for their master’s honour, and very easily give themselves a
dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must
always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a
company. It is upon this account, that joint-stock companies for foreign
trade have seldom been able to maintain the competition against private
adventurers. They have, accordingly, very seldom succeeded without an
exclusive privilege; and frequently have not succeeded with one. Without
an exclusive privilege, they have commonly mismanaged the trade. With an
exclusive privilege, they have both mismanaged and confined it.
The Royal African company, the predecessors of the present African
company, had an exclusive privilege by charter; but as that charter had not
been confirmed by act of parliament, the trade, in consequence of the
declaration of rights, was, soon after the Revolution, laid open to all his
majesty’s subjects. The Hudson’s Bay company are, as to their legal rights,
in the same situation as the Royal African company. Their exclusive charter
has not been confirmed by act of parliament. The South Sea company, as
long as they continued to be a trading company, had an exclusive privilege
confirmed by act of parliament; as have likewise the present united
company of merchants trading to the East Indies.
The Royal African company soon found that they could not maintain the
competition against private adventurers, whom, notwithstanding the
declaration of rights, they continued for some time to call interlopers, and to
persecute as such. In 1698, however, the private adventurers were subjected
to a duty of ten per cent. upon almost all the different branches of their
trade, to be employed by the company in the maintenance of their forts and
garrisons. But, notwithstanding this heavy tax, the company were still
unable to maintain the competition. Their stock and credit gradually
declined. In 1712, their debts had become so great, that a particular act of
parliament was thought necessary, both for their security and for that of
their creditors. It was enacted, that the resolution of two-thirds of these
creditors in number and value should bind the rust, both with regard to the
time which should be allowed to the company for the payment of their
debts, and with regard to any other agreement which it might be thought
proper to make with them concerning those debts. In 1730, their affairs
were in so great disorder, that they were altogether incapable of maintaining
their forts and garrisons, the sole purpose and pretext of their institution.
From that year till their final dissolution, the parliament judged it necessary
to allow the annual sum of £10,000 for that purpose. In 1732, after having
been for many years losers by the trade of carrying negroes to the West
Indies, they at last resolved to give it up altogether; to sell to the private
traders to America the negroes which they purchased upon the coast; awl to
employ their servants in a trade to the inland parts of Africa for gold dust,
elephants teeth, dyeing drugs, etc. But their success in this more confined
trade was not greater than in their former extensive one. Their affairs
continued to go gradually to decline, till at last, being in every respect a
bankrupt company, they were dissolved by act of parliament, and their forts
and garrisons vested in the present regulated company of merchants trading
to Africa. Before the erection of the Royal African company, there had been
three other joint-stock companies successively established, one after
another, for the African trade. They were all equally unsuccessful. They all,
however, had exclusive charters, which, though not confirmed by act of
parliament, were in those days supposed to convey a real exclusive
privilege.
The Hudson’s Bay company, before their misfortunes in the late war, had
been much more fortunate than the Royal African company. Their
necessary expense is much smaller. The whole number of people whom
they maintain in their different settlements and habitations, which they have
honoured with the name of forts, is said not to exceed a hundred and twenty
persons. This number, however, is sufficient to prepare beforehand the
cargo of furs and other goods necessary for loading their ships, which, on
account of the ice, can seldom remain above six or eight weeks in those
seas. This advantage of having a cargo ready prepared, could not, for
several years, be acquired by private adventurers; and without it there
seems to be no possibility of trading to Hudson’s Bay. The moderate capital
of the company, which, it is said, does not exceed one hundred and ten
thousand pounds, may, besides, be sufficient to enable them to engross the
whole, or almost the whole trade and surplus produce, of the miserable
though extensive country comprehended within their charter. No private
adventurers, accordingly, have ever attempted to trade to that country in
competition with them. This company, therefore, have always enjoyed an
exclusive trade, in fact, though they may have no right to it in law. Over and
above all this, the moderate capital of this company is said to be divided
among a very small number of proprietors. But a joint-stock company,
consisting of a small number of proprietors, with a moderate capital,
approaches very nearly to the nature of a private copartnery, and may be
capable of nearly the same degree of vigilance and attention. It is not to be
wondered at, therefore, if, in consequence of these different advantages, the
Hudson’s Bay company had, before the late war, been able to carry on their
trade with a considerable degree of success. It does not seem probable,
however, that their profits ever approached to what the late Mr Dobbs
imagined them. A much more sober and judicious writer, Mr Anderson,
author of the Historical and Chronological Deduction of Commerce, very
justly observes, that upon examining the accounts which Mr Dobbs himself
has given for several years together, of their exports and imports, and upon
making proper allowances for their extraordinary risk and expense, it does
not appear that their profits deserve to be envied, or that they can much, if
at all, exceed the ordinary profits of trade.
The South Sea company never had any forts or garrisons to maintain, and
therefore were entirely exempted from one great expense, to which other
joint-stock companies for foreign trade are subject; but they had an
immense capital divided among an immense number of proprietors. It was
naturally to be expected, therefore, that folly, negligence, and profusion,
should prevail in the whole management of their affairs. The knavery and
extravagance of their stock-jobbing projects are sufficiently known, and the
explication of them would be foreign to the present subject. Their
mercantile projects were not much better conducted. The first trade which
they engaged in, was that of supplying the Spanish West Indies with
negroes, of which (in consequence of what was called the Assiento Contract
granted them by the treaty of Utrecht) they had the exclusive privilege. But
as it was not expected that much profit could be made by this trade, both the
Portuguese and French companies, who had enjoyed it upon the same terms
before them, having been ruined by it, they were allowed, as compensation,
to send annually a ship of a certain burden, to trade directly to the Spanish
West Indies. Of the ten voyages which this annual ship was allowed to
make, they are said to have gained considerably by one, that of the Royal
Caroline, in 1731; and to have been losers, more or less, by almost all the
rest. Their ill success was imputed, by their factors and agents, to the
extortion and oppression of the Spanish government; but was, perhaps,
principally owing to the profusion and depredations of those very factors
and agents; some of whom are said to have acquired great fortunes, even in
one year. In 1734, the company petitioned the king, that they might be
allowed to dispose of the trade and tonnage of their annual ship, on account
of the little profit which they made by it, and to accept of such equivalent as
they could obtain from the king of Spain.
In 1724, this company had undertaken the whale fishery. Of this, indeed,
they had no monopoly; but as long as they carried it on, no other British
subjects appear to have engaged in it. Of the eight voyages which their
ships made to Greenland, they were gainers by one, and losers by all the
rest. After their eighth and last voyage, when they had sold their ships,
stores, and utensils, they found that their whole loss upon this branch,
capital and interest included, amounted to upwards of £237,000.
In 1722, this company petitioned the parliament to be allowed to divide
their immense capital of more than thirty-three millions eight hundred
thousand pounds, the whole of which had been lent to government, into two
equal parts; the one half, or upwards of £16,900,000, to be put upon the
same footing with other government annuities, and not to be subject to the
debts contracted, or losses incurred, by the directors of the company, in the
prosecution of their mercantile projects; the other half to remain as before, a
trading stock, and to be subject to those debts and losses. The petition was
too reasonable not to be granted. In 1733, they again petitioned the
parliament, that three-fourths of their trading stock might be turned into
annuity stock, and only one-fourth remain as trading stock, or exposed to
the hazards arising from the bad management of their directors. Both their
annuity and trading stocks had, by this time, been reduced more than two
millions each, by several different payments from government; so that this
fourth amounted only to £3,662,784:8:6. In 1748, all the demands of the
company upon the king of Spain, in consequence of the assiento contract,
were, by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, given up for what was supposed an
equivalent. An end was put to their trade with the Spanish West Indies; the
remainder of their trading stock was turned into an annuity stock; and the
company ceased, in every respect, to be a trading company.
It ought to be observed, that in the trade which the South Sea company
carried on by means of their annual ship, the only trade by which it ever
was expected that they could make any considerable profit, they were not
without competitors, either in the foreign or in the home market. At
Carthagena, Porto Bello, and La Vera Cruz, they had to encounter the
competition of the Spanish merchants, who brought from Cadiz to those
markets European goods, of the same kind with the outward cargo of their
ship; and in England they had to encounter that of the English merchants,
who imported from Cadiz goods of the Spanish West Indies, of the same
kind with the inward cargo. The goods, both of the Spanish and English
merchants, indeed, were, perhaps, subject to higher duties. But the loss
occasioned by the negligence, profusion, and malversation of the servants
of the company, had probably been a tax much heavier than all those duties.
That a joint-stock company should be able to carry on successfully any
branch of foreign trade, when private adventurers can come into any sort of
open and fair competition with them, seems contrary to all experience.
The old English East India company was established in 1600, by a
charter from Queen Elizabeth. In the first twelve voyages which they fitted
out for India, they appear to have traded as a regulated company, with
separate stocks, though only in the general ships of the company. In 1612,
they united into a joint stock. Their charter was exclusive, and, though not
confirmed by act of parliament, was in those days supposed to convey a real
exclusive privilege. For many years, therefore, they were not much
disturbed by interlopers. Their capital, which never exceeded £744,000, and
of which £50 was a share, was not so exorbitant, nor their dealings so
extensive, as to afford either a pretext for gross negligence and profusion, or
a cover to gross malversation. Notwithstanding some extraordinary losses,
occasioned partly by the malice of the Dutch East India company, and
partly by other accidents, they carried on for many years a successful trade.
But in process of time, when the principles of liberty were better
understood, it became every day more and more doubtful, how far a royal
charter, not confirmed by act of parliament, could convey an exclusive
privilege. Upon this question the decisions of the courts of justice were not
uniform, but varied with the authority of government, and the humours of
the times. Interlopers multiplied upon them; and towards the end of the
reign of Charles II., through the whole of that of James II., and during a part
of that of William III., reduced them to great distress. In 1698, a proposal
was made to parliament, of advancing two millions to government, at eight
per cent. provided the subscribers were erected into a new East India
company, with exclusive privileges. The old East India company offered
seven hundred thousand pounds, nearly the amount of their capital, at four
per cent. upon the same conditions. But such was at that time the state of
public credit, that it was more convenient for government to borrow two
millions at eight per cent. than seven hundred thousand pounds at four. The
proposal of the new subscribers was accepted, and a new East India
company established in consequence. The old East India company,
however, had a right to continue their trade till 1701. They had, at the same
time, in the name of their treasurer, subscribed very artfully three hundred
and fifteen thousand pounds into the stock of the new. By a negligence in
the expression of the act of parliament, which vested the East India trade in
the subscribers to this loan of two millions, it did not appear evident that
they were all obliged to unite into a joint stock. A few private traders,
whose subscriptions amounted only to seven thousand two hundred pounds,
insisted upon the privilege of trading separately upon their own stocks, and
at their own risks. The old East India company had a right to a separate
trade upon their own stock till 1701; and they had likewise, both before and
after that period, a right, like that or other private traders, to a separate trade
upon the £315,000, which they had subscribed into the stock of the new
company. The competition of the two companies with the private traders,
and with one another, is said to have well nigh ruined both. Upon a
subsequent occasion, in 1750, when a proposal was made to parliament for
putting the trade under the management of a regulated company, and
thereby laying it in some measure open, the East India company, in
opposition to this proposal, represented, in very strong terms, what had
been, at this time, the miserable effects, as they thought them, of this
competition. In India, they said, it raised the price of goods so high, that
they were not worth the buying; and in England, by overstocking the
market, it sunk their price so low, that no profit could be made by them.
That by a more plentiful supply, to the great advantage and conveniency of
the public, it must have reduced very much the price of India goods in the
English market, cannot well be doubted; but that it should have raised very
much their price in the Indian market, seems not very probable, as all the
extraordinary demand which that competition could occasion must have
been but as a drop of water in the immense ocean of Indian commerce. The
increase of demand, besides, though in the beginning it may sometimes
raise the price of goods, never fails to lower it in the long-run. It encourages
production, and thereby increases the competition of the producers, who, in
order to undersell one another, have recourse to new divisions or labour and
new improvements of art, which might never otherwise have been thought
of. The miserable effects of which the company complained, were the
cheapness of consumption, and the encouragement given to production;
precisely the two effects which it is the great business of political economy
to promote. The competition, however, of which they gave this doleful
account, had not been allowed to be of long continuance. In 1702, the two
companies were, in some measure, united by an indenture tripartite, to
which the queen was the third party; and in 1708, they were by act of
parliament, perfectly consolidated into one company, by their present name
of the United Company of Merchants trading to the East Indies. Into this act
it was thought worth while to insert a clause, allowing the separate traders
to continue their trade till Michaelmas 1711; but at the same time
empowering the directors, upon three years notice, to redeem their little
capital of seven thousand two hundred pounds, and thereby to convert the
whole stock of the company into a joint stock. By the same act, the capital
of the company, in consequence of a new loan to government, was
augmented from two millions to three millions two hundred thousand
pounds. In 1743, the company advanced another million to government. But
this million being raised, not by a call upon the proprietors, but by selling
annuities and contracting bond-debts, it did not augment the stock upon
which the proprietors could claim a dividend. It augmented, however, their
trading stock, it being equally liable with the other three millions two
hundred thousand pounds, to the losses sustained, and debts contracted by
the company in prosecution of their mercantile projects. From 1708, or at
least from 1711, this company, being delivered from all competitors, and
fully established in the monopoly of the English commerce to the East
Indies, carried on a successful trade, and from their profits, made annually a
moderate dividend to their proprietors. During the French war, which began
in 1741, the ambition of Mr. Dupleix, the French governor of Pondicherry,
involved them in the wars of the Carnatic, and in the politics of the Indian
princes. After many signal successes, and equally signal losses, they at last
lost Madras, at that time their principal settlement in India. It was restored
to them by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle; and, about this time the spirit of
war and conquest seems to have taken possession of their servants in India,
and never since to have left them. During the French war, which began in
1755, their arms partook of the general good fortune of those of Great
Britain. They defended Madras, took Pondicherry, recovered Calcutta, and
acquired the revenues of a rich and extensive territory, amounting, it was
then said, to upwards of three millions a-year. They remained for several
years in quiet possession of this revenue; but in 1767, administration laid
claim to their territorial acquisitions, and the revenue arising from them, as
of right belonging to the crown; and the company, in compensation for this
claim, agreed to pay to government £400,000 a-year. They had, before this,
gradually augmented their dividend from about six to ten per cent.; that is,
upon their capital of three millions two hundred thousand pounds, they had
increased it by £128,000, or had raised it from one hundred and ninety-two
thousand to three hundred and twenty thousand pounds a-year. They were
attempting about this time to raise it still further, to twelve and a-half per
cent., which would have made their annual payments to their proprietors
equal to what they had agreed to pay annually to government, or to
£400,000 a-year. But during the two years in which their agreement with
government was to take place, they were restrained from any further
increase of dividend by two successive acts of parliament, of which the
object was to enable them to make a speedier progress in the payment of
their debts, which were at this time estimated at upwards of six or seven
millions sterling. In 1769, they renewed their agreement with government
for five years more, and stipulated, that during the course of that period,
they should be allowed gradually to increase their dividend to twelve and a-
half per cent; never increasing it, however, more than one per cent. in one
year. This increase of dividend, therefore, when it had risen to its utmost
height, could augment their annual payments, to their proprietors and
government together, but by £680,000, beyond what they had been before
their late territorial acquisitions. What the gross revenue of those territorial
acquisitions was supposed to amount to, has already been mentioned; and
by an account brought by the Cruttenden East Indiaman in 1769, the neat
revenue, clear of all deductions and military charges, was stated at two
millions forty-eight thousand seven hundred and forty-seven pounds. They
were said, at the same time, to possess another revenue, arising partly from
lands, but chiefly from the customs established at their different settlements,
amounting to £439,000. The profits of their trade, too, according to the
evidence of their chairman before the house of commons, amounted, at this
time, to at least £400,000 a-year; according to that of their accountant, to at
least £500,000; according to the lowest account, at least equal to the highest
dividend that was to be paid to their proprietors. So great a revenue might
certainly have afforded an augmentation of £680,000 in their annual
payments; and, at the same time, have left a large sinking fund, sufficient
for the speedy reduction of their debt. In 1773, however, their debts, instead
of being reduced, were augmented by an arrear to the treasury in the
payment of the four hundred thousand pounds; by another to the custom-
house for duties unpaid; by a large debt to the bank, for money borrowed;
and by a fourth, for bills drawn upon them from India, and wantonly
accepted, to the amount of upwards of twelve hundred thousand pounds.
The distress which these accumulated claims brought upon them, obliged
them not only to reduce all at once their dividend to six per cent. but to
throw themselves upon the mercy of govermnent, and to supplicate, first, a
release from the further payment of the stipulated £400,000 a-year; and,
secondly, a loan of fourteen hundred thousand, to save them from
immediate bankruptcy. The great increase of their fortune had, it seems,
only served to furnish their servants with a pretext for greater profusion,
and a cover for greater malversation, than in proportion even to that
increase of fortune. The conduct of their servants in India, and the general
state of their affairs both in India and in Europe, became the subject of a
parliamentary inquiry: in consequence of which, several very important
alterations were made in the constitution of their government, both at home
and abroad. In India, their principal settlements or Madras, Bombay, and
Calcutta, which had before been altogether independent of one another,
were subjected to a governor-general, assisted by a council of four
assessors, parliament assuming to itself the first nomination of this governor
and council, who were to reside at Calcutta; that city having now become,
what Madras was before, the most important of the English settlements in
India. The court of the Mayor of Calcutta, originally instituted for the trial
of mercantile causes, which arose in the city and neighbourhood, had
gradually extended its jurisdiction with the extension of the empire. It was
now reduced and confined to the original purpose of its institution. Instead
of it, a new supreme court of judicature was established, consisting of a
chief justice and three judges, to be appointed by the crown. In Europe, the
qualification necessary to entitle a proprietor to vote at their general courts
was raised, from five hundred pounds, the original price of a share in the
stock of the company, to a thousand pounds. In order to vote upon this
qualification, too, it was declared necessary, that he should have possessed
it, if acquired by his own purchase, and not by inheritance, for at least one
year, instead of six months, the term requisite before. The court of twenty-
four directors had before been chosen annually; but it was now enacted, that
each director should, for the future, be chosen for four years; six of them,
however, to go out of office by rotation every year, and not be capable of
being re-chosen at the election of the six new directors for the ensuing year.
In consequence of these alterations, the courts, both of the proprietors and
directors, it was expected, would be likely to act with more dignity and
steadiness than they had usually done before. But it seems impossible, by
any alterations, to render those courts, in any respect, fit to govern, or even
to share in the government of a great empire; because the greater part of
their members must always have too little interest in the prosperity of that
empire, to give any serious attention to what may promote it. Frequently a
man of great, sometimes even a man of small fortune, is willing to purchase
a thousand pounds share in India stock, merely for the influence which he
expects to aquire by a vote in the court of proprietors. It gives him a share,
though not in the plunder, yet in the appointment of the plunderers of India;
the court of directors, though they make that appointment, being necessarily
more or less under the influence of the proprietors, who not only elect those
directors, but sometimes over-rule the appointments of their servants in
India. Provided he can enjoy this influence for a few years, and thereby
provide for a certain number of his friends, he frequently cares little about
the dividend, or even about the value of the stock upon which his vote is
founded. About the prosperity of the great empire, in the government of
which that vote gives him a share, he seldom cares at all. No other
sovereigns ever were, or, from the nature of things, ever could be, so
perfectly indifferent about the happiness or misery of their subjects, the
improvement or waste of their dominions, the glory or disgrace of their
administration, as, from irresistible moral causes, the greater part of the
proprietors of such a mercantile company are, and necessarily must be. This
indifference, too, was more likely to be increased than diminished by some
of the new regulations which were made in consequence of the
parliamentary inquiry. By a resolution of the house of commons, for
example, it was declared, that when the £1,400,000 lent to the company by
government, should be paid, and their bond-debts be reduced to £1,500,000,
they might then, and not till then, divide eight per cent. upon their capital;
and that whatever remained of their revenues and neat profits at home
should be divided into four parts; three of them to be paid into the
exchequer for the use of the public, and the fourth to be reserved as a fund,
either for the further reduction of their bond-debts, or for the discharge of
other contingent exigencies which the company might labour under. But if
the company were bad stewards and bad sovereigns, when the whole of
their neat revenue and profits belonged to themselves, and were at their own
disposal, they were surely not likely to be better when three-fourths of them
were to belong to other people, and the other fourth, though to be laid out
for the benefit of the company, yet to be so under the inspection and with
the approbation of other people.
It might be more agreeable to the company, that their own servants and
dependants should have either the pleasure of wasting, or the profit of
embezzling, whatever surplus might remain, after paying the proposed
dividend of eight per cent. than that it should come into the hands of a set of
people with whom those resolutions could scarce fail to set them in some
measure at variance. The interest of those servants and dependants might so
far predominate in the court of proprietors, as sometimes to dispose it to
support the authors of depredations which had been committed in direct
violation of its own authority. With the majority of proprietors, the support
even of the authority of their own court might sometimes be a matter of less
consequence than the support of those who had set that authority at
defiance.
The regulations of 1773, accordingly, did not put an end to the disorder
of the company’s government in India. Notwithstanding that, during a
momentary fit of good conduct, they had at one time collected into the
treasury of Calcutta more than £3,000,000 sterling; notwithstanding that
they had afterwards extended either their dominion or their depredations
over a vast accession of some of the richest and most fertile countries in
India, all was wasted and destroyed. They found themselves altogether
unprepared to stop or resist the incursion of Hyder Ali; and in consequence
of those disorders, the company is now (1784) in greater distress than ever;
and, in order to prevent immediate bankruptcy, is once more reduced to
supplicate the assistance of government. Different plans have been
proposed by the different parties in parliament for the better management of
its affairs; and all those plans seem to agree in supposing, what was indeed
always abundantly evident, that it is altogether unfit to govern its territorial
possessions. Even the company itself seems to be convinced of its own
incapacity so far, and seems, upon that account willing to give them up to
government.
With the right of possessing forts and garrisons in distant and barbarous
countries is necessarily connected the right of making peace and war in
those countries. The joint-stock companies, which have had the one right,
have constantly exercised the other, and have frequently had it expressly
conferred upon them. How unjustly, how capriciously, how cruelly, they
have commonly exercised it, is too well known from recent experience.
When a company of merchants undertake, at their own risk and expense,
to establish a new trade with some remote and barbarous nation, it may not
be unreasonable to incorporate them into a joint-stock company, and to
grant them, in case of their success, a monopoly of the trade for a certain
number of years. It is the easiest and most natural way in which the state
can recompense them for hazarding a dangerous and expensive experiment,
of which the public is afterwards to reap the benefit. A temporary monopoly
of this kind may be vindicated, upon the same principles upon which a like
monopoly of a new machine is granted to its inventor, and that of a new
book to its author. But upon the expiration of the term, the monopoly ought
certainly to determine; the forts and garrisons, if it was found necessary to
establish any, to be taken into the hands of government, their value to be
paid to the company, and the trade to be laid open to all the subjects of the
state. By a perpetual monopoly, all the other subjects of the state are taxed
very absurdly in two different ways: first, by the high price of goods, which,
in the case of a free trade, they could buy much cheaper; and, secondly, by
their total exclusion from a branch of business which it might be both
convenient and profitable for many of them to carry on. It is for the most
worthless of all purposes, too, that they are taxed in this manner. It is
merely to enable the company to support the negligence, profusion, and
malversation of their own servants, whose disorderly conduct seldom
allows the dividend of the company to exceed the ordinary rate of profit in
trades which are altogether free, and very frequently makes a fall even a
good deal short of that rate. Without a monopoly, however, a joint-stock
company, it would appear from experience, cannot long carry on any branch
of foreign trade. To buy in one market, in order to sell with profit in
another, when there are many competitors in both; to watch over, not only
the occasional variations in the demand, but the much greater and more
frequent variations in the competition, or in the supply which that demand
is likely to get from other people; and to suit with dexterity and judgment
both the quantity and quality of each assortment of goods to all these
circumstances, is a species of warfare, of which the operations are
continually changing, and which can scarce ever be conducted successfully,
without such an unremitting exertion of vigilance and attention as cannot
long be expected from the directors of a joint-stock company. The East
India company, upon the redemption of their funds, and the expiration of
their exclusive privilege, have a right, by act of parliament, to continue a
corporation with a joint stock, and to trade in their corporate capacity to the
East Indies, in common with the rest of their fellow subjects. But in this
situation, the superior vigilance and attention of a private adventurer would,
in all probability, soon make them weary of the trade.
An eminent French author, of great knowledge in matters of political
economy, the Abbe Morellet, gives a list of fifty-five joint-stock companies
for foreign trade, which have been established in different parts of Europe
since the year 1600, and which, according to him, have all failed from
mismanagement, notwithstanding they had exclusive privileges. He has
been misinformed with regard to the history of two or three of them, which
were not joint-stock companies and have not failed. But, in compensation,
there have been several joint-stock companies which have failed, and which
he has omitted.
The only trades which it seems possible for a joint-stock company to
carry on successfully, without an exclusive privilege, are those, of which all
the operations are capable of being reduced to what is called a routine, or to
such a uniformity of method as admits of little or no variation. Of this kind
is, first, the banking trade; secondly, the trade of insurance from fire and
from sea risk, and capture in time of war; thirdly, the trade of making and
maintaining a navigable cut or canal; and, fourthly, the similar trade of
bringing water for the supply of a great city.
Though the principles of the banking trade may appear somewhat
abstruse, the practice is capable of being reduced to strict rules. To depart
upon any occasion from those rules, in consequence of some flattering
speculation of extraordinary gain, is almost always extremely dangerous
and frequently fatal to the banking company which attempts it. But the
constitution of joint-stock companies renders them in general, more
tenacious of established rules than any private copartnery. Such companies,
therefore, seem extremely well fitted for this trade. The principal banking
companies in Europe, accordingly, are joint-stock companies, many of
which manage their trade very successfully without any exclusive privilege.
The bank of England has no other exclusive privilege, except that no other
banking company in England shall consist of more than six persons. The
two banks of Edinburgh are joint-stock companies, without any exclusive
privilege.
The value of the risk, either from fire, or from loss by sea, or by capture,
though it cannot, perhaps, be calculated very exactly, admits, however, of
such a gross estimation, as renders it, in some degree, reducible to strict rule
and method. The trade of insurance, therefore, may be carried on
successfully by a joint-stock company, without any exclusive privilege.
Neither the London Assurance, nor the Royal Exchange Assurance
companies have any such privilege.
When a navigable cut or canal has been once made, the management of it
becomes quite simple and easy, and it is reducible to strict rule and method.
Even the making of it is so, as it may be contracted for with undertakers, at
so much a mile, and so much a lock. The same thing may be said of a canal,
an aqueduct, or a great pipe for bringing water to supply a great city. Such
under-takings, therefore, may be, and accordingly frequently are, very
successfully managed by joint-stock companies, without any exclusive
privilege.
To establish a joint-stock company, however, for any undertaking, merely
because such a company might be capable of managing it successfully; or,
to exempt a particular set of dealers from some of the general laws which
take place with regard to all their neighbours, merely because they might be
capable of thriving, if they had such an exemption, would certainly not be
reasonable. To render such an establishment perfectly reasonable, with the
circumstance of being reducible to strict rule and method, two other
circumstances ought to concur. First, it ought to appear with the clearest
evidence, that the undertaking is of greater and more general utility than the
greater part of common trades; and, secondly, that it requires a greater
capital than can easily be collected into a private copartnery. If a moderate
capital were sufficient, the great utility of the undertaking would not be a
sufficient reason for establishing a joint-stock company; because, in this
case, the demand for what it was to produce, would readily and easily be
supplied by private adventurers. In the four trades above mentioned, both
those circumstances concur.
The great and general utility of the banking trade, when prudently
managed, has been fully explained in the second book of this Inquiry. But a
public bank, which is to support public credit, and, upon particular
emergencies, to advance to government the whole produce of a tax, to the
amount, perhaps, of several millions, a year or two before it comes in,
requires a greater capital than can easily be collected into any private
copartnery.
The trade of insurance gives great security to the fortunes of private
people, and, by dividing among a great many that loss which would ruin an
individual, makes it fall light and easy upon the whole society. In order to
give this security, however, it is necessary that the insurers should have a
very large capital. Before the establishment of the two joint-stock
companies for insurance in London, a list, it is said, was laid before the
attorney-general, of one hundred and fifty private usurers, who had failed in
the course of a few years.
That navigable cuts and canals, and the works which are sometimes
necessary for supplying a great city with water, are of great and general
utility, while, at the same time, they frequently require a greater expense
than suits the fortunes of private people, is sufficiently obvious.
Except the four trades above mentioned, I have not been able to recollect
any other, in which all the three circumstances requisite for rendering
reasonable the establishment of a joint-stock company concur. The English
copper company of London, the lead-smelting company, the glass-grinding
company, have not even the pretext of any great or singular utility in the
object which they pursue; nor does the pursuit of that object seem to require
any expense unsuitable to the fortunes of many private men. Whether the
trade which those companies carry on, is reducible to such strict rule and
method as to render it fit for the management of a joint-stock company, or
whether they have any reason to boast of their extraordinary profits, I do
not pretend to know. The mine-adventurers company has been long ago
bankrupt. A share in the stock of the British Linen company of Edinburgh
sells, at present, very much below par, though less so than it did some years
ago. The joint-stock companies, which are established for the public-
spirited purpose of promoting some particular manufacture, over and above
managing their own affairs ill, to the diminution of the general stock of the
society, can, in other respects, scarce ever fail to do more harm than good.
Notwithstanding the most upright intentions, the unavoidable partiality of
their directors to particular branches of the manufacture, of which the
undertakers mislead and impose upon them, is a real discouragement to the
rest, and necessarily breaks, more or less, that natural proportion which
would otherwise establish itself between judicious industry and profit, and
which, to the general industry of the country, is of all encouragements the
greatest and the most effectual.
ART. II.—Of the Expense of the Institution for the Education of Youth.
The institutions for the education of the youth may, in the same manner,
furnish a revenue sufficient for defraying their own expense. The fee or
honorary, which the scholar pays to the master, naturally constitutes a
revenue of this kind.
Even where the reward of the master does not arise altogether from this
natural revenue, it still is not necessary that it should be derived from that
general revenue of the society, of which the collection and application are,
in most countries, assigned to the executive power. Through the greater part
of Europe, accordingly, the endowment of schools and colleges makes
either no charge upon that general revenue, or but a very small one. It
everywhere arises chiefly from some local or provincial revenue, from the
rent of some landed estate, or from the interest of some sum of money,
allotted and put under the management of trustees for this particular
purpose, sometimes by the sovereign himself, and sometimes by some
private donor.
Have those public endowments contributed in general, to promote the
end of their institution? Have they contributed to encourage the diligence,
and to improve the abilities, of the teachers? Have they directed the course
of education towards objects more useful, both to the individual and to the
public, than those to which it would naturally have gone of its own accord?
It should not seem very difficult to give at least a probable answer to each
of those questions.
In every profession, the exertion of the greater part of those who exercise
it, is always in proportion to the necessity they are under of making that
exertion. This necessity is greatest with those to whom the emoluments of
their profession are the only source from which they expect their fortune, or
even their ordinary revenue and subsistence. In order to acquire this fortune,
or even to get this subsistence, they must, in the course of a year, execute a
certain quantity of work of a known value; and, where the competition is
free, the rivalship of competitors, who are all endeavouring to justle one
another out of employment, obliges every man to endeavour to execute his
work with a certain degree of exactness. The greatness of the objects which
are to be acquired by success in some particular professions may, no doubt,
sometimes animate the exertions of a few men of extraordinary spirit and
ambition. Great objects, however, are evidently not necessary, in order to
occasion the greatest exertions. Rivalship and emulation render excellency,
even in mean professions, an object of ambition, and frequently occasion
the very greatest exertions. Great objects, on the contrary, alone and
unsupported by the necessity of application, have seldom been sufficient to
occasion any considerable exertion. In England, success in the profession of
the law leads to some very great objects of ambition; and yet how few men,
born to easy fortunes, have ever in this country been eminent in that
profession?
The endowments of schools and colleges have necessarily diminished,
more or less, the necessity of application in the teachers. Their subsistence,
so far as it arises from their salaries, is evidently derived from a fund,
altogether independent of their success and reputation in their particular
professions.
In some universities, the salary makes but a part, and frequently but a
small part, of the emoluments of the teacher, of which the greater part arises
from the honoraries or fees of his pupils. The necessity of application,
though always more or less diminished, is not, in this case, entirely taken
away. Reputation in his profession is still of some importance to him, and
he still has some dependency upon the affection, gratitude, and favourable
report of those who have attended upon his instructions; and these
favourable sentiments he is likely to gain in no way so well as by deserving
them, that is, by the abilities and diligence with which he discharges every
part of his duty.
In other universities, the teacher is prohibited from receiving any
honorary or fee from his pupils, and his salary constitutes the whole of the
revenue which he derives from his office. His interest is, in this case, set as
directly in opposition to his duty as it is possible to set it. It is the interest of
every man to live as much at his ease as he can; and if his emoluments are
to be precisely the same, whether he does or does not perform some very
laborious duty, it is certainly his interest, at least as interest is vulgarly
understood, either to neglect it altogether, or, if he is subject to some
authority which will not suffer him to do this, to perform it in as careless
and slovenly a manner as that authority will permit. If he is naturally active
and a lover of labour, it is his interest to employ that activity in any way
from which he can derive some advantage, rather than in the performance
of his duty, from which he can derive none.
If the authority to which he is subject resides in the body corporate, the
college, or university, of which he himself is a member, and in which the
greater part of the other members are, like himself, persons who either are,
or ought to be teachers, they are likely to make a common cause, to be all
very indulgent to one another, and every man to consent that his neighbour
may neglect his duty, provided he himself is allowed to neglect his own. In
the university of Oxford, the greater part of the public professors have, for
these many years, given up altogether even the pretence of teaching.
If the authority to which he is subject resides, not so much in the body
corporate, of which he is a member, as in some other extraneous persons, in
the bishop of the diocese, for example, in the governor of the province, or,
perhaps, in some minister of state, it is not, indeed, in this case, very likely
that he will be suffered to neglect his duty altogether. All that such
superiors, however, can force him to do, is to attend upon his pupils a
certain number of hours, that is, to give a certain number of lectures in the
week, or in the year. What those lectures shall be, must still depend upon
the diligence of the teacher; and that diligence is likely to be proportioned
to the motives which he has for exerting it. An extraneous jurisdiction of
this kind, besides, is liable to be exercised both ignorantly and capriciously.
In its nature, it is arbitrary and discretionary; and the persons who exercise
it, neither attending upon the lectures of the teacher themselves, nor perhaps
understanding the sciences which it is his business to teach, are seldom
capable of exercising it with judgment. From the insolence of office, too,
they are frequently indifferent how they exercise it, and are very apt to
censure or deprive him of his office wantonly and without any just cause.
The person subject to such jurisdiction is necessarily degraded by it, and,
instead of being one of the most respectable, is rendered one of the meanest
and most contemptible persons in the society. It is by powerful protection
only, that he can effectually guard himself against the bad usage to which he
is at all times exposed; and this protection he is most likely to gain, not by
ability or diligence in his profession, but by obsequiousness to the will of
his superiors, and by being ready, at all times, to sacrifice to that will the
rights, the interest, and the honour of the body corporate, of which he is a
member. Whoever has attended for any considerable time to the
administration of a French university, must have had occasion to remark the
effects which naturally result from an arbitrary and extraneous jurisdiction
of this kind.
Whatever forces a certain number of students to any college or university,
independent of the merit or reputation of the teachers, tends more or less to
diminish the necessity of that merit or reputation.
The privileges of graduates in arts, in law, physic, and divinity, when they
can be obtained only by residing a certain number of years in certain
universities, necessarily force a certain number of students to such
universities, independent of the merit or reputation of the teachers. The
privileges of graduates are a sort of statutes of apprenticeship, which have
contributed to the improvement of education just as the other statutes of
apprenticeship have to that of arts and manufactures.
The charitable foundations of scholarships, exhibitions, bursaries, etc.
necessarily attach a certain number of students to certain colleges,
independent altogether of the merit of those particular colleges. Were the
students upon such charitable foundations left free to choose what college
they liked best, such liberty might perhaps contribute to excite some
emulation among different colleges. A regulation, on the contrary, which
prohibited even the independent members of every particular college from
leaving it, and going to any other, without leave first asked and obtained of
that which they meant to abandon, would tend very much to extinguish that
emulation.
If in each college, the tutor or teacher, who was to instruct each student in
all arts and sciences, should not be voluntarily chosen by the student, but
appointed by the head of the college; and if, in case of neglect, inability, or
bad usage, the student should not be allowed to change him for another,
without leave first asked and obtained; such a regulation would not only
tend very much to extinguish all emulation among the different tutors of the
same college, but to diminish very much, in all of them, the necessity of
diligence and of attention to their respective pupils. Such teachers, though
very well paid by their students, might be as much disposed to neglect
them, as those who are not paid by them at all or who have no other
recompense but their salary.
If the teacher happens to be a man of sense, it must be an unpleasant
thing to him to be conscious, while he is lecturing to his students, that he is
either speaking or reading nonsense, or what is very little better than
nonsense. It must, too, be unpleasant to him to observe, that the greater part
of his students desert his lectures; or perhaps, attend upon them with plain
enough marks of neglect, contempt, and derision. If he is obliged, therefore,
to give a certain number of lectures, these motives alone, without any other
interest, might dispose him to take some pains to give tolerably good ones.
Several different expedients, however, may be fallen upon, which will
effectually blunt the edge of all those incitements to diligence. The teacher,
instead of explaining to his pupils himself the science in which he proposes
to instruct them, may read some book upon it; and if this book is written in
a foreign and dead language, by interpreting it to them into their own, or,
what would give him still less trouble, by making them interpret it to him,
and by now and then making an occasional remark upon it, he may flatter
himself that he is giving a lecture. The slightest degree of knowledge and
application will enable him to do this, without exposing himself to
contempt or derision, by saying any thing that is really foolish, absurd, or
ridiculous. The discipline of the college, at the same time, may enable him
to force all his pupils to the most regular attendance upon his sham lecture,
and to maintain the most decent and respectful behaviour during the whole
time of the performance.
The discipline of colleges and universities is in general contrived, not for
the benefit of the students, but for the interest, or, more properly speaking,
for the ease of the masters. Its object is, in all cases, to maintain the
authority of the master, and, whether he neglects or performs his duty, to
oblige the students in all cases to behave to him as if he performed it with
the greatest diligence and ability. It seems to presume perfect wisdom and
virtue in the one order, and the greatest weakness and folly in the other.
Where the masters, however, really perform their duty, there are no
examples, I believe, that the greater part of the students ever neglect theirs.
No discipline is ever requisite to force attendance upon lectures which are
really worth the attending, as is well known wherever any such lectures are
given. Force and restraint may, no doubt, be in some degree requisite, in
order to oblige children, or very young boys, to attend to those parts of
education, which it is thought necessary for them to acquire during that
early period of life; but after twelve or thirteen years of age, provided the
master does his duty, force or restraint can scarce ever be necessary to carry
on any part of education. Such is the generosity of the greater part of young
men, that so far from being disposed to neglect or despise the instructions
of their master, provided he shews some serious intention of being of use to
them, they are generally inclined to pardon a great deal of incorrectness in
the performance of his duty, and sometimes even to conceal from the public
a good deal of gross negligence.
Those parts of education, it is to be observed, for the teaching of which
there are no public institutions, are generally the best taught. When a young
man goes to a fencing or a dancing school, he does not, indeed, always
learn to fence or to dance very well; but he seldom fails of learning to fence
or to dance. The good effects of the riding school are not commonly so
evident. The expense of a riding school is so great, that in most places it is a
public institution. The three most essential parts of literary education, to
read, write, and account, it still continues to be more common to acquire in
private than in public schools; and it very seldom happens, that anybody
fails of acquiring them to the degree in which it is necessary to acquire
them.
In England, the public schools are much less corrupted than the
universities. In the schools, the youth are taught, or at least may be taught,
Greek and Latin; that is, everything which the masters pretend to teach, or
which it is expected they should teach. In the universities, the youth neither
are taught, nor always can find any proper means of being taught the
sciences, which it is the business of those incorporated bodies to teach. The
reward of the schoolmaster, in most cases, depends principally, in some
cases almost entirely, upon the fees or honoraries of his scholars. Schools
have no exclusive privileges. In order to obtain the honours of graduation, it
is not necessary that a person should bring a certificate of his having studied
a certain number of years at a public school. If, upon examination, he
appears to understand what is taught there, no questions are asked about the
place where he learnt it.
The parts of education which are commonly taught in universities, it may
perhaps be said, are not very well taught. But had it not been for those
institutions, they would not have been commonly taught at all; and both the
individual and the public would have suffered a good deal from the want of
those important parts of education.
The present universities of Europe were originally, the greater part of
them, ecclesiastical corporations, instituted for the education of churchmen.
They were founded by the authority of the pope; and were so entirely under
his immediate protection, that their members, whether masters or students,
had all of them what was then called the benefit of clergy, that is, were
exempted from the civil jurisdiction of the countries in which their
respective universities were situated, and were amenable only to the
ecclesiastical tribunals. What was taught in the greater part of those
universities was suitable to the end of their institution, either theology, or
something that was merely preparatory to theology.
When Christianity was first established by law, a corrupted Latin had
become the common language of all the western parts of Europe. The
service of the church, accordingly, and the translation of the Bible which
were read in churches, were both in that corrupted Latin; that is, in the
common language of the country, After the irruption of the barbarous
nations who overturned the Roman empire, Latin gradually ceased to be the
language of any part of Europe. But the reverence of the people naturally
preserves the established forms and ceremonies of religion long after the
circumstances which first introduced and rendered them reasonable, are no
more. Though Latin, therefore, was no longer understood anywhere by the
great body of the people, the whole service of the church still continued to
be performed in that language. Two different languages were thus
established in Europe, in the same manner as in ancient Egypt: a language
of the priests, and a language of the people; a sacred and a profane, a
learned and an unlearned language. But it was necessary that the priests
should understand something of that sacred and learned language in which
they were to officiate; and the study of the Latin language therefore made,
from the beginning, an essential part of university education.
It was not so with that either of the Greek or of the Hebrew language.
The infallible decrees of the church had pronounced the Latin translation of
the Bible, commonly called the Latin Vulgate, to have been equally dictated
by divine inspiration, and therefore of equal authority with the Greek and
Hebrew originals. The knowledge of those two languages, therefore, not
being indispensably requisite to a churchman, the study of them did not for
along time make a necessary part of the common course of university
education. There are some Spanish universities, I am assured, in which the
study of the Greek language has never yet made any part of that course. The
first reformers found the Greek text of the New Testament, and even the
Hebrew text of the Old, more favourable to their opinions than the vulgate
translation, which, as might naturally be supposed, had been gradually
accommodated to support the doctrines of the Catholic Church. They set
themselves, therefore, to expose the many errors of that translation, which
the Roman catholic clergy were thus put under the necessity of defending or
explaining. But this could not well be done without some knowledge of the
original languages, of which the study was therefore gradually introduced
into the greater part of universities; both of those which embraced, and of
those which rejected, the doctrines of the reformation. The Greek language
was connected with every part of that classical learning, which, though at
first principally cultivated by catholics and Italians, happened to come into
fashion much about the same time that the doctrines of the reformation
were set on foot. In the greater part of universities, therefore, that language
was taught previous to the study of philosophy, and as soon as the student
had made some progress in the Latin. The Hebrew language having no
connection with classical learning, and, except the Holy Scriptures, being
the language of not a single book in any esteem the study of it did not
commonly commence till after that of philosophy, and when the student had
entered upon the study of theology.
Originally, the first rudiments, both of the Greek and Latin languages,
were taught in universities; and in some universities they still continue to be
so. In others, it is expected that the student should have previously acquired,
at least, the rudiments of one or both of those languages, of which the study
continues to make everywhere a very considerable part of university
education.
The ancient Greek philosophy was divided into three great branches;
physics, or natural philosophy; ethics, or moral philosophy; and logic. This
general division seems perfectly agreeable to the nature of things.
The great phenomena of nature, the revolutions of the heavenly bodies,
eclipses, comets; thunder and lightning, and other extraordinary meteors;
the generation, the life, growth, and dissolution of plants and animals; are
objects which, as they necessarily excite the wonder, so they naturally call
forth the curiosity of mankind to inquire into their causes. Superstition first
attempted to satisfy this curiosity, by referring all those wonderful
appearances to the immediate agency of the gods. Philosophy afterwards
endeavoured to account for them from more familiar causes, or from such
as mankind were better acquainted with, than the agency of the gods. As
those great phenomena are the first objects of human curiosity, so the
science which pretends to explain them must naturally have been the first
branch of philosophy that was cultivated. The first philosophers,
accordingly, of whom history has preserved any account, appear to have
been natural philosophers.
In every age and country of the world, men must have attended to the
characters, designs, and actions of one another; and many reputable rules
and maxims for the conduct of human life must have been laid down and
approved of by common consent. As soon as writing came into fashion,
wise men, or those who fancied themselves such, would naturally
endeavour to increase the number of those established and respected
maxims, and to express their own sense of what was either proper or
improper conduct, sometimes in the more artificial form of apologues, like
what are called the fables of Aesop; and sometimes in the more simple one
of apophthegms or wise sayings, like the proverbs of Solomon, the verses
of Theognis and Phocyllides, and some part of the works of Hesiod. They
might continue in this manner, for a long time, merely to multiply the
number of those maxims of prudence and morality, without even attempting
to arrange them in any very distinct or methodical order, much less to
connect them together by one or more general principles, from which they
were all deducible, like effects from their natural causes. The beauty of a
systematical arrangement of different observations, connected by a few
common principles, was first seen in the rude essays of those ancient times
towards a system of natural philosophy. Something of the same kind was
afterwards attempted in morals. The maxims of common life were arranged
in some methodical order, and connected together by a few common
principles, in the same manner as they had attempted to arrange and connect
the phenomena of nature. The science which pretends to investigate and
explain those connecting principles, is what is properly called Moral
Philosophy.
Different authors gave different systems, both of natural and moral
philosophy. But the arguments by which they supported those different
systems, far from being always demonstrations, were frequently at best but
very slender probabilities, and sometimes mere sophisms, which had no
other foundation but the inaccuracy and ambiguity of common language.
Speculative systems, have, in all ages of the world, been adopted for
reasons too frivolous to have determined the judgment of any man of
common sense, in a matter of the smallest pecuniary interest. Gross
sophistry has scarce ever had any influence upon the opinions of mankind,
except in matters of philosophy and speculation; and in these it has
frequently had the greatest. The patrons of each system of natural and moral
philosophy, naturally endeavoured to expose the weakness of the arguments
adduced to support the systems which were opposite to their own. In
examining those arguments, they were necessarily led to consider the
difference between a probable and a demonstrative argument, between a
fallacious and a conclusive one; and logic, or the science of the general
principles of good and bad reasoning, necessarily arose out of the
observations which a scrutiny of this kind gave occasion to; though, in its
origin, posterior both to physics and to ethics, it was commonly taught, not
indeed in all, but in the greater part of the ancient schools of philosophy,
previously to either of those sciences. The student, it seems to have been
thought, ought to understand well the difference between good and bad
reasoning, before he was led to reason upon subjects of so great importance.
This ancient division of philosophy into three parts was, in the greater
part of the universities of Europe, changed for another into five.
In the ancient philosophy, whatever was taught concerning the nature
either of the human mind or of the Deity, made a part of the system of
physics. Those beings, in whatever their essence might be supposed to
consist, were parts of the great system of the universe, and parts, too,
productive of the most important effects. Whatever human reason could
either conclude or conjecture concerning them, made, as it were, two
chapters, though no doubt two very important ones, of the science which
pretended to give an account of the origin and revolutions of the great
system of the universe. But in the universities of Europe, where philosophy
was taught only as subservient to theology, it was natural to dwell longer
upon these two chapters than upon any other of the science. They were
gradually more and more extended, and were divided into many inferior
chapters; till at last the doctrine of spirits, of which so little can be known,
came to take up as much room in the system of philosophy as the doctrine
of bodies, of which so much can be known. The doctrines concerning those
two subjects were considered as making two distinct sciences. What are
called metaphysics, or pneumatics, were set in opposition to physics, and
were cultivated not only as the more sublime, but, for the purposes of a
particular profession, as the more useful science of the two. The proper
subject of experiment and observation, a subject in which a careful attention
is capable of making so many useful discoveries, was almost entirely
neglected. The subject in which, after a very few simple and almost obvious
truths, the most careful attention can discover nothing but obscurity and
uncertainty, and can consequently produce nothing but subtleties and
sophisms, was greatly cultivated.
When those two sciences had thus been set in opposition to one another,
the comparison between them naturally gave birth to a third, to what was
called ontology, or the science which treated of the qualities and attributes
which were common to both the subjects of the other two sciences. But if
subtleties and sophisms composed the greater part of the metaphysics or
pneumatics of the schools, they composed the whole of this cobweb science
of ontology, which was likewise sometimes called metaphysics.
Wherein consisted the happiness and perfection of a man, considered not
only as an individual, but as the member of a family, of a state, and of the
great society of mankind, was the object which the ancient moral
philosophy proposed to investigate. In that philosophy, the duties of human
life were treated of as subservient to the happiness and perfection of human
life, But when moral, as well as natural philosophy, came to be taught only
as subservient to theology, the duties of human life were treated of as
chiefly subservient to the happiness of a life to come. In the ancient
philosophy, the perfection of virtue was represented as necessarily
productive, to the person who possessed it, of the most perfect happiness in
this life. In the modern philosophy, it was frequently represented as
generally, or rather as almost always, inconsistent with any degree of
happiness in this life; and heaven was to be earned only by penance and
mortification, by the austerities and abasement of a monk, not by the liberal,
generous, and spirited conduct of a man. Casuistry, and an ascetic morality,
made up, in most cases, the greater part of the moral philosophy of the
schools. By far the most important of all the different branches of
philosophy became in this manner by far the most corrupted.
Such, therefore, was the common course of philosophical education in
the greater part of the universities in Europe. Logic was taught first;
ontology came in the second place; pneumatology, comprehending the
doctrine concerning the nature of the human soul and of the Deity, in the
third; in the fourth followed a debased system of moral philosophy, which
was considered as immediately connected with the doctrines of
pneumatology, with the immortality of the human soul, and with the
rewards and punishments which, from the justice of the Deity, were to be
expected in a life to come: a short and superficial system of physics usually
concluded the course.
The alterations which the universities of Europe thus introduced into the
ancient course of philosophy were all meant for the education of
ecclesiastics, and to render it a more proper introduction to the study of
theology. But the additional quantity of subtlety and sophistry, the casuistry
and ascetic morality which those alterations introduced into it, certainly did
not render it more for the education of gentlemen or men of the world, or
more likely either to improve the understanding or to mend the heart.
This course of philosophy is what still continues to be taught in the
greater part of the universities of Europe, with more or less diligence,
according as the constitution of each particular university happens to render
diligence more or less necessary to the teachers. In some of the richest and
best endowed universities, the tutors content themselves with teaching a
few unconnected shreds and parcels of this corrupted course; and even these
they commonly teach very negligently and superficially.
The improvements which, in modern times have been made in several
different branches of philosophy, have not, the greater part of them, been
made in universities, though some, no doubt, have. The greater part of
universities have not even been very forward to adopt those improvements
after they were made; and several of those learned societies have chosen to
remain, for a long time, the sanctuaries in which exploded systems and
obsolete prejudices found shelter and protection, after they had been hunted
out of every other corner of the world. In general, the richest and best
endowed universities have been slowest in adopting those improvements,
and the most averse to permit any considerable change in the established
plan of education. Those improvements were more easily introduced into
some of the poorer universities, in which the teachers, depending upon their
reputation for the greater part of their subsistence, were obliged to pay more
attention to the current opinions of the world.
But though the public schools and universities of Europe were originally
intended only for the education of a particular profession, that of
churchmen; and though they were not always very diligent in instructing
their pupils, even in the sciences which were supposed necessary for that
profession; yet they gradually drew to themselves the education of almost
all other people, particularly of almost all gentlemen and men of fortune.
No better method, it seems, could be fallen upon, of spending, with any
advantage, the long interval between infancy and that period of life at which
men begin to apply in good earnest to the real business of the world, the
business which is to employ them during the remainder of their days. The
greater part of what is taught in schools and universities, however, does not
seem to be the most proper preparation for that business.
In England, it becomes every day more and more the custom to send
young people to travel in foreign countries immediately upon their leaving
school, and without sending them to any university. Our young people, it is
said, generally return home much improved by their travels. A young man,
who goes abroad at seventeen or eighteen, and returns home at one-and-
twenty, returns three or four years older than he was when he went abroad;
and at that age it is very difficult not to improve a good deal in three or four
years. In the course of his travels, he generally acquires some knowledge of
one or two foreign languages; a knowledge, however, which is seldom
sufficient to enable him either to speak or write them with propriety. In
other respects, he commonly returns home more conceited, more
unprincipled, more dissipated, and more incapable of my serious
application, either to study or to business, than he could well have become
in so short a time had he lived at home. By travelling so very young, by
spending in the most frivolous dissipation the most previous years of his
life, at a distance from the inspection and control of his parents and
relations, every useful habit, which the earlier parts of his education might
have had some tendency to form in him, instead of being riveted and
confirmed, is almost necessarily either weakened or effaced. Nothing but
the discredit into which the universities are allowing themselves to fall,
could ever have brought into repute so very absurd a practice as that of
travelling at this early period of life. By sending his son abroad, a father
delivers himself, at least for some time, from so disagreeable an object as
that of a son unemployed, neglected, and going to ruin before his eyes.
Such have been the effects of some of the modern institutions for
education.
Different plans and different institutions for education seem to have taken
place in other ages and nations.
In the republics of ancient Greece, every free citizen was instructed,
under the direction of the public magistrate, in gymnastic exercises and in
music. By gymnastic exercises, it was intended to harden his body, to
sharpen his courage, and to prepare him for the fatigues and dangers of war;
and as the Greek militia was, by all accounts, one of the best that ever was
in the world, this part of their public education must have answered
completely the purpose for which it was intended. By the other part, music,
it was proposed, at least by the philosophers and historians, who have given
us an account of those institutions, to humanize the mind, to soften the
temper, and to dispose it for performing all the social and moral duties of
public and private life.
In ancient Rome, the exercises of the Campus Martius answered the same
purpose as those of the Gymnasium in ancient Greece, and they seem to
have answered it equally well. But among the Romans there was nothing
which corresponded to the musical education of the Greeks. The morals of
the Romans, however, both in private and public life, seem to have been,
not only equal, but, upon the whole, a good deal superior to those of the
Greeks. That they were superior in private life, we have the express
testimony of Polybius, and of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, two authors well
acquainted with both nations; and the whole tenor of the Greek and Roman
history bears witness to the superiority of the public morals of the Romans.
The good temper and moderation of contending factions seem to be the
most essential circumstances in the public morals of a free people. But the
factions of the Greeks were almost always violent and sanguinary; whereas,
till the time of the Gracchi, no blood had ever been shed in any Roman
faction; and from the time of the Gracchi, the Roman republic may be
considered as in reality dissolved. Notwithstanding, therefore, the very
respectable authority of Plato, Aristotle, and Polybius, and notwithstanding
the very ingenious reasons by which Mr. Montesquieu endeavours to
support that authority, it seems probable that the musical education of the
Greeks had no great effect in mending their morals, since, without any such
education, those of the Romans were, upon the whole, superior. The respect
of those ancient sages for the institutions of their ancestors had probably
disposed them to find much political wisdom in what was, perhaps, merely
an ancient custom, continued, without interruption, from the earliest period
of those societies, to the times in which they had arrived at a considerable
degree of refinement. Music and dancing are the great amusements of
almost all barbarous nations, and the great accomplishments which are
supposed to fit any man for entertaining his society. It is so at this day
among the negroes on the coast of Africa. It was so among the ancient
Celtes, among the ancient Scandinavians, and, as we may learn from
Homer, among the ancient Greeks, in the times preceding the Trojan war.
When the Greek tribes had formed themselves into little republics, it was
natural that the study of those accomplishments should for a long time
make a part of the public and common education of the people.
The masters who instructed the young people, either in music or in
military exercises, do not seem to have been paid, or even appointed by the
state, either in Rome or even at Athens, the Greek republic of whose laws
and customs we are the best informed. The state required that every free
citizen should fit himself for defending it in war, and should upon that
account, learn his military exercises. But it left him to learn them of such
masters as he could find; and it seems to have advanced nothing for this
purpose, but a public field or place of exercise, in which he should practise
and perform them.
In the early ages, both of the Greek and Roman republics, the other parts
of education seem to have consisted in learning to read, write, and account,
according to the arithmetic of the times. These accomplishments the richer
citizens seem frequently to have acquired at home, by the assistance of
some domestic pedagogue, who was, generally, either a slave or a
freedman; and the poorer citizens in the schools of such masters as made a
trade of teaching for hire. Such parts of education, however, were
abandoned altogether to the care of the parents or guardians of each
individual. It does not appear that the state ever assumed any inspection or
direction of them. By a law of Solon, indeed, the children were acquitted
from maintaining those parents who had neglected to instruct them in some
profitable trade or business.
In the progress of refinement, when philosophy and rhetoric came into
fashion, the better sort of people used to send their children to the schools
of philosophers and rhetoricians, in order to be instructed in these
fashionable sciences. But those schools were not supported by the public.
They were, for a long time, barely tolerated by it. The demand for
philosophy and rhetoric was, for a long time, so small, that the first
professed teachers of either could not find constant employment in any one
city, but were obliged to travel about from place to place. In this manner
lived Zeno of Elea, Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, and many others. As the
demand increased, the school, both of philosophy and rhetoric, became
stationary, first in Athens, and afterwards in several other cities. The state,
however, seems never to have encouraged them further, than by assigning
to some of them a particular place to teach in, which was sometimes done,
too, by private donors. The state seems to have assigned the Academy to
Plato, the Lyceum to Aristotle, and the Portico to Zeno of Citta, the founder
of the Stoics. But Epicurus bequeathed his gardens to his own school. Till
about the time of Marcus Antoninus, however, no teacher appears to have
had any salary from the public, or to have had any other emoluments, but
what arose from the honorarius or fees of his scholars. The bounty which
that philosophical emperor, as we learn from Lucian, bestowed upon one of
the teachers of philosophy, probably lasted no longer than his own life.
There was nothing equivalent to the privileges of graduation; and to have
attended any of those schools was not necessary, in order to be permitted to
practise any particular trade or profession. If the opinion of their own utility
could not draw scholars to them, the law neither forced anybody to go to
them, nor rewarded anybody for having gone to them. The teachers had no
jurisdiction over their pupils, nor any other authority besides that natural
authority which superior virtue and abilities never fail to procure from
young people towards those who are entrusted with any part of their
education.
At Rome, the study of the civil law made a part of the education, not of
the greater part of the citizens, but of some particular families. The young
people, however, who wished to acquire knowledge in the law, had no
public school to go to, and had no other method of studying it, than by
frequenting the company of such of their relations and friends as were
supposed to understand it. It is, perhaps, worth while to remark, that though
the laws of the twelve tables were many of them copied from those of some
ancient Greek republics, yet law never seems to have grown up to be a
science in any republic of ancient Greece. In Rome it became a science very
early, and gave a considerable degree of illustration to those citizens who
had the reputation of understanding it. In the republics of ancient Greece,
particularly in Athens, the ordinary courts of justice consisted of numerous,
and therefore disorderly, bodies of people, who frequently decided almost at
random, or as clamour, faction, and party-spirit, happened to determine. The
ignominy of an unjust decision, when it was to be divided among five
hundred, a thousand, or fifteen hundred people (for some of their courts
were so very numerous), could not fall very heavy upon any individual. At
Rome, on the contrary, the principal courts of justice consisted either of a
single judge, or of a small number of judges, whose characters, especially
as they deliberated always in public, could not fail to be very much affected
by any rash or unjust decision. In doubtful cases such courts, from their
anxiety to avoid blame, would naturally endeavour to shelter themselves
under the example or precedent of the judges who had sat before them,
either in the same or in some other court. This attention to practice and
precedent, necessarily formed the Roman law into that regular and orderly
system in which it has been delivered down to us; and the like attention has
had the like effects upon the laws of every other country where such
attention has taken place. The superiority of character in the Romans over
that of the Greeks, so much remarked by Polybius and Dionysius of
Halicarnassus, was probably more owing to the better constitution of their
courts of justice, than to any of the circumstances to which those authors
ascribe it. The Romans are said to have been particularly distinguished for
their superior respect to an oath. But the people who were accustomed to
make oath only before some diligent and well informed court of justice,
would naturally be much more attentive to what they swore, than they who
were accustomed to do the same thing before mobbish and disorderly
assemblies.
The abilities, both civil and military, of the Greeks and Romans, will
readily be allowed to have been at least equal to those of any modern
nation. Our prejudice is perhaps rather to overrate them. But except in what
related to military exercises, the state seems to have been at no pains to
form those great abilities; for I cannot be induced to believe that the musical
education of the Greeks could be of much consequence in forming them.
Masters, however, had been found, it seems, for instructing the better sort of
people among those nations, in every art and science in which the
circumstances of their society rendered it necessary or convenient for them
to be instructed. The demand for such instruction produced, what it always
produces, the talent for giving it; and the emulation which an unrestrained
competition never fails to excite, appears to have brought that talent to a
very high degree of perfection. In the attention which the ancient
philosophers excited, in the empire which they acquired over the opinions
and principles of their auditors, in the faculty which they possessed of
giving a certain tone and character to the conduct and conversation of those
auditors, they appear to have been much superior to any modern teachers.
In modern times, the diligence of public teachers is more or less corrupted
by the circumstances which render them more or less independent of their
success and reputation in their particular professions. Their salaries, too, put
the private teacher, who would pretend to come into competition with them,
in the same state with a merchant who attempts to trade without a bounty, in
competition with those who trade with a considerable one. If he sells his
goods at nearly the same price, he cannot have the same profit; and poverty
and beggary at least, if not bankruptcy and ruin, will infallibly be his lot. If
he attempts to sell them much dearer, he is likely to have so few customers,
that his circumstances will not be much mended. The privileges of
graduation, besides, are in many countries necessary, or at least extremely
convenient, to most men of learned professions, that is, to the far greater
part of those who have occasion for a learned education. But those
privileges can be obtained only by attending the lectures of the public
teachers. The most careful attendance upon the ablest instructions of any
private teacher cannot always give any title to demand them. It is from
these different causes that the private teacher of any of the sciences, which
are commonly taught in universities, is, in modern times, generally
considered as in the very lowest order of men of letters. A man of real
abilities can scarce find out a more humiliating or a more unprofitable
employment to turn them to. The endowments of schools and colleges have
in this manner not only corrupted the diligence of public teachers, but have
rendered it almost impossible to have any good private ones.
Were there no public institutions for education, no system, no science,
would be taught, for which there was not some demand, or which the
circumstances of the times did not render it either necessary or convenient,
or at least fashionable to learn. A private teacher could never find his
account in teaching either an exploded and antiquated system of a science
acknowledged to be useful, or a science universally believed to be a mere
useless and pedantic heap of sophistry and nonsense. Such systems, such
sciences, can subsist nowhere but in those incorporated societies for
education, whose prosperity and revenue are in a great measure independent
of their industry. Were there no public institutions for education, a
gentleman, after going through, with application and abilities, the most
complete course of education which the circumstances of the times were
supposed to afford, could not come into the world completely ignorant of
everything which is the common subject of conversation among gentlemen
and men of the world.
There are no public institutions for the education of women, and there is
accordingly nothing useless, absurd, or fantastical, in the common course of
their education. They are taught what their parents or guardians judge it
necessary or useful for them to learn, and they are taught nothing else.
Every part of their education tends evidently to some useful purpose; either
to improve the natural attractions of their person, or to form their mind to
reserve, to modesty, to chastity, and to economy; to render them both likely
to became the mistresses of a family, and to behave properly when they
have become such. In every part of her life, a woman feels some
conveniency or advantage from every part of her education. It seldom
happens that a man, in any part of his life, derives any conveniency or
advantage from some of the most laborious and troublesome parts of his
education.
Ought the public, therefore, to give no attention, it may be asked, to the
education of the people? Or, if it ought to give any, what are the different
parts of education which it ought to attend to in the different orders of the
people? and in what manner ought it to attend to them?
In some cases, the state of society necessarily places the greater part of
individuals in such situations as naturally form in them, without any
attention of government, almost all the abilities and virtues which that state
requires, or perhaps can admit of. In other cases, the state of the society
does not place the greater part of individuals in such situations; and some
attention of government is necessary, in order to prevent the almost entire
corruption and degeneracy of the great body of the people.
In the progress of the division of labour, the employment of the far
greater part of those who live by labour, that is, of the great body of the
people, comes to be confined to a few very simple operations; frequently to
one or two. But the understandings of the greater part of men are
necessarily formed by their ordinary employments. The man whose whole
life is spent in performing a few simple operations, of which the effects,
too, are perhaps always the same, or very nearly the same, has no occasion
to exert his understanding, or to exercise his invention, in finding out
expedients for removing difficulties which never occur. He naturally loses,
therefore, the habit of such exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and
ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become. The torpor of his
mind renders him not only incapable of relishing or bearing a part in any
rational conversation, but of conceiving any generous, noble, or tender
sentiment, and consequently of forming any just judgment concerning many
even of the ordinary duties of private life. Of the great and extensive
interests of his country he is altogether incapable of judging; and unless
very particular pains have been taken to render him otherwise, he is equally
incapable of defending his country in war. The uniformity of his stationary
life naturally corrupts the courage of his mind, and makes him regard, with
abhorrence, the irregular, uncertain, and adventurous life of a soldier. It
corrupts even the activity of his body, and renders him incapable of exerting
his strength with vigour and perseverance in any other employment, than
that to which he has been bred. His dexterity at his own particular trade
seems, in this manner, to be acquired at the expense of his intellectual,
social, and martial virtues. But in every improved and civilized society, this
is the state into which the labouring poor, that is, the great body of the
people, must necessarily fall, unless government takes some pains to
prevent it.
It is otherwise in the barbarous societies, as they are commonly called, of
hunters, of shepherds, and even of husbandmen in that rude state of
husbandry which precedes the improvement of manufactures, and the
extension of foreign commerce. In such societies, the varied occupations of
every man oblige every man to exert his capacity, and to invent expedients
for removing difficulties which are continually occurring. Invention is kept
alive, and the mind is not suffered to fall into that drowsy stupidity, which,
in a civilized society, seems to benumb the understanding of almost all the
inferior ranks of people. In those barbarous societies, as they are called,
every man, it has already been observed, is a warrior. Every man, too, is in
some measure a statesman, and can form a tolerable judgment concerning
the interest of the society, and the conduct of those who govern it. How far
their chiefs are good judges in peace, or good leaders in war, is obvious to
the observation of almost every single man among them. In such a society,
indeed, no man can well acquire that improved and refined understanding
which a few men sometimes possess in a more civilized state. Though in a
rude society there is a good deal of variety in the occupations of every
individual, there is not a great deal in those of the whole society. Every man
does, or is capable of doing, almost every thing which any other man does,
or is capable of being. Every man has a considerable degree of knowledge,
ingenuity, and invention but scarce any man has a great degree. The degree,
however, which is commonly possessed, is generally sufficient for
conducting the whole simple business of the society. In a civilized state, on
the contrary, though there is little variety in the occupations of the greater
part of individuals, there is an almost infinite variety in those of the whole
society. These varied occupations present an almost infinite variety of
objects to the contemplation of those few, who, being attached to no
particular occupation themselves, have leisure and inclination to examine
the occupations of other people. The contemplation of so great a variety of
objects necessarily exercises their minds in endless comparisons and
combinations, and renders their understandings, in an extraordinary degree,
both acute anti comprehensive. Unless those few, however, happen to be
placed in some very particular situations, their great abilities, though
honourable to themselves, may contribute very little to the good
government or happiness of their society. Notwithstanding the great
abilities of those few, all the nobler parts of the human character may be, in
a great measure, obliterated and extinguished in the great body of the
people.
The education of the common people requires, perhaps, in a civilized and
commercial society, the attention of the public, more than that of people of
some rank and fortune. People of some rank and fortune are generally
eighteen or nineteen years of age before they enter upon that particular
business, profession, or trade, by which they propose to distinguish
themselves in the world. They have, before that, full time to acquire, or at
least to fit themselves for afterwards acquiring, every accomplishment
which can recommend them to the public esteem, or render them worthy of
it. Their parents or guardians are generally sufficiently anxious that they
should be so accomplished, and are in most cases, willing enough to lay out
the expense which is necessary for that purpose. If they are not always
properly educated, it is seldom from the want of expense laid out upon their
education, but from the improper application of that expense. It is seldom
from the want of masters, but from the negligence and incapacity of the
masters who are to be had, and from the difficulty, or rather from the
impossibility, which there is, in the present state of things, of finding any
better. The employments, too, in which people of some rank or fortune
spend the greater part of their lives, are not, like those of the common
people, simple and uniform. They are almost all of them extremely
complicated, and such as exercise the head more than the hands. The
understandings of those who are engaged in such employments, can seldom
grow torpid for want of exercise. The employments of people of some rank
and fortune, besides, are seldom such as harass them from morning to night.
They generally have a good deal of leisure, during which they may perfect
themselves in every branch, either of useful or ornamental knowledge, of
which they may have laid the foundation, or for which they may have
acquired some taste in the earlier part of life.
It is otherwise with the common people. They have little time to spare for
education. Their parents can scarce afford to maintain them, even in
infancy. As soon as they are able to work, they must apply to some trade, by
which they can earn their subsistence. That trade, too, is generally so simple
and uniform, as to give little exercise to the understanding; while, at the
same time, their labour is both so constant and so severe, that it leaves them
little leisure and less inclination to apply to, or even to think of any thing
else.
But though the common people cannot, in any civilized society, be so
well instructed as people of some rank and fortune; the most essential parts
of education, however, to read, write, and account, can be acquired at so
early a period of life, that the greater part, even of those who are to be bred
to the lowest occupations, have time to acquire them before they can be
employed in those occupations. For a very small expense, the public can
facilitate, can encourage and can even impose upon almost the whole body
of the people, the necessity of acquiring those most essential parts of
education.
The public can facilitate this acquisition, by establishing in every parish
or district a little school, where children maybe taught for a reward so
moderate, that even a common labourer may afford it; the master being
partly, but not wholly, paid by the public; because, if he was wholly, or even
principally, paid by it, he would soon learn to neglect his business. In
Scotland, the establishment of such parish schools has taught almost the
whole common people to read, and a very great proportion of them to write
and account. In England, the establishment of charity schools has had an
effect of the same kind, though not so universally, because the
establishment is not so universal. If, in those little schools, the books by
which the children are taught to read, were a little more instructive than
they commonly are; and if, instead of a little smattering in Latin, which the
children of the common people are sometimes taught there, and which can
scarce ever be of any use to them, they were instructed in the elementary
parts of geometry and mechanics; the literary education of this rank of
people would, perhaps, be as complete as can be. There is scarce a common
trade, which does not afford some opportunities of applying to it the
principles of geometry and mechanics, and which would not, therefore,
gradually exercise and improve the common people in those principles, the
necessary introduction to the most sublime, as well as to the most useful
sciences.
The public can encourage the acquisition of those most essential parts of
education, by giving small premiums, and little badges of distinction, to the
children of the common people who excel in them.
The public can impose upon almost the whole body of the people the
necessity of acquiring the most essential parts of education, by obliging
every man to undergo an examination or probation in them, before he can
obtain the freedom in any corporation, or be allowed to set up any trade,
either in a village or town corporate.
It was in this manner, by facilitating the acquisition of their military and
gymnastic exercises, by encouraging it, and even by imposing upon the
whole body of the people the necessity of learning those exercises, that the
Greek and Roman republics maintained the martial spirit of their respective
citizens. They facilitated the acquisition of those exercises, by appointing a
certain place for learning and practising them, and by granting to certain
masters the privilege of teaching in that place. Those masters do not appear
to have had either salaries or exclusive privileges of any kind. Their reward
consisted altogether in what they got from their scholars; and a citizen, who
had learnt his exercises in the public gymnasia, had no sort of legal
advantage over one who had learnt them privately, provided the latter had
learned them equally well. Those republics encouraged the acquisition of
those exercises, by bestowing little premiums and badges of distinction
upon those who excelled in them. To have gained a prize in the Olympic,
Isthmian, or Nemaean games, gave illustration, not only to the person who
gained it, but to his whole family and kindred. The obligation which every
citizen was under, to serve a certain number of years, if called upon, in the
armies of the republic, sufficiently imposed the necessity of learning those
exercises, without which he could not be fit for that service.
That in the progress of improvement, the practice of military exercises,
unless government takes proper pains to support it, goes gradually to decay,
and, together with it, the martial spirit of the great body of the people, the
example of modern Europe sufficiently demonstrates. But the security of
every society must always depend, more or less, upon the martial spirit of
the great body of the people. In the present times, indeed, that martial spirit
alone, and unsupported by a well-disciplined standing army, would not,
perhaps, be sufficient for the defence and security of any society. But where
every citizen had the spirit of a soldier, a smaller standing army would
surely be requisite. That spirit, besides, would necessarily diminish very
much the dangers to liberty, whether real or imaginary, which are
commonly apprehended from a standing army. As it would very much
facilitate the operations of that army against a foreign invader; so it would
obstruct them as much, if unfortunately they should ever be directed against
the constitution of the state.
The ancient institutions of Greece and Rome seem to have been much
more effectual for maintaining the martial spirit of the great body of the
people, than the establishment of what are called the militias of modern
times. They were much more simple. When they were once established,
they executed themselves, and it required little or no attention from
government to maintain them in the most perfect vigour. Whereas to
maintain, even in tolerable execution, the complex regulations of any
modern militia, requires the continual and painful attention of government,
without which they are constantly falling into total neglect and disuse. The
influence, besides, of the ancient institutions, was much more universal. By
means of them, the whole body of the people was completely instructed in
the use of arms; whereas it is but a very small part of them who can ever be
so instructed by the regulations of any modern militia, except, perhaps, that
of Switzerland. But a coward, a man incapable either of defending or of
revenging himself, evidently wants one of the most essential parts of the
character of a man. He is as much mutilated and deformed in his mind as
another is in his body, who is either deprived of some of its most essential
members, or has lost the use of them. He is evidently the more wretched
and miserable of the two; because happiness and misery, which reside
altogether in the mind, must necessarily depend more upon the healthful or
unhealthful, the mutilated or entire state of the mind, than upon that of the
body. Even though the martial spirit of the people were of no use towards
the defence of the society, yet, to prevent that sort of mental mutilation,
deformity, and wretchedness, which cowardice necessarily involves in it,
from spreading themselves through the great body of the people, would still
deserve the most serious attention of government; in the same manner as it
would deserve its most serious attention to prevent a leprosy, or any other
loathsome and offensive disease, though neither mortal nor dangerous, from
spreading itself among them; though, perhaps, no other public good might
result from such attention, besides the prevention of so great a public evil.
The same thing may be said of the gross ignorance and stupidity which,
in a civilized society, seem so frequently to benumb the understandings of
all the inferior ranks of people. A man without the proper use of the
intellectual faculties of a man, is, if possible, more contemptible than even a
coward, and seems to be mutilated and deformed in a still more essential
part of the character of human nature. Though the state was to derive no
advantage from the instruction of the inferior ranks of people, it would still
deserve its attention that they should not be altogether uninstructed. The
state, however, derives no inconsiderable advantage from their instruction.
The more they are instructed, the less liable they are to the delusions of
enthusiasm and superstition, which, among ignorant nations frequently
occasion the most dreadful disorders. An instructed and intelligent people,
besides, are always more decent and orderly than an ignorant and stupid
one. They feel themselves, each individually, more respectable, and more
likely to obtain the respect of their lawful superiors, and they are, therefore,
more disposed to respect those superiors. They are more disposed to
examine, and more capable of seeing through, the interested complaints of
faction and sedition; and they are, upon that account, less apt to be misled
into any wanton or unnecessary opposition to the measures of government.
In free countries, where the safety of government depends very much upon
the favourable judgment which the people may form of its conduct, it must
surely be of the highest importance, that they should not be disposed to
judge rashly or capriciously concerning it.
Art. III.—Of the Expense of the Institutions for the Instruction of People
of all Ages.
The institutions for the instruction of people of all ages, are chiefly those
for religious instruction. This is a species of instruction, of which the object
is not so much to render the people good citizens in this world, as to prepare
them for another and a better world in the life to come. The teachers of the
doctrine which contains this instruction, in the same manner as other
teachers, may either depend altogether for their subsistence upon the
voluntary contributions of their hearers; or they may derive it from some
other fund, to which the law of their country may entitle them; such as a
landed estate, a tythe or land tax, an established salary or stipend. Their
exertion, their zeal and industry, are likely to be much greater in the former
situation than in the latter. In this respect, the teachers of a new religion
have always had a considerable advantage in attacking those ancient and
established systems, of which the clergy, reposing themselves upon their
benefices, had neglected to keep up the fervour of faith and devotion in the
great body of the people; and having given themselves up to indolence,
were become altogether incapable of making any vigorous exertion in
defence even of their own establishment. The clergy of an established and
well endowed religion frequently become men of learning and elegance,
who possess all the virtues of gentlemen, or which can recommend them to
the esteem of gentlemen; but they are apt gradually to lose the qualities,
both good and bad, which gave them authority and influence with the
inferior ranks of people, and which had perhaps been the original causes of
the success and establishment of their religion. Such a clergy, when
attacked by a set of popular and bold, though perhaps stupid and ignorant
enthusiasts, feel themselves as perfectly defenceless as the indolent,
effeminate, and full fed nations of the southern parts of Asia, when they
were invaded by the active, hardy, and hungry Tartars of the north. Such a
clergy, upon such an emergency, have commonly no other resource than to
call upon the civil magistrate to persecute, destroy, or drive out their
adversaries, as disturbers of the public peace. It was thus that the Roman
catholic clergy called upon the civil magistrate to persecute the protestants,
and the church of England to persecute the dissenters; and that in general
every religious sect, when it has once enjoyed, for a century or two, the
security of a legal establishment, has found itself incapable of making any
vigorous defence against any new sect which chose to attack its doctrine or
discipline. Upon such occasions, the advantage, in point of learning and
good writing, may sometimes be on the side of the established church. But
the arts of popularity, all the arts of gaining proselytes, are constantly on the
side of its adversaries. In England, those arts have been long neglected by
the well endowed clergy of the established church, and are at present
chiefly cultivated by the dissenters and by the methodists. The independent
provisions, however, which in many places have been made for dissenting
teachers, by means of voluntary subscriptions, of trust rights, and other
evasions of the law, seem very much to have abated the zeal and activity of
those teachers. They have many of them become very learned, ingenious,
and respectable men; but they have in general ceased to be very popular
preachers. The methodists, without half the learning of the dissenters, are
much more in vogue.
In the church of Rome the industry and zeal of the inferior clergy are kept
more alive by the powerful motive of self-interest, than perhaps in any
established protestant church. The parochial clergy derive many of them, a
very considerable part of their subsistence from the voluntary oblations of
the people; a source of revenue, which confession gives them many
opportunities of improving. The mendicant orders derive their whole
subsistence from such oblations. It is with them as with the hussars and
light infantry of some armies; no plunder, no pay. The parochial clergy are
like those teachers whose reward depends partly upon their salary, and
partly upon the fees or honoraries which they get from their pupils; and
these must always depend, more or less, upon their industry and reputation.
The mendicant orders are like those teachers whose subsistence depends
altogether upon their industry. They are obliged, therefore, to use every art
which can animate the devotion of the common people. The establishment
of the two great mendicant orders of St Dominic and St. Francis, it is
observed by Machiavel, revived, in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries,
the languishing faith and devotion of the catholic church. In Roman catholic
countries, the spirit of devotion is supported altogether by the monks, and
by the poorer parochial clergy. The great dignitaries of the church, with all
the accomplishments of gentlemen and men of the world, and sometimes
with those of men of learning, are careful to maintain the necessary
discipline over their inferiors, but seldom give themselves any trouble about
the instruction of the people.
“Most of the arts and professions in a state,” says by far the most
illustrious philosopher and historian of the present age, “are of such a
nature, that, while they promote the interests of the society, they are also
useful or agreeable to some individuals; and, in that case, the constant rule
of the magistrate, except, perhaps, on the first introduction of any art, is, to
leave the profession to itself, and trust its encouragement to the individuals
who reap the benefit of it. The artizans, finding their profits to rise by the
favour of their customers, increase, as much as possible, their skill and
industry; and as matters are not disturbed by any injudicious tampering, the
commodity is always sure to be at all times nearly proportioned to the
demand.
“But there are also some callings which, though useful and even
necessary in a state, bring no advantage or pleasure to any individual; and
the supreme power is obliged to alter its conduct with regard to the retainers
of those professions. It must give them public encouragement in order to
their subsistence; and it must provide against that negligence to which they
will naturally be subject, either by annexing particular honours to
profession, by establishing a long subordination of ranks, and a strict
dependence, or by some other expedient. The persons employed in the
finances, fleets, and magistracy, are instances of this order of men.
“It may naturally be thought, at first sight, that the ecclesiastics belong to
the first class, and that their encouragement, as well as that of lawyers and
physicians, may safely be entrusted to the liberality of individuals, who are
attached to their doctrines, and who find benefit or consolation from their
spiritual ministry and assistance. Their industry and vigilance will, no
doubt, be whetted by such an additional motive; and their skill in the
profession, as well as their address in governing the minds of the people,
must receive daily increase, from their increasing practice, study, and
attention.
“But if we consider the matter more closely, we shall find that this
interested diligence of the clergy is what every wise legislator will study to
prevent; because, in every religion except the true, it is highly pernicious,
and it has even a natural tendency to pervert the truth, by infusing into it a
strong mixture of superstition, folly, and delusion. Each ghostly practitioner,
in order to render himself more precious and sacred in the eyes of his
retainers, will inspire them with the most violent abhorrence of all other
sects, and continually endeavour, by some novelty, to excite the languid
devotion of his audience. No regard will be paid to truth, morals, or
decency, in the doctrines inculcated. Every tenet will be adopted that best
suits the disorderly affections of the human frame. Customers will be drawn
to each conventicle by new industry and address, in practising on the
passions and credulity of the populace. And, in the end, the civil magistrate
will find that he has dearly paid for his intended frugality, in saving a fixed
establishment for the priests; and that, in reality, the most decent and
advantageous composition, which he can make with the spiritual guides, is
to bribe their indolence, by assigning stated salaries to their profession, and
rendering it superfluous for them to be farther active, than merely to prevent
their flock from straying in quest of new pastors. And in this manner
ecclesiastical establishments, though commonly they arose at first from
religious views, prove in the end advantageous to the political interests of
society.”
But whatever may have been the good or bad effects of the independent
provision of the clergy, it has, perhaps, been very seldom bestowed upon
them from any view to those effects. Times of violent religious controversy
have generally been times of equally violent political faction. Upon such
occasions, each political party has either found it, or imagined it, for his
interest, to league itself with some one or other of the contending religious
sects. But this could be done only by adopting, or, at least, by favouring the
tenets of that particular sect. The sect which had the good fortune to be
leagued with the conquering party necessarily shared in the victory of its
ally, by whose favour and protection it was soon enabled, in some degree,
to silence and subdue all its adversaries. Those adversaries had generally
leagued themselves with the enemies of the conquering party, and were,
therefore the enemies of that party. The clergy of this particular sect having
thus become complete masters of the field, and their influence and authority
with the great body of the people being in its highest vigour, they were
powerful enough to overawe the chiefs and leaders of their own party, and
to oblige the civil magistrate to respect their opinions and inclinations.
Their first demand was generally that he should silence and subdue all their
adversaries; and their second, that he should bestow an independent
provision on themselves. As they had generally contributed a good deal to
the victory, it seemed not unreasonable that they should have some share in
the spoil. They were weary, besides, of humouring the people, and of
depending upon their caprice for a subsistence. In making this demand,
therefore, they consulted their own ease and comfort, without troubling
themselves about the effect which it might have, in future times, upon the
influence and authority of their order. The civil magistrate, who could
comply with their demand only by giving them something which he would
have chosen much rather to take, or to keep to himself, was seldom very
forward to grant it. Necessity, however, always forced him to submit at last,
though frequently not till after many delays, evasions, and affected excuses.
But if politics had never called in the aid of religion, had the conquering
party never adopted the tenets of one sect more than those of another, when
it had gained the victory, it would probably have dealt equally and
impartially with all the different sects, and have allowed every man to
choose his own priest, and his own religion, as he thought proper. There
would, and, in this case, no doubt, have been, a great multitude of religious
sects. Almost every different congregation might probably have had a little
sect by itself, or have entertained some peculiar tenets of its own. Each
teacher, would, no doubt, have felt himself under the necessity of making
the utmost exertion, and of using every art, both to preserve and to increase
the number of his disciples. But as every other teacher would have felt
himself under the same necessity, the success of no one teacher, or sect of
teachers, could have been very great. The interested and active zeal of
religious teachers can be dangerous and troublesome only where there is
either but one sect tolerated in the society, or where the whole of a large
society is divided into two or three great sects; the teachers of each acting
by concert, and under a regular discipline and subordination. But that zeal
must be altogether innocent, where the society is divided into two or three
hundred, or, perhaps, into as many thousand small sects, of which no one
could be considerable enough to disturb the public tranquillity. The teachers
of each sect, seeing themselves surrounded on all sides with more
adversaries than friends, would be obliged to learn that candour and
moderation which are so seldom to be found among the teachers of those
great sects, whose tenets, being supported by the civil magistrate, are held
in veneration by almost all the inhabitants of extensive kingdoms and
empires, and who, therefore, see nothing round them but followers,
disciples, and humble admirers. The teachers of each little sect, finding
themselves almost alone, would be obliged to respect those of almost every
other sect; and the concessions which they would mutually find in both
convenient and agreeable to make one to another, might in time, probably
reduce the doctrine of the greater part of them to that pure and rational
religion, free from every mixture of absurdity, imposture, or fanaticism,
such as wise men have, in all ages of the world, wished to see established;
but such as positive law has, perhaps, never yet established, and probably
never will establish in any country; because, with regard to religion,
positive law always has been, and probably always will be, more or less
influenced by popular superstition and enthusiasm. This plan of
ecclesiastical government, or, more properly, of no ecclesiastical
government, was what the sect called Independents (a sect, no doubt, of
very wild enthusiasts), proposed to establish in England towards the end of
the civil war. If it had been established, though of a very unphilosophical
origin, it would probably, by this time, have been productive of the most
philosophical good temper and moderation with regard to every sort of
religious principle. It has been established in Pennsylvania, where, though
the quakers happen to be the most numerous, the law, in reality, favours no
one sect more than another; and it is there said to have been productive of
this philosophical good temper and moderation.
But though this equality of treatment should not be productive of this
good temper and moderation in all, or even in the greater part of the
religious sects of a particular country; yet, provided those sects were
sufficiently numerous, and each of them consequently too small to disturb
the public tranquillity, the excessive zeal of each for its particular tenets
could not well be productive of any very hurtful effects, but, on the
contrary, of several good ones; and if the government was perfectly
decided, both to let them all alone, and to oblige them all to let alone one
another, there is little danger that they would not of their own accord,
subdivide themselves fast enough, so as soon to become sufficiently
numerous.
In every civilized society, in every society where the distinction of ranks
has once been completely established, there have been always two different
schemes or systems of morality current at the same time; of which the one
may be called the strict or austere; the other the liberal, or, if you will, the
loose system. The former is generally admired and revered by the common
people; the latter is commonly more esteemed and adopted by what are
called the people of fashion. The degree of disapprobation with which we
ought to mark the vices of levity, the vices which are apt to arise from great
prosperity, and from the excess of gaiety and good humour, seems to
constitute the principal distinction between those two opposite schemes or
systems. In the liberal or loose system, luxury, wanton, and even disorderly
mirth, the pursuit of pleasure to some degree of intemperance, the breach of
chastity, at least in one of the two sexes, etc. provided they are not
accompanied with gross indecency, and do not lead to falsehood and
injustice, are generally treated with a good deal of indulgence, and are
easily either excused or pardoned altogether. In the austere system, on the
contrary, those excesses are regarded with the utmost abhorrence and
detestation. The vices of levity are always ruinous to the common people,
and a single week’s thoughtlessness and dissipation is often sufficient to
undo a poor workman for ever, and to drive him, through despair, upon
committing the most enormous crimes. The wiser and better sort of the
common people, therefore, have always the utmost abhorrence and
detestation of such excesses, which their experience tells them are so
immediately fatal to people of their condition. The disorder and
extravagance of several years, on the contrary, will not always ruin a man of
fashion; and people of that rank are very apt to consider the power of
indulging in some degree of excess, as one of the advantages of their
fortune; and the liberty of doing so without censure or reproach, as one of
the privileges which belong to their station. In people of their own station,
therefore, they regard such excesses with but a small degree of
disapprobation, and censure them either very slightly or not at all.
Almost all religious sects have begun among the common people, from
whom they have generally drawn their earliest, as well as their most
numerous proselytes. The austere system of morality has, accordingly, been
adopted by those sects almost constantly, or with very few exceptions; for
there have been some. It was the system by which they could best
recommend themselves to that order of people, to whom they first proposed
their plan of reformation upon what had been before established. Many of
them, perhaps the greater part of them, have even endeavoured to gain
credit by refining upon this austere system, and by carrying it to some
degree of folly and extravagance; and this excessive rigour has frequently
recommended them, more than any thing else, to the respect and veneration
of the common people.
A man of rank and fortune is, by his station, the distinguished member of
a great society, who attend to every part of his conduct, and who thereby
oblige him to attend to every part of it himself. His authority and
consideration depend very much upon the respect which this society bears
to him. He dares not do anything which would disgrace or discredit him in
it; and he is obliged to a very strict observation of that species of morals,
whether liberal or austere, which the general consent of this society
prescribes to persons of his rank and fortune. A man of low condition, on
the contrary, is far from being a distinguished member of any great society.
While he remains in a country village, his conduct may be attended to, and
he may be obliged to attend to it himself. In this situation, and in this
situation only, he may have what is called a character to lose. But as soon as
he comes into a great city, he is sunk in obscurity and darkness. His conduct
is observed and attended to by nobody; and he is, therefore, very likely to
neglect it himself, and to abandon himself to every sort of low profligacy
and vice. He never emerges so effectually from this obscurity, his conduct
never excites so much the attention of any respectable society, as by his
becoming the member of a small religious sect. He from that moment
acquires a degree of consideration which he never had before. All his
brother sectaries are, for the credit of the sect, interested to observe his
conduct; and, if he gives occasion to any scandal, if he deviates very much
from those austere morals which they almost always require of one another,
to punish him by what is always a very severe punishment, even where no
evil effects attend it, expulsion or excommunication from the sect. In little
religious sects, accordingly, the morals of the common people have been
almost always remarkably regular and orderly; generally much more so
than in the established church. The morals of those little sects, indeed, have
frequently been rather disagreeably rigorous and unsocial.
There are two very easy and effectual remedies, however, by whose joint
operation the state might, without violence, correct whatever was unsocial
or disagreeably rigorous in the morals of all the little sects into which the
country was divided.
The first of those remedies is the study of science and philosophy, which
the state might render almost universal among all people of middling or
more than middling rank and fortune; not by giving salaries to teachers in
order to make them negligent and idle, but by instituting some sort of
probation, even in the higher and more difficult sciences, to be undergone
by every person before he was permitted to exercise any liberal profession,
or before he could be received as a candidate for any honourable office, of
trust or profit. If the state imposed upon this order of men the necessity of
learning, it would have no occasion to give itself any trouble about
providing them with proper teachers. They would soon find better teachers
for themselves, than any whom the state could provide for them. Science is
the great antidote to the poison of enthusiasm and superstition; and where
all the superior ranks of people were secured from it, the inferior ranks
could not be much exposed to it.
The second of those remedies is the frequency and gaiety of public
diversions. The state, by encouraging, that is, by giving entire liberty to all
those who, from their own interest, would attempt, without scandal or
indecency, to amuse and divert the people by painting, poetry, music,
dancing; by all sorts of dramatic representations and exhibitions; would
easily dissipate, in the greater part of them, that melancholy and gloomy
humour which is almost always the nurse of popular superstition and
enthusiasm. Public diversions have always been the objects of dread and
hatred to all the fanatical promoters of those popular frenzies. The gaiety
and good humour which those diversions inspire, were altogether
inconsistent with that temper of mind which was fittest for their purpose, or
which they could best work upon. Dramatic representations, besides,
frequently exposing their artifices to public ridicule, and sometimes even to
public execration, were, upon that account, more than all other diversions,
the objects of their peculiar abhorrence.
In a country where the law favoured the teachers of no one religion more
than those of another, it would not be necessary that any of them should
have any particular or immediate dependency upon the sovereign or
executive power; or that he should have anything to do either in appointing
or in dismissing them from their offices. In such a situation, he would have
no occasion to give himself any concern about them, further than to keep
the peace among them, in the same manner as among the rest of his
subjects, that is, to hinder them from persecuting, abusing, or oppressing
one another. But it is quite otherwise in countries where there is an
established or governing religion. The sovereign can in this case never be
secure, unless he has the means of influencing in a considerable degree the
greater part of the teachers of that religion.
The clergy of every established church constitute a great incorporation.
They can act in concert, and pursue their interest upon one plan, and with
one spirit as much as if they were under the direction of one man; and they
are frequently, too, under such direction. Their interest as an incorporated
body is never the same with that of the sovereign, and is sometimes directly
opposite to it. Their great interest is to maintain their authority with the
people, and this authority depends upon the supposed certainty and
importance of the whole doctrine which they inculcate, and upon the
supposed necessity of adopting every part of it with the most implicit faith,
in order to avoid eternal misery. Should the sovereign have the imprudence
to appear either to deride, or doubt himself of the most trifling part of their
doctrine, or from humanity, attempt to protect those who did either the one
or the other, the punctilious honour of a clergy, who have no sort of
dependency upon him, is immediately provoked to proscribe him as a
profane person, and to employ all the terrors of religion, in order to oblige
the people to transfer their allegiance to some more orthodox and obedient
prince. Should he oppose any of their pretensions or usurpations, the danger
is equally great. The princes who have dared in this manner to rebel against
the church, over and above this crime of rebellion, have generally been
charged, too, with the additional crime of heresy, notwithstanding their
solemn protestations of their faith, and humble submission to every tenet
which she thought proper to prescribe to them. But the authority of religion
is superior to every other authority. The fears which it suggests conquer all
other fears. When the authorized teachers of religion propagate through the
great body of the people, doctrines subversive of the authority of the
sovereign, it is by violence only, or by the force of a standing army, that he
can maintain his authority. Even a standing army cannot in this case give
him any lasting security; because if the soldiers are not foreigners, which
can seldom be the case, but drawn from the great body of the people, which
must almost always be the case, they are likely to be soon corrupted by
those very doctrines. The revolutions which the turbulence of the Greek
clergy was continually occasioning at Constantinople, as long as the eastern
empire subsisted; the convulsions which, during the course of several
centuries, the turbulence of the Roman clergy was continually occasioning
in every part of Europe, sufficiently demonstrate how precarious and
insecure must always be the situation of the sovereign, who has no proper
means of influencing the clergy of the established and governing religion of
his country.
Articles of faith, as well as all other spiritual matters, it is evident
enough, are not within the proper department of a temporal sovereign, who,
though he may be very well qualified for protecting, is seldom supposed to
be so for instructing the people. With regard to such matters, therefore, his
authority can seldom be sufficient to counterbalance the united authority of
the clergy of the established church. The public tranquillity, however, and
his own security, may frequently depend upon the doctrines which they may
think proper to propagate concerning such matters. As he can seldom
directly oppose their decision, therefore, with proper weight and authority,
it is necessary that he should be able to influence it; and he can influence it
only by the fears and expectations which he may excite in the greater part
of the individuals of the order. Those fears and expectations may consist in
the fear of deprivation or other punishment, and in the expectation of
further preferment.
In all Christian churches, the benefices of the clergy are a sort of
freeholds, which they enjoy, not during pleasure, but during life or good
behaviour. If they held them by a more precarious tenure, and were liable to
be turned out upon every slight disobligation either of the sovereign or of
his ministers, it would perhaps be impossible for them to maintain their
authority with the people, who would then consider them as mercenary
dependents upon the court, in the sincerity of whose instructions they could
no longer have any confidence. But should the sovereign attempt
irregularly, and by violence, to deprive any number of clergymen of their
freeholds, on account, perhaps, of their having propagated, with more than
ordinary zeal, some factious or seditious doctrine, he would only render, by
such persecution, both them and their doctrine ten times more popular, and
therefore ten times more troublesome and dangerous, than they had been
before. Fear is in almost all cases a wretched instrument of govermnent, and
ought in particular never to be employed against any order of men who
have the smallest pretensions to independency. To attempt to terrify them,
serves only to irritate their bad humour, and to confirm them in an
opposition, which more gentle usage, perhaps, might easily induce them
either to soften, or to lay aside altogether. The violence which the French
government usually employed in order to oblige all their parliaments, or
sovereign courts of justice, to enregister any unpopular edict, very seldom
succeeded. The means commonly employed, however, the imprisonment of
all the refractory members, one would think, were forcible enough. The
princes of the house of Stuart sometimes employed the like means in order
to influence some of the members of the parliament of England, and they
generally found them equally intractable. The parliament of England is now
managed in another manner; and a very small experiment, which the duke
of Choiseul made, about twelve years ago, upon the parliament of Paris,
demonstrated sufficiently that all the parliaments of France might have been
managed still more easily in the same manner. That experiment was not
pursued. For though management and persuasion are always the easiest and
safest instruments of government as force and violence are the worst and
the most dangerous; yet such, it seems, is the natural insolence of man, that
he almost always disdains to use the good instrument, except when he
cannot or dare not use the bad one. The French government could and durst
use force, and therefore disdained to use management and persuasion. But
there is no order of men, it appears I believe, from the experience of all
ages, upon whom it is so dangerous or rather so perfectly ruinous, to
employ force and violence, as upon the respected clergy of an established
church. The rights, the privileges, the personal liberty of every individual
ecclesiastic, who is upon good terms with his own order, are, even in the
most despotic governments, more respected than those of any other person
of nearly equal rank and fortune. It is so in every gradation of despotism,
from that of the gentle and mild government of Paris, to that of the violent
and furious government of Constantinople. But though this order of men
can scarce ever be forced, they may be managed as easily as any other; and
the security of the sovereign, as well as the public tranquillity, seems to
depend very much upon the means which he has of managing them; and
those means seem to consist altogether in the preferment which he has to
bestow upon them.
In the ancient constitution of the Christian church, the bishop of each
diocese was elected by the joint votes of the clergy and of the people of the
episcopal city. The people did not long retain their right of election; and
while they did retain it, they almost always acted under the influence of the
clergy, who, in such spiritual matters, appeared to be their natural guides.
The clergy, however, soon grew weary of the trouble of managing them,
and found it easier to elect their own bishops themselves. The abbot, in the
same manner, was elected by the monks of the monastery, at least in the
greater part of abbacies. All the inferior ecclesiastical benefices
comprehended within the diocese were collated by the bishop, who
bestowed them upon such ecclesiastics as he thought proper. All church
preferments were in this manner in the disposal of the church. The
sovereign, though he might have some indirect influence in those elections,
and though it was sometimes usual to ask both his consent to elect, and his
approbation of the election, yet had no direct or sufficient means of
managing the clergy. The ambition of every clergyman naturally led him to
pay court, not so much to his sovereign as to his own order, from which
only he could expect preferment.
Through the greater part of Europe, the pope gradually drew to himself,
first the collation of almost all bishoprics and abbacies, or of what were
called consistorial benefices, and afterwards, by various machinations and
pretences, of the greater part of inferior benefices comprehended within
each diocese, little more being left to the bishop than what was barely
necessary to give him a decent authority with his own clergy. By this
arrangement the condition of the sovereign was still worse than it had been
before. The clergy of all the different countries of Europe were thus formed
into a sort of spiritual army, dispersed in different quarters indeed, but of
which all the movements and operations could now be directed by one
head, and conducted upon one uniform plan. The clergy of each particular
country might be considered as a particular detachment of that army, of
which the operations could easily be supported and seconded by all the
other detachments quartered in the different countries round about. Each
detachment was not only independent of the sovereign of the country in
which it was quartered, and by which it was maintained, but dependent
upon a foreign sovereign, who could at any time turn its arms against the
sovereign of that particular country, and support them by the arms of all the
other detachments.
Those arms were the most formidable that can well be imagined. In the
ancient state of Europe, before the establishment of arts and manufactures,
the wealth of the clergy gave them the same sort of influence over the
common people which that of the great barons gave them over their
respective vassals, tenants, and retainers. In the great landed estates, which
the mistaken piety both of princes and private persons had bestowed upon
the church, jurisdictions were established, of the same kind with those of
the great barons, and for the same reason. In those great landed estates, the
clergy, or their bailiffs, could easily keep the peace, without the support or
assistance either of the king or of any other person; and neither the king nor
any other person could keep the peace there without the support and
assistance of the clergy. The jurisdictions of the clergy, therefore, in their
particular baronies or manors, were equally independent, and equally
exclusive of the authority of the king’s courts, as those of the great temporal
lords. The tenants of the clergy were, like those of the great barons, almost
all tenants at will, entirely dependent upon their immediate lords, and,
therefore, liable to be called out at pleasure, in order to fight in any quarrel
in which the clergy might think proper to engage them. Over and above the
rents of those estates, the clergy possessed in the tithes a very large portion
of the rents of all the other estates in every kingdom of Europe. The
revenues arising from both those species of rents were, the greater part of
them, paid in kind, in corn, wine, cattle, poultry, etc. The quantity exceeded
greatly what the clergy could themselves consume; and there were neither
arts nor manufactures, for the produce of which they could exchange the
surplus. The clergy could derive advantage from this immense surplus in no
other way than by employing it, as the great barons employed the like
surplus of their revenues, in the most profuse hospitality, and in the most
extensive charity. Both the hospitality and the charity of the ancient clergy,
accordingly, are said to have been very great. They not only maintained
almost the whole poor of every kingdom, but many knights and gentlemen
had frequently no other means of subsistence than by travelling about from
monastery to monastery, under pretence of devotion, but in reality to enjoy
the hospitality of the clergy. The retainers of some particular prelates were
often as numerous as those of the greatest lay-lords; and the retainers of all
the clergy taken together were, perhaps, more numerous than those of all
the lay-lords. There was always much more union among the clergy than
among the lay-lords. The former were under a regular discipline and
subordination to the papal authority. The latter were under no regular
discipline or subordination, but almost always equally jealous of one
another, and of the king. Though the tenants and retainers of the clergy,
therefore, had both together been less numerous than those of the great lay-
lords, and their tenants were probably much less numerous, yet their union
would have rendered them more formidable. The hospitality and charity of
the clergy, too, not only gave them the command of a great temporal force,
but increased very much the weight of their spiritual weapons. Those
virtues procured them the highest respect and veneration among all the
inferior ranks of people, of whom many were constantly, and almost all
occasionally, fed by them. Everything belonging or related to so popular an
order, its possessions, its privileges, its doctrines, necessarily appeared
sacred in the eyes of the common people; and every violation of them,
whether real or pretended, the highest act of sacrilegious wickedness and
profaneness. In this state of things, if the sovereign frequently found it
difficult to resist the confederacy of a few of the great nobility, we cannot
wonder that he should find it still more so to resist the united force of the
clergy of his own dominions, supported by that of the clergy of all the
neighbouring dominions. In such circumstances, the wonder is, not that he
was sometimes obliged to yield, but that he ever was able to resist.
The privileges of the clergy in those ancient times (which to us, who live
in the present times, appear the most absurd), their total exemption from the
secular jurisdiction, for example, or what in England was called the benefit
of clergy, were the natural, or rather the necessary, consequences of this
state of things. How dangerous must it have been for the sovereign to
attempt to punish a clergyman for any crime whatever, if his order were
disposed to protect him, and to represent either the proof as insufficient for
convicting so holy a man, or the punishment as too severe to be inflicted
upon one whose person had been rendered sacred by religion? The
sovereign could, in such circumstances, do no better than leave him to be
tried by the ecclesiastical courts, who, for the honour of their own order,
were interested to restrain, as much as possible, every member of it from
committing enormous crimes, or even from giving occasion to such gross
scandal as might disgust the minds of the people.
In the state in which things were, through the greater part of Europe,
during the tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, and for some
time both before and after that period, the constitution of the church of
Rome may be considered as the most formidable combination that ever was
formed against the authority and security of civil government, as well as
against the liberty, reason, and happiness of mankind, which can flourish
only where civil government is able to protect them. In that constitution, the
grossest delusions of superstition were supported in such a manner by the
private interests of so great a number of people, as put them out of all
danger from any assault of human reason; because, though human reason
might, perhaps, have been able to unveil, even to the eyes of the common
people, some of the delusions of superstition, it could never have dissolved
the ties of private interest. Had this constitution been attacked by no other
enemies but the feeble efforts of human reason, it must have endured for
ever. But that immense and well-built fabric, which all the wisdom and
virtue of man could never have shaken, much less have overturned, was, by
the natural course of things, first weakened, and afterwards in part
destroyed; and is now likely, in the course of a few centuries more, perhaps,
to crumble into ruins altogether.
The gradual improvements of arts, manufactures, and commerce, the
same causes which destroyed the power of the great barons, destroyed, in
the same manner, through the greater part of Europe, the whole temporal
manufactures, and commerce, the clergy, like the great barons, found
something for which they could exchange their rude produce, and thereby
discovered the means of spending their whole revenues upon their own
persons, without giving any considerable share of them to other people.
Their charity became gradually less extensive, their hospitality less liberal,
or less profuse. Their retainers became consequently less numerous, and, by
degrees, dwindled away altogether. The clergy, too, like the great barons,
wished to get a better rent from their landed estates, in order to spend it, in
the same manner, upon the gratification of their own private vanity and
folly. But this increase of rent could be got only by granting leases to their
tenants, who thereby became, in a great measure, independent of them. The
ties of interest, which bound the inferior ranks of people to the clergy, were
in this manner gradually broken and dissolved. They were even broken and
dissolved sooner than those which bound the same ranks of people to the
great barons; because the benefices of the church being, the greater part of
them, much smaller than the estates of the great barons, the possessor of
each benefice was much sooner able to spend the whole of its revenue upon
his own person. During the greater part of the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries, the power of the great barons was, through the greater part of
Europe, in full vigour. But the temporal power of the clergy, the absolute
command which they had once had over the great body of the people was
very much decayed. The power of the church was, by that time, very nearly
reduced, through the greater part of Europe, to what arose from their
spiritual authority; and even that spiritual authority was much weakened,
when it ceased to be supported by the charity and hospitality of the clergy.
The inferior ranks of people no longer looked upon that order as they had
done before; as the comforters of their distress, and the relievers of their
indigence. On the contrary, they were provoked and disgusted by the vanity,
luxury, and expense of the richer clergy, who appeared to spend upon their
own pleasures what had always before been regarded as the patrimony of
the poor.
In this situation of things, the sovereigns in the different states of Europe
endeavoured to recover the influence which they had once had in the
disposal of the great benefices of the church; by procuring to the deans and
chapters of each diocese the restoration of their ancient right of electing the
bishop; and to the monks of each abbacy that of electing the abbot. The re-
establishing this ancient order was the object of several statutes enacted in
England during the course of the fourteenth century, particularly of what is
called the statute of provisors; and of the pragmatic sanction, established in
France in the fifteenth century. In order to render the election valid, it was
necessary that the sovereign should both consent to it before hand, and
afterwards approve of the person elected; and though the election was still
supposed to be free, he had, however all the indirect means which his
situation necessarily afforded him, of influencing the clergy in his own
dominions. Other regulations, of a similar tendency, were established in
other parts of Europe. But the power of the pope, in the collation of the
great benefices of the church, seems, before the reformation, to have been
nowhere so effectually and so universally restrained as in France and
England. The concordat afterwards, in the sixteenth century, gave to the
kings of France the absolute right of presenting to all the great, or what are
called the consistorial, benefices of the Gallican church.
Since the establishment of the pragmatic sanction and of the concordat,
the clergy of France have in general shewn less respect to the decrees of the
papal court, than the clergy of any other catholic country. In all the disputes
which their sovereign has had with the pope, they have almost constantly
taken part with the former. This independency of the clergy of France upon
the court of Rome seems to be principally founded upon the pragmatic
sanction and the concordat. In the earlier periods of the monarchy, the
clergy of France appear to have been as much devoted to the pope as those
of any other country. When Robert, the second prince of the Capetian race,
was most unjustly excommunicated by the court of Rome, his own servants,
it is said, threw the victuals which came from his table to the dogs, and
refused to taste any thing themselves which had been polluted by the
contact of a person in his situation. They were taught to do so, it may very
safely be presumed, by the clergy of his own dominions.
The claim of collating to the great benefices of the church, a claim in
defence of which the court of Rome had frequently shaken, and sometimes
overturned, the thrones of some of the greatest sovereigns in Christendom,
was in this manner either restrained or modified, or given up altogether, in
many different parts of Europe, even before the time of the reformation. As
the clergy had now less influence over the people, so the state had more
influence over the clergy. The clergy, therefore, had both less power, and
less inclination, to disturb the state.
The authority of the church of Rome was in this state of declension,
when the disputes which gave birth to the reformation began in Germany,
and soon spread themselves through every part of Europe. The new
doctrines were everywhere received with a high degree of popular favour.
They were propagated with all that enthusiastic zeal which commonly
animates the spirit of party, when it attacks established authority. The
teachers of those doctrines, though perhaps, in other respects, not more
learned than many of the divines who defended the established church,
seem in general to have been better acquainted with ecclesiastical history,
and with the origin and progress of that system of opinions upon which the
authority of the church was established; and they had thereby the advantage
in almost every dispute. The austerity of their manners gave them authority
with the common people, who contrasted the strict regularity of their
conduct with the disorderly lives of the greater part of their own clergy.
They possessed, too, in a much higher degree than their adversaries, all the
arts of popularity and of gaining proselytes; arts which the lofty and
dignified sons of the church had long neglected, as being to them in a great
measure useless. The reason of the new doctrines recommended them to
some, their novelty to many; the hatred and contempt of the established
clergy to a still greater number: but the zealous, passionate, and fanatical,
though frequently coarse and rustic eloquence, with which they were almost
everywhere inculcated, recommended them to by far the greatest number.
The success of the new doctrines was almost everywhere so great, that
the princes, who at that time happened to be on bad terms with the court of
Rome, were, by means of them, easily enabled, in their own dominions, to
overturn the church, which having lost the respect and veneration of the
inferior ranks of people, could make scarce any resistance. The court of
Rome had disobliged some of the smaller princes in the northern parts of
Germany, whom it had probably considered as too insignificant to be worth
the managing. They universally, therefore, established the reformation in
their own dominions. The tyranny of Christiern II., and of Troll archbishop
of Upsal, enabled Gustavus Vasa to expel them both from Sweden. The
pope favoured the tyrant and the archbishop, and Gustavus Vasa found no
difficulty in establishing the reformation in Sweden. Christiern II. was
afterwards deposed from the throne of Denmark, where his conduct had
rendered him as odious as in Sweden. The pope, however, was still
disposed to favour him; and Frederic of Holstein, who had mounted the
throne in his stead, revenged himself, by following the example of Gustavus
Vasa. The magistrates of Berne and Zurich, who had no particular quarrel
with the pope, established with great ease the reformation in their respective
cantons, where just before some of the clergy had, by an imposture
somewhat grosser than ordinary, rendered the whole order both odious and
contemptible.
In this critical situation of its affairs the papal court was at sufficient
pains to cultivate the friendship of the powerful sovereigns of France and
Spain, of whom the latter was at that time emperor of Germany. With their
assistance, it was enabled, though not without great difficulty, and much
bloodshed, either to suppress altogether, or to obstruct very much, the
progress of the reformation in their dominions. It was well enough inclined,
too, to be complaisant to the king of England. But from the circumstances
of the times, it could not be so without giving offence to a still greater
sovereign, Charles V., king of Spain and emperor of Germany. Henry VIII.,
accordingly, though he did not embrace himself the greater part of the
doctrines of the reformation, was yet enabled, by their general prevalence,
to suppress all the monasteries, and to abolish the authority of the church of
Rome in his dominions. That he should go so far, though he went no
further, gave some satisfaction to the patrons of the reformation, who,
having got possession of the government in the reign of his son and
successor completed, without any difficulty, the work which Henry VIII.
had begun.
In some countries, as in Scotland, where the government was weak,
unpopular, and not very firmly established, the reformation was strong
enough to overturn, not only the church, but the state likewise, for
attempting to support the church.
Among the followers of the reformation, dispersed in all the different
countries of Europe, there was no general tribunal, which, like that of the
court of Rome, or an oecumenical council, could settle all disputes among
them, and, with irresistible authority, prescribe to all of them the precise
limits of orthodoxy. When the followers of the reformation in one country,
therefore, happened to differ from their brethren in another, as they had no
common judge to appeal to, the dispute could never be decided; and many
such disputes arose among them. Those concerning the government of the
church, and the right of conferring ecclesiastical benefices, were perhaps
the most interesting to the peace and welfare of civil society. They gave
birth, accordingly, to the two principal parties or sects among the followers
of the reformation, the Lutheran and Calvinistic sects, the only sects among
them, of which the doctrine and discipline have ever yet been established by
law in any part of Europe.
The followers of Luther, together with what is called the church of
England, preserved more or less of the episcopal government, established
subordination among the clergy, gave the sovereign the disposal of all the
bishoprics, and other consistorial benefices within his dominions, and
thereby rendered him the real head of the church; and without depriving the
bishop of the right of collating to the smaller benefices within his diocese,
they, even to those benefices, not only admitted, but favoured the right of
presentation, both in the sovereign and in all other lay patrons. This system
of church government was, from the beginning, favourable to peace and
good order, and to submission to the civil sovereign. It has never,
accordingly, been the occasion of any tumult or civil commotion in any
country in which it has once been established. The church of England, in
particular, has always valued herself, with great reason, upon the
unexceptionable loyalty of her principles. Under such a government, the
clergy naturally endeavour to recommend themselves to the sovereign, to
the court, and to the nobility and gentry of the country, by whose influence
they chiefly expect to obtain preferment. They pay court to those patrons,
sometimes, no doubt, by the vilest flattery and assentation; but frequently,
too, by cultivating all those arts which best deserve, and which are therefore
most likely to gain them, the esteem of people of rank and fortune; by their
knowledge in all the different branches of useful and ornamental learning,
by the decent liberality of their manners, by the social good humour of their
conversation, and by their avowed contempt of those absurd and
hypocritical austerities which fanatics inculcate and pretend to practise, in
order to draw upon themselves the veneration, and upon the greater part of
men of rank and fortune, who avow that they do not practise them, the
abhorrence of the common people. Such a clergy, however, while they pay
their court in this manner to the higher ranks of life, are very apt to neglect
altogether the means of maintaining their influence and authority with the
lower. They are listened to, esteemed, and respected by their superiors; but
before their inferiors they are frequently incapable of defending, effectually,
and to the conviction of such hearers, their own sober and moderate
doctrines, against the most ignorant enthusiast who chooses to attack them.
The followers of Zuinglius, or more properly those of Calvin, on the
contrary, bestowed upon the people of each parish, whenever the church
became vacant, the right of electing their own pastor; and established, at the
same time, the most perfect equality among the clergy. The former part of
this institution, as long as it remained in vigour, seems to have been
productive of nothing but disorder and confusion, and to have tended
equally to corrupt the morals both of the clergy and of the people. The latter
part seems never to have had any effects but what were perfectly agreeable.
As long as the people of each parish preserved the right of electing their
own pastors, they acted almost always under the influence of the clergy, and
generally of the most factious and fanatical of the order. The clergy, in order
to preserve their influence in those popular elections, became, or affected to
become, many of them, fanatics themselves, encouraged fanaticism among
the people, and gave the preference almost always to the most fanatical
candidate. So small a matter as the appointment of a parish priest,
occasioned almost always a violent contest, not only in one parish, but in all
the neighbouring parishes who seldom failed to take part in the quarrel.
When the parish happened to be situated in a great city, it divided all the
inhabitants into two parties; and when that city happened, either to
constitute itself a little republic, or to be the head and capital of a little
republic, as in the case with many of the considerable cities in Switzerland
and Holland, every paltry dispute of this kind, over and above exasperating
the animosity of all their other factions, threatened to leave behind it, both a
new schism in the church, and a new faction in the state. In those small
republics, therefore, the magistrate very soon found it necessary, for the
sake of preserving the public peace, to assume to himself the right of
presenting to all vacant benefices. In Scotland, the most extensive country
in which this presbyterian form of church government has ever been
established, the rights of patronage were in effect abolished by the act
which established presbytery in the beginning of the reign of William III.
That act, at least, put in the power of certain classes of people in each parish
to purchase, for a very small price, the right of electing their own pastor.
The constitution which this act established, was allowed to subsist for about
two-and-twenty years, but was abolished by the 10th of queen Anne, ch.12,
on account of the confusions and disorders which this more popular mode
of election had almost everywhere occasioned. In so extensive a country as
Scotland, however, a tumult in a remote parish was not so likely to give
disturbance to government as in a smaller state. The 10th of queen Anne
restored the rights of patronage. But though, in Scotland, the law gives the
benefice, without any exception to the person presented by the patron; yet
the church requires sometimes (for she has not in this respect been very
uniform in her decisions) a certain concurrence of the people, before she
will confer upon the presentee what is called the cure of souls, or the
ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the parish. She sometimes, at least, from an
affected concern for the peace of the parish, delays the settlement till this
concurrence can be procured. The private tampering of some of the
neighbouring clergy, sometimes to procure, but more frequently to prevent
this concurrence, and the popular arts which they cultivate, in order to
enable them upon such occasions to tamper more effectually, are perhaps
the causes which principally keep up whatever remains of the old fanatical
spirit, either in the clergy or in the people of Scotland.
The equality which the presbyterian form of church government
establishes among the clergy, consists, first, in the equality of authority or
ecclesiastical jurisdiction; and, secondly, in the equality of benefice. In all
presbyterian churches, the equality of authority is perfect; that of benefice is
not so. The difference, however, between one benefice and another, is
seldom so considerable, as commonly to tempt the possessor even of the
small one to pay court to his patron, by the vile arts of flattery and
assentation, in order to get a better. In all the presbyterian churches, where
the rights of patronage are thoroughly established, it is by nobler and better
arts, that the established clergy in general endeavour to gain the favour of
their superiors; by their learning, by the irreproachable regularity of their
life, and by the faithful and diligent discharge of their duty. Their patrons
even frequently complain of the independency of their spirit, which they are
apt to construe into ingratitude for past favours, but which, at worse,
perhaps, is seldom anymore than that indifference which naturally arises
from the consciousness that no further favours of the kind are ever to be
expected. There is scarce, perhaps, to be found anywhere in Europe, a more
learned, decent, independent, and respectable set of men, than the greater
part of the presbyterian clergy of Holland, Geneva, Switzerland, and
Scotland.
Where the church benefices are all nearly equal, none of them can be
very great; and this mediocrity of benefice, though it may be, no doubt,
carried too far, has, however, some very agreeable effects. Nothing but
exemplary morals can give dignity to a man of small fortune. The vices of
levity and vanity necessarily render him ridiculous, and are, besides, almost
as ruinous to him as they are to the common people. In his own conduct,
therefore, he is obliged to follow that system of morals which the common
people respect the most. He gains their esteem and affection, by that plan of
life which his own interest and situation would lead him to follow. The
common people look upon him with that kindness with which we naturally
regard one who approaches somewhat to our own condition, but who, we
think, ought to be in a higher. Their kindness naturally provokes his
kindness. He becomes careful to instruct them, and attentive to assist and
relieve them. He does not even despise the prejudices of people who are
disposed to be so favourable to him, and never treats them with those
contemptuous and arrogant airs, which we so often meet with in the proud
dignitaries of opulent and well endowed churches. The presbyterian clergy,
accordingly, have more influence over the minds of the common people,
than perhaps the clergy of any other established church. It is, accordingly, in
presbyterian countries only, that we ever find the common people
converted, without persecution completely, and almost to a man, to the
established church.
In countries where church benefices are, the greater part of them, very
moderate, a chair in a university is generally a better establishment than a
church benefice. The universities have, in this case, the picking and chusing
of their members from all the churchmen of the country, who, in every
country, constitute by far the most numerous class of men of letters. Where
church benefices, on the contrary, are many of them very considerable, the
church naturally draws from the universities the greater part of their
eminent men of letters; who generally find some patron, who does himself
honour by procuring them church preferment. In the former situation, we
are likely to find the universities filled with the most eminent men of letters
that are to be found in the country. In the latter, we are likely to find few
eminent men among them, and those few among the youngest members of
the society, who are likely, too, to be drained away from it, before they can
have acquired experience and knowledge enough to be of much use to it. It
is observed by Mr. de Voltaire, that father Porée, a jesuit of no great
eminence in the republic of letters, was the only professor they had ever had
in France, whose works were worth the reading. In a country which has
produced so many eminent men of letters, it must appear somewhat
singular, that scarce one of them should have been a professor in a
university. The famous Cassendi was, in the beginning of his life, a
professor in the university of Aix. Upon the first dawning of his genius, it
was represented to him, that by going into the church he could easily find a
much more quiet and comfortable subsistence, as well as a better situation
for pursuing his studies; and he immediately followed the advice. The
observation of Mr. de Voltaire may be applied, I believe, not only to France,
but to all other Roman Catholic countries. We very rarely find in any of
them an eminent man of letters, who is a professor in a university, except,
perhaps, in the professions of law and physic; professions from which the
church is not so likely to draw them. After the church of Rome, that of
England is by far the richest and best endowed church in Christendom. In
England, accordingly, the church is continually draining the universities of
all their best and ablest members; and an old college tutor who is known
and distinguished in Europe as an eminent man of letters, is as rarely to be
found there as in any Roman catholic country, In Geneva, on the contrary,
in the protestant cantons of Switzerland, in the protestant countries of
Germany, in Holland, in Scotland, in Sweden, and Denmark, the most
eminent men of letters whom those countries have produced, have, not all
indeed, but the far greater part of them, been professors in universities. In
those countries, the universities are continually draining the church of all its
most eminent men of letters.
It may, perhaps, be worth while to remark, that, if we except the poets, a
few orators, and a few historians, the far greater part of the other eminent
men of letters, both of Greece and Rome, appear to have been either public
or private teachers; generally either of philosophy or of rhetoric. This
remark will be found to hold true, from the days of Lysias and Isocrates, of
Plato and Aristotle, down to those of Plutarch and Epictetus, Suetonius, and
Quintilian. To impose upon any man the necessity of teaching, year after
year, in any particular branch of science seems in reality to be the most
effectual method for rendering him completely master of it himself. By
being obliged to go every year over the same ground, if he is good for any
thing, he necessarily becomes, in a few years, well acquainted with every
part of it, and if, upon any particular point, he should form too hasty an
opinion one year, when he comes, in the course of his lectures to reconsider
the same subject the year thereafter, he is very likely to correct it. As to be a
teacher of science is certainly the natural employment of a mere man of
letters; so is it likewise, perhaps, the education which is most likely to
render him a man of solid learning and knowledge. The mediocrity of
church benefices naturally tends to draw the greater part of men of letters in
the country where it takes place, to the employment in which they can be
the most useful to the public, and at the same time to give them the best
education, perhaps, they are capable of receiving. It tends to render their
learning both as solid as possible, and as useful as possible.
The revenue of every established church, such parts of it excepted as may
arise from particular lands or manors, is a branch, it ought to be observed,
of the general revenue of the state, which is thus diverted to a purpose very
different from the defence of the state. The tithe, for example, is a real land
tax, which puts it out of the power of the proprietors of land to contribute so
largely towards the defence of the state as they otherwise might be able to
do. The rent of land, however, is, according to some, the sole fund; and,
according to others, the principal fund, from which, in all great monarchies,
the exigencies of the state must be ultimately supplied. The more of this
fund that is given to the church, the less, it is evident, can be spared to the
state. It may be laid down as a certain maxim, that all other things being
supposed equal, the richer the church, the poorer must necessarily be, either
the sovereign on the one hand, or the people on the other; and, in all cases,
the less able must the state be to defend itself. In several protestant
countries, particularly in all the protestant cantons of Switzerland, the
revenue which anciently belonged to the Roman catholic church, the tithes
and church lands, has been found a fund sufficient, not only to afford
competent salaries to the established clergy, but to defray, with little or no
addition, all the other expenses of the state. The magistrates of the powerful
canton of Berne, in particular, have accumulated, out of the savings from
this fund, a very large sum, supposed to amount to several millions; part or
which is deposited in a public treasure, and part is placed at interest in what
are called the public funds of the different indebted nations of Europe;
chiefly in those of France and Great Britain. What may be the amount of the
whole expense which the church, either of Berne, or of any other protestant
canton, costs the state, I do not pretend to know. By a very exact account it
appears, that, in 1755, the whole revenue of the clergy of the church of
Scotland, including their glebe or church lands, and the rent of their manses
or dwelling-houses, estimated according to a reasonable valuation,
amounted only to £68,514:1:5 1/12d. This very moderate revenue affords a
decent subsistence to nine hundred and forty-four ministers. The whole
expense of the church, including what is occasionally laid out for the
building and reparation of churches, and of the manses of ministers, cannot
well be supposed to exceed eighty or eighty-five thousand pounds a-year.
The most opulent church in Christendom does not maintain better the
uniformity of faith, the fervour of devotion, the spirit of order, regularity,
and austere morals, in the great body of the people, than this very poorly
endowed church of Scotland. All the good effects, both civil and religious,
which an established church can be supposed to produce, are produced by it
as completely as by any other. The greater part of the protestant churches of
Switzerland, which, in general, are not better endowed than the church of
Scotland, produce those effects in a still higher degree. In the greater part of
the protestant cantons, there is not a single person to be found, who does
not profess himself to be of the established church. If he professes himself
to be of any other, indeed, the law obliges him to leave the canton. But so
severe, or, rather, indeed, so oppressive a law, could never have been
executed in such free countries, had not the diligence of the clergy
beforehand converted to the established church the whole body of the
people, with the exception of, perhaps, a few individuals only. In some parts
of Switzerland, accordingly, where, from the accidental union of a
protestant and Roman catholic country, the conversion has not been so
complete, both religions are not only tolerated, but established by law.
The proper performance of every service seems to require, that its pay or
recompence should be, as exactly as possible, proportioned to the nature of
the service. If any service is very much underpaid, it is very apt to suffer by
the meanness and incapacity of the greater part of those who are employed
in it. If it is very much overpaid, it is apt to suffer, perhaps still more, by
their negligence and idleness. A man of a large revenue, whatever may be
his profession, thinks he ought to live like other men of large revenues; and
to spend a great part of his time in festivity, in vanity, and in dissipation.
But in a clergyman, this train of life not only consumes the time which
ought to be employed in the duties of his function, but in the eyes of the
common people, destroys almost entirely that sanctity of character, which
can alone enable him to perform those duties with proper weight and
authority.
PART IV. Of the Expense of supporting the Dignity of the
Sovereign.
Over and above the expenses necessary for enabling the sovereign to
perform his several duties, a certain expense is requisite for the support of
his dignity. This expense varies, both with the different periods of
improvement, and with the different forms of government.
In an opulent and improved society, where all the different orders of
people are growing every day more expensive in their houses, in their
furniture, in their tables, in their dress, and in their equipage; it cannot well
be expected that the sovereign should alone hold out against the fashion. He
naturally, therefore, or rather necessarily, becomes more expensive in all
those different articles too. His dignity even seems to require that he should
become so.
As, in point of dignity, a monarch is more raised above his subjects than
the chief magistrate of any republic is ever supposed to be above his fellow-
citizens; so a greater expense is necessary for supporting that higher dignity.
We naturally expect more splendour in the court of a king, than in the
mansion-house of a doge or burgo-master.
CONCLUSION.
The expense of defending the society, and that of supporting the dignity
of the chief magistrate, are both laid out for the general benefit of the whole
society. It is reasonable, therefore, that they should be defrayed by the
general contribution of the whole society; all the different members
contributing, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities.
The expense of the administration of justice, too, may no doubt be
considered as laid out for the benefit of the whole society. There is no
impropriety, therefore, in its being defrayed by the general contribution of
the whole society. The persons, however, who give occasion to this
expense, are those who, by their injustice in one way or another, make it
necessary to seek redress or protection from the courts of justice. The
persons, again, most immediately benefited by this expense, are those
whom the courts of justice either restore to their rights, or maintain in their
rights. The expense of the administration of justice, therefore, may very
properly be defrayed by the particular contribution of one or other, or both,
of those two different sets of persons, according as different occasions may
require, that is, by the fees of court. It cannot be necessary to have recourse
to the general contribution of the whole society, except for the conviction of
those criminals who have not themselves any estate or fund sufficient for
paying those fees.
Those local or provincial expenses, of which the benefit is local or
provincial (what is laid out, for example, upon the police of a particular
town or district), ought to be defrayed by a local or provincial revenue, and
ought to be no burden upon the general revenue of the society. It is unjust
that the whole society should contribute towards an expense, of which the
benefit is confined to a part of the society.
The expense of maintaining good roads and communications is, no
doubt, beneficial to the whole society, and may, therefore, without any
injustice, be defrayed by the general contributions of the whole society.
This expense, however, is most immediately and directly beneficial to those
who travel or carry goods from one place to another, and to those who
consume such goods. The turnpike tolls in England, and the duties called
peages in other countries, lay it altogether upon those two different sets of
people, and thereby discharge the general revenue of the society from a
very considerable burden.
The expense of the institutions for education and religious instruction, is
likewise, no doubt, beneficial to the whole society, and may, therefore,
without injustice, be defrayed by the general contribution of the whole
society. This expense, however, might, perhaps, with equal propriety, and
even with some advantage, be defrayed altogether by those who receive the
immediate benefit of such education and instruction, or by the voluntary
contribution of those who think they have occasion for either the one or the
other.
When the institutions, or public works, which are beneficial to the whole
society, either cannot be maintained altogether, or are not maintained
altogether, by the contribution of such particular members of the society as
are most immediately benefited by them; the deficiency must, in most
cases, be made up by the general contribution of the whole society. The
general revenue of the society, over and above defraying the expense of
defending the society, and of supporting the dignity of the chief magistrate,
must make up for the deficiency of many particular branches of revenue.
The sources of this general or public revenue, I shall endeavour to explain
in the following chapter.
CHAPTER II.
OF THE SOURCES OF THE GENERAL OR
PUBLIC REVENUE OF THE SOCIETY.
The revenue which must defray, not only the expense of defending the
society and of supporting the dignity of the chief magistrate, but all the
other necessary expenses of government, for which the constitution of the
state has not provided any particular revenue may be drawn, either, first,
from some fund which peculiarly belongs to the sovereign or
commonwealth, and which is independent of the revenue of the people; or,
secondly, from the revenue of the people.
PART I. Of the Funds, or Sources, of Revenue, which may
peculiarly belong to the Sovereign or Commonwealth.
The funds, or sources, of revenue, which may peculiarly belong to the
sovereign or commonwealth, must consist, either in stock, or in land.
The sovereign, like, any other owner of stock, may derive a revenue from
it, either by employing it himself, or by lending it. His revenue is, in the one
case, profit, in the other interest.
The revenue of a Tartar or Arabian chief consists in profit. It arises
principally from the milk and increase of his own herds and flocks, of
which he himself superintends the management, and is the principal
shepherd or herdsman of his own horde or tribe. It is, however, in this
earliest and rudest state of civil government only, that profit has ever made
the principal part of the public revenue of a monarchical state.
Small republics have sometimes derived a considerable revenue from the
profit of mercantile projects. The republic of Hamburgh is said to do so
from the profits of a public wine-cellar and apothecary’s shop. {See
Memoires concernant les Droits et Impositions en Europe, tome i. page 73.
This work was compiled by the order of the court, for the use of a
commission employed for some years past in considering the proper means
for reforming the finances of France. The account of the French taxes,
which takes up three volumes in quarto, may be regarded as perfectly
authentic. That of those of other European nations was compiled from such
information as the French ministers at the different courts could procure. It
is much shorter, and probably not quite so exact as that of the French
taxes.} That state cannot be very great, of which the sovereign has leisure to
carry on the trade of a wine-merchant or an apothecary. The profit of a
public bank has been a source of revenue to more considerable states. It has
been so, not only to Hamburgh, but to Venice and Amsterdam. A revenue of
this kind has even by some people been thought not below the attention of
so great an empire as that of Great Britain. Reckoning the ordinary dividend
of the bank of England at five and a-half per cent., and its capital at ten
millions seven hundred and eighty thousand pounds, the neat annual profit,
after paying the expense of management, must amount, it is said, to five
hundred and ninety-two thousand nine hundred pounds. Government, it is
pretended, could borrow this capital at three per cent. interest, and, by
taking the management of the bank into its own hands, might make a clear
profit of two hundred and sixty-nine thousand five hundred pounds a-year.
The orderly, vigilant, and parsimonious administration of such aristocracies
as those of Venice and Amsterdam, is extremely proper, it appears from
experience, for the management of a mercantile project of this kind. But
whether such a government us that of England, which, whatever may be its
virtues, has never been famous for good economy; which, in time of peace,
has generally conducted itself with the slothful and negligent profusion that
is, perhaps, natural to monarchies; and, in time of war, has constantly acted
with all the thoughtless extravagance that democracies are apt to fall into,
could be safely trusted with the management of such a project, must at least
be a good deal more doubtful.
The post-office is properly a mercantile project. The government
advances the expense of establishing the different offices, and of buying or
hiring the necessary horses or carriages, and is repaid, with a large profit, by
the duties upon what is carried. It is, perhaps, the only mercantile project
which has been successfully managed by, I believe, every sort of
government. The capital to be advanced is not very considerable. There is
no mystery in the business. The returns are not only certain but immediate.
Princes, however, have frequently engaged in many other mercantile
projects, and have been willing, like private persons, to mend their fortunes,
by becoming adventurers in the common branches of trade. They have
scarce ever succeeded. The profusion with which the affairs of princes are
always managed, renders it almost impossible that they should. The agents
of a prince regard the wealth of their master as inexhaustible; are careless at
what price they buy, are careless at what price they sell, are careless at what
expense they transport his goods from one place to another. Those agents
frequently live with the profusion of princes; and sometimes, too, in spite of
that profusion, and by a proper method of making up their accounts, acquire
the fortunes of princes. It was thus, as we are told by Machiavel, that the
agents of Lorenzo of Medicis, not a prince of mean abilities, carried on his
trade. The republic of Florence was several times obliged to pay the debt
into which their extravagance had involved him. He found it convenient,
accordingly to give up the business of merchant, the business to which his
family had originally owed their fortune, and, in the latter part of his life, to
employ both what remained of that fortune, and the revenue of the state, of
which he had the disposal, in projects and expenses more suitable to his
station.
No two characters seem more inconsistent than those of trader and
sovereign. If the trading spirit of the English East India company renders
them very bad sovereigns, the spirit of sovereignty seems to have rendered
them equally bad traders. While they were traders only, they managed their
trade successfully, and were able to pay from their profits a moderate
dividend to the proprietors of their stock. Since they became sovereigns,
with a revenue which, it is said, was originally more than three millions
sterling, they have been obliged to beg the ordinary assistance of
government, in order to avoid immediate bankruptcy. In their former
situation, their servants in India considered themselves as the clerks of
merchants; in their present situation, those servants consider themselves as
the ministers of sovereigns.
A state may sometimes derive some part of its public revenue from the
interest of money, as well as from the profits of stock. If it has amassed a
treasure, it may lend a part of that treasure, either to foreign states, or to its
own subjects.
The canton of Berne derives a considerable revenue by lending a part of
its treasure to foreign states, that is, by placing it in the public funds of the
different indebted nations of Europe, chiefly in those of France and
England. The security of this revenue must depend, first, upon the security
of the funds in which it is placed, or upon the good faith of the government
which has the management of them; and, secondly, upon the certainty or
probability of the continuance of peace with the debtor nation. In the case
of a war, the very first act of hostility on the part of the debtor nation might
be the forfeiture of the funds of its credit. This policy of lending money to
foreign states is, so far as I know peculiar to the canton of Berne.
The city of Hamburgh {See Memoire concernant les Droites et
Impositions en Europe tome i p. 73.}has established a sort of public pawn-
shop, which lends money to the subjects of the state, upon pledges, at six
per cent. interest. This pawn-shop, or lombard, as it is called, affords a
revenue, it is pretended, to the state, of a hundred and fifty thousand
crowns, which, at four and sixpence the crown, amounts to £33,750
sterling.
The government of Pennsylvania, without amassing any treasure,
invented a method of lending, not money, indeed, but what is equivalent to
money, to its subjects. By advancing to private people, at interest, and upon
land security to double the value, paper bills of credit, to be redeemed
fifteen years after their date; and, in the mean time, made transferable from
hand to hand, like banknotes, and declared by act of assembly to be a legal
tender in all payments from one inhabitant of the province to another, it
raised a moderate revenue, which went a considerable way towards
defraying an annual expense of about £4,500, the whole ordinary expense
of that frugal and orderly government. The success of an expedient of this
kind must have depended upon three different circumstances: first, upon the
demand for some other instrument of commerce, besides gold and silver
money, or upon the demand for such a quantity of consumable stock as
could not be had without sending abroad the greater part of their gold and
silver money, in order to purchase it; secondly, upon the good credit of the
government which made use of this expedient; and, thirdly, upon the
moderation with which it was used, the whole value of the paper bills of
credit never exceeding that of the gold and silver money which would have
been necessary for carrying on their circulation, had there been no paper
bills of credit. The same expedient was, upon different occasions, adopted
by several other American colonies; but, from want of this moderation, it
produced, in the greater part of them, much more disorder than
conveniency.
The unstable and perishable nature of stock and credit, however, renders
them unfit to be trusted to as the principal funds of that sure, steady, and
permanent revenue, which can alone give security and dignity to
government. The government of no great nation, that was advanced beyond
the shepherd state, seems ever to have derived the greater part of its public
revenue from such sources.
Land is a fund of more stable and permanent nature; and the rent of
public lands, accordingly, has been the principal source of the public
revenue of many a great nation that was much advanced beyond the
shepherd state. From the produce or rent of the public lands, the ancient
republics of Greece and Italy derived for a long the the greater part of that
revenue which defrayed the necessary expenses of the commonwealth. The
rent of the crown lands constituted for a long time the greater part of the
revenue of the ancient sovereigns of Europe.
War, and the preparation for war, are the two circumstances which, in
modern times, occasion the greater part of the necessary expense or all great
states. But in the ancient republics of Greece and Italy, every citizen was a
soldier, and both served, and prepared himself for service, at his own
expense. Neither of those two circumstances, therefore, could occasion any
very considerable expense to the state. The rent of a very moderate landed
estate might be fully sufficient for defraying all the other necessary
expenses of government.
In the ancient monarchies of Europe, the manners and customs of the
time sufficiently prepared the great body of the people for war; and when
they took the field, they were, by the condition of their feudal tenures, to be
maintained either at their own expense, or at that of their immediate lords,
without bringing any new charge upon the sovereign. The other expenses of
government were, the greater part of them, very moderate. The
administration of justice, it has been shewn, instead of being a cause of
expense was a source of revenue. The labour of the country people, for
three days before, and for three days after, harvest, was thought a fund
sufficient for making and maintaining all the bridges, highways, and other
public works, which the commerce of the country was supposed to require.
In those days the principal expense of the sovereign seems to have
consisted in the maintenance of his own family and household. The officers
of his household, accordingly, were then the great officers of state. The lord
treasurer received his rents. The lord steward and lord chamberlain looked
after the expense of his family. The care of his stables was committed to the
lord constable and the lord marshal. His houses were all built in the form of
castles, and seem to have been the principal fortresses which he possessed.
The keepers of those houses or castles might be considered as a sort of
military governors. They seem to have been the only military officers whom
it was necessary to maintain in time of peace. In these circumstances, the
rent of a great landed estate might, upon ordinary occasions, very well
defray all the necessary expenses of government.
In the present state of the greater part of the civilized monarchies of
Europe, the rent of all the lands in the country, managed as they probably
would be, if they all belonged to one proprietor, would scarce, perhaps,
amount to the ordinary revenue which they levy upon the people even in
peaceable times. The ordinary revenue of Great Britain, for example,
including not only what is necessary for defraying the current expense of
the year, but for paying the interest of the public debts, and for sinking a
part of the capital of those debts, amounts to upwards of ten millions a-year.
But the land tax, at four shillings in the pound, falls short of two millions a-
year. This land tax, as it is called however, is supposed to be one-fifth, not
only of the rent of all the land, but of that of all the houses, and of the
interest of all the capital stock of Great Britain, that part of it only excepted
which is either lent to the public, or employed as farming stock in the
cultivation of land. A very considerable part of the produce of this tax arises
from the rent of houses and the interest of capital stock. The land tax of the
city of London, for example, at four shillings in the pound, amounts to
£123,399: 6: 7; that of the city of Westminster to £63,092: 1: 5; that of the
palaces of Whitehall and St. James’s, to £30,754: 6: 3. A certain proportion
of the land tax is, in the same manner, assessed upon all the other cities and
towns corporate in the kingdom; and arises almost altogether, either from
the rent of houses, or from what is supposed to be the interest of trading and
capital stock. According to the estimation, therefore, by which Great Britain
is rated to the land tax, the whole mass of revenue arising from the rent of
all the lands, from that of all the houses, and from the interest of all the
capital stock, that part of it only excepted which is either lent to the public,
or employed in the cultivation of land, does not exceed ten millions sterling
a-year, the ordinary revenue which government levies upon the people,
even in peaceable times. The estimation by which Great Britain is rated to
the land tax is, no doubt, taking the whole kingdom at an average, very
much below the real value; though in several particular counties and
districts it is said to be nearly equal to that value. The rent of the lands
alone, exclusive of that of houses and of the interest of stock, has by many
people been estimated at twenty millions; an estimation made in a great
measure at random, and which, I apprehend, is as likely to be above as
below the truth. But if the lands of Great Britain, in the present state of their
cultivation, do not afford a rent of more than twenty millions a-year, they
could not well afford the half, most probably not the fourth part of that rent,
if they all belonged to a single proprietor, and were put under the negligent,
expensive, and oppressive management of his factors and agents. The
crown lands of Great Britain do not at present afford the fourth part of the
rent which could probably be drawn from them if they were the property of
private persons. If the crown lands were more extensive, it is probable, they
would be still worse managed.
The revenue which the great body of the people derives from land is, in
proportion, not to the rent, but to the produce of the land. The whole annual
produce of the land of every country, if we except what is reserved for seed,
is either annually consumed by the great body of the people, or exchanged
for something else that is consumed by them. Whatever keeps down the
produce of the land below what it would otherwise rise to, keeps down the
revenue of the great body of the people, still more than it does that of the
proprietors of land. The rent of land, that portion of the produce which
belongs to the proprietors, is scarce anywhere in Great Britain supposed to
be more than a third part of the whole produce. If the land which, in one
state of cultivation, affords a revenue of ten millions sterling a-year, would
in another afford a rent of twenty millions; the rent being, in both cases,
supposed a third part of the produce, the revenue of the proprietors would
be less than it otherwise might be, by ten millions a-year only; but the
revenue of the great hotly of the people would be less than it otherwise
might be, by thirty millions a-year, deducting only what would be necessary
for seed. The population of the country would be less by the number of
people which thirty millions a-year, deducting always the seed, could
maintain, according to the particular mode of living, and expense which
might take place in the different ranks of men, among whom the remainder
was distributed.
Though there is not at present in Europe, any civilized state of any kind
which derives the greater part of its public revenue from the rent of lands
which are the property of the state; yet, in all the great monarchies of
Europe, there are still many large tracts of land which belong to the crown.
They are generally forest, and sometimes forests where, after travelling
several miles, you will scarce find a single tree; a mere waste and loss of
country, in respect both of produce and population. In every great monarchy
of Europe, the sale of the crown lands would produce a very large sum of
money, which, if applied to the payment of the public debts, would deliver
from mortgage a much greater revenue than any which those lands have
even afforded to the crown. In countries where lands, improved and
cultivated very highly, and yielding, at the time of sale, as great a rent as
can easily be got from them, commonly sell at thirty years purchase; the
unimproved, uncultivated, and low-rented crown lands, might well be
expected to sell at forty, fifty, or sixty years purchase. The crown might
immediately enjoy the revenue which this great price would redeem from
mortgage. In the course of a few years, it would probably enjoy another
revenue. When the crown lands had become private property, they would, in
the course of a few years, become well improved and well cultivated. The
increase of their produce would increase the population of the country, by
augmenting the revenue and consumption of the people. But the revenue
which the crown derives from the duties or custom and excise, would
necessarily increase with the revenue and consumption of the people.
The revenue which, in any civilized monarchy, the crown derives from
the crown lands, though it appears to cost nothing to individuals, in reality
costs more to the society than perhaps any other equal revenue which the
crown enjoys. It would, in all cases, be for the interest of the society, to
replace this revenue to the crown by some other equal revenue, and to
divide the lands among the people, which could not well be done better,
perhaps, than by exposing them to public sale.
Lands, for the purposes of pleasure and magnificence, parks, gardens,
public walks, etc. possessions which are everywhere considered as causes
of expense, not as sources of revenue, seem to be the only lands which, in a
great and civilized monarchy, ought to belong to the crown.
Public stock and public lands, therefore, the two sources of revenue
which may peculiarly belong to the sovereign or commonwealth, being both
improper and insufficient funds for defraying the necessary expense of any
great and civilized state; it remains that this expense must, the greater part
of it, be defrayed by taxes of one kind or another; the people contributing a
part of their own private revenue, in order to make up a public revenue to
the sovereign or commonwealth.
PART II. Of Taxes.
The private revenue of individuals, it has been shown in the first book of
this Inquiry, arises, ultimately from three different sources; rent, profit, and
wages. Every tax must finally be paid from some one or other of those three
different sources of revenue, or from all of them indifferently. I shall
endeavour to give the best account I can, first, of those taxes which, it is
intended should fall upon rent; secondly, of those which, it is intended
should fall upon profit; thirdly, of those which, it is intended should fall
upon wages; and fourthly, of those which, it is intended should fall
indifferently upon all those three different sources of private revenue. The
particular consideration of each of these four different sorts of taxes will
divide the second part of the present chapter into four articles, three of
which will require several other subdivisions. Many of these taxes, it will
appear from the following review, are not finally paid from the fund, or
source of revenue, upon which it is intended they should fall.
Before I enter upon the examination of particular taxes, it is necessary to
premise the four following maximis with regard to taxes in general.
1. The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of
the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective
abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy
under the protection of the state. The expense of government to the
individuals of a great nation, is like the expense of management to the joint
tenants of a great estate, who are all obliged to contribute in proportion to
their respective interests in the estate. In the observation or neglect of this
maxim, consists what is called the equality or inequality of taxation. Every
tax, it must be observed once for all, which falls finally upon one only of
the three sorts of revenue above mentioned, is necessarily unequal, in so far
as it does not affect the other two. In the following examination of different
taxes, I shall seldom take much farther notice of this sort of inequality; but
shall, in most cases, confine my observations to that inequality which is
occasioned by a particular tax falling unequally upon that particular sort of
private revenue which is affected by it.
2. The tax which each individual is bound to pay, ought to be certain and
not arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to
be paid, ought all to be clear and plain to the contributor, and to every other
person. Where it is otherwise, every person subject to the tax is put more or
less in the power of the tax-gatherer, who can either aggravate the tax upon
any obnoxious contributor, or extort, by the terror of such aggravation,
some present or perquisite to himself. The uncertainty of taxation
encourages the insolence, and favours the corruption, of an order of men
who are naturally unpopular, even where they are neither insolent nor
corrupt. The certainty of what each individual ought to pay is, in taxation, a
matter of so great importance, that a very considerable degree of inequality,
it appears, I believe, from the experience of all nations, is not near so great
an evil as a very small degree of uncertainty.
3. Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner, in which it is
most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it. A tax upon the
rent of land or of houses, payable at the same term at which such rents are
usually paid, is levied at the time when it is most likely to be convenient for
the contributor to pay; or when he is most likely to have wherewithall to
pay. Taxes upon such consumable goods as are articles of luxury, are all
finally paid by the consumer, and generally in a manner that is very
convenient for him. He pays them by little and little, as he has occasion to
buy the goods. As he is at liberty too, either to buy or not to buy, as he
pleases, it must be his own fault if he ever suffers any considerable
inconveniency from such taxes.
4. Every tax ought to be so contrived, as both to take out and to keep out
of the pockets of the people as little as possible, over and above what it
brings into the public treasury of the state. A tax may either take out or keep
out of the pockets of the people a great deal more than it brings into the
public treasury, in the four following ways. First, the levying of it may
require a great number of officers, whose salaries may eat up the greater
part of the produce of the tax, and whose perquisites may impose another
additional tax upon the people. Secondly, it may obstruct the industry of the
people, and discourage them from applying to certain branches of business
which might give maintenance and employment to great multitudes. While
it obliges the people to pay, it may thus diminish, or perhaps destroy, some
of the funds which might enable them more easily to do so. Thirdly, by the
forfeitures and other penalties which those unfortunate individuals incur,
who attempt unsuccessfully to evade the tax, it may frequently ruin them,
and thereby put an end to the benefit which the community might have
received from the employment of their capitals. An injudicious tax offers a
great temptation to smuggling. But the penalties of smuggling must arise in
proportion to the temptation. The law, contrary to all the ordinary principles
of justice, first creates the temptation, and then punishes those who yield to
it; and it commonly enhances the punishment, too, in proportion to the very
circumstance which ought certainly to alleviate it, the temptation to commit
the crime. {See Sketches of the History of Man page 474, and Seq.}
Fourthly, by subjecting the people to the frequent visits and the odious
examination of the tax-gatherers, it may expose them to much unnecessary
trouble, vexation, and oppression; and though vexation is not, strictly
speaking, expense, it is certainly equivalent to the expense at which every
man would be willing to redeem himself from it. It is in some one or other
of these four different ways, that taxes are frequently so much more
burdensome to the people than they are beneficial to the sovereign.
The evident justice and utility of the foregoing maxims have
recommended them, more or less, to the attention of all nations. All nations
have endeavoured, to the best of their judgment, to render their taxes as
equal as they could contrive; as certain, as convenient to the contributor,
both the time and the mode of payment, and in proportion to the revenue
which they brought to the prince, as little burdensome to the people. The
following short review of some of the principal taxes which have taken
place in different ages and countries, will show, that the endeavours of all
nations have not in this respect been equally successful.
ARTICLE I.—Taxes upon Rent—Taxes upon the Rent of Land.
A tax upon the rent of land may either be imposed according to a certain
canon, every district being valued at a curtain rent, which valuation is not
afterwards to be altered; or it may be imposed in such a manner, as to vary
with every variation in the real rent of the land, and to rise or fall with the
improvement or declension of its cultivation.
A land tax which, like that of Great Britain, is assessed upon each district
according to a certain invariable canon, though it should be equal at the
time of its first establishment, necessarily becomes unequal in process of
time, according to the unequal degrees of improvement or neglect in the
cultivation of the different parts of the country. In England, the valuation,
according to which the different counties and parishes were assessed to the
land tax by the 4th of William and Mary, was very unequal even at its first
establishment. This tax, therefore, so far offends against the first of the four
maxims above mentioned. It is perfectly agreeable to the other three. It is
perfectly certain. The time of payment for the tax, being the same as that for
the rent, is as convenient as it can be to the contributor. Though the landlord
is, in all cases, the real contributor, the tax is commonly advanced by the
tenant, to whom the landlord is obliged to allow it in the payment of the
rent. This tax is levied by a much smaller number of officers than any other
which affords nearly the same revenue. As the tax upon each district does
not rise with the rise of the rent, the sovereign does not share in the profits
of the landlord’s improvements. Those improvements sometimes contribute,
indeed, to the discharge of the other landlords of the district. But the
aggravation of the tax, which this may sometimes occasion upon a
particular estate, is always so very small, that it never can discourage those
improvements, nor keep down the produce of the land below what it would
otherwise rise to. As it has no tendency to diminish the quantity, it can have
none to raise the price of that produce. It does not obstruct the industry of
the people; it subjects the landlord to no other inconveniency besides the
unavoidable one of paying the tax. The advantage, however, which the
land-lord has derived from the invariable constancy of the valuation, by
which all the lands of Great Britain are rated to the land-tax, has been
principally owing to some circumstances altogether extraneous to the nature
of the tax.
It has been owing in part, to the great prosperity of almost every part of
the country, the rents of almost all the estates of Great Britain having, since
the time when this valuation was first established, been continually rising,
and scarce any of them having fallen. The landlords, therefore, have almost
all gained the difference between the tax which they would have paid,
according to the present rent of their estates, and that which they actually
pay according to the ancient valuation. Had the state of the country been
different, had rents been gradually falling in consequence of the declension
of cultivation, the landlords would almost all have lost this difference. In
the state of things which has happened to take place since the revolution,
the constancy of the valuation has been advantageous to the landlord and
hurtful to the sovereign. In a different state of things it might have been
advantageous to the sovereign and hurtful to the landlord.
As the tax is made payable in money, so the valuation of the land is
expressed in money. Since the establishment of this valuation, the value of
silver has been pretty uniform, and there has been no alteration in the
standard of the coin, either as to weight or fineness. Had silver risen
considerably in its value, as it seems to have done in the course of the two
centuries which preceded the discovery of the mines of America, the
constancy of the valuation might have proved very oppressive to the
landlord. Had silver fallen considerably in its value, as it certainly did for
about a century at least after the discovery of those mines, the same
constancy of valuation would have reduced very much this branch of the
revenue of the sovereign. Had any considerable alteration been made in the
standard of the money, either by sinking the same quantity of silver to a
lower denomination, or by raising it to a higher; had an ounce of silver, for
example, instead of being coined into five shillings and two pence, been
coined either into pieces which bore so low a denomination as two shillings
and seven pence, or into pieces which bore so high a one as ten shillings
and four pence, it would, in the one case, have hurt the revenue of the
proprietor, in the other that of the sovereign.
In circumstances, therefore, somewhat different from those which have
actually taken place, this constancy of valuation might have been a very
great inconveniency, either to the contributors or to the commonwealth. In
the course of ages, such circumstances, however, must at some time or other
happen. But though empires, like all the other works of men, have all
hitherto proved mortal, yet every empire aims at immortality. Every
constitution, therefore, which it is meant should be as permanent as the
empire itself, ought to be convenient, not in certain circumstances only, but
in all circumstances; or ought to be suited, not to those circumstances which
are transitory, occasional, or accidental, but to those which are necessary,
and therefore always the same.
A tax upon the rent of land, which varies with every variation of the rent,
or which rises and falls according to the improvement or neglect of
cultivation, is recommended by that sect of men of letters in France, who
call themselves the economists, as the most equitable of all taxes. All taxes,
they pretend, fall ultimately upon the rent of land, and ought, therefore, to
be imposed equally upon the fund which must finally pay them. That all
taxes ought to fall as equally as possible upon the fund which must finally
pay them, is certainly true. But without entering into the disagreeable
discussion of the metaphysical arguments by which they support their very
ingenious theory, it will sufficiently appear, from the following review,
what are the taxes which fall finally upon the rent of the land, and what are
those which fall finally upon some other fund.
In the Venetian territory, all the arable lands which are given in lease to
farmers are taxed at a tenth of the rent. {Memoires concernant les Droits, p.
240, 241.} The leases are recorded in a public register, which is kept by the
officers of revenue in each province or district. When the proprietor
cultivates his own lands, they are valued according to an equitable
estimation, and he is allowed a deduction of one-fifth of the tax; so that for
such land he pays only eight instead of ten per cent. of the supposed rent.
A land-tax of this kind is certainly more equal than the land-tax of
England. It might not, perhaps, be altogether so certain, and the assessment
of the tax might frequently occasion a good deal more trouble to the
landlord. It might, too, be a good deal more expensive in the levying.
Such a system of administration, however, might, perhaps, be contrived,
as would in a great measure both prevent this uncertainty, and moderate this
expense.
The landlord and tenant, for example, might jointly be obliged to record
their lease in a public register. Proper penalties might be enacted against
concealing or misrepresenting any of the conditions; and if part of those
penalties were to be paid to either of the two parties who informed against
and convicted the other of such concealment or misrepresentation, it would
effectually deter them from combining together in order to defraud the
public revenue. All the conditions of the lease might be sufficiently known
from such a record.
Some landlords, instead of raising the rent, take a fine for the renewal of
the lease. This practice is, in most cases, the expedient of a spendthrift,
who, for a sum of ready money sells a future revenue of much greater
value. It is, in most cases, therefore, hurtful to the landlord; it is frequently
hurtful to the tenant; and it is always hurtful to the community. It frequently
takes from the tenant so great a part of his capital, and thereby diminishes
so much his ability to cultivate the land, that he finds it more difficult to pay
a small rent than it would otherwise have been to pay a great one. Whatever
diminishes his ability to cultivate, necessarily keeps down, below what it
would otherwise have been, the most important part of the revenue of the
community. By rendering the tax upon such fines a good deal heavier than
upon the ordinary rent, this hurtful practice might be discouraged, to the no
small advantage of all the different parties concerned, of the landlord, of the
tenant, of the sovereign, and of the whole community.
Some leases prescribe to the tenant a certain mode of cultivation, and a
certain succession of crops, during the whole continuance of the lease. This
condition, which is generally the effect of the landlord’s conceit of his own
superior knowledge (a conceit in most cases very ill-founded), ought always
to be considered as an additional rent, as a rent in service, instead of a rent
in money. In order to discourage the practice, which is generally a foolish
one, this species of rent might be valued rather high, and consequently
taxed somewhat higher than common money-rents.
Some landlords, instead of a rent in money, require a rent in kind, in
corn, cattle, poultry, wine, oil, etc.; others, again, require a rent in service.
Such rents are always more hurtful to the tenant than beneficial to the
landlord. They either take more, or keep more out of the pocket of the
former, than they put into that of the latter. In every country where they take
place, the tenants are poor and beggarly, pretty much according to the
degree in which they take place. By valuing, in the same manner, such rents
rather high, and consequently taxing them somewhat higher than common
money-rents, a practice which is hurtful to the whole community, might,
perhaps, be sufficiently discouraged.
When the landlord chose to occupy himself a part of his own lands, the
rent might be valued according to an equitable arbitration of the farmers
and landlords in the neighbourhood, and a moderate abatement of the tax
might be granted to him, in the same manner as in the Venetian territory,
provided the rent of the lands which he occupied did not exceed a certain
sum. It is of importance that the landlord should be encouraged to cultivate
a part of his own land. His capital is generally greater than that of the
tenant, and, with less skill, he can frequently raise a greater produce. The
landlord can afford to try experiments, and is generally disposed to do so.
His unsuccessful experiments occasion only a moderate loss to himself. His
successful ones contribute to the improvement and better cultivation of the
whole country. It might be of importance, however, that the abatement of
the tax should encourage him to cultivate to a certain extent only. If the
landlords should, the greater part of them, be tempted to farm the whole of
their own lands, the country (instead of sober and industrious tenants, who
are bound by their own interest to cultivate as well as their capital and skill
will allow them) would be filled with idle and profligate bailiffs, whose
abusive management would soon degrade the cultivation, and reduce the
annual produce of the land, to the diminution, not only of the revenue of
their masters, but of the most important part of that of the whole society.
Such a system of administration might, perhaps, free a tax of this kind
from any degree of uncertainty, which could occasion either oppression or
inconveniency to the contributor; and might, at the same time, serve to
introduce into the common management of land such a plan of policy as
might contribute a good deal to the general improvement and good
cultivation of the country.
The expense of levying a land-tax, which varied with every variation of
the rent, would, no doubt, be somewhat greater than that of levying one
which was always rated according to a fixed valuation. Some additional
expense would necessarily be incurred, both by the different register-offices
which it would be proper to establish in the different districts of the country,
and by the different valuations which might occasionally be made of the
lands which the proprietor chose to occupy himself. The expense of all this,
however, might be very moderate, and much below what is incurred in the
levying of many other taxes, which afford a very inconsiderable revenue in
comparison of what might easily be drawn from a tax of this kind.
The discouragement which a variable land-tax of this kind might give to
the improvement of land, seems to be the most important objection which
can be made to it. The landlord would certainly be less disposed to improve,
when the sovereign, who contributed nothing to the expense, was to share
in the profit of the improvement. Even this objection might, perhaps, be
obviated, by allowing the landlord, before he began his improvement, to
ascertain, in conjunction with the officers of revenue, the actual value of his
lands, according to the equitable arbitration of a certain number of landlords
and farmers in the neighbourhood, equally chosen by both parties: and by
rating him, according to this valuation, for such a number of years as might
be fully sufficient for his complete indemnification. To draw the attention of
the sovereign towards the improvement of the land, from a regard to the
increase of his own revenue, is one or the principal advantages proposed by
this species of land-tax. The term, therefore, allowed, for the
indemnification of the landlord, ought not to be a great deal longer than
what was necessary for that purpose, lest the remoteness of the interest
should discourage too much this attention. It had better, however, be
somewhat too long, than in any respect too short. No incitement to the
attention of the sovereign can ever counterbalance the smallest
discouragement to that of the landlord. The attention of the sovereign can
be, at best, but a very general and vague consideration of what is likely to
contribute to the better cultivation of the greater part of his dominions. The
attention of the landlord is a particular and minute consideration of what is
likely to be the most advantageous application of every inch of ground upon
his estate. The principal attention of the sovereign ought to be, to
encourage, by every means in his power, the attention both of the landlord
and of the farmer, by allowing both to pursue their own interest in their own
way, and according to their own judgment; by giving to both the most
perfect security that they shall enjoy the full recompence of their own
industry; and by procuring to both the most extensive market for every part
of their produce, in consequence of establishing the easiest and safest
communications, both by land and by water, through every part of his own
dominions, as well as the most unbounded freedom of exportation to the
dominions of all other princes.
If, by such a system of administration, a tax of this kind could be so
managed as to give, not only no discouragement, but, on the contrary, some
encouragement to the improvement or land, it does not appear likely to
occasion any other inconveniency to the landlord, except always the
unavoidable one of being obliged to pay the tax. In all the variations of the
state of the society, in the improvement and in the declension of agriculture;
in all the variations in the value of silver, and in all those in the standard of
the coin, a tax of this kind would, of its own accord, and without any
attention of government, readily suit itself to the actual situation of things,
and would be equally just and equitable in all those different changes. It
would, therefore, be much more proper to be established as a perpetual and
unalterable regulation, or as what is called a fundamental law of the
commonwealth, than any tax which was always to be levied according to a
certain valuation.
Some states, instead of the simple and obvious expedient of a register of
leases, have had recourse to the laborious and expensive one of an actual
survey and valuation of all the lands in the country. They have suspected,
probably, that the lessor and lessee, in order to defraud the public revenue,
might combine to conceal the real terms of the lease. Doomsday-book
seems to have been the result of a very accurate survey of this kind.
In the ancient dominions of the king of Prussia, the land-tax is assessed
according to an actual survey and valuation, which is reviewed and altered
from time to time. {Memoires concurent les Droits, etc. tom, i. p. 114, 115,
116, etc.} According to that valuation, the lay proprietors pay from twenty
to twenty-five per cent. of their revenue; ecclesiastics from forty to forty-
five per cent. The survey and valuation of Silesia was made by order of the
present king, it is said, with great accuracy. According to that valuation, the
lands belonging to the bishop of Breslaw are taxed at twenty-five per cent.
of their rent. The other revenues of the ecclesiastics of both religions at fifty
per cent. The commanderies of the Teutonic order, and of that of Malta, at
forty per cent. Lands held by a noble tenure, at thirty-eight and one-third
per cent. Lands held by a base tenure, at thirty-five and one-third per cent.
The survey and valuation of Bohemia is said to have been the work of
more than a hundred years. It was not perfected till after the peace of 1748,
by the orders of the present empress queen. {Id. tom i. p.85, 84.} The
survey of the duchy of Milan, which was begun in the time of Charles VI.,
was not perfected till after 1760 It is esteemed one of the most accurate that
has ever been made. The survey of Savoy and Piedmont was executed
under the orders of the late king of Sardinia. {Id. p. 280, etc.; also p, 287.
etc. to 316.}
In the dominions of the king of Prussia, the revenue of the church is
taxed much higher than that of lay proprietors. The revenue of the church is,
the greater part of it, a burden upon the rent of land. It seldom happens that
any part of it is applied towards the improvement of land; or is so employed
as to contribute, in any respect, towards increasing the revenue of the great
body of the people. His Prussian majesty had probably, upon that account,
thought it reasonable that it should contribute a good deal more towards
relieving the exigencies of the state. In some countries, the lands of the
church are exempted from all taxes. In others, they are taxed more lightly
than other lands. In the duchy of Milan, the lands which the church
possessed before 1575, are rated to the tax at a third only or their value.
In Silesia, lands held by a noble tenure are taxed three per cent. higher
than those held by a base tenure. The honours and privileges of different
kinds annexed to the former, his Prussian majesty had probably imagined,
would sufficiently compensate to the proprietor a small aggravation of the
tax; while, at the same time, the humiliating inferiority of the latter would
be in some measure alleviated, by being taxed somewhat more lightly. In
other countries, the system of taxation, instead of alleviating, aggravates
this inequality. In the dominions of the king of Sardinia, and in those
provinces of France which are subject to what is called the real or predial
taille, the tax falls altogether upon the lands held by a base tenure. Those
held by a noble one are exempted.
A land tax assessed according to a general survey and valuation, how
equal soever it may be at first, must, in the course of a very moderate period
of time, become unequal. To prevent its becoming so would require the
continual and painful attention of government to all the variations in the
state and produce of every different farm in the country. The governments
of Prussia, of Bohemia, of Sardinia, and of the duchy of Milan, actually
exert an attention of this kind; an attention so unsuitable to the nature of
government, that it is not likely to be of long continuance, and which, if it is
continued, will probably, in the long-run, occasion much more trouble and
vexation than it can possibly bring relief to the contributors.
In 1666, the generality of Montauban was assessed to the real or predial
taille, according, it is said, to a very exact survey and valuation. {Memoires
concernant les Droits, etc. tom. ii p. 139, etc.} By 1727, this assessment had
become altogether unequal. In order to remedy this inconveniency,
government has found no better expedient, than to impose upon the whole
generality an additional tax of a hundred and twenty thousand livres. This
additional tax is rated upon all the different districts subject to the taille
according to the old assessment. But it is levied only upon those which, in
the actual state of things, are by that assessment under-taxed; and it is
applied to the relief of those which, by the same assessment, are over-taxed.
Two districts, for example, one of which ought, in the actual state of things,
to be taxed at nine hundred, the other at eleven hundred livres, are, by the
old assessment, both taxed at a thousand livres. Both these districts are, by
the additional tax, rated at eleven hundred livres each. But this additional
tax is levied only upon the district under-charged, and it is applied
altogether to the relief of that overcharged, which consequently pays only
nine hundred livres. The government neither gains nor loses by the
additional tax, which is applied altogether to remedy the inequalities arising
from the old assessment. The application is pretty much regulated according
to the discretion of the intendant of the generality, and must, therefore, be in
a great measure arbitrary.
Taxes which are proportioned, not in the Rent, but to the Produce of
Land.
Taxes upon the produce of land are, In reality, taxes upon the rent; and
though they may be originally advanced by the farmer, are finally paid by
the landlord. When a certain portion of the produce is to be paid away for a
tax, the farmer computes as well as he can, what the value of this portion is,
one year with another, likely to amount to, and he makes a proportionable
abatement in the rent which he agrees to pay to the landlord. There is no
farmer who does not compute beforehand what the church tythe, which is a
land tax of this kind, is, one year with another, likely to amount to.
The tythe, and every other land tax of this kind, under the appearance of
perfect equality, are very unequal taxes; a certain portion of the produce
being in differrent situations, equivalent to a very different portion of the
rent. In some very rich lands, the produce is so great, that the one half of it
is fully sufficient to replace to the farmer his capital employed in
cultivation, together with the ordinary profits of farming stock in the
neighbourhood. The other half, or, what comes to the same thing, the value
of the other half, he could afford to pay as rent to the landlord, if there was
no tythe. But if a tenth of the produce is taken from him in the way of tythe,
he must require an abatement of the fifth part of his rent, otherwise he
cannot get back his capital with the ordinary profit. In this case, the rent of
the landlord, instead of amounting to a half, or five-tenths of the whole
produce, will amount only to four-tenths of it. In poorer lands, on the
contrary, the produce is sometimes so small, and the expense of cultivation
so great, that it requires four-fifths of the whole produce, to replace to the
farmer his capital with the ordinary profit. In this case, though there was no
tythe, the rent of the landlord could amount to no more than one-fifth or
two-tenths of the whole produce. But if the farmer pays one-tenth of the
produce in the way of tythe, he must require an equal abatement of the rent
of the landlord, which will thus be reduced to one-tenth only of the whole
produce. Upon the rent of rich lands the tythe may sometimes be a tax of no
more than one-fifth part, or four shillings in the pound; whereas upon that
of poorer lands, it may sometimes be a tax of one half, or of ten shillings in
the pound.
The tythe, as it is frequently a very unequal tax upon the rent, so it is
always a great discouragement, both to the improvements of the landlord,
and to the cultivation of the farmer. The one cannot venture to make the
most important, which are generally the most expensive improvements; nor
the other to raise the most valuable, which are generally, too, the most
expensive crops; when the church, which lays out no part of the expense, is
to share so very largely in the profit. The cultivation of madder was, for a
long time, confined by the tythe to the United Provinces, which, being
presbyterian countries, and upon that account exempted from this
destructive tax, enjoyed a sort of monopoly of that useful dyeing drug
against the rest of Europe. The late attempts to introduce the culture of this
plant into England, have been made only in consequence of the statute,
which enacted that five shillings an acre should be received in lieu of all
manner of tythe upon madder.
As through the greater part of Europe, the church, so in many different
countries of Asia, the state, is principally supported by a land tax,
proportioned not to the rent, but to the produce of the land. In China, the
principal revenue of the sovereign consists in a tenth part of the produce of
all the lands of the empire. This tenth part, however, is estimated so very
moderately, that, in many provinces, it is said not to exceed a thirtieth part
of the ordinary produce. The land tax or land rent which used to be paid to
the Mahometan government of Bengal, before that country fell into the
hands of the English East India company, is said to have amounted to about
a fifth part of the produce. The land tax of ancient Egypt is said likewise to
have amounted to a fifth part.
In Asia, this sort of land tax is said to interest the sovereign in the
improvement and cultivation of land. The sovereigns of China, those of
Bengal while under the Mahometan govermnent, and those of ancient
Egypt, are said, accordingly, to have been extremely attentive to the making
and maintaining of good roads and navigable canals, in order to increase, as
much as possible, both the quantity and value of every part of the produce
of the land, by procuring to every part of it the most extensive market which
their own dominions could afford. The tythe of the church is divided into
such small portions that no one of its proprietors can have any interest of
this kind. The parson of a parish could never find his account, in making a
road or canal to a distant part of the country, in order to extend the market
for the produce of his own particular parish. Such taxes, when destined for
the maintenance of the state, have some advantages, which may serve in
some measure to balance their inconveniency. When destined for the
maintenance of the church, they are attended with nothing but
inconveniency.
Taxes upon the produce of land may be levied, either in kind, or,
according to a certain valuation in money.
The parson of a parish, or a gentleman of small fortune who lives upon
his estate, may sometimes, perhaps find some advantage in receiving, the
one his tythe, and the other his rent, in kind. The quantity to be collected,
and the district within which it is to be collected, are so small, that they both
can oversee, with their own eyes, the collection and disposal of every part
of what is due to them. A gentleman of great fortune, who lived in the
capital, would be in danger of suffering much by the neglect, and more by
the fraud, of his factors and agents, if the rents of an estate in a distant
province were to be paid to him in this manner. The loss of the sovereign,
from the abuse and depredation of his tax-gatherers, would necessarily be
much greater. The servants of the most careless private person are, perhaps,
more under the eye of their master than those of the most careful prince;
and a public revenue, which was paid in kind, would suffer so much from
the mismanagement of the collectors, that a very small part of what was
levied upon the people would ever arrive at the treasury of the prince. Some
part of the public revenue of China, however, is said to be paid in this
manner. The mandarins and other tax-gatherers will, no doubt, find their
advantage in continuing the practice of a payment, which is so much more
liable to abuse than any payment in money.
A tax upon the produce of land, which is levied in money, may be levied,
either according to a valuation, which varies with all the variations of the
market price; or according to a fixed valuation, a bushel of wheat, for
example, being always valued at one and the same money price, whatever
may be the state of the market. The produce of a tax levied in the former
way will vary only according to the variations in the real produce of the
land, according to the improvement or neglect of cultivation. The produce
of a tax levied in the latter way will vary, not only according to the
variations in the produce of the land, but according both to those in the
value of the precious metals, and those in the quantity of those metals
which is at different times contained in coin of the same denomination. The
produce of the former will always bear the same proportion to the value of
the real produce of the land. The produce of the latter may, at different
times, bear very different proportions to that value.
When, instead either of a certain portion of the produce of land, or of the
price of a certain portion, a certain sum of money is to be paid in full
compensation for all tax or tythe; the tax becomes, in this case, exactly of
the same nature with the land tax of England. It neither rises nor falls with
the rent of the land. It neither encourages nor discourages improvement.
The tythe in the greater part of those parishes which pay what is called a
modus, in lieu of all other tythe is a tax of this kind. During the Mahometan
government of Bengal, instead of the payment in kind of the fifth part of the
produce, a modus, and, it is said, a very moderate one, was established in
the greater part of the districts or zemindaries of the country. Some of the
servants of the East India company, under pretence of restoring the public
revenue to its proper value, have, in some provinces, exchanged this modus
for a payment in kind. Under their management, this change is likely both
to discourage cultivation, and to give new opportunities for abuse in the
collection of the public revenue, which has fallen very much below what it
was said to have been when it first fell under the management of the
company. The servants of the company may, perhaps, have profited by the
change, but at the expense, it is probable, both of their masters and of the
country.
Taxes upon the Rent of Houses.
The rent of a house may be distinguished into two parts, of which the one
may very properly be called the building-rent; the other is commonly called
the ground-rent.
The building-rent is the interest or profit of the capital expended in
building the house. In order to put the trade of a builder upon a level with
other trades, it is necessary that this rent should be sufficient, first, to pay
him the same interest which he would have got for his capital, if he had lent
it upon good security; and, secondly, to keep the house in constant repair,
or, what comes to the same thing, to replace, within a certain term of years,
the capital which had been employed in building it. The building-rent, or
the ordinary profit of building, is, therefore, everywhere regulated by the
ordinary interest of money. Where the market rate of interest is four per
cent. the rent of a house, which, over and above paying the ground-rent,
affords six or six and a-half per cent. upon the whole expense of building,
may, perhaps, afford a sufficient profit to the builder. Where the market rate
of interest is five per cent. it may perhaps require seven or seven and a half
per cent. If, in proportion to the interest of money, the trade of the builders
affords at any time much greater profit than this, it will soon draw so much
capital from other trades as will reduce the profit to its proper level. If it
affords at any time much less than this, other trades will soon draw so much
capital from it as will again raise that profit.
Whatever part of the whole rent of a house is over and above what is
sufficient for affording this reasonable profit, naturally goes to the ground-
rent; and, where the owner of the ground and the owner of the building are
two different persons, is, in most cases, completely paid to the former. This
surplus rent is the price which the inhabitant of the house pays for some real
or supposed advantage of the situation. In country houses, at a distance
from any great town, where there is plenty of ground to chuse upon, the
ground-rent is scarce anything, or no more than what the ground which the
house stands upon would pay, if employed in agriculture. In country villas,
in the neighbourhood of some great town, it is sometimes a good deal
higher; and the peculiar conveniency or beauty of situation is there
frequently very well paid for. Ground-rents are generally highest in the
capital, and in those particular parts of it where there happens to be the
greatest demand for houses, whatever be the reason of that demand,
whether for trade and business, for pleasure and society, or for mere vanity
and fashion.
A tax upon house-rent, payable by the tenant, and proportioned to the
whole rent of each house, could not, for any considerable time at least,
affect the building-rent. If the builder did not get his reasonable profit, he
would be obliged to quit the trade; which, by raising the demand for
building, would, in a short time, bring back his profit to its proper level with
that of other trades. Neither would such a tax fall altogether upon the
ground-rent; but it would divide itself in such a manner, as to fall partly
upon the inhabitant of the house, and partly upon the owner of the ground.
Let us suppose, for example, that a particular person judges that he can
afford for house-rent all expense of sixty pounds a-year; and let us suppose,
too, that a tax of four shillings in the pound, or of one-fifth, payable by the
inhabitant, is laid upon house-rent. A house of sixty pounds rent will, in that
case, cost him seventy-two pounds a-year, which is twelve pounds more
than he thinks he can afford. He will, therefore, content himself with a
worse house, or a house of fifty pounds rent, which, with the additional ten
pounds that he must pay for the tax, will make up the sum of sixty pounds
a-year, the expense which he judges he can afford, and, in order to pay the
tax, he will give up a part of the additional conveniency which he might
have had from a house of ten pounds a-year more rent. He will give up, I
say, a part of this additional conveniency; for he will seldom be obliged to
give up the whole, but will, in consequence of the tax, get a better house for
fifty pounds a-year, than he could have got if there had been no tax for as a
tax of this kind, by taking away this particular competitor, must diminish
the competition for houses of sixty pounds rent, so it must likewise
diminish it for those of fifty pounds rent, and in the same manner for those
of all other rents, except the lowest rent, for which it would for some time
increase the competition. But the rents of every class of houses for which
the competition was diminished, would necessarily be more or less reduced.
As no part of this reduction, however, could for any considerable time at
least, affect the building-rent, the whole of it must, in the long-run,
necessarily fall upon the ground-rent. The final payment of this tax,
therefore, would fall partly upon the inhabitant of the house, who, in order
to pay his share, would be obliged to give up a part of his conveniency; and
partly upon the owner of the ground, who, in order to pay his share, would
be obliged to give up a part of his revenue. In what proportion this final
payment would be divided between them, it is not, perhaps, very easy to
ascertain. The division would probably be very different in different
circumstances, and a tax of this kind might, according to those different
circumstances, affect very unequally, both the inhabitant of the house and
the owner of the ground.
The inequality with which a tax of this kind might fall upon the owners
of different ground-rents, would arise altogether from the accidental
inequality of this division. But the inequality with which it might fall upon
the inhabitants of different houses, would arise, not only from this, but from
another cause. The proportion of the expense of house-rent to the whole
expense of living, is different in the different degrees of fortune. It is,
perhaps, highest in the highest degree, and it diminishes gradually through
the inferior degrees, so as in general to be lowest in the lowest degree. The
necessaries of life occasion the great expense of the poor. They find it
difficult to get food, and the greater part of their little revenue is spent in
getting it. The luxuries and vanities of life occasion the principal expense of
the rich; and a magnificent house embellishes and sets off to the best
advantage all the other luxuries and vanities which they possess. A tax upon
house-rents, therefore, would in general fall heaviest upon the rich; and in
this sort of inequality there would not, perhaps, be any thing very
unreasonable. It is not very unreasonable that the rich should contribute to
the public expense, not only in proportion to their revenue, but something
more than in that proportion.
The rent of houses, though it in some respects resembles the rent of land,
is in one respect essentially different from it. The rent of land is paid for the
use of a productive subject. The land which pays it produces it. The rent of
houses is paid for the use of an unproductive subject. Neither the house, nor
the ground which it stands upon, produce anything. The person who pays
the rent, therefore, must draw it from some other source of revenue, distinct
from and independent of this subject. A tax upon the rent of houses, so far
as it falls upon the inhabitants, must be drawn from the same source as the
rent itself, and must be paid from their revenue, whether derived from the
wages of labour, the profits of stock, or the rent of land. So far as it falls
upon the inhabitants, it is one of those taxes which fall, not upon one only,
but indifferently upon all the three different sources of revenue; and is, in
every respect, of the same nature as a tax upon any other sort of consumable
commodities. In general, there is not perhaps, any one article of expense or
consumption by which the liberality or narrowness of a man’s whole
expense can be better judged of than by his house-rent. A proportional tax
upon this particular article of expense might, perhaps, produce a more
considerable revenue than any which has hitherto been drawn from it in any
part of Europe. If the tax, indeed, was very high, the greater part of people
would endeavour to evade it as much as they could, by contenting
themselves with smaller houses, and by turning the greater part of their
expense into some other channel.
The rent of houses might easily be ascertained with sufficient accuracy,
by a policy of the same kind with that which would be necessary for
ascertaining the ordinary rent of land. Houses not inhabited ought to pay no
tax. A tax upon them would fall altogether upon the proprietor, who would
thus be taxed for a subject which afforded him neither conveniency nor
revenue. Houses inhabited by the proprietor ought to be rated, not according
to the expense which they might have cost in building, but according to the
rent which an equitable arbitration might judge them likely to bring if
leased to a tenant. If rated according to the expense which they might have
cost in building, a tax of three or four shillings in the pound, joined with
other taxes, would ruin almost all the rich and great families of this, and, I
believe, of every other civilized country. Whoever will examine with
attention the different town and country houses of some of the richest and
greatest families in this country, will find that, at the rate of only six and a-
half, or seven per cent. upon the original expense of building, their house-
rent is nearly equal to the whole neat rent of their estates. It is the
accumulated expense of several successive generations, laid out upon
objects of great beauty and magnificence, indeed, but, in proportion to what
they cost, of very small exchangeable value. {Since the first publication of
this book, a tax nearly upon the above-mentioned principles has been
imposed.}
Ground-rents are a still more proper subject of taxation than the rent of
houses. A tax upon ground-rents would not raise the rent of houses; it
would fall altogether upon the owner of the ground-rent, who acts always as
a monopolist, and exacts the greatest rent which can be got for the use of
his ground. More or less can be got for it, according as the competitors
happen to be richer or poorer, or can afford to gratify their fancy for a
particular spot of ground at a greater or smaller expense. In every country,
the greatest number of rich competitors is in the capital, and it is there
accordingly that the highest ground-rents are always to be found. As the
wealth of those competitors would in no respect be increased by a tax upon
ground-rents, they would not probably be disposed to pay more for the use
of the ground. Whether the tax was to be advanced by the inhabitant or by
the owner of the ground, would be of little importance. The more the
inhabitant was obliged to pay for the tax, the less he would incline to pay
for the ground; so that the final payment of the tax would fall altogether
upon the owner of the ground-rent. The ground-rents of uninhabited houses
ought to pay no tax. Both ground-rents, and the ordinary rent of land, are a
species of revenue which the owner, in many cases, enjoys without any care
or attention of his own. Though a part of this revenue should be taken from
him in order to defray the expenses of the state, no discouragement will
thereby be given to any sort of industry. The annual produce of the land and
labour of the society, the real wealth and revenue of the great body of the
people, might be the same after such a tax as before. Ground-rents, and the
ordinary rent of land, are therefore, perhaps, the species of revenue which
can best bear to have a peculiar tax imposed upon them.
Ground-rents seem, in this respect, a more proper subject of peculiar
taxation, than even the ordinary rent of land. The ordinary rent of land is, in
many cases, owing partly, at least, to the attention and good management of
the landlord. A very heavy tax might discourage, too much, this attention
and good management. Ground-rents, so far as they exceed the ordinary
rent of land, are altogether owing to the good government of the sovereign,
which, by protecting the industry either of the whole people or of the
inhabitants of some particular place, enables them to pay so much more
than its real value for the ground which they build their houses upon; or to
make to its owner so much more than compensation for the loss which he
might sustain by this use of it. Nothing can be more reasonable, than that a
fund, which owes its existence to the good government of the state, should
be taxed peculiarly, or should contribute something more than the greater
part of other funds, towards the support of that government.
Though, in many different countries of Europe, taxes have been imposed
upon the rent of houses, I do not know of any in which ground-rents have
been considered as a separate subject of taxation. The contrivers of taxes
have, probably, found some difficulty in ascertaining what part of the rent
ought to be considered as ground-rent, and what part ought to be considered
as building-rent. It should not, however, seem very difficult to distinguish
those two parts of the rent from one another.
In Great Britain the rent of houses is supposed to be taxed in the same
proportion as the rent of land, by what is called the annual land tax. The
valuation, according to which each different parish and district is assessed
to this tax, is always the same. It was originally extremely unequal, and it
still continues to be so. Through the greater part of the kingdom this tax
falls still more lightly upon the rent of houses than upon that of land. In
some few districts only, which were originally rated high, and in which the
rents of houses have fallen considerably, the land tax of three or four
shillings in the pound is said to amount to an equal proportion of the real
rent of houses. Untenanted houses, though by law subject to the tax, are, in
most districts, exempted from it by the favour of the assessors; and this
exemption sometimes occasions some little variation in the rate of
particular houses, though that of the district is always the same.
Improvements of rent, by new buildings, repairs, etc. go to the discharge of
the district, which occasions still further variations in the rate of particular
houses.
In the province of Holland, {Memoires concernant les Droits, etc. p.
223.} every house is taxed at two and a-half per cent. of its value, without
any regard, either to the rent which it actually pays, or to the circumstance
of its being tenanted or untenanted. There seems to be a hardship in
obliging the proprietor to pay a tax for an untenanted house, from which he
can derive no revenue, especially so very heavy a tax. In Holland, where the
market rate of interest does not exceed three per cent., two and a-half per
cent. upon the whole value of the house must, in most cases, amount to
more than a third of the building-rent, perhaps of the whole rent. The
valuation, indeed, according to which the houses are rated, though very
unequal, is said to be always below the real value. When a house is rebuilt,
improved, or enlarged, there is a new valuation, and the tax is rated
accordingly.
The contrivers of the several taxes which in England have, at different
times, been imposed upon houses, seem to have imagined that there was
some great difficulty in ascertaining, with tolerable exactness, what was the
real rent of every house. They have regulated their taxes, therefore,
according to some more obvious circumstance, such as they had probably
imagined would, in most cases, bear some proportion to the rent.
The first tax of this kind was hearth-money; or a tax of two shillings
upon every hearth. In order to ascertain how many hearths were in the
house, it was necessary that the tax-gatherer should enter every room in it.
This odious visit rendered the tax odious. Soon after the Revolution,
therefore, it was abolished as a badge of slavery.
The next tax of this kind was a tax of two shillings upon every dwelling-
house inhabited. A house with ten windows to pay four shillings more. A
house with twenty windows and upwards to pay eight shillings. This tax
was afterwards so far altered, that houses with twenty windows, and with
less than thirty, were ordered to pay ten shillings, and those with thirty
windows and upwards to pay twenty shillings. The number of windows can,
in most cases, be counted from the outside, and, in all cases, without
entering every room in the house. The visit of the tax-gatherer, therefore,
was less offensive in this tax than in the hearth-money.
This tax was afterwards repealed, and in the room of it was established
the window-tax, which has undergone two several alterations and
augmentations. The window tax, as it stands at present (January 1775), over
and above the duty of three shillings upon every house in England, and of
one shilling upon every house in Scotland, lays a duty upon every window,
which in England augments gradually from twopence, the lowest rate upon
houses with not more than seven windows, to two shillings, the highest rate
upon houses with twenty-five windows and upwards.
The principal objection to all such taxes is their inequality; an inequality
of the worst kind, as they must frequently fall much heavier upon the poor
than upon the rich. A house of ten pounds rent in a country town, may
sometimes have more windows than a house of five hundred pounds rent in
London; and though the inhabitant of the former is likely to be a much
poorer man than that of the latter, yet, so far as his contribution is regulated
by the window tax, he must contribute more to the support of the state.
Such taxes are, therefore, directly contrary to the first of the four maxims
above mentioned. They do not seem to offend much against any of the other
three.
The natural tendency of the window tax, and of all other taxes upon
houses, is to lower rents. The more a man pays for the tax, the less, it is
evident, he can afford to pay for the rent. Since the imposition of the
window tax, however, the rents of houses have, upon the whole, risen more
or less, in almost every town and village of Great Britain, with which I am
acquainted. Such has been, almost everywhere, the increase of the demand
for houses, that it has raised the rents more than the window tax could sink
them; one of the many proofs of the great prosperity of the country, and of
the increasing revenue of its inhabitants. Had it not been for the tax, rents
would probably have risen still higher.
ARTICLE II.—Taxes upon Profit, or upon the Revenue arising from
Stock.
The revenue or profit arising from stock naturally divides itself into two
parts; that which pays the interest, and which belongs to the owner of the
stock; and that surplus part which is over and above what is necessary for
paying the interest.
This latter part of profit is evidently a subject not taxable directly. It is the
compensation, and, in most cases, it is no more than a very moderate
compensation for the risk and trouble of employing the stock. The employer
must have this compensation, otherwise he cannot, consistently with his
own interest, continue the employment. If he was taxed directly, therefore,
in proportion to the whole profit, he would be obliged either to raise the rate
of his profit, or to charge the tax upon the interest of money; that is, to pay
less interest. If he raised the rate of his profit in proportion to the tax, the
whole tax, though it might be advanced by him, would be finally paid by
one or other of two different sets of people, according to the different ways
in which he might employ the stock of which he had the management. If he
employed it as a farming stock, in the cultivation of land, he could raise the
rate of his profit only by retaining a greater portion, or, what comes to the
same thing, the price of a greater portion, of the produce of the land; and as
this could be done only by a reduction of rent, the final payment of the tax
would fall upon the landlord. If he employed it as a mercantile or
manufacturing stock, he could raise the rate of his profit only by raising the
price of his goods; in which case, the final payment of the tax would fall
altogether upon the consumers of those goods. If he did not raise the rate of
his profit, he would be obliged to charge the whole tax upon that part of it
which was allotted for the interest of money. He could afford less interest
for whatever stock he borrowed, and the whole weight of the tax would, in
this case, fall ultimately upon the interest of money. So far as he could not
relieve himself from the tax in the one way, he would be obliged to relieve
himself in the other.
The interest of money seems, at first sight, a subject equally capable of
being taxed directly as the rent of land. Like the rent of land, it is a neat
produce, which remains, after completely compensating the whole risk and
trouble of employing the stock. As a tax upon the rent of land cannot raise
rents, because the neat produce which remains, after replacing the stock of
the farmer, together with his reasonable profit, cannot be greater after the
tax than before it, so, for the same reason, a tax upon the interest of money
could not raise the rate of interest; the quantity of stock or money in the
country, like the quantity of land, being supposed to remain the same after
the tax as before it. The ordinary rate of profit, it has been shewn, in the
first book, is everywhere regulated by the quantity of stock to be employed,
in proportion to the quantity of the employment, or of the business which
must be done by it. But the quantity of the employment, or of the business
to be done by stock, could neither be increased nor diminished by any tax
upon the interest of money. If the quantity of the stock to be employed,
therefore, was neither increased nor diminished by it, the ordinary rate of
profit would necessarily remain the same. But the portion of this profit,
necessary for compensating the risk and trouble of the employer, would
likewise remain the same; that risk and trouble being in no respect altered.
The residue, therefore, that portion which belongs to the owner of the stock,
and which pays the interest of money, would necessarily remain the same
too. At first sight, therefore, the interest of money seems to be a subject as
fit to be taxed directly as the rent of land.
There are, however, two different circumstances, which render the
interest of money a much less proper subject of direct taxation than the rent
of land.
First, the quantity and value of the land which any man possesses, can
never be a secret, and can always be ascertained with great exactness. But
the whole amount of the capital stock which he possesses is almost always a
secret, and can scarce ever be ascertained with tolerable exactness. It is
liable, besides, to almost continual variations. A year seldom passes away,
frequently not a month, sometimes scarce a single day, in which it does not
rise or fall more or less. An inquisition into every man’s private
circumstances, and an inquisition which, in order to accommodate the tax to
them, watched over all the fluctuations of his fortune, would be a source of
such continual and endless vexation as no person could support.
Secondly, land is a subject which cannot be removed; whereas stock
easily may. The proprietor of land is necessarily a citizen of the particular
country in which his estate lies. The proprietor of stock is properly a citizen
of the world, and is not necessarily attached to any particular country. He
would be apt to abandon the country in which he was exposed to a
vexatious inquisition, in order to be assessed to a burdensome tax; and
would remove his stock to some other country, where he could either carry
on his business, or enjoy his fortune more at his ease. By removing his
stock, he would put an end to all the industry which it had maintained in the
country which he left. Stock cultivates land; stock employs labour. A tax
which tended to drive away stock from any particular country, would so far
tend to dry up every source of revenue, both to the sovereign and to the
society. Not only the profits of stock, but the rent of land, and the wages of
labour, would necessarily be more or less diminished by its removal.
The nations, accordingly, who have attempted to tax the revenue arising
from stock, instead of any severe inquisition of this kind, have been obliged
to content themselves with some very loose, and, therefore, more or less
arbitrary estimation. The extreme inequality and uncertainty of a tax
assessed in this manner, can be compensated only by its extreme
moderation; in consequence of which, every man finds himself rated so
very much below his real revenue, that he gives himself little disturbance
though his neighbour should be rated somewhat lower.
By what is called the land tax in England, it was intended that the stock
should be taxed in the same proportion as land. When the tax upon land was
at four shillings in the pound, or at one-fifth of the supposed rent, it was
intended that stock should be taxed at one-fifth of the supposed interest.
When the present annual land tax was first imposed, the legal rate of
interest was six per cent. Every hundred pounds stock, accordingly, was
supposed to be taxed at twenty-four shillings, the fifth part of six pounds.
Since the legal rate of interest has been reduced to five per cent. every
hundred pounds stock is supposed to be taxed at twenty shillings only. The
sum to be raised, by what is called the land tax, was divided between the
country and the principal towns. The greater part of it was laid upon the
country; and of what was laid upon the towns, the greater part was assessed
upon the houses. What remained to be assessed upon the stock or trade of
the towns (for the stock upon the land was not meant to be taxed) was very
much below the real value of that stock or trade. Whatever inequalities,
therefore, there might be in the original assessment, gave little disturbance.
Every parish and district still continues to be rated for its land, its houses,
and its stock, according to the original assessment; and the almost universal
prosperity of the country, which, in most places, has raised very much the
value of all these, has rendered those inequalities of still less importance
now. The rate, too, upon each district, continuing always the same, the
uncertainty of this tax, so far as it might he assessed upon the stock of any
individual, has been very much diminished, as well as rendered of much
less consequence. If the greater part of the lands of England are not rated to
the land tax at half their actual value, the greater part of the stock of
England is, perhaps, scarce rated at the fiftieth part of its actual value. In
some towns, the whole land tax is assessed upon houses; as in Westminster,
where stock and trade are free. It is otherwise in London.
In all countries, a severe inquisition into the circumstances of private
persons has been carefully avoided.
At Hamburg, {Memoires concernant les Droits, tom. i, p.74} every
inhabitant is obliged to pay to the state one fourth per cent. of all that he
possesses; and as the wealth of the people of Hamburg consists principally
in stock, this tax maybe considered as a tax upon stock. Every man assesses
himself, and, in the presence of the magistrate, puts annually into the public
coffer a certain sum of money, which he declares upon oath, to be one
fourth per cent. of all that he possesses, but without declaring what it
amounts to, or being liable to any examination upon that subject. This tax is
generally supposed to be paid with great fidelity. In a small republic, where
the people have entire confidence in their magistrates, are convinced of the
necessity of the tax for the support of the state, and believe that it will be
faithfully applied to that purpose, such conscientious and voluntary
payment may sometimes be expected. It is not peculiar to the people of
Hamburg.
The canton of Underwald, in Switzerland, is frequently ravaged by
storms and inundations, and it is thereby exposed to extraordinary expenses.
Upon such occasions the people assemble, and every one is said to declare
with the greatest frankness what he is worth, in order to be taxed
accordingly. At Zurich, the law orders, that in cases of necessity, every one
should be taxed in proportion to his revenue; the amount of which he is
obliged to declare upon oath. They have no suspicion, it is said, that any of
their fellow citizens will deceive them. At Basil, the principal revenue of
the state arises from a small custom upon goods exported. All the citizens
make oath, that they will pay every three months all the taxes imposed by
law. All merchants, and even all inn-keepers, are trusted with keeping
themselves the account of the goods which they sell, either within or
without the territory. At the end of every three months, they send this
account to the treasurer, with the amount of the tax computed at the bottom
of it. It is not suspected that the revenue suffers by this confidence.
{Memoires concernant les Droits, tom. i p. 163, 167,171.}
To oblige every citizen to declare publicly upon oath, the amount of his
fortune, must not, it seems, in those Swiss cantons, be reckoned a hardship.
At Hamburg it would be reckoned the greatest. Merchants engaged in the
hazardous projects of trade, all tremble at the thoughts of being obliged, at
all times, to expose the real state of their circumstances. The ruin of their
credit, and the miscarriage of their projects, they foresee, would too often
be the consequence. A sober and parsimonious people, who are strangers to
all such projects, do not feel that they have occasion for any such
concealment.
In Holland, soon after the exaltation of the late prince of Orange to the
stadtholdership, a tax of two per cent. or the fiftieth penny, as it was called,
was imposed upon the whole substance of every citizen. Every citizen
assesed himself, and paid his tax, in the same manner as at Hamburg, and it
was in general supposed to have been paid with great fidelity. The people
had at that time the greatest affection for their new government, which they
had just established by a general insurrection. The tax was to be paid but
once, in order to relieve the state in a particular exigency. It was, indeed, too
heavy to be permanent. In a country where the market rate of interest
seldom exceeds three per cent., a tax of two per cent. amounts to thirteen
shillings and four pence in the pound, upon the highest neat revenue which
is commonly drawn from stock. It is a tax which very few people could pay,
without encroaching more or less upon their capitals. In a particular
exigency, the people may, from great public zeal, make a great effort, and
give up even a part of their capital, in order to relieve the state. But it is
impossible that they should continue to do so for any considerable time; and
if they did, the tax would soon ruin them so completely, as to render them
altogether incapable of supporting the state.
The tax upon stock, imposed by the land tax bill in England, though it is
proportioned to the capital, is not intended to diminish or, take away any
part of that capital. It is meant only to be a tax upon the interest of money,
proportioned to that upon the rent of land; so that when the latter is at four
shillings in the pound, the former may be at four shillings in the pound too.
The tax at Hamburg, and the still more moderate taxes of Underwald and
Zurich, are meant, in the same manner, to be taxes, not upon the capital, but
upon the interest or neat revenue of stock. That of Holland was meant to be
a tax upon the capital.
Taxes upon the Profit of particular Employments.
In some countries, extraordinary taxes are imposed upon the profits of
stock; sometimes when employed in particular branches of trade, and
sometimes when employed in agriculture.
Of the former kind, are in England, the tax upon hawkers and pedlars,
that upon hackney-coaches and chairs, and that which the keepers of ale-
houses pay for a licence to retail ale and spiritous liquors. During the late
war, another tax of the same kind was proposed upon shops. The war
having been undertaken, it was said, in defence of the trade of the country,
the merchants, who were to profit by it, ought to contribute towards the
support of it.
A tax, however, upon the profits of stock employed in any particular
branch of trade, can never fall finally upon the dealers (who must in all
ordinary cases have their reasonable profit, and, where the competition is
free, can seldom have more than that profit), but always upon the
consumers, who must be obliged to pay in the price of the goods the tax
which the dealer advances; and generally with some overcharge.
A tax of this kind, when it is proportioned to the trade of the dealer, is
finally paid by the consumer, and occasions no oppression to the dealer.
When it is not so proportioned, but is the same upon all dealers, though in
this case, too, it is finally paid by the consumer, yet it favours the great, and
occasions some oppression to the small dealer. The tax of five shillings a-
week upon every hackney coach, and that of ten shillings a-year upon every
hackney chair, so far as it is advanced by the different keepers of such
coaches and chairs, is exactly enough proportioned to the extent of their
respective dealings. It neither favours the great, nor oppresses the smaller
dealer. The tax of twenty shillings a-year for a licence to sell ale; of forty
shillings for a licence to sell spiritous liquors; and of forty shillings more
for a licence to sell wine, being the same upon all retailers, must necessarily
give some advantage to the great, and occasion some oppression to the
small dealers. The former must find it more easy to get back the tax in the
price of their goods than the latter. The moderation of the tax, however,
renders this inequality of less importance; and it may to many people
appear not improper to give some discouragement to the multiplication of
little ale-houses. The tax upon shops, it was intended, should be the same
upon all shops. It could not well have been otherwise. It would have been
impossible to proportion, with tolerable exactness, the tax upon a shop to
the extent of the trade carried on in it, without such an inquisition as would
have been altogether insupportable in a free country. If the tax had been
considerable, it would have oppressed the small, and forced almost the
whole retail trade into the hands of the great dealers. The competition of the
former being taken away, the latter would have enjoyed a monopoly of the
trade; and, like all other monopolists, would soon have combined to raise
their profits much beyond what was necessary for the payment of the tax.
The final payment, instead of falling upon the shop-keeper, would have
fallen upon the consumer, with a considerable overcharge to the profit of
the shop-keeper. For these reasons, the project of a tax upon shops was laid
aside, and in the room of it was substituted the subsidy, 1759.
What in France is called the personal taille, is perhaps, the most
important tax upon the profits of stock employed in agriculture, that is
levied in any part of Europe.
In the disorderly state of Europe, during the prevalence of the feudal
government, the sovereign was obliged to content himself with taxing those
who were too weak to refuse to pay taxes. The great lords, though willing to
assist him upon particular emergencies, refused to subject themselves to any
constant tax, and he was not strong enough to force them. The occupiers of
land all over Europe were, the greater part of them, originally bond-men.
Through the greater part of Europe, they were gradually emancipated. Some
of them acquired the property of landed estates, which they held by some
base or ignoble tenure, sometimes under the king, and sometimes under
some other great lord, like the ancient copy-holders of England. Others,
without acquiring the property, obtained leases for terms of years, of the
lands which they occupied under their lord, and thus became less dependent
upon him. The great lords seem to have beheld the degree of prosperity and
independency, which this inferior order of men had thus come to enjoy, with
a malignant and contemptuous indignation, and willingly consented that the
sovereign should tax them. In some countries, this tax was confined to the
lands which were held in property by an ignoble tenure; and, in this case,
the taille was said to be real. The land tax established by the late king of
Sardinia, and the taille in the provinces of Languedoc, Provence, Dauphine,
and Britanny; in the generality of Montauban, and in the elections of Agen
and Condom, as well as in some other districts of France; are taxes upon
lands held in property by an ignoble tenure. In other countries, the tax was
laid upon the supposed profits of all those who held, in farm or lease, lands
belonging to other people, whatever might be the tenure by which the
proprietor held them; and in this case, the taille was said to be personal. In
the greater part of those provinces of France, which are called the countries
of elections, the taille is of this kind. The real taille, as it is imposed only
upon a part of the lands of the country, is necessarily an unequal, but it is
not always an arbitrary tax, though it is so upon some occasions. The
personal taille, as it is intended to be proportioned to the profits of a certain
class of people, which can only be guessed at, is necessarily both arbitrary
and unequal.
In France, the personal taille at present (1775) annually imposed upon the
twenty generalities, called the countries of elections, amounts to 40,107,239
livres, 16 sous. {Memoires concernant les Droits, etc tom. ii, p.17.} the
proportion in which this sum is assessed upon those different provinces,
varies from year to year, according to the reports which are made to the
king’s council concerning the goodness or badness of the crops, as well as
other circumstances, which may either increase or diminish their respective
abilities to pay. Each generality is divided into a certain number of
elections; and the proportion in which the sum imposed upon the whole
generality is divided among those different elections, varies likewise from
year to year, according to the reports made to the council concerning their
respective abilities. It seems impossible, that the council, with the best
intentions, can ever proportion, with tolerable exactness, either of these two
assessments to the real abilities of the province or district upon which they
are respectively laid. Ignorance and misinformation must always, more or
less, mislead the most upright council. The proportion which each parish
ought to support of what is assessed upon the whole election, and that
which each individual ought to support of what is assessed upon his
particular parish, are both in the same manner varied from year to year,
according as circumstances are supposed to require. These circumstances
are judged of, in the one case, by the officers of the election, in the other, by
those of the parish; and both the one and the other are, more or less, under
the direction and influence of the intendant. Not only ignorance and
misinformation, but friendship, party animosity, and private resentment, are
said frequently to mislead such assessors. No man subject to such a tax, it is
evident, can ever be certain, before he is assessed, of what he is to pay. He
cannot even be certain after he is assessed. If any person has been taxed
who ought to have been exempted, or if any person has been taxed beyond
his proportion, though both must pay in the mean time, yet if they
complain, and make good their complaints, the whole parish is reimposed
next year, in order to reimburse them. If any of the contributors become
bankrupt or insolvent, the collector is obliged to advance his tax; and the
whole parish is reimposed next year, in order to reimburse the collector. If
the collector himself should become bankrupt, the parish which elects him
must answer for his conduct to the receiver-general of the election. But, as
it might be troublesome for the receiver to prosecute the whole parish, he
takes at his choice five or six of the richest contributors, and obliges them to
make good what had been lost by the insolvency of the collector. The parish
is afterwards reimposed, in order to reimburse those five or six. Such
reimpositions are always over and above the taille of the particular year in
which they are laid on.
When a tax is imposed upon the profits of stock in a particular branch of
trade, the traders are all careful to bring no more goods to market than what
they can sell at a price sufficient to reimburse them from advancing the tax.
Some of them withdraw a part of their stocks from the trade, and the market
is more sparingly supplied than before. The price of the goods rises, and the
final payment of the tax falls upon the consumer. But when a tax is imposed
upon the profits of stock employed in agriculture, it is not the interest of the
farmers to withdraw any part of their stock from that employment. Each
farmer occupies a certain quantity of land, for which he pays rent. For the
proper cultivation of this land, a certain quantity of stock is necessary; and
by withdrawing any part of this necessary quantity, the farmer is not likely
to be more able to pay either the rent or the tax. In order to pay the tax, it
can never be his interest to diminish the quantity of his produce, nor
consequently to supply the market more sparingly than before. The tax,
therefore, will never enable him to raise the price of his produce, so as to
reimburse himself, by throwing the final payment upon the consumer. The
farmer, however, must have his reasonable profit as well as every other
dealer, otherwise he must give up the trade. After the imposition of a tax of
this kind, he can get this reasonable profit only by paying less rent to the
landlord. The more he is obliged to pay in the way of tax, the less he can
afford to pay in the way of rent. A tax of this kind, imposed during the
currency of a lease, may, no doubt, distress or ruin the farmer. Upon the
renewal of the lease, it must always fall upon the landlord.
In the countries where the personal taille takes place, the farmer is
commonly assessed in proportion to the stock which he appears to employ
in cultivation. He is, upon this account, frequently afraid to have a good
team of horses or oxen, but endeavours to cultivate with the meanest and
most wretched instruments of husbandry that he can. Such is his distrust in
the justice of his assessors, that he counterfeits poverty, and wishes to
appear scarce able to pay anything, for fear of being obliged to pay too
much. By this miserable policy, he does not, perhaps, always consult his
own interest in the most effectual manner; and he probably loses more by
the diminution of his produce, than he saves by that of his tax. Though, in
consequence of this wretched cultivation, the market is, no doubt,
somewhat worse supplied; yet the small rise of price which this may
occasion, as it is not likely even to indemnify the farmer for the diminution
of his produce, it is still less likely to enable him to pay more rent to the
landlord. The public, the farmer, the landlord, all suffer more or less by this
degraded cultivation. That the personal taille tends, in many different ways,
to discourage cultivation, and consequently to dry up the principal source of
the wealth of every great country, I have already had occasion to observe in
the third book of this Inquiry.
What are called poll-taxes in the southern provinces of North America,
and the West India islands, annual taxes of so much a-head upon every
negro, are properly taxes upon the profits of a certain species of stock
employed in agriculture. As the planters, are the greater part of them, both
farmers and landlords, the final payment of the tax falls upon them in their
quality of landlords, without any retribution.
Taxes of so much a head upon the bondmen employed in cultivation,
seem anciently to have been common all over Europe. There subsists at
present a tax of this kind in the empire of Russia. It is probably upon this
account that poll-taxes of all kinds have often been represented as badges of
slavery. Every tax, however, is, to the person who pays it, a badge, not of
slavery, but of liberty. It denotes that he is subject to government, indeed;
but that, as he has some property, he cannot himself be the property of a
master. A poll tax upon slaves is altogether different from a poll-tax upon
freemen. The latter is paid by the persons upon whom it is imposed; the
former, by a different set of persons. The latter is either altogether arbitrary,
or altogether unequal, and, in most cases, is both the one and the other; the
former, though in some respects unequal, different slaves being of different
values, is in no respect arbitrary. Every master, who knows the number of
his own slaves, knows exactly what he has to pay. Those different taxes,
however, being called by the same name, have been considered as of the
same nature.
The taxes which in Holland are imposed upon men and maid servants,
are taxes, not upon stock, but upon expense; and so far resemble the taxes
upon consumable commodities. The tax of a guinea a-head for every man-
servant, which has lately been imposed in Great Britain, is of the same kind.
It falls heaviest upon the middling rank. A man of two hundred a-year may
keep a single man-servant. A man of ten thousand a-year will not keep fifty.
It does not affect the poor.
Taxes upon the profits of stock, in particular employments, can never
affect the interest of money. Nobody will lend his money for less interest to
those who exercise the taxed, than to those who exercise the untaxed
employments. Taxes upon the revenue arising from stock in all
employments, where the government attempts to levy them with any degree
of exactness, will, in many cases, fall upon the interest of money. The
vingtieme, or twentieth penny, in France, is a tax of the same kind with
what is called the land tax in England, and is assessed, in the same manner,
upon the revenue arising upon land, houses, and stock. So far as it affects
stock, it is assessed, though not with great rigour, yet with much more
exactness than that part of the land tax in England which is imposed upon
the same fund. It, in many cases, falls altogether upon the interest of money.
Money is frequently sunk in France, upon what are called contracts for the
constitution of a rent; that is, perpetual annuities, redeemable at any time by
the debtor, upon payment of the sum originally advanced, but of which this
redemption is not exigible by the creditor except in particular cases. The
vingtieme seems not to have raised the rate of those annuities, though it is
exactly levied upon them all.
APPENDIX TO ARTICLES I. AND II.—Taxes upon the Capital
Value of Lands, Houses, and Stock.
While property remains in the possession of the same person, whatever
permanent taxes may have been imposed upon it, they have never been
intended to diminish or take away any part of its capital value, but only
some part of the revenue arising from it. But when property changes hands,
when it is transmitted either from the dead to the living, or from the living
to the living, such taxes have frequently been imposed upon it as
necessarily take away some part of its capital value.
The transference of all sorts of property from the dead to the living, and
that of immoveable property of land and houses from the living to the
living, are transactions which are in their nature either public and notorious,
or such as cannot be long concealed. Such transactions, therefore, may be
taxed directly. The transference of stock or moveable property, from the
living to the living, by the lending of money, is frequently a secret
transaction, and may always be made so. It cannot easily, therefore, be
taxed directly. It has been taxed indirectly in two different ways; first, by
requiring that the deed, containing the obligation to repay, should be written
upon paper or parchment which had paid a certain stamp duty, otherwise
not to be valid; secondly, by requiring, under the like penalty of invalidity,
that it should be recorded either in a public or secret register, and by
imposing certain duties upon such registration. Stamp duties, and duties of
registration, have frequently been imposed likewise upon the deeds
transferring property of all kinds from the dead to the living, and upon those
transferring immoveable property from the living to the living; transactions
which might easily have been taxed directly.
The vicesima hereditatum, or the twentieth penny of inheritances,
imposed by Augustus upon the ancient Romans, was a tax upon the
transference of property from the dead to the living. Dion Cassius, { Lib.
55. See also Burman. de Vectigalibus Pop. Rom. cap. xi. and Bouchaud de
l’impot du vingtieme sur les successions.} the author who writes
concerning it the least indistinctly, says, that it was imposed upon all
successions, legacies and donations, in case of death, except upon those to
the nearest relations, and to the poor.
Of the same kind is the Dutch tax upon successions. {See Memoires
concernant les Droits, etc. tom i, p. 225.} Collateral successions are taxed
according to the degree of relation, from five to thirty per cent. upon the
whole value of the succession. Testamentary donations, or legacies to
collaterals, are subject to the like duties. Those from husband to wife, or
from wife to husband, to the fiftieth penny. The luctuosa hereditas, the
mournful succession of ascendants to descendants, to the twentieth penny
only. Direct successions, or those of descendants to ascendants, pay no tax.
The death of a father, to such of his children as live in the same house with
him, is seldom attended with any increase, and frequently with a
considerable diminution of revenue; by the loss of his industry, of his office,
or of some life-rent estate, of which he may have been in possession. That
tax would be cruel and oppressive, which aggravated their loss, by taking
from them any part of his succession. It may, however, sometimes be
otherwise with those children, who, in the language of the Roman law, are
said to be emancipated; in that of the Scotch law, to be foris-familiated; that
is, who have received their portion, have got families of their own, and are
supported by funds separate and independent of those of their father.
Whatever part of his succession might come to such children, would be a
real addition to their fortune, and might, therefore, perhaps, without more
inconveniency than what attends all duties of this kind, be liable to some
tax. The casualties of the feudal law were taxes upon the transference of
land, both from the dead to the living, and from the living to the living. In
ancient times, they constituted, in every part of Europe, one of the principal
branches of the revenue of the crown.
The heir of every immediate vassal of the crown paid a certain duty,
generally a year’s rent, upon receiving the investiture of the estate. If the
heir was a minor, the whole rents of the estate, during the continuance of
the minority, devolved to the superior, without any other charge besides the
maintenance of the minor, and the payment of the widow’s dower, when
there happened to be a dowager upon the land. When the minor came to de
of age, another tax, called relief, was still due to the superior, which
generally amounted likewise to a year’s rent. A long minority, which, in the
present times, so frequently disburdens a great estate of all its
incumbrances, and restores the family to their ancient splendour, could in
those times have no such effect. The waste, and not the disincumbrance of
the estate, was the common effect of a long minority.
By a feudal law, the vassal could not alienate without the consent of his
superior, who generally extorted a fine or composition on granting it. This
fine, which was at first arbitrary, came, in many countries, to be regulated at
a certain portion of the price of the land. In some countries, where the
greater part of the other feudal customs have gone into disuse, this tax upon
the alienation of land still continues to make a very considerable branch of
the revenue of the sovereign. In the canton of Berne it is so high as a sixth
part of the price of all noble fiefs, and a tenth part of that of all ignoble
ones. {Memoires concernant les Droits, etc, tom.i p.154} In the canton of
Lucern, the tax upon the sale of land is not universal, and takes place only
in certain districts. But if any person sells his land in order to remove out of
the territory, he pays ten per cent. upon the whole price of the sale. {id.
p.157.} Taxes of the same kind, upon the sale either of all lands, or of lands
held by certain tenures, take place in many other countries, and make a
more or less considerable branch of the revenue of the sovereign.
Such transactions may be taxed indirectly, by means either of stamp
duties, or of duties upon registration; and those duties either may, or may
not, be proportioned to the value of the subject which is transferred.
In Great Britain, the stamp duties are higher or lower, not so much
according to the value of the property transferred (an eighteen-penny or
half-crown stamp being sufficient upon a bond for the largest sum of
money), as according to the nature of the deed. The highest do not exceed
six pounds upon every sheet of paper, or skin of parchment; and these high
duties fall chiefly upon grants from the crown, and upon certain law
proceedings, without any regard to the value of the subject. There are, in
Great Britain, no duties on the registration of deeds or writings, except the
fees of the officers who keep the register; and these are seldom more than a
reasonable recompence for their labour. The crown derives no revenue from
them.
In Holland {Memoires concernant les Droits, etc. tom. i. p 223, 224,
225.} there are both stamp duties and duties upon registration; which in
some cases are, and in some are not, proportioned to the value of the
property transferred. All testaments must be written upon stamped paper, of
which the price is proportioned to the property disposed of; so that there are
stamps which cost from three pence or three stivers a-sheet, to three
hundred florins, equal to about twenty-seven pounds ten shillings of our
money. If the stamp is of an inferior price to what the testator ought to have
made use of, his succession is confiscated. This is over and above all their
other taxes on succession. Except bills of exchange, and some other
mercantile bills, all other deeds, bonds, and contracts, are subject to a stamp
duty. This duty, however, does not rise in proportion to the value of the
subject. All sales of land and of houses, and all mortgages upon either, must
be registered, and, upon registration, pay a duty to the state of two and a-
half per cent. upon the amount of the price or of the mortgage. This duty is
extended to the sale of all ships and vessels of more than two tons burden,
whether decked or undecked. These, it seems, are considered as a sort of
houses upon the water. The sale of moveables, when it is ordered by a court
of justice, is subject to the like duty of two and a-half per cent.
In France, there are both stamp duties and duties upon registration. The
former are considered as a branch of the aids of excise, and, in the
provinces where those duties take place, are levied by the excise officers.
The latter are considered as a branch of the domain of the crown and are
levied by a different set of officers.
Those modes of taxation by stamp duties and by duties upon registration,
are of very modern invention. In the course of little more than a century,
however, stamp duties have, in Europe, become almost universal, and duties
upon registration extremely common. There is no art which one government
sooner learns of another, than that of draining money from the pockets of
the people.
Taxes upon the transference of property from the dead to the living, fall
finally, as well as immediately, upon the persons to whom the property is
transferred. Taxes upon the sale of land fall altogether upon the seller. The
seller is almost always under the necessity of selling, and must, therefore,
take such a price as he can get. The buyer is scarce ever under the necessity
of buying, and will, therefore, only give such a price as he likes. He
considers what the land will cost him, in tax and price together. The more
he is obliged to pay in the way of tax, the less he will be disposed to give in
the way of price. Such taxes, therefore, fall almost always upon a
necessitous person, and must, therefore, be frequently very cruel and
oppressive. Taxes upon the sale of new-built houses, where the building is
sold without the ground, fall generally upon the buyer, because the builder
must generally have his profit; otherwise he must give up the trade. If he
advances the tax, therefore, the buyer must generally repay it to him. Taxes
upon the sale of old houses, for the same reason as those upon the sale of
land, fall generally upon the seller; whom, in most cases, either
conveniency or necessity obliges to sell. The number of new-built houses
that are annually brought to market, is more or less regulated by the
demand. Unless the demand is such as to afford the builder his profit, after
paying all expenses, he will build no more houses. The number of old
houses which happen at any time to come to market, is regulated by
accidents, of which the greater part have no relation to the demand. Two or
three great bankruptcies in a mercantile town, will bring many houses to
sale, which must be sold for what can be got for them. Taxes upon the sale
of ground-rents fall altogether upon the seller, for the same reason as those
upon the sale of lands. Stamp duties, and duties upon the registration of
bonds and contracts for borrowed money, fall altogether upon the borrower,
and, in fact, are always paid by him. Duties of the same kind upon law
proceedings fall upon the suitors. They reduce to both the capital value of
the subject in dispute. The more it costs to acquire any property, the less
must be the neat value of it when acquired.
All taxes upon the transference of property of every kind, so far as they
diminish the capital value of that property, tend to diminish the funds
destined for the maintenance of productive labour. They are all more or less
unthrifty taxes that increase the revenue of the sovereign, which seldom
maintains any but unproductive labourers, at the expense of the capital of
the people, which maintains none but productive.
Such taxes, even when they are proportioned to the value of the property
transferred, are still unequal; the frequency of transference not being always
equal in property of equal value. When they are not proportioned to this
value, which is the case with the greater part of the stamp duties and duties
of registration, they are still more so. They are in no respect arbitrary, but
are, or may be, in all cases, perfectly clear and certain. Though they
sometimes fall upon the person who is not very able to pay, the time of
payment is, in most cases, sufficiently convenient for him. When the
payment becomes due, he must, in most cases, have the more to pay. They
are levied at very little expense, and in general subject the contributors to
no other inconveniency, besides always the unavoidable one of paying the
tax. In France, the stamp duties are not much complained of. Those of
registration, which they call the Controle, are. They give occasion, it is
pretended, to much extortion in the officers of the farmers-general who
collect the tax, which is in a great measure arbitrary and uncertain. In the
greater part of the libels which have been written against the present system
of finances in France, the abuses of the controle make a principal article.
Uncertainty, however, does not seem to be necessarily inherent in the nature
of such taxes. If the popular complaints are well founded, the abuse must
arise, not so much from the nature of the tax as from the want of precision
and distinctness in the words of the edicts or laws which impose it.
The registration of mortgages, and in general of all rights upon
immoveable property, as it gives great security both to creditors and
purchasers, is extremely advantageous to the public. That of the greater part
of deeds of other kinds, is frequently inconvenient and even dangerous to
individuals, without any advantage to the public. All registers which, it is
acknowledged, ought to be kept secret, ought certainly never to exist. The
credit of individuals ought certainly never to depend upon so very slender a
security, as the probity and religion of the inferior officers of revenue. But
where the fees of registration have been made a source of revenue to the
sovereign, register-offices have commonly been multiplied without end,
both for the deeds which ought to be registered, and for those which ought
not. In France there are several different sorts of secret registers. This
abuse, though not perhaps a necessary, it must be acknowledged, is a very
natural effect of such taxes.
Such stamp duties as those in England upon cards and dice, upon
newspapers and periodical pamphlets, etc. are properly taxes upon
consumption; the final payment falls upon the persons who use or consume
such commodities. Such stamp duties as those upon licences to retail ale,
wine, and spiritous liquors, though intended, perhaps, to fall upon the
profits of the retailers, are likewise finally paid by the consumers of those
liquors. Such taxes, though called by the same name, and levied by the
same officers, and in the same manner with the stamp duties above
mentioned upon the transference of property, are, however, of a quite
different nature, and fall upon quite different funds.
ARTICLE III.—Taxes upon the Wages of Labour.
The wages of the inferior classes of work men, I have endeavoured to
show in the first book are everywhere necessarily regulated by two different
circumstances; the demand for labour, and the ordinary or average price of
provisions. The demand for labour, according as it happens to be either
increasing stationary or declining; or to require an increasing, stationary, or
declining population, regulates the subsistence of the labourer, and
determines in what degree it shall be either liberal, moderate, or scanty. The
ordinary average price of provisions determines the quantity of money
which must be paid to the workman, in order to enable him, one year with
another, to purchase this liberal, moderate, or scanty subsistence. While the
demand for the labour and the price of provisions, therefore, remain the
same, a direct tax upon the wages of labour can have no other effect, than to
raise them somewhat higher than the tax. Let us suppose, for example, that,
in a particular place, the demand for labour and the price of provisions were
such as to render ten shillings a-week the ordinary wages of labour; and that
a tax of one-fifth, or four shillings in the pound, was imposed upon wages.
If the demand for labour and the price of provisions remained the same, it
would still be necessary that the labourer should, in that place, earn such a
subsistence as could be bought only for ten shillings a-week; so that, after
paying the tax, he should have ten shillings a-week free wages. But, in
order to leave him such free wages, after paying such a tax, the price of
labour must, in that place, soon rise, not to twelve shillings a week only, but
to twelve and sixpence; that is, in order to enable him to pay a tax of one-
fifth, his wages must necessarily soon rise, not one-fifth part only, but one-
fourth. Whatever was the proportion of the tax, the wages of labour must, in
all cases rise, not only in that proportion, but in a higher proportion. If the
tax for example, was one-tenth, the wages of labour must necessarily soon
rise, not one-tenth part only, but one-eighth.
A direct tax upon the wages of labour, therefore, though the labourer
might, perhaps, pay it out of his hand, could not properly be said to be even
advanced by him; at least if the demand for labour and the average price of
provisions remained the same after the tax as before it. In all such cases, not
only the tax, but something more than the tax, would in reality be advanced
by the person who immediately employed him. The final payment would, in
different cases, fall upon different persons. The rise which such a tax might
occasion in the wages of manufacturing labour would be advanced by the
master manufacturer, who would both be entitled and obliged to charge it,
with a profit, upon the price of his goods. The final payment of this rise of
wages, therefore, together with the additional profit of the master
manufacturer would fall upon the consumer. The rise which such a tax
might occasion in the wages of country labour would be advanced by the
farmer, who, in order to maintain the same number of labourers as before,
would be obliged to employ a greater capital. In order to get back this
greater capital, together with the ordinary profits of stock, it would be
necessary that he should retain a larger portion, or, what comes to the same
thing, the price of a larger portion, of the produce of the land, and,
consequently, that he should pay less rent to the landlord. The final payment
of this rise of wages, therefore, would, in this case, fall upon the landlord,
together with the additional profit of the farmer who had advanced it. In all
cases, a direct tax upon the wages of labour must, in the long-run, occasion
both a greater reduction in the rent of land, and a greater rise in the price of
manufactured goods than would have followed from the proper assessment
of a sum equal to the produce of the tax, partly upon the rent of land, and
partly upon consumable commodities.
If direct taxes upon the wages of labour have not always occasioned a
proportionable rise in those wages, it is because they have generally
occasioned a considerable fall in the demand of labour. The declension of
industry, the decrease of employment for the poor, the diminution of the
annual produce of the land and labour of the country, have generally been
the effects of such taxes. In consequence of them, however, the price of
labour must always be higher than it otherwise would have been in the
actual state of the demand; and this enhancement of price, together with the
profit of those who advance it, must always be finally paid by the landlords
and consumers.
A tax upon the wages of country labour does not raise the price of the
rude produce of land in proportion to the tax; for the same reason that a tax
upon the farmer’s profit does not raise that price in that proportion.
Absurd and destructive as such taxes are, however, they take place in
many countries. In France, that part of the taille which is charged upon the
industry of workmen and day-labourers in country villages, is properly a tax
of this kind. Their wages are computed according to the common rate of the
district in which they reside; and, that they may be as little liable as possible
to any overcharge, their yearly gains are estimated at no more than two
hundred working days in the year. {Memoires concernant les Droits, etc.
tom. ii. p. 108.} The tax of each individual is varied from year to year,
according to different circumstances, of which the collector or the
commissary, whom intendant appoints to assist him, are the judges. In
Bohemia, in consequence of the alteration in the system of finances which
was begun in 1748, a very heavy tax is imposed upon the industry of
artificers. They are divided into four classes. The highest class pay a
hundred florins a year, which, at two-and-twenty pence half penny a-florin,
amounts to £9:7:6. The second class are taxed at seventy; the third at fifty;
and the fourth, comprehending artificers in villages, and the lowest class of
those in towns, at twenty-five florins. {Memoires concemant les Droits, etc.
tom. iii. p. 87.}
The recompence of ingenious artists, and of men of liberal professions, I
have endeavoured to show in the first book, necessarily keeps a certain
proportion to the emoluments of inferior trades. A tax upon this
recompence, therefore, could have no other effect than to raise it somewhat
higher than in proportion to the tax. If it did not rise in this manner, the
ingenious arts and the liberal professions, being; no longer upon a level
with other trades, would be so much deserted, that they would soon return
to that level.
The emoluments of offices are not, like those of trades and professions,
regulated by the free competition of the market, and do not, therefore,
always bear a just proportion to what the nature of the employment
requires. They are, perhaps, in most countries, higher than it requires; the
persons who have the administration of government being generally
disposed to regard both themselves and their immediate dependents, rather
more than enough. The emoluments of offices, therefore, can, in most cases,
very well bear to be taxed. The persons, besides, who enjoy public offices,
especially the more lucrative, are, in all countries, the objects of general
envy; and a tax upon their emoluments, even though it should be somewhat
higher than upon any other sort of revenue, is always a very popular tax. In
England, for example, when, by the land-tax, every other sort of revenue
was supposed to be assessed at four shillings in the pound, it was very
popular to lay a real tax of five shillings and sixpence in the pound upon the
salaries of offices which exceeded a hundred pounds a-year; the pensions of
the younger branches of the royal family, the pay of the officers of the army
and navy, and a few others less obnoxious to envy, excepted. There are in
England no other direct taxes upon the wages of labour.
ARTICLE IV.—Taxes which it is intended should fall indifferently upon
every different Species of Revenue.
The taxes which it is intended should fall indifferently upon every
different species of revenue, are capitation taxes, and taxes upon
consumable commodities. Those must be paid indifferently, from whatever
revenue the contributors may possess; from the rent of their land, from the
profits of their stock, or from the wages of their labour.
Capitation Taxes.
Capitation taxes, if it is attempted to proportion them to the fortune or
revenue of each contributor, become altogether arbitrary. The state of a
man’s fortune varies from day to day; and, without an inquisition, more
intolerable than any tax, and renewed at least once every year, can only be
guessed at. His assessment, therefore, must, in most cases, depend upon the
good or bad humour of his assessors, and must, therefore, be altogether
arbitrary and uncertain.
Capitation taxes, if they are proportioned, not to the supposed fortune,
but to the rank of each contributor, become altogether unequal; the degrees
of fortune being frequently unequal in the same degree of rank.
Such taxes, therefore, if it is attempted to render them equal, become
altogether arbitrary and uncertain; and if it is attempted to render them
certain and not arbitrary, become altogether unequal. Let the tax be light or
heavy, uncertainty is always a great grievance. In a light tax, a considerable
degree of inequality may be supported; in a heavy one, it is altogether
intolerable.
In the different poll-taxes which took place in England during the reign
of William III. the contributors were, the greater part of them, assessed
according to the degree of their rank; as dukes, marquises, earls, viscounts,
barons, esquires, gentlemen, the eldest and youngest sons of peers, etc. All
shop-keepers and tradesmen worth more than three hundred pounds, that is,
the better sort of them, were subject to the same assessment, how great
soever might be the difference in their fortunes. Their rank was more
considered than their fortune. Several of those who, in the first poll-tax,
were rated according to their supposed fortune were afterwards rated
according to their rank. Serjeants, attorneys, and proctors at law, who, in the
first poll-tax, were assessed at three shillings in the pound of their supposed
income, were afterwards assessed as gentlemen. In the assessment of a tax
which was not very heavy, a considerable degree of inequality had been
found less insupportable than any degree of uncertainty.
In the capitation which has been levied in France, without-any
interruption, since the beginning of the present century, the highest orders
of people are rated according to their rank, by an invariable tariff; the lower
orders of people, according to what is supposed to be their fortune, by an
assessment which varies from year to year. The officers of the king’s court,
the judges, and other officers in the superior courts of justice, the officers of
the troops, etc are assessed in the first manner. The inferior ranks of people
in the provinces are assessed in the second. In France, the great easily
submit to a considerable degree of inequality in a tax which, so far as it
affects them, is not a very heavy one; but could not brook the arbitrary
assessment of an intendant.
The inferior ranks of people must, in that country, suffer patiently the
usage which their superiors think proper to give them.
In England, the different poll-taxes never produced the sum which had
been expected from them, or which it was supposed they might have
produced, had they been exactly levied. In France, the capitation always
produces the sum expected from it. The mild government of England, when
it assessed the different ranks of people to the poll-tax, contented itself with
what that assessment happened to produce, and required no compensation
for the loss which the state might sustain, either by those who could not
pay, or by those who would not pay (for there were many such), and who,
by the indulgent execution of the law, were not forced to pay. The more
severe government of France assesses upon each generality a certain sum,
which the intendant must find as he can. If any province complains of being
assessed too high, it may, in the assessment of next year, obtain an
abatement proportioned to the overcharge of the year before; but it must pay
in the mean time. The intendant, in order to be sure of finding the sum
assessed upon his generality, was empowered to assess it in a larger sum,
that the failure or inability of some of the contributors might be
compensated by the overcharge of the rest; and till 1765, the fixation of this
surplus assessment was left altogether to his discretion. In that year, indeed,
the council assumed this power to itself. In the capitation of the provinces,
it is observed by the perfectly well informed author of the Memoirs upon
the Impositions in France, the proportion which falls upon the nobility, and
upon those whose privileges exempt them from the taille, is the least
considerable. The largest falls upon those subject to the taille, who are
assessed to the capitation at so much a-pound of what they pay to that other
tax. Capitation taxes, so far as they are levied upon the lower ranks of
people, are direct taxes upon the wages of labour, and are attended with all
the inconveniencies of such taxes.
Capitation taxes are levied at little expense; and, where they are
rigorously exacted, afford a very sure revenue to the state. It is upon this
account that, in countries where the case, comfort, and security of the
inferior ranks of people are little attended to, capitation taxes are very
common. It is in general, however, but a small part of the public revenue,
which, in a great empire, has ever been drawn from such taxes; and the
greatest sum which they have ever afforded, might always have been found
in some other way much more convenient to the people.
Taxes upon Consumable Commodities.
The impossibility of taxing the people, in proportion to their revenue, by
any capitation, seems to have given occasion to the invention of taxes upon
consumable commodities. The state not knowing how to tax, directly and
proportionably, the revenue of its subjects, endeavours to tax it indirectly by
taxing their expense, which, it is supposed, will, in most cases, be nearly in
proportion to their revenue. Their expense is taxed, by taxing the
consumable commodities upon which it is laid out.
Consumable commodities are either necessaries or luxuries.
By necessaries I understand, not only the commodities which are
indispensibly necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of
the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest
order, to be without. A linen shirt, for example, is, strictly speaking, not a
necessary of life. The Greeks and Romans lived, I suppose, very
comfortably, though they had no linen. But in the present times, through the
greater part of Europe, a creditable day-labourer would be ashamed to
appear in public without a linen shirt, the want of which would be supposed
to denote that disgraceful degree of poverty, which, it is presumed, nobody
can well fall into without extreme bad conduct. Custom, in the same
manner, has rendered leather shoes a necessary of life in England. The
poorest creditable person, of either sex, would be ashamed to appear in
public without them. In Scotland, custom has rendered them a necessary of
life to the lowest order of men; but not to the same order of women, who
may, without any discredit, walk about barefooted. In France, they are
necessaries neither to men nor to women; the lowest rank of both sexes
appearing there publicly, without any discredit, sometimes in wooden
shoes, and sometimes barefooted. Under necessaries, therefore, I
comprehend, not only those things which nature, but those things which the
established rules of decency have rendered necessary to the lowest rank of
people. All other things I call luxuries, without meaning, by this
appellation, to throw the smallest degree of reproach upon the temperate
use of them. Beer and ale, for example, in Great Britain, and wine, even in
the wine countries, I call luxuries. A man of any rank may, without any
reproach, abstain totally from tasting such liquors. Nature does not render
them necessary for the support of life; and custom nowhere renders it
indecent to live without them.
As the wages of labour are everywhere regulated, partly by the demand
for it, and partly by the average price of the necessary articles of
subsistence; whatever raises this average price must necessarily raise those
wages; so that the labourer may still be able to purchase that quantity of
those necessary articles which the state of the demand for labour, whether
increasing, stationary, or declining, requires that he should have. {See book
i.chap. 8} A tax upon those articles necessarily raises their price somewhat
higher than the amount of the tax, because the dealer, who advances the tax,
must generally get it back, with a profit. Such a tax must, therefore,
occasion a rise in the wages of labour, proportionable to this rise of price.
It is thus that a tax upon the necessaries of life operates exactly in the
same manner as a direct tax upon the wages of labour. The labourer, though
he may pay it out of his hand, cannot, for any considerable time at least, be
properly said even to advance it. It must always, in the long-run, be
advanced to him by his immediate employer, in the advanced state of
wages. His employer, if he is a manufacturer, will charge upon the price of
his goods the rise of wages, together with a profit, so that the final payment
of the tax, together with this overcharge, will fall upon the consumer. If his
employer is a farmer, the final payment, together with a like overcharge,
will fall upon the rent of the landlord.
It is otherwise with taxes upon what I call luxuries, even upon those of
the poor. The rise in the price of the taxed commodities, will not necessarily
occasion any rise in the wages of labour. A tax upon tobacco, for example,
though a luxury of the poor, as well as of the rich, will not raise wages.
Though it is taxed in England at three times, and in France at fifteen times
its original price, those high duties seem to have no effect upon the wages
of labour. The same thing maybe said of the taxes upon tea and sugar,
which, in England and Holland, have become luxuries of the lowest ranks
of people; and of those upon chocolate, which, in Spain, is said to have
become so.
The different taxes which, in Great Britain, have, in the course of the
present century, been imposed upon spiritous liquors, are not supposed to
have had any effect upon the wages of labour. The rise in the price of porter,
occasioned by an additional tax of three shillings upon the barrel of strong
beer, has not raised the wages of common labour in London. These were
about eighteen pence or twenty pence a-day before the tax, and they are not
more now.
The high price of such commodities does not necessarily diminish the
ability of the inferior ranks of people to bring up families. Upon the sober
and industrious poor, taxes upon such commodities act as sumptuary laws,
and dispose them either to moderate, or to refrain altogether from the use of
superfluities which they can no longer easily afford. Their ability to bring
up families, in consequence of this forced frugality, instead of being
diminished, is frequently, perhaps, increased by the tax. It is the sober and
industrious poor who generally bring up the most numerous families, and
who principally supply the demand for useful labour. All the poor, indeed,
are not sober and industrious; and the dissolute and disorderly might
continue to indulge themselves in the use of such commodities, after this
rise of price, in the same manner as before, without regarding the distress
which this indulgence might bring upon their families. Such disorderly
persons, however, seldom rear up numerous families, their children
generally perishing from neglect, mismanagement, and the scantiness or
unwholesomeness of their food. If by the strength of their constitution, they
survive the hardships to which the bad conduct of their parents exposes
them, yet the example of that bad conduct commonly corrupts their morals;
so that, instead of being useful to society by their industry, they become
public nuisances by their vices and disorders. Through the advanced price
of the luxuries of the poor, therefore, might increase somewhat the distress
of such disorderly families, and thereby diminish somewhat their ability to
bring up children, it would not probably diminish much the useful
population of the country.
Any rise in the average price of necessaries, unless it be compensated by
a proportionable rise in the wages of labour, must necessarily diminish,
more or less, the ability of the poor to bring up numerous families, and,
consequently, to supply the demand for useful labour; whatever may be the
state of that demand, whether increasing, stationary, or declining; or such as
requires an increasing, stationary, or declining population.
Taxes upon luxuries have no tendency to raise the price of any other
commodities, except that of the commodities taxed. Taxes upon necessaries,
by raising the wages of labour, necessarily tend to raise the price of all
manufactures, and consequently to diminish the extent of their sale and
consumption. Taxes upon luxuries are finally paid by the consumers of the
commodities taxed, without any retribution. They fall indifferently upon
every species of revenue, the wages of labour, the profits of stock, and the
rent of land. Taxes upon necessaries, so far as they affect the labouring
poor, are finally paid, partly by landlords, in the diminished rent of their
lands, and partly by rich consumers, whether landlords or others, in the
advanced price of manufactured goods; and always with a considerable
overcharge. The advanced price of such manufactures as are real
necessaries of life, and are destined for the consumption of the poor, of
coarse woollens, for example, must be compensated to the poor by a farther
advancement of their wages. The middling and superior ranks of people, if
they understood their own interest, ought always to oppose all taxes upon
the necessaries of life, as well as all taxes upon the wages of labour. The
final payment of both the one and the other falls altogether upon
themselves, and always with a considerable overcharge. They fall heaviest
upon the landlords, who always pay in a double capacity; in that of
landlords, by the reduction, of their rent; and in that of rich consumers, by
the increase of their expense. The observation of Sir Matthew Decker, that
certain taxes are, in the price of certain goods, sometimes repeated and
accumulated four or five times, is perfectly just with regard to taxes upon
the necessaries of life. In the price of leather, for example, you must pay not
only for the tax upon the leather of your own shoes, but for a part of that
upon those of the shoemaker and the tanner. You must pay, too, for the tax
upon the salt, upon the soap, and upon the candles which those workmen
consume while employed in your service; and for the tax upon the leather,
which the saltmaker, the soap-maker, and the candle-maker consume, while
employed in their service.
In Great Britain, the principal taxes upon the necessaries of life, are those
upon the four commodities just now mentioned, salt, leather, soap, and
candles.
Salt is a very ancient and a very universal subject of taxation. It was
taxed among the Romans, and it is so at present in, I believe, every part of
Europe. The quantity annually consumed by any individual is so small, and
may be purchased so gradually, that nobody, it seems to have been thought,
could feel very sensibly even a pretty heavy tax upon it. It is in England
taxed at three shillings and fourpence a bushel; about three times the
original price of the commodity. In some other countries, the tax is still
higher. Leather is a real necessary of life. The use of linen renders soap
such. In countries where the winter nights are long, candles are a necessary
instrument of trade. Leather and soap are in Great Britain taxed at three
halfpence a-pound; candles at a penny; taxes which, upon the original price
of leather, may amount to about eight or ten per cent.; upon that of soap, to
about twenty or five-and-twenty per cent.; and upon that of candles to about
fourteen or fifteen per cent.; taxes which, though lighter than that upon salt,
are still very heavy. As all those four commodities are real necessaries of
life, such heavy taxes upon them must increase somewhat the expense of
the sober and industrious poor, and must consequently raise more or less the
wages of their labour.
In a country where the winters are so cold as in Great Britain, fuel is,
during that season, in the strictest sense of the word, a necessary of life, not
only for the purpose of dressing victuals, but for the comfortable
subsistence of many different sorts of workmen who work within doors;
and coals are the cheapest of all fuel. The price of fuel has so important an
influence upon that of labour, that all over Great Britain, manufactures have
confined themselves principally to the coal counties; other parts of the
country, on account of the high price of this necessary article, not being able
to work so cheap. In some manufactures, besides, coal is a necessary
instrument of trade; as in those of glass, iron, and all other metals. If a
bounty could in any case be reasonable, it might perhaps be so upon the
transportation of coals from those parts of the country in which they
abound, to those in which they are wanted. But the legislature, instead of a
bounty, has imposed a tax of three shillings and threepence a-ton upon coals
carried coastways; which, upon most sorts of coal, is more than sixty per
cent. of the original price at the coal pit. Coals carried, either by land or by
inland navigation, pay no duty. Where they are naturally cheap, they are
consumed duty free; where they are naturally dear, they are loaded with a
heavy duty.
Such taxes, though they raise the price of subsistence, and consequently
the wages of labour, yet they afford a considerable revenue to government,
which it might not be easy to find in any other way. There may, therefore,
be good reasons for continuing them. The bounty upon the exportation of
corn, so far us it tends, in the actual state of tillage, to raise the price of that
necessary article, produces all the like bad effects; and instead of affording
any revenue, frequently occasions a very great expense to government. The
high duties upon the importation of foreign corn, which, in years of
moderate plenty, amount to a prohibition; and the absolute prohibition of
the importation, either of live cattle, or of salt provisions, which takes place
in the ordinary state of the law, and which, on account of the scarcity, is at
present suspended for a limited time with regard to Ireland and the British
plantations, have all had the bad effects of taxes upon the necessaries of
life, and produce no revenue to government. Nothing seems necessary for
the repeal of such regulations, but to convince the public of the futility of
that system in consequence of which they have been established.
Taxes upon the necessaries of life are much higher in many other
countries than in Great Britain. Duties upon flour and meal when ground at
the mill, and upon bread when baked at the oven, take place in many
countries. In Holland the money-price of the: bread consumed in towns is
supposed to be doubled by means of such taxes. In lieu of a part of them,
the people who live in the country, pay every year so much a-head,
according to the sort of bread they are supposed to consume. Those who
consume wheaten bread pay three guilders fifteen stivers; about six
shillings and ninepence halfpenny. Those, and some other taxes of the same
kind, by raising the price of labour, are said to have ruined the greater part
of the manufactures of Holland {Memoires concernant les Droits, etc. p.
210, 211.}. Similar taxes, though not quite so heavy, take place in the
Milanese, in the states of Genoa, in the duchy of Modena, in the duchies of
Parma, Placentia, and Guastalla, and the Ecclesiastical state. A French
author {Le Reformateur} of some note, has proposed to reform the finances
of his country, by substituting in the room of the greater part of other taxes,
this most ruinous of all taxes. There is nothing so absurd, says Cicero,
which has not sometimes been asserted by some philosophers.
Taxes upon butcher’s meat are still more common than those upon bread.
It may indeed be doubted, whether butcher’s meat is any where a necessary
of life. Grain and other vegetables, with the help of milk, cheese, and butter,
or oil, where butter is not to be had, it is known from experience, can,
without any butcher’s meat, afford the most plentiful, the most wholesome,
the most nourishing, and the most invigorating diet. Decency nowhere
requires that any man should eat butcher’s meat, as it in most places
requires that he should wear a linen shirt or a pair of leather shoes.
Consumable commodities, whether necessaries or luxuries, may be taxed
in two different ways. The consumer may either pay an annual sum on
account of his using or consuming goods of a certain kind; or the goods
may be taxed while they remain in the hands of the dealer, and before they
are delivered to the consumer. The consumable goods which last a
considerable time before they are consumed altogether, are most properly
taxed in the one way; those of which the consumption is either immediate
or more speedy, in the other. The coach-tax and plate tax are examples of
the former method of imposing; the greater part of the other duties of excise
and customs, of the latter.
A coach may, with good management, last ten or twelve years. It might
be taxed, once for all, before it comes out of the hands of the coach-maker.
But it is certainly more convenient for the buyer to pay four pounds a-year
for the privilege of keeping a coach, than to pay all at once forty or forty-
eight pounds additional price to the coach-maker; or a sum equivalent to
what the tax is likely to cost him during the time he uses the same coach. A
service of plate in the same manner, may last more than a century. It is
certainly-easier for the consumer to pay five shillings a-year for every
hundred ounces of plate, near one per cent. of the value, than to redeem this
long annuity at five-and-twenty or thirty years purchase, which would
enhance the price at least five-and-twenty or thirty per cent. The different
taxes which affect houses, are certainly more conveniently paid by
moderate annual payments, than by a heavy tax of equal value upon the first
building or sale of the house.
It was the well-known proposal of Sir Matthew Decker, that all
commodities, even those of which the consumption is either immediate or
speedy, should be taxed in this manner; the dealer advancing nothing, but
the consumer paying a certain annual sum for the licence to consume
certain goods. The object of his scheme was to promote all the different
branches of foreign trade, particularly the carrying trade, by taking away all
duties upon importation and exportation, and thereby enabling the merchant
to employ his whole capital and credit in the purchase of goods and the
freight of ships, no part of either being diverted towards the advancing of
taxes, The project, however, of taxing, in this manner, goods of immediate
or speedy consumption, seems liable to the four following very important
objections. First, the tax would be more unequal, or not so well
proportioned to the expense and consumption of the different contributors,
as in the way in which it is commonly imposed. The taxes upon ale, wine,
and spiritous liquors, which are advanced by the dealers, are finally paid by
the different consumers, exactly in proportion to their respective
consumption. But if the tax were to be paid by purchasing a licence to drink
those liquors, the sober would, in proportion to his consumption, be taxed
much more heavily than the drunken consumer. A family which exercised
great hospitality, would be taxed much more lightly than one who
entertained fewer guests. Secondly, this mode of taxation, by paying for an
annual, half-yearly, or quarterly licence to consume certain goods, would
diminish very much one of the principal conveniences of taxes upon goods
of speedy consumption; the piece-meal payment. In the price of threepence
halfpenny, which is at present paid for a pot of porter, the different taxes
upon malt, hops, and beer, together with the extraordinary profit which the
brewer charges for having advanced than, may perhaps amount to about
three halfpence. If a workman can conveniently spare those three halfpence,
he buys a pot of porter. If he cannot, he contents himself with a pint; and, as
a penny saved is a penny got, he thus gains a farthing by his temperance. He
pays the tax piece-meal, as he can afford to pay it, and when he can afford
to pay it, and every act of payment is perfectly voluntary, and what he can
avoid if he chuses to do so. Thirdly, such taxes would operate less as
sumptuary laws. When the licence was once purchased, whether the
purchaser drunk much or drunk little, his tax would be the same. Fourthly,
if a workman were to pay all at once, by yearly, half-yearly, or quarterly
payments, a tax equal to what he at present pays, with little or no
inconveniency, upon all the different pots and pints of porter which he
drinks in any such period of time, the sum might frequently distress him
very much. This mode of taxation, therefore, it seems evident, could never,
without the most grievous oppression, produce a revenue nearly equal to
what is derived from the present mode without any oppression. In several
countries, however, commodities of an immediate or very speedy
consumption are taxed in this manner. In Holland, people pay so much a-
head for a licence to drink tea. I have already mentioned a tax upon bread,
which, so far as it is consumed in farm houses and country villages, is there
levied in the same manner.
The duties of excise are imposed chiefly upon goods of home produce,
destined for home consumption. They are imposed only upon a few sorts of
goods of the most general use. There can never be any doubt, either
concerning the goods which are subject to those duties, or concerning the
particular duty which each species of goods is subject to. They fall almost
altogether upon what I call luxuries, excepting always the four duties above
mentioned, upon salt, soap, leather, candles, and perhaps that upon green
glass.
The duties of customs are much more ancient than those of excise. They
seem to have been called customs, as denoting customary payments, which
had been in use for time immemorial. They appear to have been originally
considered as taxes upon the profits of merchants. During the barbarous
times of feudal anarchy, merchants, like all the other inhabitants of burghs,
were considered as little better than emancipated bondmen, whose persons
were despised, and whose gains were envied. The great nobility, who had
consented that the king should tallage the profits of their own tenants, were
not unwilling that he should tallage likewise those of an order of men whom
it was much less their interest to protect. In those ignorant times, it was not
understood, that the profits of merchants are a subject not taxable directly;
or that the final payment of all such taxes must fall, with a considerable
overcharge, upon the consumers.
The gains of alien merchants were looked upon more unfavourably than
those of English merchants. It was natural, therefore, that those of the
former should be taxed more heavily than those of the latter. This
distinction between the duties upon aliens and those upon English
merchants, which was begun from ignorance, has been continued front the
spirit of monopoly, or in order to give our own merchants an advantage,
both in the home and in the foreign market.
With this distinction, the ancient duties of customs were imposed equally
upon all sorts of goods, necessaries as well its luxuries, goods exported as
well as goods imported. Why should the dealers in one sort of goods, it
seems to have been thought, be more favoured than those in another? or
why should the merchant exporter be more favoured than the merchant
importer?
The ancient customs were divided into three branches. The first, and,
perhaps, the most ancient of all those duties, was that upon wool and
leather. It seems to have been chiefly or altogether an exportation duty.
When the woollen manufacture came to be established in England, lest the
king should lose any part of his customs upon wool by the exportation of
woollen cloths, a like duty was imposed upon them. The other two branches
were, first, a duty upon wine, which being imposed at so much a-ton, was
called a tonnage; and, secondly, a duty upon all other goods, which being
imposed at so much a-pound of their supposed value, was called a
poundage. In the forty-seventh year of Edward III., a duty of sixpence in the
pound was imposed upon all goods exported and imported, except wools,
wool-felts, leather, and wines which were subject to particular duties. In the
fourteenth of Richard II., this duty was raised to one shilling in the pound;
but, three years afterwards, it was again reduced to sixpence. It was raised
to eightpence in the second year of Henry IV.; and, in the fourth of the same
prince, to one shilling. From this time to the ninth year of William III., this
duty continued at one shilling in the pound. The duties of tonnage and
poundage were generally granted to the king by one and the same act of
parliament, and were called the subsidy of tonnage and poundage. The
subsidy of poundage having continued for so long a time at one shilling in
the pound, or at five per cent., a subsidy came, in the language of the
customs, to denote a general duty of this kind of five per cent. This subsidy,
which is now called the old subsidy, still continues to be levied, according
to the book of rates established by the twelfth of Charles II. The method of
ascertaining, by a book of rates, the value of goods subject to this duty, is
said to be older than the time of James I. The new subsidy, imposed by the
ninth and tenth of William III., was an additional five per cent. upon the
greater part of goods. The one-third and the two-third subsidy made up
between them another five per cent. of which they were proportionable
parts. The subsidy of 1747 made a fourth five per cent. upon the greater part
of goods; and that of 1759, a fifth upon some particular sorts of goods.
Besides those five subsidies, a great variety of other duties have
occasionally been imposed upon particular sorts of goods, in order
sometimes to relieve the exigencies of the state, and sometimes to regulate
the trade of the country, according to the principles of the mercantile
system.
That system has come gradually more and more into fashion. The old
subsidy was imposed indifferently upon exportation, as well as importation.
The four subsequent subsidies, as well as the other duties which have since
been occasionally imposed upon particular sorts of goods, have, with a few
exceptions, been laid altogether upon importation. The greater part of the
ancient duties which had been imposed upon the exportation of the goods of
home produce and manufacture, have either been lightened or taken away
altogether. In most cases, they have been taken away. Bounties have even
been given upon the exportation of some of them. Drawbacks, too,
sometimes of the whole, and, in most cases, of a part of the duties which are
paid upon the importation of foreign goods, have been granted upon their
exportation. Only half the duties imposed by the old subsidy upon
importation, are drawn back upon exportation; but the whole of those
imposed by the latter subsidies and other imposts are, upon the greater parts
of the goods, drawn back in the same manner. This growing favour of
exportation, and discouragement of importation, have suffered only a few
exceptions, which chiefly concern the materials of some manufactures.
These our merchants and manufacturers are willing should come as cheap
as possible to themselves, and as dear as possible to their rivals and
competitors in other countries. Foreign materials are, upon this account,
sometimes allowed to be imported duty-free; spanish wool, for example,
flax, and raw linen yarn. The exportation of the materials of home produce,
and of those which are the particular produce of our colonies, has
sometimes been prohibited, and sometimes subjected to higher duties. The
exportation of English wool has been prohibited. That of beaver skins, of
beaver wool, and of gum-senega, has been subjected to higher duties; Great
Britain, by the conquests of Canada and Senegal, having got almost the
monopoly of those commodities.
That the mercantile system has not been very favourable to the revenue
of the great body of the people, to the annual produce of the land and labour
of the country, I have endeavoured to show in the fourth book of this
Inquiry. It seems not to have been more favourable to the revenue of the
sovereign; so far, at least, as that revenue depends upon the duties of
customs.
In consequence of that system, the importation of several sorts of goods
has been prohibited altogether. This prohibition has, in some cases, entirely
prevented, and in others has very much diminished, the importation of those
commodities, by reducing the importers to the necessity of smuggling. It
has entirely prevented the importation of foreign wollens; and it has very
much diminished that of foreign silks and velvets, In both cases, it has
entirely annihilated the revenue of customs which might have been levied
upon such importation.
The high duties which have been imposed upon the importation of many
different sorts of foreign goods in order to discourage their consumption in
Great Britain, have, in many cases, served only to encourage smuggling,
and, in all cases, have reduced the revenues of the customs below what
more moderate duties would have afforded. The saying of Dr. Swift, that in
the arithmetic of the customs, two and two, instead of making four, make
sometimes only one, holds perfectly true with regard to such heavy duties,
which never could have been imposed, had not the mercantile system taught
us, in many cases, to employ taxation as an instrument, not of revenue, but
of monopoly.
The bounties which are sometimes given upon the exportation of home
produce and manufactures, and the drawbacks which are paid upon the re-
exportation of the greater part of foreign goods, have given occasion to
many frauds, and to a species of smuggling, more destructive of the public
revenue than any other. In order to obtain the bounty or drawback, the
goods, it is well known, are sometimes shipped, and sent to sea, but soon
afterwards clandestinely re-landed in some other part of the country. The
defalcation of the revenue of customs occasioned by bounties and
drawbacks, of which a great part are obtained fraudulently, is very great.
The gross produce of the customs, in the year which ended on the 5th of
January 1755, amounted to £5,068,000. The bounties which were paid out
of this revenue, though in that year there was no bounty upon corn,
amounted to £167,806. The drawbacks which were paid upon debentures
and certificates, to £2,156,800. Bounties and drawbacks together amounted
to £2,324,600. In consequence of these deductions, the revenue of the
customs amounted only to £2,743,400; from which deducting £287,900 for
the expense of management, in salaries and other incidents, the neat
revenue of the customs for that year comes out to be £2,455,500. The
expense of management, amounts, in this manner, to between five and six
per cent. upon the gross revenue of the customs; and to something more
than ten per cent. upon what remains of that revenue, after deducting what
is paid away in bounties and drawbacks.
Heavy duties being imposed upon almost all goods imported, our
merchant importers smuggle as much, and make entry of as little as they
can. Our merchant exporters, on the contrary, make entry of more than they
export; sometimes out of vanity, and to pass for great dealers in goods
which pay no duty gain a bounty back. Our exports, in consequence of these
different frauds, appear upon the custom-house books greatly to
overbalance our imports, to the unspeakable comfort of those politicians,
who measure the national prosperity by what they call the balance of trade.
All goods imported, unless particularly exempted, and such exemptions
are not very numerous, are liable to some duties of customs. If any goods
are imported, not mentioned in the book of rates, they are taxed at 4s:9¾d.
for every twenty shillings value, according to the oath of the importer, that
is, nearly at five subsidies, or five poundage duties. The book of rates is
extremely comprehensive, and enumerates a great variety of articles, many
of them little used, and, therefore, not well known. It is, upon this account,
frequently uncertain under what article a particular sort of goods ought to
be classed, and, consequently what duty they ought to pay. Mistakes with
regard to this sometimes ruin the custom-house officer, and frequently
occasion much trouble, expense, and vexation to the importer. In point of
perspicuity, precision, and distinctness, therefore, the duties of customs are
much inferior to those of excise.
In order that the greater part of the members of any society should
contribute to the public revenue, in proportion to their respective expense, it
does not seem necessary that every single article of that expense should be
taxed. The revenue which is levied by the duties of excise is supposed to
fall as equally upon the contributors as that which is levied by the duties of
customs; and the duties of excise are imposed upon a few articles only of
the most general used and consumption. It has been the opinion of many
people, that, by proper management, the duties of customs might likewise,
without any loss to the public revenue, and with great advantage to foreign
trade, be confined to a few articles only.
The foreign articles, of the most general use and consumption in Great
Britain, seem at present to consist chiefly in foreign wines and brandies; in
some of the productions of America and the West Indies, sugar, rum,
tobacco, cocoa-nuts, etc. and in some of those of the East Indies, tea, coffee,
china-ware, spiceries of all kinds, several sorts of piece-goods, etc. These
different articles afford, the greater part of the perhaps, at present, revenue
which is drawn from the duties of customs. The taxes which at present
subsist upon foreign manufactures, if you except those upon the few
contained in the foregoing enumeration, have, the greater part of them, been
imposed for the purpose, not of revenue, but of monopoly, or to give our
own merchants an advantage in the home market. By removing all
prohibitions, and by subjecting all foreign manufactures to such moderate
taxes, as it was found from experience, afforded upon each article the
greatest revenue to the public, our own workmen might still have a
considerable advantage in the home market; and many articles, some of
which at present afford no revenue to government, and others a very
inconsiderable one, might afford a very great one.
High taxes, sometimes by diminishing the consumption of the taxed
commodities, and sometimes by encouraging smuggling frequently afford a
smaller revenue to government than what might be drawn from more
moderate taxes.
When the diminution of revenue is the effect of the diminution of
consumption, there can be but one remedy, and that is the lowering of the
tax. When the diminution of revenue is the effect of the encouragement
given to smuggling, it may, perhaps, be remedied in two ways; either by
diminishing the temptation to smuggle, or by increasing the difficulty of
smuggling. The temptation to smuggle can be diminished only by the
lowering of the tax; and the difficulty of smuggling can be increased only
by establishing that system of administration which is most proper for
preventing it.
The excise laws, it appears, I believe, from experience, obstruct and
embarrass the operations of the smuggler much more effectually than those
of the customs. By introducing into the customs a system of administration
as similar to that of the excise as the nature of the different duties will
admit, the difficulty of smuggling might be very much increased. This
alteration, it has been supposed by many people, might very easily be
brought about.
The importer of commodities liable to any duties of customs, it has been
said, might, at his option, be allowed either to carry them to his own private
warehouse; or to lodge them in a warehouse, provided either at his own
expense or at that of the public, but under the key of the custom-house
officer, and never to be opened but in his presence. If the merchant carried
them to his own private warehouse, the duties to be immediately paid, and
never afterwards to be drawn back; and that warehouse to be at all times
subject to the visit and examination of the custom-house officer, in order to
ascertain how far the quantity contained in it corresponded with that for
which the duty had been paid. If he carried them to the public warehouse,
no duty to be paid till they were taken out for home consumption. If taken
out for exportation, to be duty-free; proper security being always given that
they should be so exported. The dealers in those particular commodities,
either by wholesale or retail, to be at all times subject to the visit and
examination of the custom-house officer; and to be obliged to justify, by
proper certificates, the payment of the duty upon the whole quantity
contained in their shops or warehouses. What are called the excise duties
upon rum imported, are at present levied in this manner; and the same
system of administration might, perhaps, be extended to all duties upon
goods imported; provided always that those duties were, like the duties of
excise, confined to a few sorts of goods of the most general use and
consumption. If they were extended to almost all sorts of goods, as at
present, public warehouses of sufficient extent could not easily be provided;
and goods of a very delicate nature, or of which the preservation required
much care and attention, could not safely be trusted by the merchant in any
warehouse but his own.
If, by such a system of administration, smuggling to any considerable
extent could be prevented, even under pretty high duties; and if every duty
was occasionally either heightened or lowered according as it was most
likely, either the one way or the other, to afford the greatest revenue to the
state; taxation being always employed as an instrument of revenue, and
never of monopoly; it seems not improbable that a revenue, at least equal to
the present neat revenue of the customs, might be drawn from duties upon
the importation of only a few sorts of goods of the most general use and
consumption; and that the duties of customs might thus be brought to the
same degree of simplicity, certainty, and precision, as those of excise. What
the revenue at present loses by drawbacks upon the re-exportation of
foreign goods, which are afterwards re-landed and consumed at home,
would, under this system, be saved altogether. If to this saving, which
would alone be very considerable, were added the abolition of all bounties
upon the exportation of home produce; in all cases in which those bounties
were not in reality drawbacks of some duties of excise which had before
been advanced; it cannot well be doubted, but that the neat revenue of
customs might, after an alteration of this kind, be fully equal to what it had
ever been before.
If, by such a change of system, the public revenue suffered no loss, the
trade and manufactures of the country would certainly gain a very
considerable advantage. The trade in the commodities not taxed, by far the
greatest number would be perfectly free, and might be carried on to and
from all parts of the world with every possible advantage. Among those
commodities would be comprehended all the necessaries of life, and all the
materials of manufacture. So far as the free importation of the necessaries
of life reduced their average money price in the home market, it would
reduce the money price of labour, but without reducing in any respect its
real recompence. The value of money is in proportion to the quantity of the
necessaries of life which it will purchase. That of the necessaries of life is
altogether independent of the quantity of money which can be had for them.
The reduction in the money price of labour would necessarily be attended
with a proportionable one in that of all home manufactures, which would
thereby gain some advantage in all foreign markets. The price of some
manufactures would be reduced, in a still greater proportion, by the free
importation of the raw materials. If raw silk could be imported from China
and Indostan, duty-free, the silk manufacturers in England could greatly
undersell those of both France and Italy. There would be no occasion to
prohibit the importation of foreign silks and velvets. The cheapness of their
goods would secure to our own workmen, not only the possession of a
home, but a very great command of the foreign market. Even the trade in
the commodities taxed, would be carried on with much more advantage
than at present. If those commodities were delivered out of the public
warehouse for foreign exportation, being in this case exempted from all
taxes, the trade in them would be perfectly free. The carrying trade, in all
sorts of goods, would, under this system, enjoy every possible advantage. If
these commodities were delivered out for home consumption, the importer
not being obliged to advance the tax till he had an opportunity of selling his
goods, either to some dealer, or to some consumer, he could always afford
to sell them cheaper than if he had been obliged to advance it at the moment
of importation. Under the same taxes, the foreign trade of consumption,
even in the taxed commodities, might in this manner be carried on with
much more advantage than it is at present.
It was the object of the famous excise scheme of Sir Robert Walpole, to
establish, with regard to wine and tobacco, a system not very unlike that
which is here proposed. But though the bill which was then brought into
Parliament, comprehended those two commodities only, it was generally
supposed to be meant as an introduction to a more extensive scheme of the
same kind. Faction, combined with the interest of smuggling merchants,
raised so violent, though so unjust a clamour, against that bill, that the
minister thought proper to drop it; and, from a dread of exciting a clamour
of the same kind, none of his successors have dared to resume the project.
The duties upon foreign luxuries, imported for home consumption,
though they sometimes fall upon the poor, fall principally upon people of
middling or more than middling fortune. Such are, for example, the duties
upon foreign wines, upon coffee, chocolate, tea, sugar, etc.
The duties upon the cheaper luxuries of home produce, destined for home
consumption, fall pretty equally upon people of all ranks, in proportion to
their respective expense. The poor pay the duties upon malt, hops, beer, and
ale, upon their own consumption; the rich, upon both their own
consumption and that of their servants.
The whole consumption of the inferior ranks of people, or of those below
the middling rank, it must be observed, is, in every country, much greater,
not only in quantity, but in value, than that of the middling, and of those
above the middling rank. The whole expense of the inferior is much greater
titan that of the superior ranks. In the first place, almost the whole capital of
every country is annually distributed among the inferior ranks of people, as
the wages of productive labour. Secondly, a great part of the revenue,
arising from both the rent of land and the profits of stock, is annually
distributed among the same rank, in the wages and maintenance of menial
servants, and other unproductive labourers. Thirdly, some part of the profits
of stock belongs to the same rank, as a revenue arising from the
employment of their small capitals. The amount of the profits annually
made by small shopkeepers, tradesmen, and retailers of all kinds, is
everywhere very considerable, and makes a very considerable portion of the
annual produce. Fourthly and lastly, some part even of the rent of land
belongs to the same rank; a considerable part to those who are somewhat
below the middling rank, and a small part even to the lowest rank; common
labourers sometimes possessing in property an acre or two of land. Though
the expense of those inferior ranks of people, therefore, taking them
individually, is very small, yet the whole mass of it, taking them
collectively, amounts always to by much the largest portion of the whole
expense of the society; what remains of the annual produce of the land and
labour of the country, for the consumption of the superior ranks, being
always much less, not only in quantity, but in value. The taxes upon
expense, therefore, which fall chiefly upon that of the superior ranks of
people, upon the smaller portion of the annual produce, are likely to be
much less productive than either those which fall indifferently upon the
expense of all ranks, or even those which fall chiefly upon that of the
inferior ranks, than either those which fall indifferently upon the whole
annual produce, or those which fall chiefly upon the larger portion of it. The
excise upon the materials and manufacture of home-made fermented and
spirituous liquors, is, accordingly, of all the different taxes upon expense,
by far the most productive; and this branch of the excise falls very much,
perhaps principally, upon the expense of the common people. In the year
which ended on the 5th of July 1775, the gross produce of this branch of the
excise amounted to £3,341,837:9:9.
It must always be remembered, however, that it is the luxuries, and not
the necessary expense of the inferior ranks of people, that ought ever to be
taxed. The final payment of any tax upon their necessary expense, would
fall altogether upon the superior ranks of people; upon the smaller portion
of the annual produce, and not upon the greater. Such a tax must, in all
cases, either raise the wages of labour, or lessen the demand for it. It could
not raise the wages of labour, without throwing the final payment of the tax
upon the superior ranks of people. It could not lessen the demand for labour,
without lessening the annual produce of the land and labour of the country,
the fund upon which all taxes must be finally paid. Whatever might be the
state to which a tax of this kind reduced the demand for labour, it must
always raise wages higher than they otherwise would be in that state; and
the final payment of this enhancement of wages must, in all cases, fall upon
the superior ranks of people.
Fermented liquors brewed, and spiritous liquors distilled, not for sale, but
for private use, are not in Great Britain liable to any duties of excise. This
exemption, of which the object is to save private families from the odious
visit and examination of the tax-gatherer, occasions the burden of those
duties to fall frequently much lighter upon the rich than upon the poor. It is
not, indeed, very common to distil for private use, though it is done
sometimes. But in the country, many middling and almost all rich and great
families, brew their own beer. Their strong beer, therefore, costs them eight
shillings a-barrel less than it costs the common brewer, who must have his
profit upon the tax, as well as upon all the other expense which he
advances. Such families, therefore, must drink their beer at least nine or ten
shillings a-barrel cheaper than any liquor of the same quality can be drank
by the common people, to whom it is everywhere more convenient to buy
their beer, by little and little, from the brewery or the ale-house. Malt, in the
same manner, that is made for the use of a private family, is not liable to the
visit or examination of the tax-gatherer but, in this case the family must
compound at seven shillings and sixpence a-head for the tax. Seven
shillings and sixpence are equal to the excise upon ten bushels of malt; a
quantity fully equal to what all the different members of any sober family,
men, women, and children, are, at an average, likely to consume. But in rich
and great families, where country hospitality is much practised, the malt
liquors consumed by the members of the family make but a small part of
the consmnption of the house. Either on account of this composition,
however, or for other reasons, it is not near so common to malt as to brew
for private use. It is difficult to imagine any equitable reason, why those
who either brew or distil for private use should not be subject to a
composition of the same kind.
A greater revenue than what is at present drawn from all the heavy taxes
upon malt, beer, and ale, might be raised, it has frequently been said, by a
much lighter tax upon malt; the opportunities of defrauding the revenue
being much greater in a brewery than in a malt-house; and those who brew
for private use being exempted from all duties or composition for duties,
which is not the case with those who malt for private use.
In the porter brewery of London, a quarter of malt is commonly brewed
into more than two barrels and a-half, sometimes into three barrels of
porter. The different taxes upon malt amount to six shillings a-quarter; those
upon strong ale and beer to eight shillings a-barrel. In the porter brewery,
therefore, the different taxes upon malt, beer, and ale, amount to between
twenty-six and thirty shillings upon the produce of a quarter of malt. In the
country brewery for common country sale, a quarter of malt is seldom
brewed into less than two barrels of strong, and one barrel of small beer;
frequently into two barrels and a-half of strong beer. The different taxes
upon small beer amount to one shilling and fourpence a-barrel. In the
country brewery, therefore, the different taxes upon malt, beer, and ale,
seldom amount to less than twenty-three shillings and fourpence, frequently
to twenty-six shillings, upon the produce of a quarter of malt. Taking the
whole kingdom at an average, therefore, the whole amount of the duties
upon malt, beer, and ale, cannot be estimated at less than twenty-four or
twenty-five shillings upon the produce of a quarter of malt. But by taking
off all the different duties upon beer and ale, and by trebling the malt tax, or
by raising it from six to eighteen shillings upon the quarter of malt, a
greater revenue, it is said, might be raised by this single tax, than what is at
present drawn from all those heavier taxes.
  In 1772, the old malt tax produced.........  £722,023: 11: 11
                             The additional... £356,776:  7:  9¾
  In 1775, the old tax produced............... £561,627:  3:  7½
                             The additional... £278,650: 15:  3¾
  In 1774, the old tax  produced ............ £624,614: 17:  5¾
                             The additional....£310,745:  2:  8½
  In 1775, the old tax produced  ............£657,357:  0:  8¼
                             The additional....£323,785: 12:  6¼
                                             £5,855,580: 12:  0¾
  Average of these four years ..............  £958,895:  3:  0
  In 1772, the country excise produced.......£1,243,120:  5:  3
                    The London brewery          408,260:  7:  2¾
  In 1773, the country excise................£1,245,808:  3:  3
                    The London brewery          405,406: 17: 10½
  In 1774, the country excise................£1,246,373: 14:  5½
                    The London brewery          320,601: 18:  0¼
  In 1775, the country excise................£1,214,583:  6:  1¼
                    The London brewery          463,670:  7:  0¼
                                           4)£6,547,832: 19:  2¼
  Average of these four years ..............£1,636,958:  4:  9½
  To which adding the average malt tax........  958,895:  3:  0¼
  The whole amount of those different
                taxes comes out to be........£2,595,835:  7: 10
  But, by trebling the malt tax,
  or by raising it from six to
  eighteen shillings upon the quarter
  of malt, that single tax would produce.....£2,876,685:  9:  0
  A sum which exceeds the
                         foregoing by....       280,832:  1:  3
Under the old malt tax, indeed, is comprehended a tax of four shillings
upon the hogshead of cyder, and another of ten shillings upon the barrel of
mum. In 1774, the tax upon cyder produced only £3,083:6:8. It probably
fell somewhat short of its usual amount; all the different taxes upon cyder,
having, that year, produced less than ordinary. The tax upon mum, though
much heavier, is still less productive, on account of the smaller
consumption of that liquor. But to balance whatever may be the ordinary
amount of those two taxes, there is comprehended under what is called the
country excise, first, the old excise of six shillings and eightpence upon the
hogshead of cyder; secondly, a like tax of six shillings and eightpence upon
the hogshead of verjuice; thirdly, another of eight shillings and ninepence
upon the hogshead of vinegar; and, lastly, a fourth tax of elevenpence upon
the gallon of mead or metheglin. The produce of those different taxes will
probably much more than counterbalance that of the duties imposed, by
what is called the annual malt tax, upon cyder and mum.
Malt is consumed, not only in the brewery of beer and ale, but in the
manufacture of low wines and spirits. If the malt tax were to be raised to
eighteen shillings upon the quarter, it might be necessary to make some
abatement in the different excises which are imposed upon those particular
sorts of low wines and spirits, of which malt makes any part of the
materials. In what are called malt spirits, it makes commonly but a third
part of the materials; the other two-thirds being either raw barley, or one-
third barley and one-third wheat. In the distillery of malt spirits, both the
opportunity and the temptation to smuggle are much greater than either in a
brewery or in a malt-house; the opportunity, on account of the smaller bulk
and greater value of the commodity, and the temptation, on account of the
superior height of the duties, which amounted to 3s. 10 2/3d. upon the
gallon of spirits. {Though the duties directly imposed upon proof spirits
amount only to 2s. 6d per gallon, these, added to the duties upon the low
wines, from which they are distilled, amount to 3s 10 2/3d. Both low wines
and proof spirits are, to prevent frauds, now rated according to what they
gauge in the wash.}
By increasing the duties upon malt, and reducing those upon the
distillery, both the opportunities and the temptation to smuggle would be
diminished, which might occasion a still further augmentation of revenue.
It has for some time past been the policy of Great Britain to discourage
the consumption of spiritous liquors, on account of their supposed tendency
to ruin the health and to corrupt the morals of the common people.
According to this policy, the abatement of the taxes upon the distillery
ought not to be so great as to reduce, in any respect, the price of those
liquors. Spiritous liquors might remain as dear as ever; while, at the same
time, the wholesome and invigorating liquors of beer and ale might be
considerably reduced in their price. The people might thus be in part
relieved from one of the burdens of which they at present complain the
most; while, at the same time, the revenue might be considerably
augmented.
The objections of Dr. Davenant to this alteration in the present system of
excise duties, seem to be without foundation. Those objections are, that the
tax, instead of dividing itself, as at present, pretty equally upon the profit of
the maltster, upon that of the brewer and upon that of the retailer, would so
far as it affected profit, fall altogether upon that of the maltster; that the
maltster could not so easily get back the amount of the tax in the advanced
price of his malt, as the brewer and retailer in the advanced price of their
liquor; and that so heavy a tax upon malt might reduce the rent and profit of
barley land.
No tax can ever reduce, for any considerable time, the rate of profit in
any particular trade, which must always keep its level with other trades in
the neighbourhood. The present duties upon malt, beer, and ale, do not
affect the profits of the dealers in those commodities, who all get back the
tax with an additional profit, in the enhanced price of their goods. A tax,
indeed, may render the goods upon which it is imposed so dear, as to
diminish the consumption of them. But the consumption of malt is in malt
liquors; and a tax of eighteen shillings upon the quarter of malt could not
well render those liquors dearer than the different taxes, amounting to
twenty-four or twenty-five shillings, do at present. Those liquors, on the
contrary, would probably become cheaper, and the consumption of them
would be more likely to increase than to diminish.
It is not very easy to understand why it should be more difficult for the
maltster to get back eighteen shillings in the advanced price of his malt,
than it is at present for the brewer to get back twenty-four or twenty-five,
sometimes thirty shillings, in that of his liquor. The maltster, indeed, instead
of a tax of six shillings, would be obliged to advance one of eighteen
shilling upon every quarter of malt. But the brewer is at present obliged to
advance a tax of twenty-four or twenty-five, sometimes thirty shillings,
upon every quarter of malt which he brews. It could not be more
inconvenient for the maltster to advance a lighter tax, than it is at present
for the brewer to advance a heavier one. The maltster does not always keep
in his granaries a stock of malt, which it will require a longer time to
dispose of than the stock of beer and ale which the brewer frequently keeps
in his cellars. The former, therefore, may frequently get the returns of his
money as soon as the latter. But whatever inconveniency might arise to the
maltster from being obliged to advance a heavier tax, it could easily be
remedied, by granting him a few months longer credit than is at present
commonly given to the brewer.
Nothing could reduce the rent and profit of barley land, which did not
reduce the demand for barley. But a change of system, which reduced the
duties upon a quarter of malt brewed into beer and ale, from twentyfour and
twenty-five shillings to eighteen shillings, would be more likely to increase
than diminish that demand. The rent and profit of barley land, besides, must
always be nearly equal to those of other equally fertile and equally well
cultivated land. If they were less, some part of the barley land would soon
be turned to some other purpose; and if they were greater, more land would
soon be turned to the raising of barley. When the ordinary price of any
particular produce of land is at what may be called a monopoly price, a tax
upon it necessarily reduces the rent and profit of the land which grows it. A
tax upon the produce of those precious vineyards, of which the wine falls so
much short of the effectual demand, that its price is always above the
natural proportion to that of the produce of other equally fertile and equally
well cultivated land, would necessarily reduce the rent and profit of those
vineyards. The price of the wines being already the highest that could be
got for the quantity commonly sent to market, it could not be raised higher
without diminishing that quantity; and the quantity could not be diminished
without still greater loss, because the lands could not be turned to any other
equally valuable produce. The whole weight of the tax, therefore, would fall
upon the rent and profit; properly upon the rent of the vineyard. When it has
been proposed to lay any new tax upon sugar, our sugar planters have
frequently complained that the whole weight of such taxes fell not upon the
consumer, but upon the producer; they never having been able to raise the
price of their sugar after the tax higher than it was before. The price had, it
seems, before the tax, been a monopoly price; and the arguments adduced to
show that sugar was an improper subject of taxation, demonstrated perhaps
that it was a proper one; the gains of monopolists, whenever they can be
come at, being certainly of all subjects the most proper. But the ordinary
price of barley has never been a monopoly price; and the rent and profit of
barley land have never been above their natural proportion to those of other
equally fertile and equally well cultivated land. The different taxes which
have been imposed upon malt, beer, and ale, have never lowered the price
of barley; have never reduced the rent and profit of barley land. The price of
malt to the brewer has constantly risen in proportion to the taxes imposed
upon it; and those taxes, together with the different duties upon beer and
ale, have constantly either raised the price, or, what comes to the same
thing, reduced the quality of those commodities to the consumer. The final
payment of those taxes has fallen constantly upon the consumer, and not
upon the producer.
The only people likely to suffer by the change of system here proposed,
are those who brew for their own private use. But the exemption, which this
superior rank of people at present enjoy, from very heavy taxes which are
paid by the poor labourer and artificer, is surely most unjust and unequal,
and ought to be taken away, even though this change was never to take
place. It has probably been the interest of this superior order of people,
however, which has hitherto prevented a change of system that could not
well fail both to increase the revenue and to relieve the people.
Besides such duties as those of custom and excise above mentioned,
there are several others which affect the price of goods more unequally and
more indirectly. Of this kind are the duties, which, in French, are called
peages, which in old Saxon times were called the duties of passage, and
which seem to have been originally established for the same purpose as our
turnpike tolls, or the tolls upon our canals and navigable rivers, for the
maintenance of the road or of the navigation. Those duties, when applied to
such purposes, are most properly imposed according to the bulk or weight
of the goods. As they were originally local and provincial duties, applicable
to local and provincial purposes, the administration of them was, in most
cases, entrusted to the particular town, parish, or lordship, in which they
were levied; such communities being, in some way or other, supposed to be
accountable for the application. The sovereign, who is altogether
unaccountable, has in many countries assumed to himself the administration
of those duties; and though he has in most cases enhanced very much the
duty, he has in many entirely neglected the application. If the turnpike tolls
of Great Britain should ever become one of the resources of government,
we may learn, by the example of many other nations, what would probably
be the consequence. Such tolls, no doubt, are finally paid by the consumer;
but the consumer is not taxed in proportion to his expense, when he pays,
not according to the value, but according to the bulk or weight of what he
consumes. When such duties are imposed, not according to the bulk or
weight, but according to the supposed value of the goods, they become
properly a sort of inland customs or excise, which obstruct very much the
most important of all branches of commerce, the interior commerce of the
country.
In some small states, duties similar to those passage duties are imposed
upon goods carried across the territory, either by land or by water, from one
foreign country to another. These are in some countries called transit-duties.
Some of the little Italian states which are situated upon the Po, and the
rivers which run into it, derive some revenue from duties of this kind, which
are paid altogether by foreigners, and which, perhaps, are the only duties
that one state can impose upon the subjects of another, without obstruction
in any respect, the industry or commerce of its own. The most important
transit-duty in the world, is that levied by the king of Denmark upon all
merchant ships which pass through the Sound.
Such taxes upon luxuries, as the greater part of the duties of customs and
excise, though they all fall indifferently upon every different species of
revenue, and are paid finally, or without any retribution, by whoever
consumes the commodities upon which they are imposed; yet they do not
always fall equally or proportionally upon the revenue of every individual.
As every man’s humour regulates the degree of his consumption, every man
contributes rather according to his humour, than proportion to his revenue:
the profuse contribute more, the parsimonious less, than their proper
proportion. During the minority of a man of great fortune, he contributes
commonly very little, by his consumption, towards the support of that state
from whose protection he derives a great revenue. Those who live in
another country, contribute nothing by their consumption towards the
support of the government of that country, in which is situated the source of
their revenue. If in this latter country there should be no land tax, nor any
considerable duty upon the transference either of moveable or immoveable
property, as is the case in Ireland, such absentees may derive a great
revenue from the protection of a government, to the support of which they
do not contribute a single shilling. This inequality is likely to be greatest in
a country of which the government is, in some respects, subordinate and
dependant upon that of some other. The people who possess the most
extensive property in the dependant, will, in this case, generally chuse to
live in the governing country. Ireland is precisely in this situation; and we
cannot therefore wonder, that the proposal of a tax upon absentees should
be so very popular in that country. It might, perhaps, be a little difficult to
ascertain either what sort, or what degree of absence, would subject a man
to be taxed as an absentee, or at what precise time the tax should either
begin or end. If you except, however, this very peculiar situation, any
inequality in the contribution of individuals which can arise from such
taxes, is much more than compensated by the very circumstance which
occasions that inequality; the circumstance that every man’s contribution is
altogether voluntary; it being altogether in his power, either to consume, or
not to consume, the commodity taxed. Where such taxes, therefore, are
properly assessed, and upon proper commodities, they are paid with less
grumbling than any other. When they are advanced by the merchant or
manufacturer, the consumer, who finally pays them, soon comes to
confound them with the price of the commodities, and almost forgets that
he pays any tax. Such taxes are, or may be, perfectly certain; or may be
assessed, so as to leave no doubt concerning either what ought to be paid, or
when it ought to be paid; concerning either the quantity or the time of
payment. What ever uncertainty there may sometimes be, either in the
duties of customs in Great Britain, or in other duties of the same kind in
other countries, it cannot arise from the nature of those duties, but from the
inaccurate or unskilful manner in which the law that imposes them is
expressed.
Taxes upon luxuries generally are, and always may be, paid piece-meal,
or in proportion as the contributors have occasion to purchase the goods
upon which they are imposed. In the time and mode of payment, they are,
or may be, of all taxes the most convenient. Upon the whole, such taxes,
therefore, are perhaps as agreeable to the three first of the four general
maxims concerning taxation, as any other. They offend in every respect
against the fourth.
Such taxes, in proportion to what they bring into the public treasury of
the state, always take out, or keep out, of the pockets of the people, more
than almost any other taxes. They seem to do this in all the four different
ways in which it is possible to do it.
First, the levying of such taxes, even when imposed in the most judicious
manner, requires a great number of custom-house and excise officers,
whose salaries and perquisites are a real tax upon the people, which brings
nothing into the treasury of the state. This expense, however, it must be
acknowledged, is more moderate in Great Britain than in most other
countries. In the year which ended on the 5th of July, 1775, the gross
produce of the different duties, under the management of the commissioners
of excise in England, amounted to £5,507,308:18:8¼, which was levied at
an expense of little more than five and a-half per cent. From this gross
produce, however, there must be deducted what was paid away in bounties
and drawbacks upon the exportation of exciseable goods, which will reduce
the neat produce below five millions. {The neat produce of that year, after
deducting all expenses and allowances, amounted to £4,975,652:19:6.} The
levying of the salt duty, and excise duty, but under a different management,
is much more expensive. The neat revenue of the customs does not amount
to two millions and a-half, which is levied at an expense of more than ten
per cent., in the salaries of officers and other incidents. But the perquisites
of custom-house officers are everywhere much greater than their salaries; at
some ports more than double or triple those salaries. If the salaries of
officers, and other incidents, therefore, amount to more than ten per cent.
upon the neat revenue of the customs, the whole expense of levying that
revenue may amount, in salaries and perquisites together, to more than
twenty or thirty per cent. The officers of excise receive few or no
perquisites; and the administration of that branch of the revenue being of
more recent establishment, is in general less corrupted than that of the
customs, into which length of time has introduced and authorised many
abuses. By charging upon malt the whole revenue which is at present levied
by the different duties upon malt and malt liquors, a saving, it is supposed,
of more than £50,000, might be made in the annual expense of the excise.
By confining the duties of customs to a few sorts of goods, and by levying
those duties according to the excise laws, a much greater saving might
probably be made in the annual expense of the customs.
Secondly, such taxes necessarily occasion some obstruction or
discouragement to certain branches of industry. As they always raise the
price of the commodity taxed, they so far discourage its consumption, and
consequently its production. If it is a commodity of home growth or
manufacture, less labour comes to be employed in raising and producing it.
If it is a foreign commodity of which the tax increases in this manner the
price, the commodities of the same kind which are made at home may
thereby, indeed, gain some advantage in the home market, and a greater
quantity of domestic industry may thereby be turned toward preparing
them. But though this rise of price in a foreign commodity, may encourage
domestic industry in one particular branch, it necessarily discourages that
industry in almost every other. The dearer the Birmingham manufacturer
buys his foreign wine, the cheaper he necessarily sells that part of his
hardware with which, or, what comes to the same thing, with the price of
which, he buys it. That part of his hardware, therefore, becomes of less
value to him, and he has less encouragement to work at it. The dearer the
consumers in one country pay for the surplus produce of another, the
cheaper they necessarily sell that part of their own surplus produce with
which, or, what comes to the same thing, with the price of which, they buy
it. That part of their own surplus produce becomes of less value to them,
and they have less encouragement to increase its quantity. All taxes upon
consumable commodities, therefore, tend to reduce the quantity of
productive labour below what it otherwise would be, either in preparing the
commodities taxed, if they are home commodities, or in preparing those
with which they are purchased, if they are foreign commodities. Such taxes,
too, always alter, more or less, the natural direction of national industry, and
turn it into a channel always different from, and generally less
advantageous, than that in which it would have run of its own accord.
Thirdly, the hope of evading such taxes by smuggling, gives frequent
occasion to forfeitures and other penalties, which entirely ruin the
smuggler; a person who, though no doubt highly blameable for violating the
laws of his country, is frequently incapable of violating those of natural
justice, and would have been, in every respect, an excellent citizen, had not
the laws of his country made that a crime which nature never meant to be
so. In those corrupted governments, where there is at least a general
suspicion of much unnecessary expense, and great misapplication of the
public revenue, the laws which guard it are little respected. Not many
people are scrupulous about smuggling, when, without perjury, they can
find an easy and safe opportunity of doing so. To pretend to have any
scruple about buying smuggled goods, though a manifest encouragement to
the violation of the revenue laws, and to the perjury which almost always
attends it, would, in most countries, be regarded as one of those pedantic
pieces of hypocrisy which, instead of gaining credit with anybody, serve
only to expose the person who affects to practise them to the suspicion of
being a greater knave than most of his neighbours. By this indulgence of the
public, the smuggler is often encouraged to continue a trade, which he is
thus taught to consider as in some measure innocent; and when the severity
of the revenue laws is ready to fall upon him, he is frequently disposed to
defend with violence, what he has been accustomed to regard as his just
property. From being at first, perhaps, rather imprudent than criminal, he at
last too often becomes one of the hardiest and most determined violators of
the laws of society. By the ruin of the smuggler, his capital, which had
before been employed in maintaining productive labour, is absorbed either
in the revenue of the state, or in that of the revenue officer; and is employed
in maintaining unproductive, to the diminution of the general capital of the
society, and of the useful industry which it might otherwise have
maintained.
Fourthly, such taxes, by subjecting at least the dealers in the taxed
commodities, to the frequent visits and odious examination of the tax-
gatherers, expose them sometimes, no doubt, to some degree of oppression,
and always to much trouble and vexation; and though vexation, as has
already been said, is not strictly speaking expense, it is certainly equivalent
to the expense at which every man would be willing to redeem himself from
it. The laws of excise, though more effectual for the purpose for which they
were instituted, are, in this respect, more vexatious than those of the
customs. When a merchant has imported goods subject to certain duties of
customs; when he has paid those duties, and lodged the goods in his
warehouse; he is not, in most cases, liable to any further trouble or vexation
from the custom-house officer. It is otherwise with goods subject to duties
of excise. The dealers have no respite from the continual visits and
examination of the excise officers. The duties of excise are, upon this
account, more unpopular than those of the customs; and so are the officers
who levy them. Those officers, it is pretended, though in general, perhaps,
they do their duty fully as well as those of the customs; yet, as that duty
obliges them to be frequently very troublesome to some of their neighbours,
commonly contract a certain hardness of character, which the others
frequently have not. This observation, however, may very probably be the
mere suggestion of fraudulent dealers, whose smuggling is either prevented
or detected by their diligence.
The inconveniencies, however, which are, perhaps, in some degree
inseparable from taxes upon consumable communities, fall as light upon the
people of Great Britain as upon those of any other country of which the
government is nearly as expensive. Our state is not perfect, and might be
mended; but it is as good, or better, than that of most of our neighbours.
In consequence of the notion, that duties upon consumable goods were
taxes upon the profits of merchants, those duties have, in some countries,
been repeated upon every successive sale of the goods. If the profits of the
merchant-importer or merchant-manufacturer were taxed, equality seemed
to require that those of all the middle buyers, who intervened between either
of them and the consumer, should likewise be taxed. The famous alcavala
of Spain seems to have been established upon this principle. It was at first a
tax of ten per cent. afterwards of fourteen per cent. and it is at present only
six per cent. upon the sale of every sort of property whether moveable or
immoveable; and it is repeated every time the property is sold. {Memoires
concernant les Droits, etc. tom. i, p. 15} The levying of this tax requires a
multitude of revenue officers, sufficient to guard the transportation of
goods, not only from one province to another, but from one shop to another.
It subjects, not only the dealers in some sorts of goods, but those in all sorts,
every farmer, every manufacturer, every merchant and shopkeeper, to the
continual visit and examination of the tax-gatherers. Through the greater
part of the country in which a tax of this kind is established, nothing can be
produced for distant sale. The produce of every part of the country must be
proportioned to the consumption of the neighbourhood. It is to the alcavala,
accordingly, that Ustaritz imputes the ruin of the manufactures of Spain. He
might have imputed to it, likewise, the declension of agriculture, it being
imposed not only upon manufactures, but upon the rude produce of the
land.
In the kingdom of Naples, there is a similar tax of three per cent. upon
the value of all contracts, and consequently upon that of all contracts of
sale. It is both lighter than the Spanish tax, and the greater part of towns and
parishes are allowed to pay a composition in lieu of it. They levy this
composition in what manner they please, generally in a way that gives no
interruption to the interior commerce of the place. The Neapolitan tax,
therefore, is not near so ruinous as the Spanish one.
The uniform system of taxation, which, with a few exception of no great
consequence, takes place in all the different parts of the united kingdom of
Great Britain, leaves the interior commerce of the country, the inland and
coasting trade, almost entirely free. The inland trade is almost perfectly
free; and the greater part of goods may be carried from one end of the
kingdom to the other, without requiring any permit or let-pass, without
being subject to question, visit or examination, from the revenue officers.
There are a few exceptions, but they are such as can give no interruption to
any important branch of inland commerce of the country. Goods carried
coastwise, indeed, require certificates or coast-cockets. If you except coals,
however, the rest are almost all duty-free. This freedom of interior
commerce, the effect of the uniformity of the system of taxation, is perhaps
one of the principal causes of the prosperity of Great Britain; every great
country being necessarily the best and most extensive market for the greater
part of the productions of its own industry. If the same freedom in
consequence of the same uniformity, could be extended to Ireland and the
plantations, both the grandeur of the state, and the prosperity of every part
of the empire, would probably be still greater than at present.
In France, the different revenue laws which take place in the different
provinces, require a multitude of revenue officers to surround, not only the
frontiers of the kingdom, but those of almost each particular province, in
order either to prevent the importation of certain goods, or to subject it to
the payment of certain duties, to the no small interruption of the interior
commerce of the country. Some provinces are allowed to compound for the
gabelle, or salt tax; others are exempted from it altogether. Some provinces
are exempted from the exclusive sale of tobacco, which the farmers-general
enjoy through the greater part of the kingdom. The aides, which correspond
to the excise in England, are very different in different provinces. Some
provinces are exempted from them, and pay a composition or equivalent. In
those in which they take place, and are in farm, there are many local duties
which do not extend beyond a particular town or district. The traites, which
correspond to our customs, divide the kingdom into three great parts; first,
the provinces subject to the tariff of 1664, which are called the provinces of
the five great farms, and under which are comprehended Picardy,
Normandy, and the greater part of the interior provinces of the kingdom;
secondly, the provinces subject to the tariff of 1667, which are called the
provinces reckoned foreign, and under which are comprehended the greater
part of the frontier provinces; and, thirdly, those provinces which are said to
be treated as foreign, or which, because they are allowed a free commerce
with foreign countries, are, in their commerce with the other provinces of
France, subjected to the same duties as other foreign countries. These are
Alsace, the three bishoprics of Mentz, Toul, and Verdun, and the three cities
of Dunkirk, Bayonne, and Marseilles. Both in the provinces of the five great
farms (called so on account of an ancient division of the duties of customs
into five great branches, each of which was originally the subject of a
particular farm, though they are now all united into one), and in those which
are said to be reckoned foreign, there are many local duties which do not
extend beyond a particular town or district. There are some such even in the
provinces which are said to be treated as foreign, particularly in the city of
Marseilles. It is unnecessary to observe how much both the restraints upon
the interior commerce of the country, and the number of the revenue
officers, must be multiplied, in order to guard the frontiers of those different
provinces and districts which are subject to such different systems of
taxation.
Over and above the general restraints arising from this complicated
system of revenue laws, the commerce of wine (after corn, perhaps, the
most important production of France) is, in the greater part of the provinces,
subject to particular restraints arising from the favour which has been
shown to the vineyards of particular provinces and districts above those of
others. The provinces most famous for their wines, it will be found, I
believe, are those in which the trade in that article is subject to the fewest
restraints of this kind. The extensive market which such provinces enjoy,
encourages good management both in the cultivation of their vineyards, and
in the subsequent preparation of their wines.
Such various and complicated revenue laws are not peculiar to France.
The little duchy of Milan is divided into six provinces, in each of which
there is a different system of taxation, with regard to several different sorts
of consumable goods. The still smaller territories of the duke of Parma are
divided into three or four, each of which has, in the same manner, a system
of its own. Under such absurd management, nothing but the great fertility of
the soil, and happiness of the climate, could preserve such countries from
soon relapsing into the lowest state of poverty and barbarism.
Taxes upon consumable commodities may either he levied by an
administration, of which the officers are appointed by govermnent, and are
immediately accountable to government, of which the revenue must, in this
case, vary from year to year, according to the occasional variations in the
produce of the tax; or they may be let in farm for a rent certain, the farmer
being allowed to appoint his own officers, who, though obliged to levy the
tax in the manner directed by the law, are under his immediate inspection,
and are immediately accountable to him. The best and most frugal way of
levying a tax can never be by farm. Over and above what is necessary for
paying the stipulated rent, the salaries of the officers, and the whole expense
of administration, the farmer must always draw from the produce of the tax
a certain profit, proportioned at least to the advance which he makes, to the
risk which he runs, to the trouble which he is at, and to the knowledge and
skill which it requires to manage so very complicated a concern.
Government, by establishing an administration under their own immediate
inspection, of the same kind with that which the farmer establishes, might at
least save this profit, which is almost always exorbitant. To farm any
considerable branch of the public revenue requires either a great capital, or
a great credit; circumstances which would alone restrain the competition for
such an undertaking to a very small number of people. Of the few who have
this capital or credit, a still smaller number have the necessary knowledge
or experience; another circumstance which restrains the competition still
further. The very few who are in condition to become competitors, find it
more for their interest to combine together; to become copartners, instead of
competitors; and, when the farm is set up to auction, to offer no rent but
what is much below the real value. In countries where the public revenues
are in farm, the farmers are generally the most opulent people. Their wealth
would alone excite the public indignation; and the vanity which almost
always accompanies such upstart fortunes, the foolish ostentation with
which they commonly display that wealth, excite that indignation still more.
The farmers of the public revenue never find the laws too severe, which
punish any attempt to evade the payment of a tax. They have no bowels for
the contributors, who are not their subjects, and whose universal
bankruptcy, if it should happen the day after the farm is expired, would not
much affect their interest. In the greatest exigencies of the state, when the
anxiety of the sovereign for the exact payment of his revenue is necessarily
the greatest, they seldom fail to complain, that without laws more rigorous
than those which actually took place, it will be impossible for them to pay
even the usual rent. In those moments of public distress, their commands
cannot be disputed. The revenue laws, therefore, become gradually more
and more severe. The most sanguinary are always to be found in countries
where the greater part of the public revenue is in farm; the mildest, in
countries where it is levied under the immediate inspection of the
sovereign. Even a bad sovereign feels more compassion for his people than
can ever be expected from the farmers of his revenue. He knows that the
permanent grandeur of his family depends upon the prosperity of his
people, and he will never knowingly ruin that prosperity for the sake of any
momentary interest of his own. It is otherwise with the farmers of his
revenue, whose grandeur may frequently be the effect of the ruin, and not of
the prosperity, of his people.
A tax is sometimes not only farmed for a certain rent, but the farmer has,
besides, the monopoly of the commodity taxed. In France, the duties upon
tobacco and salt are levied in this manner. In such cases, the farmer, instead
of one, levies two exorbitant profits upon the people; the profit of the
farmer, and the still more exorbitant one of the monopolist. Tobacco being a
luxury, every man is allowed to buy or not to buy as he chuses; but salt
being a necessary, every man is obliged to buy of the farmer a certain
quantity of it; because, if he did not buy this quantity of the farmer, he
would, it is presumed, buy it of some smuggler. The taxes upon both
commodities are exorbitant. The temptation to smuggle, consequently, is to
many people irresistible; while, at the same time, the rigour of the law, and
the vigilance of the farmer’s officers, render the yielding to the temptation
almost certainly ruinous. The smuggling of salt and tobacco sends every
year several hundred people to the galleys, besides a very considerable
number whom it sends to the gibbet. Those taxes, levied in this manner,
yield a very considerable revenue to government. In 1767, the farm of
tobacco was let for twenty-two millions five hundred and forty-one
thousand two hundred and seventy-eight livres a-year; that of salt for thirty-
six millions four hundred and ninety-two thousand four hundred and four
livres. The farm, in both cases, was to commence in 1768, and to last for six
years. Those who consider the blood of the people as nothing, in
comparison with the revenue of the prince, may, perhaps, approve of this
method of levying taxes. Similar taxes and monopolies of salt and tobacco
have been established in many other countries, particularly in the Austrian
and Prussian dominions, and in the greater part of the states of Italy.
In France, the greater part of the actual revenue of the crown is derived
from eight different sources; the taille, the capitation, the two vingtiemes,
the gabelles, the aides, the traites, the domaine, and the farm of tobacco.
The live last are, in the greater part of the provinces, under farm. The three
first are everywhere levied by an administration, under the immediate
inspection and direction of government; and it is universally acknowledged,
that in proportion to what they take out of the pockets of the people, they
bring more into the treasury of the prince than the other five, of which the
administration is much more wasteful and expensive.
The finances of France seem, in their present state, to admit of three very
obvious reformations. First, by abolishing the taille and the capitation, and
by increasing the number of the vingtiemes, so as to produce an additional
revenue equal to the amount of those other taxes, the revenue of the crown
might be preserved; the expense of collection might be much diminished;
the vexation of the inferior ranks of people, which the taille and capitation
occasion, might be entirely prevented; and the superior ranks might not be
more burdened than the greater part of them are at present. The vingtieme, I
have already observed, is a tax very nearly of the same kind with what is
called the land tax of England. The burden of the taille, it is acknowledged,
falls finally upon the proprietors of land; and as the greater part of the
capitation is assessed upon those who are subject to the taille, at so much a-
pound of that other tax, the final payment of the greater part of it must
likewise fall upon the same order of people. Though the number of the
vingtiemes, therefore, was increased, so as to produce an additional revenue
equal to the amount of both those taxes, the superior ranks of people might
not be more burdened than they are at present; many individuals, no doubt,
would, on account of the great inequalities with which the taille is
commonly assessed upon the estates and tenants of different individuals.
The interest and opposition of such favoured subjects, are the obstacles
most likely to prevent this, or any other reformation of the same kind.
Secondly, by rendering the gabelle, the aides, the traites, the taxes upon
tobacco, all the different customs and excises, uniform in all the different
parts of the kingdom, those taxes might be levied at much less expense, and
the interior commerce of the kingdom might be rendered as free as that of
England. Thirdly, and lastly, by subjecting all those taxes to an
administration under the immediate inspection and direction or government,
the exorbitant profits of the farmers-general might be added to the revenue
of the state. The opposition arising from the private interest of individuals,
is likely to be as effectual for preventing the two last as the first-mentioned
scheme of reformation.
The French system of taxation seems, in every respect, inferior to the
British. In Great Britain, ten millions sterling are annually levied upon less
than eight millions of people, without its being possible to say that any
particular order is oppressed. From the Collections of the Abbé Expilly, and
the observations of the author of the Essay upon the Legislation and
Commerce of Corn, it appears probable that France, including the provinces
of Lorraine and Bar, contains about twenty-three or twenty-four millions of
people; three times the number, perhaps, contained in Great Britain. The
soil and climate of France are better than those of Great Britain. The
country has been much longer in a state of improvement and cultivation,
and is, upon that account, better stocked with all those things which it
requires a long time to raise up and accumulate; such as great towns, and
convenient and well-built houses, both in town and country. With these
advantages, it might be expected, that in France a revenue of thirty millions
might be levied for the support of the state, with as little inconvenience as a
revenue of ten millions is in Great Britain. In 1765 and 1766, the whole
revenue paid into the treasury of France, according to the best, though, I
acknowledge, very imperfect accounts which I could get of it, usually run
between 308 and 325 millions of livres; that is, it did not amount to fifteen
millions sterling; not the half of what might have been expected, had the
people contributed in the same proportion to their numbers as the people of
Great Britain. The people of France, however, it is generally acknowledged,
are much more oppressed by taxes than the people of Great Britain. France,
however, is certainly the great empire in Europe, which, after that of Great
Britain, enjoys the mildest and most indulgent government.
In Holland, the heavy taxes upon the necessaries of life have ruined, it is
said, their principal manufacturers, and are likely to discourage, gradually,
even their fisheries and their trade in ship-building. The taxes upon the
necessaries of life are inconsiderable in Great Britain, and no manufacture
has hitherto been ruined by them. The British taxes which bear hardest on
manufactures, are some duties upon the importation of raw materials,
particularly upon that of raw silk. The revenue of the States-General and of
the different cities, however, is said to amount to more than five millions
two hundred and fifty thousand pounds sterling; and as the inhabitants of
the United Provinces cannot well be supposed to amount to more than a
third part of those of Great Britain, they must, in proportion to their number,
be much more heavily taxed.
After all the proper subjects of taxation have been exhausted, if the
exigencies of the state still continue to require new taxes, they must be
imposed upon improper ones. The taxes upon the necessaries of life,
therefore, may be no impeachment of the wisdom of that republic, which, in
order to acquire and to maintain its independency, has, in spite of its meat
frugality, been involved in such expensive wars as have obliged it to
contract great debts. The singular countries of Holland and Zealand,
besides, require a considerable expense even to preserve their existence, or
to prevent their being swallowed up by the sea, which must have
contributed to increase considerably the load of taxes in those two
provinces. The republican form of government seems to be the principal
support of the present grandeur of Holland. The owners of great capitals,
the great mercantile families, have generally either some direct share, or
some indirect influence, in the administration of that government. For the
sake of the respect and authority which they derive from this situation, they
are willing to live in a country where their capital, if they employ it
themselves, will bring them less profit, and if they lend it to another, less
interest; and where the very moderate revenue which they can draw from it
will purchase less of the necessaries and conveniencies of life than in any
other part of Europe. The residence of such wealthy people necessarily
keeps alive, in spite of all disadvantages, a certain degree of industry in the
country. Any public calamity which should destroy the republican form of
government, which should throw the whole administration into the hands of
nobles and of soldiers, which should annihilate altogether the importance of
those wealthy merchants, would soon render it disagreeable to them to live
in a country where they were no longer likely to be much respected. They
would remove both their residence and their capital to some other country,




In that rude state of society which precedes the extension of commerce
and the improvement of manufactures; when those expensive luxuries,
which commerce and manufactures can alone introduce, are altogether
unknown; the person who possesses a large revenue, I have endeavoured to
show in the third book of this Inquiry, can spend or enjoy that revenue in no
other way than by maintaining nearly as many people as it can maintain. A
large revenue may at all times be said to consist in the command of a large
quantity of the necessaries of life. In that rude state of things, it is
commonly paid in a large quantity of those necessaries, in the materials of
plain food and coarse clothing, in corn and cattle, in wool and raw hides.
When neither commerce nor manufactures furnish any thing for which the
owner can exchange the greater part of those materials which are over and
above his own consumption, he can do nothing with the surplus, but feed
and clothe nearly as many people as it will feed and clothe. A hospitality in
which there is no luxury, and a liberality in which there is no ostentation,
occasion, in this situation of things, the principal expenses of the rich and
the great. But these I have likewise endeavoured to show, in the same book,
are expenses by which people are not very apt to ruin themselves. There is
not, perhaps, any selfish pleasure so frivolous, of which the pursuit has not
sometimes ruined even sensible men. A passion for cock-fighting has
ruined many. But the instances, I believe, are not very numerous, of people
who have been ruined by a hospitality or liberality of this kind; though the
hospitality of luxury, and the liberality of ostentation have ruined many.
Among our feudal ancestors, the long time during which estates used to
continue in the same family, sufficiently demonstrates the general
disposition of people to live within their income. Though the rustic
hospitality, constantly exercised by the great landholders, may not, to us in
the present times, seem consistent with that order which we are apt to
consider as inseparably connected with good economy; yet we must
certainly allow them to have been at least so far frugal, as not commonly to
have spent their whole income. A part of their wool and raw hides, they had
generally an opportunity of selling for money. Some part of this money,
perhaps, they spent in purchasing the few objects of vanity and luxury, with
which the circumstances of the times could furnish them; but some part of it
they seem commonly to have hoarded. They could not well, indeed, do any
thing else but hoard whatever money they saved. To trade, was disgraceful
to a gentleman; and to lend money at interest, which at that time was
considered as usury, and prohibited bylaw, would have been still more so.
In those times of violence and disorder, besides, it was convenient to have a
hoard of money at hand, that in case they should be driven from their own
home, they might have something of known value to carry with them to
some place of safety. The same violence which made it convenient to hoard,
made it equally convenient to conceal the hoard. The frequency of treasure-
trove, or of treasure found, of which no owner was known, sufficiently
demonstrates the frequency, in those times, both of hoarding and of
concealing the hoard. Treasure-trove was then considered as an important
branch of the revenue of the sovereign. All the treasure-trove of the
kingdom would scarce, perhaps, in the present times, make an important
branch of the revenue of a private gentleman of a good estate.
The same disposition, to save and to hoard, prevailed in the sovereign, as
well as in the subjects. Among nations, to whom commerce and
manufacture are little known, the sovereign, it has already been observed in
the Fourth book, is in a situation which naturally disposes him to the
parsimony requisite for accumulation. In that situation, the expense, even of
a sovereign, cannot be directed by that vanity which delights in the gaudy
finery of a court. The ignorance of the times affords but few of the trinkets
in which that finery consists. Standing armies are not then necessary; so that
the expense, even of a sovereign, like that of any other great lord can be
employed in scarce any thing but bounty to his tenants, and hospitality to
his retainers. But bounty and hospitality very seldom lead to extravagance;
though vanity almost always does. All the ancient sovereigns of Europe,
accordingly, it has already been observed, had treasures. Every Tartar chief,
in the present times, is said to have one.
In a commercial country, abounding with every sort of expensive luxury,
the sovereign, in the same manner as almost all the great proprietors in his
dominions, naturally spends a great part of his revenue in purchasing those
luxuries. His own and the neighbouring countries supply him abundantly
with all the costly trinkets which compose the splendid, but insignificant,
pageantry of a court. For the sake of an inferior pageantry of the same kind,
his nobles dismiss their retainers, make their tenants independent, and
become gradually themselves as insignificant as the greater part of the
wealthy burghers in his dominions. The same frivolous passions, which
influence their conduct, influence his. How can it be supposed that he
should be the only rich man in his dominions who is insensible to pleasures
of this kind? If he does not, what he is very likely to do, spend upon those
pleasures so great a part of his revenue as to debilitate very much the
defensive power of the state, it cannot well be expected that he should not
spend upon them all that part of it which is over and above what is
necessary for supporting that defensive power. His ordinary expense
becomes equal to his ordinary revenue, and it is well if it does not
frequently exceed it. The amassing of treasure can no longer be expected;
and when extraordinary exigencies require extraordinary expenses, he must
necessarily call upon his subjects for an extraordinary aid. The present and
the late king of Prussia are the only great princes of Europe, who, since the
death of Henry IV. of France, in 1610, are supposed to have amassed any
considerable treasure. The parsimony which leads to accumulation has
become almost as rare in republican as in monarchical governments. The
Italian republics, the United Provinces of the Netherlands, are all in debt.
The canton of Berne is the single republic in Europe which has amassed any
considerable treasure. The other Swiss republics have not. The taste for
some sort of pageantry, for splendid buildings, at least, and other public
ornaments, frequently prevails as much in the apparently sober senate-
house of a little republic, as in the dissipated court of the greatest king.
The want of parsimony, in time of peace, imposes the necessity of
contracting debt in time of war. When war comes, there is no money in the
treasury, but what is necessary for carrying on the ordinary expense of the
peace establishment. In war, an establishment of three or four times that
expense becomes necessary for the defence of the state; and consequently, a
revenue three or four times greater than the peace revenue. Supposing that
the sovereign should have, what he scarce ever has, the immediate means of
augmenting his revenue in proportion to the augmentation of his expense;
yet still the produce of the taxes, from which this increase of revenue must
be drawn, will not begin to come into the treasury, till perhaps ten or twelve
months after they are imposed. But the moment in which war begins, or
rather the moment in which it appears likely to begin, the army must be
augmented, the fleet must be fitted out, the garrisoned towns must be put
into a posture of defence; that army, that fleet, those garrisoned towns, must
be furnished with arms, ammunition, and provisions. An immediate and
great expense must be incurred in that moment of immediate danger, which
will not wait for the gradual and slow returns of the new taxes. In this
exigency, government can have no other resource but in borrowing.
The same commercial state of society which, by the operation of moral
causes, brings government in this manner into the necessity of borrowing,
produces in the subjects both an ability and an inclination to lend. If it
commonly brings along with it the necessity of borrowing, it likewise
brings with it the facility of doing so.
A country abounding with merchants and manufacturers, necessarily
abounds with a set of people through whose hands, not only their own
capitals, but the capitals of all those who either lend them money, or trust
them with goods, pass as frequently, or more frequently, than the revenue of
a private man, who, without trade or business, lives upon his income, passes
through his hands. The revenue of such a man can regularly pass through
his hands only once in a year. But the whole amount of the capital and
credit of a merchant, who deals in a trade of which the returns are very
quick, may sometimes pass through his hands two, three, or four times in a
year. A country abounding with merchants and manufacturers, therefore,
necessarily abounds with a set of people, who have it at all times in their
power to advance, if they chuse to do so, a very large sum of money to
government. Hence the ability in the subjects of a commercial state to lend.
Commerce and manufactures can seldom flourish long in any state which
does not enjoy a regular administration of justice; in which the people do
not feel themselves secure in the possession of their property; in which the
faith of contracts is not supported by law; and in which the authority of the
state is not supposed to be regularly employed in enforcing the payment of
debts from all those who are able to pay. Commerce and manufactures, in
short, can seldom flourish in any state, in which there is not a certain degree
of confidence in the justice of government. The same confidence which
disposes great merchants and manufacturers upon ordinary occasions, to
trust their property to the protection of a particular government, disposes
them, upon extraordinary occasions, to trust that government with the use of
their property. By lending money to government, they do not even for a
moment diminish their ability to carry on their trade and manufactures; on
the contrary, they commonly augment it. The necessities of the state render
government, upon most occasions willing to borrow upon terms extremely
advantageous to the lender. The security which it grants to the original
creditor, is made transferable to any other creditor; and from the universal
confidence in the justice of the state, generally sells in the market for more
than was originally paid for it. The merchant or monied man makes money
by lending money to government, and instead of diminishing, increases his
trading capital. He generally considers it as a favour, therefore, when the
administration admits him to a share in the first subscription for a new loan.
Hence the inclination or willingness in the subjects of a commercial state to
lend.
The government of such a state is very apt to repose itself upon this
ability and willingness of its subjects to lend it their money on
extraordinary occasions. It foresees the facility of borrowing, and therefore
dispenses itself from the duty of saving.
In a rude state of society, there are no great mercantile or manufacturing
capitals. The individuals, who hoard whatever money they can save, and
who conceal their hoard, do so from a distrust of the justice of government;
from a fear, that if it was known that they had a hoard, and where that hoard
was to be found, they would quickly be plundered. In such a state of things,
few people would be able, and nobody would be willing to lend their
money to government on extraordinary exigencies. The sovereign feels that
he must provide for such exigencies by saving, because he foresees the
absolute impossibility of borrowing. This foresight increases still further his
natural disposition to save.
The progress of the enormous debts which at present oppress, and will in
the long-run probably ruin, all the great nations of Europe, has been pretty
uniform. Nations, like private men, have generally begun to borrow upon
what may be called personal credit, without assigning or mortgaging any
particular fund for the payment of the debt; and when this resource has
failed them, they have gone on to borrow upon assignments or mortgages of
particular funds.
What is called the unfunded debt of Great Britain, is contracted in the
former of those two ways. It consists partly in a debt which bears, or is
supposed to bear, no interest, and which resembles the debts that a private
man contracts upon account; and partly in a debt which bears interest, and
which resembles what a private man contracts upon his bill or promissory-
note. The debts which are due, either for extraordinary services, or for
services either not provided for, or not paid at the time when they are
performed; part of the extraordinaries of the army, navy, and ordnance, the
arrears of subsidies to foreign princes, those of seamen’s wages, etc. usually
constitute a debt of the first kind. Navy and exchequer bills, which are
issued sometimes in payment of a part of such debts, and sometimes for
other purposes, constitute a debt of the second kind; exchequer bills bearing
interest from the day on which they are issued, and navy bills six months
after they are issued. The bank of England, either by voluntarily discounting
those bills at their current value, or by agreeing with government for certain
considerations to circulate exchequer bills, that is, to receive them at par,
paying the interest which happens to be due upon them, keeps up their
value, and facilitates their circulation, and thereby frequently enables
government to contract a very large debt of this kind. In France, where there
is no bank, the state bills (billets d’etat {See Examen des Reflections
Politiques sur les Finances.}) have sometimes sold at sixty and seventy per
cent. discount. During the great recoinage in king William’s time, when the
bank of England thought proper to put a stop to its usual transactions,
exchequer bills and tallies are said to have sold from twenty-five to sixty
per cent. discount; owing partly, no doubt, to the supposed instability of the
new government established by the Revolution, but partly, too, to the want
of the support of the bank of England.
When this resource is exhausted, and it becomes necessary, in order to
raise money, to assign or mortgage some particular branch of the public
revenue for the payment of the debt, government has, upon different
occasions, done this in two different ways. Sometimes it has made this
assignment or mortgage for a short period of time only, a year, or a few
years, for example; and sometimes for perpetuity. In the one case, the fund
was supposed sufficient to pay, within the limited time, both principal and
interest of the money borrowed. In the other, it was supposed sufficient to
pay the interest only, or a perpetual annuity equivalent to the interest,
government being at liberty to redeem, at any time, this annuity, upon
paying back the principal sum borrowed. When money was raised in the
one way, it was said to be raised by anticipation; when in the other, by
perpetual funding, or, more shortly, by funding.
In Great Britain, the annual land and malt taxes are regularly anticipated
every year, by virtue of a borrowing clause constantly inserted into the acts
which impose them. The bank of England generally advances at an interest,
which, since the Revolution, has varied from eight to three per cent., the
sums of which those taxes are granted, and receives payment as their
produce gradually comes in. If there is a deficiency, which there always is,
it is provided for in the supplies of the ensuing year. The only considerable
branch of the public revenue which yet remains unmortgaged, is thus
regularly spent before it comes in. Like an improvident spendthrift, whose
pressing occasions will not allow him to wait for the regular payment of his
revenue, the state is in the constant practice of borrowing of its own factors
and agents, and of paying interest for the use of its own money.
In the reign of king William, and during a great part of that of queen
Anne, before we had become so familiar as we are now with the practice of
perpetual funding, the greater part of the new taxes were imposed but for a
short period of time (for four, five, six, or seven years only), and a great part
of the grants of every year consisted in loans upon anticipations of the
produce of those taxes. The produce being frequently insufficient for
paying, within the limited term, the principal and interest of the money
borrowed, deficiencies arose; to make good which, it became necessary to
prolong the term.
In 1697, by the 8th of William III., c. 20, the deficiencies of several taxes
were charged upon what was then called the first general mortgage or fund,
consisting of a prolongation to the first of August 1706, of several different
taxes, which would have expired within a shorter term, and of which the
produce was accumulated into one general fund. The deficiencies charged
upon this prolonged term amounted to £5,160,459: 14: 9½.
In 1701, those duties, with some others, were still further prolonged, for
the like purposes, till the first of August 1710, and were called the second
general mortgage or fund. The deficiencies charged upon it amounted to
£2,055,999: 7: 11½.
In 1707, those duties were still further prolonged, as a fund for new
loans, to the first of August 1712, and were called the third general
mortgage or fund. The sum borrowed upon it was £983,254:11:9¼.
In 1708, those duties were all (except the old subsidy of tonnage and
poundage, of which one moiety only was made a part of this fund, and a
duty upon the importation of Scotch linen, which had been taken off by the
articles of union) still further continued, as a fund for new loans, to the first
of August 1714, and were called the fourth general mortgage or fund. The
sum borrowed upon it was £925,176:9:2¼.
In 1709, those duties were all ( except the old subsidy of tonnage and
poundage, which was now left out of this fund altogether ) still further
continued, for the same purpose, to the first of August 1716, and were
called the fifth general mortgage or fund. The sum borrowed upon it was
£922,029:6s.
In 1710, those duties were again prolonged to the first of August 1720,
and were called the sixth general mortgage or fund. The sum borrowed
upon it was £1,296,552:9:11¾.
In 1711, the same duties (which at this time were thus subject to four
different anticipations), together with several others, were continued for
ever, and made a fund for paying the interest of the capital of the South-sea
company, which had that year advanced to government, for paying debts,
and making good deficiencies, the sum of £9,177,967:15:4d, the greatest
loan which at that time had ever been made.
Before this period, the principal, so far as I have been able to observe, the
only taxes, which, in order to pay the interest of a debt, had been imposed
for perpetuity, were those for paying the interest of the money which had
been advanced to government by the bank and East-India company, and of
what it was expected would be advanced, but which was never advanced,
by a projected land bank. The bank fund at this time amounted to
£3,375,027:17:10½, for which was paid an annuity or interest of
£206,501:15:5d. The East-India fund amounted to £3,200,000, for which
was paid an annuity or interest of £160,000; the bank fund being at six per
cent., the East-India fund at five per cent. interest.
In 1715, by the first of George I., c. 12, the different taxes which had
been mortgaged for paying the bank annuity, together with several others,
which, by this act, were likewise rendered perpetual, were accumulated into
one common fund, called the aggregate fund, which was charged not only
with the payment of the bank annuity, but with several other annuities and
burdens of different kinds. This fund was afterwards augmented by the third
of George I., c.8., and by the fifth of George I., c. 3, and the different duties
which were then added to it were likewise rendered perpetual.
In 1717, by the third of George I., c. 7, several other taxes were rendered
perpetual, and accumulated into another common fund, called the general
fund, for the payment of certain annuities, amounting in the whole to
£724,849:6:10½.
In consequence of those different acts, the greater part of the taxes, which
before had been anticipated only for a short term of years were rendered
perpetual, as a fund for paying, not the capital, but the interest only, of the
money which had been borrowed upon them by different successive
anticipations.
Had money never been raised but by anticipation, the course of a few
years would have liberated the public revenue, without any other attention
of government besides that of not overloading the fund, by charging it with
more debt than it could pay within the limited term, and not of anticipating
a second time before the expiration of the first anticipation. But the greater
part of European governments have been incapable of those attentions.
They have frequently overloaded the fund, even upon the first anticipation;
and when this happened not to be the case, they have generally taken care to
overload it, by anticipating a second and a third time, before the expiration
of the first anticipation. The fund becoming in this manner altogether
insufficient for paying both principal and interest of the money borrowed
upon it, it became necessary to charge it with the interest only, or a
perpetual annuity equal to the interest; and such improvident anticipations
necessarily gave birth to the more ruinous practice of perpetual funding.
But though this practice necessarily puts off the liberation of the public
revenue from a fixed period, to one so indefinite that it is not very likely
ever to arrive; yet, as a greater sum can, in all cases, be raised by this new
practice than by the old one of anticipation, the former, when men have
once become familiar with it, has, in the great exigencies of the state, been
universally preferred to the latter. To relieve the present exigency, is always
the object which principally interests those immediately concerned in the
administration of public affairs. The future liberation of the public revenue
they leave to the care of posterity.
During the reign of queen Anne, the market rate of interest had fallen
from six to five per cent.; and, in the twelfth year of her reign, five per cent.
was declared to be the highest rate which could lawfully be taken for money
borrowed upon private security. Soon after the greater part of the temporary
taxes of Great Britain had been rendered perpetual, and distributed into the
aggregate, South-sea, and general funds, the creditors of the public, like
those of private persons, were induced to accept of five per cent. for the
interest of their money, which occasioned a saving of one per cent. upon the
capital of the greater part or the debts which had been thus funded for
perpetuity, or of one-sixth of the greater part of the annuities which were
paid out of the three great funds above mentioned. This saving left a
considerable surplus in the produce of the different taxes which had been
accumulated into those funds, over and above what was necessary for
paying the annuities which were now charged upon them, and laid the
foundation of what has since been called the sinking fund. In 1717, it
amounted to £523,454:7:7½. In 1727, the interest of the greater part of the
public debts was still further reduced to four per cent.; and, in 1753 and
1757, to three and a-half, and three per cent., which reductions still further
augmented the sinking fund.
A sinking fund, though instituted for the payment of old, facilitates very
much the contracting of new debts. It is a subsidiary fund, always at hand,
to be mortgaged in aid of any other doubtful fund, upon which money is
proposed to be raised in any exigency of the state. Whether the sinking fund
of Great Britain has been more frequently applied to the one or to other of
those two purposes, will sufficiently appear by and by.
Besides those two methods of borrowing, by anticipations and by a
perpetual funding, there are two other methods, which hold a sort of middle
place between them; these are, that of borrowing upon annuities for terms
of years, and that of borrowing upon annuities for lives.
During the reigns of king William and queen Anne, large sums were
frequently borrowed upon annuities for terms of years, which were
sometimes longer and sometimes shorter. In 1695, an act was passed for
borrowing one million upon an annuity of fourteen per cent., or £140,000 a-
year, for sixteen years. In 1691, an act was passed for borrowing a million
upon annuities for lives, upon terms which, in the present times, would
appear very advantageous; but the subscription was not filled up. In the
following year, the deficiency was made good, by borrowing upon annuities
for lives, at fourteen per cent. or a little more than seven years purchase. In
1695, the persons who had purchased those annuities were allowed to
exchange them for others of ninety-six years, upon paying into the
exchequer sixty-three pounds in the hundred; that is, the difference between
fourteen per cent. for life, and fourteen per cent. for ninety-six years, was
sold for sixty-three pounds, or for four and a-half years purchase. Such was
the supposed instability of government, that even these terms procured few
purchasers. In the reign of queen Anne, money was, upon different
occasions, borrowed both upon annuities for lives, and upon annuities for
terms of thirty-two, of eighty-nine, of ninety-eight, and of ninety-nine
years. In 1719, the proprietors of the annuities for thirty-two years were
induced to accept, in lieu of them, South-sea stock to the amount of eleven
and a-half years purchase of the annuities, together with an additional
quantity of stock, equal to the arrears which happened then to be due upon
them. In 1720, the greater part of the other annuities for terms of years, both
long and short, were subscribed into the same fund. The long annuities, at
that time, amounted to £666,821: 8:3½ a-year. On the 5th of January 1775,
the remainder of them, or what was not subscribed at that time, amounted
only to £136,453:12:8d.
During the two wars which began in 1739 and in 1755, little money was
borrowed, either upon annuities for terms of years, or upon those for lives.
An annuity for ninety-eight or ninety-nine years, however, is worth nearly
as much as a perpetuity, and should therefore, one might think, be a fund for
borrowing nearly as much. But those who, in order to make family
settlements, and to provide for remote futurity, buy into the public stocks,
would not care to purchase into one of which the value was continually
diminishing; and such people make a very considerable proportion, both of
the proprietors and purchasers of stock. An annuity for a long term of years,
therefore, though its intrinsic value may be very nearly the same with that
of a perpetual annuity, will not find nearly the same number of purchasers.
The subscribers to a new loan, who mean generally to sell their subscription
as soon as possible, prefer greatly a perpetual annuity, redeemable by
parliament, to an irredeemable annuity, for a long term of years, of only
equal amount. The value of the former may be supposed always the same,
or very nearly the same; and it makes, therefore, a more convenient
transferable stock than the latter.
During the two last-mentioned wars, annuities, either for terms of years
or for lives, were seldom granted, but as premiums to the subscribers of a
new loan, over and above the redeemable annuity or interest, upon the
credit of which the loan was supposed to be made. They were granted, not
as the proper fund upon which the money was borrowed, but as an
additional encouragement to the lender.
Annuities for lives have occasionally been granted in two different ways;
either upon separate lives, or upon lots of lives, which, in French, are called
tontines, from the name of their inventor. When annuities are granted upon
separate lives, the death of every individual annuitant disburdens the public
revenue, so far as it was affected by his annuity. When annuities are granted
upon tontines, the liberation of the public revenue does not commence till
the death of all the annuitants comprehended in one lot, which may
sometimes consist of twenty or thirty persons, of whom the survivors
succeed to the annuities of all those who die before them; the last survivor
succeeding to the annuities of the whole lot. Upon the same revenue, more
money can always be raised by tontines than by annuities for separate lives.
An annuity, with a right of survivorship, is really worth more than an equal
annuity for a separate life; and, from the confidence which every man
naturally has in his own good fortune, the principle upon which is founded
the success of all lotteries, such an annuity generally sells for something
more than it is worth. In countries where it is usual for government to raise
money by granting annuities, tontines are, upon this account, generally
preferred to annuities for separate lives. The expedient which will raise
most money, is almost always preferred to that which is likely to bring
about, in the speediest manner, the liberation of the public revenue.
In France, a much greater proportion of the public debts consists in
annuities for lives than in England. According to a memoir presented by the
parliament of Bourdeaux to the king, in 1764, the whole public debt of
France is estimated at twenty-four hundred millions of livres; of which the
capital, for which annuities for lives had been granted, is supposed to
amount to three hundred millions, the eighth part of the whole public debt.
The annuities themselves are computed to amount to thirty millions a-year,
the fourth part of one hundred and twenty millions, the supposed interest of
that whole debt. These estimations, I know very well, are not exact; but
having been presented by so very respectable a body as approximations to
the truth, they may, I apprehend, be considered as such. It is not the
different degrees of anxiety in the two governments of France and England
for the liberation of the public revenue, which occasions this difference in
their respective modes of borrowing; it arises altogether from the different
views and interests of the lenders.
In England, the seat of government being in the greatest mercantile city
in the world, the merchants are generally the people who advance money to
government. By advancing it, they do not mean to diminish, but, on the
contrary, to increase their mercantile capitals; and unless they expected to
sell, with some profit, their share in the subscription for a new loan, they
never would subscribe. But if, by advancing their money, they were to
purchase, instead of perpetual annuities, annuities for lives only, whether
their own or those of other people, they would not always be so likely to
sell them with a profit. Annuities upon their own lives they would always
sell with loss; because no man will give for an annuity upon the life of
another, whose age and state of health are nearly the same with his own, the
same price which he would give for one upon his own. An annuity upon the
life of a third person, indeed, is, no doubt, of equal value to the buyer and
the seller; but its real value begins to diminish from the moment it is
granted, and continues to do so, more and more, as long as it subsists. It can
never, therefore, make so convenient a transferable stock as a perpetual
annuity, of which the real value may be supposed always the same, or very
nearly the same.
In France, the seat of government not being in a great mercantile city,
merchants do not make so great a proportion of the people who advance
money to government. The people concerned in the finances, the farmers-
general, the receivers of the taxes which are not in farm, the court-bankers,
etc. make the greater part of those who advance their money in all public
exigencies. Such people are commonly men of mean birth, but of great
wealth, and frequently of great pride. They are too proud to marry their
equals, and women of quality disdain to marry them. They frequently
resolve, therefore, to live bachelors; and having neither any families of their
own, nor much regard for those of their relations, whom they are not always
very fond of acknowledging, they desire only to live in splendour during
their own time, and are not unwilling that their fortune should end with
themselves. The number of rich people, besides, who are either averse to
marry, or whose condition of life renders it either improper or inconvenient
for them to do so, is much greater in France than in England. To such
people, who have little or no care for posterity, nothing can be more
convenient than to exchange their capital for a revenue, which is to last just
as long, and no longer, than they wish it to do.
The ordinary expense of the greater part of modern governments, in time
of peace, being equal, or nearly equal, to their ordinary revenue, when war
comes, they are both unwilling and unable to increase their revenue in
proportion to the increase of their expense. They are unwilling, for fear of
offending the people, who, by so great and so sudden an increase of taxes,
would soon be disgusted with the war; and they are unable, from not well
knowing what taxes would be sufficient to produce the revenue wanted. The
facility of borrowing delivers them from the embarrassment which this fear
and inability would otherwise occasion. By means of borrowing, they are
enabled, with a very moderate increase of taxes, to raise, from year to year,
money sufficient for carrying on the war; and by the practice of perpetual
funding, they are enabled, with the smallest possible increase of taxes, to
raise annually the largest possible sum of money. In great empires, the
people who live in the capital, and in the provinces remote from the scene
of action, feel, many of them, scarce any inconveniency from the war, but
enjoy, at their ease, the amusement of reading in the newspapers the
exploits of their own fleets and armies. To them this amusement
compensates the small difference between the taxes which they pay on
account of the war, and those which they had been accustomed to pay in
time of peace. They are commonly dissatisfied with the return of peace,
which puts an end to their amusement, and to a thousand visionary hopes of
conquest and national glory, from a longer continuance of the war.
The return of peace, indeed, seldom relieves them from the greater part
of the taxes imposed during the war. These are mortgaged for the interest of
the debt contracted, in order to carry it on. If, over and above paying the
interest of this debt, and defraying the ordinary expense of government, the
old revenue, together with the new taxes, produce some surplus revenue, it
may, perhaps, be converted into a sinking fund for paying off the debt. But,
in the first place, this sinking fund, even supposing it should be applied to
no other purpose, is generally altogether inadequate for paying, in the
course of any period during which it can reasonably be expected that peace
should continue, the whole debt contracted during the war; and, in the
second place, this fund is almost always applied to other purposes.
The new taxes were imposed for the sole purpose of paying the interest
of the money borrowed upon them. If they produce more, it is generally
something which was neither intended nor expected, and is, therefore,
seldom very considerable. Sinking funds have generally arisen, not so much
from any surplus of the taxes which was over and above what was
necessary for paying the interest or annuity originally charged upon them,
as from a subsequent reduction of that interest; that of Holland in 1655, and
that of the ecclesiastical state in 1685, were both formed in this manner.
Hence the usual insufficiency of such funds.
During the most profound peace, various events occur, which require an
extraordinary expense; and government finds it always more convenient to
defray this expense by misapplying the sinking fund, than by imposing a
new tax. Every new tax is immediately felt more or less by the people. It
occasions always some murmur, and meets with some opposition. The more
taxes may have been multiplied, the higher they may have been raised upon
every different subject of taxation; the more loudly the people complain of
every new tax, the more difficult it becomes, too, either to find out new
subjects of taxation, or to raise much higher the taxes already imposed upon
the old. A momentary suspension of the payment of debt is not immediately
felt by the people, and occasions neither murmur nor complaint. To borrow
of the sinking fund is always an obvious and easy expedient for getting out
of the present difficulty. The more the public debts may have been
accumulated, the more necessary it may have become to study to reduce
them; the more dangerous, the more ruinous it may be to misapply any part
of the sinking fund; the less likely is the public debt to be reduced to any
considerable degree, the more likely, the more certainly, is the sinking fund
to be misapplied towards defraying all the extraordinary expenses which
occur in time of peace. When a nation is already overburdened with taxes,
nothing but the necessities of a new war, nothing but either the animosity of
national vengeance, or the anxiety for national security, can induce the
people to submit, with tolerable patience, to a new tax. Hence the usual
misapplication of the sinking fund.
In Great Britain, from the time that we had first recourse to the ruinous
expedient of perpetual funding, the reduction of the public debt, in time of
peace, has never borne any proportion to its accumulation in time of war. It
was in the war which began in 1668, and was concluded by the treaty of
Ryswick, in 1697, that the foundation of the present enormous debt of Great
Britain was first laid.
On the 31st of December 1697, the public debts of Great Britain, funded
and unfunded, amounted to £21,515,742:13:8½. A great part of those debts
had been contracted upon short anticipations, and some part upon annuities
for lives; so that, before the 31st of December 1701, in less than four years,
there had partly been paid off; and partly reverted to the public, the sum of
£5,121,041:12:0¾d; a greater reduction of the public debt than has ever
since been brought about in so short a period of time. The remaining debt,
therefore, amounted only to £16,394,701:1:7¼d.
In the war which began in 1702, and which was concluded by the treaty
of Utrecht, the public debts were still more accumulated. On the 31st of
December 1714, they amounted to £53,681,076:5:6½. The subscription into
the South-sea fund, of the short and long annuities, increased the capital of
the public debt; so that, on the 31st of December 1722, it amounted to
£55,282,978:1:3 5/6. The reduction of the debt began in 1723, and went on
so slowly, that, on the 31st of December 1739, during seventeen years-of
profound peace, the whole sum paid off was no more than £8,328,554:17:11
3/12, the capital of the public debt, at that time, amounting to
£46,954,623:3:4 7/12.
The Spanish war, which began in 1739, and the French war which soon
followed it, occasioned a further increase of the debt, which, on the 31st of
December 1748, after the war had been concluded by the treaty of Aix-la-
Chapelle, amounted to £78,293,313:1:10¾. The most profound peace, of 17
years continuance, had taken no more than £8,328,354, 17:11¼ from it. A
war, of less than nine years continuance, added £31,338,689:18: 6 1/6 to it.
{See James Postlethwaite’s History of the Public Revenue.}
During the administration of Mr. Pelham, the interest of the public debt
was reduced, or at least measures were taken for reducing it, from four to
three per cent.; the sinking fund was increased, and some part of the public
debt was paid off. In 1755, before the breaking out of the late war, the
funded debt of Great Britain amounted to £72,289,675. On the 5th of
January 1763, at the conclusion of the peace, the funded debt amounted
debt to £122,603,336:8:2¼. The unfunded debt has been stated at
£13,927,589:2:2. But the expense occasioned by the war did not end with
the conclusion of the peace; so that, though on the 5th of January 1764, the
funded debt was increased (partly by a new loan, and partly by funding a
part of the unfunded debt) to £129,586,789:10:1¾, there still remained
(according to the very well informed author of Considerations on the Trade
and Finances of Great Britain) an unfunded debt, which was brought to
account in that and the following year, of £9,975,017: 12:2 15/44d. In 1764,
therefore, the public debt of Great Britain, funded and unfunded together,
amounted, according to this author, to £139,561,807:2:4. The annuities for
lives, too, which had been granted as premiums to the subscribers to the
new loans in 1757, estimated at fourteen years purchase, were valued at
£472,500; and the annuities for long terms of years, granted as premiums
likewise, in 1761 and 1762, estimated at twenty-seven and a-half years
purchase, were valued at £6,826,875. During a peace of about seven years
continuance, the prudent and truly patriotic administration of Mr. Pelham
was not able to pay off an old debt of six millions. During a war of nearly
the same continuance, a new debt of more than seventy-five millions was
contracted.
On the 5th of January 1775, the funded debt of Great Britain amounted to
£124,996,086, 1:6¼d. The unfunded, exclusive of a large civil-list debt, to
£4,150,236:3:11 7/8. Both together, to £129,146,322:5:6. According to this
account, the whole debt paid off, during eleven years of profound peace,
amounted only to £10,415,476:16:9 7/8. Even this small reduction of debt,
however, has not been all made from the savings out of the ordinary
revenue of the state. Several extraneous sums, altogether independent of
that ordinary revenue, have contributed towards it. Amongst these we may
reckon an additional shilling in the pound land tax, for three years; the two
millions received from the East-India company, as indemnification for their
territorial acquisitions; and the one hundred and ten thousand pounds
received from the bank for the renewal of their charter. To these must be
added several other sums, which, as they arose out of the late war, ought
perhaps to be considered as deductions from the expenses of it. The
principal are,
   The produce of French prizes..............    £690,449: 18: 9
   Composition for French prisoners.........      670,000:  0: 0
   What has been received from the sale
   of the ceded islands.........................   95,500:  0: 0
   Total, .....................................£1,455,949: 18: 9
If we add to this sum the balance of the earl of Chatham’s and Mr.
Calcraft’s accounts, and other army savings of the same kind, together with
what has been received from the bank, the East-India company, and the
additional shilling in the pound land tax, the whole must be a good deal
more than five millions. The debt, therefore, which, since the peace, has
been paid out of the savings from the ordinary revenue of the state, has not,
one year with another, amounted to half a million a-year. The sinking fund
has, no doubt, been considerably augmented since the peace, by the debt
which had been paid off, by the reduction of the redeemable four per cents
to three per cents, and by the annuities for lives which have fallen in; and, if
peace were to continue, a million, perhaps, might now be annually spared
out of it towards the discharge of the debt. Another million, accordingly,
was paid in the course of last year; but at the same time, a large civil-list
debt was left unpaid, and we are now involved in a new war, which, in its
progress, may prove as expensive as any of our former wars. {It has proved
more expensive than any one of our former wars, and has involved us in an
additional debt of more than one hundred millions. During a profound
peace of eleven years, little more than ten millions of debt was paid; during
a war of seven years, more than one hundred millions was contracted.} The
new debt which will probably be contracted before the end of the next
campaign, may, perhaps, be nearly equal to all the old debt which has been
paid off from the savings out of the ordinary revenue of the state. It would
be altogether chimerical, therefore, to expect that the public debt should
ever be completely discharged, by any savings which are likely to be made
from that ordinary revenue as it stands at present.
The public funds of the different indebted nations of Europe, particularly
those of England, have, by one author, been represented as the
accumulation of a great capital, superadded to the other capital of the
country, by means of which its trade is extended, its manufactures are
multiplied, and its lands cultivated and improved, much beyond what they
could have been by means of that other capital only. He does not consider
that the capital which the first creditors of the public advanced to
government, was, from the moment in which he advanced it, a certain
portion of the annual produce, turned away from serving in the function of a
capital, to serve in that of a revenue; from maintaining productive labourers,
to maintain unproductive ones, and to be spent and wasted, generally in the
course of the year, without even the hope of any future reproduction. In
return for the capital which they advanced, they obtained, indeed, an
annuity of the public funds, in most cases, of more than equal value. This
annuity, no doubt, replaced to them their capital, and enabled them to carry
on their trade and business to the same, or, perhaps, to a greater extent than
before; that is, they were enabled, either to borrow of other people a new
capital, upon the credit of this annuity or, by selling it, to get from other
people a new capital of their own, equal, or superior, to that which they had
advanced to government. This new capital, however, which they in this
manner either bought or borrowed of other people, must have existed in the
country before, and must have been employed, as all capitals are, in
maintaining productive labour. When it came into the hands of those who
had advanced their money to government, though it was, in some respects, a
new capital to them, it was not so to the country, but was only a capital
withdrawn from certain employments, in order to be turned towards others.
Though it replaced to them what they had advanced to government, it did
not replace it to the country. Had they not advanced this capital to
government, there would have been in the country two capitals, two
portions of the annual produce, instead of one, employed in maintaining
productive labour.
When, for defraying the expense of government, a revenue is raised
within the year, from the produce of free or unmortgaged taxes, a certain
portion of the revenue of private people is only turned away from
maintaining one species of unproductive labour, towards maintaining
another. Some part of what they pay in those taxes, might, no doubt, have
been accumulated into capital, and consequently employed in maintaining
productive labour; but the greater part would probably have been spent, and
consequently employed in maintaining unproductive labour. The public
expense, however, when defrayed in this manner, no doubt hinders, more or
less, the further accumulation of new capital; but it does not necessarily
occasion the destruction of any actually-existing capital.
When the public expense is defrayed by funding, it is defrayed by the
annual destruction of some capital which had before existed in the country;
by the perversion of some portion of the annual produce which had before
been destined for the maintenance of productive labour, towards that of
unproductive labour. As in this case, however, the taxes are lighter than they
would have been, had a revenue sufficient for defraying the same expense
been raised within the year; the private revenue of individuals is necessarily
less burdened, and consequently their ability to save and accumulate some
part of that revenue into capital, is a good deal less impaired. If the method
of funding destroys more old capital, it, at the same time, hinders less the
accumulation or acquisition of new capital, than that of defraying the public
expense by a revenue raised within the year. Under the system of funding,
the frugality and industry of private people can more easily repair the
breaches which the waste and extravagance of government may
occasionally make in the general capital of the society.
It is only during the continuance of war, however, that the system of
funding has this advantage over the other system. Were the expense of war
to be defrayed always by a revenue raised within the year, the taxes from
which that extraordinary revenue was drawn would last no longer than the
war. The ability of private people to accumulate, though less during the war,
would have been greater during the peace, than under the system of
funding. War would not necessarily have occasioned the destruction of any
old capitals, and peace would have occasioned the accumulation of many
more new. Wars would, in general, be more speedily concluded, and less
wantonly undertaken. The people feeling, during continuance of war, the
complete burden of it, would soon grow weary of it; and government, in
order to humour them, would not be under the necessity of carrying it on
longer than it was necessary to do so. The foresight of the heavy and
unavoidable burdens of war would hinder the people from wantonly calling
for it when there was no real or solid interest to fight for. The seasons
during which the ability of private people to accumulate was somewhat
impaired, would occur more rarely, and be of shorter continuance. Those,
on the contrary, during which that ability was in the highest vigour would
be of much longer duration than they can well be under the system of
funding.
When funding, besides, has made a certain progress, the multiplication of
taxes which it brings along with it, sometimes impairs as much the ability
of private people to accumulate, even in time of peace, as the other system
would in time of war. The peace revenue of Great Britain amounts at
present to more than ten millions a-year. If free and unmortgaged, it might
be sufficient, with proper management, and without contracting a shilling of
new debt, to carry on the most vigorous war. The private revenue of the
inhabitants of Great Britain is at present as much incumbered in time of
peace, their ability to accumulate is as much impaired, as it would have
been in the time of the most expensive war, had the pernicious system of
funding never been adopted.
In the payment of the interest of the public debt, it has been said, it is the
right hand which pays the left. The money does not go out of the country. It
is only a part of the revenue of one set of the inhabitants which is
transferred to another; and the nation is not a farthing the poorer. This
apology is founded altogether in the sophistry of the mercantile system;
and, after the long examination which I have already bestowed upon that
system, it may, perhaps, be unnecessary to say anything further about it. It
supposes, besides, that the whole public debt is owing to the inhabitants of
the country, which happens not to be true; the Dutch, as well as several
other foreign nations, having a very considerable share in our public funds.
But though the whole debt were owing to the inhabitants of the country, it
would not, upon that account, be less pernicious.
Land and capital stock are the two original sources of all revenue, both
private and public. Capital stock pays the wages of productive labour,
whether employed in agriculture, manufactures, or commerce. The
management of those two original sources of revenue belongs to two
different sets of people; the proprietors of land, and the owners or
employers of capital stock.
The proprietor of land is interested, for the sake of his own revenue, to
keep his estate in as good condition as he can, by building and repairing his
tenants houses, by making and maintaining the necessary drains and
inclosures, and all those other expensive improvements which it properly
belongs to the landlord to make and maintain. But, by different land taxes,
the revenue of the landlord may be so much diminished, and, by different
duties upon the necessaries and conveniencies of life, that diminished
revenue may be rendered of so little real value, that he may find himself
altogether unable to make or maintain those expensive improvements.
When the landlord, however, ceases to do his part, it is altogether
impossible that the tenant should continue to do his. As the distress of the
landlord increases, the agriculture of the country must necessarily decline.
When, by different taxes upon the necessaries and conveniencies of life,
the owners and employers of capital stock find, that whatever revenue they
derive from it, will not, in a particular country, purchase the same quantity
of those necessaries and conveniencies which an equal revenue would in
almost any other, they will be disposed to remove to some other. And when,
in order to raise those taxes, all or the greater part of merchants and
manufacturers, that is, all or the greater part of the employers of great
capitals, come to be continually exposed to the mortifying and vexatious
visits of the tax-gatherers, this disposition to remove will soon be changed
into an actual removing. The industry of the country will necessarily fall
with the removal of the capital which supported it, and the ruin of trade and
manufactures will follow the declension of agriculture.
To transfer from the owners of those two great sources of revenue, land,
and capital stock, from the persons immediately interested in the good
condition of every particular portion of land, and in the good management
of every particular portion of capital stock, to another set of persons (the
creditors of the public, who have no such particular interest ), the greater
part of the revenue arising from either, must, in the long-run, occasion both
the neglect of land, and the waste or removal of capital stock. A creditor of
the public has, no doubt, a general interest in the prosperity of the
agriculture, manufactures, and commerce of the country; and consequently
in the good condition of its land, and in the good management of its capital
stock. Should there be any general failure or declension in any of these
things, the produce of the different taxes might no longer be sufficient to
pay him the annuity or interest which is due to him. But a creditor of the
public, considered merely as such, has no interest in the good condition of
any particular portion of land, or in the good management of any particular
portion of capital stock. As a creditor of the public, he has no knowledge of
any such particular portion. He has no inspection of it. He can have no care
about it. Its ruin may in some cases be unknown to him, and cannot directly
affect him.
The practice of funding has gradually enfeebled every state which has
adopted it. The Italian republics seem to have begun it. Genoa and Venice,
the only two remaining which can pretend to an independent existence,
have both been enfeebled by it. Spain seems to have learned the practice
from the Italian republics, and (its taxes being probably less judicious than
theirs) it has, in proportion to its natural strength, been-still more enfeebled.
The debts of Spain are of very old standing. It was deeply in debt before the
end of the sixteenth century, about a hundred years before England owed a
shilling. France, notwithstanding all its natural resources, languishes under
an oppressive load of the same kind. The republic of the United Provinces
is as much enfeebled by its debts as either Genoa or Venice. Is it likely that,
in Great Britain alone, a practice, which has brought either weakness or
dissolution into every other country, should prove altogether innocent?
The system of taxation established in those different countries, it may be
said, is inferior to that of England. I believe it is so. But it ought to be
remembered, that when the wisest government has exhausted all the proper
subjects of taxation, it must, in cases of urgent necessity, have recourse to
improper ones. The wise republic of Holland has, upon some occasions,
been obliged to have recourse to taxes as inconvenient as the greater part of
those of Spain. Another war, begun before any considerable liberation of
the public revenue had been brought about, and growing in its progress as
expensive as the last war, may, from irresistible necessity, render the British
system of taxation as oppressive as that of Holland, or even as that of Spain.
To the honour of our present system of taxation, indeed, it has hitherto
given so little embarrassment to industry, that, during the course even of the
most expensive wars, the frugality and good conduct of individuals seem to
have been able, by saving and accumulation, to repair all the breaches
which the waste and extravagance of government had made in the general
capital of the society. At the conclusion of the late war, the most expensive
that Great Britain ever waged, her agriculture was as flourishing, her
manufacturers as numerous and as fully employed, and her commerce as
extensive, as they had ever been before. The capital, therefore, which
supported all those different branches of industry, must have been equal to
what it had ever been before. Since the peace, agriculture has been still
further improved; the rents of houses have risen in every town and village
of the country, a proof of the increasing wealth and revenue of the people;
and the annual amount of the greater part of the old taxes, of the principal
branches of the excise and customs, in particular, has been continually
increasing, an equally clear proof of an increasing consumption, and
consequently of an increasing produce, which could alone support that
consumption. Great Britain seems to support with ease, a burden which,
half a century ago, nobody believed her capable of supporting, Let us not,
however, upon this account, rashly conclude that she is capable of
supporting any burden; nor even be too confident that she could support,
without great distress, a burden a little greater than what has already been
laid upon her.
When national debts have once been accumulated to a certain degree,
there is scarce, I believe, a single instance of their having been fairly and
completely paid. The liberation of the public revenue, if it has ever been
brought about at all, has always been brought about by a bankruptcy;
sometimes by an avowed one, though frequently by a pretended payment.
The raising of the denomination of the coin has been the most usual
expedient by which a real public bankruptcy has been disguised under the
appearance of a pretended payment. If a sixpence, for example, should,
either by act of parliament or royal proclamation, be raised to the
denomination of a shilling, and twenty sixpences to that of a pound sterling;
the person who, under the old denomination, had borrowed twenty shillings,
or near four ounces of silver, would, under the new, pay with twenty
sixpences, or with something less than two ounces. A national debt of about
a hundred and twenty-eight millions, near the capital of the funded and
unfunded debt of Great Britain, might, in this manner, be paid with about
sixty-four millions of our present money. It would, indeed, be a pretended
payment only, and the creditors of the public would really be defrauded of
ten shillings in the pound of what was due to them. The calamity, too,
would extend much further than to the creditors of the public, and those of
every private person would suffer a proportionable loss; and this without
any advantage, but in most cases with a great additional loss, to the
creditors of the public. If the creditors of the public, indeed, were generally
much in debt to other people, they might in some measure compensate their
loss by paying their creditors in the same coin in which the public had paid
them. But in most countries, the creditors of the public are, the greater part
of them, wealthy people, who stand more in the relation of creditors than in
that of debtors, towards the rest of their fellow citizens. A pretended
payment of this kind, therefore, instead of alleviating, aggravates, in most
cases, the loss of the creditors of the public; and, without any advantage to
the public, extends the calamity to a great number of other innocent people.
It occasions a general and most pernicious subversion of the fortunes of
private people; enriching, in most cases, the idle and profuse debtor, at the
expense of the industrious and frugal creditor; and transporting a great part
of the national capital from the hands which were likely to increase and
improve it, to those who are likely to dissipate and destroy it. When it
becomes necessary for a state to declare itself bankrupt, in the same manner
as when it becomes necessary for an individual to do so, a fair, open, and
avowed bankruptcy, is always the measure which is both least
dishonourable to the debtor, and least hurtful to the creditor. The honour of
a state is surely very poorly provided for, when, in order to cover the
disgrace of a real bankruptcy, it has recourse to a juggling trick of this kind,
so easily seen through, and at the same time so extremely pernicious.
Almost all states, however, ancient as well as modern, when reduced to
this necessity, have, upon some occasions, played this very juggling trick.
The Romans, at the end of the first Punic war, reduced the As, the coin or
denomination by which they computed the value of all their other coins,
from containing twelve ounces of copper, to contain only two ounces; that
is, they raised two ounces of copper to a denomination which had always
before expressed the value of twelve ounces. The republic was, in this
manner, enabled to pay the great debts which it had contracted with the
sixth part of what it really owed. So sudden and so great a bankruptcy, we
should in the present times be apt to imagine, must have occasioned a very
violent popular clamour. It does not appear to have occasioned any. The law
which enacted it was, like all other laws relating to the coin, introduced and
carried through the assembly of the people by a tribune, and was probably a
very popular law. In Rome, as in all other ancient republics, the poor people
were constantly in debt to the rich and the great, who, in order to secure
their votes at the annual elections, used to lend them money at exorbitant
interest, which, being never paid, soon accumulated into a sum too great
either for the debtor to pay, or for any body else to pay for him. The debtor,
for fear of a very severe execution, was obliged, without any further
gratuity, to vote for the candidate whom the creditor recommended. In spite
of all the laws against bribery and corruption, the bounty of the candidates,
together with the occasional distributions of coin which were ordered by the
senate, were the principal funds from which, during the latter times of the
Roman republic, the poorer citizens derived their subsistence. To deliver
themselves from this subjection to their creditors, the poorer citizens were
continually calling out, either for an entire abolition of debts, or for what
they called new tables; that is, for a law which should entitle them to a
complete acquittance, upon paying only a certain proportion of their
accumulated debts. The law which reduced the coin of all denominations to
a sixth part of its former value, as it enabled them to pay their debts with a
sixth part of what they really owed, was equivalent to the most
advantageous new tables. In order to satisfy the people, the rich and the
great were, upon several different occasions, obliged to consent to laws,
both for abolishing debts, and for introducing new tables; and they probably
were induced to consent to this law, partly for the same reason, and partly
that, by liberating the public revenue, they might restore vigour to that
government, of which they themselves had the principal direction. An
operation of this kind would at once reduce a debt of £128,000,000 to
£21,333,333:6:8. In the course of the second Punic war, the As was still
further reduced, first, from two ounces of copper to one ounce, and
afterwards from one ounce to half an ounce; that is, to the twenty-fourth
part of its original value. By combining the three Roman operations into
one, a debt of a hundred and twenty-eight millions of our present money,
might in this manner be reduced all at once to a debt of £5,333,333:6:8.
Even the enormous debt of Great Britain might in this manner soon be paid.
By means of such expedients, the coin of, I believe, all nations, has been
gradually reduced more and more below its original value, and the same
nominal sum has been gradually brought to contain a smaller and a smaller
quantity of silver.
Nations have sometimes, for the same purpose, adulterated the standard
of their coin; that is, have mixed a greater quantity of alloy in it. If in the
pound weight of our silver coin, for example, instead of eighteen penny-
weight, according to the present standard, there were mixed eight ounces of
alloy; a pound sterling, or twenty shillings of such coin, would be worth
little more than six shillings and eightpence of our present money. The
quantity of silver contained in six shillings and eightpence of our present
money, would thus be raised very nearly to the denomination of a pound
sterling. The adulteration of the standard has exactly the same effect with
what the French call an augmentation, or a direct raising of the
denomination of the coin.
An augmentation, or a direct raising of the denomination of the coin,
always is, and from its nature must be, an open and avowed operation. By
means of it, pieces of a smaller weight and bulk are called by the same
name, which had before been given to pieces of a greater weight and bulk.
The adulteration of the standard, on the contrary, has generally been a
concealed operation. By means of it, pieces are issued from the mint, of the
same denomination, and, as nearly as could be contrived, of the same
weight, bulk, and appearance, with pieces which had been current before of
much greater value. When king John of France, {See Du Cange Glossary,
voce Moneta; the Benedictine Edition.} in order to pay his debts,
adulterated his coin, all the officers of his mint were sworn to secrecy. Both
operations are unjust. But a simple augmentation is an injustice of open
violence; whereas an adulteration is an injustice of treacherous fraud. This
latter operation, therefore, as soon as it has been discovered, and it could
never be concealed very long, has always excited much greater indignation
than the former. The coin, after any considerable augmentation, has very
seldom been brought back to its former weight; but after the greatest
adulterations, it has almost always been brought back to its former fineness.
It has scarce ever happened, that the fury and indignation of the people
could otherwise be appeased.
In the end of the reign of Henry VIII., and in the beginning of that of
Edward VI., the English coin was not only raised in its denomination, but
adulterated in its standard. The like frauds were practised in Scotland
during the minority of James VI. They have occasionally been practised in
most other countries.
That the public revenue of Great Britain can never be completely
liberated, or even that any considerable progress can ever be made towards
that liberation, while the surplus of that revenue, or what is over and above
defraying the annual expense of the peace establishment, is so very small, it
seems altogether in vain to expect. That liberation, it is evident, can never
be brought about, without either some very considerable augmentation of
the public revenue, or some equally considerable reduction of the public
expense.
A more equal land tax, a more equal tax upon the rent of houses, and
such alterations in the present system of customs and excise as those which
have been mentioned in the foregoing chapter, might, perhaps, without
increasing the burden of the greater part of the people, but only distributing
the weight of it more equally upon the whole, produce a considerable
augmentation of revenue. The most sanguine projector, however, could
scarce flatter himself, that any augmentation of this kind would be such as
could give any reasonable hopes, either of liberating the public revenue
altogether, or even of making such progress towards that liberation in time
of peace, as either to prevent or to compensate the further accumulation of
the public debt in the next war.
By extending the British system of taxation to all the different provinces
of the empire, inhabited by people either of British or European extraction,
a much greater augmentation of revenue might be expected. This, however,
could scarce, perhaps, be done, consistently with the principles of the
British constitution, without admitting into the British parliament, or, if you
will, into the states-general of the British empire, a fair and equal
representation of all those different provinces; that of each province bearing
the same proportion to the produce of its taxes, as the representation of
Great Britain might bear to the produce of the taxes levied upon Great
Britain. The private interest of many powerful individuals, the confirmed
prejudices of great bodies of people, seem, indeed, at present, to oppose to
so great a change, such obstacles as it may be very difficult, perhaps
altogether impossible, to surmount. Without, however, pretending to
determine whether such a union be practicable or impracticable, it may not,
perhaps, be improper, in a speculative work of this kind, to consider how far
the British system of taxation might be applicable to all the different
provinces of the empire; what revenue might be expected from it, if so
applied; and in what manner a general union of this kind might be likely to
affect the happiness and prosperity of the differrent provinces
comprehended within it. Such a speculation, can, at worst, be regarded but
as a new Utopia, less amusing, certainly, but no more useless and
chimerical than the old one.
The land-tax, the stamp duties, and the different duties of customs and
excise, constitute the four principal branches of the British taxes.
Ireland is certainly as able, and our American and West India plantations
more able, to pay a land tax, than Great Britain. Where the landlord is
subject neither to tythe nor poor’s rate, he must certainly be more able to
pay such a tax, than where he is subject to both those other burdens. The
tythe, where there is no modus, and where it is levied in kind, diminishes
more what would otherwise be the rent of the landlord, than a land tax
which really amounted to five shillings in the pound. Such a tythe will be
found, in most cases, to amount to more than a fourth part of the real rent of
the land, or of what remains after replacing completely the capital of the
farmer, together with his reasonable profit. If all moduses and all
impropriations were taken away, the complete church tythe of Great Britain
and Ireland could not well be estimated at less than six or seven millions. If
there was no tythe either in Great Britain or Ireland, the landlords could
afford to pay six or seven millions additional land tax, without being more
burdened than a very great part of them are at present. America pays no
tythe, and could, therefore, very well afford to pay a land tax. The lands in
America and the West Indies, indeed, are, in general, not tenanted nor
leased out to farmers. They could not, therefore, be assessed according to
any rent roll. But neither were the lands of Great Britain, in the 4th of
William and Mary, assessed according to any rent roll, but according to a
very loose and inaccurate estimation. The lands in America might be
assessed either in the same manner, or according to an equitable valuation,
in consequence of an accurate survey, like that which was lately made in the
Milanese, and in the dominions of Austria, Prussia, and Sardinia.
Stamp duties, it is evident, might be levied without any variation, in all
countries where the forms of law process, and the deeds by which property,
both real and personal, is transferred, are the same, or nearly the same.
The extension of the custom-house laws of Great Britain to Ireland and
the plantations, provided it was accompanied, as in justice it ought to be,
with an extension of the freedom of trade, would be in the highest degree
advantageous to both. All the invidious restraints which at present oppress
the trade of Ireland, the distinction between the enumerated and non-
enumerated commodities of America, would be entirely at an end. The
countries north of Cape Finisterre would be as open to every part of the
produce of America, as those south of that cape are to some parts of that
produce at present. The trade between all the different parts of the British
empire would, in consequence of this uniformity in the custom-house laws,
be as free as the coasting trade of Great Britain is at present. The British
empire would thus afford, within itself, an immense internal market for
every part of the produce of all its different provinces. So great an extension
of market would soon compensate, both to Ireland and the plantations, all
that they could suffer from the increase of the duties of customs.
The excise is the only part of the British system of taxation, which would
require to be varied in any respect, according as it was applied to the
different provinces of the empire. It might be applied to Ireland without any
variation; the produce and consumption of that kingdom being exactly of
the same nature with those of Great Britain. In its application to America
and the West Indies, of which the produce and consumption are so very
different from those of Great Britain, some modification might be
necessary, in the same manner as in its application to the cyder and beer
counties of England.
A fermented liquor, for example, which is called beer, but which, as it is
made of molasses, bears very little resemblance to our beer, makes a
considerable part of the common drink of the people in America. This
liquor, as it can be kept only for a few days, cannot, like our beer, be
prepared and stored up for sale in great breweries; but every private family
must brew it for their own use, in the same manner as they cook their
victuals. But to subject every private family to the odious visits and
examination of the tax-gatherers, in the same manner as we subject the
keepers of ale-houses and the brewers for public sale, would be altogether
inconsistent with liberty. If, for the sake of equality, it was thought
necessary to lay a tax upon this liquor, it might be taxed by taxing the
material of which it is made, either at the place of manufacture, or, if the
circumstances of the trade rendered such an excise improper, by laying a
duty upon its importation into the colony in which it was to be consumed.
Besides the duty of one penny a-gallon imposed by the British parliament
upon the importation of molasses into America, there is a provincial tax of
this kind upon their importation into Massachusetts Bay, in ships belonging
to any other colony, of eight-pence the hogshead; and another upon their
importation from the northern colonies into South Carolina, of five-pence
the gallon. Or, if neither of these methods was found convenient, each
family might compound for its consumption of this liquor, either according
to the number of persons of which it consisted, in the same manner as
private families compound for the malt tax in England; or according to the
different ages and sexes of those persons, in the same manner as several
different taxes are levied in Holland; or, nearly as Sir Matthew Decker
proposes, that all taxes upon consumable commodities should be levied in
England. This mode of taxation, it has already been observed, when applied
to objects of a speedy consumption, is not a very convenient one. It might
be adopted, however, in cases where no better could be done.
Sugar, rum, and tobacco, are commodities which are nowhere necessaries
of life, which are become objects of almost universal consumption, and
which are, therefore, extremely proper subjects of taxation. If a union with
the colonies were to take place, those commodities might be taxed, either
before they go out of the hands of the manufacturer or grower; or, if this
mode of taxation did not suit the circumstances of those persons, they might
be deposited in public warehouses, both at the place of manufacture, and at
all the different ports of the empire, to which they might afterwards be
transported, to remain there, under the joint custody of the owner and the
revenue officer, till such time as they should be delivered out, either to the
consumer, to the merchant-retailer for home consumption, or to the
merchant-exporter; the tax not to be advanced till such delivery. When
delivered out for exportation, to go duty-free, upon proper security being
given, that they should really be exported out of the empire. These are,
perhaps, the principal commodities, with regard to which the union with the
colonies might require some considerable change in the present system of
British taxation.
What might be the amount of the revenue which this system of taxation,
extended to all the different provinces of the empire, might produce, it
must, no doubt, be altogether impossible to ascertain with tolerable
exactness. By means of this system, there is annually levied in Great
Britain, upon less than eight millions of people, more than ten millions of
revenue. Ireland contains more than two millions of people, and, according
to the accounts laid before the congress, the twelve associated provinces of
America contain more than three. Those accounts, however, may have been
exaggerated, in order, perhaps, either to encourage their own people, or to
intimidate those of this country; and we shall suppose, therefore, that our
North American and West Indian colonies, taken together, contain no more
than three millions; or that the whole British empire, in Europe and
America, contains no more than thirteen millions of inhabitants. If, upon
less than eight millions of inhabitants, this system of taxation raises a
revenue of more than ten millions sterling; it ought, upon thirteen millions
of inhabitants, to raise a revenue of more than sixteen millions two hundred
and fifty thousand pounds sterling. From this revenue, supposing that this
system could produce it, must be deducted the revenue usually raised in
Ireland and the plantations, for defraying the expense of the respective civil
governments. The expense of the civil and military establishment of
Ireland, together with the interest of the public debt, amounts, at a medium
of the two years which ended March 1775, to something less than seven
hundred and fifty thousand pounds a year. By a very exact account of the
revenue of the principal colonies of America and the West Indies, it
amounted, before the commencement of the present disturbances, to a
hundred and forty-one thousand eight hundred pounds. In this account,
however, the revenue of Maryland, of North Carolina, and of all our late
acquisitions, both upon the continent, and in the islands, is omitted; which
may, perhaps, make a difference of thirty or forty thousand pounds. For the
sake of even numbers, therefore, let us suppose that the revenue necessary
for supporting the civil government of Ireland and the plantations may
amount to a million. There would remain, consequently, a revenue of fifteen
millions two hundred and fifty thousand pounds, to be applied towards
defraying the general expense of the empire, and towards paying the public
debt. But if, from the present revenue of Great Britain, a million could, in
peaceable times, be spared towards the payment of that debt, six millions
two hundred and fifty thousand pounds could very well be spared from this
improved revenue. This great sinking fund, too, might be augmented every
year by the interest of the debt which had been discharged the year before;
and might, in this manner, increase so very rapidly, as to be sufficient in a
few years to discharge the whole debt, and thus to restore completely the at-
present debilitated and languishing vigour of the empire. In the meantime,
the people might be relieved from some of the most burdensome taxes;
from those which are imposed either upon the necessaries of life, or upon
the materials of manufacture. The labouring poor would thus be enabled to
live better, to work cheaper, and to send their goods cheaper to market. The
cheapness of their goods would increase the demand for them, and
consequently for the labour of those who produced them. This increase in
the demand for labour would both increase the numbers, and improve the
circumstances of the labouring poor. Their consumption would increase,
and, together with it, the revenue arising from all those articles of their
consumption upon which the taxes might be allowed to remain.
The revenue arising from this system of taxation, however, might not
immediately increase in proportion to the number of people who were
subjected to it. Great indulgence would for some time be due to those
provinces of the empire which were thus subjected to burdens to which they
had not before been accustomed; and even when the same taxes came to be
levied everywhere as exactly as possible, they would not everywhere
produce a revenue proportioned to the numbers of the people. In a poor
country, the consumption of the principal commodities subject to the duties
of customs and excise, is very small; and in a thinly inhabited country, the
opportunities of smuggling are very great. The consumption of malt liquors
among the inferior ranks of people in Scotland is very small; and the excise
upon malt, beer, and ale, produces less there than in England, in proportion
to the numbers of the people and the rate of the duties, which upon malt is
different, on account of a supposed difference of quality. In these particular
branches of the excise, there is not, I apprehend, much more smuggling in
the one country than in the other. The duties upon the distillery, and the
greater part of the duties of customs, in proportion to the numbers of people
in the respective countries, produce less in Scotland than in England, not
only on account of the smaller consumption of the taxed commodities, but
of the much greater facility of smuggling. In Ireland, the inferior ranks of
people are still poorer than in Scotland, and many parts of the country are
almost as thinly inhabited. In Ireland, therefore, the consumption of the
taxed commodities might, in proportion to the number of the people, be still
less than in Scotland, and the facility of smuggling nearly the same. In
America and the West Indies, the white people, even of the lowest rank, are
in much better circumstances than those of the same rank in England; and
their consumption of all the luxuries in which they usually indulge
themselves, is probably much greater. The blacks, indeed, who make the
greater part of the inhabitants, both of the southern colonies upon the
continent and of the West India islands, as they are in a state of slavery, are,
no doubt, in a worse condition than the poorest people either in Scotland or
Ireland. We must not, however, upon that account, imagine that they are
worse fed, or that their consumption of articles which might be subjected to
moderate duties, is less than that even of the lower ranks of people in
England. In order that they may work well, it is the interest of their master
that they should be fed well, and kept in good heart, in the same manner as
it is his interest that his working cattle should be so. The blacks,
accordingly, have almost everywhere their allowance of rum, and of
molasses or spruce-beer, in the same manner as the white servants; and this
allowance would not probably be withdrawn, though those articles should
be subjected to moderate duties. The consumption of the taxed
commodities, therefore, in proportion to the number of inhabitants, would
probably be as great in America and the West Indies as in any part of the
British empire. The opportunities of smuggling, indeed, would be much
greater; America, in proportion to the extent of the country, being much
more thinly inhabited than either Scotland or Ireland. If the revenue,
however, which is at present raised by the different duties upon malt and
malt liquors, were to be levied by a single duty upon malt, the opportunity
of smuggling in the most important branch of the excise would be almost
entirely taken away; and if the duties of customs, instead of being imposed
upon almost all the different articles of importation, were confined to a few
of the most general use and consumption, and if the levying of those duties
were subjected to the excise laws, the opportunity of smuggling, though not
so entirely taken away, would be very much diminished. In consequence of
those two apparently very simple and easy alterations, the duties of customs
and excise might probably produce a revenue as great, in proportion to the
consumption of the most thinly inhabited province, as they do at present, in
proportion to that of the most populous.
The Americans, it has been said, indeed, have no gold or silver money,
the interior commerce of the country being carried on by a paper currency;
and the gold and silver, which occasionally come among them, being all
sent to Great Britain, in return for the commodities which they receive from
us. But without gold and silver, it is added, there is no possibility of paying
taxes. We already get all the gold and silver which they have. How is it
possible to draw from them what they have not?
The present scarcity of gold and silver money in America, is not the
effect of the poverty of that country, or of the inability of the people there to
purchase those metals. In a country where the wages of labour are so much
higher, and the price of provisions so much lower than in England, the
greater part of the people must surely have wherewithal to purchase a
greater quantity, if it were either necessary or convenient for them to do so.
The scarcity of those metals, therefore, must be the effect of choice, and not
of necessity.
It is for transacting either domestic or foreign business, that gold or silver
money is either necessary or convenient.
The domestic business of every country, it has been shewn in the second
book of this Inquiry, may, at least in peaceable times, be transacted by
means of a paper currency, with nearly the same degree of conveniency as
by gold and silver money. It is convenient for the Americans, who could
always employ with profit, in the improvement of their lands, a greater
stock than they can easily get, to save as much as possible the expense of so
costly an instrument of commerce as gold and silver; and rather to employ
that part of their surplus produce which would be necessary for purchasing
those metals, in purchasing the instruments of trade, the materials of
clothing, several parts of household furniture, and the iron work necessary
for building and extending their settlements and plantations; in purchasing
not dead stock, but active and productive stock. The colony governments
find it for their interest to supply the people with such a quantity of paper
money as is fully sufficient, and generally more than sufficient, for
transacting their domestic business. Some of those governments, that of
Pennsylvania, particularly, derive a revenue from lending this paper money
to their subjects, at an interest of so much per cent. Others, like that of
Massachusetts Bay, advance, upon extraordinary emergencies, a paper
money of this kind for defraying the public expense; and afterwards, when
it suits the conveniency of the colony, redeem it at the depreciated value to
which it gradually falls. In 1747, {See Hutchinson’s History of
Massachusetts Bay vol. ii. page 436 et seq.} that colony paid in this manner
the greater part of its public debts, with the tenth part of the money for
which its bills had been granted. It suits the conveniency of the planters, to
save the expense of employing gold and silver money in their domestic
transactions; and it suits the conveniency of the colony governments, to
supply them with a medium, which, though attended with some very
considerable disadvantages, enables them to save that expense. The
redundancy of paper money necessarily banishes gold and silver from the
domestic transactions of the colonies, for the same reason that it has
banished those metals from the greater part of the domestic transactions in
Scotland; and in both countries, it is not the poverty, but the enterprizing
and projecting spirit of the people, their desire of employing all the stock
which they can get, as active and productive stock, which has occasioned
this redundancy of paper money.
In the exterior commerce which the different colonies carry on with
Great Britain, gold and silver are more or less employed, exactly in
proportion as they are more or less necessary. Where those metals are not
necessary, they seldom appear. Where they are necessary, they are generally
found.
In the commerce between Great Britain and the tobacco colonies, the
British goods are generally advanced to the colonists at a pretty long credit,
and are afterwards paid for in tobacco, rated at a certain price. It is more
convenient for the colonists to pay in tobacco than in gold and silver. It
would be more convenient for any merchant to pay for the goods which his
correspondents had sold to him, in some other sort of goods which he might
happen to deal in, than in money. Such a merchant would have no occasion
to keep any part of his stock by him unemployed, and in ready money, for
answering occasional demands. He could have, at all times, a larger
quantity of goods in his shop or warehouse, and he could deal to a greater
extent. But it seldom happens to be convenient for all the correspondents of
a merchant to receive payment for the goods which they sell to him, in
goods of some other kind which he happens to deal in. The British
merchants who trade to Virginia and Maryland, happen to be a particular set
of correspondents, to whom it is more convenient to receive payment for
the goods which they sell to those colonies in tobacco, than in gold and
silver. They expect to make a profit by the sale of the tobacco; they could
make none by that of the gold and silver. Gold and silver, therefore, very
seldom appear in the commerce between Great Britain and the tobacco
colonies. Maryland and Virginia have as little occasion for those metals in
their foreign, as in their domestic commerce. They are said, accordingly, to
have less gold and silver money than any other colonies in America. They
are reckoned, however, as thriving, and consequently as rich, as any of their
neighbours.
In the northern colonies, Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, the four
governments of New England, etc. the value of their own produce which
they export to Great Britain is not equal to that of the manufactures which
they import for their own use, and for that of some of the other colonies, to
which they are the carriers. A balance, therefore, must be paid to the
mother-country in gold and silver and this balance they generally find.
In the sugar colonies, the value of the produce annually exported to Great
Britain is much greater than that of all the goods imported from thence. If
the sugar and rum annually sent to the mother-country were paid for in
those colonies, Great Britain would be obliged to send out, every year, a
very large balance in money; and the trade to the West Indies would, by a
certain species of politicians, be considered as extremely disadvantageous.
But it so happens, that many of the principal proprietors of the sugar
plantations reside in Great Britain. Their rents are remitted to them in sugar
and rum, the produce of their estates. The sugar and rum which the West
India merchants purchase in those colonies upon their own account, are not
equal in value to the goods which they annually sell there. A balance,
therefore, must necessarily be paid to them in gold and silver, and this
balance, too, is generally found.
The difficulty and irregularity of payment from the different colonies to
Great Britain, have not been at all in proportion to the greatness or
smallness of the balances which were respectively due from them.
Payments have, in general, been more regular from the northern than from
the tobacco colonies, though the former have generally paid a pretty large
balance in money, while the latter have either paid no balance, or a much
smaller one. The difficulty of getting payment from our different sugar
colonies has been greater or less in proportion, not so much to the extent of
the balances respectively due from them, as to the quantity of uncultivated
land which they contained; that is, to the greater or smaller temptation
which the planters have been under of over-trading, or of undertaking the
settlement and plantation of greater quantities of waste land than suited the
extent of their capitals. The returns from the great island of Jamaica, where
there is still much uncultivated land, have, upon this account, been, in
general, more irregular and uncertain than those from the smaller islands of
Barbadoes, Antigua, and St. Christopher’s, which have, for these many
years, been completely cultivated, and have, upon that account, afforded
less field for the speculations of the planter. The new acquisitions of
Grenada, Tobago, St. Vincent’s, and Dominica, have opened a new field for
speculations of this kind; and the returns front those islands have of late
been as irregular and uncertain as those from the great island of Jamaica.
It is not, therefore, the poverty of the colonies which occasions, in the
greater part of them, the present scarcity of gold and silver money. Their
great demand for active and productive stock makes it convenient for them
to have as little dead stock as possible, and disposes them, upon that
account, to content themselves with a cheaper, though less commodious
instrument of commerce, than gold and silver. They are thereby enabled to
convert the value of that gold and silver into the instruments of trade, into
the materials of clothing, into household furniture, and into the iron work
necessary for building and extending their settlements and plantations. In
those branches of business which cannot be transacted without gold and
silver money, it appears, that they can always find the necessary quantity of
those metals; and if they frequently do not find it, their failure is generally
the effect, not of their necessary poverty, but of their unnecessary and
excessive enterprise. It is not because they are poor that their payments are
irregular and uncertain, but because they are too eager to become
excessively rich. Though all that part of the produce of the colony taxes,
which was over and above what was necessary for defraying the expense of
their own civil and military establishments, were to be remitted to Great
Britain in gold and silver, the colonies have abundantly wherewithal to
purchase the requisite quantity of those metals. They would in this case be
obliged, indeed, to exchange a part of their surplus produce, with which
they now purchase active and productive stock, for dead stock. In
transacting their domestic business, they would be obliged to employ a
costly, instead of a cheap instrument of commerce; and the expense of
purchasing this costly instrument might damp somewhat the vivacity and
ardour of their excessive enterprise in the improvement of land. It might
not, however, be necessary to remit any part of the American revenue in
gold and silver. It might be remitted in bills drawn upon, and accepted by,
particular merchants or companies in Great Britain, to whom a part of the
surplus produce of America had been consigned, who would pay into the
treasury the American revenue in money, after having themselves received
the value of it in goods; and the whole business might frequently be
transacted without exporting a single ounce of gold or silver from America.
It is not contrary to justice, that both Ireland and America should
contribute towards the discharge of the public debt of Great Britain. That
debt has been contracted in support of the government established by the
Revolution; a government to which the protestants of Ireland owe, not only
the whole authority which they at present enjoy in their own country, but
every security which they possess for their liberty, their property, and their
religion; a government to which several of the colonies of America owe
their present charters, and consequently their present constitution; and to
which all the colonies of America owe the liberty, security, and property,
which they have ever since enjoyed. That public debt has been contracted in
the defence, not of Great Britain alone, but of all the different provinces of
the empire. The immense debt contracted in the late war in particular, and a
great part of that contracted in the war before, were both properly
contracted in defence of America.
By a union with Great Britain, Ireland would gain, besides the freedom
of trade, other advantages much more important, and which would much
more than compensate any increase of taxes that might accompany that
union. By the union with England, the middling and inferior ranks of people
in Scotland gained a complete deliverance from the power of an aristocracy,
which had always before oppressed them. By a union with Great Britain,
the greater part of people of all ranks in Ireland would gain an equally
complete deliverance from a much more oppressive aristocracy; an
aristocracy not founded, like that of Scotland, in the natural and respectable
distinctions of birth and fortune, but in the most odious of all distinctions,
those of religious and political prejudices; distinctions which, more than
any other, animate both the insolence of the oppressors, and the hatred and
indignation of the oppressed, and which commonly render the inhabitants of
the same country more hostile to one another than those of different
countries ever are. Without a union with Great Britain, the inhabitants of
Ireland are not likely, for many ages, to consider themselves as one people.
No oppressive aristocracy has ever prevailed in the colonies. Even they,
however, would, in point of happiness and tranquillity, gain considerably by
a union with Great Britain. It would, at least, deliver them from those
rancourous and virulent factions which are inseparable from small
democracies, and which have so frequently divided the affections of their
people, and disturbed the tranquillity of their governments, in their form so
nearly democratical. In the case of a total separation from Great Britain,
which, unless prevented by a union of this kind, seems very likely to take
place, those factions would be ten times more virulent than ever. Before the
commencement of the present disturbances, the coercive power of the
mother-country had always been able to restrain those factions from
breaking out into any thing worse than gross brutality and insult. If that
coercive power were entirely taken away, they would probably soon break
out into open violence and bloodshed. In all great countries which are
united under one uniform government, the spirit of party commonly
prevails less in the remote provinces than in the centre of the empire. The
distance of those provinces from the capital, from the principal seat of the
great scramble of faction and ambition, makes them enter less into the
views of any of the contending parties, and renders them more indifferent
and impartial spectators of the conduct of all. The spirit of party prevails
less in Scotland than in England. In the case of a union, it would probably
prevail less in Ireland than in Scotland; and the colonies would probably
soon enjoy a degree of concord and unanimity, at present unknown in any
part of the British empire. Both Ireland and the colonies, indeed, would be
subjected to heavier taxes than any which they at present pay. In
consequence, however, of a diligent and faithful application of the public
revenue towards the discharge of the national debt, the greater part of those
taxes might not be of long continuance, and the public revenue of Great
Britain might soon be reduced to what was necessary for maintaining a
moderate peace-establishment.
The territorial acquisitions of the East India Company, the undoubted
right of the Crown, that is, of the state and people of Great Britain, might be
rendered another source of revenue, more abundant, perhaps, than all those
already mentioned. Those countries are represented as more fertile, more
extensive, and, in proportion to their extent, much richer and more populous
than Great Britain. In order to draw a great revenue from them, it would not
probably be necessary to introduce any new system of taxation into
countries which are already sufficiently, and more than sufficiently, taxed. It
might, perhaps, be more proper to lighten than to aggravate the burden of
those unfortunate countries, and to endeavour to draw a revenue from them,
not by imposing new taxes, but by preventing the embezzlement and
misapplication of the greater part of those which they already pay.
If it should be found impracticable for Great Britain to draw any
considerable augmentation of revenue from any of the resources above
mentioned, the only resource which can remain to her, is a diminution of
her expense. In the mode of collecting and in that of expending the public
revenue, though in both there may be still room for improvement, Great
Britain seems to be at least as economical as any of her neighbours. The
military establishment which she maintains for her own defence in time of
peace, is more moderate than that of any European state, which can pretend
to rival her either in wealth or in power. None of these articles, therefore,
seem to admit of any considerable reduction of expense. The expense of the
peace-establishment of the colonies was, before the commencement of the
present disturbances, very considerable, and is an expense which may, and,
if no revenue can be drawn from them, ought certainly to be saved
altogether. This constant expense in time of peace, though very great, is
insignificant in comparison with what the defence of the colonies has cost
us in time of war. The last war, which was undertaken altogether on account
of the colonies, cost Great Britain, it has already been observed, upwards of
ninety millions. The Spanish war of 1739 was principally undertaken on
their account; in which, and in the French war that was the consequence of
it, Great Britain, spent upwards of forty millions; a great part of which
ought justly to be charged to the colonies. In those two wars, the colonies
cost Great Britain much more than double the sum which the national debt
amounted to before the commencement of the first of them. Had it not been
for those wars, that debt might, and probably would by this time, have been
completely paid; and had it not been for the colonies, the former of those
wars might not, and the latter certainly would not, have been undertaken. It
was because the colonies were supposed to be provinces of the British
Empire, that this expense was laid out upon them. But countries which
contribute neither revenue nor military force towards the support of the
empire, cannot be considered as provinces. They may, perhaps, be
considered as appendages, as a sort of splendid and shewy equipage of the
empire. But if the empire can no longer support the expense of keeping up
this equipage, it ought certainly to lay it down; and if it cannot raise its
revenue in proportion to its expense, it ought at least to accommodate its
expense to its revenue. If the colonies, notwithstanding their refusal to
submit to British taxes, are still to be considered as provinces of the British
empire, their defence, in some future war, may cost Great Britain as great
an expense as it ever has done in any former war. The rulers of Great
Britain have, for more than a century past, amused the people with the
imagination that they possessed a great empire on the west side of the
Atlantic. This empire, however, has hitherto existed in imagination only. It
has hitherto been, not an empire, but the project of an empire; not a gold
mine, but the project of a gold mine; a project which has cost, which
continues to cost, and which, if pursued in the same way as it has been
hitherto, is likely to cost, immense expense, without being likely to bring
any profit; for the effects of the monopoly of the colony trade, it has been
shewn, are to the great body of the people, mere loss instead of profit. It is
surely now time that our rulers should either realize this golden dream, in
which they have been indulging themselves, perhaps, as well as the people;
or that they should awake from it themselves, and endeavour to awaken the
people. If the project cannot be completed, it ought to be given up. If any of
the provinces of the British empire cannot be made to contribute towards
the support of the whole empire, it is surely time that Great Britain should
free herself from the expense of defending those provinces in time of war,
and of supporting any part of their civil or military establishment in time of
peace; and endeavour to accommodate her future views and designs to the
real mediocrity of her circumstances.
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